Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.pdf

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Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-MakingAuthor(s): Barbara FarnhamSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 3, Special Issue (Part Two): Prospect Theory (Jun., 2004)

, pp. 441-463Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792551Accessed: 09-11-2015 03:16 UTC

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2/24

Political

Psychology,

ol.

5,

No.

3,

2004

Impact

fthe

Political ontext

n

Foreign

olicy

Decision-Making

Barbara

Farnham

Columbia

University

One

of

hemost

ressing

oncerns

n

the

tudy f

nternational

elations

oday

s

to

develop

a

systematic

ccount

f

he

mpact

f

domestic

olitics

n

foreign

olicy.

his

aper

rgues

that omestic

olitics requently

nfluencesoreign olicy hrough

process

f

decision-

making

hat

rows

ut

of

thedecision-maker's

wareness

f

the

requirementsor

effective

action n

the

olitical

ontext.

t s

therefore

ecessary

o

develop

theory

hat an

explain

how

the

political

context's haracteristic

eatures

ffect

ecision-makers'

hinking.

n

attemptingocombinensightsulled romhe iteraturenpolitical ecision-makingith

psychological

heories

f

decision-makingrocesses,

his

aper offers first

tep

toward

such

theory.

KEY

WORDS:

decision-making,

omestic

olitics, oreign olicy, olitical

ontext

One

of

themost

ressing

oncernsnthe

tudy

f nternationalelations

oday

is

developing systematic

ccount

f the

mpact

f domestic

olitics

n

foreign

policy

Bueno

de

Mesquita,

002;

Fearon,

998).'

Until

his

s

accomplished,

ot

onlywill ourexplanationsf foreign olicydecisionsbe incomplete,ut our

theories

may

often

e

less

useful

o

policymakers

han

we

would

ike

George,

1993,

pp.

xxv,

-11).

Some

try

o address his

roblem

y turning

o thedomestic

olitics

evel

of

analysis;

others

ropose

modeling

he

relationship

etween

nternational

nd

domestic actorss a

two-level

ame

Evans,

Jacobson, Putnam,

993;

Putnam,

1988).

suggest

different

pproach.

lthoughagree

hat

omestic

olitics

nflu-

ences

foreign

olicy hrougholicymakers'

ttempts

o

cope

simultaneously

ith

internationalnd

domestic

mperatives,argue

hat t s often

rought

o bearnot

For he iew

hat oth lassical

ealism nd

ontemporary

esearch

oint

othe

mportance

fdomes-

tic

political

onsiderationsn the

making

f

foreign olicy,

ee

Snyder

1991,

p.

20).

441

0162-895X 2004

International

ociety

f

Political

sychology

Published

y

Blackwell

ublishing.

nc.,

350

Main

Street, alden,

MA

02148, USA,

and

9600

Garsington

oad,Oxford,

X4

2DQ

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3/24

442

Farnham

through argaining

s

in two-level

ames,

but

through

process

f

decision-

making

hat

rows

utof

an

awareness f

the

requirements

or ffectivection

n

the

political

ontext.

hus,

o

explain

he

mpact

f domestic

olitics

n

foreign

policy,we need todevelop theoryfforeignolicydecision-makinghat an

give

n account fthe

decision-makers'

esponse

o

that

ontext;2

e

must

nder-

standhow the

political

ontext's haracteristiceaturesffect heir

hinking.3

Such a

theory

hould ell

us, first,

ow the

political

ontextnfluences

hat

decision-makersocuson when

considering

foreign

olicy

problem.

oes

it

merely

oster

preoccupation

ith

ersonal

ower,

r does

t

have

ess

parochial

consequences

s well?

Second,

we want o knowhow

sensitivity

o the

demands

of

the

olitical

ontextffectsctual

ecision-making

rocesses.

lthoughargue

that tfosters reluctanceomake harp alue rade-offs,ts mplicationsor eci-

sion-making

ehavior

may

be broader han

imply ncouraging

tendency

o

capitulate

o

political ressures.

hird,

we must sk how

such

processes

ffect

foreign

olicy

utcomes.What

kinds

f decisions

oes awareness

f

the

political

context

roduce?

he ultimate

oal,

however

istantts

achievement,

s to

give

an account f the

mpact

f

these ecisions n

outcomes

t the

evel

of

the nter-

national

ystem.

In

attempting

o combine

nsights

ulledfrom he

iteraturen

political

eci-

sion-making

ith

sychological

heories f

decision-makingrocesses,

his

aperoffers first

tep.

Rather han

resentingystematic

esearch o test he

heory

f

decision-making

n

a

political

ontext,

t

suggests

direction or uch

research.

(For

a

plausibilityrobe

f this

heory,

ee

Farnham,

997.)

As Lamborn

1997)

has

suggested,

theoretical ork n the

political ignificance

f

cognition

nd

perception

is

simultaneouslyndependent

nd

nextricably

ied o theories f

strate-

gic

nteraction.

hese theoretical

ridges arry

raffic

n

both

irections.

...

To

use the

ommon hread

f

strategic

nteractiono build

more on-

structive

onversationscross

differentesearch

rograms,

e

need to

link

eparate

heoretical

gendas,

ot onflate

hem.

p.

210)

The

Political

Context nd

Foreign

Policy

Decision-Making

Simon

1990)

has

argued

hat

each

kind

f task

he

human

mind

ddresses

defines

different

species'

of

thought,

nd

because

cognitive

erformance

2

As Alan

Lamborn

1997)

has

observed,

even

research

rograms

hat

ocuson the

nteractionf

domestic

nd

internationalncentives

ypically

o

not have a

theory

hat

xplains

how

they

re

connected

p.

201).

This

means

elating

he

domain

ndependent

spects

f

thinking-such

s

recognition

rocesses,

heuristic

earch,

nd serial

pattern

ecognition-to

asic

contextual

eatures. he

challenge

s

to

discover

when

ifferent

haracteristicsome

nto

lay

n

particular

ituationsndwith

what ffect

(Simon,

1990;

see also

Bennett,

981).



4/24

PoliticalContext nd

Foreign

PolicyDecision-Making

443

dependsheavily

n

socially

tructurednd

socially cquiredknowledge,

we]

must

pay

constant ttentiono the social

environment

f

cognition....

Social

variables

must e introducedo set

he oundaries

four

generalizations.

n other

words, ecision-makingehavior annot eunderstood ithoutpecifyinghe it-

uation o

which

he decision-makers

responding-and

or

political

ecision-

makers hat ncludes

ot

only

ubstantive

olicyproblems,

ut lso the

political

contextwithinwhich

hey

must e addressed

Simon,

1990,

pp.

4,

16;

see also

Bennett, 981,

pp.

172-173; Farnham, 990; Levine,Resnick,

Higgins,

993,

p.

586; Tetlock, 985,

pp.

300-306).4

The

basic features f

any

context

ncourage

istinctive

ays

of

thinking

about decision

problems

nd characteristic

rocedures

or

dealing

with hem

(Tetlock, 985,p. 306), and howthey re definedwill stronglynfluence he

hypotheses

hat an be

developed

boutbehavior:

ifferentontextual eatures

have different

mplications

or

decision-making.5

hus,

the

political

context

affectshe

decision-making

ehavior f those

who are sensitive o

it n

distinct

and dentifiable

ays, eading

o the

development

f

characteristicodes

f ana-

lyzing

nd

dealing

with ecision

roblems.

A review f

the

political

cience

decision-making

iteraturef the

past

40

years6

uggests hat hebasicfeaturefthe olitical ontexts a pervasive oncern

with

cceptability.

n

a

political

ontext,

ffectivectionwith

espect

o substan-

tive

goals normallyequires

sufficientonsensus n

support

f

proposed oli-

cies

(George,

1980b,

pp.

