IMO-MARINA NATIONAL FORUM ON

DOMESTIC FERRY SAFETY

9-11 September 2013 MARINA Multipurpose Hall, 7th Floor, Parkview Plaza, Taft Avenue, Ermita,

Manila

TOPIC: RPMMRR 1997, AS AMENDED:

LESSONS LEARNED AFTER 16 YEARS, ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSESS

SPEAKER:

September 9, 2013 Atty. LAMBERTO V. PIA

Former Deputy Administrator for Operations – MARINA (1992 to 2006)

RPMMRR97 STEERING COMMITTEE CHAIRS

Chair: Pio H. Garrido, Jr.+ Rear Admiral, PCG Commandant Administrator, MARINA

Co-Chair: Lamberto V. Pia DAO, MARINA Members: Dir. Rodolfo S. Llobrera Dir. Amadeo V. Bautista, Jr. +

Dir. Porfirio M. Limpiada+

BASIS OF RPMMRR97: IMO MODEL CODE ON SAFETY OF NON-CONVENTION SIZED SHIPS (1996); EXECUTIVE ORDER

(EO) NO. 125/125-A, SERIES OF 1987; CONSTITUTION

IMO Model Code was shaped after series of regional conferences conducted by IMO Experts in Manila; Bangkok, Thailand; Mumbai, India; Teheran, Iran, attended by senior government officials from ASEAN, India, Iran (the “Final revision”), 1996.

Sec.1: MARINA DRAFTING OF THE RPMRR 1997

The IMO Model Code on the Safety of Non-Convention

sized ships facilitated the MARINA Committee in configuring the RR. There is imperative need for the RR after previous administrations failed to update the then

out-of-date 1976 RPMRR.

The RR is composed of 19 chapters – 13 of which are taken from the Model Code which provides generally standards taken from SOLAS but modified to address the safety concerns on vessels below 500GT which

SOLAS does not apply.

EO No. 125/125-A, while issued by the

President and not passed by congress has the stature of an Acts of Congress (e.g. CAs, PDs

and RAs). The EO transferred the maritime safety functions from the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to MARINA including vessel registration and issuance of seamen’s books (SIRB), and

quasi-judicial function of BOT relating to domestic water transportation.

Sec.1: MARINA DRAFTING OF THE RPMRR 1997

The PMRR of 1976 (circa PCG) was considered

obsolete. It was based on SOLAS ’60 which underwent amendments with SOLAS 74/78, as

amended. MARINA Memorandum Circulars updated the RR to conform to IMO’s

amendments which are binding to us under the “tacit amendment” procedures which consider SOLAS Member States to have acceded to the

amendments absent objections, within the required period, say 1 year.

Sec.1: MARINA DRAFTING OF THE RPMRR 1997

• Lack of additional budgetary support for added functions; • Need for senior technical positions in MROs/Central-

Office; • Need to reorganize MARINA Central Office and MROs; • Transfer of PCG technical personnel to MARINA; • Pending Court cases filed against MARINA due to the

transfer of safety functions from PCG to MARINA. Opposition heightened by the transfer of the issuance of Seaman’s Book (SIRB).

Section 3: While EO 125/125-A was issued in 1987, the transfer of function did not take place until 10 years later due to -

Section 4: RR ‘97 PUBLIC HEARINGS

The RR’97 was subjected to public hearings held in MARINA Central Office, Regional Offices

(MROs): Batangas, Iloilo, Cebu, Davao, Zamboanga afterwhich the RR was finalized in

Manila.

The drafting of the 1997 RR was quite challenging and stressful especially the care in the usage of language and difficulty of

categorization of ships. Before the RR was published in the O.G. Marina was faced by IMO STCW while list requirements, which MARINA had to lead in the preparation of the Philippine Country

Reports to IMO.

The bigger challenge was two-fold:Legal and Technical Questions –

-How to incorporate IMO Safety Conventions ratified by the Senate in one RR; when Congress did not pass enabling laws?

-How to standardize safety rules for non-convention sized ships e.g. Below 500GT?

-How about ships below 500GT down the line?

Section 4

The RR which was published in the Official Gazette and

was first furnished IMO, as part of the Philippine Country Report on STCW ’95 White Listing, more specifically on Disciplinary Action, as it relates to

Seafarers. The RR resolves the legal and technical issues by

Incorporating the ratified Conventions by way of general statements, scope & coverage.

Section 5: Implementation of RR

• By administrative regulations “RR” the following IMO maritime Safety Conventions are considered parts of the law of the land under the “incorporation treaty clause” of the Philippine Constitution (1935, 1973, 1987 Constitutions): – SOLAS ‘74/78, as amended – COLREG ‘72, as amended – Tonnage ‘69, as amended – STCW ‘78/95, as amended – Loadline ’66, as amended – MARPOL ‘73/78, as amended; and – UN Law of the Sea Convention 1982. – The RR merely implements these Conventions

Section 6: Application of the IMO Maritime Safety Conventions

1. “RR” strength lies in the fact that the Philippines by subsidiary legislation had been able to codify and update the rules and regulations, absent enabling laws to implement the

enumerated conventions

2. The RR is anchored on generally accepted principles of international law getting a cue from sec. 2 art. II Phil.

Constitution.

3. The Philippines has ratified at least 20 IMO Conventions and the “RR” provided a platform for all players to base their compliance with minimum safety standards at least by

administrative fiat.

4. The “RR” serves the ship’s inspector’s needs and surveyors/classification society guidance on what

Government standards are.

