IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ......2016/02/03 · 10 moves per hr/crane DROPPED 17 moves per hr/crane Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2010 10/24/2013 10/21/2013 Comments

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003544

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H3270 IDA-H5040 TF-92332 TF-96385)

ON

GRANT H-3720

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24.3 MILLION (US$37 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

GRANT TF-92332

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$3.0 MILLION FROM PILOT CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW

GRANT H-5040

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.4 MILLION (US$16 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND AN

EU GRANT TF-96385

IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 10 MILLION (US$12.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

FOR AN

AGRICULTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

January 26, 2016

Transport and ICT Global Practice Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective July 31, 2015)

Currency Unit = Liberian Dollars (LRD) US$1 = LRD 86.5 US$1 = SDR 0.72

FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank AfT Agenda for Transformation AIDP Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project ASCO Action for Safer Community Organization CAAS-Lib Comprehensive Assessment of the Agriculture Sector – Liberia CAS Country Assistance Strategy CARI Central Agriculture Research Institute CGRs Community Grain Reserves CPI Consumer Price Index CPS Country Partnership Strategy CFSNS Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey DO Development Objectives EC European Commission EDF European Development Fund EIP Emergency Infrastructure Project ESMP Environment and Social Mitigation Plan EVD Ebola Virus Disease FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FBOs Farmers Based Organizations GDP Gross Domestic Product GOL Government of Liberia ha Hectare HSEMP Health, Safety and Environmental Management Plan ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IITA International Institute for Tropical Agriculture IIU Infrastructure Implementation Unit ILO International Labor Organization IP Implementation Progress ILO International Labor Organization I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status and Results Report Km Kilometer LAI Liberia Agriculture Initiative

LIBRAMP Liberia Road Asset Maintenance Project LIRP Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project LWSC Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOT Ministry of Transport MG/D Million gallons per day MPW Ministry of Public Works MT metric tons MT/ha Metric tons per hectare MTR Mid-Term Review NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations NPA National Port Authority NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia OP Operations Policy PDO Project Development Objective PDU Presidential Delivery Unit PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PMU Project Management Unit, MOA SIU Special Implementation Unit TA Technical Assistance TF Trust Fund TFLIB Trust Fund for Liberia UN United Nations UNMIL United Nations Mission to Liberia URIRP Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project UWSSP Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project WAAPP-1C West Africa Agricultural Productivity Project WFP World Food Program WTP Water Treatment Plant

Vice President: Country Director:

Senior Global Practice Director: Practice Manager:

Task Team Leader: ICR Team Leader:

Makhtar Diop Henry Kerali Pierre Guislain Supee Teravaninthorn Kulwinder Singh Rao John Richardson

LIBERIA

AGRICULTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ................................................................................................................. i A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... i B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... ii D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii E. Bank Staff.................................................................................................................. iii F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................. viii H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................ ix I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................. x 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................. 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 8 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 15 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ........................................................ 23 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 24 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 26 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 27 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................... 29 Annex 2: Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 36 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 38 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 40 Annex 6: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 43 Annex 7. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 51 Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 52 MAP.............................................................................................................................. 54

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DATA SHEET

A. Basic Information

Country: Liberia Project Name: LR-Agriculture & Infrastructure Development Project

Project ID: P104716 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H3270,IDA-H5040,TF-92332,TF-96385

ICR Date: 01/26/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA

Original Total Commitment:

USD 37.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 53.63M

Revised Amount: USD 53.00M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies:

Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU)

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

European Commission

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/17/2007 Effectiveness: 09/11/2007 09/11/2007

Appraisal: 05/11/2007 Restructuring(s):

05/22/2008 06/30/2009 06/24/2011 10/24/2013 10/01/2014

Approval: 07/31/2007 Mid-term Review: 09/22/2008 – 10/17/2008

Closing: 12/31/2011 07/31/2015

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C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 6 14

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 12 8

Ports, waterways and shipping 18 14

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 48 60

Water supply 16 4

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Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 50 47

Infrastructure services for private sector development 25 35

Rural services and infrastructure 25 18

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Henry G. R. Kerali Mats Karlsson

Practice Manager/Manager:

Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham

Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao Gylfi Palsson

ICR Team Leader: John Kobina Richardson

ICR Primary Author: John Kobina Richardson

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The project will support Government's efforts in re-establishing basic infrastructure and in reviving the agriculture activities.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The project development objective was not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increased access to water for residents of Monrovia. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

2 million gallons per day (MGD)

8 MGD DROPPED

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement)

The description of this indicator was revised at the time of the October 2013 Restructuring (RP) in order to improve clarity, although the unit of measurement was not changed. Indicator 2 replaced this indicator.

Indicator 2 : Daily production of treated water in Monrovia (million gallons per day â€“ MG/D)

Value (quantitative or

2 8 6

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Qualitative) Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2010 07/31/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target was dropped from monitoring in October 2013.

Indicator 3 : Port productivity increases. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

3 moves per hr/crane 10 moves per hr/crane

DROPPED 17 moves per hr/crane

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2010 10/24/2013 10/21/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target was surpassed (170%). This indicator was dropped from monitoring during restructuring of October 2013 as the target was achieved in 2012.

Indicator 4 : Increased access to an all season road for targeted rural population Value quantitative or Qualitative)

NA NA DROPPED 83


Target was achieved. The major highway between Monrovia and Roberts International Airport (Monrovia-Cotton Tree corridor, totaling 83km) was rehabilitated.

Indicator 5 : Increase in the number of markets where seed rice is available Value quantitative or Qualitative)

3 10 DROPPED

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2009 10/24/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement)

This indicator was dropped, because marketing of seed rice is too complex for this kind of project, and has been replaced by production of foundation seed (see intermediate indicator 10).

Indicator 6 : Percentage increase (30 percent) in metric tons of cocoa sites Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

3,000 tons 4,000 tons DROPPED


This indicator was dropped as interventions on tree crops were to be done under the new tree crops project financed by the World Bank.

Indicator 7 : Production of rice and cassava in project areas. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA NA DROPPED

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2010 10/24/2013

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator was dropped during the restructuring of October 2013. It is replaced by a revised indicator for monitoring of rice production in Bong and Lofa Counties, which was being monitored at the intermediate level (see PDO indicator 7).

Indicator 8 : Total rice production in Bong and Lofa Counties

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Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA 134,808 metric ton (MT)

132,408 (MT)

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2007 07/31/2015


Target was achieved (98%). Expected target could not be reached as some farmers could not harvest during the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). Originally an intermediate indicator and was moved to PDO level indicator during the 2013 restructuring.

Indicator 9 : Yields of rice and cassava amongst beneficiary farmers Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA NA DROPPED


Indicator was dropped during the restructuring of October 2013 as cassava was determined not to be a priority crop for the project. It is replaced by indicator 7a for monitoring of rice yields on beneficiary farms.

Indicator 10 : Rice yield on beneficiary farms Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA 1.44 2.44

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2011 07/31/2015


Target surpassed (169%). The yield (1.2 MT) per hectare (ha) in low land had increased to 2.5 MT per ha in Bong and 3 MT per ha in Lofa. In Gbarpolu the yield was 2.43 MT per ha while Bomi County realized 2.33 MT per ha in part due to new rice varieties.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : External Port Management Team in Place Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

Does not exist. External port management team in place

DROPPED External Port Management Team in place.


Target achieved (100%). This indicator was dropped during the October 2013 restructuring as the target was achieved.

Indicator 2 : Draft National Transport Policy and Strategy Paper formulated and prepared for Government's review and endorsement.


Does not exist. Endorsed DROPPED Endorsed

Date achieved 07/17/2007 06/30/2008 10/24/2013 12/31/2009 Comments Target achieved (100%)

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(incl. % achievement)

This indicator was dropped during the October 2013 restructuring as the target was achieved. National Transport Policy was formulated in 2009. National Transport Plan was prepared and finally adopted in May 2012.

Indicator 3 : Two new agriculture sector policies complete with results framework submitted to Minister of Agriculture.


Does not exist. Submitted Dropped


This indicator was dropped during the October 2013 restructuring since the project interventions had instead focused on developing a basic ability to monitor results and plan activities.

Indicator 4 : Increased market through-put in sample of markets in project area. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA NA DROPPED

Date achieved 07/17/2007 10/24/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement)

This indicator was dropped during the October 2013 restructuring from monitoring due to lack of clarity and because marketing is not a principal focus of the project.

Indicator 5 :

Bridges: 1. New Vai Town Bridge built 2. 6 main bridges rehabilitated 3. River crossings improved


NO 0 0

Yes 6 30

(no change) DROPPED 25

YES 25

Date achieved 07/17/2007 06/30/2010 10/24/2013 07/31/2015


Target achieved (100%). The sub-indicator "six main bridges" was dropped at AF (2009). Four of these included in the road rehabilitation works under AIDP. The target for river crossings was revised (2013) as two crossings required multiple Bailey bridges.

Indicator 6 : Rural population within 2 km of an all season road increases Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA Indicator known with reasonable level of accuracy

DROPPED


Dropped due to lack of funds for implementation of a systematic data collection. Accessibility indicator is limited to Monrovia-Buchanan corridor; however, there was no capacity within transport sector to measure this indicator.

Indicator 7 : Refurbishment of the Oil Jetty structure including construction of new off-load station, mooring dolphins, and walkways


Oil jetty is deteriorated and can collapse

Oil jetty fully refurbished

DROPPED

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2008 07/21/2009

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This activity was dropped, partly to lessen the additional financing requirement as well as to rationalize project activities. After repeated procurement attempts for rehabilitation had been unsuccessful, a decision was made to cease further attempts.

Indicator 8 : Refurbishment of water treatment plant in Monrovia Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

10-15% 50% 50%


Revised to "Foundation seed (including improved varieties and reintroduced old varieties) produced and distributed inn project areas." in 2013. 100 percent achieved.

Indicator 9 : Production and sales of rice and seeds on beneficiary farms. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA NA DROPPED


The original indicator was revised during October 2013 restructuring to better reflect project interventions and to not include marketing.

Indicator 10 : Foundation seeds (including improved varieties and reintroduced old varieties) produced and distributed in project areas (MT)


NA NA 20 >20

Date achieved 07/17/2007 12/31/2010 10/24/2013 07/31/2015


Target achieved (100%). Production of over 20 MT of Foundation seed and (including improved varieties and reintroduction of three lost varieties) at CARI and distributed to over 27 outgrowers. Rice seed availability was ensured for next planting seasons.

Indicator 11 : Small scale irrigation schemes rehabilitated in project areas (Number) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA 6 30

Date achieved 10/24/2013 10/24/2013 07/31/2015


This indicator was introduced in 2013 to better reflect the scope of interventions in support of agriculture. Target surpassed (300%). The project constructed 18 concrete spillways even though seven months was lost to the Outbreak of the EVD.

Indicator 12 : Rice land rehabilitated in project areas (hectares) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA 300 195.8


This indicator was introduced in 2013 to better reflect the scope interventions under the project. Target partially achieved (65%). (84.9 ha in Gbarpolu, 93.1

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ha in Bomi, and 17.8 ha in Grand Kru.) Implementation was disrupted by EVD outbreak in 2014."

Indicator 13 : Grain storages constructed in project areas Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA 3 5


This indicator was introduced in October 2013 to better reflect the physical infrastructure interventions under the project in support of agricultural marketing. Target surpassed (167%).

Indicator 14 : Grain storages rehabilitated in project areas Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA 1 3


This indicator was introduced in October 2013 to better reflect the physical infrastructure interventions under the project in support of agricultural marketing. Target surpassed (300%). Three CGR rehabilitated in Bomi County.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.

Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 11/29/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.00


3 12/16/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.50





8 01/29/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 43.76






14 06/03/2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 52.19

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H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

05/22/2008 N S S 2.00

Additional grant of US$3 m from the Crisis Response Trust Fund to scale up agricultural productivity interventions

06/30/2009 N MS MS 19.71 Additional grant of US$16 m to scale up infrastructure investments

06/24/2011 N S S 40.76 Extension of Project closing date from December 31, 2011 to October 31, 2013

10/24/2013 MS MS 50.20

Extension of Project closing date from October 31, 2013 to September 30, 2014; revision to Results Framework; revision to legal agreement terms.

10/01/2014 N S S 51.49

Extension of Project closing date from September 30, 2014 to July 31, 2015 due to Ebola Virus Outbreak

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal

Country Background.

1. In June 2003, the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought 14 years of civil war and unrest in Liberia to a close. The protracted period of conflict was devastating for Liberia’s economy, government, and infrastructure. State institutions were severely eroded. Despite having achieved rapid economic growth during the 1960s and ‘70s and reaching nearly middle-income status, by 2003 Liberia was one of the world’s poorest countries with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately US$1511.

2. Post-war challenges facing Liberia were numerous and covered every area of society: an estimated 85 percent of the formal sector workforce was unemployed or underemployed; more than half of children were not in school; less than ten percent of the population had access to healthcare; the majority of rural houses, roads, and bridges were “in need of reconstruction”, etc.2 Migration resulting from insecurity in the countryside had doubled the urban population of Monrovia and there was an urgent need to establish security in the countryside so that internally displaced individuals could return and livelihoods, largely based in agriculture, could be rebuilt.

3. Liberia entered new era of peace ill equipped to rebuild. Government institutions were largely eroded by war and unprepared for the challenges of policy-making and reconstruction. The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) consisted of representatives of warring parties, political parties, civil society, and the country’s fifteen counties.3

4. In October 2005 Liberia was able to hold its first general elections since 1997. Despite a successful political transition to an elected government, Liberia was still in a state of crisis. Unemployment was estimated to be around 80 percent.4 Disarmament had only been completed the prior year (late 2004) and high unemployment increased the chances of Liberia backsliding into unrest and conflict. Key physical infrastructure required emergency repairs and rebuilding.

5. The first post war government of Liberia made clear its focus on growth-oriented policy, including land tenure reform to promote agricultural employment. While Liberia experienced an immediate peace dividend in the form of accelerating growth under the elected government, Liberia’s recovery and future stability were extremely fragile.

Sector Background.

6. Up until June 2006, reconstruction efforts in Liberia were limited to small operations consisting primarily of community-based rebuilding. These programs were led by non-governmental organizations and by the United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL), involved relatively little technical capacity, and primarily consisted of basic rebuilding of housing, roads,

1 Emergency Project Paper for the AIDP, World Bank 2007 2 National Transitional Government of Liberia, Joint Needs Assessment 3 Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Recovery 4 Joint African Development Bank/World Bank Interim Strategy Note (ISN) 2007-2008

2

and bridges, including rebuilding trust in communities and producing employment. As such, many critical infrastructure needs of the country were yet to be addressed and Liberia faced a infrastructure deficit that would eventually serve as an obstacle to growth and recovery. By 2007 Liberia had established a Special Implementation Unit (SIU) within the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) to undertake infrastructure works but had yet to undertake highly technical works on the scale necessary to rebuild and lacked the institutional capacity to do so.

