Imaginery and Imagination

8/18/2019 Imaginery and Imagination

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http://www.iep.utm.edu/imagery/

Imagery and Imagination

Both imagery and imagination play an important part in our mental lives. This article,

which has three main sections, discusses both of these phenomena, and the connection between them. The first part discusses mental images and, in particular, the dispute about

their representational nature that has become known as the imagery debate. The second partturns to the faculty of the imagination, discussing the long philosophical tradition linking

mental imagery and the imagination—a tradition that came under attack in the early part of

the twentieth century with the rise of behaviorism. Finally, the third part of this article

examines modal epistemology, where the imagination has been thought to serve animportant philosophical function, namely, as a guide to possibility.

Table of Contents

1. The magery !ebate

1. Two "iews #bout $ental mages% &ictorialism vs. !escriptionalism

'. The #rgument from ntrospection

(. )b*ections to &ictorialism

+. # emaining -uestion #bout &ictorial vs. !escriptional epresentation

'. #ccounts of magination

1. mageBased Theories

'. /onmageBased Theories

(. magination and &ossibility

+. eferences and Further eading

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1. The Imagery Debate

0onsider the following list of uestions%

• 2hat shape are a beagle3s ears4

• 5ow many windows are in your bedroom4

• 2hich is a darker shade of green, a pine tree or a fro6en pea4

• 2hen a person stands up straight, which is higher, her navel or her wrist4

• f the letter ! is turned on its back and put on top of a 7, what does the combination

remind you of4

2hen attempting to answer these uestions, which are adapted from &inker 8199:; andrand 0anyon and a photograph of the

>rand 0anyon. ntuitively, the two are similar sorts of representations. Both are pictures— only the latter is in a frame while the former is in my head.

This view of mental images, commonly referred to as pictorialism, is defended most

prominently by Fodor 819:=; and


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19?@; that it posits. f such pictures are nonphysical, then they are not made of the right

sort of CstuffD for use in a scientific conception of the mind. n order to avoid dualism, then,the pictorialist seems forced to suppose that these pictures in the head are located in the

brain. Enfortunately, this supposition is also problematic, as it is not clear that there are any

structures in the brain that could plausibly be construed as these physical pictures.

$otivated in large part by such worries, many philosophers and other researchers incontemporary cognitive science advocate an alternative view called descriptionalism.

#mong its most prominent defenders are !ennett 8199, 19:9; and &ylyshyn 819:(, 19:?;.

2hile pictorialists claim that mental images represent roughly in the way that pictures

represent, descriptionalists claim that they represent roughly in the way that languagerepresents. 0onsider a state of affairs where >eorge 2. Bush is seated to the right of !ick

0heney. )ne way to represent this situation is by drawing a picture of Bush and 0heney

with Bush sitting to 0heney3s right. #s we have seen, pictorialists claim that this providesus with a model for the way that mental images represent. But another way to represent the

same state of affairs is with a sentence such as, C>eorge 2. Bush is sitting to the right of

!ick 0heney.D !escriptionalists claim that this provides a better model for the way thatmental images represent.

/atural language descriptions, however, are by no means the only kind of representations

that count as descriptional in the sense intended by descriptionalists. n fact, for the

descriptionalists, a representation can count as descriptional even if it is not literallydescriptive of the states of affairs represented. 0onsider one such representation% the binary

language of a computer. n a computational system, a particular string of @s and 1s might

represent the above state of affairs. #lternatively, consider a representation of this state of affairs that proceeds by defining a certain operator, the C>5T)FD operator, that takes an

ordered argument pair% >5T)F8>eorge 2. Bush, !ick 0heney;. Gike the sentence

C>eorge 2. Bush is sitting to the right of !ick 0heney,D the binary representation and the

operator representation are clearly not pictorial in nature. )ne important reason is that theserepresentations do not look like what they represent. 2hat sets pictorial representations

apart from other representations is that they represent in virtue of having at least one visual

characteristic 8e.g., form, shape, or color ; in common with what they represent. Ao, for example, though a blackandwhite photograph can represent a pumpkin pictorially, a

drawing of a purple triangle cannot.

The dispute between the pictorialists and the descriptionalists, known as the imagery

debate, has generated considerable controversy and discussion in the last thirty years. #swe have seen, the imagery debate concerns the representative nature of mental images. The

descriptionalists challenge the pictorialists3 claim that mental images represent in a pictorial

way. Enfortunately, the imagery debate is commonly mischaracteri6ed as a debate over theexistence of mental images. !escriptionalists are often taken to be denying the existence of

mental images, while pictorialists are often taken to be defending their existence. 8Aee

Block 19?1a for discussion of this mischaracteri6ation.; The situation is exacerbated by thevery participants in the debate, who themselves often obfuscate the issue between them.