1, 3;

see also

George,

980a,

pp.

234-235;

Kissinger,

1964,

p.

24),

and that

epends

n

acceptability.

o be

effective,

nternationally

s

well as

domestically,

policy

must e

acceptable

o some minimum umber f

relevant

roups

nd ndividuals

Diesing,

1962,

p.

214;

Hilsman, 967,

p.

547).7

4

There

s

seldom ne

option

ictated

y

the

nternational

ystem

or

..

when here

s,

t s seldom

obvious o all in

advance)

nd

.

adaptation

o external

mperatives

nvolves

olitical ompetition

among iewsofwhat s rational Betts, 994,p. 807).

For

a

more

omplete

iscussion f the

nature f context nd how it

can

shape decision-making

behavior,

ee

Farnham

1990).

6

My

review

f this iteratureocuses n thework f the

first ave

theoristsf

political

ecision-

making:

oger

Hilsman,

amuel

Huntington,

ichard

Neustadt,

nd

Warner

chilling,

ll of

whom

analyzed

he

requirements

f

effectivection n

the

political

ontext,

ttempting

o define he

deci-

sion-maker's

niquely olitical

roblems

nd

pointing

o the

political trategies

ommonly

sed to

cope

with hem

Art,

1973;

see

also

Farnham,

990,

pp.

85-89).

Alexander

George's

nd Paul

Diesing's

nsights

nto henature f the

political

ontext ere lso

indispensable,

ndthework f

a

number

f

contemporary

olicy nalysts roved

elpful

s

well.

Tetlock

1992)

has

proposed

hat wo

contextualeatures

haracterizell social

and

organizational

settings:1) accountabilityf conduct nd 2) peopleas approvalnd statuseekers inpartic-

ular,

hey

eekto

gain

he

pproval

fthose o whom

hey

re

ccountable)

pp.

336-339).

However,

although

hese

haracteristics

ay

ell

us

something

bout

decision-making

n

social contexts

en-

erally, hey

re

not

ikely

o ead us

to the

decision-makingrocesses

hat haracterize

specifically

political

ontext. or

example, lthough

cceptabilityppears

n

Tetlock's

formulation

1992,

pp.

338-342),

t s

sought

s a means f

gaining

ocial

approval.

n

a

political

ontext,

n the ther

hand,

ecision-makers

mphasize

cceptability

ot

primarily

ecause

hey

eed

ocial

approval

ut

because

they

esire o

accomplish

arious

oals

within

hat

ontext.

n

fact,

he

kind f

acceptance

thatmoves

people

to do

a decision-maker's

olitical

iddingmay

t

times e obtained

nly

t

the



5/24

444 Farnham

As former

ecretary

f

State

James aker

1995)

observed,

in a

democracy

ny

foreign olicy

hat annot ttract domestic

olitical

onsensuswill have diffi-

culty

ucceeding p.

144).

Althoughhe undamentaleaturesfthe oliticalontextrerelativelyixed,

its

pecific perationalequirements

ay

hange

rom

ociety

o

society,

nd

even

within he

same

society

ver time

see

George's

1980a,

p.

236)

discussion f

legitimacy

n

foreign olicy;

see also

Majone

(1975,

p.

264)].

For

example,

although

concern

with

cceptability

s

present

o some

degree

n

anypolitical

context,8

he

dentity

f thosewho must ind decision

cceptable

nd

the

ual-

ities hatmake

t

o

may

vary

n

specific

ontexts.

hus,

ll

political

ocieties

may

be

located

long

continuumn which heneed

for

cceptability

anges

rom

conditionfnear-anarchywhere lmostveryoneasa veto) othemost xtreme

form

f

tyranny

in

which lmostno one

does).

The

degree

to

which

those

approaching

decision

politically

re

constrained

y

acceptabilityepends

n

where heir

ociety

alls

on this ontinuum.9he need for

cceptability

s

also

partly ontingent

n the

type

f

decision

George,

1980b,

p.

1; Hilsman, 967,

pp.

553,

561)

and thedecision-maker's

lace

in

the

policy

hierarchy

Neustadt,

1980,

p.

135).

Whatever

he

specific equirements,

he

political

decision-maker's ost

important

ask

s

to find

n

alternativeroundwhich consensus an be built hat

also deals

satisfactorily

iththe substantivessues at stake n the decision

(Hilsman,

987,

p.

78;

see also

Hilsman, 959,

p.

372).

This

eads

to a funda-

mentally

trategic

pproach

o

decision-making

nvolving

constantnteraction

between

valuations

f the

ubstantive erits f a

proposal

nd assessments f

its

acceptability. '

ndeed,

political

ecision-makersre

likely

o

incorporate

strategy

or

getting

greement

nto

hedecision

tself,

arely

hoosing

n

option

without irst

onsidering

ow

to

mplement

t. Unlike

urely nalytical

ecision-

expense

f social

approval,

s

was

pointed

ut

by

Machiavelli ome ime

go

1979,

chap.

17)

and

RichardNeustadt

uite

ecently

1990,

p.

48).

As

Payne

1984)

also

pointed

ut,

ocial

approval

s

somethingoliticians

must

requently

o without

pp.

1, 3,

78ff.).

To remainn

high

fficen

both

emocracies

nd

dictatorships,

manmust ither

atisfy

he alues

of

the

groups

with

ower

r

pit

the

power

f one

group

gainst

he

power

f

another,

nd

usually

he must o a

bit

f

both. he

number f

groups

hat

ave

power

s

undoubtedly

maller n

a dicta-

torship...

but

hey

o exist

Hilsman,

956,

pp.

147-148).

n

the

political

ealm,

herealities f

power

re

always

to

some

degree

behind

he need for

cceptability

Lasswell

&

Kaplan,

1950,

pp.

144-146,

ee also

pp.

72, 85,

240).

In

fact,

he

entral oleof

power

s what

istinguishes

he

political

ontext rom ther

ocial contexts.

9 Thus,

cceptability

s a continuousatherhan dichotomous

ariable.

10

s

George

1974)

described

t,

he

decision-maker,

while

deferring

is

decision,...

takes ound-

ings, repares

he

ground,

nteracts ith ther

olitical

ctorswhose nterestsre

nvolved r who

can be

helpful

o

him,

nd

manipulates

nd

orchestrateshe

political rocess

s

part

f

his search

for

decision hatwill

ecure

or

im s

much s

possible

f

the

multiple

takes

e seeks

p.

185).

In

other

words,

olitical

ecision-makers

nticipate

onflictnd

try

o

defuse

otential

pposition

by

the

way

they

tructurehe

decision tself.

We

must,

owever,

istinguish

his

rocess,

s

George

did,

from

traightforward

olitical

ombat.



6/24

PoliticalContext nd

ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

445

makers,

hey

do

not

treat ecisions s

though

hey

were

self-executing

C.

Kaysen,

ersonal

ommunication,

ebruary

993).

The need for uch

a

focus

often omes as a shock

o thoseused to a more

analytical pproach o foreign olicy.Forexample, nmoving rom he State

Department

o theWhite

House,

Edward

Djerejian expressed urprise

t 'the

interaction

f domestic

olitics

nd

foreign olicy....

At

theState

Department

you

make hebest

udgments

n the

foreign olicy

nterestsftheU.S.

Here

you

have to

be

abundantly

ware,

nd

put

n the

quation,

omestic

olitical

onsid-

erations. hat's

new forme'

(Weinraub, 985).