7. Agriculture, the main source of livelihoods for approximately 80 percent of the population, accounted for 50 percent of GDP5 and was rightly identified to be of critical importance to Liberia’s short-term recovery and long-term stability. At the time of appraisal, Liberia faced immediate crises of food insecurity and unemployment, a global food crisis was emerging, and world food prices were increasing dramatically. The impacts of these increases were already evident in the domestic economy since food is such a large share of household expenditure and, even in 2007, 70 percent of Liberia’s food needs were met with imports. Investments in physical infrastructure, policy reform, and capacity were needed to improve farmer productivity. The consumer price index (CPI - in which food carries a weight of 45 percent) increased to 14 percent in March 2008, about 25 percent more than in January 2007. At appraisal, 48 percent of the population was unable to meet their basic food needs. Poverty was endemic, with an estimated national poverty rate of 64 percent, and the impact of food price increases on Liberia’s poor was severe. Rice is a staple food for Liberians, accounting for 37 percent of value of food consumption and 50 percent of daily calorific intake for the average household, but prices are relatively high and local production is relatively low. Increasing agricultural production was vital to reducing poverty and food insecurity and to increasing employment. 6

8. In an effort to advance agriculture development, the Government of Liberia (GOL) and development partners prepared a Comprehensive Assessment of the Agriculture Sector (CAAS-Lib) in 2007. The agriculture sector of Liberia consisted of large plantation producers focusing on export crops and a relatively small number of medium-size operations, and small household farms. Small household farms made up the majority of all farming and typically used traditional production techniques. CAAS-Lib recognized that the potential for agriculture to contribute maximally to poverty reduction and economic growth would hinge upon transformation of the sector from dominance by large cash-crop plantations and low productivity small holders into a system where higher productivity of small holders enables an increase in their participation in the cash economy. The key institutional challenges in the sector were: (a) the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was in need of top to bottom modernization; (b) MOA lacked basic capacity to collect and analyze data and formulate policy; and, (c) redevelopment of extension services. The sector suffered from lack of trucks and a weak market for trucking services, and from roads and bridges that were generally in very poor condition.

Rationale for Bank Assistance

9. To maintain peace and stability in the postwar transition, Liberia would need to resolve the acute economic, food insecurity, and employment crises. The agriculture sector had the greatest potential to create employment opportunities and address food insecurity, and was a natural focal point for development efforts. The Bank was already positioned as the donor of choice by the

5 The African Development Bank, The World Bank. Joint Interim Strategy Note 2007-2008. 6 The World Bank. 2008. Liberia - Emergency Food Crisis Response Program. Report No. 43788-LR.

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GOL to lead donor efforts in infrastructure development, particularly given its extensive global experience in reinstating large-scale transport infrastructure, particularly in post conflict situations. The Bank had also already been playing a key role in natural resource development and in revitalizing the forestry and the agricultural sectors. The rationale for AIDP was therefore to rebuild the agriculture sector and key infrastructure assets in order to address an already poor situation made worse by the global food crisis. A program for infrastructure development, which was originally conceived as a separate operation from agricultural activities, was combined with the agricultural investments in order to take advantage of synergies between the sectors.

10. The rationale for the infrastructure component of AIDP was relatively simple. A range of infrastructure investments across several sectors was needed to restore basic services and set the foundation for future growth and stability. These ranged from urban and rural roads and bridges, the municipal water supply and distribution system, the oil jetty and other basic facilities. AIDP also supported rebuilding the country’s capacity to manage infrastructure projects in order to establish a pathway to sustained reconstruction and growth.

11. The rationale for the agricultural component and aspects of the infrastructure component followed along the lines of the conclusions of the CAAS-Lib study. CAAS-Lib identified the overarching challenge to achieving poverty reduction in the sector as transforming the role of small-holder farmers from small-scale subsistence farmers to operations with greater participation in the cash economy.

Contribution to Higher Level Objectives

12. The project was consistent with the government’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) for the period 2006-08 as well as the Bank Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of 2007-2008. Specifically, the project supported pillars II and IV of the IPRS, which was built on four pillars: (a) enhancing national security; (b) revitalizing the economy; (c) strengthening governance and the rule of law; and (d) rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services. The World Bank’s ISN laid out a comprehensive 18-month strategy closely aligned to priorities expressed in the IPRS. This provided for a scaled-up International Development Association (IDA) pre-arrears program in infrastructure, economic governance reform, and delivery of basic services (community-driven development, health, and education).

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

13. The development objective of the project was to support the Recipient’s efforts to: (a) rehabilitate its basic infrastructure; and (b) revive its agriculture activities.7

14. The key performance indicators agreed between the government and the World Bank at appraisal were:

(i) Increased access to water for residents of Monrovia; (ii) Port productivity increased; (iii) Increased access to an all season road for targeted rural population; (iv) Increased number of markets where seed rice is available; and

7 The PDO wording here is taken from the Financing Agreement and differs slightly from the PDO wording in the PAD (found in the Data Sheet). The difference in wording is minor and does not impact the meaning of the PDO.

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(v) Percentage increase in metric tons of cocoa.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

15. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was not revised.

16. Restructuring of the project during implementation in October 2013 led to a revision of the project indicators as presented in the data sheet. The changes were mainly driven by the need to better reflect the interventions on the ground and eliminate complexity in project results monitoring.

17. The revised key indicators for the project at the time of closure, including key indicators that were achieved and dropped from monitoring, were as follows:

(a) Total rice production in Bong and Lofa counties; (b) Port productivity increased (moves per hour/crane); (c) Increased Access to an all-season road for targeted rural population; (d) Rice yield on beneficiary farms; and (e) Daily production of treated water.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

18. The main beneficiaries of the project were the people of Liberia at large who would benefit from the increased port productivity and increased food production and the population of urban and rural areas in Monrovia and along the Monrovia-Cotton Tree-Buchanan and Gate 15-Ganta corridors benefitting from road and bridge improvements. These include the population living within Monrovia city; rural community groups involved in rice, vegetable, and cassava farming on a household basis, and suppliers and service providers; community based organizations who ensured that the project activities were realized; and people employed in rural roads construction and along the Monrovia-Buchanan road corridor.

19. The specific institutions that participated in the project include the Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Agriculture, Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC), and National Port Authority (NPA). These institutions were direct beneficiaries of the funding that contributed to capacity building, policy reforms, and the improvements in infrastructure in the transport, water, port, and agriculture sectors.

20. The secondary target beneficiaries were: (a) the out growers of lowland rice; (b) the Ministry of Agriculture, county extension staff, and local groups who managed and sustained progress under the project toward sustainable increases in the incomes of rural dwellers affected by the project; and (c) residents of the urban area of Monrovia who benefitted from the increased volume of the urban water supply.

1.5 Original Components

21. The Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP) comprised of three components:

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Component A: Policy Reform and Institutional Support (Original Funding US$5.7 million excluding contingencies, no additional financing)

22. This component was designed to support the development of key strategic policies of the Government and strengthen relevant government entities. This includes a management contract for operation of the Port of Monrovia and complementary advisory services in undertaking comprehensive reform of the port sector, as well as funding of technical assistance to various entities of the Government responsible for transport and infrastructure. This component also was to provide: (a) targeted assistance for policy reforms and institutional strengthening of LWSC, improving the legal and regulatory framework, and capacity building in the water sector; and (b) technical assistance to the MOA to strengthen its capacity in policy formulation and planning, as well as monitoring, evaluation and statistical reporting.

Component B: Agriculture and Infrastructure Investment (Original Funding US$27.3 million, additional financing US$19 million, excluding contingencies)

23. This component was to finance the design, rehabilitation, and supervision activities of infrastructure assets. Included in these activities were rehabilitation and/or construction of: (a) the existing oil jetty in Freetown port; (b) major bridges on principal road corridors; (c) bridges on a number of smaller river crossings nationwide; (d) secondary and tertiary feeder roads; and (e) a feasibility, environmental and design study for a new landfill near Monrovia. Funds were also to be made available for developing a sustainable local roads maintenance capacity. The water treatment plant for Monrovia was targeted for rehabilitation to at least 50 percent of design capacity with the aim of improving provision of safe drinking water in selected secondary cities. In addition, this component covered the rehabilitation of Monrovia’s water distribution network (secondary and tertiary pipelines to connect to water posts and selected institutions/users).

24. The planned agriculture sector investments were: (a) to establish basic seed multiplication facilities to ensure seed availability for future planting; and (b) support existing Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs) to effectively manage the facility, including producing and marketing quality seed for local markets. This component was also to rebuild agriculture value and marketing chains such as marketplaces and post-harvest handling facilities concentrating on cocoa, coffee, food crops, and vegetable production, including support to FBOs to enhance production and on-farm community processing. Marketing infrastructure, including marketplaces, post-handling infrastructure, local distribution hubs, storage places, and local markets were also to be established.

Component C: Project Management and Capacity Building (Original Funding US$0.9 million excluding contingencies, no additional financing)

25. Under this component, incremental support was to be given to the existing project management and implementation entities, namely the SIU and Public Financial Management Unit (PFMU) of the MPW.

1.6 Revised Components

26. The project components were revised on several instances: in the first Additional Financing, in 2008; in the second Additional Financing, in 2009; and in the Restructuring in 2013. The project PDO was not revised but the Results Framework was revised twice, in 2008 and in 2013.

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27. Changes in 2008 consisted of scaling up the agriculture component through an Additional Financing grant of US$3.0 million from the Food Crisis Response Trust Fund (Grant H327-LR). The Grant supported expansion of the tree crop value chain enhancement activities being delivered by the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to include rice and cassava. This opportunistic restructuring was undertaken in response to the worsening global food price crisis and supported the existing PDO. Implementation arrangements continued to be through the SIU and PFMU. SIU recruited an agriculture specialist around the time of appraisal in order to strengthen implementation of the agriculture activities of the project. The existing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) arrangements were applied to the additional activities.

28. In 2009 an Additional Financing in the amount of US$16.0 million was approved to be applied to: (a) cost over-runs for two project activities, (i) pre-contracting design of road corridors, and (ii) higher than expected costs for reconstruction of the collapsed Vai Town Bridge; and (b) for scaling-up of the Monrovia-Cotton Tree Road Works by the addition of 83 km of road length originally planned to be deferred to a subsequent project. Several activities were also dropped from AIDP to be implemented under the Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (URIRP, Grants H4780 and TF094353). These include: rehabilitation of the oil jetty, maintenance of rehabilitated roads, and rehabilitation/reconstruction of five of the six bridges along the Monrovia-Ganta and Monrovia-Buchanan roads. The sixth bridge in the corridor required only minor repairs, which were to be funded by the government. This Additional Financing also retained the project’s existing implementation arrangements, via SIU and PFMU. The Project Paper noted the planned transition of the SIU into the Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU).

29. The Project underwent a third restructuring in 2013 to refine the results framework and, particularly, increase focus on staple food production. Cassava production was removed from the results framework, as rice had become the major focus of the expanded staple crop activities. Increased production of cocoa was also dropped as a PDO indicator, as tree crop activities would be delivered under a newly launched tree crops project, the Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Project (IDA Credit 5101). The number of markets where seed rice is available was also dropped. Although the project activities remained focused on increasing availability of seed rice, marketing of seed rice was found to be overly complex for the project’s focus (see Data Sheet).

1.7 Other significant changes

30. The Government of Liberia requested extension of the project closing date at no additional cost on three occasions. Additionally, in 2011, the legal agreement for Grant TF096385 was revised to allow retroactive financing of some water sector activities covered by the original Grant Agreement that were not originally anticipated to be financed retroactively. Table 1 provides an overview of project changes, including changes to components and results.

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Table 1: Additional Financings and Restructurings: Type of Change Date of Approval

Details of change Additional Financing: Food Crisis Response Trust Fund Grant TF092332 (US$3.0 million)

5/22/2008

Opportunistic Restructuring: Addition of staple crops rice and cassava to existing farmer training activities and to results framework

Additional Financing: IDA Grant H5040 (SDR 10.4 million, US$16 million equivalent)

6/30/2009

Corrective restructuring: Cost overruns: i) Pre-contracting road design; ii) Vai Town Bridge construction; Scaling-up: Monrovia-Cotton Tree Road Works expanded by 83 km. Dropped activities: road maintenance, jetty rehabilitation; five bridge improvements moved to URIRP project; one bridge dropped and repaired with government funds.

Restructuring: Extension of closing date 6/24/2011 22 month no-cost extension, from December 31, 2011 to October 31, 2013 to allow completion of agriculture and infrastructure activities

Restructuring: Extension of closing date and restructuring. 10/24/2013 Corrective Restructuring and Extension 11 months extension of closing date, to September 2014, to allow completion of agriculture and infrastructure activities; Revision to Grant Agreement TF096385 to allow retroactive financing of water activities Revision of Results Framework to remove cassava and elevate importance of rice

Restructuring: Extension of closing date 10/1/ 2014 10 months extension of closing date to allow completion of agriculture activities impacted by Ebola.

31. The first extension, of 22 months, was approved on June 24, 2011, from December 31, 2011 to October 31, 2013. The second extension, of 11 months, was approved on October 24, 2013, from October 31, 2013 to September 30, 2014. Both of these extensions were requested to allow additional time for project activities to be completed. The last project extension, approved by the Bank on October 1, 2014, was occasioned by the occurrence of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in Liberia. The outbreak brought several project activities in the agriculture sector to a standstill. An additional 10 months extension was approved on October 1, 2014, bringing the total time extension for the project to 43 months.

32. The project was prepared with co-financing of a €10 million Grant (US$12.5 million equivalent) from the European Commission (EC). The emergency project paper approved by the Board on July 31, 2007 indicated that an EC Grant was expected in September 2007. In spite of these good intentions several delays were experienced in getting the funds on stream. The trust fund (TF) Administration Agreement for the EC grant was signed on February 23, 2009. The TF was activated on August 4, 2009 and the Grant Agreement was signed on July 20, 2010, almost a year later. The delay in signing of the Grant Agreement left only 11 months for procurement and implementation of the targeted activities. The closing date for the grant was therefore extended from June 30, 2011 to July 31, 2012. The Grant Agreement was also amended to include

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retroactive financing to the tune of US$1,519,309.94 equivalent for eligible expenditures incurred on or after February 15, 2010.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

33. The AIDP was the first major IDA-funded project after the Emergency Infrastructure Project (EIP, IDA Grants H2360, H2560, and H5050) was approved in June 2006 and the second major IDA-funded reconstruction operation in Liberia following the end of the war period. AIDP was prepared as an emergency operation under the Bank’s OP 8.00 for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies. The situation in Liberia justified this approach as the OP 8.00 objectives include: (a) rebuilding and restoring physical assets; and (b) restoring the means of production and economic activities. In the determination of the project scope and activities to be prepared, the project built on the work carried out under the Technical Assistance (TA) project financed by Trust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB), which carried out a comprehensive infrastructure needs assessment identifying critical emergency works. Of these urgent needs, the Bank agreed with the GOL to focus on a short-term program of road rehabilitation, restoration of potable water supply, labor-intensive public works, and critical repairs of port and airport infrastructure. On the agricultural aspects, project preparation benefited from the integrated approach to agricultural development, which was a central component of the Liberia Agricultural Initiative (LAI), to which other development partners were providing parallel financing. The proposed activities related to revitalizing agriculture focused on the priorities identified by CAAS-Lib (a joint analytical work carried out in 2006-2007 by the MOA, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Bank, and International Fund for Agricultural Development) and contributed to the overall Program for Food Security developed by the MOA. The project was therefore well founded in the initial analytical work of the post-conflict era in Liberia.