!ennett 819:9; describes the debate as Ca war between the believers and the skeptics, the

lovers of mental images H and those who decry or deny them,D and he freuently puts his

own position in terms of CabandoningD mental images. Gikewise, Fodor 819:=; cites

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empirical studies in an effort to Cargue forcibly for the psychological reality of images.D

The pictorialist, however, should really be seen as arguing for the psychological reality of

pictorial representation, which is also what the descriptionalist should be seen as

abandoning.

b. The Argument from Introsection

t is also important to note that the imagery debate is not a debate over whether we Cthink in

wordsD or Cthink in images.D To see this, it will be useful to consider the argument from

introspection that is directed at descriptionalism. 2hen we introspect, it seems to us that

our mental images look like what they represent. This introspective *udgment is often takenas definitive support for pictorialism, since pictorial representations look like what they

represent while descriptional representations do not.

Block 819?(; and Tye 81991; each argue persuasively that this argument should be re*ected.&roperly understood, the evidence from introspection can be seen to be neutral with respect

to the imagery debate. To see this, we need to distinguish the experience of imaging fromthe representation that underlies or accounts for this experience. 0onsider the following

analogy% Auppose you were to come across a box on whose surface was displayed a crude black and white image of a rabbit in a meadow. Iou might then ask% 2hat is going on

inside this box to account for the rabbitimage4 )ne possibility is that some sort of slide

pro*ector inside the box pro*ects the rabbitimage onto the box3s surface. f this were thecase, then what underlies the image would be a pictorial process. But another possibility is

that a computer inside the box produces the rabbitimage by way of binary code J strings of

@s and 1s that turn certain pixels on the surface of the box to black, certain pixels to gray,and so on, such that the rabbit image appears. f this were the case, then what underlies the

image would be a nonpictorial process.

#s this analogy suggests, the pictorialists claim that underlying the experience of mental

imagery is some sort of representation that is pictorial in nature while the descriptionalistsclaim that underlying the experience of mental imagery is some sort of representation that

is descriptional or linguistic in nature. By distinguishing between experiences and the

underlying representations, we undercut the force of the introspective *udgment that lies atthe heart of the argument from introspection, namely, that mental images look like what

they represent.

&ictorialists and descriptionalists alike thus accept that we sometimes think in images. n

other words, pictorialists and descriptionalists agree that we have certain imagistic

experiences, that we experience what we would call Cimaging.D 2hen we introspect, whenwe look within, it seems to us as if we are experiencing mental pictures. But the experience

is one thing, the representation that accounts for this experience another. The pictorialists

think that the introspective data should be interpreted *ust as it seems—our mindmanipulates representations that are pictorial in nature. The pictorialist view thus offers us a

unified conception of our experiences and the representations that underlie them. n

contrast, the descriptionalists think that the introspective data is misleading in a certain

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sense our experiences are not uite as they seem. nsofar as it seems to us that we have

certain mental representations that are pictorial in nature, we are the victims of an illusion.

n defending descriptionalism against the argument from introspection, Tye 81991; makesthe further point that all that introspection really suggests is that imaging is like perception%

Cto assert that a mental image of my brother, say, looks to me like my brother is merely toassert that my imagistic experience is like the perceptual experience undergo when viewmy brother with my eyes.D Kmpirical experiments have tended to confirm introspective

reports that imaging resembles perceiving. &erky 8191@; placed a number of people in a

room, facing a screen, and asked them to produce mental images of various ordinary

ob*ects on the screen. The sub*ects were not aware of the fact that, after they had reportedthat they were engaged in the reuested imaging 8of a banana, for example;, an image of a

banana was lightly pro*ected onto the screen. The pro*ected image was slowly increased in

intensity until, eventually, it was visible to any newcomer entering the room. /onetheless,the sub*ects never reali6ed that they were seeing an image of a banana. The only differences

that they noted in their sub*ective experiences were changes in the si6e and the orientation

of the banana they had been imaging. n this highly controlled setting at least, seeing wasmistaken for visual imaging.

#dditional empirical evidence strongly suggests that the mechanisms underlying imagery

and underlying perception are the same. 8For an overview of some such experiments, see

Finke and Ahepard 19?.; )ne set of important results was generated by iven the totality of the evidence, both introspective and empirical, it seems reasonable toassume that the representations underlying the experience of imagery are like the

representations that underlie the experience of perception. mportantly, however, the

representations that underlie the experience of perception may themselves be descriptional

in nature. Thus, without a theory of the nature of the representation underlying perceptualexperience, evidence connecting mental imagery with perception cannot be taken as

support for pictorialism.

c. !b"ections to Pictorialism

2hile the above considerations suggest that the argument from introspection should be

re*ected, they do not entail the truth of descriptionalism. Ao why would anyone embrace

descriptionalism4 )ne influential consideration, as noted earlier, comes from the seemingincompatibility of pictorialism and materialism. This problem, at least in part, is what


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Block 819?(; has called the No Seeum Objection% when we look in the brain, we do not see

any pictures.

