IMPLEMENTATION OF MASS TRANSIT PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA: … · Lagos, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Kwara, Rivers, Oyo and Edo States in the early 1980s after the collapse of others equally

IMPLEMENTATION OF MASS TRANSIT PROGRAMME IN

NIGERIA: A STUDY OF ANAMBRA STATE TRANSPORT COMPANY

(TRACAS)

BY

PROF. J.C. OKOYE

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION NNAMDI AZIKIWE

UNIVERSITY, AWKA

AND

ANSELEM C. NWEKE

DEPARME NT OF PUBLIC ADMINIMISTRATION ANAMBRA

STATE UNIVERSITY, IGBARIAM CAMPUS

1

ABSTRACT

This paper examined the impact of government’s programme on mass transit asone of the ways of alleviating the hash economic conditions of the sufferingmasses of Nigeria following the adoption of the Structural AdjustmentProgramme in 1988. Survey research method was adopted in the study. Thepaper adopted customer satisfaction theory as its framework of analysis. Theobjective of the paper was to ascertain if there was any planning for theachievement of mass transit policy objective and also assessed commuterssatisfaction with the operatives of Anambra State Mass Transit Programmes.The problem is that masses suffer disappointment in hands of the publictransport operators. Two hypotheses guided the study. Statistical tool (s),tables and percentages were used in data analysis. The results show thatTRACAS lacked effective systematic planning in their operations and as suchcould not generate substantial customer satisfaction. It is therefore,recommended that the operational plans of TRACAS be totally restructured toaccommodate strategic choice elements that would make them more result –oriented.

Key words: Mass Transit, Planning, Customer Satisfaction

2

INTRODUCTION

Transportation is an inevitable service in human activities and development. It

began as personal or private activity and developed to embrace public

concerns. In Nigeria, the first generation of public sector transport operators

came into existence shortly after Nigeria’s political independence and they

included, the Ibadan City Bus Service, which collapsed in 1976 (Adeniji,

1983), the Kano State Transport Corporation (operating then as Kano Line),

Kwara Line and Plateau State Transport Corporations among others. Most of

these public transport lines collapsed in the second half of 1970s and early

1980s (Adeniji, 1983; Barret, 1993).

Even other government owned public transport companies established in

Lagos, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Kwara, Rivers, Oyo and Edo States in the early

1980s after the collapse of others equally failed to operate in the urban centres

and later closed down completely (Barret, 1993). The few municipal bus

transport system that survived until 1988, when the mass transit programme

was introduced, included Water Line, Bendel Line, Borno Express, Kaduna

State Transport Authority and the Lagos State Transport Corporation (LSTC),

although many of them were actually running skeletal service at that time

(Adesanya, 2002).

Scholars like Adesanya (1996, 2002), Adeniji (1983) and Barret (1986)

identified financial impropriety, inadequate government financial support, lack

of qualified staff, political interference, and uncontrolled competition from

private transport operators as the reasons for their collapse. The collapse of

these transport lines/schemes left the Nigerian transport system at the mercy of

private transporters who lack organised administrative structure and rules, and

depend more on fare revenues and financial supports from informal sources

such as friends, relatives, and money lenders in order to manage their

companies (Adesanya, 2002).

3

The inadequate vehicles to meet commuters demand, sub-standard and

unorganized operational system subjected the condition of transportation in

Nigeria to the following :

1. Steady decline in the level of motorization for over a decade as motor

vehicle fleet decreased by 50percent between 1990 and 1998, leading to

acute shortage of transport services (Adeyemi 2001).

2. Overcrowded public transport system and use of second hand vehicles

[‘tokumbo’] imported from different parts of the world particularly from

Europe and America. The public owned transport operations in the few

states where they exist are inefficient and the private sector operators of

transport system are substandard and disorganized (Adesanya, 1996).

3. Incessant traffic congestion, awkward parking system and environmental

pollution.

4. Haphazard and uncoordinated ownership and organization of the road

public transport system.

5. Increasing scourge of road traffic accident that continues unabated in

spite of appreciable role of government established road safety

commission (Barret, 1993).

To address these problems, the federal government introduced the policy of

Mass Transit Programme in 1988 with the following objectives:

(i) To moderate the national urban transit system;

(ii) To alleviate the problems of urban commuters and the general

masses; and

(iii) To lay the foundation for organized mass transit in Nigeria.

Since the introduction of the policy in 1988, virtually every state government

in Nigeria has established its own transport company (Umar 2005). According

to Umar (2005), many of these government owned mass transit companies in

Nigeria have better trained staff, workshops and maintenance facilities than

most of private sector operators. Their services are often provided on fixed

routes, and are usually cheaper than those provided by private sector operators.4

Their bus services are scheduled for definite routes although they are seldom

followed because of the inadequacy of vehicles, growing competition with

private transport operators, poor traffic management, congestion problems

especially during peak travel periods and other problems associated with the

operating environment.

The old Anambra state was among the states that introduced the Mass Transit

Programme in 1989 with the establishment of Transport Company of Anambra

State (TRACAS). This transport company was functional when the new

Anambra state was created and exists till date. Anambra state is central to the

economic development of Nigeria and West Africa in general because of

Onitsha main market. Consequently, the state has attracted thousands of people

in and out of its cities for commercial and economic activities. Therefore inter-

city and inter-state transportations are high in the state.

Against this background it becomes pertinent to question the extent that

TRACAS has planned or is planning for the achievement of Mass Transit

Policy objective in the state.

The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the implementation of public

Mass Transit policy in Anambra State by understanding the activities of

TRACAS. However, the specific objectives include:

1. To ascertain the extent of planning for the achievement of mass transit

policy objectives in the state.