34. Although lessons learnt and reflected in the project design are not explicitly stated in the Project Paper, (PP) the write up is nuanced with references to experiences elsewhere that were incorporated in the project design. The following key lessons are derived from the project paper:

Participatory approach to the selection of feeder roads in areas selected to benefit from agriculture productivity interventions, which potentially eliminates the risk of adverse selection of roads;

The use of farmers and farmer based groups to effectively organize and coordinate production and marketing activities based on a similar approach on the Sierra Leone Rural and Private Sector Development Project;

Maximization of synergies between agriculture productivity interventions and other infrastructure investments to achieve maximum impact of financing; and

Intense hands-on technical support to the borrower is required in fragile environments.

35. Quality at entry was not formally assessed by the Bank. However, the roll out of implementation suggests that the quality of entry was high. The project became effective in a relatively short period (within 6 weeks of Bank Board approval), emphasizing the readiness to kick start implementation rapidly under the emergency conditions. The resources expended by the Bank on key technical expertise to design the project, which covered technical and policy issues in-depth in infrastructure and agriculture, was also appreciable.

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36. Assessment of the project design. The PDO was relevant and responsive to the needs of Liberia in the early post-conflict era. It was defined to be broad and allowed a certain degree of flexibility to accommodate emergent needs of the emergency operation. The components were simple and well aligned with the development objective. The sectoral interventions identified were in critical need of restoration or reform. As noted in Paragraph 33, the initial postwar studies prioritized the needs and provided the guidance for selection of project activities.

37. The scope was highly ambitious when compared to the modest financial resources available for the project. From the point of view of implementation, the project was complex due to its multi-sectoral nature involving agriculture, roads, water, sanitation and ports, and the challenge of effective coordination of the project across these sectors. The capacity of the implementing agencies was assessed to be weak, and the project design made provision for capacity building in the SIU and the use of specialized agencies such as IITA and FAO for implementing significant agriculture sub-components to reduce the burden of implementation on the Ministry of Agriculture. Furthermore, the use of the FBOs was incorporated in the design to ensure structured transfer of farming knowledge to beneficiaries. Therefore, the proposed implementation arrangements were adequate and had taken into consideration the need to take mitigation action to augment project implementation. The design did acknowledge the limitations of a weak institutional environment in decision-making, and made provision for the development of critical policies and strategies to shape the future direction of Government, which is critical for sustainability of interventions. The project monitoring indicators were relatively simple and linked directly from the interventions proposed. Nevertheless, one indicator for rural accessibility (rural population within 2 km of an all season road), which is a core transport sector indicator, was included despite the lack of baseline data. This indicator proved difficult to monitor because of capacity constraints and the unit of measure was subsequently revised.

38. The project preparation envisaged co-financing by one partner, the EC. Preparation of the EC component, which focused on water and roads, was still in progress at the time of appraisal and was expected to be completed by September 2007. This added to the complexity of the design because activities could not be considered as one package, and had an impact on implementation focus.

39. Government commitment was satisfactory. Broadly, the government agreed with the need to establish key policies for the management of the sectors and facilitated discussions on the key policies to be addressed under the project. At the level of the presidency, there was a strong focus on the need to transform the port sector as a whole and particularly at the port of Monrovia, as efficiency had been hampered by noticeable mismanagement and misguided policies. A Presidential Delivery Unit (PDU) was also created to monitor and track development projects in Liberia, particularly in the infrastructure sector. The relatively short duration of project preparation under emergency conditions and the cooperation received from the multi-sector stakeholder groups is credited to government commitment.

40. With a high degree of relevance, good donor coordination, high government commitment and a simple but ambitious design, adequate implementation arrangements and minor drawbacks in the results framework, the overall project design is considered reasonably sound.

41. Assessment of risks. Project risks taken into account during preparation were: (i) risk of political unrest and social upheaval; (ii) inadequacy of internal controls in Government systems,

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(iii) risk of failure to achieve the project development objectives; and (iv) political resistance to institutional reforms and policy implementation.

42. The first risk is of a global nature to the project, and could not be addressed within the project scope. Strengthening the existing SIU with experienced procurement and contract management specialists mitigated the second risk. The third risk was deemed moderate on account of the number of activities being adequately spread across sectors to elicit a more than average level of performance. The proposed mitigation of the fourth risk included phasing of the reform process, if needed, and strong government commitment.

43. Overall, the task team did not assess project risks adequately; for instance, the Task Team failed to identify the critical risk that poor coordination with the co-financier could impact delivery despite the fact that the co-financed component was still under preparation at the time of Board approval of AIDP. The proposed mitigation measures for the identified risks were appropriate even though, in the post-conflict environment, difficulties were bound to be experienced in their implementation, as was also seen from the difficulties experienced in strengthening the technical capacity of SIU over the project period.

2.2 Implementation

44. The project was appraised in June 2007 and approved by the board on July 31, 2007. It was declared effective on September 11, 2007, after complying with all requirements needed to declare the effectiveness of the Financing Agreement. The following were the main factors that affected implementation.

45. Mid-Term Review: The mid-term review (MTR) was held from September to October 2008, just one year after project effectiveness, as part of the MTR for the entire transport portfolio, which was being managed in a programmatic manner. At this time, the Emergency Infrastructure Project (EIP) and the EIP Supplemental Component were also under implementation and the URIRP was under preparation. All these projects were under the management of the SIU. Therefore its limited capacity was stretched thin. Furthermore, the planned capacity building of the SIU has not materialized due to poor responses to requests for consultancy services for both firms and individuals to provide technical assistance for project management. The Bank, as anticipated at appraisal, had to engage in intense hands-on implementation support to help build the capacity of the SIU, including the provision of technical specialists in the field to augment the intense and frequent implementation support missions.

46. The MTR recommended the restructuring of implementation arrangements to replace the SIU with an autonomous IIU with international management. This was critical to achieve the needed skills mix required for managing the rapidly evolving program of donor projects being implemented by the MPW. The main incentive was international-level salaries for prospective project staff with suitable qualifications. The Government showed strong commitment to ensure a successful transition to the new arrangements, however, as noted above, and notwithstanding the change in approach, the capacity build-up was slow due to difficulties attracting the right caliber of professionals to Liberia to occupy the positions fielded.

47. Weak Project Management Capacity. Project Management was initially under the remit of the SIU. A year into the project, there was a restructuring of the unit to transform it into an IIU,

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responsible for managing all donor-funded projects as a program. Anticipated capacity strengthening did not unfold as expected. Though a program manager was successfully hired, a host of other positions went through a long speculative period of procurement before they could be filled. Coordination of all project activities was also problematic. MPW, in charge of the EC roads component, made slow progress and the agriculture component, with only one staff seconded from MOA to IIU, was also experiencing significant delays. While IDA continued to assist with intense hands on support to the IIU, a decision was made by MPW to bring on board the International Labor Organization (ILO) to handle the roads sub-component financed by the EC. Following a joint assessment of project implementation, IIU transferred responsibility of the agriculture sector activities to the Project Management Unit (PMU) that had been set up at the MOA with a separate designated account for the AIDP agriculture activities. This would ensure close follow up on the implementation of the agriculture productivity interventions.

48. Delays in procurement: Particular reference is made to the agricultural component, rural road rehabilitation (co-financed by EC), and the port activities. Start-up of agriculture activities under the project was delayed significantly. This was due to failure of the identified agriculture implementing agency, IITA, which had been sole-sourced, to come up with a good proposal for the execution of the proposed agriculture sector activities; on the rural roads, the MPW, which retained responsibility for implementation, lacked the capacity to move the project activities forward. When the project was restructured, provision was made to bring on board two additional implementing partners in the agriculture sector, the World Food Program (WFP) and AFRICARE, to minimize the risk of failure of the procurement process and utilize project funds in a more targeted way. The implementation of the port infrastructure, i.e. the rehabilitation of the oil jetty, was also delayed due to the inability to attract qualified international consultants to complete the feasibility studies in the first instance. Even when it was completed, the procurement of a contractor also failed; by this time it was apparent that the activity could not be funded under the project due to lack of funds arising from cost overruns on other sub-components, and the activity was consequently dropped from the project.

49. Delay in EC co-financing. The emergency project paper approved by the Board on July 31, 2007 indicated that an EC Grant to co-finance the project was under preparation and was expected in September 2007. While the IDA funds became effective on September 11, 2007, the trust fund Administration Agreement for the EC grant was signed on February 23, 2009. The trust fund was activated on August 4, 2009 but Grant Agreement TF96385, to the Government of Liberia, was signed on July 20, 2010, almost a year later. The delay in signing of the Grant Agreement left only 11 months for procurement and implementation of the targeted activities. The closing date for the grant was therefore extended from June 30, 2011 to July 31, 2012. The Grant agreement was also amended to include retroactive financing to the tune of US$1,519,309.94 equivalent for eligible expenditures incurred on or after February 15, 2010.

50. Due to implementation delays, the Government of Liberia, in April 2013, requested extension of the Closing Date of Grant TF96385 by another year to enable the planned activities in the water and road sectors to be completed; however, the request was turned down by the EC due to the limitation on availability of the EC grant as a result of closure of the European Development Fund (EDF) by December 31, 2012. In order to allow the Client to utilize as much of the balance funds as possible, IDA proposed to EC to repost the expenditure of US$1.5 million, which had been spent on rehabilitation of rural roads in the Bong, Nimba and Lofa counties under

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the IDA funded URIRP during the grant period, to Grant TF96385. The EC considered the proposal and indicated that eligibility requirements were satisfied, and therefore agreed to the reposting. Under the circumstances, it was not possible to fully utilize the EC grant on project activities. A refund was triggered in November 2011 on account of wrongly booked expenses. An uncommitted balance of US$3.8 million was also cancelled from the EC co-financing, and some incomplete activities had to be shifted to IDA for completion.

51. Food for work and cash for work incentives. The first additional financing of US$3.0 million was part of an overall emergency food crisis response program that provided additional grant to a community empowerment project (US$3.0 million) as well as a grant for food support for vulnerable women and children (US$4.0 million). The design incorporated food for work and cash for work incentives as a means of getting the populace to return to agriculture and mitigating hunger. This incentive was a new approach to the agricultural productivity interventions that worked positively and was well embraced within the communities where they were implemented. The significant achievement of increased land cultivation is partly attributable to this strategic change.

52. Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease. The outbreak of EVD from August 2014 till its subsidence in April 2015 impacted implementation of the remaining project activities at the time to a large degree, including the testing of high lift pumps installed at the White Plains treatment plant, food value chain development activities, as well as a community grain storage facility.

53. At the time of the outbreak the agriculture activities had picked up and were on course for completion. The outbreak resulted in decimation of the workforce and abandonment of farms for fear of the disease. Thus, though the total land available to be cultivated could not be fully rehabilitated and utilized due to EVD, the expected yield was met (98% achievement). Achievement of the targeted yield despite the impact of EVD can be attributed to higher than expected yields per hectare as a result of project interventions (improved rice varieties and adoption of lowland cultivation practices). Though the farm rehabilitation target was far less than expected, achievement of the targeted yield is a remarkable success of the agriculture intervention.

54. The outbreak of EVD also impacted the supply, installation testing, and commissioning of high lift pumps for the White Plains treatment plant, as well as pumps and generators for the Newport and Caldwell booster stations. With all elements in place, testing of the provided facilities was delayed till January 2015 on account of the reluctance of the supplier to mobilize staff under the conditions of EVD in Liberia.

2.2 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

55. Design. The original design had five PDO-level indicators and 11 intermediate results indicators. The project indicators selected were simple, focused, and relevant, with the indicators directly derived from achievement of project activities. The core indicator for rural accessibility, i.e. “increased access to an all season road for targeted rural population”, was relevant but difficult to measure. The government lacked a baseline measurement of this indicator at the time of appraisal. The PDO indicator for “increased number of markets where rice seed is available” was rather ambiguous. Also, the water investments indicator “Increased access to water for residents of Monrovia” was wrongly described even though the correct unit of measurement (millions of

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gallons/day) for measuring the intended project achievement (daily production of water) was used. Combining “production of rice and cassava” in a single indicator was also problematic and undesirable in terms of measurement. The PDO target levels were generally realistic, while the intermediate outcome indicators were mostly of a qualitative nature, which could easily be monitored. The indicators, while clearly linked to the PDO, had some shortcomings in regards to measurement and attribution of achievements.

56. While the design of the results framework suffered from some shortcomings, the PDO on the other hand was well aligned to the country’s post-conflict needs. The flexibility of the PDO allowed subsequent project restructuring to modify the results framework and fine tune the descriptions of the intended outcomes as needed to reflect the changing realities.

57. Implementation. The selected transport indicators were collected on a regular basis by staff of the SIU/IIU as the implementation of the project activities progressed, and were disseminated in quarterly progress reports. On the agriculture component, the implementing partners who came in after the additional financing effectively organized the data collection on an annual basis. Each implementing partner in the agriculture sector monitored progress by preparing monthly reports with inputs from community based organizations in a fairly robust set up with technical audits of the results. Thus though there were delays in implementation, the data collected was relevant.

58. Additional financing and restructuring of the project necessitated some changes to the results framework. Three of the original outcome indicators to measure agriculture productivity were dropped to remove the ambiguous indicator described above and to reflect a shift in focus from cassava and cocoa to rice. The changes in scope and focus on rice meant that new indicators had to be added to the outcome indicators to focus on rice production and yield, while the intermediate outcomes needed to include new indicators to reflect the outputs of the rice productivity interventions (community grain storage constructed or rehabilitated, foundation seed produced and distributed, and rice land cultivated in project areas, and small scale irrigation schemes rehabilitated in project areas). The remaining indicators were either continued with revisions to make them more targeted or dropped because they had been achieved. It is noteworthy that a substantial amount of project funding was targeted at the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor at the time of restructuring, and the project would have benefited from monitoring of an outcome such as reduced travel time along the corridor.

59. Utilization. The infrastructure components were relatively simple as they are linked to distinct outputs and did not require anything more than a rudimentary monitoring mechanism. The major impact is the establishment of a streamlined mechanism for monitoring of such data within IIU as projects are formulated. However, as noted earlier, the monitoring of the core indicator was an issue because of lack of capacity within the sector and was subsequently dropped. On hindsight, it is noted that an attempt at establishing a framework for its monitoring would have served for the longer-term needs for determination of the accessibility of road infrastructure. For the port sector in particular, the number of moves per crane continues to be monitored by the NPA, as it is linked to how investments are made by the concessionaire to improve efficiency. Also the indicator for production of water is easily measured at the White Plains Treatment Plant, where the newly installed high-lift pumps are fitted with instruments for measuring the potable water, which is pumped after production.

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60. As part of project funding, a sector-wide monitoring and evaluation mechanism was put in place within the PMU for monitoring outcomes in the agriculture sector. This system continues to work for other projects under implementation. Continuous monitoring of the project outcomes beyond the completion of project activities is therefore in place and is serving as good information for policy-making in the agriculture sector. The Monrovia port also routinely monitors the efficiency of container movement at the port.

