Document a tion

Imperial Germany’s Military Strategy in the South Pacific

Introduced by Jiirgen Tampke

Certain historians in Australia today are very critical of official policy towards Germans and Australians of German origin during and after World War I. They lament that the latter’s history as reliable and industrious settlers came to an abrupt end in 1914-11 when a combination of allegedly bigoted politicians, an unscrupulous police force, fanatical editors and an angry public at large turned on their former friends and neighbours causing thousands of them to be interned and otherwise subjected to all forms of discrimination. All this was out of place in a purportedly civilised country.

Michael McKernan, for example, asserts that “exaggerated patriotism” and “impossible demands” flourished in a climate of unreality “The Australian government needed to manufacture threats and crises to make the war real and immediate; the claim that Australia was to be the ‘first prize’ of a victorious Germany was a product of this atmosphere” (p. 150). In similar vein Manning Clark condemned the Council of the University of Melbourne for perceiving itself as “defender of British Philistinism in Australia”, as well as the “Pharisees of Parramatta Road in Sydney and their spiritual cousins in Adelaide ‘Terrace” (A History ofAustralia Vol. 5 , p. 412) for deciding to dismiss unnaturalized citizens of an enemy country from the teaching staff. And Frank Crowley reiterated that anti-Germanism gave a free rein to the busybody and slanderer (Australia in Documents VoI. I, p. 228). Most recently the Australian-based Germanist, Gerhard Fischer in his study of Australian internment policy, mainly towards Germans during the first world war (Enemy Aliens, St Lucia, 1989) pilloried both the Commonwealth government and citizens in general for their unwarranted xenophobia.

Such allegations are not baseless, of course, and certainly, as so often in history, small and innocent people suffered injustice. There is, however, far more to the story than has hitherto been suspected. In fact, by the outbreak of war in 1914 Australia was a part of Imperial Germany’s strategic and military planning for the South Pacific, and the headquarters of the German Navy’s surveillance organisation for the whole western Pacific was based in Sydney at the Consulate-General of the Imperial German government. Referred to as the Australische Station, material collected by the various agents in Australasia and the Islands was re-coded and sent to the headquarters of the German Admiralty’s headquarters in Berlin. The possible exislence of such an operation, not unexpectedly, caused great concern to Australian military and naval intelligence - such as it was at that time.

The unification of Germany which had been achieved in 1871 by Prussia, Germany’s largest and militarily strongest state, under the ieadership of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, not only changed the power structure of Europe but also had implications extending as far as Australia. Initially, the Imperial German government, and Chancellor Bismarck in particular, had no interest in colonial adventures. Having achieved Germany’s unification the “Iron Chancellor” was content lo consolidate Europe’s political status quo. Sensitively attuned to the balance of power he did not intend to rock the boat by becoming involved in risky endeavours outside Europe which were unlikely to yield sound economic returns and would probably increase international tension.

What made Bismarck change his mind in 1884-5 and decide to provide government backing for the acquisition of colonies has been a subject of considerable historiographical debate. Some historians argue that this step was taken to divert attention from the troubled domestic scene - the possibility of the election of a hostile Reichstag threatened the passage of his budget. All this is part of the so-called social imperialism debate begun (or revived) by the Bielefeld historian, Hans-Ulrich Wehler. There is, however, also sufficient evidence to maintain that pressure from various interest

In his book The Australian People and the Great W a r ,

JUrgen Tampke 99

groups forced Bismarck to play a more active role in the game of acquiring colonies. The Deutscher Kolonialverein, the Zentralverein fiir Handelsgeographie und Forderung deutscher Interessen im Ausland as well as individual businessmen and other vested interests in Africa, Asia and other parts of the globe, all urged the German government to take decisive steps on the colonial question.

Certainly in the South Pacific the Hamburg merchant house J. C. Godeffroy and Son took the initiative and urged the establishment of German protectorates there. The Company was in severe financial difficulties in the late 1870s and early 188Os, and this they hoped to overcome by the floating of a new company, the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagengesellschafr der Siiakee Inseln zu Hamburg. This company managed to win the support of Adolph Hansemann, a director of the big Gennan bank Disconto-Gesellschaft and one of the keenest advocates of German colonial expansion. They designed a scheme under which the costs of German colonies were to be met by private enterprise. As this would save Bismarck from the awkward task of asking the Reichfag for funds, the Chancellor had no objection. His willingness to give the go-ahead for the acquisition of a Gennan colony in the South Pacific was further strengthened by the news that the hitherto profitable South-Sea island trade was being seriously challenged by the British. On 17 November 1884 the symbolic hoisting of the German flag by marines at Madang, the Gazelle peninsula and Fischhafen on the New Guinea mainland and in the Duke of York group confirmed the arrival of Germany in the South Pacific as an imperial power ready to challenge the hegemony of Britain in the region. Two decades later Imperial Germany had annexed a number of islands reaching northwards to encompass the Micronesian archipelago and as far east as Samoa. Around three thousand Germans in the region and a number of companies were pursuing a profitable trade in coconut oil and other plantation products, pearl shells and cotton. And, of course, imperial possession necessitated defence arrangements, and so the German Admiralty felt obliged to devise plans for possible confrontation and host