Some,

of

course,

ever

nder-

standthis

requirement-witness

he

alleged separation

etween

political

nd

policy

oncerns

racticed

y

President

eorge

H.

W.

Bush

and

his

secretary

f

state,JamesBaker. Noteverydecision-makerperatingn a political etting

approaches

ecisions

olitically.

ut f heneed oreconcile ubstance

nd

upport

is

recognized, ecision-making

rocesses

an be

strongly

ffected,

articularly

when

he ssue

nvolves clash

of

mportant

alues.12

Acceptability

oncerns

t

All

Stages

of

Decision-Making

For

political

ecision-makers,

cceptability

s

a constant

heme nd an

inte-

gralpart

fthedecision

rocess.

t s both

prior

oncern hatmust e addressed

before heother ttributesf an alternativean be

seriously

onsidered ndan

unavoidable onstraint

undamentallyhapingdecision-making

t all

stages

(Diesing,

1962,

p.

229;

Meltsner,

972,

p.

865).

Part

of

thetask

of

problem iagnosis,

or

xample,

s

determining

hether

there

s a

political problem

s well

as a

policy problem Diesing,

1962,

pp.

228-229).

n the reaof

foreign olicy,

ecause

t s

difficult

o act

effectively

internationally

f

policies

ack domestic

cceptability,olitical

ecision-makers

assess domestic entiment

long

with he

nternationalituation.

Some

political

decision-makersften onsultnternational,s well as domestic,ublic pinion;

see,

e.g.,

Haefele's

2001)

discussion

f

President ohn .

Kennedy's

ttentiono

international

ublic

pinion.]

According

o

Mandelbaum,

'For these

uys,

heres no

relationship

etween

olitics

nd

policy.

... In

theBush-Baker orld

iew,

you

do

ugly,

istasteful

hings

o

get

lected... Andthenwhen

you get

nto

ffice,

ou

do what

you

thinks

right.

he

idea that

ou

should

have to

explain

your-

self..,

is

grubby'

(Dowd, 1992a).

Although

his

may

have been

true

f

Bush,

Baker

1995)

espoused uite

different

iew,

t least

n

retrospect:

At ts

core,

he

Secretary

f State's

ob

is

political,uston an internationaltage.... As a Cabinet ecretary,oufocusnotonthe echnical

side of

governing

ut n the

political.

ou don't esolve

uestions olely

n the

basis

of

their

olit-

ical

impact

nd

you

don'tmake

decisions

olely

because

of

their

olitical

opularity,

ut

you

do

make

decisions,

ush

nitiatives,

void

disasters,

nd

develop

trategies

ith hose

onsequences

firmly

n mind

pp.

38-39).

12

Unlike hosewho claim

hat

heir

heories an

explain

ll

decision-making

ehavior

e.g.,

Janis

Mann, 1977,

p. 80),

I

do not

uggest

hat

veryone

perating

n a

political

etting

ill

nevitably

treat decision

olitically.

learly,

here re other

esponses

o the

problem

f

acceptability

see

Hermann, reston,

Young,

996).



7/24

446

Farnham

Moreover,

hould uchdecision-makersncover serious onflict etween

domestic

nd nternational

nterests,

hey

will be

strongly

otivated

o

look

for

policies

o transcendt.

During

heCuban missile

risis,

or

xample,

ecision-

makers eveloped policy hat ouldserve wo valuesthat ppeared o be in a

trade-off

elationshipdealing

with he

ecurity

hreat

osed

by

Soviet

missiles n

Cuba,

and

avoiding

herisk f

war

nvolved

n

military

ction

o remove

hem).

The

need o trade

ffwas

averted

ith

he ranscendentolution f

blockade,

lti-

matum,

nd assurances boutthe removal

f

the

Jupiter

issiles rom

urkey

(Trachtenberg,

985,

pp.

145, 149, 155, 165-166,

171-173, 182,

192-193).13

Indeed,

heultimate

oal

of suchdecision-makerss an alternativehat

ims

at

serving

ll

the

values

nvolved,

acrificing

one-a

quest

hat ffects

oreign

as well as domestic

olicy.14

A goodexample f this mpulse an be foundn

President ames

Monroe's

handling

f Andrew

Jackson's

eizureof

Spanish

military

osts

n

Florida

n

1818:

Monroewas

unwilling

o

accept

ny

dverse

onsequences

t

all in this

affair.

he

leadership roblem

e setoutto tackle

was

nothing

ess than

to save

Jackson,

ssuage

he

panish,

ain

Florida,

moderatehedomes-

tic

political

ebate,

nd

wrap

up

thewholesordid usiness

n

vindica-

tion f the

nduring

irtues

f

republican

nstitutions.nce

he

reached

this ssessmentfthechallengethand, herewas no limit o his cre-

ativity

n

trying

o

piece

t

all

together.

Skowronek,

993,

p.

95)

Translatedntothe

vocabulary

f

decision-making,

he

quest

fortranscendent

alternatives

nvolves search or ominant

olutions,

r

those est

n

all dimen-

sions.Even

f a

decision-maker

ust

ventually

ettle

or

compromise,

hich

many

elieve

o be thehallmark

f

political ecision-making,

hat s notwhat

s

initially ought

Neustadt,

986,

pp.

20-21).

Rather,

ccording

o formeron-

gressmanMickey

Edwards,

olitical

decision-makersre inclined o

push

for

everyastbitof what heywant ntil hey angetnomore;notuntil hey inally

hit hat rickwall do

they

ntertainhe dea of

compromisepersonal

ommu-

nication,

une

993).

5

'3

According

o

some,

herewas

a domestic alue attached o the

ecurity

alue,

which

Kennedy

lso

refused

o

trade ff

Kaufman,

993).

14

George

1974)

called

his he

trategy

f

seeking

multiple ayoffs pp. 184-185)-something

hat

Bill Clinton racticednhis1993decision ocooperatewith heRussiansnthe pacestation:By

continuing

he

pace

station

Clinton]

eeps

ontractors

appy, y

nvolving

heRussians e lends

support

o the

troubled

residency

f Boris

Yeltsin,

nd

by

trimming

he

pace

station

udget

e

may

reduce heFederaldeficit

Broad,

1993).

5

In

psychology,

ranscendent

r

integrative

olutions re

specifically

ontrasted

ith

ompromise,

a

solution

hat

nly artly

atisfieshe wo

parties'

nterests

..

The

integrative

olution

ives

ach

more f what he/he ants

Carnevale

Isen,

1986,

p.

2).

For

an

interestingxample

f how he

searchfor

ranscendentlternatives orks ut n

practice,

ee

De

Rivera's

1968,

pp.

112-113)

discussion

f Truman's

950

budget

ecision.



8/24

PoliticalContext nd


447

Screening

orAcceptability

The

goal

of

finding

transcendent

lternativean affect

very

spect

f the

decisionprocess-search s well as evaluation nd choice.However,t s most

prominenturing

valuation,

hen

triking

epartures

rom raditional

ormative

standardsften

ccur. n

particular,

ecision-makersensitiveo

political

onsid-

erations rereluctant

o

trade

ff

mportant

alues.

As

a

consequence,

valuation

usually egins

with

screening

or

cceptability,

nd a

policy udged ncapable

of

being rought

o someminimalevel

s

unlikely

o be evaluated urther.

yndon

Johnson,

or

xample,

s

reported

o have

seriously

onsidered o alternative

e

had

not

previously

udged

achievable

n

political

erms,

ccording

o Adam

Yarmolinsky,n assistantecretaryf defense n his administrationpersonal

communication,

uly

987;

see also

Diesing,

1962,

pp.