2.3 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

61. Safeguards. AIDP was classified as a Category B project for environmental purposes and triggered OP/BP/GP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment). At the time of appraisal the environmental and social impacts of most AIDP activities had already been assessed and disclosed under the EIP and LIRP projects. The exceptions were the Vai Town Bridge and the agriculture investments. Per the provisions of OP 10.00, assessment of the environmental and social impacts of these activities could be deferred to the implementation phase. OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement was anticipated for the Vai Town Bridge pending confirmation of the bridge designs. The following instruments were disclosed in-country and at the Info Shop: Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) for water sector projects (prepared under an African Development Bank (AfDB) project); Environmental Mitigation Plan associated with Implementation of Emergency works for the Monrovia-Buchanan Corridor and Gate 15 to Guinea Border Road; Environmental Management Plan for Repair of Rural and Urban Roads in General; Environmental Management Plan & Resettlement Management Plan for the construction of a bridge replacing the collapsed/failed old bridge at Vai Town, Monrovia. Overall, the project complied with the requirements of all safeguards policies and is therefore rated satisfactory.

62. Financial Management. Financial management arrangements were adequate. The PFMU was adequately staffed with qualified and experienced financial management specialists throughout implementation. Project cost updates were maintained in a robust manner. The project’s audited accounts were submitted in a timely manner and the audit reports were of acceptable quality. Accounting was generally satisfactory for implementing partners who were using UN rules of engagement. The exception is ILO, which was contracted under EC co-financing for the implementation of rural roads. The closure of the EC co-financing was delayed on account of difficulties reconciling the expenditures of ILO on the project. At the time of closure of the EC grant, on July 31, 2012, the IIU failed to indicate to ILO to stop project activities. ILO therefore claimed expenses incurred beyond the closing date of the grant till the time of notification by IIU, i.e. September 27, 2012. The outstanding amount of US$115,574.34 was recorded by the EC as an ineligible expenditure and has since been refunded by the GOL (as communicated via letter dated November 9, 2015). While the project financial management processes and systems were well in place and maintained during implementation, the issues relating to the closure of the EC co-financing and the delays thereof on account of reconciliation of ILO’s expenditures justify a financial management rating of moderately satisfactory.

63. Procurement. The procurement activities of the AIDP project were carried out as planned. Performance was moderately satisfactory with several quality reviews necessitated prior to clearance of procurement documents. A review of post procurement activities was conducted during review meetings, which generally showed that procurement processes were carried out in accordance with the Legal Agreement/PAD, the World Bank procurement and consultant’s

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guidelines and the procurement plan. Steady progress was made during the project on record keeping, post procurement review (PPR) findings, and compliance with procurement procedures guidelines.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

64. A number of interventions are already in place to support or scale up completed activities and extend their impact beyond the life of the project. Some project activities that could not be implemented have been better defined and taken up for financing by donors, including IDA.

65. Ports. The construction of a new oil jetty is now financed by the Bank-funded Urban and Rural Infrastructure Development Project (URIRP, Credit 5351; Grants IDA-H4780, H6040, and Trust Fund Grants TF94353, TF98040, and TF16065).

66. Water. Other donors are currently making interventions to continue with the activities in the water sector that could not be funded by IDA. Full rehabilitation of the White Plains Water Treatment Plant and a 36 inch, 21 km transmission pipeline from the Plant to Paynesville Red Light in Monrovia is currently financed under an AfDB grant for an Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project (UWSSP).

67. Roads. Experiences derived from this project have already been incorporated in the current transport sector project, i.e. URIRP, and Liberia Road Asset Management Project (LIBRAMP, IDA Credits 4950 and 5167 and Trust Fund Grant TF99588).

68. Agriculture. Investment in revival of cocoa cultivation, which was dropped from the agriculture interventions, is now being financed by IDA under the Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Project (IDA Credit 5101) mentioned earlier. The cassava and rice production is also continued under the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Project (WAAPP).

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: High

69. The relevance of objectives is rated high. The project’s overall objective of supporting the Government of Liberia to re-establish basic infrastructure and revive agricultural activities is as relevant now as it was at appraisal. The project objective is fully consistent with the key development priorities that remain for Liberia today. The government’s Agenda for Transformation (AfT) is organized around five pillars: (i) Peace, Justice, Security and Rule of Law; (ii) Economic Transformation; (iii) Human Development; (iv) Governance and Public Institutions; and (v) Cross Cutting Issues. The World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (FY13-FY17) (CPS) is aligned with the Pillar II, III and IV of the AfT. AIDP focused on addressing three focal areas consistent with these strategies (i): Economic Transformation to reduce constraints to rapid, broad-based and sustained economic growth to create employment; (ii) Human Development to increase access and quality of basic social services and reducing vulnerability; and (iii) Governance and Public Sector Institutions to improve public sector and natural resources governance. The project objective therefore contributes to all three pillars of both the AfT and the

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CPS. Both transport and agriculture subsectors continue to be of high relevance in the strategy documents.

70. The relevance of design is also high. The project components and implementation arrangements were consistent with the project’s stated objectives. The design also responded well to the strategic objectives of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). Furthermore, the components were well aligned with the relevant sector institutions and delivery responsibility was delegated to those agencies with the appropriate motivation to ensure implementation of the proposed activities. The nature of the design allowed for scaling-up of interventions such as was seen in the agriculture sector when the food crisis situation was deteriorating in Liberia. The results framework was designed to capture all the sectoral interventions to a large extent, although results were not defined for monitoring the outcomes of policy reform and capacity building activities. While the number of institutions and implementing partners (including the co-financier) involved made implementation challenging from a coordination point of view, this does diminish the high degree of relevance of the project’s design.

71. Relevance of implementation is also high. The Bank’s implementation assistance was responsive to changing needs on the ground. For example, the Task team prepared US$3.0 million additional financing grant for scaling up the agricultural interventions under the project on account of a food crisis emergency response to Liberia. This was done ten months after board approval of the original project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Substantial

72. The AIDP largely achieved its development objective of supporting the Government's efforts in re-establishing basic infrastructure and in reviving the agriculture activities. Key infrastructure has been established and made a substantial contribution to the improvement of life in Liberia in general and Monrovia city in particular. An increase in the amount of potable water produced and available to Liberians has been achieved, from two million gallons per day (MG/D) at project inception to six MG/D. The project constructed a new Vai Town Bridge, a key piece of infrastructure in the city of Monrovia that ensures continued access to the city (the bridge collapsed during the construction period). A major highway between Monrovia and Roberts International Airport (Monrovia–Cotton tree corridor) including selected links in Monrovia (totaling 83km) has been successfully rehabilitated. The project has also made substantial contributions to the wellbeing of the beneficiaries and local economy, particularly in the ports and agriculture sectors. Improved port efficiency has resulted in increased willingness to do business (import and export) to and from Liberia, with concomitant effects on the national economy. Expansion in rural incomes and provision of skills for strengthening agriculture value chains through support for FBOs in both production and marketing was also significant outcome. There were significant increases in yields from the lowlands, reduced hunger from increased production and Food for Work incentives.

73. The achievement of the PDO is examined in the light of agreed outcome indicators as below. It must be noted that two indicators at the PDO level for increased port productivity and increased access to an all season road were achieved earlier on in the project implementation and

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subsequently dropped from monitoring of the results in accordance with established practice to cease monitoring completed indicators.

Table 2: Achievement of Project Development Objectives PDO Indicator Original Project

Target Revised Project

Target Achievement

Port productivity increased (moves per crane) 10 10 17

Increased access to an all season road (km) No target

established N/A 838

Daily production of treated water in Monrovia (MG/D)

8 8 6

Total rice production in Bong and Lofa counties (MT)

134,808 134,808 132,408

Rice yield on beneficiary farms MT/ha 1.44 1.44 2.44

(a) Port productivity increased. The outcome of the port component was to achieve increased port productivity. With the successful concessioning of the port to a landlord model, a private operator is now investing and improving the port operations and the result is seen in the increased number of moves per hour at the port, from 3 moves/crane at project inception to the current 17 moves per crane, reducing queuing and improving port efficiency.

(b) Increased access to an all season road. The project contributed to the construction of the 83km Monrovia-Cotton Tree corridor to asphaltic concrete finish. This has opened up the corridor by way of the availability of increased access to an all season road which impacts on the economic development along the corridor.

(c) Daily production of treated water in Monrovia (MG/D). The project targeted a production of 8 million gallons per day (MG/D) of water at the White Plains Treatment plant; 6 MG/D was achieved, i.e. 75 percent achievement. The supply and installation of two high lift pumps and generators at White Plains and two pumps and generators to the Newport and Caldwell booster stations was successfully completed, as was the rehabilitation of the Newport, Caldwell, and Ducor reservoirs, contributing to the increase in capacity to supply water. The impact is limited, though, because of weaknesses in the water distribution network that prevent water from getting into the reservoirs for supply (by gravity) to Monrovia. Effectively, the water gets only to Paynesville from the water treatment plant (WTP), and though the pumps are capable of delivering water under pressure at high speed, the poor condition of the distribution network does not allow the water to get to the reservoirs at Newport and Caldwell for onward distribution to Monrovia. That notwithstanding, the production capacity is available and water regularly finds its way into Monrovia and its environs via small-scale water supply operators.

(b) Total rice production in Bong and Lofa counties increased. This performance indicator measured the impact of the agricultural productivity interventions by measuring increased production of the main staple food in Liberia, which is rice. There was no baseline at the beginning of the project, but it can be inferred from the post conflict situation at appraisal that production was at best on subsistence level. The project achievement of 132,408 was slightly less than the

8 The indicator was reported as the increase in the number of kilometers of all season road available to the target population. The rehabilitation of the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor (83 km) is therefore reported here.

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target of 134,808 metric tons (MT) by 2,400 MT. This is regarded as a substantial achievement, which helped to improve food security in Liberia.

(b) Rice yield on beneficiary farms. Achievement of this performance indicator is about 69 percent more than the targeted yield on the average. Seed multiplication was carried out by AFRICARE/Central Agricultural Research Institute (CARI) to provide about 20 MT of foundation seed to farmers who had been organized into FBOs in Bong, Lofa, Gbarpolu and Bomi counties. The production of seed was supplemented by training of farmers in various techniques for increasing productivity on farms, as well as the construction of irrigation schemes in the lowland farming areas. The reported yield was from lowland farms in the where NERICA L19, NERICA 14, SUAKOKO 8 and AROMATIC rice varieties were provided to farmers. Before the project interventions, yield was averaging less than one (1.2) MT/hectare (ha) for lowland rice. Average rice yield per hectare achieved under the project was 2.5 MT/ha in Lofa County and 3 MT/ha in Bong County while 2.43 and 2.33 MT/ha was achieved in Gbarbolu and Bomi Counties, respectively.

74. The achievement of the intermediate outcome indicators which contributed overall to the achievement of the agreed outcome indicators, including those that were achieved and dropped from monitoring, is also discussed below:

Table 3: Achievement of Intermediate Outcomes Intermediate Outcome Indicator

Original Project Target

Revised Project Target Achievement

External Port Management Team in Place

External port management Team

in place by December 2009

External port management Team in

place by December 2009

Port management in place by February 2011

Draft National Transport Policy and Strategy Paper formulated and prepared for Governments review and endorsement

Management of transport sector in accordance with

strategy by December 2009

Management of transport sector in accordance with

strategy by December 2009

Transport policy and strategy paper

formulated in 2009 and National transport plan adopted in May 2012

New Vai Town Bridge built River crossings improved

Yes 30

Yes 25

Yes 25

Refurbishment of water treatment plant in Monrovia

50% 50% 50%

Foundation seeds produced and distributed to farmers in project areas

NA 20 >20

Small scale irrigation schemes rehabilitated in project areas (No.)

6 6 18

Rice land rehabilitation in project areas (ha)

300 ha 300 ha 195.8 ha

Grain storage constructed in project area

3 3 5

Grain storage rehabilitated in project area

1 1 3

75. The revised intermediate outcomes were focused on the infrastructure, i.e. roads/bridges and water, as well as the agriculture interventions. Overall the intermediate outcome indicators for the roads and water infrastructure were fully achieved. Refurbishment of the water treatment plant at White Plains to a level of 50 percent contributed significantly to the 6.0 MG/D daily

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production of treated water at the treatment plant. The New Vai Town bridge was also successfully built and officially commissioned on December 30, 2011; 25 out of 30 targeted minor river crossings were also improved by installation of bailey bridges

76. The intermediate outcome indicators for the agriculture sector were also substantially achieved. With the exception of the small-scale irrigation schemes and the area of land for rice rehabilitation, which fell short of the expected target by a fairly significant margin, all other indicators (for grain storage and production of foundation seeds) were fully achieved. These also contributed to the overall rice production in Bong and Lofa counties as well as the improved yield of rice per acre on the beneficiary farms.

77. Although the focus of AIDP shifted towards rice, the initial efforts of AIDP at developing new cassava varieties were continued under the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program APL (WAAPP-1C, IDA Credit 4883) which has resulted in eight new cassava varieties currently being cultivated by outgrowers.

78. On the policy and management side, the Draft National Transport Policy and Strategy paper was formulated ahead of the scheduled completion date of December 2009 and, following this, a National Transport plan was adopted in 2012. The establishment of an external port management team was also achieved by February 2011 after a delay of about a year, nevertheless a significant achievement in the annals of the NPA.

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Modest

79. In line with the Bank’s operational policy for emergency operations, OP 8.00, a conventional economic and financial analysis was not undertaken at appraisal because the conditions in Liberia at the time of appraisal and the emergency nature of the project simply did not lend themselves to rigorous financial and economic analysis. Under the circumstances, efficiency is judged on the manner in which implementation was carried out, and cost comparison of identifiable infrastructure. (See Annex 3.) In light of the several delays in implementation observed, specifically delays related to the procurement process and the processing of the EC grant for co-financing of the project, efficiency is rated modest.

80. Operational and administrative efficiency. Looking at efficiency from an operational and administrative perspective, it is clear that further factors need to be taken into account. The project was originally scheduled to close on December 31, 2011, i.e. four years and five months after Board approval. The project eventually closed eight years after Board approval. This was largely due to major delays initiating some components.

81. The agriculture component was delayed for three years because IITA, which was sole-sourced for implementation of the tree crops value chain activities, lacked the capacity and capability to fulfill the overall coordinating and management role even though it is a recognized institution in conducting successful programs in value chain development. Eventually this component was dropped and WFP and AfricaRice had to be recruited to focus on the food crops.

