Imperial Decline

8/12/2019 Imperial Decline

1/58

Reo Matsuzaki (SFS03) wrote this thesis in fulfillment of the International Politics Honors Program.

He majored in International Politics, subfield Transstate Actors in World Politics, with a

certificate in Social & Political Thought. His thesis mentor was Daniel Nexon.

Politics of Imperial Decline:

Nationalism, Elite Politics, and the Habsburg Empire

Reo Matsuzaki

Unless put in historical context, the present offers only a snapshot of a world

in the midst of profound transition. Unless anchored in the past, analysis of the

present is likely to be one of only fleeting relevance and risks overlooking the

potent sources of change that run beneath the surface and become apparent only

in historical relief.1

The future displayed recently by Europe looks distressingly like the past. The re-

birth of nationalism in Europe and the break-up of multiethnic states including the So-

viet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia bring back memories of the collapse of the

Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Empires in the early twentieth century.2Have the

ghosts of nationalism finally risen to haunt the world for some time to come? At first

glance, it is hard to conclude otherwise. The turbulent nationalist movements of the

1990s have not ended, and many heterogeneous states, from Russia to Indonesia, are

still battling their own nationalist devils. It seems as though the optimistic belief that

nationalism was a problem of the past resembles something like the 1910 assertion by

Norman Angell that Europe was headed for perpetual peace. Therefore, although this


2/58

114 Reo Matsuzaki

paper is about the past, it is meant for the present and the future. Although the paper

examines the relationship between nationalism and the decline of the Habsburg Empire,

its insights are meant for those who are grappling with the problems of nationalism in the

twenty-first century.At the turn of the twentieth century, the Habsburg Empire was one of Europes

leading powers with a population of over fifty million. It was an empire with a long

history, dating back to the thirteenth century, and at its height the Empire included terri-

tories from current day Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary,

Romania, Slovenia, and Croatia. The Empire survived and often expanded after great

wars that broke other leading states of Europe. It was able to tighten its hold on Bohemia

and Hungary during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The Empire escaped complete

collapse during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1741) and successfully fought

back during the Seven Years War (1755-1763). It was at the center of the anti-Napole-

onic alliance during the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), and although repeatedly defeated

by Napoleons troops, its unity was preserved and its influence was expanded after the

peace settlement. The Empire was able to suppress the revolutions of 1848-1849, and

although it lost Lombardy in 1859 and Venetia in 1866, it expanded in the Balkans right

up to 1914.

Yet, in 1918, this very versatile and successful Empire suddenly collapsed. Its vari-

ous nationalities chose to part ways and the vast territory that one empire had occupied

came to be shared by seven states. The collapse was sudden and total. Many scholars

have suggested that the collapse was almost natural and inevitable as the Habsburg

Empire was becoming anachronistic in an age of nation-states. Even before the Great

War, the Empire was plagued by conflicts among its various nationalities. The awaken-

ing of nationalism in the mid nineteenth century led to the death of the Empire.

Similarly, Europe in the late 1980s witnessed the awakening of nationalism and

the result was the death of three multiethnic European states: Yugoslavia, the mostsuccessful and prosperous state in the communist bloc, Czechoslovakia, a country with

a rich history and a solid industrial base, and the Soviet Union, the once mighty evil

empire. Violent or peaceful, the disintegration of these three states was as sudden and

shocking as the collapse of the Habsburg Empire was in 1918. Also, in both eras nation-

alism is said to have played a critical role.

Thus, the revisiting of nationalism and the decline of the Habsburg Empire is timely.

Although there are many books written on the topic, there are few that are methodologi-

cally rigorous. Multiple conflicting narratives of the rise of nationalism and the decline of

the Empire exist, but not explanations that examine causal mechanisms. The few expla-

nations provided by political scientists use methodologies that are inappropriate for the

study of historically contingent and theoretically elusive concepts such as nationalism.

Therefore, in the words of Rogers Brubaker, A theoretically sophisticated eventful

perspective on nationness and nationalism is today urgently needed. To make sense of

the Soviet and Yugoslav collapse and their aftermaths, we needamong other things

to think theoretically about relative sudden fluctuations in the nationness of groups and

relational settings.3

This paper proposes to do exactly that. By investigating the development of Czech

nationalism in the nineteenth century and by investigating the decline and collapse of the


3/58

115Politics of Imperial Decline: Nationalism, Elite Politics, and the Habsburg Empire

Habsburg Empire, this paper will systematically analyze the development of nationalism

in the Empire and its effects. The paper will argue that nationalism was indeed an

important factor in the decline of the Empire. However, nationalism did not directly lead

to the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy. The critical intermediary processthat links nationalism with Habsburg decline is elite politics. Prior to the rise of national-

ism, the local rulers in the periphery (the aristocracy) had a collaborative relationship

with the central authority. However, as nationalism empowered a new class of political

elites, this relationship was severed. The new masters of Bohemia, the nationalist lead-

ers, derived their power from the local constituents and did not see their fate tied to that

of the monarchy as the aristocracy had. Since the Habsburg Empire was a composite

statea state including more than one country under the sovereignty of one rulera

symbiotic relationship between the center and the periphery was central to its survival.

Once this tie broke, the Empire headed for its seemingly inevitable decline.

Review of Existing Perspectives

I have studied the Habsburg Empire for quite a few years now, but I still cannot

quite decide on the nature and effect of nationalism on the Empire,4said Steven Beller,

a prominent historian of the Habsburg Empire, after discussing nationalism and the Em-

pire over lunch one afternoon. This comment was particularly striking since Beller has

argued strongly for the importance of nationalism in causing the collapse of the Empire.

But such uncertainty is understandable given the wide variance in views on the extent to

which nationalism was responsible for Habsburg decline. It is in fact this rich debate

despite most authors using the same sources and evidencesthat make the study of the

Empire interesting. Nonetheless, this variance also suggests that a new approach should

be used to analyze the topic. Before the argument of the paper is presented though, the

existing dominant perspectives will be reviewed.

There exist largely five different views on the question of nationalism and the de-cline of the Habsburg Empire. (1) The Empire collapsed because of a natural and

transhistoric process of imperial rise and decline. (2) Nationalism made the collapse of

the Empire inevitable. (3) The mishandling of the nationalities issue by the core elites led

to the decline and eventual collapse of the Empire. (4) The national question paralyzed

the peripheral Diets and made the Habsburg political system dysfunctional. (5) The

Empire was not in a state of decline up to the Great War and collapsed as a result of

defeat in 1918.

I. The Inevitable Collapse of an Imperial System

The first set of arguments concerning the decline and eventual collapse of the

Habsburg Empire views the collapse of the Empire within the context of a general

theory of imperial rise and decline. There was nothing special about how and why the

Habsburgs fell. The Empire followed the same trajectory of imperial decay as the Otto-

man, Russian, and Roman Empires. This view, which is more prevalent among political

scientists, is seen most clearly in the arguments presented by Alexander Motyl and

Solomon Wank.5According to Wank, In the end the fall of the Habsburg empire was

the logical consequence of the dynamics of its imperial structure.6As the emphasis on

structure indicates, this perspective posits that a certain structure tend to promote pa-


4/58

116 Reo Matsuzaki

thologies specific to that structure.7This pathology is transhistorical and occurs despite

variance in social and ideological contexts.