228-232).

The

cceptability

onstraint.

uring

his nitial

creening,

he

decision-maker

matches he lternatives

gainst

what

might

e calledan

acceptability

onstraint,

performing

sort

fcalculus f

political easibility

Farnham,

991,

pp.

186-201;

May,

1986,

pp.

111-113).16

As we

have

seen,

the

particular

lements f such

a

calculus redifficult

o

specify

part

rom

articular

ituations.

owever,

wo

on-

cerns re fundamental:

ow to

get

effectivection

n thedecision t

hand,

nd

how to

preserve

nd foster

capacity

or

ffective

ction

n

the

political

ontext

as

a whole-in thefutures well as the

present

Diesing,

1962,

p.

171).17

Thus,

the

cceptability

onstraintesembles

kind f checklist f thosewhose

upport

is

needed or ffective

ction,

lus

other

ualities

hat ontributeo

acceptability

(such

as

proceduralegitimacy).

oreover,

t often ncludes ach of thevalues

implicated

n thedecision.

ndeed,

verlooking

he nterests

feventhosewhose

support

s not

crucial

o the

current ecision

may

be unwisebecause their

id

could

be needed

n thefuture

Hilsman,

959,

p.

371;

Majone,

1975,

p.

261).

Noncompensatory

creening.

he

screeningrocess

tselfs

likely

o be non-

compensatory.lternativesailing o reach minimalevelofacceptabilityre

normally

liminated

ecause a serious

deficiency

n the

political

dimension

cannot

e

offset

y high

cores

n other imensions.

ecause

a

policy acking

sufficientonsensuss

unlikely

o

succeed,

t s

inherently

nattractiven a

polit-

ical

context,

ven

though

his

may

well

result n diminished

tility

n terms f

substantivealues.

Thus,

when tcomes o

acceptability,

references

re

ikely

o

be

lexicographic.18

16

In his

discussion

f

backward

mapping,

eustadt

1990,

pp.

214-215)

advocated

strategy

imilar

to the pplicationf an acceptabilityonstraint.

17

The term

politician]

as reference.. not

merely

o the

holding

r

striving

or

olitical

ffice,

ut

to the

endency

o consider

lways

he

ffect

n

influencer

powerposition

f

projected

ines

of

conduct

Lasswell

&

Kaplan,

1971,

pp.

74-75,

146;

see also

May,

1986,

p.

113).

8

If

a

decision-makeras

lexicographicreferences,

ne

dimensions

incomparably

ore

mpor-

tant han

he

others,

nd there an be no

value trade-offs.lster

1984)

has noted hat

lexico-

graphic

rderings

re

perhaps

more

requent

n

political

ife han n

economic

ife

pp.

124-127,

n.

27;

see alsoAbelson&

Levi, 1985,

.

260; Ordeshook, 986,

p.

17-18;

Svenson&

Montgomery,

1976,

pp.

285-286).



9/24

448

Farnham

In

foreign

olicy,

his

means hat ecision-makers

nfluenced

y

thedemands

of

the

political

ontextwill be

reluctanto trade

ff

domesticnterests.

ather,

they

re

ikely

o react

differently

o nternationalnd

domestic

onstraints,

nd

theweight hey ssign o domestic actors ftentronglyffects owthey eal

with he nternational

roblem.

We

cannot

ssume, herefore,

hat

oreign

olicy

decisions re madeon a level

playing

ieldwhere ll therelevant onsiderations

are

freely

raded ff

n

pursuit

fan

optimal olicy.

nstead,

he

unavoidability

f

the

cceptability

onstraint

uggests

n

implicit

ierarchy

mong

hevalues

and

it

may

be a rather ifferentne

from

hat

osited

y

the tandardealist

ccount,

which

onsistently

ccords

riority

o the

ecurity

alue).

The

hypothesis

hat

olitical

ecision-makersre

ikely

o

begin

n evalua-

tionwith noncompensatorycreeningf the lternativess supportedy exper-

imental

indings

s well as

the

practice

f actualdecision-makers.

n a series f

experiments,

eva

and

Mintz

1993;

see also

Mintz,

1993)

found videncenot

only

that decision-makersonsiderdomestic

political

factorswhen

making

foreignolicy

ecisions,

ut

lso

that

hey

onsider

hemfirst.

necdotal vidence

of n nitial

creening

or

cceptability

s also abundant.

ay

1986),

for

xample,

cites he tatementf

a WhiteHouse assistantn the

Kennedy

dministrationhat

thefirst

uestion

was

always,

Will t

fly

n

the

Hill?

p.

111).

Further valuation

After he nitial

creening,

nbiased

olitical

ecision-makersill continue

to evaluate lternativeshathave satisfied he

acceptability

onstraintn other

grounds,

alancing

ubstance

gainst upport.19

Nonetheless,

ecision-makers

sensitive o thedemands f the

political

ontext

may

tillbe

unwilling

o

make

sharp

rade-offs.

lthough

ven the most

political

f decision-makers

ay

be

forced

ventually

o trade ff

George,

980b,

p.

1),20

hey

make uch acrifices

reluctantly,ndusually nlyafter irstryingo accommodate ll the nterests

involved.

rading

ff

may

ttimes e

necessary,

ut

t s

never

he irst

hing olit-

ical decision-makersre

disposed

o

do,2'

not

merely

ecause uch rade-offsre

difficulto

ustify

ublicly,

ut

because

they

may hamper

he

achievementf

effectivection.

Thus,

he earch or

cceptable

oliciesgoes beyond

he

nitial

screening,

nfluencing

valuation

n

a number

f

ways.

19

Moreover,

iven

he ritical

mportance

f

acceptability,hey

re also

likely

o

attempt

o discover

which

f the

minimallycceptable

lternativesxcel on the

political

imension

s

well.

20

George

1980b,

pp.

1-3;

see also

George,

1993,

pp.

22-24)

saw decision-makerss sometimes

facing

rade-offsot

nly

between

uality

nd

acceptability

ut lso

between oth

f

these nd the

factor f time

nd other

olicy

esources.

21

See,

for

xample,

Neustadt's

1986,

p.

15)

account f the

ppeal

to

Congress

f the

1985

Gramm-

Rudman

ct

n

terms f

ts

promise

o ease the

pain

of

necessary

rade-offs.



10/24

PoliticalContext nd

Foreign

Policy

Decision-Making

449

In

the

political

ontext,

xperimenting

s one

characteristicethod f

eval-

uating olicies

for

both

cceptability

nd

substance.22

etween1936 and

1938,

for

xample,

resident ranklin .

Roosevelt,

acedwith

ncertainty

bout

how

to achievehis mostmportantalues keepingheUnited tates tpeaceandpre-

venting

disastrous

eneral

war

that

might

eopardize

hat

oal),

experimented

rather

han

arefully

eighing

he

dvantages

nd

disadvantages

f

the lterna-

tives nd

making

rade-offs

Farnham,

997,

hap.

3).

This allowedhim o avoid

both

passivity

n the

face

of

impending

atastrophe

nd

committing

imself

o

solutions f dubious

fficacy.

nstead,

e

kept

his

options

pen,

politically

nd

strategically,

hile

he

searched or

policy

hatwouldwork

omestically

s well

as

internationally.23

Anotheruality f thepolitical ontextffectingvaluations the ikelihood

that ecision-makers

ave had

prior

xperience

ith

many

f the lternatives.24

Because

ssues tend o

recur,

heymay

well have been dealtwith

efore,

hich

meansthat

olicyoptions

an have a

significantistory.

his is related o the

incrementalharacterf

much

political ecision-making

Lindblom,

959).