2. To identify the challenges facing the implementation of the policy

objective.

3. To asses commuters’ satisfaction with the operations of Anambra State

Mass Transit programmes.

4. To make recommendations for improvement.

HYPOTHESIS

The following hypothesis will guide the survey.

H1. there is no effective planning for the achievement of mass transit

policy objective in TRACAS5

H2. TRACAS has not substantially achieved the goals of mass transit policy

in the state

H3. Lack of adequate planning may be responsible for the policy

implementation failure in TRACAS

METHODOLOGY

The area of study is Anambra state and specifically, Awka, Onitsha, Nnewi,

Ekwulobia and its Headquarters. Our choice of four major cities/urban areas in

the state is informed by the fact that they are the economic, political,

administrative, and transportation centres of the state where the other 177

communities and the rest of Nigeria are networked or connected to. The

population of the study is 896. However, to determine the actual sample size

for the study, the researcher used Yaro Yemani (1962) formula for determining

sample size, which is 277. Simple percentage was used for the analyses.

This study is quantitative in nature i.e. it adopted survey method for the

collection of data/information needed for analysis and inferences.

Basically, the paper employed instruments of structured questionnaire,

interview and documentary research in the collection of information. The

booking method of buses and transport routes in various depots studied, yearly

fiscal allocation to the company, purchase of new vehicles, and registration of

loaned/hired vehicles were consulted. Issues not covered by the questionnaire

and these records and that bother on daily administration and management of

these company, and their relationship with the Executive organ of government

in the state were investigated through interview.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper adopts customer satisfaction theory as its framework of analysis.

This theory, which is also known as theory of “common good”, views public

transport as a common good and studies transportation effectiveness from the

transport user’s satisfaction with the service product. The major proponents of

6

this theory include Oliver (1996), Edvardsson (1996), Haglund and

Stålhammar (2001).

The service product, public travel, is composed of a series of qualities the

customer wants to have fulfilled on the part of the transport company. The

travel service here refers to the sum of qualities expected from the company’s

system or workers and buses by the customer for travelling from location ‘A’ to

location ‘B’ (Edvardson, 1996; Haglund & Stålhammar, 2001).

The properties in measuring customer’s satisfaction includes; favourable

timetable i.e. of departure and arrival, operating bus stop with safety qualities

for all the times or periods of the day and night, the standard of company’s

vehicles, safety aspects of both the vehicle and the journey, long cues of

commuters, price, driver and conductor behaviour, the company’s route to

destination i.e. is it a direct trip or is there possibilities to change the vehicle or

handover to another vehicle during the trip.

The customer satisfaction from different aspects of the travel refers to the

fulfilment of these qualities and they form the criterion of success for the

transportation system together with the number of travellers that use the

transport service (Oliver, 1966). This theory therefore investigates commuters’

satisfaction with these factors in any company they choose to patronize.

The theory is relevant to the work because it will assess the performance of

TRACAS base on the travel service identified by the theory, which includes,

favourable timetable (ie of departure and arrival, operating bus top safety of

commuters, vehicle and the journey, price ,the driver and conductor behaviour.

The standard of their vehicle and route to destination. (ie is it a direct rout or is

there possibility to change the vehicle or handover to another vehicle driving

the trip.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

7

Data Presentation: Table A: Responses to Questions

Table 1. The cost of Transport fare

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 11 56 206Total 0 11 262Percentage 5.1% 94.9%

Source Field work 2012

The cost of transport fare in TRACAS is not lower than the private operators this was shown by 94.99%

Table 2. The numbers of passengers per roll

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 60 7 173 36Total 60 7 209 Percentage 21.7% 75.7%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that the number of passengers per – roll is not lesser than thatof private operators. This was show by 75.7%.

Table 3: Passengers loads/baggage

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 43 183 50Total 0 233Percentage 84.4%Source Field work 2012

From the result it shows that TRACAS change extra money for passengers loads. This was shown by 84.4%

Table 4: Transport fare fixed by the management

SA A N D SDRespondents 18 84 4 106 64Total 102 170Percentage 37% 61.6%Source Field work 2012

The result should that management of TRACAS does not have fixed transport fare, it fluctuate along market trends like that of private operations. This was shown by 61.6% .

8

Table 5: The provision for safety of commuters

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 0 164 112Total 0 0 276Percentage 100%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS has no provision for safety of commuters who arrive late in the night from their journey.100%

Table 6: The compensation for loss or damage of commuters’ luggage

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 21 97 158Total 0 255Percentage 37% 91.4%Source Field work 2012

The result shows TRACAS don’t pay compensation in the event of loss or damage of commuters luggage, as indicated by 91.4%.

Table 7: Preferential treatment to the physically challenged and pregnant women

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 43 103 130Total 0 43 233Percentage 15.4% 84.4%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS don’t give preferential treatment to the physically challenged and pregnant women during rush periods. This was shown by 84.4% .

Table 8: Drivers’ speed to ensure compliance to speed limits

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 17 169 90Total 0 17 259Percentage 91%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS don’t monitor their drivers speed to ensure compliance to speed limits provided for by the federal load safety corps.

Table 9: Accident emergency scheme.

9

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 6 201 69Total 0 270Percentage 95.5%Source Field work 2012

From the result it shows that TRACAS has not established accident emergencyscheme for its customers. 95.5%.

Table 10: Vehicles always in good condition

SA A N D SDRespondents 137 102 37 0 0Total 239 Percentage 86.6%Source Field work 2012

The results shows that TRACAS vehicles are in good condition by 86.6%.

Table 11: Mechanism for customer’s complaint

SA A N D SDRespondents 24 205 27 20 0Total 229 Percentage 83%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS has a well established mechanism for customer’s complaints.