The key role in Gennany's strategic and military planning was played by Australia. This is not surprising because Australia was cconomically, politically and militarily the most important state in the South Pacific. German ships, those of the merchant marine as well as of the imperial navy, needed to call on Australian ports for fuel and supplies. There were consular representatives in all Australian capital cities and major ports, and at that time they played an important part in the collection and passing on of surveillance material.

The documentary record of this activity has been lying in the archives of the imperial German navy in Freiburg in Breisgau as well as in the repository of the former German Democratic Republic at Potsdam virtually untouched by scholars since it was deposited. My initial investigations in the mid-1980s revealed that the documents date from the turn of the century when the German navy began making arrangements for the establishment of an intelligence gathering network. This initiative is described by Peter Overlack in greater detail in his article in this issue. Other documents show that the Germans had amassed an immense amount of information for their warships, conunandcrs knew of remote inlets and bays suitable for sheltcr and for launching surprise attacks. They were informed of the size, shape, firing range and other capabilities (and deficiencies) of Allied warships and land fortifications and they knew about the stationing of troops and unprotected coal depots. Contingency plans in the event of war were continuously updated and the possibility of war with all rival imperial powers in the region was considered. These came under the following headings: war case A (hostilities with the USA), war case B (hostilities with France), war caye C (hostilities with Russia or Japan) and war case D (hostilities with the British Empire). And by 1908- 09 at the latest strategists had been aialysing the possibility (and profitability) of direct naval action against Australian harbour fac

What is to be made all this? Firstly, there was nothing exceptional, or unusual, in the activities of the German surveillance agents. Germany, having acquired a sizeable Empire in the Pacific, was inevitably concerned about defence and other aspects of military strategy. In this way agents' activities amounted to routine surveillance work, such as would have been undertaken by all imperial powers. Even the contemplation of possible military action, however ominous, was at the time not a major threat, though it certainly was an expression of the official German will to open hostilities against British possessions as an imminent possibility. Naval operations in the South Pacific were to be carried out by Imperial Germany's Ostasiafische Geschwuder (East Asian Squadron) then made up of two large vessels, (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau both around 12,000 tons), three light cruisers (Leipzig, Niirnberg, and Emden between 3,000 to 4,000 tons) and two gunboats (Cormoran and Condor). These in no way matched the British Empire's forces in the region, especially by 1913 when HMAS Australia, a battle cruiser of some 20,000 tons had been

es with rival powers.

es and coastal cities.

100 Documen fat ion

delivered. But this, of course, does not mean that in the event of a later outbreak of war, operational forces might be more evenly balanced, or that, if strategically positioned to avoid contact with superior naval forces, the German squadron could eliminate undefended merchant shipping. Moreover, quick and decisive surprise attacks on Australian coastal facilities or other forms of military action in Australian waters were regarded as possible and, as is aptly illustrated by the mine-laying activities off the Victorian coast by the raider Wo& did take place. The legendary voyage, in the earlier weeks of the war, of the Emden, too, shows the destructive capacities of the German navy against merchant shipping.

This brings us to the second, and no doubt [nore important point: how does the information presented here and in Peter Overlacks article affect ow view of the behaviour of the Australian authorities at the time? As we have already stated, strident historical opinion has been expressed in some quarters which purports not to believe that Germany constituted a threat to Australia - and hence the precautions taken by the Australian security forces towards German nationals and citizens of Germans origin were out of all proportion. The documents we present in our selection leave no doubt that this interpretation cannot be sustained. Australia was definitely within the orbit of Germany's war planning, and the Australian security forces reacted with more perception than they have been given credit for. They knew that the Germans were operating a surveillance network in the Antipodes but they did not have sufficient information to counter it. The Australian military authorities also correctly realised that Australia played an important part in Germany's strategic and military planning in the western Pacific and they knew some of the German merchant vessels were carrying guns and ammunition and hence, in case of war, could be converted into auxiliary cruisers. All this meant that Australia had to act decisively should war break out. The Australian security services may have realised that many innocent people would suffer but they could not afford to take risks. As Richard Davies argued forcefully:

A government's first duty is to protect its territory and people. From the beginning of the war, the Commonwealth government had an increased responsibility to take measures to that end. Those measures included protection against known or expected dangers, and precautions against possible dangers. In my view, the government did not have to wail for an external threat to materialize, or for sabotage or espionage to be carried out, before acting. If strife loomed, the Commonwealth had to be able to identify enemy aliens quickly, and know where they were, and what they were doing . . . it had a responsibility to take pre-emptive action. (Some Aspects of the Government's Response to the Prescnce of Germans and Gcrinan Descendants in Australia, 1914-1918, PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 1981, p. 8.)