If a

decision ddresses

nly

part

f a

problem,

hat

roblem

may

well surface

gain,

and with

t

a number f alternatives

nitiallyudged

nfeasible.

hus,

failure o

consider

rior

xperience

may

ead to

the

conclusion hat decision

rocess

s

marked

y

attenuatedearch r

a

cursoryppraisal

f

the

lternatives,

hen

n

fact earch nd

evaluation

ave been

performed,

nd

performed

epeatedly,

n

the

past.

Of

course,

readily

vailable tock f

pre-screened

lternativesould

encourage

verconfidencebouttheir

elevance

o the

present

ituation

r

the

decision-maker's

nderstanding

f

their

amifications.ut

when

ime

s

short,

s

in a

crisis,

aving

bank ccount f

pre-examinedptions

o draw n

might,

n

fact,

e

quite

useful.

Political

Rationality

nd

PoliticalBias

Political oncerns an

be satisfiedn a

rational r a biasedmanner.

ational

political

ecision-makers

ry

o balance

domestic nd nternational

mperatives,

22

As Voss

1990)

explained

t,

in the

political

omain,

solution

may

be

proposed

nd

adopted,

ut

it

usually

s

by

no means lear that he olutionwill

work. olutions n the

political

rena re

n

factoftenmore ike

hypotheses

hatneed to

be tested

hen

sic]

they

re

real' or correct' olu-

tions

see

also

Hilsman, 967,

p.

548).

23

Roosevelt1941) seems tohaveregarded is 1937Quarantinepeechas preciselyhiskindof

experiment.

s he

explained

o

reporters,

e was

actively earching

or

way

to

promote

eace,

but ouldnot

yet

ay

what he

methods ouldbe. His

speech

ndicatedn

attitude,

nd t does not

outline

program;

ut t

says

we

are

ooking

or

program pp.

414-425;

see also

Borg,

1964,

p.

383).

24

As Voss

1990)

pointed

ut,

In

considering

owan

alternative

olicy

s

selected,

t s

important

o

acknowledge

hat

hoosing

n

alternativeo an

existing olicy

s not

n isolated vent.

hanging

a

policy

takes

place

within he context f

a

policy

making rocess

and that

process

tself s

embeddedn a

historicalontext.



11/24

450

Farnham

taking

omestic

olitical

actorsnto ccountwithout

asing

heir ecisions

olely

on

them.25

ffectivection

s

their

rimary

oal,

but

hey

ecognize

hat t s

dif-

ficult o achievewithout

cceptability.

Attimes, owever, concernwith omesticcceptabilityanleaddecision-

makers

o

slight

ffectiveness.26n

foreign olicy, econciling

ubstance

nd

support

may

be

particularly

ifficult hen

value

enjoys

measure

f

support

from

ey

domestic

roups

isproportionate

o ts ubstantive

mportance.27

ore-

over,

n such

circumstances,

ecision-makers

ay

be

tempted

o

end an

evalua-

tion s soon as

they dentify policy

with

fairly ighdegree

f

acceptability

(George,

1980b,

p.

42).

They may

even refuse o make unavoidable

rade-offs

between alues

with

quivalent olitical acking,

nstead

dvancing

olicies

hat

seem o

satisfy

more nterestshan

hey

ctually

o.28

Moreover,

preoccupation

with cceptabilityan leadtofailureooffer eededpolicynitiatives29rreluc-

tance o alter

urrently

cceptable oliciesdespite pressing

eed

for

hange,

tendency

ompounded y

the

difficulty

f

renegotiating

majority

oalition

(Snyder Diesing,

1977,

p.

351;

see also

George,

980a,

p.

248).

Excessiveconcernwith

cceptability

ay

also be fueled

y

preoccupation

with

ersonal ower,

which

gain

manifeststselfn a

reluctanceo makeneces-

sary

hoices

r

an

unwillingness

o

develop

needed

olicies.30

A

reporter

aw

this

25

As

Morgenthau

1985)

argued,

he statesmanmust trike

prudent

alance between

dapting

himself

o

[popular assions]

nd

marshaling

hem n

the

upport

f his

policies p.

109).

26

Nelson

2000)

offered

umerous

xamples

f President

ichardNixon

engaging

n this

practice.

For

example,

e

cited his

2

March

1972

entry

rom he

unpublishedart

f chief f

staff alde-

man's

diary:

The

Presidentwants o be

sure hat

go

to

work

n

[Alexander]

aig

and

Henry

[Kissinger],hrough

im,

o make he

point

hat ome

of thedecisions

ave

got

o be madeon

the

basis of the

ffect

hey'll

ave

on the lection. or

example,

the

President]

eels

trongly

hatwe

should

go

to

Poland fter he

Russian

rip,

hile

Henry

s

equally

tronglypposed

o

that,

o we

have

o

convince

enry.'

In

fact,

t s

Nelson's onviction

hat

mattersnternalo he

nation,

spe-

cially

he lectorate's

onditionnd

desires, layed

n

immense ole

n

the

reation nd definition

ofdetente.t wasthe

public's

despair

bout heVietnamWar nd tsdemand or

eace

thated the

president

o

try

o

develop everage

with

he Soviets n

thefirst

lace,

and

t

was his

nability

o

end thewar

hat ed

him

o offer he

voters he

ubstitute

f

superpower

6tente

s

timely

roof

f

his

sincerity

nd

statesmanshipp.

136,

n.

73;

p.

142).

27

An

example

f this

ype

f

political

ias can be found n

President

eorge

W.

Bush's abandonment

of his own

free-trade

olicies

o

espouse

tariff

n steel

mports,resumably

o

gain

the

upport

of

the teel

ndustry

nd

tsworkers

Sanger,

002).

28

Lyndon

ohnson'sefusal

ither oconsider

needed

ax

ncrease

o

finance oth

he

war n

Vietnam

and the

Great

ociety

r to

sacrifice ne of them

hows his

ype

f

reluctanceo trade ff:

The

budget

esolves

f

1966 echoed

he tate f

theUnion

message, nsisting

hat herewas no

need o

'halt

rogress

n

the

great

nd

vitalGreat

ociety rograms

n

order o

financehe

ost f

our

fforts

in Southeast sia.' Playing or he breaks osedthe esserrisk oJohnson'solitical uthority

(Skowronek,

993,

p.

253).

29

According

o

theNew York

imes,

here

sraeliPrime

Minister

himon eres

had

a

national

on-

sensus

lready

ehind

im

..

his

managerial

kills

nabledhim o

score ome

mpressive

chieve-

ments. ut

wherehe did

nothave a

built-inonsensus

..

,

he tended o

compromise

r hesitate

and

failed

o

shape ny

new

reality

Friedman,

986).

30

Of

course,

iasedbehavior an

be

driven

y

both

olitical

nd

personal

motives. or

example,

n

theeve

of the 1997

election,

ritish rime

Minister ohn

Major changed

is

position,

nd n an

attempt

o

invigorate

is

flagging

e-election

ampaign..

declaredhis

opposition

o

current



12/24

PoliticalContext nd

ForeignPolicy

Decision-Making

451

in

President

eorge

H.W.

Bush'sfailure o take

dvantage

f

his

popularity

n the

wakeof thePersianGulfwar: From he

beginning

f his

Administration,

t was

clearthat

e

had no deas or

programs

e

wanted

o

enact,

hat

is

greatest

leas-

urecamefrom imply eingPresident. fter isfirst undredays noffice,t

was clear hat

e

was

practicing

he

politics

f minimalism

Dowd,

1992b).