Table 12: Enough vehicles

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 25 104 147Total 0 251Percentage 87%Source Field work 2012

The company’s vehicles is not enough to meet up with the number of commuters particularly during fast like periods.

Table 13: Routes to major cities and towns in Nigeria.

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 9 134 133

10

Total 0 267Percentage 95%Source Field work 2012

It shows that TRACAS has not established routs to major cities in Nigeria, this was indicated by 95%.

Table 14: Relief to the sufferings commuters in the hands of private

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 49 84 144Total 0 230Percentage 79%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS has not giving relief to commuters in the handsof private operators

Table 15: The Company’s drivers are not reckless, rude and always over speeding.

SA A N D SDRespondents 0 0 0 43 233Total 0 276Percentage 100%


Table 16: Quantity of the Company’s vehicles

SA A N D SDRespondents 166 85 25 0 0Total 251 Percentage 90.9%Sources: Field work, 2012

Notes: S A = strongly agree; A= agree; N= no response; D = disagree; SD = strongly disagree

Test of Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: There is no effective planning for the achievement of Mass

Transit Policy by TRACAS

An investigation into the management and structure of administration of

TRACAS reveals that it was established on September 12, 1988 by the old

11

Anambra state to cushion the effects of Structural Adjustment Programme and

was inherited after the creation of the new Anambra state in 1991.

According to official documents perused in TRACAS’ office and site view

conducted on the 22nd of January 2012, TRACAS that was established on

September 12, 1988 has a total number of five hundred (500) vehicles with

only forty (40) vehicles purchased by the state government between 2006 -

2012 while 460 are Hired Vehicles (HV). The company has depots in all the

locations of our study, headquarters at Awka, an active servicing/repair

workshop with mechanics, a General Manager and depot managers, civil

servants within its employ discharging various duties ranging from security,

revenue/account officers, supervisors, secretary etc.

In the course of the research, we discovered that TRACAS has all the

paraphernalia of civil service with a hierarchical administrative structure

headed by a General Manager. The company has its headquarters at Awka with

many company owned depots across the major towns in the state. In addition,

it has the following departments or units; administration / personnel, works /

workshops, operations, finance / stores, and planning / monitoring with a total

number of 139 Administrative Staff and 500 Drivers.

According to the General Manager in an interview in his office on January 12,

2012, the company does not purchase vehicles on their own rather the state

government has the responsibility of providing the company vehicles while the

money generated by the company in its daily operations is paid into

government treasury. Consequently, the company operates as a normal

government parastatal rendering service to the public. TRACAS General

Manager, disclosed in an interview granted on the 12th of January 2012 that

Anambra State Government does not give annual subvention or allocation to

TRACAS. However, TRACAS opted for registering private vehicles as Hired

12

Vehicles to enable the company meet up with commuters’ demands, generate

fund for maintenance of company staff and vehicles.

Therefore the null hypothesis is validated. There is no proper planning for the

achievement of the transport policy by TRACAS

Hypothesis 2: TRACAS has not substantially achieved the goal of mass

transit policy in the state

230 respondents representing 79% of our sample study noted that the

establishment of TRACAS has not made any significant change on the

sufferings of commuters in the hands of private transport operators in the state.

46 respondents remained silent over this question.

From the above, it is clear that Anambra State Mass Transit programmes have

not generated substantial customer satisfaction in their operations in line with

the goals of establishing Mass Transit programme in Nigeria. This validates

our null hypothesis, which states that “TRACAS operations have no significant

relationship with the (high) demands of commuters”.

CONCLUSIONS

After due consideration of the responses gathered through interview and

questionnaires, and the analysis of the data generated, this paper concludes as

follows:

1. There is no effective planning in the operations of TRACAS

2. TRACAS has not achieved substantially the goals of Mass Transit

System in Nigeria. Thus, Anambra State Mass Transit programmes have

not generated substantial customer satisfaction in their operations.

3. Lack of adequate planning is responsible for the policy implementation

failure in TRACAS.

13

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper offers the followings as practicable solutions to the identified

problems above:

1. Authority should be given to TRACAS to use their revenue for the

purchase of more vehicles;

2. TRACAS should establish security system for staff and passengers

particularly those that arrive very late in the night;

3. Transport fare for the mass transit system should be cheaper than those

of private operators;

4. The operational plans TRACAS should be totally restructured to

accommodate strategic choice elements that would make them more

result oriented.

References

Textbooks:14

Adeniji, K. (1983), Public Transportation and Urban Development in Nigeria.

Lagos: Institute of Town Planners.

Adesanwo S (2000), Towards a vibrant transport policy. Lagos: Nigerian Port

Authority.

Adesanya, A. O. (2002), “Public Transport Operations in Nigeria” in T.

Bolade, And E.O Adeyemi, (Eds.). Enhancing the Efficiency of Mass

Transit Operations in Nigeria. Ibadan: Rex Charles and Connell

Publication, pp.31-39.

Adesanya, A. (1996), “Public Transport Operations in Nigeria”. In

Bolade and E.O Adeyemi, (eds.). Enhancing the Efficiency of Mass Transit

Operations in Nigeria. lbadan: Rex Charles Publications.

Adeyemi, O. (2001), Moving Nigeria Forward: The Development Planning

Approach. Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press.

Barret, I.M.D (1986), “Conventional Bus Operations in African cities”. In

Institution of Civil Engineers; Moving People in Tomorrow's World.

London: Thomas Telfordd.

Barret, R. (1993), Nigeria Urban Mass Transport in Crisis. In S.G Ikya, (ed.)