This is the basic explanation of what happened. What follows is a selection of the documents made by myself and later by Peter Overlack from the archives of the imperial German navy housed now in the Freiburg repository of the German Federal Archives. They illustrate the growing German will to destroy Australian shipping and, if necessary, harbour installations, in the event of a war with Britain. In addition they provide evidence for the existence of a German naval intelligence gathering network based on the various German consulates around Australia and New Zealand as part of a worldwide operation. The translations were carried out by Peter Overlack and John A. Moses in collaboration with myself.

[Gcrman naval officers and consular officials regularly reported back to Berlin their perceptions of power relationships in the Pacific generally and in the Antipodes in particular. These evince a distinct will to destroy that was established and being expressed by the turn of the century and which grew in intensity through the ensuing decade. What follows is an early example; there are many more to come. Ed.]

The archival identification of the individual documents is given at the top left hand corner.

Jtirgen Tampke

RM 51V 6693 Senior Officer, Australian Station, Apia, November 1901.

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Top Secret! Operational Matter!

Memorandum Concerning Warfare of Germany against England on the Australian Station (Part I1 of Operational Orders for the Station)

1 The Declaration of War a) Prior to a war between Germany and England there will be, with a high degree of certainty, an

extended period of political tension. This can be expected during the next five to six years because of the relative strengths of both navies. Germany on the one hand will not be driven to any precipitate act of offence, while England, on the other, will try to postpone a declaration of war by means of diplomatic manoeuvres until she is ready with her inferior mobilisation preparations. Only then will England open hostilities, probably by means of some act of violence. This view is founded on historical precedents (Boer wars, Fashoda). Because of this we will have to try in the mobilisation phase, so far as it is possible, to make ourselves ready.

b) If this should not be possible we still have a short space of time after the declaration of war for thc most necessary preparations. According to international law the neutral ships in the harbours of belligerent powers are supposed to be allowed a short time in order, if necessary, to be cleared by customs. Of course, one would scarcely expect that England will not respect these arrangements because she would reckon with reprisals against her own numerous merchant vessels. Therefore, the short time then available to us must be exploited to notify those vessels which are not equipped with wireless, and, further, to take steps to enable our cruisers to implement their war-time orders.

In the Australian Station it can be assumed that the time for these necessary functions will be available. The Commonwealth of Australia, already almost independent from England, would certainly not comply with orders from the mother country that were a violation of international law. Such an order would be the requirement to seize those postal and cargo vessels in Australian ports. ' he very fact that these vessels would be mainly transporting Australian primary products to British, Indian, Italian and Dutch ports would cause the Australian parliament to reflect 011 the implications of seizure. Besides that it is to our advantage that the Norddeutscher Lloyd as well as the Hamburg-Australia line dispose over rich deposits of coal and provisions in Sydney and Melbourne, and that the Lloyd stcamers have a speed which makes pursuit impossible by the English warships stationed there with few exceptions (for the time being only Royal Arfhur and Phoebe). 2 The Transmission of War Intelligence and Equinment from Auxiliary Vessels

a) In spite of what was previously said, it would be a mistake to go through English ports for the channelling of operational orders. The English and overseas telegraph organisations could be denied to us and an Attempt would have to be make to reach cruisers stationed in neutral ports in the South Seas as soon as possible. Both Batavia and San Francisco come into consideration. It would only be a coiiicidence if the vessels of the Singapore-Sydney and Hong Kong-Sydney line were available for this purpose from Shanghai, Batavia, Amboina and Marcassar. For this reason the consulate in Batavia would need to have a requisition for the confidential reporter which assures that a vessel can be chartered for the transmission of war intelligence and equipment for the cruisers of the Western Station and for the survey ship.

For the same purpose a larger vessel must be made available in San Francisco which is designated for the cruisers of the Eastern Station.

b) Next, it will be necessary to requisition all German vessels in Australian ports of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and the Hamburg-Australia line as well as the Jaluit Company and dispatch them, because of the danger of pursuit, via different routes to Apia and Herbertshohe and further to the war depot to be installed at Ruck Atoll.