)f course, when we look in the brain, we do not see any descriptions either. But, in contrastto the pictorialists, the descriptionalists seem to have an easy response to the /o Aeeum

charge. Aterelny 819?; notes that, since sentences are not mediumdependent, accountingfor descriptional representations in the brain is unproblematic% CAentences can come assound waves, marks on paper, electrical pulses, punched cards, and so on. 2hy not then as

patterns of neural firings as well4D

nterestingly, Block 819?(; argues that we can extend this sort of response to protect

pictorialism from the /o Aeeum ob*ection as well. To know whether you are looking at adescriptional representation, you must be familiar with the representational medium that is

in use. Block proposes that the pictorialist can adopt this same line of reasoning. 2hat

makes something the sort of representation that it is, regardless of whether it is pictorial or descriptional, depends in large part on the system of representation in which it functions.

Thus, until we know more about how the representational system of the brain works, we areunlikely even to be able to tell which structures in the brain are representations, let alone

what sort of representations they are.

!escriptionalism has also been thought to gain support from the Paraphernalia Objection

to pictorialism% even if we were to discover pictures in the brain, these pictures could not

play a role in our cognitive processes unless there were an internal eye to see the pictures,

and since there is no such internal eye, pictorialism must be false. 8Aee ey 19?1, Block 19?( for discussion of this ob*ection.; !ennett 8199; voices the &araphernalia ob*ection by

way of an apt analogy%

magine a fool putting a television camera on his car and connecting it to a small receiver under the bonnet so the engine could Lsee where it is going3. The madness in this is that

although an image has been provided, no provision has been made for anyone or anything

analogous to a perceiver to watch the image.

#ccording to the &araphernalia ob*ection, the pictorialist is like this fool. Block 819?(; and


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1. $ental images can be indeterminate with respect to visual properties 8e.g., the

number of stripes on a tiger;.

'. &ictorial representations cannot be indeterminate with respect to visual properties.

(. Ao, mental images are not pictorial representations.

!ennett3s second example attempts to show that mental images can be noncommittal in a

way in which pictorial representations generally cannot. 8Aee also Ahorter 19='. n what

follows, slightly modify !ennett3s example. Aee Block 19?1a for a discussion of why theexample needs modification.; Form a mental image of a tall woman wearing a hat and then

try to answer the following uestions% 2hat kind of hat was it4 2as she sitting or standing4

2as she indoors or outdoors4 2as she wearing shoes4 2as she wearing a watch4 Though

you can undoubtedly answer some of these uestions—probably you can tell what kind of hat the woman was wearing in your image, be it a beret or a cowboy hat or a baseball cap—

you were probably unable to answer some of the others. 2hen asked whether she was

indoors or outdoors, or whether she was wearing a watch, you probably did not haveenough information to answer the uestion. #nd this need not be because you imagined her

only from the neck up. Kven if you imagined her fullfigure before you, your image likely

did not go into sufficient detail to enable you to answer whether she was wearing a watch.

0onsider next a picture of a tall woman wearing a hat. !ennett argues that in a pictorialrepresentation of the woman, assuming that her wrists are in view, she must either be

depicted wearing a watch or not wearing a watch. The only way for the picture to avoid

addressing the issue would be to have something obscuring the woman3s wrists. This seemsto differentiate the representational nature of a mental image from the representational

nature of a picture. Iour image can be inexplicitly noncommittal about whether she is

wearing a watch, but a picture can only be explicitly noncommittal about it. 8Thisterminology derives from Block 19?1a.;

Finally, consider a written description of the woman. 0learly a description can be

inexplicitly noncommittal. Iour description might be very short, for example, which would

make it impossible to tell whether the woman was wearing a watch or not. !ennett thusconcludes that mental imagery has to be descriptional, and not pictorial, in nature.

n response to this example, Block 819?1a;, Fodor 819:=;, and Tye 81991; have each argued

that !ennett is operating with too narrow a conception of pictorial representation, accusing

him of committing the photographic fallacy. f we consider photographs, which are onekind of pictorial representation, then it might seem that !ennett is right% photographs are

incapable of being inexplicitly noncommittal about visual features. But consideration of

photographs does not show that pictorial representation in general lacks this option. n particular, consider children3s drawings or stick figures. n drawing a stick figure of a

woman, you might simply fail to go into the matter of the woman3s wristwear. There are

lots of different kinds of pictorial representation, and although both stick figure drawings

and photographs represent pictorially, they do so in very different ways. The pictorialists3claim that mental images represent pictorially should not force one to the position that