Urban Passenger Transportation in Nigeria. Heinemann Educational

Books.

Bolade, A. T. (1993), Introduction to Transport Planning (3rd Ed), London

University College: London Press.

Brain Turton and Richard Knowles (2000), “Urban Transport Problems and

Solutions” in Hoyle and Knowles (eds.) Modern Transport Geography,

New York: John Wiley and Sons , pp 135-157.

Chakwizira, J. (2009), Social Dimensions and the impact of sustainable

transport and mobility on social development: Sustainable Transport and

Mobility Handbook. London: Golden Books publishers

Dewar, D. and Uytenbogaardt, R.S. (1991), South African Cities: A Manifesto

for Change. Cape Town: Urban Problem Research Unit.

15

Dror, Y. (1989), Public policymaking re-examined. (2nd edition). New

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers

Dunn, W.N. (1981), Public policy analysis: An introduction. Englewood Cliffs,

NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Dye, T.R. (1984), Understanding public policy. (5th edition). Englewood

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Edvardsson, B. (1996), Kvalitet och tjänsteutveckling. Studentlitteratur, Lund.

Egunjobi, L. (2002), “Planning the Nigerian cities for better quality of life.”

In S.O. Onakamaiya and O.O. Oyesiku (Eds.). Environment, Physical

Planning and Development in Nigeria. Ibadan: College Press and

Publishers, pp. 89-107.

Filani, M.O. (2002), “Mobility Crisis and the Federal Government’s Mass

Transit Programme ” In M.O. Filani.; F.O. Akintola, and C.O Ikporukpo

(eds.). Transportation in Ibadan Region. Ibadan: Rex Charles, pp.179-190.

Filani, M. O. and Abumere, S. I. (1993), “Operational Efficiency in the

Provision of Mass Transit Services by State-owned Transit Companies in

Nigeria” in S. G. Ikya (ed.). Urban Passenger Transportation in Nigeria.

Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Haglund, L. and Stålhammar, A. (2001), Market and service orientation in

public transportation. Karlstad: Karlstad University Studies

Haughton, G. & Hunter, C. (1994), Sustainable Cities. London: Jessica

Kingsley.

Hearty, M. (1980), Public Transport in Jamaica. Crowthorne: Transport and

Road Research Laboratory Report, No. SR 546.

Hilling, D. (1996), Transport and Developing Countries. London: Routledge

Lasswell, H.D. (1971), A Pre-view of the Policy Sciences. New York: American

Elsevier

Majone, G. (1988), “Policy analysis and public deliberation” In R.B. Reich

(ed.) The Power of public ideas. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger

16

Meltsner, A.J. (1976), Policy analysts in the bureaucracy. Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press

Mokeka, M, (2009), The Role of Public Transport: Sustainable Transport and

Mobility Handbook.

Obi. E. Nwachukwu, C. And Obiora .A. (2008), policy Analysis and Decision

making. Onitsha: Book point educational LTD.

Oliver, R.L. (1996), Satisfaction: A Behavioural Perspective on the Consumer.

Boston: McGraw Hill.

Wildavsky, A. (1979), Speaking truth to power: the art and craft of policy

analysis. Boston: Little, Brown

Journals:

Heckathorn, Douglas D.; Maser, Steven M. (1990), "The Contractual

Architecture of Public Policy: A Critical Reconstruction of Lowi's

Typology" . The Journal of Politics 52 (4): 1101–1123.

Lowi, Theodore J. (1968), "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice".

Public Administration Review 33 (3): 298–310

Mintzberg, H. and J. Jorgensen. 1987, “Emergent Strategy for Policy.”

Canadian Public Administration. 30 (2): 214-229

Umar, T.J. (2005), Empirical studies of work trip distribution models.

Transportation Research A, 15: 233-243.

Internet Materials:

Maduekwe O (2002 May, 21) “Ministerial press briefing”. Federal Ministry of

Transport Abuja”. Available @ http://www.Nigeria.gov.ng/ministry/ inform

ation/media/summit/transport 12/01/12

Oni, S.I. and Okalawon, K.R. (2005), Nigeria’s transport Infrastructural

Development: an integral Part of the National Economic Empowerment and

Development Strategy (NEEDS) Lagos: Department of Geography,

17

http://www/

University of Lagos Nigeria. Available @ Error! Hyperlink reference not

valid. pdf-similar 12/01/12

World Bank Group (2009), Nigeria: Rural Access and Mobility Project

(RAMP). Available @ http://www.worldbank.org/exter nal/projects

12/01/12

Papers and Government Publications:

Federal Ministry of Transport (1993), National Transport Policy. Abuja:

Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Federal Government of Nigeria (2010), Draft National Transport Policy. Abuja:

Government Press

FUMTA (1989), Federal Urban Mass Transit Agency: Monograh Number One,

March.

Kolawole, Gbadamosi T. (2010), An Evaluation of the Impact of Bus Rapid

Transit in Urban Intra-city Passenger movement in Lagos State. A paper

presented at WCTR 2010, Lisbon.

World Bank, (2008) World Development Report. Washington D.C: World

Bank.

World Bank (1996) Sustainable Transport, Priority for Policy Reforms.

Washington D.C: World Bank.

Magazines and Newspapers:

Osita Nwajah; Ibim Semenitari; Anene Ugoani; Stephen Ubanna; Dele

Oyewale and Ann Ariole (2003) “Infrastructure: A Rotten Foundation”.

TELL Nigeria’s Independent Weekly No. 23 June 9, pp. 47-50.