Thiskind f

political

ias

has been

mply

ocumented

y

Lebow, tein,

nd

others

Lebow,

1981;

Lebow &

Stein,

1994).

t

s

important,

owever,

o

recog-

nize thedifference

etween

hebehavior

hey

escribe nd that f a decision-

maker

whose

attempts

o

balance

domestic nd

international

mperatives

re

motivated

y

he

equirements

f ffectivection. olumnist

oseph lsop's

com-

parison

f

Lyndon

ohnson's

ecision-makinguring

heVietnamwarwith

hat

of Rooseveltmakes he

point:

As an

unparalleled

aster

f

domestic

olitics,

Johnson]

lso thinks

irst

about nternal

olitical

epercussions.

hatwillbe

said or

thought

fhe

does this

or

that,

s

his

immediate,

nstinctivealculation. he

crucial

calculationsboutwhatneeds

o be doneare

unavoidably

ubordinated.

...

Here is one essential ifferenceetween

yndon

Johnson

nd his

hero,

ranklin .

Roosevelt.When

Mr.Roosevelt

inally

ad to turn

is

main attentiono

foreign

ffairs,

e

always

decided,

irst f

all,

what

needed o be done.And

only

fter hat

ecision,

id he

begin

o

figureout how he could

get

away

with

oing

t,

orhow close he could come

to

doing

t.

cited

n

Berman,

982,

p.

131) '

Attempts

o Enhance

Acceptability

Traditional

trategies

or

mprovingcceptability

Sensitivityopoliticalmperativeseednotmeanpassivityn the aceofthe

acceptability

onstraint,

nd

political

ecision-makers

ay ttempt

o

push gainst

its

boundaries,

ot

by

trading

ff

ompeting

aluesbut

byusing

ne of

the trate-

gies

for

dealing

with t thathave

grown

p

in the

political

ontext.

hus,

f

no

satisfactory

lternative as

emerged

rom

he

search

process, hey

may

either

tinker ith ne to

make t so or

design

new

one.32

proposals

for Britain's

ntegration

nto

Europe (Hoge,

1997).

See also Neustadt's

1990,

pp.

210-212)

discussion

f

themotivation

ehind

yndon

ohnson's

eceptiveness

bout he

oten-

tialcosts

of theVietnam ar.

3'

In this onnection,oteCantril's1967) observationboutRoosevelt's se ofpublic pinion olls:

Roosevelt

egarded

he

reports

enthim

he

way

a

general

would

egard

nformation

urnedn

by

his

ntelligence

ervices

s he

planned

he

trategy

f

a

campaign.

s

far

s I am

aware,

Roosevelt

never ltered is

goals

because

public pinion

ppeared gainst

im

r

was

uninformed.ather e

utilized uch

nformationo

try

o

bring

he

public

roundmore

uickly

r more

ffectively

o the

course

f

actionhe felt

was best

for

he

ountry

pp.

41-42;

see also

Steele,

1985,

p.

6).

32

Experimental

vidence hows hat

ecision-makersse both

esign

nd

manipulation

Abelson

&

Levi, 1985,

p.

273; Alexander, 979,

p.

384;

Mintzberg

t

al.,

1976,

p.

255-256;

Newell&

Simon,

1972).



13/24

452

Farnham

Because

political

ecision-makers

ften esire o serve number

f

values,

blending,

r

combining

lements f everal

lternativesnto new

one,

s

likely

to be a

prominent

eature f the

design

rocess

Alexander,

979,

pp.

397-398,

402; see also Abelson& Levi,1985,p. 275;Mintzberg,aisinghani, Theoret,

1976,

pp.

252,

256-259).

In

particular,heymay

blend

ogether

he urvivors

f

the nitial

creening

or

cceptability

n

order o

ncorporate

s

much f

ach

value

as

possible.

resident isenhower's ombinationf the

very

iverse ecommen-

dations

f

three askforces

n

U.S.

policy

oward astern

urope

s an

example

of

blending.

y

mixing

lementsf

ach,

Eisenhower

eplaced

he

harply

efined

alternativesnd

clear-cut rade-offs

f the askforce

eports

ith

formulation

that erved oth is substantiveoncernsndhis

political

eeds.

According

o one

of theparticipants,he askforceswerenot tall happy o see their roducthus

mongrelized Project

olarium,

988,

pp.

13-14).

In

preference

o

designing

new

policy,

olitical

ecision-makersan also

try

to enhance

acceptability

y

modifying

n

existing ption May,

1986,

pp.

111-112;

see also

Hilsman, 959,

pp.

365-366,

on the

techniques

f acco-

mmodation).

roceduresor

oing

o

are

argelyncorporated

nto ive raditional

political strategies:

ranscendence,

alculated

procrastination,ompromise,

sequencing,

nd minimalecisions.33These

strategies

re directedt

minimizing

sacrifices

f value that educe

cceptability

nd threatenonsensus-in other

words,

t

avoiding harp

alue trade-offs.

hey

ncrease

cceptabilityy bring-

ing

a decision

acking

t nto n

acceptable

ange

r

by

broadening

he onsensus

supporting

n

already cceptable

olicy

by

the nclusion

f

other nterests.

Each of these

trategies

as both ational nd biased forms. ational trate-

gies

aremarked

y

the

ecognition

ndresolutionf

value

onflict,

s well s con-

siderable ttention

o

the

substantiveoncerns t

stake

n the

decision.Biased

strategies

end o maskvalue onflictsndeither voidorresolve

puriously

hose

that re

recognized,acrificing

ubstance o

acceptability.

hisresults

n

spurious

transcendence,elay nthefaceof anurgenteedtodecide, iased ompromise,

disjointed

ncrementalism,

nd

deciding

without

hoosing.34

compromise,

or

example,

s

biasedwhen

major

alues

t

stake

n

thedecision re sacrificed

olely

to

get

greement

George,

980b,

.

30).

This s a

product

f

consensus

olitics

(George,

980b,

.

42),

which

Huntington

1961,

p.

164)

identified

s

part

f

the

strategicegislative

rocess.

n one

form,

he

decision-maker

erely

mediates

between

ompeting

nterests.

ccording

o Thies

(1980),

this

was

President

Johnson's

esponse

n

1966

to the

ritics f his Vietnam

olicy;

acedwith on-

flictingressures,e played herole of brakeman,'ulling he witch gainst

33

George

1980b,

pp.

29-31,

36, 41;

see also

George,

974,

p.

185)

discussed

ranscendence,

alcu-

lated

procrastination,ompromise,

nd

sequencing.

or

minimal

ecisions,

ee

Schilling

1961).

For a

more

etailed

nalysis

f

these

trategies,

ee Farnham

1997,

appendix

).

34

For the

first

our,

ee

George

1980b,

pp.

30-31, 36, 41-42;

see also

George,

974,

p.

185)

and

Huntington

1961,

p.

162).

For

the

ast,

ee

Schilling

1961,

pp.

36-40,

43-44).



14/24

Political ontextnd

Foreign

olicy

ecision-Making

453

both he dvocates f decisive scalation' ndthe

dvocates f

disengagement.'

The

key

was to stake utthemiddle

round

pp.

352-355).35

eustadt's

1970)

discussion f the

planning

or he

sraeli, rench,

nd British ttack

n

Egypt

n

1956showsthat hiskindof biasedcompromisean occur t the nternational

level with

qually

unfortunateesults.

n that

ase,

a seriesof

three-way

om-

promises

n the

military

lan

o

make t

cceptable

o

all the

arties proved

atal

to the over

tory

n

which he uccess

of

the

operation epended

p.

22).