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mental images are like mental snapshots they might be more like mental stickfigure

drawings.

nterestingly, these points about the photographic fallacy do not protect the pictorialist fromthe striped tiger example. Aince there is a difference between being inexplicitly

noncommittal and being indeterminate, the fact that some pictorial representations, likestick figures, are able to be inexplicitly noncommittal about certain visual features does notshow that they can be indeterminate about these visual features. The descriptionalist might

argue that *ust as a photograph has to depict a determinate number of stripes on the tiger, so

too does a stickfigure drawing.

Fodor 819:=; suggests a way to deny the first premise of the above argument. t might bethat there is some definite answer to the uestion, Chow many stripes does my imagetiger

have4D but that cannot answer the uestion because images are labile 8changing

constantly, plastic; the problem is that we cannot hold onto our images long enough tocount the stripes. Eltimately, however, Fodor re*ects the second premise of the above

argument, suggesting that on blurry or outoffocus pictures there may not be a determinateanswer to the uestion, C5ow many stripes are there on the photograph4D 8Aee 5annay

19:1 for a similar treatment of the problem.;

#lternatively, the pictorialist might re*ect the move that !ennett seems to make from the

claim%

8a; cannot count the stripes on the tiger in my mental image

to the claim%

8b;The mental image is indeterminate with respect to the number of stripes.

Iour mental image might well be determinate without your being able to count the stripes.For example, if you only get a fleeting glance at an actual tiger, you are not going to be able

to count his stripes. 8Aee Gyons 19?+ for a suggestion of this sort.; But that does not entail

that the tiger has an indeterminate number of stripes.

#. A $emaining %uestion About Pictorial vs. Descritional $eresentation

#bove, in explaining the descriptionalist view, noted that descriptional representations

need not be literally descriptive. !escriptional representations are characteri6ed primarily

negatively, i.e., for the purposes of understanding the imagery debate, a representation willcount as descriptional as long as it is not pictorial. This assumes, however, that we have a

clear understanding of what makes a representation pictorial. Enfortunately, spelling outexactly what makes a representation a pictorial one—or, to put it another way, spelling out

the nature of depiction—turns out to be rather difficult.

t is standardly noted that a pictorial representation must have at least one feature in

common with what it is representing. /ot *ust any feature will do, so we will have to limit


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ourselves to visual features. Auppose that we could specify, without begging any uestions,

what a visual feature is. n any case, we can surely identify some uncontroversial examplesof visual features, such as color and shape, even if we cannot give a precise specification of

what makes something a visual feature. /onetheless, it soon becomes apparent that merely

sharing the visual feature of color with the thing represented seems insufficient to make a

representation pictorial. To take an obvious example, writing the noun CappleD in red ink does not make it a pictorial representation of an apple. 8Aee ey 19?1 and 5opkins 199=

for further discussion of the nature of depiction.;

n the absence of a clear characteri6ation of pictorial representation, some recent accounts

of mental images may seem difficult to classify as either pictorialist or descriptionalist. For example, Tye 81991; claims that his own view of mental imagery—which treats images as

interpreted, symbolfilled arrays—is a ChybridD one. Aince these arrays are in some respects

like pictures but in other respects like linguistic representations, Tye claims that his viewcannot be easily classified as either pictorialist or descriptionalist.

&. Accounts of Imagination

$ental imagery clearly plays a role in many mental activities. For example, memory often

proceeds by way of imagery. But no mental activity is more prominently linked with mentalimagery than that of imagining. n this section, will discuss different accounts of the

imagination, paying particular attention to the connections between imagery and

imagination.

a. Image'(ase# Theories

enM !escartes3 treatment of the imagination 81+'N19?+; is representative of a long

philosophical tradition that analy6es imagination in terms of mental imagery. #s he says inhis Meditations on irst Philosophy%

OPf want to think of a chiliagon, although understand that it is a figure consisting of a

thousand sides *ust as well as understand the triangle to be a threesided figure, do not in

the same way imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were present before me. HBut suppose am dealing with a pentagon% can of course understand the figure of a

pentagon, *ust as can the figure of a chiliagon, without the help of the imagination but

can also imagine a pentagon, by applying the mind3s eye to its five sides and the areacontained within them. #nd in doing this notice uite clearly that imagination reuires a

peculiar effort of mind which is not reuired for understanding.

&resumably, what he means by this Cpeculiar effort of mindD is the effort to produce an

image. n this way, !escartes sharply distinguishes the act of imagining from the relatedintellectual act of conceiving 8or, in his terms, the act of understanding;.

