Implementing the Central Asia regional risk assessment: A framework for action

7/28/2019 Implementing the Central Asia regional risk assessment: A framework for action

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Implementing the Central Asia

Regional Risk Assessment:

A Framework for Action


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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ADB Asian Development BankBCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)CACDRMI Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management InstituteCAREC Central Asia Regional Economic CooperationCARRA Central Asia Regional Risk AssessmentCIS Commonwealth of Independent StatesCoES Committee of Emergency Situations

CPD Country Programme DocumentDFID Department for International DevelopmentEC European CommissionEurAsEc European Economic CommunityGEF Global Environment FacilityFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationGRIP Global Risk Identification ProgrammeGTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentILO International Labour OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundIOM International Organization for MigrationISDR International Strategy for Disaster ManagementJCSS Joint Country Support StrategyKfW Kreditanstalt fr Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PEI Poverty and Environmental InitiativePRS Poverty Reduction StrategyRCWG Regional Coordination Working GroupREACT Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... 1I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5II. What Changed in 2009? What Have We Learned?.................................................................... 8III. Crisis Prevention: Early Warning and Risk Monitoring ........................................................... 10IV.

Early Recovery Programming ................................................................................................. 13

V. Identifying Remaining Gaps ................................................................................................... 16VI. Recommendations for Action .................................................................................................. 18Annex 1: Proposed Short- and Medium-term Early Recovery Interventions ................................... 23


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

This document is intended as a framework for implementing the January 2009 Central AsiaRegional Risk Assessment (CARRA), which focused on the humanitarian anddevelopment implications of the inter-linked threats to water, energy and food securityin the region, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It also reviews developments in CentralAsia over the past year in terms of these threats, and the response to the threats by the UN CountryTeams (UNCTs) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The report is not meant to provide a comprehensive update of all regional risks in CentralAsia, and the responses undertaken to address them. Nor is it meant to be a comprehensive actionplan to address all these risks. Rather, the objective is to provide a framework for future action toguide UNCTs support to these countries, and to facilitate cooperation among UN agencies andother development partners. The report is, therefore, intended to serve as a concept note for theAlmaty International Coordination Meeting scheduled for 20-21 July 2009, both in terms of

reporting back a year after the Almaty meeting of July 2008, and in guiding the design andimplementation of UNs programmes in Central Asia. Beyond that, the objective of the document isto serve as a platform for enhanced coordination among development partners. As the report notes,much is being done by IFIs and other international partners in the critical water-energy-food nexus,which is critical both for humanitarian and longer term sustainability of Central Asia. However,there are gaps in the international coordination which need to be filled for better support to thecountries of the region. In this sense, this reportand the forthcoming Almaty Meetingis aninvitation to development partners to aim for greater coordination in the delivery of our services to

the Central Asian countries.

The document provides some details on the work of UN agencies and other partners in thespecific area of early warning and risk management. This is meant to be an example of the type of


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These developments strongly suggest that the slow-onset water, energy, and foodinsecurities that emerged in Tajikistan in the winter of 2007-2008 have taken root, have spread toKyrgyzstan, and are now being exacerbated by the effects of the global economic crisis. While nosignificant increases in intra- and inter-state tensions are apparent, the possible socio-political

consequences of these developments should not be ignored. This underscores the importance ofeffective responses to these insecurities, by both governments and the international community.

Neither the government nor the international community in Tajikistan was fully prepared forthe compound crisis that took hold in the winter of 2007-2008. To some extent, this lack ofpreparation can be explained by the unusual, slow-onset nature of the crisis, reflecting theunexpected interactions of severe winter weather, drought, high global food and energy prices, andgovernance failures in the energy and water sectors. Moreover, the intervening 18 months have

witnessed better use by the government and the international community of the coordinationinstitutions and instruments at their disposal to respond to these challenges. Nonetheless, there islittle doubt that in many respects inadequate preparation reflected inadequate coordination: amonggovernment/national stakeholders; within the United Nations system; within broader internationalcommunity; and between the international community and the government. Details are provided inthe document.

Recommendations for Action

The forthcoming meeting in Almaty is a good opportunity to take stock of the lessonslearned and to agree on the framework for improved coordination.

In the area ofearly warning/risk monitori ng, it is recommended to:

review the unresolved challenges facing early warning/risk monitoring efforts inTajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;

designate regional experts/resource people (or working groups of such) to supportthematic areas (e.g., precipitation/water levels, food price trends, energy, health,


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that the UN agencies can design and implement, with support from the international partners. Someillustrative examples include:

better monitoring of food security trends, especially in vulnerable communities;strengthening well-targeted food subsidies, and supporting agricultural, horticultural andlivestock activities;

providing financing for maintaining and improving health care and education services andbuilding infrastructure in vulnerable communities;

increasing financial support for energy efficient projects, public awareness campaigns toreduce energy and water use; and designing pro-poor tariff policies; and

designing, implementing and supporting projects to improve irrigation, water harvesting,and more generally aiming for better and more integrated water resource management.