18

Okoye, J. C. & Nweke A. C., (2014); Implementation of Mass Transit Programme in Nigeria: A Study of Anambra State TransportCompany (TRACAS), ANSU Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 2 (2):71-79

Implementation of Mass Transit Programme in Nigeria: A Study of Anambra State Transport Company (TRACAS)

Okoye, J.C. PhDDepartment of Public AdministrationNnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka

Nweke, Anselem C.Department of Public Administration Anambra State University, Igbariam Campus

AbstractThis paper examined the impact of government’s programme on mass transit as one of the ways ofalleviating the hash economic conditions of the suffering masses of Nigeria following the adoptionof the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1988. Survey research method was adopted in the study.The paper adopted customer satisfaction theory as its framework of analysis. The objective of thepaper was to ascertain if there was any planning for the achievement of mass transit policyobjective and also assessed commuters satisfaction with the operatives of Anambra State MassTransit Programmes. The problem is that masses suffer disappointment in hands of the publictransport operators. Two hypotheses guided the study. Statistical tool (s), tables and percentageswere used in data analysis. The results show that TRACAS lacked effective systematic planning intheir operations and as such could not generate substantial customer satisfaction. It is therefore,recommended that the operational plans of TRACAS be totally restructured to accommodatestrategic choice elements that would make them more result – oriented.

Key words: Mass Transit, Planning, Customer Satisfaction

71

ANSU Journal of Arts and Social Sciences

IntroductionTransportation is an inevitable service inhuman activities and development. It began aspersonal or private activity and developed toembrace public concerns. In Nigeria, the firstgeneration of public sector transport operatorscame into existence shortly after Nigeria’spolitical independence and they included, theIbadan City Bus Service, which collapsed in1976 (Adeniji, 1983), the Kano State TransportCorporation (operating then as Kano Line),Kwara Line and Plateau State TransportCorporations among others. Most of thesepublic transport lines collapsed in the secondhalf of 1970s and early 1980s (Adeniji, 1983;Barret, 1993).

Even other government owned publictransport companies established in Lagos,Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Kwara, Rivers, Oyoand Edo States in the early 1980s after thecollapse of others equally failed to operate inthe urban centres and later closed downcompletely (Barret, 1993). The few municipalbus transport system that survived until 1988,when the mass transit programme wasintroduced, included Water Line, Bendel Line,Borno Express, Kaduna State TransportAuthority and the Lagos State TransportCorporation (LSTC), although many of themwere actually running skeletal service at thattime (Adesanya, 2002).

Scholars like Adesanya (1996, 2002),Adeniji (1983) and Barret (1986) identifiedfinancial impropriety, inadequate governmentfinancial support, lack of qualified staff,political interference, and uncontrolledcompetition from private transport operators asthe reasons for their collapse. The collapse ofthese transport lines/schemes left the Nigeriantransport system at the mercy of privatetransporters who lack organised administrativestructure and rules, and depend more on farerevenues and financial supports from informalsources such as friends, relatives, and moneylenders in order to manage their companies(Adesanya, 2002).

The inadequate vehicles to meet commutersdemand, sub-standard and unorganizedoperational system subjected the condition oftransportation in Nigeria to the following:1. Steady decline in the level of

motorization for over a decade as motorvehicle fleet decreased by 50percentbetween 1990 and 1998, leading toacute shortage of transport services(Adeyemi 2001).

2. Overcrowded public transport systemand use of second hand vehicles[‘tokumbo’] imported from differentparts of the world particularly fromEurope and America. The public ownedtransport operations in the few stateswhere they exist are inefficient and theprivate sector operators of transportsystem are substandard anddisorganized (Adesanya, 1996).

3. Incessant traffic congestion, awkwardparking system and environmentalpollution.

4. Haphazard and uncoordinatedownership and organization of the roadpublic transport system.

5. Increasing scourge of road trafficaccident that continues unabated in spiteof appreciable role of governmentestablished road safety commission(Barret, 1993).

To address these problems, the federalgovernment introduced the policy of MassTransit Programme in 1988 with the followingobjectives:(i) To moderate the national urban transit

system; (ii) To alleviate the problems of urban

commuters and the general masses; and (iii) To lay the foundation for organized

mass transit in Nigeria.

Since the introduction of the policy in 1988,virtually every state government in Nigeria has

72


established its own transport company (Umar2005). According to Umar (2005), many ofthese government-owned mass transitcompanies in Nigeria have better trained staff,workshops and maintenance facilities thanmost of private sector operators. Their servicesare often provided on fixed routes, and areusually cheaper than those provided by privatesector operators. Their bus services arescheduled for definite routes although they areseldom followed because of the inadequacy ofvehicles, growing competition with privatetransport operators, poor traffic management,congestion problems especially during peaktravel periods and other problems associatedwith the operating environment.

The old Anambra state was among thestates that introduced the Mass TransitProgramme in 1989 with the establishment ofTransport Company of Anambra State(TRACAS). This transport company wasfunctional when the new Anambra state wascreated and exists till date. Anambra state iscentral to the economic development of Nigeriaand West Africa in general because of Onitshamain market. Consequently, the state hasattracted thousands of people in and out of itscities for commercial and economic activities.Therefore inter-city and inter-statetransportations are high in the state.

Against this background it becomespertinent to question the extent that TRACAShas planned or is planning for the achievementof Mass Transit Policy objective in the state. The primary objective of this study is toevaluate the implementation of public MassTransit policy in Anambra State byunderstanding the activities of TRACAS.However, the specific objectives include: 1. To ascertain the extent of planning for

the achievement of mass transit policyobjectives in the state.