82. The Grant Agreement for the EC grant was signed on July 20, 2010, three years after Board approval of the project. The delay in signing of the Grant Agreement left only 11 months for

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procurement and implementation of the targeted activities. The closing date for the grant was therefore extended from June 30, 2011 to July 31, 2012. In the meantime, IDA funding had taken up some of the EC grant responsibilities in the water sector, pending effectiveness of the grant, and provision had to be made for retroactive financing of those activities under the Grant Agreement. The EC Grant Agreement was amended to allow retroactive financing and US$1,519,309.94 equivalent was reposted to the EC grant for eligible expenditures incurred on or after February 15, 2010. Furthermore, the EC activities could not be implemented beyond July 31, 2012 due to a decision of the EC to not extend the Trust Fund from which the grant funds came. Therefore, delayed EC-funded activities in the roads sector could not be implemented. With EC approval, some IDA-funded expenses for primary laterite roads in Bong and Lofa counties (which were consistent with the PDO of AIDP) were reposted to the EC grant in order to make maximum use of the grant funds. Such posting, reposting, and adjustment of expenditures contributed overall to operational efficiency but reflected administrative inefficiency arising from the delays in signing the grant agreement.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

83. This Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for this operation does not use a disbursement-weighted rating for the PDO. This decision is based primarily on the fact that the PDO remained the same throughout the project. In addition, revisions of the indicators were done to provide clarity and targets were revised upward to reflect the scaling-up of activities. Taking into consideration the high relevance of the PDO, the project design and implementation, as well as the achievement of the project objectives and modest efficiency, the overall project outcome is rated moderately satisfactory. Three out of the five key indicators selected in the lifetime of the project fully achieved their targets (i.e. port productivity, rice production and rice yield). The target for water production was 75 percent achieved while the target for increased access to an all season road is considered reasonable and substantial (83km of Monrovia-Cotton tree corridor rehabilitated) though no target was set during appraisal.. These achievements were within reasonable budget and modest efficiency.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

(i) Poverty impact and gender. Poverty and food insecurity are high across the country and particularly acute in Liberia’s rural areas. The government-led 2012 Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) found that every fifth household in Liberia is food insecure, with the highest rates found in Bomi (55 percent), Grand Kru (46 percent), and River Cess (45 percent) counties. Food insecurity and poverty are strongly correlated, as poor rural households with informal livelihoods tend to be the most food insecure. The project greatly contributed to reducing food insecurity in Liberia as it helped to increase agricultural productivity, which simultaneously improved the livelihoods of vulnerable youth and women by providing their basic social needs. As it aimed at promoting the production of quality and sufficient planting materials for the Liberian farming population, the project helped provide essential inputs - including knowledge - to scale-up production and rebuild physical marketing infrastructure such as market places and post-harvest handling facilities (concentrating on cocoa, coffee, food crops and vegetable production).

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The project had substantially positive impacts on women, particularly in the agriculture activities. Women constitute a dominant force in the rural communities. 80 FBO’s, with a combined membership of 2,000, were engaged in the project in Bong and Lofa Counties and 60 percent of these participating FBOs’ members were women. The project trained community and beneficiary female group members in rice post-harvest handling and processing using training methodology and modules that were adapted to the context of the target participants. Through its strong capacity building focus, the project left behind communities with tremendous knowledge and learning to undertake similar initiatives on their own.

(ii) Impact on incomes of farmer based organizations. The improved business climate for farmers enabled the establishment of Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLAs) under the management of three executives. In Bomi County, for example, the VSLA of the FBO sold surplus of the rice produced in 2013 and opened a bank account with the proceeds worth about US$800 (LR$75,000). These proceeds are used to purchase farm implements for group farming, or are given out as loans to members, payable by harvest from the member’s farming plots in the next season.

(iii) Collaboration between MOA and local farmers. As part of agricultural productivity interventions, collaboration between MOA and local farmers was reorganized through the FBOs. This strategy was adopted in order to increase the production and sales of quality rice seed and strengthen market oriented FBOs.

(iv) Improved Citizen-Government relations. The project, with its broad coverage of activities across several sectors, may be said to have improved the relations between citizens and government. The provision of jobs, access to social amenities, training in agriculture as a livelihood and other impacts, such as reconstruction of Agricultural Extensions, have all contributed to better relations between the citizenry and government. In light of the decline in the government’s legitimacy during the war period, the government’s ability to effectively deliver agricultural programs in rural areas is a significant accomplishment in Liberia’s post-conflict development.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

84. Ports. The successful concessioning of the ports to a private sector operator represents a landmark achievement for the Freeport of Monrovia and Liberia at large. The improvements in port productivity are already evident. Additional investments will be made by the concessionaire to continue with port improvement and efficiency at determined benchmarks over the 25-year period.

85. MPW and local contractors - Under the rural road investments funded by the EC co-financing grant, three (3) engineers of the MPW were trained as trainers in labor-based road building technology. Twenty-four MPW staff completed training under ILO in feeder roads and drainage design, while three representatives each from twenty local contractors were trained in labor based methods in Road Rehabilitation based on a 1.9 km pilot section from Bensonville to Low Cost village. Training of community based groups for maintenance of roads could not be accomplished due to closure of EC funds.

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86. LWSC – following the supply of Transformer at White Plains Treatment Plant for High Lift Pumps, 20 technicians were trained in the operations and maintenance of the pumps.

87. IIU and PFMU – The project continued to provide incremental support to these units, including recruitment of key and support staff in procurement and financial management. Despite all challenges, IIU and PFMU have built capacity over time, handled their work-load well, and are counted amongst the better performing entities in the government.

88. Ministry of Agriculture - The implementation coordination capacity of the supervising Ministry of Agriculture and its agencies was strengthened by the project as evidenced by the project support to the Ministry’s PMU and the Central Agricultural Research Institute. The project provided support for the staffing of the PMU including Project Director, Financial Manager, and Procurement Specialist. A web based M&E system was also developed and has evolved into a single framework for monitoring of all projects. About 20 professionals have been trained in various aspects of seed multiplication technology and seed genetics at CARI. The intervention provided the national staff of MOA and CARI, as well as local government, the opportunity to improve the living standard of the vulnerable communities. This exercise led to improved production, ability to market assets, and increased income.

89. Farmer Based Organizations - Building the capacity of farmers’ organizations was very important aspect of the project. Farmer field schools were conducted under the project to teach and demonstrate improved farming techniques, utilization of the improved low cost technology (rice planter, row weeder, threshers, etc.) for rice production, as well as post-harvest technology for preservation of food. Business and marketing skills were also disseminated at such workshops.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

90. Establishment of Community Grain Reserves (CGRs) built by the project played a vital role in providing first response to the hunger crisis precipitated by the Ebola Crisis in Liberia. Many people who had migrated from the areas that were hard hit by the virus turned to the areas/counties where CGRs were in place to seek food and shelter. This played a major role in stemming potential nutrition related deaths during the Ebola crisis.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

91. A beneficiary survey was conducted during the ICR mission to interact with the beneficiaries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the agriculture productivity interventions with the view to understand how they had been impacted by the project. The beneficiaries were very satisfied with the support they had received from the project. Significant positive impacts were reported on livelihoods and household incomes, crop cultivation habits, food self-sufficiency and capacity building aspects of the project intervention. Interviews were also held with the other key stakeholders, i.e. MOA, WFP, AFRICARE, FAO, and the local NGOs who were involved in sensitization and training of FBOs. All the stakeholders expressed the need for the government of Liberia to assume ownership of the project after the closing date for it to be sustainable.

92. Change in community crop cultivation habits. Traditionally, farming in Liberia has been principally on higher ground. The valleys, though well watered all year round, are seen as difficult

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to cultivate, culturally. Through intensive sensitization campaigns carried out in beneficiary communities by NGOs rice cultivation was adopted in the low lands. This enabled at last two harvests per year and increased the benefits and profits. The use of FBOs brought about some cohesion in the communities, with benefits of increased productivity accruing to the groups.

93. Improved livelihoods and household incomes. There was a dramatic increase in the livelihoods of beneficiaries participating in the project, mainly due to the cash and food for work programs at the initial stages of the project, in which individuals were paid to help prepare farms for planting. Through the supply of seed varieties to farmers a majority of households were able to plant, harvest, and keep seeds for the next season, and sell the surplus. This culminated in increased incomes for the beneficiary households. With an increase in income levels, some of the households have embarked on facelift programs and acquisition of personal farming assets such as pumps for irrigation of farms, farm implements, etc.

94. Improved food self-sufficiency. The project helped beneficiaries accumulate enough foodstuffs from the 2013 and 2014 season and, as a result, most beneficiaries were able to save money that would have been used to purchase food for use for other purposes, such as expenditure on their children’s education and health care for members of their households. Incidentally, the outbreak of EVD brought about heavy reliance on the food reserves in the community grain storage facilities, as many people from affected areas started to migrate in search of food and safety from the disease. To a large extent, this food self-sufficiency helped to stem the tide of nutrition related deaths during the EVD outbreak.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

95. The risk to development outcomes and sustainability of project benefits is rated significant, given the number of issues that are likely to impact the development outcomes in each sub-sector.

96. Roads. The initially targeted roads for the EC component were not fully completed. Only drainage works were carried out and re-gravelling contracts could not be signed before the grant closing date. There have been no further interventions along these roads, and the competing demands for budgetary allocations suggest that these roads are unlikely to be rehabilitated in the short-to medium-term. Therefore the risk is rated significant.

97. Water. The water sector is also faced with significant operational inefficiencies in spite of achieving a potable water production of 50 percent of the capacity of the WTP. The outcomes in the water sector are contingent upon further adequate investments in improving overall operational efficiency - in particular ensuring the integrity of the distribution network and reducing revenue loss by strengthening cost recovery mechanisms. The current lack of institutional capacity to address the management and operational issues poses a significant risk to development outcome.

98. Ports. The successful concessioning of the port for 25 years and the improved productivity of the concessionaire, APM Terminals, would render the risk to development outcome low. Furthermore, government ownership is high and the government continues to maintain a keen focus on developments at the port.

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99. Agriculture. The increased levels of rice production are readily absorbed, currently, by the WFP for the national school-feeding program. The evidence is that the purchase price of locally produced rice is about 45 percent higher than what is openly available on the market. This could be evidence of lopsided government policies and merits further investigation as to the underlying causes. This is a significant risk to development outcome because unless locally produced rice is sold at a price lower than what is imported, the economic benefits to farmers will be eroded, and will serve as a disincentive to farmers when the policy of buying school food from local markets is ended.

100. Risk of Ebola virus outbreak is rated moderate. The outbreak of Ebola, which impacted the project toward the end, has been successfully contained in Liberia. Given the devastating nature of the virus, mutation and flare ups could occur, however the level of vigilance seen in Liberia, which has continued to maintain the structures and systems established for containment of the disease, would render the risk moderate.

101. Institutional risk to development outcome is rated high. In the MOA for example, systems for monitoring, evaluation, and strengthening of project and financial management functions have been established. Government commitment is also seen in the port reforms and in the establishment of policies and strategies in the transport and agriculture sectors for future guidance. However, the slow buildup of capacity across the institutions renders this risk high because of the challenges in maintaining an institutional focus for implementation of these strategies, policies, and measures.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

102. Bank performance during project entry was satisfactory. The project was well conceived and responded to the pertinent issues in the immediate post-conflict era of Liberia. The relevant OP/BP8.0 was employed for processing the operation and it ensured a rapid response to alleviate the situation in Liberia. The design combined critical institutional reforms in the port sector, capacity building of the weakened institutions and other forms of institutional support. Although the design covered five subsectors of the economy, the selection of the interventions was well targeted. The Bank was able to mobilize a highly competent cross-sectoral team at short notice with a range of skills to cover the project’s institutional and technical requirements. The speed of processing the operation was commendable and in the true spirit of emergency projects. Appraisal was completed on May 12, 2007; the Board approved on July 31, 2007; and effectiveness was declared on September 11, 2007. The Bank team also leveraged effective donor coordination to bring on board sizeable EC co-financing for road and water infrastructure.

103. The results framework though simple and straightforward had some shortcomings in terms of focus and measurement of results. It is considered that, though some shortcomings were observed in the M&E framework, the overall picture of Bank performance remains satisfactory.

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(b) Quality of Supervision


104. The Bank's performance during implementation of the project was satisfactory. The Bank team paid great attention to the quality of supervision. The team organized no fewer than 14 implementation support missions consisting of up to four missions in some years. In addition, specialists on the team supported supervision through intensive sector-focused missions, such as for ports and agriculture sectors. Though the Task Team Leader was changed three times during the project, adequate focus on project objectives was maintained at all times. Implementation progress was adequately reported, and implementation problems were identified early and addressed proactively. Performance ratings given in the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were realistic, and sufficient attention was paid to the project’s likely development impact. Supervision reports were sufficiently detailed and well written, and highlighted key issues, with action plans for next steps. Working relationships with the donors, whose presence increased over time, were effective.

105. Early in project implementation, a general MTR for all transport projects was held. This enabled strategic decisions regarding implementation, particularly regarding the transformation of SIU to IIU with greater autonomy. The team also took action to scale up interventions, such as for the food crisis response window grant, and restructured the project as needed based on emerging realities on the ground. The latest cause for restructuring was the incidence of EVD, which led to a further extension of the project by 10 months to allow agriculture interventions to generate another cycle of rice production.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


106. The overall performance is rated satisfactory. The project preparation was efficient, objective was sound, and highly relevant to the context, and the project supported clearly focused activities aligned with the government’s i-PRSP. Bank supervision was also intense and proactive in recommending changes as and when needed. Restructuring was also effectively used to streamline the project activities and clarify outcomes.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


107. Government performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory based on the high degree of commitment shown to the project and clear sense of project ownership throughout the project life, with some drawbacks in the areas of agriculture, water and rural roads. The government ensured that all effectiveness conditions were met quickly. During implementation, the government showed interest in the progress of project activities, particularly the reforms. Port reform, for example, was under the purview of the Project Development Unit, which was sitting right in President’s office. Several changes were made to the port to bring on board the right management to lead the port reforms. In the case of the squatters to be resettled from Vai Town bridge construction, the government expeditiously implemented the safeguards policy and funds for compensation were released in a timely manner. However, in the case of the reforms in the

26

agriculture and water sectors, as well as the implementation of the rural roads financed by the EC, government drive was not very evident.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


108. The implementing agency’s performance is rated moderately satisfactory. The SIU was highly committed to achieving the Project Development Objectives and had sufficient resources to perform well. However there were challenges in achieving the required staffing levels at the SIU due to difficulties attracting the right quality of professionals. Even when the SIU was transformed into the IIU, and was granted greater autonomy, the same situation prevailed and the professionals on board were stretched. This led to some lapses in project administration and in the agriculture component, which was proceeding slowly at the beginning.

109. In spite of these challenges, the IIU and PFMU ensured compliance with Bank safeguards and fiduciary policies. Adequate financial management systems were established and maintained; the procurement recordkeeping and reporting improved through the project life. After the responsibility for the agriculture activities was transferred to the PMU of the MOA, the IIU maintained effective coordination of agriculture and infrastructure investments. However, management of the ILO-implemented EC grant was problematic and symptomatic of the inability to manage the increasing transport portfolio with the available staffing. As a consequence, funds were cancelled from the EC grant.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


110. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated moderately satisfactory. The borrower demonstrated a high level of commitment to the project objectives and ensured that the project stayed on course to achieve the intended development outcomes. In spite of capacity challenges, the IIU/PFMU did well to ensure compliance with all legal covenants satisfactorily. However, the challenges with the ILO implementation of the infrastructure components under the EC grant, leading to cancellation of funds, which could have been used effectively, would appear as a major setback in performance under the circumstances.

6. Lessons Learned

111. The following lessons are drawn from the implementation of project activities:

(a) Government commitment for reforms secured early i.e. during project conceptualization is critical to successful implementation of institutional reforms. This is seen in the reforms carried out in the port sector successfully transforming the Port of Monrovia to a landlord port model. Even though the consultancy contract was terminated, the government remained resolute and made the necessary management changes in NPA to ensure that the reforms were properly understood and carried through.