Once again, the Almaty Meeting will serve as a useful opportunity for international partnersto reach better understanding and agreement on these issues, and to join in supporting and/orexpanding these sectoral and cross-cutting activities.

In terms ofsupporti ng analytical work and researchfor improved, evidence-based policy-making:

funding should be provided for research that would more clearly illustrate linkages betweenincome poverty and water, energy, and food insecurities (e.g., by providing updated,accurate data on the numbers of households that do not have access to reliable year-roundwater and electricity supplies);

The governments of both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have promised significant increases inhousehold energy and water tariffs. Further analytical work needs to be undertaken to agreeon the magnitude of energy and water tariffs needed, and equally importantly how to protect


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Within the broader international community, while progress has been made, there is roomfor further improvement between the UN system and the rest of the international partners onthe basis of pre-agreed national divisions of labour to ensure better preparedness in the event

of a full-blown humanitarian emergency. Likewise, cooperation within the Joint CountrySupport Strategy (JCSS) needs to be made more uniformly effective across the region.Efforts should also be made to reach out to non-OECD/DAC donors, both by the UN systemand other leading development partners. The international community should also workjointly to (i) restore the ministerial status of the Committee of Emergency Situations(CoES)in Tajikistan; (ii) strengthen sub-national coordinating bodies such as the oblast-level RapidEmergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) groups in Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan to ensure that early warning and early recovery activities reflect local demands,

and that institutional capacity is developed at the local level. Finally, the internationalcommunity should support the Regional Centre for Disaster Response and Risk Reduction inAlmaty. Over time, this Centre could play a growing role in regional early warning/riskmonitoring activities.

To provide the institutional back-bone for better coordination, this document proposes theestablishment of a Regional Coordination Working Group (RCWG) to support the activitiesdescribed in the report. The RCWG could consist of focal points from the UN Regional Centre forPreventive Diplomacy (UNRCC) in Ashgabat, the Almaty regional offices of OCHA, World Bank,ADB, USAID, UNDP, ISDR and other relevant partners. The RCWG would serve as anetworked/virtual information-analytical centre for the Central Asian countries, collecting,analyzing and disseminating early warning and other important information to various stakeholdersin Central Asia and beyond.

As part of its own contribution to improve coordination and ensure greater complementarity

in the work of international agencies, the UNDP is launching its Almaty sub-regional office tosupport better coordination, being guided by the programmes of other development partners.UNDPs Almaty Office would also work closely with the CAREC Unit of ADB and otherinternational partners to provide administrative support services.


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I. IntroductionThe past 18 months have seen a variety of reports assessing various risks associated with

water, energy, food, macroeconomic, and socio-political insecurities in Central Asia. 1 The CentralAsia Regional Risk Assessment(CARRA), which was undertaken by UNDP at the behest and withthe support of international organisations working in Central Asia during the second half of 2008,was one of these. The CARRA, work on which was initiated following decisions taken at the July2008 meeting of the international community in Almaty and which was released in January 2009,

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sought to examine the:

nature of the slow-onset humanitarian crisis associated with the combination of severecold, drought, and antiquated water and energy infrastructures that deprived millions ofpeople in Tajikistan of access to reliable heat and electricity supplies during the past twowinters. These shortages particularly affected urban households, for whom energy securityhad not been an issue since the end of Tajikistans civil war 10 years ago, and who (unlikerural residents) had not developed coping mechanisms in response to these insecurities;

spread of these water/energy insecurities during the winter of 2008-2009 to Kyrgyzstan,where large-scale shortfalls of heat and electricity also took hold, and where an emergencyUN appeal was introduced to forestall a possible humanitarian crisis;

interactions of these water/energy tensions (which are themselves reflections of deeperdevelopment challenges in Central Asia) with the impact of the dramatic increases in globalfood prices during 2007-2008 (which heightened food security risks in Central Asia, andparticularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and which benefitted from stepped-up foodassistance activities delivered under the on-going humanitarian appeals), as well as with the

initial impact of the global economic crisis (particularly in terms of much slower economicgrowth and sharply lower remittance inflows); and

difficulties facing governments and the international community in fashioning an


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In terms of policy reform, the CARRA emphasised the:

rapid expansion of small-scale renewable energy projects (e.g., mini-hydro, biofuels), as animmediate response to growing household energy insecurity;

accelerated introduction of energy efficiency and water saving technologies3 and publicinformation campaigns designed to reduce unnecessary energy and water use; and

adoption of more robust water, agricultural, and energy sector reforms, in order to bettermeter and measure actual energy consumption, reduce grid losses, improve cash flow, attractmore investment into these sectors, increase food security, and strengthen social protectionschemes for low-income households vulnerable to water and energy tariff hikes.