2. To identify the challenges facing theimplementation of the policy objective.

3. To asses commuters’ satisfaction withthe operations of Anambra State MassTransit programmes.

4. To make recommendations forimprovement.

HypothesisThe following hypothesis will guide the survey.H1. There is no effective planning for theachievement of mass transit policy objective inTRACASH2. TRACAS has not substantially achievedthe goals of mass transit policy in the stateH3. Lack of adequate planning may beresponsible for the policy implementationfailure in TRACAS

MethodologyThe area of study is Anambra state andspecifically, Awka, Onitsha, Nnewi, Ekwulobiaand its Headquarters. Our choice of four majorcities/urban areas in the state is informed by thefact that they are the economic, political,administrative, and transportation centres of thestate where the other 177 communities and therest of Nigeria are networked or connected to.The population of the study is 896. However, todetermine the actual sample size for the study,the researcher used Yaro Yemani (1962)formula for determining sample size, which is277. Simple percentage was used for theanalyses.

This study is quantitative in nature i.e. itadopted survey method for the collection ofdata/information needed for analysis andinferences.

Basically, the paper employedinstruments of structured questionnaire,interview and documentary research in thecollection of information. The booking methodof buses and transport routes in various depotsstudied, yearly fiscal allocation to the company,purchase of new vehicles, and registration ofloaned/hired vehicles were consulted. Issuesnot covered by the questionnaire and theserecords and that bother on daily administration

73


and management of these company, and theirrelationship with the Executive organ ofgovernment in the state were investigatedthrough interview.

Theoretical FrameworkThis paper adopts customer satisfaction theoryas its framework of analysis. This theory,which is also known as theory of “commongood”, views public transport as a commongood and studies transportation effectivenessfrom the transport user’s satisfaction with theservice product. The major proponents of thistheory include Oliver (1996), Edvardsson(1996), Haglund and Stålhammar (2001).

The service product, public travel, iscomposed of a series of qualities the customerwants to have fulfilled on the part of thetransport company. The travel service hererefers to the sum of qualities expected from thecompany’s system or workers and buses by thecustomer for travelling from location ‘A’ tolocation ‘B’ (Edvardson, 1996; Haglund &Stålhammar, 2001).

The properties in measuring customer’ssatisfaction includes; favourable timetable i.e.of departure and arrival, operating bus stopwith safety qualities for all the times or periodsof the day and night, the standard of company’svehicles, safety aspects of both the vehicle andthe journey, long cues of commuters, price,driver and conductor behaviour, the company’sroute to destination i.e. is it a direct trip or isthere possibilities to change the vehicle orhandover to another vehicle during the trip.

The customer satisfaction from differentaspects of the travel refers to the fulfilment ofthese qualities and they form the criterion ofsuccess for the transportation system togetherwith the number of travellers that use thetransport service (Oliver, 1966). This theorytherefore investigates commuters’ satisfactionwith these factors in any company they chooseto patronize.

The theory is relevant to the work because itwill assess the performance of TRACAS baseon the travel service identified by the theory,which includes, favourable timetable (ie ofdeparture and arrival, operating bus top safetyof commuters, vehicle and the journey, price,the driver and conductor behaviour. Thestandard of their vehicle and route todestination. (ie is it a direct rout or is therepossibility to change the vehicle or handover toanother vehicle driving the trip.

Data Presentation and Analysis Data Presentation: Table A: Responses to Questions Table 1. The cost of Transport fare

SA A

N D SD

Respondents 0 0

11 56 206

Total 0 11 262Percentage 5.1% 94.9%


The cost of transport fare in TRACAS is not lower than the private operators this was shownby 94.99%

Table 2. The numbers of passengers per roll SA A N D

SDRespondents 0 60 7 173

36Total 60 7 209 Percentage 21.7% 75.7%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that the number of passengersper – roll is not lesser than that of private operators. This was show by 75.7%.

Table 3: Passengers loads/baggage SA A N D


50Total 0 233Percentage 84.4%Source Field work 2012

74


From the result it shows that TRACAS changeextra money for passengers’ loads. This wasshown by 84.4%

Table 4: Transport fare fixed by themanagement

SA A N D SD

Respondents 18 84 4 106 64

Total 102 170Percentage 37% 61.6%Source Field work 2012

The result should that management ofTRACAS does not have fixed transport fare, itfluctuate along market trends like that ofprivate operations. This was shown by 61.6% .

Table 5: The provision for safety ofcommuters

SA A N D SD


Total 0 0 276Percentage 100%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS has noprovision for safety of commuters who arrivelate in the night from their journey.100%

Table 6: The compensation for loss ordamage of commuters’ luggage

SA A N D SD


Total 0 255Percentage 37% 91.4%Source Field work 2012

The result shows TRACAS don’t paycompensation in the event of loss or damage ofcommuters luggage, as indicated by 91.4%.

Table 7: Preferential treatment to thephysically challenged and pregnant women

SA A N D SD


Total 0 43 233Percentage 15.4% 84.4%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS don’t givepreferential treatment to the physicallychallenged and pregnant women during rushperiods. This was shown by 84.4% .

Table 8: Drivers’ speed to ensure complianceto speed limits

SA A N D SD


Total 0 17 259

Percentage 91%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS don’t monitortheir drivers speed to ensure compliance tospeed limits provided for by the federal loadsafety corps.

Table 9: Accident emergency schemeSA A N D


69Total 0 270Percentage 95.5%Source Field work 2012

From the result it shows that TRACAS has not established accident emergency scheme for its customers. 95.5%.

75


Table 10: Vehicles always in good condition SA A N D


0Total 239 Percentage 86.6%Source Field work 2012

The results shows that TRACAS vehicles are ingood condition by 86.6%.

Table 11: Mechanism for customer’s complaint

SA A N D SD

Respondents 24 205

27 20 0

Total 229 Percentage 83%Source Field work 2012

The result shows that TRACAS has a wellestablished mechanism for customer’scomplaints.