Loosening

he

Acceptability

onstraint

Time-buying.

aken

together, any

of these classical

political trategies

reflect reliance n time-buyingo sidestep he value trade-offshatreduce

acceptability.

n

theface

of value

conflict,

olitical

ecision-makersften ide

their

ime,

elying

n the

ogic

of events. f there s

nothing

o be done at

the

moment,

hey

re contento wait

for

hange

n a

more

avorable irection.

hey

are not nxious

o foreclose hoice

prematurely

ecause

better,

ore

cceptable

solutions

may merge-solutions

hat

will alienate ewer

eople.

This resistance o

acting

until he time s

right

as

long

been

remarked.36

Neustadt

1986)

gave

tsrationalen

explaining

he

behavior f Ronald

Reagan,

a

President

onsistentlyefusing,

ime fter

ime,

ear

fter

ear,

he rade-offs

his own

analysts

ress

n him

pp.

20-21).

In

this,

Neustadt aw

an

implicit

mode

of

thought

bout

priorities

nd

timing.

eneath hese

lie

commensurate

alues and notions

f

risk.To wit: f

you

have three

incompatible bjectives-say,

tax

cuts,

defense

hikes,

and balanced

budgets-and

you really

want

hem

ll,

don't rade hem

ff,

ang

on.

...

In

an uncertain

orld,

ome

unexpected

oodmight

omeof

hanging

onto

verythingou

can....

Time

enough

o

trade

ff f and as

[advis-

ers']warningstart o be substantiatedithoutffsettingdvantage.ut

wait

upon

events;

events

might

break in a more favorable

way.

(pp.

20-21;

emphasis

n

original)37

Related o this

trategy

s a reluctance o

engage

n

long-termlanning.

hus,

Winston

hurchillold heHouse

of

Commons n

returning

rom

alta

n

1945,

35

Thies

1980)

also

pointed

ut

that

Johnson's

nability

o execute

strategy

f

graduated ressure

that

epended

n

carefully

ontrolledirwarwas a

direct esult f his need

for

onsensus. To the

extent hat hePresidentoughtokeep veryoneonboard,' e was unable o turn hebombing p

or down n accordance

with

he

goal

of

'negotiating'y

word

nd deed in an

optimal

ashion

(p.

373).

36 Machiavelli

1979),

for

ne,

dvised hat themanwho

dapts

his course f action o thenature

f

the imes

will

succeed

nd, ikewise,

. themanwho etshis course

f

action

ut

of

tunewith he

timeswillcome to

grief' pp.

160,

344-345).

37

Franklin oosevelt nce toldhis wife hat

he

would never

e a

good

politician

ecause hewas

too

mpatient.

t

was

necessary

o wait ntil

eople

were

eady

o

support

hanges,

therwise

hey

wouldrevolt

Friedel,

973,

p.

500).



15/24

454

Farnham

It is a

mistake

o look

too

far

head....

Only

one link n

the

chainof

destiny

can be handled t

a

time

cited

n

Davis, 1972,

p.

411).

This

disposition

oes not

necessarily

ndicate

he

bsenceof

ong-rangeoals,

but

does

imply

desire o

be flexibleboutwhen nd how to achieve hem. or suchgoals, nfact, valu-

ation

may

be

stretchedut ver considerable

eriod

f

time,

s

George's

1980a,

245ff.)

ccount

fthe

development

fRoosevelt'sGrand

esign

for he

post-war

international

rder emonstrates.

This

s

also

an llustration

f

the

political

trat-

egy

of

sequencing.)

The

political

ecision-maker's

endency

o focuson one

step

at a time

s

related o

uncertainty-notnly

bout he

probability

f

success,

ut lso about

even

the

value

of the next

move;

witness

Roosevelt'sfavorite

omparison

f

himself

s a

quarterback

n a

football

ame:

He couldnot

ay

what he

play

fter

nextwas going o be until henextplaywascompleted.If theplaymakes en

yards,'

e told

press

onference

n

April

1933,

the

ucceeding lay

willbe dif-

ferent

romwhat t would have been if

they

had been thrown

or

a

loss'

(Schlesinger,

957,

p.

193).

This focus mounts o more

han acticalmaneuver-

ing.

t s based

on the

beliefs

oth hat ne cannot ee

probable

utcomes oo

far

ahead

and that ne cannot now

he

desirability

f thenextmoveuntil

ne

has

seenthe

onsequences

fthe

present

ne.This

uggests

hat

n

a

political

ontext,

contrary

o the

tipulations

f normative

heory,references ay

not

lways

be

exogenous o the decisionprocess. t also suggests hat, xceptforvery mall

segments

f a

decision,

he

notion f

expected

alue

may

notbe as useful

n

ana-

lyzing

he decisions

f

political

ecision-makerss the

proponents

f rational

choice

theory

ontend.

Education.

uying

ime

may

lso affordn

opportunity

o ncrease

eceptiv-

ity

o a

policy.

Not

only

do

political

ecision-makersiew the alternativess

manipulable,hey

lso see

people's

preferences

s malleable.38

hus,

although

highly

ensitive o the

constraints,

hey

will at times

ry

o

alter

hem,

eciding

on a

policyfirst,

hen

ttempting

o create

upport

or t

Dror,1971,pp.83-84,

92).

This can be done on a

long-

r short-term

asis.

Overthe

ong

term,

oliti-

cal decision-makersse the time

gained

with

raditional

olitical trategies

o

increase onsensus

y actually

hanging

hat

people

find

cceptable,

ngaging

in what

many

elieve o be one of most

mportant

unctions

f

political

eader-

ship:

eaching

Farnham,

997,

hap.

6).

38

n

criticizing

resident

eorge

H.

W.

Bush for

nadequate upport

f Russian

emocracy,

ichard

Nixon

rgued

hat themark f

great olitical

eadership

s not

imply

o

support

hat s

popular,

but o makewhat s

unpopular

opular

Friedman,

992).

President

eagan

wouldhave

agreed.

Accordingohis secretaryfstate,George hultz 1993),Reagan didnot ccept hat xtensive

political

pposition

oomed n attractivedea. He

would

fight

esolutely

or

n

idea,

believing

hat

if

t was valid he

could

persuade

he

American

eople

to

support

t.

He

changed

he

national nd

international

genda

on

issue afterssue

p.

1135).

39

Bennett

1985)

contrastedoosevelt's

ttitudeoward

heneed o

begin ducating

he

public

o

the

dangers

f the

nternationalituation

efore he Second WorldWar with

hat f his

secretary

f

state,

ordellHull:

The

secretary

as

aware fthe

ossibility,

nd

even

he

robability,

f a devel-

oping

worldwar

nd ts

accompanying

hreat o American

ecurity,

uthe balked t

any

move o

prepare

or t

publicly

ecause

public pinion

errified

im

p.

104).



16/24

Political

Context

nd

Foreign

Policy

Decision-Making

455

Many political

eaders

recognize

hat

one

of their

rime

functionss

to

educate.

Witness

resident ill

Clinton's bservation

hat

the

mportant

hing

s

we

have to make

foreign

olicy

make sense to

most

ordinary

mericans....

Somethinghat need otake n evenmore s tryingofigureut waytomake

theAmerican

eople

believenot

ustepisodically

ut

nstinctively

hat here's o

longer

n

easy dividing

inebetween

oreign

olicy

nd

domestic

olicy

The

Clinton

ecord,

996).40

Moreover,

lthough olitical

ecision-makers

ay

ometimes

e

willing

or

forced)

o confront

ough

ssuesforwhich

upport

s

lacking, hey enerally

o

so

only

s

part

f a

concomitant

fforto

bring

eople

long-to

show

hem

why

a

painful

rade-off

ay

be

necessary

nd thusmake t more

cceptable,

ttempt-

ingtoeducate hem o thepointwhere,f a trade-offannot e avoided, tleast

a

bruising

olitical

attle

an be

(Neustadt,

986,

pp.