The CARRA also sought to provide an initial framework of action, to help governments andthe international community to better respond to these risks in Central Asia. Particular emphasiswas placed on:

improving coordination within the UN system and the international community, tostrengthen government capacity to better respond to water, energy, and food insecurities;

strengthening institutional and programmatic linkages between disaster prevention(including via more effective early warning/risk monitoring systems), humanitarianresponse, early recovery, and longer term development activities, within and betweengovernments and the international community;

improving the quality and quantity of official socio-economic (and hydrological) data, sothat key development trends may be appropriately monitored and assessed, and the

appropriate risk mitigation and early recovery responses designed and implemented;

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further strengthening the UNs emergency response mechanisms in Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan, particularly in terms of: (i) increasing the UN country teams staffing and


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promoting the more rapid expansion ofearly recovery programming (by governments andthe international community), to bridge gaps between emergency-humanitarian response anddevelopment programming and to strengthen vulnerable households resilience towater/energy/food insecurities; and

strengthening national early warning/risk monitoring activities (by governments and theinternational community), and developing appropriate regional linkages between theseactivities.

The CARRA emphasised the breadth and supra-national dimensions of Central Asiaswater/energy/food insecurities, and called for regional solutions to these problems, where these areappropriate.

However, the CARRA did not attempt to assess all the short- and longer-term risks tosustainable development prospects facing the entirety of Central Asia; the focus was on water,energy, and food insecurities in the Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This focus precluded thoroughlyaddressing such issues as national disaster risk management strategies, cross-border water resourcemanagement, mitigating and adapting to climate change, management of hazardous wastes/hot spots(e.g., uranium tailings), or the desirability of constructing large dams in the upper reaches of theAral Sea Basin. Nor did the CARRA seek to provide a comprehensive inventory of all the responsesundertaken by government agencies and the international community to address Central Asiaswater/energy/food insecurities.

This document is intended as a framework for implementing the CARRA, which focused onthe humanitarian and development implications of the inter-linked threats to water, energy and foodsecurity in the region, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It also reviews developments inCentral Asia over the past year in terms of these threats, and the response to the threats by the UN

Country Teams (UNCTs) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The report is not meant to provide a comprehensive update of all regional risks in CentralAsia, and the responses undertaken to address them. Nor is it meant to be a comprehensive action


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II. What Changed in 2009? What Have We Learned?Since the CARRAs publication in January 2009, the following developmentsin the

context of Central Asias water, energy, and food insecuritiesseem particularly important.

A relatively warm, wet winter, decli ni ng global food prices, and stepped up responses from

the in ternational communi ty and governments did not bring about fundamental change for the

better in Taj ik istan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite some favourable developments, serious electricityshortages continued in Tajikistan, and spread to Kyrgyzstan during the winter of 2008-2009.Continuing high grid losses, an episode of acute regional non-cooperation between Uzbekistan andTajikistan in February 2009 (which stopped the cross-transmission of Turkmenistan electricity toTajikistan), and rising prices for natural gas imports from Uzbekistan overwhelmed the impact ofrelatively favourable meteorological and hydrological trends. Hundreds of schools in Kyrgyzstanthat heat with electricity closed during the winter of 2008-2009, transmitting energy insecurity intoreductions in access to education for hundreds of thousands of children.

Fortunately, some of the conditions that led to the compound crisis in Tajikistan in thewinter of 2007-2008 dissipated during the first half of 2009. This past winter in much of Central

Asia was warmer and wetter than the previous years, and the collapse in global food and energyprices in the second half of 2008 removed significant potential inflationary pressures from theseeconomies. According to national data provided by the Interstate Committee for WaterCoordinations Scientific Information Centre, above-average spring precipitation in much of CentralAsia has significantly improved water balances in the region. In May, water volumes in TajikistansNurek reservoir and hydropower station were some 2% above their historical averages for thatmonth.5 An even more pronounced improvement was apparent in Northern Tajikistans Kayrakkumreservoir: May water volumes there were some 8% above historical averages.

6Similar

improvements were noted at a number of other reservoirs, including Chardara (in Kazakhstan) andCharvak (in Uzbekistan). These developments suggest that the intensity of the water shortagesplaguing much of the region for the past 12-18 months has abated.


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role in providing summer water for irrigated agriculture in downstream countries, as well as forwinter electricity and thermal energy production in Kyrgyzstan. Water volumes in May atToktogul were some 42% below historical averages for that month, as well as 5% below May2008s depressed levels. Shortfalls continued to be reported in May at reservoirs in Andijan,

Kyrgyzstan (where volumes were 27% below historical averages), and in Tuyamuyun, Uzbekistan(where volumes were 11% below historical averages). Moreover, the rains that apparently removedthe spectre of drought in Tajikistan brought with them heightened vulnerability to other naturaldisasters. In Tajikistan, some 50 natural disastersflooding, avalanches, mudflowshad by beenreported by early May 2009, causing 26 fatalities, damaging or destroying 2000 houses, andproducing economic losses on the order of 1% of GDP. The suddenness and intensity of the shiftfrom drought to deluge are suggestive of an increasing variability in weather patterns in CentralAsia, which many observers regard as a manifestation of climate change. These developments have

added to previous climate change concerns associated with the melting of Central Asias glaciersconcerns that have continued (if not been intensified) by recent press reports and governmentstatements.