So what is it about an imperial structure that leads eventually to its decline? Wank

writes, Imperial decay inevitably sets in when the ruler, in order to preserve theintegrity of his state and the longevity of his empire, accords some or all of the peripheral

territories a greater degree of autonomy vis--vis the center.8An empire is assumed to

be a form of an absolutist state. For such a state to function properly, the absolutist ruler

needs to have adequate information about the activities of its subjects, and must be

guaranteed continuous and abundant inflow of economic resources. The lack of either

component will undermine the absolutist rulers ability to effectively impose his will on

his subjects.9In order to gather information and extract resources, the absolutists pre-

ferred method is to empower a centrally controlled network of agents. However, these

agents, since they know little about the periphery and have very few ties with the sub-

jects in the periphery, will have difficulty gathering enough information and resources to

sustain absolutist rule. Therefore, the short-term alternative is to develop local elites that

are loyal to the center.10

The problem with this short-term strategy though is that it erodes the powerbase of

the core and increases regional identification of the periphery. Therefore, one finds in

mature empires a system whereby the periphery treasures its autonomy and is able to

protect its autonomy with its increased wealth and power. The internal weakening of the

empire due to decentralization also leads to external weakness, as other great powers

are able to pick at the periphery. In an attempt to revitalize its strength, an empire may

try to recentralize, but this goes directly against the wishes of the empowered peripheral

elites, and rebellions result. It is then a matter of time before the empire implodes or is

partitioned by other great powers.11

Assuming that the Habsburg Empire followed this exact path to doom, the next

important issue is in determining when the decline of the Empire started. Here Motyland Wank part company: While Wank argues that the decline of the Empire was a

nineteenth-century phenomenon,12Motyl suggests that the Habsburg empire may have

been subject to a process of steady decay from the time it incorporated Bohemia, Moravia,

and Hungary in the early part of the sixteenth century.13

To a great extent, this difference arises from the two authors diverging views re-

garding nationalism. As a pure structuralist, Motyl dismisses the importance of national-

ism all together: Nationalismor the belief that nations should enjoy political sover-

eigntyis tailor-made for regional elites who wish to legitimize their own aspirations to

self-rule.14Therefore, Motyls concern becomes the apparent independence of the

local elites since the sixteenth century. On the other hand, although Wank largely adopts

the structuralist argument, he cannot dismiss the fact that the rise of nationalism in the

nineteenth century had an impact on the Habsburg Empire.15

II. The Inevitable Collapse of an Empire in the Age of Nationalism

Although Wank uses Motyls framework, by placing greater emphasis on the role of

nationalism, his perspective serves as an alternative to that of Motyls. While both au-

thors argue for the inevitability of the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, their indepen-

dent variables are different. Motyl focuses mainly on economic relationships between


5/58


the core and the periphery; Wank on the other hand grasps the importance of ideology in

ushering in imperial collapse.

Perhaps it is simply good historical reading that forces Wank to break ranks. After

all, it is very difficult to argue that the Habsburg Empire was declining since the six-teenth century.16At least until 1792, and arguably until 1848, if not beyond, the core

elites were consolidating their control of the periphery. Since Wank, like Motyl, defines

imperial decline as the process whereby decentralization weakens the power of the core

relative to the periphery, the centralizing programs of the Habsburgs that characterized

the reign of rulers from Maria Theresa to Francis I can only be a proof of imperial

consolidation.17According to Wank, it was the pressure of modernizing forces18that

compelled the Habsburgs to reverse course and end their program of gradual centraliza-

tion. The rise of nationalism and the nationalists call for local autonomy made further

centralization not only impossible, but led the Habsburgs to decentralize, thus weakening

the material base for Habsburg rule. Moreover, imperial rule itself was delegitimized and

the dynasty, the court and the imperial government increasingly appeared German [and

imperialist].19The supranational ideology was further weakened by the creation of the

Dual Monarchy in 1867,20and the Empire came to be viewed as a way in which the

Germans and Magyars could rule over the other nationalities.21

III. Decline as a Result of the Mistakes of Core Elites

Jaszis work, like that of Wanks, places great emphasis on nationalism as the

primary reason for Habsburg decline. However, while Wank views nationalism as inevi-

tably forcing the core elites to conduct destabilizing policies, Jaszi argues that the

problem was more a matter of bad politics. There was nothing inevitable about the

policies of the Habsburg core elites, but once they chose to preserve an imperial system

in an age of nationalism, collapse was unavoidable. Jaszis position is that imperialism

and nationalism cannot coexist in a single political structure.In order to have readers accept this position, Jaszi goes through a series of quota-

tions by nationalist writers in the first chapters of his book. He writes, Mickiewicz, the

great Polish poet, almost a hundred years ago wrote the following startlingly clear-

sighted description of the Habsburg empire: This Empire counts thirty-four million in

habitants, but in reality it has no more than six million people; namely six million Germans

keeping twenty-eight millions of other stocks in bondage. 22Another good example

is a quotation by Charles Sealsfield, who according to Jaszi, is a brilliant German-Ameri-

can: They [Bohemians] feel depressed that they exist for a dynasty which remained

foreign to them and their wishes in spite of a rule of several hundred years, and which in

its incapacity cares only how to subdue Bohemia and how to kill its national aims.23

After quoting a chain of anti-Habsburg nationalists, he then goes through the

history of the Habsburg Empire to display how the Empire, with its rulers unwilling to

change the imperial form of governance, was doomed to collapse. This view of Habsburg

history is especially pronounced in his discussion of the Great War. He argues that the

Great War did not cause the demise of the Empire, but was simply the final crisis that

brought to light the fact that all along the Habsburgs were fighting an inner war with its

inhabitants.24To support this argument, he notes how it was common practice for the

Czechs to desert the Habsburg army en masse early in the war.25At the end of what he


6/58

118 Reo Matsuzaki

calls a cursory chapter on the World War, he quotes an Austrian royalist by the name of

Victor Bibl. According to Bibl:

The death struggle of the Danube Monarchy has come to its end. She waswe

have seen itgravely sick for a long time, sentenced to collapse. We were compelledto die, said Ottokar Czernin, we would choose only the manner of death and we have

chosen the most terrible. One can dispute whether we could really have chosen and

whether the end could have been more terrible. But this is absolutely correct: the

Habsburg Empire was no longer capable of life, it had become an anachronism.26

Despite the fatalistic rhetoric, as stated above, Jaszi is not arguing for the inevitabil-

ity of Habsburg collapse. Therefore, Jaszi writes, [T]he most conspicuous centrifugal

forces, the forces of national awakening and integration, were at their first appearance

not at all forces of dissolution or segregation but they became such only because, instead

of being prudently canalized and utilized in the interest of the state, they were pushed

back by violence or fraud and were forced into a direction which was irreconcilable with

the unity and development of the old state. The reason for Habsburg collapse was not

nationalism per se, but nationalism plus the stubbornness and stupidity of the core elites.

The locus of the problem was the outdated policies of the center. Collapse only became

inevitable when it was clear that the Habsburgs were not going to conduct serious

reforms to federalize the system.

Authors such as Steven Beller, Charles Ingrao, and A.J.P. Taylor also blame Habsburg

core policies for the destruction of the Monarchy. Beller writes, The failure of Austria-

Hungary, or even Austria, to establish a clear state identity and a competing focus of

loyalty beyond mere dynastic fealty to Francis Joseph is one of the most obvious

explanations as to why the military defeat that the state suffered in 1918 led not only to

its collapse, but also to its falling apart and disappearance.27This failure of the Habsburgs

was especially lamentable, according to Beller, because it was a result of a consciouschange in policies during the reign of Francis I (1792-1835) and Metternich when they

reversed the state-building efforts of Maria Theresa and her two sons (1740-1792).28

Shocked by the French Revolution, Francis I and Metternich associated all ideas of

Enlightenment with the Revolution, and halted the project of transforming Austria into a

modern state by discontinuing the enlightened project of Maria Theresa, Joseph II,

and Leopold II. However, even this last source of legitimacy was destroyed in 1867 with

the decision to split the monarchy into two. As A.J.P. Taylor writes, Old Austria, the

Austria of Metternich, had rested on the dynasty and had evaded national definition.

This Austria perished in 1866. Austria-Hungary was the symbol that the dynasty had

made its peace with the Magyars and the Germans, the two master-races29 By

creating the Dual Monarchy, the Habsburgs made ethnicity the focal point of gover-

nance. It was only natural then that the Czechs and the Poles would also demand equal

national rights. The fragile fabric of the Empire was torn. In short, a chain of bad politi-

cal decisions by the monarch and his advisors destroyed the Habsburg Monarchy.

