Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung

Center for European Integration Studies

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

“ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: WHOBENEFITS?”

By

Faith Omokegbe Gabriel

A thesis presented to the Center for European Integration Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

Master of European Studies – Governance and Regulation

to achieve the degree of a Master of European Studies

Bonn, 31 August 2017

First Supervisor: Prof. Stephen Calleya

Second Supervisor: Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt

ACRONYMS

EU European Union

EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System

FRONTEX European Border and Coast Guard Agency

FTFs Foreign Terrorist Fighters

GNA Government of National Accord

HRW Human Right Watch

IOM International Organisation for Migration

ISIS Islamic State

ILO International Labour Organisation

LADDER Local Authorities as Drivers for Development Education and Raising awareness

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

MSF Médecins sans Frontières

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MOAS Migrant Offshore Aid Station

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SAR Search and Rescue Operation

TCN Third Country National(s)

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UN United Nations

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms........................................................................................................................................2

1. Introduction..................................................................................................................................4

2. Methodical Approach...................................................................................................................7

3. Migration Overview....................................................................................................................8

I. The Historic Analysis of the Politics of Migration between Africa and Europe ...................10

II. A Survey of Illegal Migration ...............................................................................................11

4. Migration Routes in the Mediterranean ....................................................................................13

5. Types and Causes of Migration.................................................................................................16

6. A Survey of the Case of Italy.....................................................................................................24

I. Italy immigration policy style.................................................................................................27

II. The role of NGO on the Central Mediterranean sea vs code of conduct ..............................31

7. Illegal Migration as a Gateway to Security Threat....................................................................34

8. EU Policy on Illegal Migration..................................................................................................38

I. An assessment of EU policy as regards the Malta Declaration ..............................................41

9. Recommendations......................................................................................................................43

10. Conclusion..............................................................................................................................46

References.....................................................................................................................................49

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1. INTRODUCTION

From the map above1, the Mediterranean Sea connects three continents (Africa, Europe and the

Middle East), which is a complex sea “broken up by Islands, interrupted by peninsulas, ringed by

intricate coastlines”2. Over the years, this geographic proximity has increasing threats and

opportunities. Although, the strategic perspective can be viewed at least from four different

angles: “the Western Mediterranean from the Gibraltar to the Gulf of Sirte, linking southern

Europe to the Maghreb, the Adriatic sea linking Italy to the Balkans, the Aegean sea connecting

Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean basin” linking into the area of Israeli-

Arab ongoing conflict3. The Mediterranean is already a geo-strategic area where several roots of

insecurity threaten to escalate and put regional and international stability at risk. The regional

trends that need to be urgently addressed include “collapse of failed States, illegal migration, the

1 Source: https://www.welt-atlas.de/map_of_mediterranean_sea_4-634

2 In the words of Fernand Braudel, see Calleya 2013

3 Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area in the 21st Century, Stephen Calleya, Routledge, (2013) pp 4

4

increase of terrorists’ activities, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the proliferation of all types of

weapons and increasing state of economic disparity between the northern and southern shores of

the Mediterranean etc”4.

The absence of a security arrangement in the Mediterranean has resulted in a security vacuum in

this geo-strategically sensitive part of the world. This security vacuum creates opportunities for

forces of insecurity to strive with the proliferation of arms in a region “where military

procurement is already one of the highest in the world”5.Throughout history, the Mediterranean

has continuously been at the centre of international relations. The end of the Cold War led some

analysts to believe that the Mediterranean would be marginalised in global relations. The

enlargement of the EU towards the east, the rise of China in Asia, and the emergence of India

and Brazil as leading economic developing countries further cemented this perception (Calleya:

2013).

Also, it is the location of the more than six decade old conflict between Israel and Palestine. The

Arab Spring of 20116 has also unleashed a period of revolution that has further attracted

international attention to the Mediterranean. The long list of threats and risks that need to be

addressed and managed in a coherent manner requires an institutional design that can cope with

such serious demands. A more stable security situation across the Mediterranean can be achieved

with a better coordination between the multitudes of sub-regional groupings across the basin7.