If concerns about water balances in Central Asia have lessened but not abated, similarconclusions can be drawn regarding food and energy security in the region. Official statistics showboth food and energy prices in the region continuing to rise in 2009, even as world market prices forthese products collapsed. Whereas global food prices in April 2009 were some 24% below theirApril 2008 levels (according to IMF data), in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan national data show thatfood prices were 9% and 8% higher, respectively, in these two countries. And whereas IMF datashow that global energy prices in April 2009 had dropped 52% from their April 2008 levels, inKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan national data show that prices for electricity, gas and heat grew 33% and78%, respectively, during this time. These trends strongly suggest that vulnerable households inCentral Asia have yet to benefit from declining world prices for food and energy. They also raisedifficult questions about the causes and longevity of these diverging price trends.8

Meanwhile, the impact of the global economic crisis has begun to make itself felt, primarilyin the form of reduced remittances (preliminary data from the National Bank of Tajikistan show a29% decline in the dollar value of remittances in the first quarter of 2009, relative to first quarter of


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These developments strongly suggest thatnot withstanding the hope presented inimproving water balancesthe water, energy, and food insecurities that took hold in Tajikistan inthe winter of 2007-2008 have taken root, have spread to Kyrgyzstan, and are now being exacerbatedby the effects of the global economic crisis. While no significant increases in intra- and inter-state

tensions are apparent, the possible socio-political consequences of these developments should notbe ignored. Such an assessment underscores the importance of the continued design andimplementation of measures to respond to these insecurities, by both governments and theinternational community, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

As mentioned above, this document does not seek to provide a comprehensive inventory ofresponses to these difficulties that have been, or are now being, undertaken. It focuses instead on thechanges that have been introduced by UNDP and the UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and, to a lesser

extent, the international community more broadly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Still, it seems clearthat signif icant increases in UN engagement in /support for disaster preventi on and earl y recoveryactivi tiesmade possibl e by investments in UNCT capaciti es for programming in these areas

(thanks in part to support provided by UNDP s Bureau for Cr isis Preventi on and Recovery)

have been an important r esul t of the in ternational community s response to Central Asia s

growing water/energy/food insecurit ies. As these investments are on-going, and since their impactdepends in part on the support and cooperation they elicit from governments and other developmentpartners, most of the rest of this paper is devoted to the issues they raise.

III. Crisis Prevention: Early Warning and Risk MonitoringThe CARRA places particular emphasis on improving the quality of early warning systems,

as a lesson emerging from the international communitys slow response to the unfolding ofTajikistans compound crisis in the winter of 2007-2008.9 A number of early warning systems are in

use in Central Asia, by the international community and government agencies.10

However, thesesystems were unable to correctly anticipate the compound crisis facing Tajikistan during the winterof 2008; nor could they effectively link the spectre of these water, energy, and food insecurities toappropriate preventive or early recovery responses. These gaps reflect inter alia differences


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Attempts to move in this direction must answer a series of questions. These were taken up inDushanbe in mid-April,

12at a workshop attended by representatives of most of the UN agencies

working in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The participants concentrated on providing concrete answersto eight questions that seem particularly relevant in improving the quality and use of early warning

systems in Central Asia. With some simplification, these can be summarised as follows:

Earl y warn ing, or ri sk monitoring?With the exception of some specialised early warningsystems that are tailored to the needs of specific government partners (e.g., Ministry of Health) andare already ongoing, the emphasis should not be on early warning per se, but rather on themonitoring of risks to those development processes and beneficiaries that are of greatest immediateconcern. This conclusion is based on a number of arguments:

Government partners often have higher comfort levels with risk monitoring than they dowith early warninginter aliabecause of self-fulfilling prophecy issues.

To be effective, early warning reports must be produced on a rapid basis. The 2003 reviewof the UNDP early warning systems in Southeast Europe13 showed that ensuring timelinesscan be difficult. By contrast, risk monitoring reports can be issued according to a regularproduction schedule, which is easier to reconcile with the sometimes deliberative nature ofdevelopment programming.

The UNCTs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are already engaged in risk monitoring, linked tothe humanitarian appeals and the situation reports regularly generated by these offices.Rather than seeking to create something new and different, representatives from Kyrgyzstanseemed to prefer expanding/building upon the risk management elements contained in thesituation reports. In the case of Tajikistan, the argument that the existing early warningreports do not differ fundamentally from the situation reports seems broadly acceptable.

The choice of the risk management (rather than early warning) reporting paradigm neednot preclude the periodic issuance of early warning reports, when such would be trulyjustified by the national development context. In this sense, the issue is not really early


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What r isks? To whom?The risks to be monitored, and the objects of this monitoring, shouldbe those associated with vulnerable groups, communities, regions, and sectorsas defined byrelevant policy and programming documents (e.g., national development or poverty reduction

strategies, UNDAFs, appeals). Such an approach seems most likely to ensure that UN riskmonitoring is aligned with on-going initiatives, while helping to raise comfort levels amonggovernment partners concerning risk monitoring /early warning activities. Focusing on risks to basicrights/access to education, water, health, energythe denial of which could lead to humanitarianemergencies, crises, and conflictis also important.