IV. Nationalism and the Breakdown of Politics in the Periphery

In contrast to the above view that the collapse of the Empire was a consequence of

bad policies by the core elites, some authors have focused their attention on the political


7/58


climate in the periphery. According to this view, the core elites had done their best to

solve the nationalities question, but their attempts were trumped by the uncompromising

stance of ethnic Germans and Czechs. Dominic Lieven writes, The Habsburg authori-

ties after 1867 genuinely tried to be neutral in these disputes [disputes between ethnicGermans and Czechs over language use in Bohemia], as in similar later conflicts in other

crownlands.30In 1905 for example, after years of negotiations with the ethnic Ger-

mans and Czechs in Bohemia, the government of Cisleithenia31believed that it had

reached a compromise between the Czech and German moderates and presented a

proposal for electoral and constitutional reform in Bohemia. However, a few months

later, the Czech delegates submitted a counter proposal that brought discussions to a

standstill. The government, frustrated, but still striving for a compromise, even started

discussion with the radical National Socialists in the Bohemian Diet.32

Therefore, the problem was not the Habsburg authorities, but the Czech and Ger-

man representatives in the Bohemian Diet and the Imperial Council (the parliament in

Vienna). For example, when elections for the Bohemian Diet was held in 1908, the

campaign of the Germans was based on the idea of national autonomythe idea that

the Bohemian lands should be divided according to ethnic groups so that there could be

some regions that were run solely by Germans. On the other hand, the campaign of the

Czech parties was based on the historic unity of Bohemia and the use of Czech in all

Bohemian institutions regardless of the ethnic composition of each local district.33When

the Diet reconvened after the elections, the Germans immediately submitted the 1905

drafts, mentioned above, with amendments for the division of Bohemia along ethnic

lines. The Czechs submitted their own proposal, heedless of what the Germans were

demanding. It was immediately apparent that compromise was impossible. The govern-

ment therefore asked the Diet to elect a commission to study the nationalities problem in

Bohemia hoping that a compromise could be reached in the future. The Czechs, using

their superior numbers in the Bohemian Diet, elected only Czechs to be in this commis-sion. Furious, the Germans decided to obstruct Diet proceedings and the Bohemian Diet

was shut down.34

The breakdown of the Bohemian Diet adds an interesting twist to the review of

Habsburg decline. By the late nineteenth century, there existed two groups in the Bohe-

mian Diet whose minimumrequirement for compromise did not coincide. An agreement

between the Czechs and the Germans was impossible when the Germans demanded the

division of Bohemia along ethnic lines, and the Czechs demanded the unity of Bohemia

under Czech leadership. Parliamentarianism could not function under such conditions.35

Therefore, it is hard to imagine how more democratization or more federalization, sug-

gested by authors such as Beller, Ingrao, and Jaszi, could have solved the nationalities

question. Even if Cisleithenia were federalized, the problem of the German minority in

Bohemia and the Czech minority in Lower Austria would not have been solved.

Moreover, it is questionable if the controversy in Bohemia was really only about

language, or even about federalism. Suzanne Konirsh writes, These developments indi-

cate that the basic struggle between Germans and the Czechs during the period under

investigation was not primarily for a constitutional reorganization of the Monarchy. True,

the Czechs demanded a greater autonomy for the Bohemian crownlands, but the Ger-

mans were no longer committed to centralism and would have discussed federalism


8/58

120 Reo Matsuzaki

once their demands were met in the crownlands.36The Czech demands were starting

to suggest a desire for hegemonic control in a multiethnic Bohemia, which would then

destroy the fragile structure of the Habsburg Empire. As Arthur Kogan writes, The

right to national existence implied the possession of a definite national territory. Obvi-ously what the Czechs really wanted was a state.37

V. No Decline in the Nineteenth Century

Opposed to the views discussed so far, Alan Sked argues that the system was not in

decline in the nineteenth century. The fall of the Empire can be attributed solely to the

Great War. The Habsburg Empire was on the losing side of the conflict and losing in a

total war had dire consequences:

[T]he Empire fell because it lost a major war. Before then it was economically

prosperous with the latest research showing an industrial growth rate in Bosnia-

Herzegovina as high as 12.4 per cent for the period of 1881-1913, thus reinforcing the

work of David F. Good and others on the economic integration of the Monarch as well

as its growth. [P]rogress on the nationality question was being made, although there

were set-backs too. The point of my book was not to say that the nationality problem

had been solved or that it was unimportant My view of the nationality question is that

whereas it might have let in the long-run tot he downfall of the Monarchy, this did not

happen before 1914; moreover, there is no reason to assume that if war had not broken

out, more progress could not have been made towards solving it after that date.38

The argument that the Habsburg Empire was not in a state of decline rests on two

factors. First, not only was the economy of the Empire growing, but economic integra-

tion had advanced to the degree that no longer was the economy a system of core/

periphery relations, but an integrated common market, which was characteristic of a

modern state. Second, compromises were being found on the nationality issue.Given the recent findings by authors such as David Good, the first factorthat of

economic growth in the nineteenth centuryseems uncontroversial. Abundant evidence

displays the emergence of sustained growth in the western part of the Empire. Even the

Hungarian and the Carpathian lands were experiencing economic development as a

result of a revolution in transportation. Feudal economic institutions were gradually de-

clining as capitalist modes of production started to take hold everywhere in the Em-

pire.39The significance of economic growth in the nineteenth century is evident by

comparing the Habsburg Monarchy to its peer competitors. Whereas the Habsburg

Empire was growing at a rate of 1.45 percent per annum between 1870 and 1913, the

United Kingdom and France were only growing at 1.00 percent and 1.06 percent re-

spectively. Russia grew at a meager 0.62 percent and Germanys balance-threatening

1.51 percent was not that far ahead.40

The notion that the Habsburg economy was becoming more integrated is also con-

vincing. First, from the mid nineteenth century on, the Empires railroad network ex-

panded greatly, with over 40,000 kilometers having been built by World War I.41Since

the construction of a railroad network has been the prerequisite for economic union in

other economies in Europe, such expansion can be assumed to have laid the groundwork

for Habsburg economic integration. Second, there was a substantial increase in interre-


9/58


gional flows of capital from west to east, and these flows serve as indicators of market

integration.42In fact, if one compares the regional differentiation of interest rates, the

Habsburg Empire displayed less regional differences than the United States or Japan.

Also, there was less regional variation within the Empire with regards to per capitaincome than in Italy or Sweden.43

Despite these promising economic indicators, the second proposition of Skedthat

the nationalities problem was slowly being solvedis harder to maintain. As discussed

above, the Bohemian Diet was shut down because neither side could agree on the

nationalities issue. Skeds optimistic evaluation of the nationalities question comes largely

from the Moravian case, where the Germans and the Czechs successfully agreed to a

compromise constitution for the local Diet.44However, the fact remains that something

like the Moravian compromise was suggested but rejected in the Bohemian Diet. Also,

Bohemia was considered the center of the Czech homeland, while Moravia was only a

part of the Bohemian kingdom, which included at its height Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia,

and Lusatia. Evidence thus better supports the argument that the nationalities question

had made the parliamentary system dysfunctional, and the delay of a Bohemian com-

promise only strengthened the hand of the Czech nationalists as the expansion of the

franchise led to greater control of the Bohemian Diet by the Czechs.

However, one also cannot ignore the fact that virtually none of the Czech parties

were in favor of Czech independence in 1914. The Agrarian party, the largest Czech

party, was pro-Habsburg and reasoned that eventually the demographic reality of the

Empire would make Austria into a Slav empire. The Social Democrats, the second

largest party, were also very much pro-Habsburg and strove to reform the Empire into a

federation. Even the more radical and staunchly nationalistic parties such as Young

Czech Party and the Realist Party were in favor of a united Empire since the alterna-

tives to Habsburg rule were viewed as either German or Russian expansion in Eastern

Europe. These alternatives were seen to most likely put an end to Bohemian autonomy.Only the State Rights Party, which controlled four out of 107 Czech seats in the Imperial

Council, pushed for independence.45

In Search of a New Model

The perspectives discussed so far all fail as adequate explanations for various rea-

sons. First, Skeds argument that the Great War was primarily responsible for the col-

lapse of the Habsburg Empire is unconvincing. As discussed earlier, the Habsburg Em-

pire survived several major wars in its history. In fact, the initial defeats the Habsburg

Empire experienced during the Napoleonic Wars were arguably more severe compared

to its defeat in the Great War. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Habsburgs were deci-

sively defeated several times by Napoleon, and French troops physically occupied the

Habsburg lands. Nonetheless, the crownlands that composed the Habsburg Empire did

not show any signs of seeking separation from Vienna. The Great War clearly deter-

mined the timing of the Habsburg collapse, but one is still left asking why the Empire

was unable to withstand this conflict when it had survived other major wars.

