Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMP and Intentional EMI on Electric Grids

8/6/2019 Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMP and Intentional EMI on Electric Grids

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Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMPand Intentional EMI on Electric Grids

John G. Kappenman


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A Quick Definition of Solar Activity & Space Weather

As Recent US FERC, EMP Commission, FEMA and National Academyof Sciences reviews have noted Electric Power Grid is one of the

most important and severely impacted Critical Infrastructures

Space Weather due to Solar Activitycan impact many technology and

infrastructure systems

Solar Flares/Energetic Particlesthemselves can directly impactCommunication/Navigation Systems,Satellites

CMEs from Sun can causeGeomagnetic Storms which can alsoimpact many systems

Extremes of these Threats have notbeen well-understood

Vulnerabilities of Systems havegenerally grown over time


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A Quick Definition of EMP and IEMI

EMP ElectroMagnetic Pulse EMP Risk come from Detonation of a Nuclear Weapon at

high Altitude (above 30 km) Intentional Attack carried out by a rogue nation or

terroist Group Could also result from Successful Interception of a

Nuclear Missile at high altitudes Continental Impact Footprint

IEMI Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference High Power Electromagnetic Weapons (Non-Nuclear EM

or RF Weapons) Limited Area of Impact Unless used in Coordinated

Attack A Risk Scenario of likelihood comparable to Cyber Attack

E3-EMP can impact Electric Power Grids in manner like thatposed by Geomagnetic Storms

Both E1-EMP and IEMI can also damage electronic equipment

& control systems like SCADA


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A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to SolarActivity & Geomagnetic Storms

Geomagnetic Storms haveContinent-Wide &

Planetary Footprints

Geomagnetic Storms are disturbances in the Earths normally

quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense Solar activity

Intense Solar Activity


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A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce

Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC a quasi-DC current) toflow in the continental interconnected Electric Power Grids

Storm causesGeomagnetic FieldDisturbances fromElectrojet Current

that couple to

Power Systems


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2 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 . 0 0 02 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 : 0 0 . 0 0 0

Areas of ProbablePower System

Collapse

Blackouts ofUnprecedented

Scale

GIC flow in transformers will cause half-cycle saturation which can

cause Power Grid Blackouts & Damage


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GIC flow can also has potential to cause wide-spread catastrophic

damage to key Power Grid TransformersCausing Restoration Problems

Salem Nuclear Plant

GSU TransformerFailure, March 89

InternalDamage dueto one storm

These Key Assets may take aYear or More to Replace


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Historic Storm ImpactsA Brief Overview of a

Geomagnetic SuperstormNorth American Power Grid Impacts

March 13-14, 1989


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Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT)

March 13, 1989 Storm 7:39UT

20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather


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Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) Quebec Blackout in 92 Seconds atIntensity 0f ~480 nT/min

Reported Power System Events March 13, 1989


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Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)

March 13, 1989 Storm 21:40UT


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Time 16:03-17:30 EST (21:03-22:30 UT) Intensity over Mid-Atlantic Region~300 nT/min

Reported Power System Events March 13, 1989


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Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer IncidentsWithin 25 months after the March 1989 Storm

11

12

12

54

10

89

6

3

1. Salem2. Oyster Creek3. South Texas4. Shearon Harris5. Surry 16. Zion 27. WNP 28. Peach Bottom 3

9. D.C. Cook 110. Susquehanna11. Maine Yankee12. Nine-Mile

7

Latent Impacts of March 1989 Storm Delayed Failures of Large Transformers

at Nuclear Plants suspected across US


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Great Geomagnetic StormsDisturbance Intensity Perspectives

Impacts on North American Power Grid on March 13-14,1989 occurred at disturbance intensities of ~300-500 nT/min

Disturbance intensities of >2000 nT/min have been observed

at latitudes of concern for US power grid infrastructure on atleast 3 occasions since 1972

Disturbance intensity of ~5000 nT/min was estimated forstorm on May 14-15, 1921 (estimated to be largest storm of20 th Century and comparable to Carrington Event of 1859)

Power Grids should expect Storms 4 to 10 Times MoreIntense than the March 1989 Storm