Should the indi cators to be moni tored be selected on the basis of f easibi li ty or desirabil i ty?

This choice is to some extent misleadingrisk monitoring/early warning indicators should be both

feasible (i.e., easily tracked and monitored) and desirable (i.e., robustly connected to the underlyingrisk variablesinter alia by reflecting their inter-sectoral nature). In reality, however, use of themost desirable indicators in Central Asia is often precluded by the fact that the data on which theyare based are not made available, either to the international community or to the general public, bythe state or commercial structures (e.g., public utilities) that gather and maintain them. Negotiationsto obtain these data can both reduce potential interest in the early warning/risk monitoring systemamong these structures (who could otherwise be important clients) and distract attention from orslow the analysis of those data and indicators that are publicly available. In the short run, then,emphasis should be on working with those data that are available. In the longer term, work withgovernment partners should ideally focus on improving the quality and quantity of risk-related data,in order to expand the set of indicators that are feasible as well as desirable.

National or (sub-) regional r isk monitor ing/early warn ing reports?UN-associated riskmonitoring/early warning activities in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan should retain a predominantlybut not exclusivelynational character, for two key reasons. First, differences in the national

development contexts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the difficulties in coordinating across twoUNCTs, require at least some degree of product differentiation across risk monitoring activities inthe two countries. Second, an emphasis on UNCT national risk monitoring could facilitate deepercooperation and integration among the various UN agencies engaged in the production of these


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have their roots in the emergency situations that led to the humanitarian appeals launched in 2008.Over time, however, socioeconomic indicators (e.g., food prices, energy tariffs, remittances,exchange rates)many of which show the impact of the global economic crisis upon vulnerablehouseholdshave acquired a larger role in the Tajikistan REACT early warning system. Risk

monitoring efforts should therefore track both humanitarian and development indicators, whilemaintaining the flexibility to focus on either or both, as circumstances might suggest.

Frequency of publication. Risk monitoring reports should be published as often as ispossible and feasible, in light of such factors as report length, human and financial resourceconstraints, and the like. Different frequencies discussed included quarterly (which to someparticipants seemed too infrequent) and monthly (which to others seemed too ambitious). Onbalance, a publication regime emphasising: (i) the management of data bases to track relatively

large numbers of indicators; that would (ii) make possible longer, more in-depth (but perhaps lessfrequent, i.e., quarterly) analyses of the trends being monitored;14 and (iii) the ability to quicklyissue early warning reports when justified by the prevailing circumstances, may be the way to go.

Distr ibution mechanism. If technically possible, the two countries risk monitoring reportsshould be delivered via a common, user-friendly electronic subscription mechanism (e.g., from acommon list-serve). Such an approach could maximise circulation/readership, strengthen thecommon brand (providing external network benefits for both publications), while minimising theadministrative costs of distributing the reports to subscribers. On the other hand, the fact that someimportant (government) partners may not enjoy appropriately robust internet access underscores theneed for delivery of hard copies. Likewise, the greater the significance assigned to government (andother national) partners as clients, the more important is the publication and distribution of thereports in Russian and/or other national/state languages.

IV. Early Recovery ProgrammingThe UN response at the national level to the water, energy, and food insecurities that have

taken hold in Central Asia since 2007 has reflected the importance of the early recovery paradigm15


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As a result, both bilateral donors and UNDP are now moving to more robustly support earlywarning programming, often in a coordinated manner.

17In Tajikistan, for example:

In early 2009, UNDPs Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) approved a $3.1million project on Strengthening Early Recovery Capacities in Tajikistan, to mainstreamcompound crisis resilience into UNDP-Tajikistans existing development programmingportfolio. The BCPR initiative will build on the project implementation infrastructuredeveloped in the Country Offices Disaster Risk Management, Mine Action, andCommunities Programmes, which has developed an extensive portfolio in energy andenvironment and local economic development. In 2008, for example, some 500 smallinfrastructure projects were completed under the Communities Programme alone; many ofthese focused on finding local solutions to growing threats to water, energy, and food

security. Six regional micro loan foundations extended some $2 million in credits to some106,000 beneficiaries (30% of whom were women) last year; recycled remittance incomesconstituted nearly a third of these funds. As a result of these activities, some 500,000 ruralresidents had better access to safe drinking water, irrigation systems, electricity, medical andeducational services. These programmes have also played important roles in mainstreamingdisaster risk reduction and early recovery principles into local planning.

Some $1.2 million has been committed by UNDP-Tajikistan for work on renewable energy,especially small hydro and biogas. Emphasis will be on creating the policy and legalenvironment needed to attract private funds into alternative energy investments. Possibleadditional funding is expected via the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and theEuropean Commission. On the demand side, small energy efficiency investments, especiallyin public buildings (with GEF funding), are expected to play an important role.