Since the end of the Cold War and especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks, there has

been a continuous perception in Europe of a threat from the Middle East. Alarming headlines in

the international media focusing on instability in the Middle East and regular arrival of hundreds

of illegal migrants from the southern shores of the Mediterranean to Europe highlight such a

trend8. Also, the media has focused on the emergence of an Islamic jihad against the West, due to4Ibid pp 6

5Ibid pp 1

6 Started with Tunisia then other countries followed like Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen

7 Ibid ,pp 10

8 Ibid

5

the ever increasing number of illegal migrants that have sought to seek a better life in Europe by

crossing the Mediterranean.

During the first decade of the new millennium, negative perceptions of the Middle East have

been further fuelled by constant images of violence and terror activities including Islamic

extremists preaching hatred against the West (Iran, Lebanon), terrorists displaying contempt

from human rights (Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Israel), brutal dictators flush with billions of dollars of

oil money often seeking to purchase all types of weapons and Muslim leaders and lasses

determined to establish Islamic states with laws that go against secular Western standards of

civilisation9.

Nevertheless, there is an ever increasing threat of human trafficking through the Mediterranean

which is organised by criminal networks. These criminal networks are well organised, well

equipped and connected to security forces throughout the region. This is a €250 Million business

per year10 counting on the ‘fees’ collected by these criminal networks or human traffickers.

Addressing this issue is essential as the number of migrants is certain to rise in the decades ahead

as the sub-saharan state struggle to cope with the rising expectations of their respective

populations. For example, since the stepping down of Gambian President Yahya Jammeh after

22 years rule, this political shift has brought hope, peace and stability to Gambians wishing to

travel to Europe for a better life. Instead of traveling to Europe, they prefer to stay home to build

their economy. Data from the IOM shows a decrease of the Gambians since February 2017. A

constant revise of a forward and inclusive EU migration must be in view to tackle the roots

causes of illegal migration through the Central Mediterranean Sea. One should bear in mind that

the EU will need “20 million work force between 2010 – 2030 workers that its demographic

trends cannot produce” (Calleya: 2013).

Generally, the debates in Europe about migration have been profoundly influenced by the

refugee crisis. In 2015, 1,003,124 people were reported by IOM (2016) to have arrived in the EU

via the Mediterranean Sea routes with 3,771 people reported dead or missing. This ever

9 Ibid, pp 11

10 Ibid pp 14

6

increasing flow narrative is linked to national security matters and rise in terrorists activities in

Europe.

Thus, the term security has broad interpretations but for the purpose of this research work, the

focus will be in the words of Prof. Barry Buzan, security complex, which is defined as a “set of

States whose major perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security

problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved from one another”’11. The term security is

far more complex than the traditional realist politico-military perspective as developed by the

Copenhagen School. The more multidimensional nature of security required a more

comprehensive analytical lens through which security challenges could be examined and

addressed. It also introduced a constructivist approach to international security through the

concept of ‘securitisation’. The purpose of ‘securitisation’ is to reach a precise understanding of

who securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why with what results and

not least what conditions”12. In this regard, illegal migration through the Mediterranean Sea with

the increase in terrorist activities is seen as a security threats against European values, culture,

peace and stability rather than the economic views or the demographic imbalance concerns.

2. METHODICAL APPROACH

This research work is divided into 7 sections. Section 1 discusses migration overview in a

general sense of migration in the world, the historical analysis of migration between Africa and

Europe as dated back in the 1920s and a survey of illegal migration in Europe. Section 2 focuses

on the general overview of the three routes on the Mediterranean Sea and an analysis of

migrants, search and rescue mission and death tolls on the Sea. Furthermore, the focus of this

work is more on the central Mediterranean route leading to Italy. Section 3 discusses the two

categories of migration and the roots causes of migration to Europe and from Africa with

available statistics. Also, this section discusses why illegal migration is a problem. Section 4

analyses the case of Italy, looking at its transition period from being an emigration country to

immigration county as regards the effects played by illegal migration, regularisations of illegal

11 Ibid pp 1

12 Ibid

7

migration effects to the economy, immigration policy and style and the role of NGOs on the

Central Mediterranean Sea and the revised code of conduct for NGOs. Section 5 analyses the

fears and concerns as a result of illegal migration seen in Europe as a gateway to increasing

security threats. Section 6 discusses the EU policy on illegal migration with focus on its general

overview on this policy and then an assessment of Malta declaration as regards where reviews

can be applied. Then, section 7 given general recommendations to the problems identified on the

course of the research. Finally, this research work ends with conclusion of points raised.