Second, Motyls argument fails because it does not fit actual historical develop-

ments. Although Motyl proclaims that the Empire was in decline since the early six-

teenth century, the Habsburgs were gradually consolidating their Empire in the seven-


10/58

122 Reo Matsuzaki

teenth and eighteenth centuries. More taxes were collected from the periphery and the

local elites were becoming well integrated into the Habsburg bureaucracy up to the late

eighteenth century. Motyl equates local autonomy with separatist tendencies, while in

actuality, localities could have significant autonomy and still be integrated very effec-tively into the imperial system.

Wanks argument is important to the extent that it draws attentions to how national-

ism changed the political dynamics of the Empire. However, Wank assumes that the rise

of nationalism led directly to imperial collapse. He does not consider how various inter-

vening variables were important, and how, depending on these intervening variables, the

rise of nationalism may not have led to Habsburg collapse.

The two remaining perspectives, those that focus on the political decisions of the

core elites and those that focus on the political dynamics in the periphery, provide good

critiques to scholars that argue for the inevitability of Habsburg collapse. However, as

Bellers comment displays, there is no theoretical underpinning to these arguments.

Causal mechanisms are not investigated. Because there is a lack of understanding of

the relationship between nationalism and elite politics, and how these two led to the

collapse of the Habsburg Empire, authors such as Beller remain puzzled about the whole

phenomenon. They know their history; they can tell readers the specifics of elite politics;

but they cannot tell us why.

The argument presented in this paper is at its core a critique and elaboration of the

authors discussed above. This paper identifies nationalism as the independent variable

and imperial decay and collapse as the dependent variable. This paper goes further

though and argues that nationalism does not lead directly to collapse; there is an inter-

vening variableelite politics. Therefore, this paper incorporates the insights of authors

such as Beller and Konirsh into a theoretical framework, thus providing a causal under-

standing of the link between nationalism, elite politics, and imperial collapse.

Nationalism created a new elite class in Bohemia. Previous to the era of nationalawakening, when subjects in Bohemia became rich through material success or were

able to become prominent political actors, they had adopted the German language. There-

fore, there was a great degree of assimilation in the upper ranks of society. However,

just when industrialization took off in Bohemia and many peasants were coming to the

cities, there was the awakening of the Czech nation: As people rose in society, they

did not give up the Czech language. The result of this was that a distinctly Czech elite

class formed in Bohemia. As these new elites became stronger and replaced the old

aristocrats as the most significant political actors in Bohemia, collaboration between the

periphery and the core became difficult. More than any other factor, the lack of a

symbiotic relationship between the central authority and the new peripheral leaders

accounted for the eventual decline of the Empire. As it will be argued in the following

chapter, a composite state such as the Habsburg Empire could only survive when a

cooperative bond between the local rulers and the core elites was flourishing.

The central authority did indeed make a series of bad decisionsthe decision for

Dualism being the most notorious. In the words of Francis Palacky, the great nineteenth-

century Czech historian, This [Dualism] would mean two fold centralism which is a

twofold evil and therefore, as simple common sense comprehends it, worse than the

single one [Centralism].46Nonetheless, Palacky thought that even Dualism was still


11/58


better than Austrian disintegration and was unwavering in his belief that the best place

for the Czechs was in the Habsburg Empire no matter what shape the Empire may

take.47Although known as the father of Czech nationalism, Palacky was a conserva-

tive and had more in common with the old aristocrats than the new Czech elites. Thus,as long as the old aristocrats and those like Palacky were the main political actors in

Bohemia, it is hard to believe that the Empire would have disintegrated.

In short, this paper posits that nationalism (independent variable) changed the dy-

namics of elite politics (intervening variable), which in turn led to the collapse of the

Habsburg Empire (dependent variable).

Where Do We Go From Here?

The rest of the paper will be divided into four sections. The theoretical framework

used in this paper will be introduced in the following chapter. It will be argued that a

composite state structure is not inherently destabilizing. What led to the decline of the

Habsburg Empire was the central authoritys inability to alter its strategy of managing

the periphery when ideological, political, social, and economic changes had nullified the

usefulness of its previous strategy.

Chapter three will trace the development of Habsburg politics from 1526 to 1792.

During this era, the landed aristocracy in Bohemia increasingly partook in imperial poli-

tics, therefore transforming themselves into a court aristocracy. As the fate of the Bohe-

mian aristocracy became intricately tied to the overall success of the Empire, even

though the Habsburg Empire remained a composite state, the unity of the Empire was

assured.

Chapter four examines the years between 1848 and 1897. This era is characterized

by the rapid rise of the new elites and the gradual decline of the aristocracy as the ruling

class in Bohemia. Nonetheless, the aristocracy retained their importance in the Habsburg

court and the monarch was unwilling to incorporate the new masters of Bohemia intogreater imperial politics. Ultimately this meant that Bohemia, now controlled by the

nationalist elites, became disintegrated from the Empire.

The final chapter will conclude the study by discussing how this paper contributes to

the growing body of works dealing with empires and imperialism. At the same time this

paper is about nationalism, it is also about why empires and composite states rise and

decline. Furthermore, the final chapter will suggest ways in which the theoretical frame-

work developed in this paper could be used to understand contemporary politics. The

main mistake made by the Habsburg core elites was that they directly linked nationalism

to imperial decline, and they did not understand that there could have been a political

solution to the crisis. Similarly, contemporary ethnic wars, such as the Yugoslav wars,

are sometimes discusses as if they were inevitable outcomes of some ancient hatreds.

This study, by focusing on thepoliticsof imperial decline displays that there is always a

political solution to national or ethnic conflicts.

A Theory of Politics in Composite States

Persuasion is important as crucial collaborators begin to accept metropolitan

values, and the Mister Johnsons of Africa, the Thomas Hutchinsons of colonial


12/58

124 Reo Matsuzaki

America, and the zamindars of India soon come to regard the public policy of the

imperialists as both civilized and correct. If they have doubts, the metropole

has the means by which to bribe and coerce individuals directly. Should these arts

fail, gunboats are ever ready to supplement their shortcomings, and force can beexercised directly on the subject population.48

In the above passage, Michael Doyle captures the essence of how European states

pursued their policy of imperialism. In most cases, the European state was not powerful

enough to conquer and dominate the populations in the periphery directlythe only way

their empire was maintained was through collaborating with the local elites. Gunboats

could be sent to reinforce the authority of the center, but this was so that the former

collaborators could be convinced to reestablish their ties with the metropole or so that

new collaborators could be found in the periphery. In every empire, the core has the

ability to augment a preponderant military power to subdue the periphery temporarily,

but the core does not have enough resources to permanently integrate the periphery into

a centralized structure.

Having an imperial structure, similar limitations characterized the rule of the Habsburg

authority over its associated territories that spanned the center of the European conti-

nent. Some have argued that this inability of the Habsburg Empire to terminate local

autonomy meant that the empire was plagued with persistent political instability. How-

ever, permanent autonomy of the local kingdoms did not mean perpetual instability in the

imperial governance structure. There were various strategies the Habsburg core elites

could pursue to make the local rulers in the periphery good collaborators of the regime.

In order to understand how this was the case, this chapter will first review the political

dynamics prevalent in most early European states. These states all had in common a

composite-state structure, which is essentially the political structure characterizing all

empires.Secondly, the theoretical framework informing the investigation of the remaining

chapters of this paper will be developed. This paper argues that there were various

strategies the Habsburg central authorities could have pursued in order to develop a

cohesive political structure. The preferred choice of the Habsburg elites, like many of its

contemporaries, was that of aristocratic co-optation. The Habsburgs were very suc-

cessful in doing this, but ironically it was this very success that led to their demise. The

rise of nationalism and nationalist leaders nullified the importance of the close ties devel-

oped between the central authority and the aristocracy. However, the Habsburgs re-

fused to change their strategy and helplessly witnessed the gradual disintegration of

their once mighty empire.