In March 2009, DFID and UNDP-Tajikistan developed a $470,000 early recoveryprogramme, under which additional staff are being recruited to work on humanitarian andearly recovery programming in the UN Resident Coordinators office and UNDPs DisasterRisk Management Programme, in co-ordination with the Rapid Emergency Assessment andCoordination Team (REACTTajikistans joint government-humanitarian community


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watching TV. As of early 2008 some 13 small hydro plants had been installed in ninevillages of the Issyk-Kul region and local communities trained in their proper use.

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The UNCT in 2009 created an Early Recovery Unit (located in the Resident Coordinatorsoffice), consisting of an early recovery advisor (funded by BCPR) and two early recoveryspecialists (funded by DFID). An early recovery document has been developed, and a needsassessment initiated, focusing on renewable energy, land and water management, agricultureand food security, small infrastructure development, social service provision (especially inrural areas), and risk reduction and mitigation.

UNDP-Kyrgyzstans peace and development initiative for conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstanhas been in operation since April 2007 (with support from BCPR). Current activities include

collection of national survey data on links between conflict potential and governance,natural resource management, food security, and gender.

In Uzbekistan:

As in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, UNDP has a portfolio of area-based development andenvironment projects to increase the resilience of vulnerable households and communities towater, food, and energy insecurities. EC-funded area-based development programming inthe Karakalpakstan, Kashkadarya, and Ferghana regions is providing small farmers and poorhouseholds with access to improved water sources for drinking and irrigation, helping toincrease incomes and improve food security. Cooperation with the World Banks Health IIproject, to improve energy efficiency and security for remote rural health clinics, is ongoing.

In the Kyzyl-Kum biodiversity preserve, UNDP is piloting the liberalisation of Uzbekistansland leasing regime, to encourage local households to invest in the cultivation of fruit and

nut trees. In addition to increasing household incomes and modernising Uzbekistans legalframework, this project offers a blueprint for reducing short-term food insecurity byreversing deforestation, desertification, and unsustainable land management practices.20


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Promoting Integrated Water Resource Management and Transboundary Dialogue inCentral Asia:This multi-donor project (led by UNDP and the European Commission) seeksto build national capacity for integrated water resource management, with a specialemphasis on small/micro/mini hydro, irrigated agriculture, rural water supply and sanitation

services, and bi- and multilateral river basin management. Preliminary pilot regions includethe Zarafshan (in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and Isfara (in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) riverbasins.

Cross-border activities are focusing primarily on communities straddling the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border. In addition to the possible extension of peace and developmentprogramming from Kyrgyzstan, these cross-border activities include a $120,000 cross-border environmental risk management project (financed by Germany and BCPR), under the

Environment and Security Initiative (http://www.envsec.org/).

This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of early recovery activities now beingundertaken. The emphasis here is instead on the expansion of programming that links employment-and income-generating activities for vulnerable communities and households to activities that helpreduce environmental, conflict and disaster risks.

V. Identifying Remaining GapsNeither the government nor international agencies in Tajikistan were fully prepared for the

compound crisis that took hold in the winter of 2007-2008. To some extent, this lack ofpreparation can be explained by the unusual, slow-onset nature of the crisis, reflecting theunexpected interactions of severe winter weather, drought, high global food and energy prices, andgovernance failures in the energy and water sectors. In other respects, however, inadequate

preparation reflected inadequate coordination: among government/national stakeholders (betweensuch bodies as the Ministry of Economy and Trade, Committee of Emergency Situations, REACT);within the United Nations systems (the UNCT was not fully prepared for coordination internally,and with the government and NGOs, according to the logic of the global humanitarian reform;


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Matrix of coordination institutions, instruments (Central Asia)Organisational scope:

Geographic

scope:

International

community

Governments, other impor tant

national actors

Uni ted Nations

- Regional(Central Asia)

CAREC CAREC, EurAsEC, CIS, others RegionalDirectors Team

- National JCSS, DCC NDS, CDS, PRS, REACT, CoES,

MES, others

UNDAF, CPD

Improvements in coordination in several dimensions during the past 18 monthsnotwithstanding, there are several important gaps that remain:

Within governments and between governments and the international community, regardingboth emergency/disaster response and development strategies more generally. In bothTajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, concerns remain regarding the PRS/CDS/NDS in terms of theirlinkages to the budgetary frameworks, integration with sectoral development strategies, orbeing subjected to rigorous monitoring and evaluation. In Tajikistan, stronger links betweenthe State Commission on Emergency Situations and REACT, to ensure closer cooperation atall times (and especially during emergencies) is quite important;

Within the international community, although progress has been achieved, there is room forincreased coordination between the World Bank and UN system, on the basis of pre-agreeddivisions of labour.22 Likewise, cooperation within the JCSS framework does not seems tobe of uniform effectiveness across the region; there may be lessons to be learned in thisrespect. Perhaps most importantly, key non-OECD/DAC donors (e.g., the RussianFederation, China, Saudi Arabia) remain outside the JCSS and related coordination

frameworks.