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Great Geomagnetic StormsMarch 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Boundaries of Eastward ElectrojetMarch 13, 1989

Position of WestwardElectrojet


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Estimated Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet

May 14-15, 1921Larger & More Intense than

March 1989


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Severe Geomagnetic Storms will have an even larger Planetary Footprint


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Geomagnetic Storms GIC & Conventional WisdomConventional Wisdom

Proximity to Electrojet Intensifications Large Magnetic Field DisturbancesHigh to Mid-Latitude Locations - Largest Magnetic Field DisturbancesPower Grids at these Locations Measured Large GICs Related ProblemsThis did not explain Power Grid Problems Reported at Low-Latitudes

A New Class of GIC Risks Large GICs are possible at Low-LatitudesSignificant and Long Duration GICs have been observed at Low LatitudeLocationsDiffering Magnetospheric Processes are the Drivers for Geomagnetic Fielddisturbances


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Ring Current & Ground Level DisturbancesJuly 15, 2000 (21:30-22:00UT)


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Observed GICs in Central Japan Power Grid - Nov 6, 2001

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

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50

1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:30 6:00 6:30 7:00 7:30

Time UT

G I C ( A m p s )

GIC(A) SUNEN S/SGIC(A) SHINANO S/SGIC(A) FUKUMITSU BTB

Observed & Calculated GIC Nov 6, 2001Southern/Central Japan

Meso-Scale ModelsValidation Across the System

Geo-Electric Field

GIC flows out of Network

GIC flows intoNetwork


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Eskom Summary of Failures and Damages

5 Major Stations, 15 Large Transformers Failures ~13% of System EHV Transformers

GIC appeared to have activated this

Oct 29-31, 2003 Storm was Equal in Intensity to March 1989

Storm but Longer in Duration

Storms many times Larger than this Storm could pose evenhigher impacts to Low Latitude Power Grids

Overview of South Africa (Eskom) Episodic EHV TransformerFailures due to Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic StormsFailures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure

Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee


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Station 3 Gen Transformer 4HV winding failure Station 3 Gen. Transformer 5evidence of overheating

Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee

Overview of Eskom Episodic EHV Transformer Failures dueto Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic Storms

Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure


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Great Geomagnetic StormsElectric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness

New Awareness has developed on the Extremes of SevereGeomagnetic Storms

Current Design Practices of Electric Grids have unknowinglyand greatly escalated the Risks and Potential Impacts

Un-Recognized Systemic Risk No Design Code Yet to minimizethis ThreatPresent Operational Procedures are based upon limited experience,do not reduce GIC levels and are inadequate for Severe Storms

Government Forecasters provide K Indices which have not

communicated the real risks to the Electric Power IndustryIndices saturate and reach Maximum Levels at Low ThresholdsMany K9 Storms (post March 1989) have been less intense thanMarch 1989 Storm with unintended consequences for power gridoperators

False Sense of Security & Complacency by Power Grid Operators


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0.001

0.01

0.1

1

R e s

i s t a n c e

( O h m s /

k m )

kV Rating

Transmission Line Resistance by kV Rating in USA

115 kV

138 kV161 kV 230 kV

345 kV 500 kV

765 kV

GIC Risk Factor kV Rating Design

Lower Transmission LineResistance per mile at

Higher kV Designs

Trend ~Factor of 10 Decrease in RLeads to ~Factor of 10 Increase in GIC

Highest GIC in LargestMost Important Parts of

the Grid


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765kV

500kV345kV

US High-Voltage Transmission Network

European and Asian Continental Grids are

of similar proportions

500 kV & 765 kV serve ~60% of US geographicterritory and ~86% of US population


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2 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 . 0 0 02 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 : 0 0 . 0 0 0

Areas of ProbablePower System

Collapse

Simulation of Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario

Blackout ofUnprecedented

Scale

Red & Green DotsIndicate Transformerswith Large GIC Flows


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Severe Geomagnetic Storm ScenarioAt-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers

Estimated that many large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GICexposure to be At-Risk of Permanent Damage & Loss Replacement could

extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates

Many Regions with High

Damage Loss Estimated


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1962 Starfish - Hawaii

STARFISH event, July 9, 1962 1.4 MT, 400 km HOB 800 nautical miles from Honolulu

HEMP effects felt in Hawaii Coupling to Hawaiian electric light

grid turns off some nighttime lightsin Honolulu

Kauai telecom microwave outage Other nuisance effects (alarms)

Collateral effect: Sky swept clean of allcommercial satellites within six months

*EMP Commission

EMP Threat: Historical Evidence (US)*


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EMP Threat: Terminology & Overview

E1 or Fast-Transient of EMP can damage micro-

electronic systemsthroughout

infrastructures

E3 or Slow-Transientof EMP is like SevereGeomagnetic Storm

h l d h l d


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HEMP Effects Area Fast Pulse

High Altitude-EMP Threats to US Electric GridSource: EMP Commission Executive Report

Both E1 & E3Threats can haveLarge Geographic

Footprints


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HEMP Fast Pulse Exposure covers a total of 1765 substations exposed or ~83%of 2106 major HV and EHV substations. In addition some 35,000 to 40,000

Distribution Class Substations may also be of concern for Fast Pulse Exposure

EMP Threats to US Electric GridMajor HV and EHV Substations


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HEMP Fast Pulse exposed power plants (Red) total 10,730 with a generation

capacity that is ~74.4% of the U.S. total generation capability.

EMP Threats to US Electric GridLarge Electric Generation Plants


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E1-EMP & IEMI Terminology & Overview E1-EMP is Fast Transient Frequency Range Higher than Lightning so existing Lightning

Protections do not provide Protection against this threat

IEMI (Intentional Electromagnetic Interference) Can be produced by simple Non-NuclearWeapons, can pose risk at Higher Frequencies and has Great Potential to Grow in Magnitude &Probability of Occurrence

IEMI Deviceshave potentialto reach higherlevels in future


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Diehl Munitions Systeme hasdeveloped a small interference source(including antenna) 350 MHz damped sine field 120 kV/m at 1 meter (omni-

directional antenna) 30 minute continuous operation

(5 pulses per second) or 3 hours inbursts

20 x 16 x 8 inches and 62 pounds

Demonstration in Summer 2004

IEMI Overview Non-Nuclear Devices

IEMI Weapons can be Highly Portable and Concealable

Components to Manufacture Devices are readily available Can be designed with relative ease (Many Terrorists have Engineering

Backgrounds) Has Potential for Big Increases in Threat Environment Output &

Unpleasant Surprises for Society


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JOLT IRA HyperbandGenerator

AFRL has developed anextremely powerful IRAsystem that produceshyperband pulses E*r = 5.3 MV pulse width

~100 ps

IEMI Overview Non-Nuclear Devices

Multiple Sites can be Impacted by Coordinated Attacks

IEMI Weapons can also be Highly PowerfulTruck or Plane Transportable

EMP d G G i S


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EMP and Great Geomagnetic StormsUS Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness

Historically large Geomagnetic storms have potential to create Power Grid Blackouts and

widespread catastrophic Transformer Damage of unprecedented proportions, long termblackout, lengthy restoration times, and chronic shortages (multiple years) are possible

Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels;August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate - $4 - $10 BillionHurricane Katrina Cost Estimate - $150 - $300 Billion

Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario $1 - $2 Trillion in 1st YearDepending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 10 Years

Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readilyavailable, Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous KIndices

EMP and IEMI also have capacity to create similar widespread damage to Power Grids

Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm, EMP & IEMI-RelatedCatastrophic Failures

Remedial Design measures to block GIC(transformer neutral devices) are readilyfeasible and cost effectiveMethods available for Hardening against EMP and IEMI


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EMP d G t G ti St


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The Nation has experienced a Several Decade Long Failure toUnderstand how Risk has Migrated into our Infrastructuresfrom these Threats . . . An Unrecognized Systemic Risk

As Sir Winston Churchill said in 1936 in the early days offacing a different emerging world threat

"these are the years that the locust hath eaten."

the era of procrastination, of half -measures, of soothingand baffling expedients, of delays is coming to its close.

In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.

EMP and Great Geomagnetic StormsUS Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness

Documents

Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMP and Intentional EMI on Electric Grids