Academic materials, official data from international organisations like UN agencies, European

Union, HRW, Amnesty International etc and reliable media sources which was verified from

official outlets were used to confirm recent happenings as regards the topic mentioned above.

For the purpose of work, illegal migrants will be used instead of irregular migrants which in

context refers to the same security threat.

3. MIGRATION OVERVIEW

In order to understand the context of this work, some essential background terms are defined.

According to IOM, “migrant is defined as any person who is moving or has moved across an

international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of

(1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what are

the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is”.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, “mixed migration flows means people traveling with

different background and motivation through same route, such as refugees, asylum seekers,

economic migrants, unaccompanied minors , environmental migrants, victims of trafficking and

stranded migrants”. Which is the case at the Mediterranean area today. The question of illegal

migrants is broadly interpreted by a sovereign state.

Emigration – means to leave one's country to live in another country. An emigrate is the person

performing the action of emigration. Immigration is the action to move to another country to live

permanently. An immigrant is the person performing the action of immigration.

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Since the existence of man, man has always move from one place to another in search of foods,

protection, better living conditions, better environmental conditions or better life. This is further

enhanced by globalisation and freedom of capital, persons, goods and services (4 Freedoms) as

in the case of the EU. As long as man lives on planet earth, migration will continue. The constant

question always arising are: will this movement be voluntary or involuntary and / or legal or

illegal migration. How will host countries handle these arrivals? The politics of implementation

of immigration policy as against economic and social benefits. The fear of Islamist terrorists as

an invasive agenda. Economic migrants seeking the status of refugees and asylum seekers. Who

really benefits from this movement, the state, the economy, the migrants or the citizens?

According to UNFPA, in 2015, 244 million people about 3.3 percent of world’s population lived

outside their country of origin in which most are economic migrants. According to International

Labour Organisation (ILO) nearly 73 percent of the working age migrant population were

migrant workers. This figures show the drive of migrants in search for better conditions is

predominately high and has fundamentally impacted the economic growth of various countries.

In the International Migration report (2015), high-income countries host more than two thirds of

all international migrants. These two thirds live in either Europe or Asia. In 2015, the figures of

international migration are as follows 76 million in Europe, 75 million in Asia, 54 million in

North America, 21 million in Africa, 9 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, and finally 8

million in the Oceania. Of the top twenty destinations of international migrants worldwide, 9

were in Asia, 7 in Europe, 2 in Northern America and 1 each in Africa and Oceania. The above

analysis explains why Europe will remain destination for migrants as a result of geographic

proximity to Africa and the Middle East and economic benefit derivatives.

In addition, it is interesting to note that migration has also become an important component of

population growth in countries where fertility has declined. According to UNFPA, in some parts

of Europe, migration is mitigating population declines related to low fertility and aging

population. Furthermore, migration is seen as an increasingly contributor to development.

Migrants make important contributions to the economic prosperity of their host countries and the

flow of financial, technological, social and human capital flow back to their countries of origin

9

helps to reduce poverty and stimulate economic development there as well. Thus, it is clear that

both emigration countries and immigration countries could be of great benefit to each other if

immigration policies are better managed and implemented coherently.

I. THE HISTORIC ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE

To answer the question of the historic analysis of the politics of migration between Africa and

Europe dating back to the 1920s during and after the World War One is analysed in the views of

Hansen and Jonsson (2011). Stating that after the war was the first time that European politicians

and diplomats negotiate on how to limit the number of Africans in Europe, while at the same

time recognising that Africans were needed, as soldiers, in Europe. Presumed demographic

‘imbalances’ (i.e. population surplus or deficit) have been used to justify vastly different

migration policies. But migration makes the EU’s relation to Africa exceptional also in a

historical sense. At that time, issues of migration were seen in the context of a co-European

colonial effort in Africa, which has been channeled to be at the benefits of Europe be it

emigration from Europe to Africa or Immigration to Europe. That is, European integration was

inseparably with the “Eurafrica project”. Still in the authors’ views, this historical dimension is

precisely what is lacking in existing scholarly analyses of European migration, which are usually

governed by a present day perspective. Stating also the existence of some hidden undefined

perceptive of the Eurafrican project, “an ingrained belief that the presence of Africans in Europe

was an absurdity, an offense, whereas the presence of Europeans in Africa was a necessity”