Table 12: Enough vehicles SA A N D


147Total 0 251Percentage 87%Source Field work 2012

The company’s vehicles are not enough to meetup with the number of commuters particularlyduring fast like periods.

Table 13: Routes to major cities and towns in Nigeria

SA A N D SD



It shows that TRACAS has not establishedrouts to major cities in Nigeria, this wasindicated by 95%.

Table 14: Relief to the sufferings commuters in the hands of private

SA A N D SD



The result shows that TRACAS has not giving relief to commuters in the hands of private operators

Table 15: The Company’s drivers are not reckless, rude and always over speeding.

SA A N D SD



Table 16: Quantity of the Company’s vehicles

SA A N D SD


Total 251 Percentage 90.9%Sources: Field work, 2012

Notes: S A = strongly agree; A= agree; N= noresponse; D = disagree; SD = strongly disagree

Test of HypothesisHypothesis 1: There is no effective planning

for the achievement of MassTransit Policy by TRACAS

An investigation into the management andstructure of administration of TRACASreveals that it was established on September

76


12, 1988 by the old Anambra state to cushionthe effects of Structural AdjustmentProgramme and was inherited after the creationof the new Anambra state in 1991.

According to official documentsperused in TRACAS’ office and site viewconducted on the 22nd of January 2012,TRACAS that was established on September12, 1988 has a total number of five hundred(500) vehicles with only forty (40) vehiclespurchased by the state government between2006 - 2012 while 460 are Hired Vehicles(HV). The company has depots in all thelocations of our study, headquarters at Awka, anactive servicing/repair workshop withmechanics, a General Manager and depotmanagers, civil servants within its employdischarging various duties ranging fromsecurity, revenue/account officers, supervisors,secretary etc.

In the course of the research, wediscovered that TRACAS has all theparaphernalia of civil service with ahierarchical administrative structure headed bya General Manager. The company has itsheadquarters at Awka with many companyowned depots across the major towns in thestate. In addition, it has the followingdepartments or units; administration /personnel, works / workshops, operations,finance / stores, and planning / monitoring witha total number of 139 Administrative Staff and500 Drivers.

According to the General Manager in aninterview in his office on January 12, 2012, thecompany does not purchase vehicles on theirown rather the state government has theresponsibility of providing the companyvehicles while the money generated by thecompany in its daily operations is paid intogovernment treasury. Consequently, thecompany operates as a normal governmentparastatal rendering service to the public.TRACAS General Manager, disclosed in aninterview granted on the 12th of January 2012that Anambra State Government does not give

annual subvention or allocation to TRACAS.However, TRACAS opted for registeringprivate vehicles as Hired Vehicles to enable thecompany meet up with commuters’ demands,generate fund for maintenance of companystaff and vehicles.

Therefore the null hypothesis isvalidated. There is no proper planning for theachievement of the transport policy byTRACAS

Hypothesis 2: TRACAS has not substantiallyachieved the goal of mass transit policy in thestate 230 respondents representing 79% of oursample study noted that the establishment ofTRACAS has not made any significant changeon the sufferings of commuters in the hands ofprivate transport operators in the state. 46respondents remained silent over this question. From the above, it is clear that Anambra StateMass Transit programmes have not generatedsubstantial customer satisfaction in theiroperations in line with the goals of establishingMass Transit programme in Nigeria. Thisvalidates our null hypothesis, which states that“TRACAS operations have no significantrelationship with the (high) demands ofcommuters”.

Conclusions After due consideration of the responsesgathered through interview and questionnaires,and the analysis of the data generated, thispaper concludes as follows:1. There is no effective planning in the

operations of TRACAS 2. TRACAS has not achieved substantially

the goals of Mass Transit System inNigeria. Thus, Anambra State MassTransit programmes have not generatedsubstantial customer satisfaction in theiroperations.

3. Lack of adequate planning isresponsible for the policyimplementation failure in TRACAS.

77


RecommendationsThis paper offers the followings as practicablesolutions to the identified problems above: 1. Authority should be given to TRACAS

to use their revenue for the purchase ofmore vehicles;

2. TRACAS should establish securitysystem for staff and passengersparticularly those that arrive very late inthe night;

3. Transport fare for the mass transitsystem should be cheaper than those ofprivate operators;

4. The operational plans of TRACASshould be totally restructured toaccommodate strategic choice elementsthat would make them more resultoriented.

Works CitedAdeniji, K. (1983). Public Transportation and

Urban Development in Nigeria. Lagos:Institute of Town Planners.

Adesanwo S (2000). Towards a vibrant transportpolicy. Lagos: Nigerian Port Authority.

Adesanya, A. (1996). “Public TransportOperations in Nigeria”. In

Adesanya, A. O. (2002). “Public TransportOperations in Nigeria” in T. Bolade, AndE.O Adeyemi, (Eds.). Enhancing theEfficiency of Mass Transit Operations inNigeria. Ibadan: Rex Charles and ConnellPublication, pp.31-39.

Adeyemi, O. (2001). Moving Nigeria Forward:The Development Planning Approach.Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press.

Barret, I.M.D (1986). “Conventional BusOperations in African cities”. InInstitution of Civil Engineers; MovingPeople in Tomorrow's World. London:Thomas Telfordd.

Barret, R. (1993). Nigeria Urban Mass Transportin Crisis. In S.G Ikya, (ed.) UrbanPassenger Transportation in Nigeria.Heinemann Educational Books.

Bolade and E.O Adeyemi, (eds.). Enhancingthe Efficiency of Mass Transit Operations

in Nigeria. lbadan: Rex CharlesPublications.