(b) The conditions for Grant and Administration agreement for other partners (the EC in this case) should be well aligned with the Bank Financing agreement with the borrower

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to avoid the misinterpretation of the Grant Agreement by the borrower. This is a reflection of the inability of the EC grant to be extended beyond July 2012 due to an overarching decision by the EC to end the funding cycle in 2012.

(c) Free standing grants to support projects should be planned with similar objectives, project activities, and implementing arrangements in order to provide flexibility and efficiency in the use of funds. The EC co-financing provided a good example of such flexibility, and in the unforeseen event of the three-year delay in making the grant effective, allowed for IDA-executed eligible activities to be funded by the EC seamlessly.

(d) Projects designed to provide systems should be prepared from the viewpoint that the entire system needs to be delivered satisfactorily for it to perform as a whole. The failure to deliver the entire planned water system provides a good example of the inherent risk in having different funding sources delivering different components. Splitting up interdependent systems into separate packages to be financed by a single financing source is therefore critical for a satisfactory outcome and to avoid mismatched implementation schedules.

(e) A higher standard of due diligence is required in the Procurement of suppliers in weak operating environments to ensure selection of qualified suppliers who are most likely to perform satisfactorily. For example it was assumed that the IITA, being present on the ground, could easily be sole sourced for the implementation of the agriculture component for Tree Crops; however this could not materialize and had to be abandoned and replaced by contracts with WFP and AFRICARE.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

112. Comments made by the borrower are found in Annex 6A of the ICR and notes the need to synchronize the Administration agreements between the World Bank and co-financiers, (the EC in this case). This has also been noted by the ICR and reflected in the section on lessons learnt. (b) Co-financiers

113. Comments made by EC are captured in Annex 7 of the ICR and relate mainly to the components funded by the EC for which project performance was considered unsatisfactory with only 62 percent of Grant funds spent and the remainder reimbursed. 114. On the comment of the PDO indicators that were dropped, it is accepted practice to drop indicators that have been achieved from monitoring during restructuring. However, the dropped indicators are still evaluated as part of the assessment of the PDO. 115. The satisfactory rating of the Achievement of the PDO is largely a reflection of the project activities achieved over the course of implementation. It is noted that even though the EC could not finance some of the activities to completion, these were taken over by IDA funding and completed. Therefore, the closure of EC funding was alleviated by the flexibility of the available IDA funds to cover the same activities. Admittedly, greater utilization of available funds would have further enhanced the project’s achievements.

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116. The satisfactory rating of Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry is also viewed by the EC as unrealistic. The assessment is based on a number of factors that went into preparation as outlined in Paragraphs 33-35. The rating was selected to reflect the circumstances of a post conflict environment and the need to respond in a timely and flexible manner, and the concrete actions taken by the Bank to ensure quality. A satisfactory rating would indicate that there were shortcomings in the process but not so critical as to derail the objective of the project.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

117. No other stakeholders or partners provided feedback on this ICR.

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ANNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Project Cost By Component

AIDP (July 31,

2007)

AIDP AF1 (June 21,

2008)

AIDP AF2 (June 30,

2009)

Total Project

Cost

Actual/ Latest

Estimate

Percentage of Actual Financed

(US$ m) (US$ m) (US$ m) (US$ m) (US$ m)

1

Policy Reform Studies and Technical Assistance

5.70 0.00 0.00 5.70 9.56 168%

2 Agriculture and Infrastructure Investments

27.25 3.00 16.00 46.25 43.07 93%

3

Project Management and Capacity Building

0.90 0.90 3.94 438%

Baseline Cost for IDA funded portion

33.85 3.00 16.00 52.85 56.57 107%

Contingency 15% (civil works only)

3.15 3.15 0%

Total 37.00 3.00 16.00 56.00 56.57 101%

4 EC Funded Infrastructure

4a Feeder Rural Roads (including

di )

6.00 6.00 3.57 60%

4b Local road maintenance 1.50 1.50 1.39 93%

4c Water 3.75 3.75 3.59 96%

Baseline cost of EC funded 11.25 11.25 8.55 76%

Contingency (15% civil 1.25 1.25 0%

TOTAL (€10 million

12.50 12.50 8.55 68%

GRAND TOTAL

49.50 68.50 64.61 94%

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(b) Financing Source of

Funds Type of Co-

financing Appraisal Estimate

(USS millions)

Revised Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/ Latest

Estimate (US$

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Percentage of Revised Estimate

Borrower 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% IDA Grant 37.00 56.00 56.57 153% 101% EC co-financing

12.9* 8.55 8.55 66% 100%

* EC Co-financing was €10m, an equivalent of US$12.5 million at the time of appraisal. The effective value at the time the grant was executed was US$12.9m ** Revised estimate is due to cancellation of US$4.48m at the time of closure of the EC grant Note: Increase observed in actual funds disbursed is a result of USD gains on the SDR.

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ANNEX 2: OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Component/Activity Description

End of Project Target Outputs/Remarks

Component 1: Policy Reforms and Capacity Building

1a. Policy Reform and Capacity Building.

2-3 year management contract for operation of port of Monrovia to undertake institutional and legal reforms.

Technical assistance was procured to support GOL reforming the Liberian Port Sector in three main phases:

Phase1: Analysis and recommendation for the restructuring.

Phase 2: Detailing and finalization of the legal and institutional frameworks, organizational structure, and preparation, leading to implementation of port sector reform.

Phase 3: Intermittent support to new institutional and managerial structure

Service was mutually terminated due to delays in implementation.

However, NPA was in the position to proceed with the reforms on the basis of the studies conducted.

Reform and professionalization of LWSC to make it financially viable.

Not achieved.

Preparation of National Transport Policy and Strategy Paper for Government consideration and endorsement.

National Transport Policy was formulated in 2009. National Transport Plan was prepared and finally adopted in May 2012. This is serving as a guiding document for decision-making in the transport sector.

Strengthening of Policy Planning and Coordination Unit of MOA: (i) to support the monitoring, evaluation, and statistical capacity of the MOA; and (ii) to develop priority agriculture sector policies.

Rehabilitation of Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) Bong Regional Offices, Central Agriculture Research Institute (CARI), Bong County.

Technical Assistance for Program Coordination, Financial Management, and Procurement Advisor procured for PMU of MOA.

High priority agriculture sector policies produced and submitted for approval.

Not achieved. Focus was on developing a basic ability to monitor results and plan activities.

Review and Reform of Existing parastatals, in particular LPMC.

Not achieved.

1b. Value Chain Development

Value Chain Development: to provide technical assistance to farmer based organizations to support agricultural production of

2,046 beneficiaries were organized in 62 FBOs who now have the ability to organize themselves to work as a group, seek new knowledge and access market. 87 percent.

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tree crops and food crops along value and marketing chains. To increase production and marketing of rice seeds.

Strengthening agriculture value and marketing chains: improving the production, basic processing and marketing of agricultural crops, including small-holder tree crops (coffee and especially cocoa) and food crops (including food staples such as rice as well as vegetables/ horticulture).

Productive Infrastructure support: (i) productive and marketing infrastructure including market places; (ii) local agriculture distribution hubs, storage facilities and post-harvest handling facilities; and (iii) rehabilitation and maintenance of seed multiplication facilities to supply quality seeds to farmers.

The project targeted 240 ha to be developed and rehabilitated, of which, 198.5 ha was fully developed. (Gbarpolu 84.9 ha out of 100 ha developed; Bomi- 93.1 ha out of a target of 100 ha fully developed; and Grand Kru – 17.8 ha out of a target of 40 ha developed).

Low land rice production increased to 1.4 MT

Rice yield on beneficiary farms increased. By the end of the project, the average increase in rice production was 132,408 MT.

The yield (1.2 MT/ha in low land) had increased to 2.5 MT/ha in low land in Bong; 3 MT/ha in lowland Lofa; and 2.43 MT/ha in Gbarpolu and 2.33 MT/ha in Bomi. Increase was mainly due to improved rice variety provided by AfricaRice. Yield went above project target of 1.44 MT/ha.

1c. Seed Multiplication Establish basic seed multiplication facilities to supply high quality rice seed for rice farmers.

Rehabilitation of essential infrastructure (irrigation, basic machinery and post-harvest handling including threshing, sorting, and bagging of seed rice); and

Support to existing FBOs to effectively manage the facility to produce and market quality seed for local markets.

Production of over 20 MT of Foundation seed and restoration of 3 lost varieties at CARI.

Foundation seed (including improved varieties and reintroduced old varieties) produced and distributed in project areas.

Over 20 tons foundation and breeder seed produced achieving project target of 20 MT and distributed to over 27 out growers in Bong, Lofa, Gbarpolu, Grandkru and Bomi Counties. And the restoration of over 3 lost varieties to Liberia Farmers. Rice seed availability was ensured for next planting seasons.

Component 2:Agriculture and Infrastructure Investments

2a. Bridges - Construction/Rehabilitation

Six main bridges on Monrovia-Ganta/Monrovia-

Dropped due to lack of funds.

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of 6 bridges on Monrovia-Ganta/Monrovia-Buchanan.

Buchanan rehabilitated by June 30, 2009.

2b. Bridges - River crossings and small bridge construction nationwide.

30 minor river crossings improved by June 30, 2010.

Intervention was re-scoped to address installation of 27 Bailey bridges purchased under another program. All the 27 Bailey bridges installed and operational at 25 river crossings.

63 percent of target achieved. Accessibility is improved in these areas.

2c. Bridges - Vai Town bridge: feasibility/design and construction.

New Vai Town Bridge built by December 31, 2008.

New Vai Town Bridge built and commissioned officially on December 30, 2011.

2d. Port - Oil jetty rehabilitation.

Refurbishment of the Oil Jetty structure including construction of new off-load station, mooring dolphins, and walkways by December 31, 2008.

Not achieved. Scope changed. Intervention limited to Conceptual Design and preparation of bidding documents for Design and Build for the Fuel Unloading Facility in the Freeport of Monrovia.

Paving Container Yard (21,600 sq.m) along with four (4) internal access routes at the Freeport-National Port Authority (NPA).

Part funding of Monitoring/Supervision Consultancy Services for New Fuel Unloading Facility at the Port of Monrovia.

2e. Port - Management contract, sector reform, and implementation.

External Port Management team in place.

Monrovia Port transformed from State-owned enterprise into a “landlord port” with private operator (APM Terminals) in charge of Port Operations on a 25-year concession contract.

The efficiency of port services upgraded improving ship turnaround time.

Improved security by cutting theft by 90 percent through surveillance camera.

Port Productivity increased from 3 moves/hr./crane to 10 moves/hr./crane that exceeded the target.

2f. Roads - Monrovia Buchanan additional financing.

Monrovia-Cotton Tree corridor rehabilitated.

83 kilometers of Monrovia-Buchanan corridor rehabilitated. Partly funded under URIRP.

2g. Roads - Maintenance of rehabilitated roads.

Rural population within 2 km of an all season road increases.

Dropped due to lack of funds. Accessibility indicator is limited to Monrovia-Cotton Tree corridor; however, there was no capacity within transport sector to measure this indicator.

2h. Roads - Redesign Gate 15 - Ganta-Guinea border.

Redesign of Gate 15 to Ganta Corridor.

Conceptual Design and bidding documents prepared. Currently being implemented under LIBRAMP.

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2i. Solid Waste - Landfill site study (feasibility and EIA).

Improved Waste management in Monrovia and its environs.

Feasibility, environmental, and design study completed for the new landfill location at Mt Barclay. Handed over to EMUS project.

2j. Water - White Plains 1/2 design capacity and improve distribution.

8 million gallons of production of portable water per day to be achieved.

Supply, Installation, Testing & Commissioning of High Lift Pumps and Generators.

Supply of Transformer at White Plains Treatment Plant for High Lift Pumps.

Training of Technicians in the Operations & Maintenance of the Pumps.

Moulded Case Breaker (MCCB) procured for White Plains Water Treatment Plant.

Spare Parts procured for the Newly Installed High Lift Pumps of White Plains Water Treatment Plant.

Pumping rate of portable water increased from 2 MG/D to 6 MG/D. 75 percent achieved.

However problems with the distribution network are affecting its delivery to project beneficiaries.

2k. Water - Secondary cities.

Monrovia Distribution Network (Lot 1B) tested.

Reconstruction of Caldwell Booster Station Fence Works, Caldwell Junction, Monrovia, Liberia.

Component 3. Project Management and Capacity Building Project Management/Capacity Building.

Incremental cost of supporting existing IIU and PFMU.

Capacity building in the infrastructure sectors.

Component 4. EC Funded Infrastructure 4a. Feeder Rural Roads (including studies).

Incremental cost of supporting existing IIU and PFMU.

Capacity building in the infrastructure sectors.

200 km of feeder roads in Lofa, Nimba, and Bong Counties targeted for studies rehabilitation.

Culvert/drainage works: 457 cross drainage were built against a targeted 623. The originally planned road works were not executed at all due to higher than estimated costs as well as closure of EC funding.

Works for IDA in the same locations assigned to the EC grant totaling 618 km of road rehabilitation. Original target exceeded by 220 percent.

4b. Local road maintenance capacity development (including studies).

Capacity Development for MPW staff & local contractors in feeder road rehabilitation.

Three (3) engineers trained as trainers. Twenty-four (24) MPW staff completed

training under ILO in feeder roads and drainage design.

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Training of Community Based Maintenance Groups for Routine Maintenance.

20 local contractors trained in Labor based methods in Road Rehabilitation based on a 1.9 Km pilot section from Bensonville to Low Cost village.

Training of community-based groups could not be accomplished due to closure of EC funds.

4c. Water. Increased access to water for residents of Monrovia.

Monrovia Distribution Network (Lot 1B) rehabilitated.

Rehabilitation of Bushrod Island Booster Station, Newport Booster Station, and Ducor & Mamba Point Reservoirs.

Supply and installation of High Lift Pumps and Generator for WPTP was partially achieved – only the generator was supplied. Balance procured under IDA.

Reconstruction of Caldwell Booster Station Fence Works, Caldwell Junction.

At the time of EC Grant closure, water production capacity was 4.18 MG/D, from 2 MG/D.

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ANNEX 3. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

1. The project was prepared as an emergency project under OP8.0, and as such did not lend itself to a rigorous financial and economic analysis. In this regard, the cost per unit of major works items are compared with similar works in the sub-region at Implementation Completion and Results Report stage (ICR) as a measure of cost-effectiveness. Planned costs and the implementation time of various activities are also assessed against the actual execution outcomes as a measure of efficiency.

2. Cost-effectiveness considerations. The costs associated with the completed works appear reasonable compared to similar works completed in the subregion..