So far, UNs efforts to address Central Asias inter-woven water, energy, and foodinsecurities have focused primarily on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and have emphasized the


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VI. Recommendations for ActionIn terms ofearly warni ng/risk monitori ng, it is recommended to:

review the current status of, and unresolved challenges facing, early warning/riskmonitoring efforts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;

designate regional experts/resource people (or working groups of such) to supportthematic areas (e.g., precipitation/water levels, food price trends, energy, health,remittances, etc.), with representation from such institutions as OCHA, UNICEF,WFP, WHO, UNDP, UNECE the World Bank, IMF, and Asian DevelopmentBank;

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propose concrete steps to develop the regional component(s) of early warning/riskmonitoring reports, taking appropriate advantage of the Global Risk IdentificationProgramme (GRIP),25 OCHAs and ISDRs expertise and programming, and theresources at the disposal of other relevant institutions;

promote closer cooperation between GRIP, the World Meteorological Organisation(WMO), and the World Bank in support of capacity development for national hydro-met services.

make effort to deliver as one in this area at the UN level; and move from monitoring risk data to creating a broader programmatic framework for

assessing risk impact and mitigation, as circumstances permit.

These topics can be discussed in a dedicated session at the July 2009 Almaty Meeting.

In terms ofearly recovery and longer- term development issues, there is clearly a need toh h li k b l d i i i h ld i bili i


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designing, implementing and supporting projects to improve irrigation, water harvesting,and more generally aiming for better and more integrated water resource management.

Once again, the Almaty Meeting will serve as a useful opportunity for international partners

to reach better understanding and agreement on these issues, and to join in supporting and/orexpanding these sectoral and cross-cutting activities.

In terms of supporti ng analytical wor k, research and advocacyfor improved, evidence-based policy-making:

Programming under the Poverty and Environment Initiative could address the weak linksbetween development and poverty reduction strategies on the one hand and concrete

measures to address short- and medium-term water, energy, and food insecurities on theother. Funding for research that would more clearly illustrate linkages between incomepoverty and water, energy, and food insecurities (e.g., by providing updated, accurate dataon the numbers of households that do not have access to reliable year-round water andelectricity supplies), is very much needed for evidence-based policy development.

The governments of both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have promised significant increases inhousehold energy and water tariffs.26 Opinions in both countries are sharply divided betweenthose who believe that higher nominal tariffs either will not be paid (either because ofinadequate metering and billing practices and the culture of non-payment), will be paidand reduce the welfare of vulnerable households for whom these services will becomeunaffordable, or will be paid and improve these households welfare, who will (re)gainaccess to these services at affordable prices (perhaps after the payment of compensatingsubsidies). Which argument is correct? How this question is answered can have a powerfulimpact on the pace and extent of tariff increases in these countries, on their implications for

socio-economic vulnerability, and on prospects for early recovery programming (e.g., smallhydro, or energy efficiency projects) to reduce water and energy insecurities in thesecountries. These issues can only be resolved by further discussion and research.


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Central Asias high rates of water and energy consumption28 can be explained in part byvery low (effective) tariff rates, and by the absence of effective metering and billingpractices. But they also reflect wasteful water and energy usage practices, many of whichremain from the Soviet period. While much of this waste is in the industrial and (especially)

agricultural sectors, part of it also lies in such household habits as leaving taps open duringperiods of no water due to low water pressure (so as to be sure to actually get some waterwhen the pressure is restored), lowering indoor temperatures during the fall and winter byopening windows, and the like. This suggests a need for broad public informationcampaigns, to underscore the importance of simple energy- and water-saving practices.Public information campaigns can also help households to minimise their utility bills bytransferring consumption from peak to off-peak hours, and the like.

In terms ofcoordination:

Efforts to reach out to non-OECD/DAC donors should be redoubled, both by the UN systemand by the leading OECD/DAC donors active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. By the sametoken, non-OECD/DAC donors should be willing to more robustly explore traditionaldonor coordination instruments.

Within the international community, while progress has been made, there is room for furtherimprovement between the World Bank and UN system on the basis of pre-agreed nationaldivisions of labour to ensure better preparedness in the event of a full-blown humanitarianemergency. Likewise, cooperation within the JCSS framework does not seem to be ofuniform effectiveness across the region; there may be lessons to be learned in this respect.

At the UN level, UNDAFs are widely seen by participants as indispensible in principle, theprocesses associated with them are often seen as onerous excessively bureaucratic, and in

need of simplification. In countries facing slow-onset water/energy/food security crises,these should be simplified.

In Tajikistan, the international community should make an effort to improve linkages


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early warning, and joint planning. The international community should support this Centre,and foster close ties with the offices in Almaty of UNDP, OCHA, the World Bank, USAIDand the European Commission. Over time, the Centre could play a growing role in regionalearly warning/risk monitoring activities.

Wherever possible, networks of national officials from Central Asian (and neighbouring)countries working in the relevant thematic areas should be supported, to ensure that CentralAsian programming benefits from the exchange of lessons learned and best practices in earlywarning, early recovery and medium-term development measures. Secondments of nationalstaff, and the creation of data bases of national experts and programmes, could beparticularly important. Regional cooperation arrangements such as CAREC can play animportant role in this respect.