Section 7: Strengths and Weaknesses

• The three –fold purpose of maritime investigation is to determine: – cause(s) of the accidents/ incidents; – person(s) responsible; – how to prevent it from happening in the future/

lessons learned. • Have we learned? Do we have compilation of maritime

accident investigations reports? Database for maritime accidents? Analysis of these accidents?

• It’s hightime to create one Maritime Accident Investigation Board independent of MARINA & BMI, if not the NTSB for all transport modes.

Section 8: Maritime Incident Investigations

– Some small vessel operators complain that the “RR” is difficult to comply by small-sized (below 500 G.T.) vessels and therefore it needs re-visiting for comprehensive review.

– By implementing the “RR” to SOLAS standards to domestic vessels, its safety standards are higher than IMO standards.

– It needs re-alignment with IMO Regulations insofar as domestic vessels 500 G.T. and above; different “RR” for vessels 3-15 G.T.s, 16 to 449 G.T. etc. and different treatment per types or build.

Section 8:

1. The RR’97 has served its purpose to provide the rules of the game. Accidents involving bigger vessels are alarming and the “RR” is not the

culprit. 2. The domestic ships consist of various sizes and

different makes 3. Several offers were made from the private sector

to draft the “RR” on the condition that MARINA staff would still be involved.

4. With the existing “RR” as a roadmap, the revising Committee can have better perspective learned

from experience.

CONCLUSION

1. Like a ship which needs regular maintenance/repair if not re-engineering or re-powering the “RR” need updating to meet the ever changing legal, political, economic and social imperatives

2. Shipping is dynamic, very competitive and considered to be a dangerous business, and a ship is as safe on the basis of the Hardware; Construction/ Design/Equipment /Machineries/ Software and the Peopleware – the human element.

3. Shipping has a decidedly major advantage over land transportation as fuel efficient, or airline industry which is the younger sister industry of shipping, but airline is more disciplined and well regulated. Make sea travel more alluring to erase fears.

4. Creation of Maritime Accident Investigation Board(MAIB) which must be independent whose decision is appealable to the CA

to do away with suspicion of bias by the persons who are the police, prosecutor and judge.

RECOMMENDATION

Selected Philippine Ferry Accidents

Dona Paz Collision, 1987

Princess of the Stars 2008

Princess of the Orient 1998

Cebu Collision, August 2013

Selected Philippine Ferry Accidents

Timeline of Deadly Ferry Disasters in the Philippines

Ferry Date Casualties Cause

Dona Paz Dec-87 4,300 collision

Dona Marilyn Oct-88 250 sinking

Ferry Cebu City Dec-94 140 collision

Princess of the Orient Sep-98 150 sinking

Anahanda Apr-2000 100 sinking

Timeline of Deadly Ferry Disasters in the Philippines

Ferry Date Casualties Cause

SuperFerry14 Feb-04 116 firebomb

Princess of the Stars Jun-08 793 sinking

Don Dexter Kathleen Nov-08 42 capsize

Maejan Dec-08 30 capsize

Commander 6 May-09 12 sinking

SupperFerry Sep-09 9 sinking

Catalyn B Dec-09 4 collision

MV Baleno-9 Dec-09 6 sinking

wooden-hulled ferry Jun-12 7 capsize

Lady of Mount Carmel Jun-13 7 sinking

St Thomas Aquinas Aug-13 92 collision

• An analysis of 319 accident investigation reports involving 319 Accidents (2002-2011). Investigation UK(MAIB)(148); Australia(ATS B)110 Maritime New Zealand(43); US NSTB(18)

148 = UK 110 = AUS 43 = NZ 18 = US

• Types of Accidents – Collision, Close Quarter and Contact – 99 x (31%) – Grounding 62x (19.49%) – Fire and explosion 33x (10.39%) – Lifeboat 13x (4.1%) – Other 112x (35.2%)

An Analysis by SIRC 3-4 July 2013 Symposium

• The Use of Mandatory Equipment on Board by MARPOL and SOLAS – Emergency Response Equipment – Life saving apparatus – Fire detection – Fire-fighting equipment

– Hoses (SOLAS Chapter II-2, Part A, Reg.4)

An Analysis by SIRC 3-4 July 2013 Symposium

319 ACCIDENT'S IMMEDIATE CAUSES

Immediate Causes No. of Cases Percentage Poor Judgement/Operation 58 18.20%

Technical Failure 40 12.50%

Inadequate Lookout 38 11.90%

Inadequate Risk Management 29 9.10%

Inappropriate/Ineffective Maintenance 25 7.80%

Inadequate Training Experience 24 7.50%

Third Party Deficiency 24 7.50%

Failure in Communication/Coordination 22 6.90%

Weather/Environment Factors 20 6.30%

Pilot Error/Mishandling 29 6.00%

Rule Violation 26 5.00%

319 ACCIDENT'S IMMEDIATE CAUSES (Cont.)

Immediate Causes No. of Cases Percentage

Poor Design 13 4.10%

Fatigue 12 3.80%

Communication Problem (of/with) Captain/Pilot 8 2.50%

Alcohol/Drugs 7 2.20%

Unsafe Speed 7 2.20%

Inappropriate Use of Technology/Equipment 6 1.90%

Overloading 4 1.30%

Ineffective Use of Technology/Equipment 3 0.90%

Lack of Manufacturer Guidelines 2 0.60% Distraction 1 0.30% TOTAL 319 100.00%

Looking at the Immediate Causes, “Poor Judgement/Operation” was the most

frequently found cause of accidents(18.2%); followed by “Technical Failure” and

“Inadequate Lookout” which accounted for 12.5% and 11.9%, respectively.

FINDINGS OVERALL PICTURE

Thank you for listening!