The Political Dynamics of the Old Order

Like many of its contemporaries in the early modern era, the Habsburg Empire

was a composite statea state including more than one country under the sovereignty

of one ruler. Unlike many of its contemporaries though, at the dawn of the Great War,

the Habsburg Empire was still a composite state.49In fact, authors such as Alexander

Motyl argue that it was precisely for this reason that the Habsburg Empire was unable

to survive the Great War. According to such authors, composite states were far from


13/58


being an ideal form of political organization. The structure of such entities had inherent

potential for destabilization as the multiple layers of authority created inefficiencies in

the extraction of resources from the periphery. This existence of difficulties in aggregat-

ing national wealth undermined the strength of composite states both internally andexternally, thus leading to their inevitable disappearance by 1918.50

It is beyond doubt that the existence of two or more distinct political units under the

rule of a single monarch necessitated governance by cooperation and collaboration,51

and that this in turn suggests brittleness in the composite-state structure. Moreover, the

risk involved in subduing the semiautonomous territories into provinces52and the eco-

nomic centrality of the aristocracy-controlled agrarian economy53allowed the local no-

bility to maintain a high level of political leverage over the center.54Also, the local aris-

tocracy was the body that had the ability to implement any reforms the center wished to

undertake. Therefore, successful government initiatives were generally those that the

nobility were willing to support, acquiesce in, or at least not actively seek to thwart.55

However, contrary to Motyls analysis, it is far from certain that a composite state

was no more than a necessary but unsatisfactory form of political organization to be

inevitably replaced by the more stable nation-state.56Also, there is no reason to be-

lieve that rule by collaboration and cooperation was inherently destabilizing. In fact,

power-sharing by the monarch and the local aristocracy created a fluctuating, but stable

equilibrium. Similar to how the monarchy saw incredible risk in provincializing the semi-

autonomous regions, local elites also found the negative consequences of rebellion unat-

tractive.57The European-wide increases in demand for tax revenues between the 1500s

and 1700s were more tolerable to the aristocracy than the possible social upheavals that

may result from political destabilization.58Even without actively causing regional turmoil

by outright rebellion, the local elites often faced the danger of social upheaval resulting

from peasant revolts. In such instances, the military support of the central administration

proved vital for the survival of the local authority.59

One must also keep in mind that the aristocracy and the central authority were not

the only political actors involved in European politics. Broadly speaking, in what Motyl

simply calls the periphery, there were three separate political entities: nobility, clergy,

and commoners. In addition, there were numerous other corporate bodies such as the

law courts, craft and trade guilds, universities, and towns, which all claimed certain

rights and privileges.60The periphery was hardly a unified entity and was characterized

by occasional power struggles. The aristocracy often found it convenient to ally with the

center in order to maintain dominance within its own regional lands as much as the

center relied on the aristocracy to help uphold its authority.

Also, as Howard Kaminsky argues, [T]he new territorial aristocracies [of the late

medieval era] were not consolidations of long-established noble strata but consisted

chiefly of more or less new men, new families, whose noble status did not depend on

whether older families would condescend to intermarry with them, but rather on the

solidity of noble estate as a form of property guaranteed by the culture and legalities of

the territorial policy under its king or prince.61In other words, the authority of the

center was needed to legitimize the rule of the local aristocracy, because the newness of

many aristocrats to the land meant that only the right given to them by their king legiti-

mized their local lordships. In fact, from the thirteenth century on, the extinction rate of


14/58


15/58


nobles were so enmeshed that any concept of permanent aristocratic opposition is

unlikely to make much sense.74The composite state was a system that worked effec-

tively in a political situation where the center was not powerful enough to bring outlying

kingdoms and provinces under tight royal control. It was a system whereby the localelites were guaranteed continued enjoyment of their existing privileges, while having the

added benefit of participating in wider imperial politics.75

Explaining the Dynamics of Elite Politics in Habsburg Decline

As suggested above, a composite state involved more actors than simply the aris-

tocracy and the central authority. According to Wayne te Brake, a composite state has,

at the very least, three sets of actors: national claimants to power, local rulers, and

ordinary political subjects.76In this paper, te Brakes framework will be adopted to

analyze elite politics within Bohemia and between Bohemia and Vienna, but with the

following labels: central authority, local rulers, and local actors. Also, this paper will add

a fourth group to this list of actors: the nationalist leaders. These actors are defined as

follows: The central authorityis composed of the emperor and his administration at the

imperial center. The local rulersare those in the elite stratum of the peripheral units.

They could be united in supporting the central authority or divided. If divided, the central

authority has the option of playing one set of elites against another set to keep the

periphery under control.Local actorsare those that are from the non-ruling strata of

society. Their political power is limited, and they cannot directly challenge the central

authority within the bounds of politics (although they have often challenged the status

quo outside of politics by activities such as peasant revolts). Nonetheless, they could be

mobilized to support the local rulers against the central authority or to support the central

authority against the local rulers. Finally, the nationalist leadersare people originally

from the local actor group that acquired political power due to mass nationalism. With

the introduction of elections and the expansion of the franchise, members of the lowerclasses were able to effectively challenge the aristocracy (the old local rulers) for politi-

cal legitimacy in the periphery.

The strength of a composite state depends on the type of coalition that forms be-

tween the central authority and various actors in the periphery. As figure 2.1 (on page

29) displays, there were four different coalitions in the Habsburg Empire between 1526

and 1914. These coalitions were not unique to the Habsburg Empire; other empires have

had similar political situations. Also, it must be stressed that these are not the only pos-

sible political coalitions in composite states. Even within the Habsburg Empire, these

political relationships reflect only those that the central authority had vis--vis Bohemia.

The relationship the central authority maintained with Hungary was vastly different.

Finally, how the coalition groupings changed in the Bohemia-Habsburg example was not

predetermined; these groupings were the result of the strategies pursued by the Habsburg

authorities. Therefore, even as the political, social, economic, and ideological changes in

the Habsburg Empire affected the unity of the Habsburg Empire adversely, there still

existed a political solution. The collapse of the Empire was not inevitable.

The pre-White Mountain situation (named after the battle that ended Bohemian

resistance in 1620) consisted of loose positive political relationships between the central

authority, local rulers, and local actors. The very looseness of this arrangement provided


16/58

128 Reo Matsuzaki

the Habsburg elites with great flexibility: They had the option of balancing the aristoc-

racy and members of the lower classes against one another. For example, the mer-

chants from the towns could be used as an alternate source of income if the aristocracyproved to be uncooperative in providing the central authority with tax revenue. The

peasants could also be rallied against the aristocracy. On the other hand, the fear of

peasant revolts would compel the aristocracy to cooperate with the central authority.

However, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, as it will be discussed below in

more detail, a significant portion of the aristocracy started to perceive the central au-

thority as a nuisance and allied with the local actors in order to secede from the dynastic

union. Yet, this secession attempt was hardly a united effort on the part of the aristoc-

racy, and for that reason, the rebellion in 1620 was suppressed with ease.

Soon after the rebellion, the Habsburg authorities had no trouble finding elements

within the aristocracy to help purge the disloyal and quickly reestablished control over

Bohemia. In addition to the purges, the Habsburg authorities embarked on a strategy to

co-opt the Bohemian aristocracy. They decided that the strategy of maintaining a loose

friendly relationship with both the local rulers and the local actors was too risky. There-

fore, the Habsburgs overtly supported the aristocracy against the local actors and tried

their best to win the trust of the Bohemian nobles. For a while, the strategy seemed like

a success: Bohemia became politically united and extremely loyal to the crown for the

remainder of the seventeenth century. However, as time passed, cleavages in the elite

stratum started to form once again with some political actors still loyal to Vienna while


17/58


others seeking an alternative arrangement to the union with Austria. Therefore, in 1741,

when Charles Albert of Bavaria marched into Bohemia following Frederick II of Prussias

invasion of Silesia, the Bohemian estates voted to crown Charles as king of Bohemia.

Nonetheless, the opposition to the Habsburgs was limited and those that voted to crownCharles quickly returned their allegiance to Vienna once Bavaria was defeated.

The failed rebellion of 1741 then inaugurated a second era of close collaboration

between the Bohemian aristocracy and Vienna. The effort to transform the local Bohe-

mian aristocracy into a court aristocracy was redoubled. By the late eighteenth century,

the Habsburgs had achieved their goalthe Bohemian aristocracy became indistin-

guishable from the central authority as the local nobles occupied positions in both the

imperial court and the bureaucracy.

Ironically, the very success of the central authority in co-opting the Bohemian elites

led to the decline of the Empire. With the rise of nationalist ideology in Bohemia, some

local actors started to acquire a Czech identity. These nationally conscious men looked

for leaders that would represent their cause, but found that the aristocracy was unwilling

to carry the banner of nationalism. The ties between the local actors and the local rulers

were severed. Nonetheless, in this early stage of the nationalist awakening, only a

small minority of the non-political local actors were nationalists. Therefore, although

some local actors felt politically marginalized in Bohemia, they were unable to challenge

the system.