)n this understanding of the imagination, imagining is thought of as importantly analogous

to perception. This fits well with various experimental data 8notably, &erky 191@; and

corresponds to a long philosophical tradition of treating imagining as an inferior kind of

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perceiving. For example, Thomas 5obbes 81=1N19?; refers to imagining as Cdecaying

senseD and >eorge Berkeley 81:(+N19=; claims that sense perceptions are Cmore strong,lively, and distinctD than our imaginings.

This analogy between imagining and perceiving makes it natural to consider imagination as

a kind of perception with the Cmind3s eye.D #gain, !escartes3 discussion of the imaginationin the Sixth Meditation provides a representative example of this%

2hen imagine a triangle, for example, do not merely understand that it is a figure bounded by three lines, but at the same time also see the three lines with my mind3s eye as

if they were present before me and this is what call imagining. 81+'N19?+;

)f course, there are clear instances of imagining in which the mind3s CeyeD is not doing any

work at all, i.e., in which visual images are not involved. "endler 819?+; gives examplessuch as imagining the roar of the lion, imagining the smell of onions frying on a grill,

imagining the heat of the sun, imagining the pain in one3s molar. The imagebased account

thus must extend the notion of image to encompass imagistic representations from other sensory modalities. &resumably, there are counterparts to visual images for each of the

other senses—auditory images, olfactory images, and so on. The case of imagining the pain

in one3s molar can be dealt with in a parallel way. #lthough pain is not perceived by one of the five traditional senses, there is an analogue to sensory images that comes into play in

this case% what is often called an affective image.

Kven with this broad understanding of the notion of image, however, there are instances of

uses of the word CimagineD in everyday language that do not seem to involve mentalimagery. 0onsider cases where CimagineD is used to signal supposition 8or, even more

commonly, false supposition;, as when a parent who says, C imagined that my daughter

was in her room last night, when in fact now learn that she snuck out her bedroomwindow.D 0onsider also cases where CimagineD is used as part of various idiomatic

expressions, as when someone says, Cmagine thatQD in response to some surprising news.

Fortunately for the proponent of an imagebased account, such cases can be easily

dismissed. Aurely it is unreasonable to expect that we should have to accommodate everyordinary language use of CimagineD or its cognates when giving an account of the

imagination. 8But see 2hite 199@ for a contrary view.; ather, what we should focus on are

the cases where the imagination is actually being exercised and attempt to explain the

nature of such imaginative exercises. This is what the proponent of the imagebasedaccount attempts to do.

Ao let us focus on actual exercises of the imagination. #re there any such exercises in

which there is no mental imagery4 yle 819+9; answers in the affirmative. Though hegrants that acts commonly described as Chaving a mental pictureD of something are

instances of imagining, he argues that concentrating on these sorts of examples to the

exclusion of others gives us a misleading picture of what the imagination is. 0onsider%

1. a witness who lies when she takes the stand

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'. an inventor who contemplates the machine she is working on

(. a novelist working out the plot of her next book

+. a group of children who are pretending that they are bears.

n these cases, yle claims that the witness, the inventor, the novelist, and the children may be exercising their imaginations without accompanying imagery. 8n fact, the exercises of

the imagination that occur when the *udge listens to the lying witness3 story, the inventor3s

colleague comments on the new machine, someone reads the novel, and the mother ignoresthe growls emanating from the Cbears,D also might well proceed without imagery.; Think

about what is going on when a group of children Cplay bears.D They get down on their

hands and knees, growl at each other, probably rearrange the sofa cushions to make dens

for themselves, and so on—but while engaging in this activity, they need not producemental imagery of, say, furry paws and the snowbound den.

n response to yle3s discussion, the proponent of an imagebased conception of theimagination might argue that these cases conflate being imaginative with exercising the

imagination. But even if this suggestion covers the above cases, there are additional

examples for which the suggestion lacks plausibility. 2hite 8199@; suggests that Cwe can

imagine, or be unable to imagine, what the neighbours will think or why someone should

try to kill us, *ust as we can imagine that the neighbours envy us or that someone is tryingto kill us. Iet none of these imagined situations is something picturable in visual, auditory

or tangible terms and, therefore, none is something pertaining to imagery.D Gikewise,

although we can imagine >eorge 2. Bush playing the electric guitar, how 8assuming thatimagining reuires imagery; can we imagine his having a secret desire to be a rock and roll

musician4 2hat image could we produce to imagine, as 7ohn Gennon exhorts us to do, that

there3s no heaven4

n addition to dealing with counterexamples such as these, there are two uestions that any proponent of an imagebased account must answer%