Table 3.1: Cost Effectiveness of the Project

Project Unit of

comparison Cost

(US$ m) Value Cost/unit

Comparator Value

Source

Vai Town Bridge

m2 0.24 n/a n/a

Monrovia-Cotton Tree Corridor

km 27.30 83 US$0.33m/km 0.58 Bank Projects in Ghana

Primary Rural Roads

km 6.30 618 US$0.01m/km 0.08 Bank Projects in Ghana

Supply and installation of high lift pumps

No. 2 n/a n/a

Irrigation Schemes

m2 n/a n/a

Feeder Roads (drainage works)

Culvert-km 3.57 6,200 US$575/m

Water Distribution Network

km n/a n/a

Table 3.2: Cost Effectiveness of the Project

Project Cost of Works

(US$) Cost of supervision

(US$) Ratio of supervision to

works Vai Town Bridge 17.99 2.76 15.3% Monrovia-Cotton Tree Corridor

11.35 1.1 9.7%

Primary Rural Roads 3.57 0.33 9.2%

Water - White Plains 50% design, capacity and improve distribution

3.58 1.11 31.0%

Feeder Roads (drainage works)

3.57 0.60 16.8%

Total 40.06 5.9 14.7%

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3. Implementation timing. Project implementation was delayed as several issues needed to be resolved before implementation could proceed. Major delays were experienced in the implementation of EC-financed component as well as the agriculture components. These are further elucidated as follows:

The IDA Financing Agreement became effective on September 11, 2007 while the EC Grant became effective on July 2010, about three years later. Thus there was a relatively short time of 11 months to implement the activities funded by the EC Grant.

The water sector activities were contingent on completion of the African Development Bank (AfDB)-funded technical studies, which were delayed considerably. Subsequently, implementation of the key activities in water components suffered from poor supplier performance with extensions of time, variation orders, and in the case of the supply of high lift pumps termination of the contract and procuring of another supplier under IDA funding in light of the EC grant closing date.

In spite of the project starting under IDA funding, initial start-up of the feeder roads component faced significant delays emanating primarily from a scarcity of motivated and skilled human resources at the Ministry of Public Works (MPW). This culminated in contracting the International Labor Organization (ILO) on a sole source basis to act as an Implementation Agent on behalf of the MPW.

The ILO strategy was to engage and train local contractors in labor-based methodology for implementation of the works. In light of difficulties experienced by MPW in procuring equipment to assist the local contractors, the works were split into two phases, drainage and road works, to allow for equipping of the contractors before the works were contracted out.

The ILO implemented labor-based public works also had several irregularities in the manner in which the contracts were procured and managed. Bank procurement procedures were not followed in the procurement of contractors, and advance payment and performance guarantees were not obtained in the approved formats. This resulted in significant delays in retrofitting contracts, as well as in payment of contractors.

The sole-sourcing of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) for the Tree Crops Value Chain activity originally planned was unsuccessful and had to be abandoned after two years. The World Food Program (WFP) and AFRICARE were brought in as implementing partners to kick-start the activities under the agriculture component.

Delay in the rehabilitation of the oil jetty was due to delays in the procurement of the feasibility and pre-design consultancy for a year. This component was eventually dropped on account of insufficient funding.

4. Considering the balance between lower costs, the delays in implementation, and the mitigating circumstances of working in a post conflict, fragile environment overall, the efficiency is rated as modest.

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ANNEX 4. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES

(a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Gylfi Palsson Lead Transport Specialist GTIDR Task Team Leader

Supervision/ICR

Baba Imoru Abdulai Procurement Specialist AFTPE –

HIS Procurement

Paola Agostini Lead Environment Specialist GENDR Environmental Safeguards

Owusu Mensah Agyei Consultant AFTME HIS Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Senior Transport Engineer GTIDR Transport Engineering

Yao Badjo Senior Infrastructure Specialist AFTU1 -

HIS

Samuel Bruce-Smith Consultant AFTDE -

HIS Financial Management

Thillainath Chelliah Senior Highway Specialist TWITR -

HIS Highway Engineering

Callista Chen Consultant GTCDR

Maxwell Bruku Dapaah Sr Financial Management Specialist

GGODR Financial Management

Robert Wallace DeGraftHanson

Sr Financial Management Specialist

GGODR Financial Management

Florence Geegbae Dukuly Consultant GGODR

Jeremy Jay Fischer Consultant AFTTR - HIS

Kremena M. Ionkova Senior Urban Development Specialist

GSURR Urban

Christopher Paul Jackson Lead Rural Development Specialist

GFADR Rural Development

Yitzhak A. Kamhi Consultant AFTTR - HIS

Highway Engineering

Paul Kriss Program Leader LCC5C Antoine V. Lema Senior Social Development

Specialist GSURR

Social Safeguards

Anthony Mensa-Bonsu E T Consultant AFTPE - HIS

Anne Njuguna Country Program Assistant MNCA2 Administration Jung Eun Oh Senior Transport Economist GTIDR Transport

Wycliffe Okoth E T Temporary AFTTR - HIS

Adminisration

Kristine Schwebach Social Development Specialist GSURR Amadou Tidiane Toure Consultant EACMM Thomas E. Walton Consultant GENDR Environment Fang Xu Senior Evaluation Officer IEGPS Transport

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Kulwinder Singh Rao Senior Highway Engineer GTIDR Task Team Leader John Kobina Richardson Transport Specialist GTIDR ICR Task Team Leader Abimbola Adubi Senior Agriculture Specialist GFA01 Agriculture Oliver Braedt Program Leader LCC6C Agriculture Mei Wang Senior Counsel LEGAM Law Eden Dava Consultant GSU01 Social Development John Bryant Collier Environmental Specialist GEN01 Environment Cornelis Kruk Consultant GTI01 Ports Beatrix Allah-Mensa Senior Operations Officer AFCW1 Social Development Charles Taylor Consultant GGODR Procurement Winter Chinamale Senior Procurement Specialist GGO01 Procurement Saidu Dani Goje Financial Management

Specialist GGO31

Public Financial Management

Ntombie Siwale Operations Analyst AFTTR Administration Yeyea Gloria Nasser Program Assistant AFMLR Administration

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY07 16.81 165.9 FY08 6.69 22.6

Total: 25.50 188.5

Supervision/ICR FY08 49.71 311.6 FY09 27.08 270.5

FY10 28.22 202.2

FY11 22.65 189.4

FY12 16.82 107.5

FY13 15.69 93.0

FY14 10.17 66.0

FY15 12.69 72.7

FY16 2.56 16.6

Total: 185.59 1,329.4

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ANNEX 5. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS

1. A beneficiary survey was conducted during the ICR mission to interact with the beneficiaries and NGO’s involved in the agriculture productivity interventions and better understand project impacts. Interviews were also held with the other key stakeholders, i.e. MOA, WFP, AFRICARE, FAO, and the local NGOs who were involved in sensitization and training of FBOs. Overall, the project succeeded in organizing 2,046 beneficiary farmers and value chain actors (1,020 in Bong County and 1,026 in Lofa) into Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs), and provided various trainer of trainer workshops and community-level training to build the capacity of 1,884 farmers (1,128 from Bong County and 756 from Lofa County).

2. The mission visited project sites for the agriculture component in Bomi and Bong counties where the interventions were in rice and cassava production, respectively, to interact with project beneficiaries and inspect progress of farming activities. Site conditions during the rainfall did not permit easy access to Lofa, Gbarpolu, and some parts of Bomi counties. In Bomi County, two farming communities at Zelekai and Dulime were visited and in Bong County, two farmer based organizations at Youth Mission and Worla were also visited.

3. The beneficiaries were very satisfied with the support they had received from the project. Significant positive impacts were reported on livelihoods and household incomes, crop cultivation habits, food self-sufficiency and capacity building aspects of the project intervention. All the stakeholders expressed the need for the government of Liberia to assume ownership of the project after the closing date for it to be sustainable.

4. Summary of interactions with primary project beneficiaries:

Project approach and mobilization methodologies applied. Beneficiaries expressed satisfaction and great interest in the project. The revival of Farmer Based Organizations previously known in Liberia with food for work and Cash for Work incentives were appropriate. The FBOs brought about cohesion in the communities, with benefits of increased productivity accruing to the groups.

Capacity building aspects. Beneficiaries attested to success of the farmer field schools (48 farmer field schools were established) which were organized by FAO to provide the FBOs with training on improved farming methods, best farming practices including practical demonstrations at demonstration sites, introduction of new seed varieties, marketing strategies and mini kits that included seed rice, assorted vegetable seeds, cassava cuttings, cutlass, axes, wheel barrow, diggers, measuring tape. On the downstream end, training was also provided in agricultural processing, marketing, quality standards and market prices, and innovation in value addition to crop products including product handling, preservation, processing, and packaging. Beneficiaries claim that valuable information was received that has transformed their perspective of farming.

Change in community crop cultivation habits. Traditionally, farming in Liberia has been principally on higher ground. The valleys, though well-watered all year round, are seen as difficult to cultivate. Intensive sensitization campaigns carried out by NGOs in the beneficiary communities led to rice cultivation in lowlands. This enabled at last two harvests per year, which also increased the benefits and profits.

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Role of local NGOs. The use of knowledgeable local NGOs as Implementing Partners on the ground was a plus. The collaboration between District Agricultural Officers, the Implementing Partners, and local NGOs with agricultural extension officers was excellent and a high level of interest has been established in sustaining the project outcomes. Some of the beneficiaries in Bong County recommended that projects should not be left under the management of local NGOs but there should be an agricultural focal person from the World Bank besides the project coordinator, to work with any World Bank project in order to assure regular field visitation and accurate monitoring.

Marketing aspects. Finding ready markets for produce before harvest led to sales success. Farmers also expressed that planting on time and cultivating the appropriate surface areas according to the available workforce or labor helped them succeed.

Improved livelihoods and household incomes. There was a dramatic increase in the livelihood of the beneficiaries resulting from participation in the project, mainly due to the cash and food for work that the project provided them at the initial stages of preparation of the farms for planting. Through the supply of seed varieties to farmers, a majority of households were able to plant, harvest, and keep seeds for the next season, and sold surplus. This culminated in the increased incomes for the beneficiary households. With an increase in income levels, some of the households have embarked on facelift programs and acquisition of personal farming assets such as pumps for irrigation of farms, farm implements, etc.

Improved food self-sufficiency: the project helped beneficiaries accumulate enough foodstuffs from the 2013 and 2014 seasons and, as a result, most beneficiaries were able to save money that would have been used to purchase food and put those financial resources to use for other purposes, such as their children’s education or health care for members of their households. Community grain reserves (eight were established under the project) were crucial for food preservation and management during the dry season. Incidentally, the outbreak of EVD brought about heavy reliance on the food reserves in the community grain storage facilities as many people from affected areas started to migrate in search of food and safety from the disease. To a large extent, this food self-sufficiency helped to stem the tide of nutrition-related deaths during the EVD outbreak.

Impact of Ebola virus Disease. The benefit of the FBO methodology was undermined by the occurrence of EVD, which had a devastating effect on the project. Farmers no longer wanted to work in groups on account of the disease transmission mechanisms and many farms were therefore abandoned, leading to decreased productivity in the 2014 season. However, the benefits of the FBOs are evident from the 2013 farming season and the FBOs have been reorganized with the subsidence of the disease.

5. Desirable follow-up activities. Based on the interactions with the primary project beneficiaries encountered, the following are seen as desirable to ensure sustainability of the project:

Government ownership. Government/MOA should assume the ownership of the project and complete the activities that remain outstanding on account of EVD. The evidence is

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that there is greater interest from communities to develop their farms profitably and it is imperative that the momentum is sustained.

Increased efficiency in farming. There is a need to move to mechanized forms of farming, e.g. the use of power tillers and irrigation pumps in the lowlands for rice production.

Post-harvest management. Post-harvest management of agricultural produce is a challenge. Beneficiaries lack requisite processing and value addition equipment and infrastructure. The Government should consider providing direct support in the provision of equipment or create conditions that would encourage private investors establish farming equipment rental services at affordable rates for active farmers. Community grain storages established in eight locations were critical to the success of the rice productivity interventions. Consideration should also be given to provision of storage facilities to reduce spoilage of farmers’ produce.

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ANNEX 6: SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR

(A.) Summary of Borrower’s ICR

The main elements of the Borrower’s ICR are summarized below.

1.0 Project Development Objective

1. The project Development Objective (PDO) was to support Government’s efforts to: a) rehabilitate its basic infrastructure; and b) revive its agriculture activities.

2.0 Original and Revised Project Activities and Components

2.1 Original Components

2. The Project was in the amount of US$49.5 million (IDA US$37.0 million and EC US$12.5 million equivalent) and consisted of three components.

A. Policy Reform and Institutional Support IDA US$5.7 million:

3. This component supported Government with the preparation of a management contract for operation of the Port of Monrovia and complementary advisory services in undertaking comprehensive reform of the port sector, as well as fund Technical Assistance to various entities of the Government responsible for transport and infrastructure. It provided targeted assistance for policy reforms, legal and regulatory framework and capacity building in the water sector in particular the institutional strengthening of Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation (LWSC). It also provided Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in strengthening their capacity in policy formulation and planning, as well as monitoring, evaluation and statistical reporting.

B. Agriculture and Infrastructure Investments: EC US$12.5 million; IDA US$30.4 million

4. This component funded the design, rehabilitation and supervision activities of infrastructure assets including the rehabilitation and construction of several major bridges on principal road corridors and on a number of smaller river crossings nationwide, as well as secondary and tertiary feeder roads. Funds were also made available for developing sustainable local roads maintenance capacity. The water treatment plant for Monrovia was rehabilitated to at least 50 percent of design capacity and provision of safe drinking water in selected secondary cities. In addition, this component covered the rehabilitation of Monrovia’s water distribution network (secondary and tertiary pipelines to connect to water posts and selected institutions/users).

5. The agriculture interventions were based on an understanding of the value chain. This component provided essential inputs- including knowledge - to spur production and rebuild physical marketing infrastructure such as market places and post-harvest handling facilities concentrating on cocoa, coffee, food crops, and vegetable production. Building the capacity of farmers’ organizations was an important aspect of this component.

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C. Project Management and Capacity Building: Bank US$0.9 million:

6. Under this component, incremental support was given to the existing management and implementation entities, namely the SIU/IIU and PFMU.

2.2 Revised Components

7. Although the project was restructured with many changes, the overall development objectives in general remained the same. Additional financing were required to cover cost increases in the projects, scaling up of activities and added activities within the scope of the development objectives. The restructurings resulted in cancelling some activities and significantly amending the scope of others. The major changes sought were: (i) to cover cost over-runs for a major consultancy assignment and for the construction of a critical bridge in Monrovia; (ii) for scaling up road works on 83 km corridors from Freeport of Monrovia to Cotton Tree; and (iii) for dropping three activities from the project.

8. The three components of the project were subsequently revised as follows:

9. Component A for policy reform and institutional support, including financing for comprehensive reform of the port sector, Technical Assistance to various entities of the government responsible for transport and infrastructure as well as for policy reforms, legal and regulatory framework and capacity building.

10. Component B funded design, rehabilitation and supervision activities of infrastructure assets, bridges on principal road corridors and on smaller river crossings nationwide, as well as secondary and tertiary feeder roads; contribution to the rehabilitation of the water treatment plant for Monrovia, as well as activities in agriculture.

11. Component C funded project management and capacity building.

3.0 Expected Outcome Indicators

3.1 Expected Outcomes

12. The expected outcomes for the project were:

1. Increased access to water for residents of Monrovia; 2. Port productivity increased; 3. Increased access to an all season road for targeted rural population; 4. Increased number of markets where seed rice is available; and 5. Percentage increase in metric tons of cocoa.