The Habsburg Empire entered a phase of political crisis when industrialization gave

rise to mass nationalism. By the mid eighteenth century, new nationalist leaders emerged

to represent the sentiments of the masses. This in turn, thus signified that there was now

a source of substantial political opposition in the periphery even while the aristocracy

remained loyal to Vienna. As time passed, the strength of the nationalist leaders grew at

the expense of the aristocratic leadership in Bohemia. Nonetheless, despite the emer-

gence of the nationalist leaders as the dominant political force in Bohemia, the centralauthority refused to cooperate with them. The Czech people and their leaders were

frustrated and felt that the Empire no longer represented them fairly. Although most of

the nationalist leaders did not call for Czech independence prior to 1914, their commit-

ment to a united Habsburg Empire had diminished.

As the above discussion displays, the Habsburg Empire declined because the cen-

tral authorities failed to readjust their strategy of peripheral control when the political

realities within the periphery had undergone revolutionary changes. If the strategy the

Habsburgs had employed were ultimately self-defeating, what other options did the

central authority have? Figure 2.2 displays some alternative strategies the central au-

thority could have used to manage elite politics.

Prior to the rise of nationalism, the Habsburg authority could have weakened its

ties with the local rulers so that they could identify themselves more closely with the

local actors. Also, by lessening the collaborative relationship with the local rulers, the

Habsburgs could have been able to be more mindful of the needs of the local actors.

This arrangement would be similar to a strategy the Habsburg authorities pursued prior

to the Battle of White Mountain. However, it was extremely difficult for the Habsburgs

to adopt this strategy: The Bohemian aristocrats were comfortable in their position as


18/58

130 Reo Matsuzaki

members of the court aristocracy and the central authority was now accustomed to

working exclusively with the landed aristocracy.The second strategythat of nation-state buildingwould entail the Habsburgs

clamping down on the autonomy of the local rulers and co-opting the local actors in

creating an Austrianness within a unitary-state structure. This strategy was pursued

by other European states, such as France. However, this option was hard to realize for

two reasons. First, the central authority did not have the military power to subdue all of

the other political entities within the Habsburg Empire. The aristocrats in both Bohemia

and Hungary were economically and militarily powerful. Second, because the Habsburg

Empire was so diverse in its ethnic composition, it would have been difficult to forge a

pan-Austrian identity. Also, the creation of a pan-Austrian identity had to have occurred

in the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centurybefore the rise of national move-

ments in the various Habsburg regions. However, the strategy of close collaboration

with the aristocracy started to break down only after the regional ethnic identities crys-

tallized. It is hard to imagine that the Habsburgs would have changed their successful

strategy of aristocratic co-optation before the strategy had shown signs of failure.

After the split between the local actors and the local rulers and the rise of the

nationalist leaders, the Habsburg authority had two options: First, they could have tried

to balance the local rulers with the nationalist leaders. Second, the nationalist leaders

could have been co-opted in a way similar to how the aristocracy was a century earlier.


19/58


The former strategy could possibly be successful in the short run, but because the rela-

tionship between the local actors/nationalist leaders bloc and the local rulers was sour,

this option would not have been a viable long-term strategy. Eventually, the Habsburgs

would have had to choose between the local rulers and the nationalist leaders. The onlyway this arrangement could have worked was if the negative relationship between the

local rulers and the nationalist leaders was amended. Even if this was possible, this

strategy would have been subjected to the very constraints that made the first alterna-

tive strategythat of a return to loose cooperationdifficult to implement.

The latter of the two options would have led to the rapid disintegration of the Em-

pire. The strategy of ruling with the nationalists would mean that, unless all of the differ-

ent nationalities were somehow balanced equally in the Empire, a certain nation or a

coalition of nations would highjack the state apparatus. For example, if the Habsburgs

chose to rule the Empire through the Czechs, the Germans would have sought seces-

sion. On the other hand, even if the Empire did include the Czechs, Germans, Poles,

Magyars, Croats, and other nationalities in the administrative structure, the inter-ethnic

political battles that characterized the Bohemian Diet could easily have erupted in the

central administration.

Conclusion

In sum, with the center unable to sustain a cooperative relationship with the various

important actors in the periphery, the Empire no longer functioned as a stable political

entity. The problem was not that the Empire was a composite state but that the Empire

was an ill-functioning composite state. The sources of this crisis were political, and thus,

a political solution, although difficult to implement for various reasons, existed. This

conclusion has profound implications for the study of empires and also of other modern

composite states. But before these implications are investigated, this paper will now

review the history of the Habsburg Empire from 1526 to 1897 in detail to display how theframework presented above fits well with the historical narrative. The Habsburg history

from 1526 to 1792 will be discussed in the following chapter, and the post-national-

awakening era will be analyzed in chapter four.

Chapter 3: The Politics of Integration

The thought was often expressed that there were in Austria some sixty aristo-

cratic families who conducted the state as their private enterprise and attempts

were made in an ingenious way to deduce the story of Austria from this proposi-

tion. This thought has some truth in it but it is incomplete. Add to these sixty aristo-

cratic families thirty or forty bishops and you will have the whole truth.77

The above passage may seem to lend itself to some exaggeration, but scholars such

as Oscar Jaszi posit that such view of the aristocracy depicted the complete reality

proved by any careful sociological or historical survey.78Such are strong words, but it

is evident that the role of the aristocrats was critical in the politics of the Habsburg

Empire for most of its history. After all, the Empire was far from being a unitary state,


20/58

132 Reo Matsuzaki

and the officials in Vienna governed the country by collaborating with the local elites in

each of the regions within the Empire. Although the bureaucratization starting in the mid

eighteenth century did curb the power of the estates, the aristocracys governing role did

not diminish as the aristocrats were employed as the top officials in the court and in thebureaucracy.

Works by those such as Alexander Motyl suggest a theoretical account to why the

territorial nobility of the crownlands enjoyed immense power in an imperial system.79

And as discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, Motyl was convinced that

these powerful local aristocrats were a divisive force within the Empire.80Superficially,

there is ample evidence that supports this view of the aristocracy even when examining

the less rebellious (after 1620) Bohemian aristocracy. However, if one studies Habsburg

politics at a deeper level, in accordance with the analysis presented in the previous

chapter, it becomes evident that the aristocrats were in fact close collaborators of the

monarchy.

From Rebellion to Collaboration

The kingdom of Bohemia (also known as the crownland of St. Wenceslas)

formed one of the prime political and economic units of the late-medieval Europe. With

its core territory of Bohemia proper, Prague as its capital, and the associated territories

of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia, the kingdom possessed a population of about three

million peoplemore than the population of contemporary England. The Bohemian lands

were well endowed in productive resources with its rich farmlands of the Elbe valley

and the Southern Moravian plain, the textile industry and merchant population of Silesia,

and the silver mines. At the time, Europeans often saw Bohemia as the central region of

the continent. By contrast, Austria, prior to 1526, was a collection of provinces hardly

distinctive or influential, and Vienna was only in the initial stages of being developed as

its capital. Therefore, no one could have predicted which of the partiesAustria orBohemiawould dominate over the other, when the Bohemian lands passed by election

to Ferdinand I of Habsburg in 1526.81

With Bohemia clearly much wealthier than Austria, the Habsburg policy during its

first period of governance (1526-1620) aimed at limited dominion. In this way, the Habsburg

lands were a composite state in the loosest sense and consequentially, the local aristoc-

racy in Bohemia had great bargaining power over the central authorities in Vienna. As

the previous discussion of composite states suggests, the Viennese authority was com-

pelled to employ all means available to cooperate with the rulers of the mighty kingdom.