Bolade, A. T. (1993). Introduction to TransportPlanning (3rd Ed), London UniversityCollege: London Press.

Brain Turton and Richard Knowles (2000).“Urban Transport Problems andSolutions” in Hoyle and Knowles (eds.)Modern Transport Geography, New York:John Wiley and Sons, pp 135-157.

Chakwizira, J. (2009). Social Dimensions andthe impact of sustainable transport andmobility on social development:Sustainable Transport and MobilityHandbook. London: Golden Bookspublishers

Dewar, D. and Uytenbogaardt, R.S. (1991).South African Cities: A Manifesto forChange. Cape Town: Urban ProblemResearch Unit.

Dror, Y. (1989). Public policymaking re-examined. (2nd edition). New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction Publishers

Dunn, W.N. (1981). Public policy analysis: Anintroduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.

Dye, T.R. (1984). Understanding public policy.(5th edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.

Edvardsson, B. (1996). Kvalitet ochtjänsteutveckling. Studentlitteratur, Lund.

Egunjobi, L. (2002). “Planning the Nigeriancities for better quality of life.” In S.O.Onakamaiya and O.O. Oyesiku (Eds.).Environment, Physical Planning andDevelopment in Nigeria. Ibadan: CollegePress and Publishers, pp. 89-107.

Federal Government of Nigeria (2010). DraftNational Transport Policy. Abuja:Government Press

Federal Ministry of Transport (1993). NationalTransport Policy. Abuja: FederalRepublic of Nigeria.

Filani, M. O. and Abumere, S. I. (1993).“Operational Efficiency in the Provisionof Mass Transit Services by State-ownedTransit Companies in Nigeria” in S. G.Ikya (ed.). Urban Passenger

78


Transportation in Nigeria. Ibadan:Heinemann Educational Books.

Filani, M.O. (2002). “Mobility Crisis and theFederal Government’s Mass TransitProgramme” In M.O. Filani.; F.O.Akintola, and C.O Ikporukpo (eds.).Transportation in Ibadan Region. Ibadan:Rex Charles, pp.179-190.

FUMTA (1989). Federal Urban Mass TransitAgency: Monograh Number One, March.

Haglund, L. and Stålhammar, A. (2001). Marketand service orientation in publictransportation. Karlstad: KarlstadUniversity Studies

Haughton, G. & Hunter, C. (1994). SustainableCities. London: Jessica Kingsley.

Hearty, M. (1980). Public Transport in Jamaica.Crowthorne: Transport and RoadResearch Laboratory Report, No. SR 546.

Heckathorn, Douglas D.; Maser, Steven M.(1990). "The Contractual Architecture ofPublic Policy: A Critical Reconstructionof Lowi's Typology". The Journal ofPolitics 52 (4): 1101–1123.

Hilling, D. (1996). Transport and DevelopingCountries. London: Routledge

Kolawole, Gbadamosi T. (2010). An Evaluationof the Impact of Bus Rapid Transit inUrban Intra-city Passenger movement inLagos State. A paper presented at WCTR2010, Lisbon.

Lasswell, H.D. (1971). A Pre-view of the PolicySciences. New York: American Elsevier

Lowi, Theodore J. (1968). "Four Systems ofPolicy, Politics, and Choice". PublicAdministration Review 33 (3): 298–310

Maduekwe O (2002 May, 21) “Ministerial pressbriefing”. Federal Ministry of TransportAbuja”. Available @http://www.Nigeria.gov.ng/ministry/inform ation/media/summit/transport12/01/12

Majone, G. (1988). “Policy analysis and publicdeliberation” In R.B. Reich (ed.) ThePower of public ideas. Cambridge, MA:Ballinger

Meltsner, A.J. (1976). Policy analysts in thebureaucracy. Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press

Mintzberg, H. and J. Jorgensen. 1987, “EmergentStrategy for Policy.” Canadian PublicAdministration. 30 (2): 214-229

Mokeka, M, (2009). The Role of PublicTransport: Sustainable Transport andMobility Handbook.

Obi. E. Nwachukwu, C. And Obiora. A. (2008).Policy Analysis and Decision making.Onitsha: Book point educational LTD.

Oliver, R.L. (1996). Satisfaction: A BehaviouralPerspective on the Consumer. Boston:McGraw Hill.

Oni, S.I. and Okalawon, K.R. (2005). Nigeria’stransport Infrastructural Development: anintegral Part of the National EconomicEmpowerment and Development Strategy(NEEDS) Lagos: Department ofGeography, University of Lagos Nigeria.Available @ Error! Hyperlink referencenot valid. pdf-similar 12/01/12.

Osita Nwajah; Ibim Semenitari; Anene Ugoani;Stephen Ubanna; Dele Oyewale and AnnAriole (2003) “Infrastructure: A RottenFoundation”. TELL Nigeria’s IndependentWeekly No. 23 June 9, pp. 47-50.

Umar, T.J. (2005). Empirical studies of work tripdistribution models. TransportationResearch A, 15: 233-243.

Wildavsky, A. (1979). Speaking truth to power:the art and craft of policy analysis.Boston: Little, Brown.

World Bank (1996). Sustainable Transport,Priority for Policy Reforms. WashingtonD.C: World Bank.

World Bank, (2008). World Development Report.Washington D.C: World Bank.

World Bank Group (2009). Nigeria: Rural Accessand Mobility Project (RAMP). Available@ http://www.worldbank.org/external/projects 12/01/12.

79

http://www/


80


81

Documents

IMPLEMENTATION OF MASS TRANSIT PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA: … · Lagos, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Kwara, Rivers, Oyo and Edo States in the early 1980s after the collapse of others equally