81;2hat role does the image play in imagining4

8';2hat makes an imagining the imagining that it is4

magebased theories have often been saddled with an unfortunate answer to the first of

these uestions. First, once someone invokes mental images in an account of imagination,she appears to commit herself to the claim that such images are the ob*ects of our

imaginings—a highly implausible claim. 8For development of this argument, see "endler

19?+.; n brief, the problem with this view is that when imagine something, say >eorge2. Bush, my imagining is about >eorge 2. Bush, not about a mental image. The proponent

of an imagebased account thus must find some other way of answering uestion 81;.

nterestingly, imagebased theories have also often been saddled with an unfortunate

answer to the second uestion, namely, that the image involved in an imagining serves to


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individuate the imagining from other imaginings. The problem, however, is that imagery

seems neither necessary nor sufficient to make an imagining the imagining it is. The basicworry traces back to 2ittgenstein 819=(;, who wrote, C2hat makes my image of him into

an image of him4 /ot its looking like him.D 8Aee also Tidman 199+.; 0onsider the

following two examples from 2hite 8199@;%

)ne is imagining exactly the same thing when one imagines that, for example, a sailor isscrambling ashore on a desert island, however varied one3s imagery may be.

The imagery of a sailor scrambling ashore could be exactly the same as that of his twin

brother crawling backwards into the sea, yet to imagine one of these is uite different from

imagining the other.

#lthough proponents of imagebased theories have various options for answering both of these uestions 8see


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"endler contrasts two different kinds of imaginative exercises. First, imagine swimming in

cold water. /ext, imagine yourself swimming in cold water. n the first case, what you do isto imagine the salty taste of the water, the feel of the waves as they lap against you, and so

on. Iou put yourself in the water from the inside. "endler calls this subjective imagining. n

the second case, one thing you might do is to picture yourself in the water, so you see your

head bobbing in the waves, and so on. )nce again, you put yourself in the water, but in thiscase you do it from the outside. "endler calls this objective imagining.

/otice that can adopt the same ob*ective perspective in imagining someone else. can *ust

as easily imagine my sister or my husband swimming in the ocean as can imagine myself

swimming in the ocean. But sub*ective imagining works differently. There, con*ure up theexperiences that would be having if were in certain circumstances, and it seems that

can do this only about myself. n ob*ective imagining, imagine what someone, myself

included, would look like in a certain situation in sub*ective imagining, imagine what thesituation itself would feel like.

0learly, sub*ective imagining involves evoking experiences. 2hen imagine swimming inthe ocean, evoke experiences like feeling cold, being pulled by the current, and seeing the

shoreline. nterestingly, however, "endler argues that ob*ective imagining also reuires usto evoke experiences. 2hen imagine myself swimming in the water, am essentially

imagining the experience of seeing 8or hearing, etc.; myself swimming in the water. Thus,

ob*ective imagination ultimately reduces to a speciali6ed kind of sub*ective imagination.#ccording to "endler, the materials of both sub*ective and ob*ective imagination are

basically the same, namely, experiences. Both kinds of imagination are constructions out of

experiences, but the constructions proceed in slightly different ways% Cn the sub*ective casethe aim is to represent a consciousness, one3s own, or someone else3s, at a given point of

lifehistory. n the ob*ective case the purpose is to represent a thing as it appears in the field

of experienceD 8"endler 19?+;.

#dopting an experiential account has interesting conseuences for answering the uestion%2hat can we imagine4 The basic form of sub*ective imagining is C imagine Ring,D

suggesting that we can substitute any activity for R. But "endler does not believe that we

can. 0onsider being dead, or being sound asleep, or snoring while sound asleep. These areactivities, or states of being, that lack experiential content. #ccording to an experiential

account of imagining, it is a necessary condition on imagining performing a certain action R

8or imagining being in a certain condition 0; that there be an experiential content to Ring

8or to being 0;. Thus these are activities that "endler does not think we can imagine.

#n interesting corollary of this necessary condition comes out in Thomas /agel3s seminal

paper, C2hat is it like to be a bat4D 819:+;. Bats are mammals, and most of us would

probably share the intuition that they have conscious experiences, but bats perceive the

external world in a way that is radically different from the way we perceive the externalworld% they use sonar, or echolocation. They emit highpitched, subtly modulated noises

and then detect ob*ects that are in range on the basis of the reflections they detect. This

raises an interesting uestion% can we know what it is like to be a bat4 n attempting toanswer this uestion, /agel implicitly endorses the claim of an experiential account that we

can only imagine what we can experience as he notes, C)ur own experience provides the

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basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited.D Because /agel thinks

our imagination does not allow us to extrapolate to the experience of bats, he denies that wecan imagine what it is like to be a bat. This shows that on an experiential account, not only

must there be an experiential content to Ring 8or to being 0;, but also it must be the case

that the experiential content is in principle accessible to the imaginer.