This included the appointment of a Bohemian aristocrat to the position of the Grand

Burgrave of Prague (the most senior royal position in Bohemia) and the Chancellor (the

keeper of the seals and the head of the local administration).82

Also, Ferdinand had the opportunity to exploit the inter-provincial rivalries between

the nobility of Bohemia and the nobility of the other associated regions of the Bohemian

crownlands. The lands of St. Wenceslas had very little internal cohesion: Moravia, Silesia,

and Lusatia83foiled the creation of a unified Bohemian Diet and resisted the authority of

the Chancellor, who was the only overall officer of the crown of St. Wenceslas. Intellec-

tually, the dominant Bohemian culture, shaped by the Czech language, extended through

much of Moravia, but hardly to Silesia or Lusatia. This situation allowed the king to


21/58


employ two alternating strategies. He could either use Bohemia to press for tighter

control throughout the territories, or else favor the other provinces as a lever against

Bohemia.84As long as the elites in the kingdom of St. Wenceslas remained divided, an

uncertain but a working political dynamic resulted. Nonetheless, the formation of a stable working relationship was prevented in

Bohemia due to the tentative connection between the Bohemian aristocracy and the

central authority in Vienna. As discussed earlier, the potentially destabilizing forces within

a composite state are often mollified and co-opted through their participation in empire-

wide politics. In Bohemia though, the local administration was quite distinct and practi-

cally no Bohemians found advancement in Vienna. Conversely, the Bohemian aristoc-

racy guarded their rights to determine aristocratic membership vehemently. As such, the

role of the sovereign as the guarantor of the rights of the aristocracy was unimportant in

Bohemia.85Furthermore, the culture of cooperation between the crown and the aristoc-

racy had not yet formed. The aristocracy still firmly believed in their natural right to

rebel against the monarch if the monarch did not serve their narrow interests. 86This

was perhaps acutely so in Bohemia with its tradition of electing its own king.87

It was within this context of a fragile union between Bohemia and Austria that

Protestantism became a major political issue. Protestantism was particularly divisive for

the Empire because the religious cleavage also involved an intra-Habsburg schism, plac-

ing king Rudolf II (1583-1618) on the side of religious toleration and his brother Matthias

on the side of counter-Reformation. The largely Protestant Bohemia naturally rallied in

defense of Rudolf, who even moved the imperial capital from Vienna to Prague, and the

Bohemian aristocracy began taking an active part in the intra-Habsburg power struggle.

To the chagrin of the Bohemian aristocracy, the intra-Habsburg conflict ended with the

victory of Matthias when Rudolf II died of ill health, which in turn deprived the Bohe-

mian aristocracy of their short-enjoyed status as the closest subject of the king. With the

succession of Matthias I (1612-1619), the capital of the Empire was moved back toVienna, and the central authoritys stance toward Protestantism hardened.88

Matthiass effort to persecute the Protestants encountered opposition everywhere

within the Empire, but the greatest resistance came within Bohemia where the aristoc-

racy was already unhappy with their fall from the pinnacle of power.89On 23 May 1618,

a group of Bohemian nobles marched into Prague Castle and declared open resistance

to Vienna by hurling the Emperors representatives, Jaroslave Martinic and Vilm Slavata,

off the castle balcony.90However, this did not at all mean that the entire Bohemian

aristocracy was united in opposition against Vienna. The two victims, who both miracu-

lously survived the fall, were authentically more old-Bohemian than several of the

rebellious aristocrats. Also, the support of Moravia and Silesia could not be taken for

granted (Moravia had even tried to strike a deal with Matthias when Bohemia remained

highly anti-Matthias).91Therefore, the crisis was not too severe for the Habsburg au-

thorities when Bohemian forces clashed with the imperial coalition at White Mountain

on 8 November 1620. It was unsurprising that the internally divided Bohemian forces

surrendered with hardly any fighting.92

Although the battle itself was quite anti-climatic, the rebellious elements within the

nobility, as well as their local actor supporter, paid a heavy price. After the Battle of

White Mountain, Ferdinand II (1619-1637) came to understand Protestantism to mean


22/58

134 Reo Matsuzaki

disloyalty, and the purge of the Protestants started. In June 1621, twenty-seven foment-

ers of the revolt were executed and the rest had their properties confiscated.93Prior to

the Battle of White Mountain, there were altogether 1382 (254 higher nobles and 1128

knightly families) aristocrats in Bohemia. After the purges, the number of noble familiesdwindled to 441 (10 princes, 110 counts, 83 barons, and 228 knights). Of these 441

families, only one-eighth to one-fifth had belonged to the old Bohemian nobility, the rest

being loyal conquerors that were installed by Ferdinand II.94Also, over 30,000 families

fled from Bohemia immediately after the Battle of White Mountain, and at the conclu-

sion of the Thirty Years War, only 900,000 of the 3 million prewar inhabitants were left

in Bohemia.95Over fifty percent of the landed wealth changed hands,96most of which

were given to the conquering warriors and the Jesuits, as well as the old aristocrats in

Bohemia that remained loyal to Catholicism.97

The consequence of the rebellion of the Bohemian nobles seemed to go further than

the persecution of Protestants in Bohemia. The Land Ordinance of 1627 ostensibly

repudiated many of the rights the Crown of Wenceslas enjoyed prior to 1620. The

Bohemian kingship became hereditary and the old custom of the Bohemian Diet electing

the king was done away with. The clergy became the first estate of the realm. Religious

toleration ended, and all Protestants that refused to convert were ordered out of the

country. The sovereign was to be the author of all legislation. All officials of Bohemia

became officials of the king by swearing oath to the king and not to the kingdom of

Bohemia. The existing power of the crown to hear appeals from any law court was

strengthened. The king, not the estates, would grant the patents of Bohemian nobility,

thus allowing those that were not natives of Bohemia to join the nobility. Finally, the

German language was raised to equality with Czech for all state purposes. The only real

power the Bohemian Diet still retained was in matters of taxation. Although Bohemia

itself was preserved, on paper, most of its independence was lost. The system whereby

the crown and the estates worked in partnership seemed to have been destroyed.98

The other major consequence of the Thirty Years War on Bohemia was that the

Bohemian cities were decimated. Since the Czech cities were primarily Protestant,

Ferdinand II forced many of the Czech burgers, who were not killed during the war, into

exile.99As a result, not only were the contending forces within the Czech aristocracy

that formed the local rulers consolidated into a single pro-Habsburg elite, the remaining

center of potential political poweri.e. the local actorsdisappeared from the political

map. The reduced status of the cities in Bohemian politics was clear from their level of

representation in the Bohemian estates. Prior to the Battle of White Mountain, there

were forty-two to forty-six free cities represented in the local Diet. After the Battle of

While Mountain there were only six: three towns in Prague, Kutn Hora, Plisen, and

Cesk Budejovince.100

By the mid seventeenth century Bohemia nominally exhibited the appearance of a

conquered territory. A large part of its nobility had been persecuted, foreign nobles, who

owed their loyalty to the crown, had been installed, and most of the rights Bohemia had

enjoyed prior to the Battle of White Mountain were abolished. Yet, in reality, the subju-

gation of Bohemia was more apparent than real. As Oskar Krejc writes, Although the

defeat in the Battle of While Mountain marked the end of the Confederation, it did not

bring any substantial changes to the relationship between the royal dynasty and the


23/58


Czech crown.101

The primary reason why Bohemia was able to preserve its semiautonomous posi-

tion in the aftermath of the Battle of White Mountain was a result of the willingness of

some members of the old Bohemian nobility to help the Habsburg authorities purge theirProtestant associates. The Habsburg monarchs, preoccupied by the Thirty Years War,

were grateful to these collaborators within Bohemia and rewarded them with great

wealth.102Therefore, although reduced significantly in number, the remaining members

of the old nobility of Bohemia grew richer and continued to provide the political leader-

ship in Bohemia.103This inner circle of aristocrats in Bohemia came to comprise no

more than ten families, all of which had been infected by Protestantism at one time or

another, if not involved in the rebellion itself. The inner circle was composed of the

Lobkovices, Waldsteins, Slavatas, Martinics, Cernins, Kinskys, Sternbergs, Kolovrats,

Schlicks, and Nostitzes.104Alongside the inner elite stood an outer circle of aristocrats

comprising no more than fifteen to twenty families. This closely intermarried class of

aristocrats formed the political core of Bohemia after 1620, as they had done before

with a larger aristocratic base.105

In the hands of the old-new oligarchy, the autonomy of Bohemia was preserved.

All of the important positions in Bohemia, such the Grand Burgrave and the Bohemian

Chancellor, always went to a member of the old Bohemian aristocracy. In addition, the

Bohemian aristocrats control of the estates, and thus the control of the Bohemian Diet,

was complete, even when the clergy was officially the first estate. Since the Diet con-

vened annually in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and the committees elected

by the Diet were responsible for public order and tax-collection, the old Bohemian nobles

continued to decisively exert political power within Bohemia. The old Bohemian houses

did not approve of the Land Ordinance of 1627, and since the Ordinance could not

function without the old Bohemian aristocrats, through them, the ordinance was de facto

amended. Local autonomies did in fact fade away in Bohemia, but the largest benefac-tor was not the crown, but the small group of the old Bohemian aristocracy.106

Also, the powers of the estates over taxation actually grew after White Mountain.