If all these vessels are given the order in the shortest possible time and if necessary without completiiig loading with coal and machinery supplies as well as victualing, they will still have sufficient reserves despite the long voyages, to make the cruisers independent of English coaling stations.

c) As far as it is at all possible, the three German postal steamers which ply the South Seas (Singapore-Sydney, Hong Kong-Sydney, Yap-Jaluit-Sydney) must be requisitioned. Their senior personnel will be particularly useful in these waters; and with regard to the often mixed nationality crews, i t is all the more advisable to have good control of crews so that the enemy cannot exploit

I02 Documentation

them against us. For this purpose, it is necessary that the consulates in Singapore and Batavia, the colonial officials, the Sydney Consulate General and the confidential reporters are provided with the requisite instructions even in peace time.

It is perhaps worth considering whether the captains of the vessels themselves should be entrusted with these instructions in sealed letters. 3 Organisation of an Intelligence System

a) Very careful preparatory work will be needed to replace the German consulates at the time of the declaration of war in their function as transmitters of war news and even of the mobilisation declarations. Precisely in the present case it must be reckoned that the confidential reporters in Australia and New Zealand will refuse to communicate directly with German colonies. For this reason, intermediate stations must be set up in other places from where the dispatches furnished by these persons can be forwarded. Such places are: Tonga, Fiji (Levuka), Rarotonga, Noumea, Amboina, Marcassar and possibly Tahiti and Honolulu. In none of these places have any confidential agents been recruited, but in my view appropriate persons can be found there. However, this can only be achieved if one of the cruisers stationed here, preferably that of the most senior officer, visits these places. In order to attain our goal it would of course be necessary for the vessel in question to sojourn at least 8 to 14 days in the particular ports so that the necessary investigations of the persons considered most suitable can be carried out.

b) Further it will be necessary to devise a code book in simpler sentences than the existing one. For this purpose the help of the Admiralty staff will have to be enlisted because the work capacity of the relevant commandant will not be adequate in the light of his many other clerical duties. I most obediently request Your Excellency to proceed without delay to produce such a code book. In this regard it is perhaps worth recommending that the cipher codex in use by the Norddeutscher Lloyd and the other companies engaged in commerce in the South Seas be considered. By means of an introductory word or a cover signature such telegrams could be used for intelligence purposes in the event of war. 4 Setting up War Supplies on Ruck Atoll

The establishment of a war supplies depot on Ruck Atoll which is described in the report as desirable in the event of war (cases A, B, C & E), would be in the case of D a necessity. In general the same details would apply here as mentioned in the same report. However, in the event of war case E, it is recommended to out-fit SMS Miive and the auxiliary cruisers at Ruck Atoll. Miive would then serve as a depot ship at Ruck Atoll. For A, B, C & E this location has not been considered because the outfitting of the auxiliary cruiser at the selected location can be effected more quickly. (It lies on the route to the rendezvous p i n t while Ruck Atoll is too far for the slow moving Mave.) 5 Instructions for the Execution of Cruiser Warfare

In my opinion a joint operation of two cruisers and the auxiliary is required. For this reason the rendezvous point is proposed to be an atoll (Likieb) of the Marshall Islands, after visiting Jaluit.

From there the coal depots in Butaritari (Gilbert islands), Guvulu (Solomon Islands) and Moresby (British New Guinea) can be proceeded against and Thursday Island placed under threat. The elimination of the first two coaling stations can be undertaken by the two cruisers on the voyage to Jaluit. The threatening and destruction of Australian and New Zealand coastal locations should be considered along with the conquest of Thursday Island. 6 Relative Strength

For the defence of their South Sea possessions the British have relatively few and very inferior vessels at their disposal. The so-called Australian auxiliary squadron is limited to the Australian coast. Of the actual “English” squadron two vessels stationed in New Zealand, Torch and Archer as well as the two old survey ships, Dart and Penguin must be discounted. Apart from them the following remain at the disposal of the English Admiral for operations in the South Seas: Royal Arthur, Phoebe; Lizard; Pylades; Sparrow.

Of these only the first two are stronger and faster that our cruisers. It follows that if the two German cruisers and the auxiliary cruiser stay together the prospects for success in cruiser warfare are not all that bad.

Ruthless warfare, especially against Australian or New Zealand ports will arouse the Australians and this will help strengthen public opinion there that the Australian auxiliary squadron be kept on the coast.

Grapow, Korvetten-Kapitiin und altester Offizier der australischen Station