3.2 Results Indicators for Each Component

13. Intermediate outcomes for Component A.

1. External Port Management Team in place; 2. Draft National Transport Policy and Strategy Paper formulated and prepared for

Government’s review and endorsement, June 30, 2008; and

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3. Two new agriculture sector policies complete with results framework submitted to Minister of Agriculture, December 31, 2010.

14. Intermediate outcomes for Component A.

1. New Vai Town Bridge built, December 31, 2008; 2. Six main bridges rehabilitated, June 30, 2009; 3. At least 40 minor river crossings improved, June 30, 2010; 4. Rural population within 2 km of an all season road increases; 5. Refurbishment of the Oil Jetty structure including construction of new off-loading

station, mooring dolphins, and walkways, December 31, 2008; 6. Refurbishment of water treatment plant in Monrovia, December 31, 2008; and 7. Increased production and sale of rice seeds on beneficiary Sites and increased market

throughput in project areas, Dec. 31, 2010.

4.0 Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

4.1 Project Preparation and Design

15. The Special Implementation Unit (SIU) was transformed into the Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) in October 2009 to pave the way for the expansion of the infrastructure portfolio.

16. The IIU with the assistance of the Ministry of Public Works and the World Bank Transport Task Team continued with the implementation of key civil works contracts with focus on contracts which were being unsatisfactorily executed leading to considerable delays in completion.

17. In parallel, the IIU had to proceed with recruitment of staff, the procurement processes for Goods, Services and Works, the recruitment of supervising/monitoring Consultants and Civil Works Contractors on other major Infrastructure Projects. The transition from SIU to IIU, by itself was a great challenge and a daunting task. Project preparation and design would have inevitably been affected negatively. However, the IIU with the assistance of MPW, former SIU staff and hired technical assistance under the project, were able to deliver these projects within reasonable timeframe.

4.2 Implementation

4.2.1 Ports

18. A management contract for the operation of the port of Monrovia and the Port Management and Sector Advisory Reform Services for the National Port Authority was signed with a Consultant in January 2009.

19. Paving Container Yard (21,600sq.m) along with four (4) internal access routes at the Freeport-National Port Authority (NPA) was completed August 2010. Originally, a Contract to provide Consultancy Services for the Supervision of the Oil Jetty Refurbishment and Provision of Fire Fighting Facilities at the Port of Monrovia was signed. The services were modified to a Conceptual Design and preparation of bidding documents for Design and Build for the Fuel

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Unloading Facility in the Freeport of Monrovia. The Bids for design and construction were opened on May 1, 2012, Bids were evaluated, and Contract awarded.

4.2.2 Agriculture Sector

20. The Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) of the Ministry of Public Works over the period from September 2009 to August 2012 has implemented the following components of the Agriculture Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP) on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture;

21. Rehabilitation of Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) Bong Regional Offices, Central Agriculture Research Institute (CARI) Bong County including Fabrication and Installation of security / burglar bars for windows and metal steel doors.

Purchase of two generators for MOA Bong Regional Office, furniture for the Regional Offices and Landscaping of MOA Regional Office Compound;

Consultancy; Recruitment of three (3) advisors for the Program Management Unit (MOA) Program Coordination Advisor/Financial Management Advisor/Procurement Advisor;

Consultancy; Food Crop Value Chains Development Support (FAO); Consultancy; Rice Food Emergency Support (Africa Rice, formerly WARDA); Consultancy; Detailed Preparation Study on Cocoa , Coffee within (Bong, Nimba, and

Lofa Counties); Oil Palm within (Lofa, Bong, Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties); Rubber within

(Maryland, Bong, Montserrado & Margibi Counties); and Consultancy; Social Impact Assessment (SIA) & Environmental and Social Management

Framework (ESMF).

22. The implementation of the Consultancy Services has been delayed mainly due to poor preparation and response from some of the Consultants.

4.2.3 Water Sector

23. The Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) of the Ministry of Public Works over the period from September 2009 to 2015 has implemented the following components of the Agriculture Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP) on behalf of the LWSC:

Monrovia Water Distribution Network (Lot 1B); Rehabilitation of Bushrod Island Booster Station, Newport Booster Station and also

Ducor & Mamba Point Reservoirs; Supply, Installation, Testing and Commissioning of High Lift Pumps & Generators; Supervision of Works for Rehabilitation of Bushrod Island Booster Station, Newport

Booster Stations, and also Ducor & Mamba Point Reservoirs; Supply of Transformer at White Plains Treatment Plant for LWSC’s High Lift Pumps; Supply of Moulded Case Breaker (MCCB) for Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation

(LWSC) White Plains Water Treatment Plant; Reconstruction of Caldwell Booster Station Fence Works, Caldwell Junction, Monrovia,

Liberia; and

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Supply of Spare Parts for the Newly Installed High Lift Pumps of the Water Treatment Plant in White Plains, & Training of Technicians in the Operations & Maintenance of the Pumps.

4.2.4 Roads Sector

a. Demolition of collapsed Vai Town Bridge and its replacement with a New Bridge

24. The Contract was for the demolition of the existing collapsed Vai Town Bridge and its replacement with a New Bridge 240m long, cast in place balanced cantilever box girder with three spans of 70+100+70m respectively.

25. The contract was signed in September 2008, however the initial progress was unsatisfactory and had already been delayed for one year by the time of the new implementing unit; Infrastructure Implementation Unit took over. Poor management and inadequate planning by the Contractor were part of the obstacles to the progress on this project. Some of the issues which took time to be resolved were:

b. Staffing, Geotechnical Investigation and Foundation Design, Shop Drawings, inadequate equipment and a comprehensive Work Program.

26. The contractor was very slow in mobilizing and suffered from poor management, lack of planning, and hardly any competent technical staff. The situation was so serious that a meeting was called in January 2010 to improve the situation. Since that meeting the situation improved with the first pile done (Cast) on 26th June 2010.

27. The Supervision Consultancy had not been satisfactory either, with the change of five Project managers and non – compliance to their contract.

28. Extra effort had to be made from including High Level Meetings (MPW, IIU, Consultant and Contractor), regular site visits, and meetings before there was positive transformation in physical progress.

c. Small Bridges (Installation of Bailey Bridges)

29. Installation of 27 Bailey singular Bailey bridge components, which had been purchased under a previous program was targeted, and was installed at 25 bridge locations due to the width of the river crossings prioritized to install these bridges at various locations throughout the country. The twenty-seven bridges have been launched and completed 100 percent. The Bridges have helped alleviate the chronic problems caused by failed and damaged bridges in most of Liberia's road network.

d. Feeder Roads

30. The ILO contract to implement Feeder Roads Project on behalf of the Ministry of Public Works in three Counties was partially completed at the end of August 2012. The agreement for this assignment was signed on 13th July 2010. The component covered 200km of feeder roads in Lofa, Nimba and Bong Counties. The assignment also covered the training of local contractors and MPW staff in the management of feeder roads.

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31. The goal and purpose of the project was defined as: (a) Improvement of productive livelihood and service delivery; and (b) to (i) Build the capacity of MPW staff to manage feeder roads network and develop the capacity of local contractors to rehabilitate feeder roads using labour based methods; and (ii) Carry out engineering studies of feeder roads in Lofa, Nimba and Bong Counties, package roads into sizeable contracts for award and to supervise the rehabilitation works, respectively.

4.3 Details of the Components

A Capacity Development

32. The following Capacity Development activities were undertaken under the project:

1. Capacity Development for MPW staff & local contractors in feeder road rehabilitation: i. Train 2 MPW Engineers

ii. Train 20 MPW Engineers/Technicians + 3 representatives from each of 20 local contracting firms

2. Capacity Development for MPW staff & local contractors – Pilot Surfacing of Rural & Secondary Roads using labor-based methods.

i. Train 6 representatives of local contractors & MPW Engineers for bitumen surfacing of roads – 3km road section

3. Community Based Maintenance Groups for Routine Maintenance i. Train community based groups through combination of “trainers’ & direct

contracting

B Engineering Study of Roads & Preparation of contract packages 200 km of Roads for rehabilitation

33. The performance of ILO was not satisfactory and queries were raised by the Task Team; IIU presented an assessment based on MPW/ILO’s interpretation of the Agreement, implementation strategy and actual performance.

34. On the contrary, MPW later provided a justification for the continuation of the ILO services based on its unique experience on Labor Based Methodology and ILO’s performance on the ongoing African Development Bank funded Feeder Roads Program.

C National Transport Policy and Strategy Paper

35. The National Transport Policy & Strategy (NTPS) was published by the Government in 2009.

5.0 Lessons Learnt

5.1 Equipment

36. The unavailability of road construction equipment affected the delivery of road works in Liberia. In the case of AIDP, the project was designed with the assumption that the local contractors already had the requisite equipment for the works. It was in view of this fact that it was agreed to implement the project in two (2) phases with the hope that the equipment being

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procured by MPW under the LBPWP would be available for the works. The low equipment capacity resulted in serious time overruns on a number of projects in Liberia.

37. Efforts should be made by the MPW to assist local contractors to obtain pieces of the required equipment for the works. Different methods have been used in a number of countries and the MPW availing itself to some of these approaches would go a long way in helping to build the capacity of the local construction industry for the future maintenance of roads in Liberia.

5.2 Contract Securities

38. The local contractors faced difficulties in obtaining the necessary securities from the local banks to support their tender/contract. Most of the contractors cannot provide the collateral (usually landed properties) required by banks. The banks usually, in the absence of the landed properties, requires the applicant to deposit with them an amount equivalent to the value of the security required, a situation that cripples the contractors financially.

5.3 Staffing

39. SIU and later IIU were understaffed to handle the implementation of all the components, which included non-roads component. As other projects were launched the burden on the skeleton staff increased as there were no corresponding increase in staff strength. A technical support team of young national engineers should have been incorporated so as to gain training and experience from the Non-nationals, international staff and consultants.

5.4 Financial Management (FM)

40. It was self-evident that FM considerations were over taken by project implementation matters, thus FM flags were unfortunately not part of the control process because for the period 2008 – 2010, there was no in-house capacity to review and advise on FM issues. Subsequently in 2011 – 2012, some semblance of FM control came into existence but with difficulties.

41. There was a clear sign that no Quality Assurance (QA) process was in place to review the financial accuracy of the documents as no capacity existed. Even when capacity became abundant, it was very difficult to integrate Financial QA into the review of approval of draft documents and reports as the culture had been to ignore or exclude FM issues. The role of FM was perceived as simply to process payments and to explain the status of any contractor or consultant payment.

5.5 Project Management

42. Progress on site is enhanced by the availability of information required by the contractor, which may include queries as to how certain provisions of the contract should be interpreted or how problems encountered on site should be dealt with promptly and properly. The Supervision Consultant appointed was expected to be familiar with details of the project to deal with them promptly. However, some of those were referred to the Employer, IIU for approvals or concurrence even when the contract was clear as to the cause of action.

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5.1 Comments on Draft ICR

43. The Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU), which managed this project, is of the view that the most important lesson learnt is the impact on implementation schedule due to the timing of Administration Agreements between the partners. It is therefore proposed that Administration Agreements for future projects of this nature are efficiently aligned in a manner that would allow the successful attainment of all objectives of the project.

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ANNEX 7. COMMENTS OF COFINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS

1. We understand that the report relates to the totality of the WB-administered project of USD 52 million. I note that the ratings are given as mostly satisfactory. For the activities funded under EU grant contribution of EUR 10 million, which at the time amounted to some USD 13 million our assessment is there are areas/objectives were the project performance is unsatisfactory. There is an independent Evaluation report of this contract funded by the EUD, posted under our website (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/liberia/projects/evaluation/index_ en.htm) which highlights the main problems the project has faced for what concerns the activities financed by us.

2. Only 62 percent of our grant funds were spent and the rest has been reimbursed. More specifically, mentioning just a few points:

(i) PDO indicators: it is surprising how many were dropped. The original indicator 1 was actually revised because no substantial results could achieved.

(ii) Para. 67: Achievement of Project Development Objectives: in EU's view a rating: Satisfactory is unrealistic. For the parts funded by the EU it was unsatisfactory, maybe in total a bit better.

(iii) Para. 97: Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry: in EU's view a rating: Satisfactory is unrealistic. For the parts funded by the EU it was partly unsatisfactory (poor design of the water component, which did not achieve significant results notwithstanding the amounts spent and the hardware installed; poor selection of the rural roads sections), maybe in total a bit better.

3. We would find it appropriate that these comments are somehow included in the report.

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ANNEX 8. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. The World Bank. 2007. Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Pre-Arears Clearance Grant in the Amount of SDR24.3 Million to the Republic of Liberia. Report No. 39163-LR. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

2. The World Bank. 2008. Liberia - Emergency Food Crisis Response Program. Report No. 43788-LR. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

3. The World Bank. 2009. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing in the Amount of SDR15.7 Million to the Republic of Liberia for the Emergency Infrastructure Project and Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project. Report No. 48880-LR, Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

4. The World Bank. 2011. Liberia – LR-Agriculture & Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP). Report No. 62852. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

5. The World Bank. 2013. Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of the LR-Agriculture & Infrastructure Development Project. Report 77194-LR. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

6. The World Bank. 2014. Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of LR-Agriculture & Infrastructure Development Project. Report No. 16356. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

7. The World Bank. 2007. Financing Agreement (Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project) between Republic of Liberia and International Development Association acting as Trustee of the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund, dated June 28, 2008, Grant Number H327-LBR.

8. The World Bank. 2008. Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund Grant Agreement (Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project) between Republic of Liberia and International Development Association, dated August 21, 2007, PPCR TF Grant Number TF092332.

9. The World Bank. 2009. Financing Agreement (Additional Financing for Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project and amended and restated Financing Agreement for Grant number H327-LBR) between Republic of Liberia and International Development Association, dated July 21, 2009, Grant Number H504-LBR, Grant Number H327-LBR

10. The World Bank. 2007. Financing Agreement (Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project) between Republic of Liberia and International Development Association, dated August 21, 2007, Grant Number H327-LBR.

11. The World Bank. 2006. Implementation Completion and Results Report Guidelines. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

12. Nicholas Cook. 2005. Liberia’s Post-War Recovery; Key Issues and Developments. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

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13. David Zounmenou. 2008. Managing Post-War Liberia: An Update. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

14. Ministry of Agriculture. 2007. Comprehensive Assessment of the Agriculture Sector Volume 1 – Synthesis Report. Monrovia: Republic of Liberia.

15. 2005. Results Focused Transitional Framework (Revision, April 2005). Monrovia: National Transitional Government of Liberia.

16. The World Bank. 2004. Country Re-Engagement Note for Liberia, Report 28387. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

17. 2007. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

18. The African Development Bank, The World Bank. 2007. International Development Association and African Development Fund Joint Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Liberia. Washington, DC: African Development Bank, World Bank Group.

19. 2004. Joint Needs Assessment. Monrovia: National Transitional Government of Liberia

20. Aide Memoires for Project Preparation and Supervision missions 2007-2014. Project Implementation Status Reports for 2007-2015.

21. Project Files.

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MAP