#lthough the experiential account has some intuitive plausibility, the reduction of ob*ectiveimagination to sub*ective imagination reuires the proponent of the experiential analysis to

do some fancy footwork in response to certain occurrences of the word CimagineD that

come up in everyday speech. For example, it is uite common to say things like%

• Cmagine that there is life on $ars.D

• C can pretty clearly imagine why she married him.D

• Cmagine what would happen if the /#FT# treaty had not been signed.D

n each case, it seems as if we change the meaning of each of these mental exercises if we

insert the word Cseeing.D magining that there is life on $ars might not entail puttingmyself into the situation as observer, that is, it seems that it need not involve imagining

seeing that there is life on $ars. Aimilar points can be made about the other two cases.

To deal with this problem, "endler argues that the word CimagineD functions differently inthese cases from the way it functions in the cases of ob*ective and sub*ective imagination

that we3ve been talking about. n essence, "endler denies that these claims describe genuine

exercises of the imagination. 7ust as one might say C can pretty well see why she married

himD without implying that one was doing something with one3s eyes, one can say C can

pretty well imagine why she married himD without implying that one is doing somethingwith one3s imagination. n this case, it seems plausible to suppose that what is going on is

an exercise of reasoning rather than a perceptual or imaginative exercise. 8This recalls thestrategy used by the imagebased theorists to dismiss cases in which the word CimaginingD

seems to mean only supposition.;

There are, however, other cases that "endler may not be able to dismiss as easily. Aome of

these are the sorts of cases that threaten imagebased accounts—both imagebased theoriesand experiential theories have trouble accounting for apparently nonperceptual imagining,

as when someone imagines a solution to a problem. 2hite 8199@; suggests other examples

as well for example, one can imagine Csacrificing everything for one3s principles or selling

one3s birthright for a mess of pottage, without giving oneself a representation of anyexperiences.D )r, to use another of 2hite3s examples, suppose someone imagines giving up

all she has for love. t is hard for the experiential theorist to dismiss this as an exercise of mere reasoning, but likewise, it is not plausible to suggest that in such an imagining what

one is doing is imagining seeing oneself giving up all one has for love.

nterestingly, the fact that examples of the sort that threatened imagebased accounts

reappear in the context of experiential accounts suggests an important connection between


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these two types of accounts. Though imagebased accounts and experiential accounts

initially appear clearly different, in that they draw attention to different features that makean act an act of the imagination, it can be argued that the experiential analysis entails that

acts of the imagination will involve mental imagery. f such an argument were to succeed,

then the experiential account would ultimately collapse into an imagebased account. ecall

that "endler claims that the material of the imagination is imagined experience. The image based theorist might try to argue that these experiences can only be understood in terms of

imagery. Aimilar points might be made about other experiential theories. For example,

Gyons 819?; offers an experiential analysis according to which imagination is the CreplayDof perception. For Gyons, when someone imagines something, she does not form a mental

image but rather rehearses, reactivates, or replays the act of seeing that thing. But since, as

we saw above, empirical evidence strongly suggests that the mechanisms underlyingimagery and underlying perception are the same, the replay of perception will likely

involve imagery as well.

#s the foregoing suggests, even if experiential theories do not analy6e imagination in terms

of imagery, such theories may be thought at least implicitly to rely on imagery. Thus,insofar as mental imagery is ontologically problematic, such problems will likely confront

experiential theories as well as imagebased theories. )ntological worries about imagery

began with the rise of behaviorism in the early twentieth century. #s the mindbrain identitytheory gained currency in the 19=@s, worries about imagery grew, since the very existence

of mental images has been thought to raise an ontological problem for such theories. To put

the problem crudely, images are not the right sort of CstuffD for use in a scientific

explanation of the mind. This problem has engendered a strong antipathy for mental imagesin the second half of the twentieth century. 0orrespondingly, many of the mid to late

twentieth century theories of imagination, such as those offered by yle 819+9;, Ahorter

819=';, #rmstrong 819?;, and !ennett 8199;, are imageless theories.

yle3s theory, which is probably the most developed of the imageless theories, wasconstructed in direct reaction to the 0artesian view of imagining. yle worries that once we

think of imagining as a sort of seeing with the mind3s eye, we are inclined to suppose that

there exist things, mental images, that are seen with the mind3s eye. 5is goal is to preventthis natural move% Cthe familiar truth that people are constantly seeing things in their minds3

eyes and hearing things in their heads is no proof that there exist things which they see and

hearH.D 5is defense of this claim relies in large part on an analogy% 7ust as the fact that amurder is staged as part of a play does not entail that there is a victim actually murdered,

the fact that we see things with the mind3s eye does not entail that there are things actually

seen. This analogy also leads yle to a positive theory of the imagination. Aince an actor3sresemblance to a murderer can be explained by the fact that he is pretending to be a

murderer, and pretending to murder, we can also explain the similarity between the

imaginer and the observer by invoking the notion of pretense. $ore generally, yle claims

that imagining is a species of pretending.