When the Thirty Years War ended, Bohemia remained the dynastys richest region,

supplying well over fifty percent of the revenue from direct taxation. The estates were

able to guard effectively their right not only to give formal approval for, but also to assess

and collect, even greater sums in this important region. Furthermore, the destruction of

the cities and towns, which in a sense was a possible locus of opposition to the central

authority, had the interesting effect of increasing the power of the local aristocracy. Not

only were the central authorities deprived of an alternative center of political power to

play off against the aristocracy, but also, the destruction of the cities and towns implied

that the crown increasingly depended on the aristocracys farmlands as the primary

source of tax revenues.107The aristocracy became both the political and economic

center of power within Bohemia. The economic power of the Bohemian aristocracy in

the seventeenth century would have lasting effects: As the Bohemian lands experienced

industrialization in the eighteenth century, it was the aristocracy, not the city burgers, that

had the wealth to undertake these new lucrative enterprises.108 Therefore, as other

aristocrats in Europe started to lose their power with the rise of the new industrial class,

in Bohemia, the industrial class and the aristocratic class were one and the same for a


24/58

136 Reo Matsuzaki

long while.

In addition to controlling Bohemian politics, the small group of Bohemian aristocrats

wielded great power, relative to their small number, in Vienna. The most well known

example was the ascendance of Albrecht von Waldstein, who rose from an impover-ished rank of a senior Czech noble to become the generalissimo of the imperialist armies

and duke of Friedland, Sagan, and Mecklenburg in the earlier part of the Thirty Years

War. Although the rise of Waldstein was soon followed by his rapid and complete fall,

the mere fact that a Czech noble was able to rise to such high ranks immediately after

the Battle of White Mountain displays that the political influence of the Czech nobility

was far from having been reduced. Other examples of prominent Czech aristocrats that

played an important role in Habsburg politics in the seventeenth century include Wenzel

Eusebius (belonging to the Lobkowitz family), who became President of the War Coun-

cil, and then chief minister to Leopold I (1658-1705) in the years around 1670, and

Humprecht Jan Czernin, who became one of Leopold Is most intimate friends.109

The victory of Vienna over Bohemia was at the same time the victory of the court

as the center of power over the estates. As the court emerged decisively as the most

powerful organ in the Habsburg Empire, the desire for the local nobility to partake in

court politics grew. The attraction of the court was evident from the fact that even

Protestant noblemen were seeking employment at the court. Even though the estates

did not disappear, the Thirty Years War created the beginnings of a courtly culture and

politics whereby the local aristocracy became increasingly intertwined in larger Habsburg

politics.110As Volker Press writes, It was obvious that the Viennese court was able to

grant favors and privileges in numerous ways. In this manner, the House of Austria tied

its dependents, newly created princes and counts of long standing, into its political sys-

tem, an instrument of influence, information, and ties that functioned well up until 1740.111

Although this process of the domestication of the aristocracy was far from complete,

as the 1741 Bohemian revolt displays, 1620 marked the change of the Habsburg Empirefrom a tenuous union to a stable composite state.

The creation of a single loyal center of local political power in Bohemia and the

Bohemian nobilitys increasing ties with the Habsburg court have led many authors to

suggest that the Bohemian aristocracy had become politically inactive;112that Bohemia

was handed over to the tax gatherer, to the recruiting officer, and to the Jesuits, and the

main job of the estates was to collect taxes;113 that Bohemia was controlled by the

Habsburg officials in Vienna.114However, such views simply confuse collaboration with

provincialization. As shown above, the Bohemian aristocracy continued to exert the

dominant influence within Bohemia and even started to partake in imperial politics. Ar-

guably, the Bohemian aristocracy was stronger after the 1620 rebellion. In a sense, this

fact may seem counterintuitivehow is it possible that there were fewer conflicts be-

tween the central authority and the Bohemian aristocracy when the Bohemian aristoc-

racy had actually increased its power after the Battle of White Mountain?

The key to resolving the apparent paradox lies in understanding the imperative of

elite politics in composite states. As discussed in chapter two, there are many incentives

for collaboration in composite states, such as maintaining personal security and accumu-

lating wealth and prestige. Although still powerful, the Bohemian aristocrats started to

understand how working with the Habsburgs was beneficial, especially after witnessing


25/58


the demise of their fellow rebellious associates in 1620.

From Collaboration to Limited Rebellion

Like his predecessors, Charles VI (1711-1740) attempted to govern by consen-sus with the aristocracy, rather than through coercion. He was disinterested in changing

the administrative system and was firmly committed to maintaining the constitutional

structure of all his dominions. The intimate working relationship between the monarch

and the aristocrats was especially strong in Bohemia initially, where Charles continued

his predecessors practice of rewarding the Bohemian kingdoms loyalty by extending

its privileges. Charles allowed for the revision of the Land Ordinance of 1627, and as the

activities of the Diet were expanded, the Bohemian Diet was in almost continuous ses-

sion by the end of Charless reign. In addition, the function of the local aristocracy as the

transmitters and modifiers of imperial initiatives gained institutional underpinning from

1714 when a National Committee was established under the Grand Burgrave to coordi-

nate the estates activities.115In return, the Bohemian aristocrats expanded the monarchs

power over church lands, courts, and taxes. Most notable was the Bohemian Diets

acceptance of the Decennial Recess in 1715 where Bohemia was bounded to provide a

fixed contribution to the central revenue without the need for annual negotiations.116

In Charles eyes, the ultimate reward for his collaboration with the Bohemian aristo-

crats was their rapid ratification of the Pragmatic Sanction. The Pragmatic Sanction

was accepted by the Bohemian Diet in 1720 and changed the union from a personal to

a real union. Previously, the lands were united because the king of Bohemia was also the

king of Austria. After the acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction, the king of Bohemia

and Austria became indivisible and could be passed on to both sexes (thus allowing for

Maria Theresa to be the monarch).117In other countries, such revision in succession

rules would have caused great controversy. For example, the Hanoverian succession in

Great Britain in 1688 had resulted in Jacobite challenges in subsequent years. Similardifficulties with succession also existed in Spain, France, and Russia.118

The other important issue that displayed the collaborative nature of the Bohemian

aristocrats was in the realm of taxation. Although the Empire that Charles VI inherited

was vast, most parts of the Empire did not provide much in terms of revenue. Naples

was so hopelessly mismanaged that it was a net drain on the treasury. Austrian Nether-

lands revenue mostly went to reimburse the Dutch for the protection of the French

boarder. Hungary hardly contributed either, and the same was true of Inner Austria,

Outer Austria, and Tyrol.119Therefore, most of the burden fell on Bohemia during the

reign of Charles VI and Bohemias relative contribution to the Habsburg treasury con-

tinued to be the greatest for the remainder of the eighteenth century. For example, in the

years between 1716 and 1739, the Bohemian lands contributed 75.8 percent of the total

quota for military expense.120

Nonetheless, this high level of collaboration between the crown and the Bohemian

aristocracy did not mean complete compliance. The Bohemian aristocracy retained their

strength and would make its displeasure known if Vienna seemed to ignore some of their

interests. Although the Bohemian nobles largely acquiesced to the heavy tax burden,

they had become annoyed that new excise taxes could bypass supervision by the estates

altogether. At the same time, direct government interference grew. The Bohemian aris-


26/58

138 Reo Matsuzaki

tocracy was particularly unhappy with how the Viennese government seemed inclined

to aid the oppressed and increasingly rebellious peasantry. In addition, the nobles felt

neglected by Vienna when Emperor Charles VI bestowed favors to subjects other than

the Bohemians when Bohemia was clearly the most important region in the Empire.121Similar, although to a lesser degree, to the situation in 1620, a major war threatened

the Habsburg Empire at a time when the Bohemian subjects were unhappy with their

treatment. Within less than two months after the death of Charles VI in October 1740,

the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) began with the invasion of Silesia by

Frederick II of Prussia. Besides Prussia, other powers that cha

Documents

Imperial Decline