Given the well-known difficulties of regional initiatives in Central Asia and the need formore effective capacity at that level, it is not surprising that there has been lukewarmsupport among official partners in other Central Asia countries to extend this exercisebeyond Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This strongly suggests the need for systematicallybuilding capacity and helping enhance ownership. Moreover, the experience from thePoverty and Environment and the Integrated Water Resource Management initiativesdemonstrates that regional initiatives can serve as chapeaux for more effective coordinationof national activities, via reduced transaction costs and more effective codification anddissemination of project results. The adoption of regional approaches can help extend thelogic of CARRA follow up to new substantive areas (e.g., the regional components ofUNCT early warning/risk monitoring systems) or possibly other Central Asian countries.

To provide the institutional back-bone for better coordination, this document proposes theestablishment of a Regional Coordination Working Group (RCWG) to support the activities

described in the report. The RCWG could consist of focal points from the UN Regional Centre forPreventive Diplomacy (UNRCC) in Ashgabat, the Almaty regional offices of OCHA, World Bank,ADB, USAID, UNDP, ISDR and other relevant partners. The RCWG would serve as anetworked/virtual information-analytical centre for the Central Asian countries, collecting,


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When requested, providing substantive, programmatic, and monitoring andevaluation support to UNCTs in Central Asia;

Designing and conducting regional training programmes on such topics as earlywarning systems and humanitarian coordination for the benefit of Central Asiangovernment officials and NGOs; and

Identifying and when possible pre-selecting companies for the procurement ofsupplies that are most likely to be needed during emergencies in Central Asia.

As part of this effort to improve coordination and ensure greater complementarity in thework of international agencies, the UNDP is launching its Almaty Sub-regional office to support

better coordination, being guided by the programmes of other development partners. UNDPsAlmaty Office would work closely with the CAREC Unit of ADB and other international partnersin providing administrative support services.

To conclude, more effective coordination among international development partners willfacilitate our joint efforts to develop national capacity and strengthen inter-governmentalcooperation. It will also ensure better support to specific activities of the international community inthese countries.


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Annex 1: Proposed Short- and Medium-term Early Recovery Interventions

Thematic area Proposed activities Possible partners

Food secur ity Supporting expanded food and nutrition surveys, to better monitor food security trends,particularly in vulnerable communities;

Strengthening targeted food safety nets in vulnerable areas (via topping off social benefits,school feeding programmes);

Supporting horticulture, family greenhouses, school gardens, livestock financing schemes; seeddistribution, seed vouchers, fertilizers, hand tools; micro-credits for traders; crop

diversification;

Protecting and rehabilitating farm assets (fodder production, animal health); and Providing targeted agricultural input subsidies (e.g., high yield seeds, fertilizers).

FAO, World Bank,ADB, UNDP,

USAID

Basic social services,

infrastructure Increasing financial support for maintaining health care and education services and

infrastructure in vulnerable communities; and

Supporting public works projects for community infrastructure (e.g., bridges) to facilitate themovement of goods and people to markets, and to improve access to social services.

FAO, UNICEF,

UNFPA

I ncome- ,

employment-

generation

opportunities

Increasing financial support for private sector development and access to credit for SMEs,vulnerable households (including microfinance, via non-collateralised, group-liabilityschemes); and

Increasing financial support for labour-intensive public works/community projects forvulnerable communities and households (e.g., returning migrants, unemployed) in such areas asreforestation, introduction and maintenance of flood control infrastructure, small hydro stations,

and disaster preparedness activities.

World Bank, ADB,UNDP, DFID,

GTZ, KfW, ILO,IOM

Energy eff iciency,

energy sector reform

Conducting a study in the commercial and hydrological feasibility of significantly, rapidlyexpanding the role of small/micro/mini hydro power (and other renewable energy technologies,including solar and bio fuels) in Central Asia;

Increasing financial support for energy efficiency projects, including for the introduction andmaintenance of energy efficient equipment;

Designing, implementing, and supporting public awareness campaigns to reduce energy andwater use in households, schools, and public agencies, including via training of trainers

programmes for NGOs; and

Design, implement, and support projects to strengthen the evidentiary basis for pro-poor energytariff policies and improved metering and bill collection.

World Bank, ADB,

UNDP, KfW,DFID, UNEP, SDC


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Water Design, implement, and support projects to improve irrigation, water harvesting schemes forvulnerable communities, including via the introduction of innovative water management

technologies (particularly in drought-affected areas);

Support the restoration of greenbelt areas through the introduction of appropriate seedlings(e.g., community-based nursery programmes); and

Design, implement, and support projects to strengthen the evidentiary basis for pro-poor watertariff policies and improved metering and bill collection.

Swiss Agency forDevelopment and

Cooperation (SDC)

DFID, UNDP,

UNEP, ILO

Documents

Implementing the Central Asia regional risk assessment: A framework for action