yle is clearly right that there are similarities between imagining and pretending in

particular, there is what we might call an Cair of hypotheticalityD to both activities. But

despite such similarities, it seems a mistake to characteri6e the former sort of activity in

terms of the latter. #s yle characteri6es it, pretending is typically a performance intended

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to convince, while imagining is the sort of pretending that typically aims at convincing

oneself rather than others. But many cases of imagining involve no attempt at persuasion— even of oneself. 0onsider various different kinds of imagining% imagining one3s next dentist

appointment, imagining the pain of having a tooth pulled, or imagining the tooth itself. n

none of these imaginings must we suppose that the imaginer tries to convince herself of

anything. 2hite 8199@; critici6es yle3s analogy between pretending and imagining indetail, elaborating numerous differences between these two types of activities. 8Aee also

5amlyn 199+.;


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maginability claim% if something is imaginable, then it is possible.

Though these claims did not originate with 5ume—!escartes 81+'N19?+;, for example,

famously relied on the imaginability claim in his argument for dualism, drawing theconclusion that disembodiment is possible from the premise that disembodiment is

imaginable—he is the philosopher with whom they are most commonly associated. Thus, will refer to them *ointly as the "umean thesis.

$any different notions of possibility abound in contemporary philosophical discussion, sowe should be clear that the possibility invoked by the 5umean thesis is usually meant to be

a very weak one, namely, logical possibility. mportantly, logical possibility far outstrips

physical possibility what is physically possible is governed by the laws of physics, butwhat is logically possible is governed only by the laws of logic. 2ere the imagination

meant to be a guide to the physically possible, the imaginability claim would be

immediately problematic. $any physical impossibilities seem easily imaginable% mightimagine a *uggling pin remaining suspended in the air after having been thrown there, or

might imagine the eight ball remaining absolutely motionless after hit it with the cue ball.

Eltimately, it seems that an analogy to perception motivates the 5umean thesis%

imagination is supposed to give rise to knowledge of possibility as perception gives rise toknowledge of the actual world. )ur knowledge of the world in which we live is grounded

largely in perception. But, since we have no sensory access to what is not actually the case,

perception can afford us no real insight into nonactuali6ed possibilities. n contrast, the

imagination is not limited to what is actually the case. This feature of the imagination, incon*unction with the close connection between perception and imagination, is what seems

to lead us to rely on the imagination for knowledge of possibility.

n fact, we need only to reflect briefly on how we typically form modal *udgments to seethe force of the 5umean thesis. &resumably, we are convinced that it is possible for there to

be purple cows, and for humans to fly unaided by machines, as a result of our imaginings%

we can imagine a purple cow, and we can imagine humans flying without mechanical aid.

Gikewise, consider how we would determine whether round suares are possible, or whether it would have been possible for me to have been a fish. )ur conviction that these

are impossible states of affairs springs from our inability to imagine them. #s 5art 819??;

writes, C)ne3s own experience in settling modal uestions seems to show that theimagination plays a fundamental role.D

But despite this intuitive support for the 5umean thesis, there is legitimate reason to worry

about it. The unimaginability claim in particular has been thought to be especially

problematic. )ne problem derives from the fact that there is considerable variation amongindividuals3 imaginative capacities. 7ill might be able to imagine many things that 7ack

cannot, in which case it would seem clear that we are by no means entitled to infer from the

fact that 7ack cannot imagine something that it is impossible. Fortunately, this problem can be fairly easily resolved by interpreting CunimaginableD as something like Cunimaginable

by any human.D #nother problem is the fact that there might be features of human

psychology that make certain states of affairs in principle unimaginable by any of us. But if the unimaginability of a state of affairs is due solely to some psychological limitation on


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our part, then we would not seem to be *ustified in inferring the impossibility of such a

state. 8Aee 2hite 199@ Tidman 199+.;

$ost problematic, however, is that the limitation of the possible to the imaginable, particularly on an imagebased analysis of imagination, seems overly restrictive. nsofar as

the imagination cannot extend to nonsensory ob*ects and states of affairs, philosophersclaim that we should not draw conclusions about impossibility based on unimaginability.For this reason, the 5umean thesis is often interpreted as about conceivability rather than

imaginability, where conception is supposed to be an intellectual faculty. 8Aee Iablo 199(

Tidman 199+. But see 5art 19?? and


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Documents

Imaginery and Imagination