24-25).

Decision-makers

ay

also

need

to create

upport

or

policy

n the short

run.41

his s most

ikely

o

occurwhen he

ssue s

important

nd time

ressure

is

considerable. he

attempt

o

sell

policies

hould, owever,

e

distinguished

from

genuine

ducationalffort

Renshon,

995,

pp.

80-81).

Education ocuses

on

changing

alues,

whereas

elling

nvolves

manipulation

f

preferences

n

the

short

un,

s

illustrated

y

the

French

overnment's

ehavior n

1992

over

the

issue of trade

olicy

n the

faceof bitter

pposition y

French

armers:

France

ppears

o have

begun

public

elations

fforthat ould

mount

to a

preparation

or n

eventual oncession.

..

If

a GATTaccord an be

shown o be no

moreharmfulo farmers

hanwhathas

already

een

undertakenn

the

reform,

hen

t

may

be

politically

alable.

Cohen,

1992)

Much as

political

eaders

may

wish to

extend

he domain of

acceptability,

however,

he

arge

iteraturen the

prospects

nd

processes

f

loosening

he

acceptabilityonstraintuggestshat lthougheadershavesome atitude,hey

are limited n

a number

f

ways

(Rieselbach,

1966,

pp.

184,

193)-witness

Roosevelt's nswer o

criticismhat e had

not

moved

head

with

egislation

is

progressive

upporters

esired:

I

think he

mpression

as

that incolnwas

a sad

man.. .

because

he

could not

do all he

wanted o do at one

time,

nd think

ou

will find

examples

where incoln

had to

compromise

o

gain

a

little

omething.

...

If

you

ever it

here,

you

will

earn hat

ou

cannot,

ust

by shouting

fromhehousetops, etwhatyouwant llthe ime.Lash,1976,p. 124)

40

According

o an

early

ssessment

y

Arthur

chlesinger

r.,

linton

ucceeded

t this venfrom

the

beginning

Schlesinger,

993).

4'

Here,

here

may

be some

opportunity

or ecision-makerso

take

dvantage

f the

possibility

hat

an

international

greement

an

sometimes reatenew

domestic

pportunities

synergistic

ssue

linkage )

Putnam,

988,

pp.

446-447;

Moravchik,

993).



17/24

456

Farnham

(This

observations also

a

good

llustrationf the

political

ecision-maker's

ess

than nthusiasticttitudeoward

ompromise.)

ImpactofContext n Outcomes:PoliticalDecision-Making

and Rational Choice

The

decision-making

rocesses

hat

wareness fthe

political

ontext osters

have several

nteresting

mplications

or

oreign olicy

utcomes.

f the

process

is

unbiased,

twill

produce olicies

hat

re the esult f neithernternational

or

domestic

ressures

lone,

but he

decision-maker's

ttempt

o balance

he laims

of

both.

Owing

o a

pervasive

oncernwith

cceptability,

owever,

hese

olicies

maydiffer rom heproductf a pureoptimizingtrategyn severalways.For

one

thing, hey

re

likely

o exhibit ewer

harp

rade-offsetween

mportant

values,

ecausedecision-makersilloften earch

ast

lternatives

nvolving

hem

to find ne with

reatercceptability.

n

addition,

olicies

may

eflectn efforto

broaden

cceptability,

ot

only by

blending

ogether

eatures orrowed rom

several

lternatives,

ut lso

by ncorporating

dditional

alues hat

may

or

may

notbe

directly

elated

o

the

policy

ssue.

As

Hilsman

1967)

pointed

ut,

n a

political

ontext he

est

f

a

policy

s that

greater

umber f

people

decideto

endorse

t

p.547).]

In

fact,

we

may

ee

foreign olicy

ecisions

n

which omes-

tic nterestsre ncluded or ittle easonotherhan o increase

upport.

David

Epstein personal

communication,

ovember

1993)

has

suggested

he term

bundling

or

his

ractice.] ccording

o

theNew York

imes,

or

xample,

his

strategy

as behind resident linton's uccess with he North merican ree

Trade

Agreement

NAFTA):

He

kept hoving

more nd more

hips

nto he

pot

on an issue that ew

Americans

eally

nderstood...

and]

urnedheHouse n hisdirection

becausehe skillfullyepackedheissue,.... [with] bewilderingeries

of idedealsthatweremade owinvotes ..

,

some fthem

nabashedly

protectionist

orollarieso

a free-tradeheorem...

They

meant hat ree

tradewouldnotbe

quite

o free s it

might

ave

been,

butmorewalls

came down

hisweekthanwent

p. Apple,

1993)

Decisions

may

lso be stretched

ut

n

order o makethem

more

cceptable,

s

in

sequencing.

ndeed,

ecause

of

the

mportance

f

acceptability,

olitical

eci-

sion-makers

ay

be reluctanto

adopt olicies

hat

annot e broken own n this

way.42

Moreover, emay xpect olicies eflectingcertainmountfrisk-taking

to increase

cceptability.

decision-maker

ight,

or

xample,

hoose

a

policy

less certain

f

uccess n the nternational

imension,

ut

atisfying

olitical

on-

straints,

n

preference

o one more

ikely

o work etter

nternationally

ut ess

42

This notionwas

suggested y

Robert ervis

personal

ommunication,

ay

1993).



18/24

PoliticalContext nd


457

acceptable omestically.43

urthermore,

ecause

gains

and

losses

may

be

more

immediaten domestic

olitics

han n the nternational

rena,

his

practice

s

likely

obe reinforced

y

the

endency

odiscount

ong-range

onsequences

more

heavily han hose urfacingnthe hort unRobert ervis,ersonal ommuni-

cation,

March

004).

Of

greatest

nterest,

erhaps,

s the

ossibility

hat ecision-makers

nfluenced

by

thedemands f the

political

ontext

will

sometimes hoose

a

policy

hat s

acceptable,

r can be made

so,

even

f

t

appears

ess

satisfactory

n cost/benefit

terms hanothers.

n

Roosevelt's

ase,

for

example, lthough

vertdeterrent

threats

might

ave

had a

greater

mpact

n

Hitler,

hey

were

politically

nac-

ceptable,

nd the

president

hose to aid the llies nstead.

Thus,because thepolitical ontext otonlyprovides onstraintsut also

ways

of

handling

hem,

herole of

acceptability

n the

decision-making

rocess

goes

far

eyond arrowing

hefeasible et

of

alternatives4

nd

may

ften

ead

to

outcomes

hat,

lthough

ational

n

some

sense,

re

quite

differentrom hose

produced

y

economic

rationalityDiesing,

1962,

pp.

2-3),

reflecting

nstead

rationality

ithout

ptimization

Simon,

1990,

p.

8).

Moreover,

he hance f

deriving

uch utcomes rom deductivemodel

may

be

quite

lim

and,

s Elster

1984)

pointed

ut,

s well as

being

ble to deter-

mine feasible

et,

we needthe

bility

o

select romt

p. 13)].Explaining

nd

predicting

ehavior uch s

a

reluctanceo trade ff ven

mong

lternativeshat

are

already

minimallycceptable,

r

the

prevalence

f

time-buyingtrategies

nd

a

disposition

o stretchut

decisions,

equires

whole et

of

auxiliaryssump-

tions hat he

ationalm

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Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.pdf