(Hansen and Jonsson, 2011:27). This vividly shows that the EU migration policies was largely

shaped by demographic projections to its benefits. Today, the reverse is the case with more

migrants coming from a continent that once was receptive to Europe. Even though, the question

of the legal and illegal migrants tends to fuel the debates on migration from Africa. However, EU

insists its engagement in Africa is guided by “interdependence” and commitment to a “mutually

beneficial partnership of equals” that will promote development, economic growth, democratic

governance, human rights, peace and prosperity in the continent.

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In addition, in Brussels - 1951, the provisional intergovernmental committee for the movement

of migrants from Europe was created, today called (the International Organisation for Migration,

IOM). In 1950s, Robert Rochefort (1954) states that, Robert Schuman's former chief of Cabinet

and diplomatic Counsellor to the Intergovernmental committee for the movement of migrants, a

coordinated effort was needed to help overcrowded, Austria, West Germany, Italy, Greece and

Netherlands to encourage its population to resettle in Africa. Of course, a plausible reason for

the preference may be because of Eurafrican project which was defined as a political project

(Hansen and Jonsson (2011).

According to Jean Fremigacci (2005),states that African leaders were fiercely opposed to this

invasion which will deprive native working class of work and to avoid some degree of racism.

Hansen and Jonsson explains that the historic analysis of the politics of migration involving

Africa and Europe was based on demography projections and seen more like the “servant of neo-

colonial system of unequal exchange”.

On a contrary, today, the politics of immigration in the EU have become increasingly associated

with other issues such as national security and terrorism especially with the presence of radical

Islam as a major threat.

II. A SURVEY OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

An illegal immigrant is a person who either enters a country illegally, or who enters legally but

subsequently violates the terms of their visa, permanent resident permit or refugee permit.

Geddes and Scholten (2016) explains that illegal migration means migration that is not

authorised by migration laws and policies in destination countries. It is important to note that it is

not so much the personality or character of the individual migrant - for example, an asylum

seeker or a high skilled labour migrant or a low skilled worker - that matters in immigration

policy, but rather the ways in which they are viewed by institutions and organisations in the

countries to which they move. These can then shape wider social perceptions of the value of

migration and migrants irrespective of the actual qualities, skills and attributes that they possess.

The authors further argue that defining immigration and immigrants are political matter, which

11

lies with the sovereign state which is mostly based on the political, economic and social needs of

the State.

The fear of illegal migrants in host countries is expressed by Jahn and Straubhaar (1999), stating

that illegal migrants are not registered in official records, thus they avoid contact with

government and formal sectors. Also, illegal migrants break laws and rules and clearly challenge

the credibility of judicial systems and confidence in constitutionally derived power and authority.

Their presence also conflicts with public transfer systems. Illegal foreign workers do not pay

direct income taxes, but on the other hand use public goods or publicly subsidised services like

schooling or medical treatment or their children. ‘Illegal’ compete with ‘legal’ for job

opportunities but have the possibility to avoid certain obligations, cost, taxes and fees

compulsory for legal workers. These legal, economic and social provocations make it easily

understandable that politicians and voters are not willing to accept the phenomenon of illegal

migration. In contrast, the authors expressed that most of the data on illegal migration are

sometimes politically biased and misused.

The prevailing issues about illegal migration is as a result of the crude law of demand and supply

that plays out in specific sectors of economy as will be discussed in the case of Italy. This

situation can be reversed only if the formal system is able to produce and distribute the goods

and services required by all members of the society then can informal solutions be less relevant

and thus less pervasive. In addition, the strong perception that, the supply of and demand for

illegal foreign workers create an economic market for illegal migration. And a political market

for the supply and demand of border controls and labour market regulation as in the case of most

southern European countries remains an open debate (Baldwin-Edwards & Arango, 1999). This

further shows that the solution starts in bridging the gap between the supply and demand with

legal migrants.

In addition, the behavioural pattern of illegal migrant as analysed by Baldwin-Edwards (1999)

which is categorised into four groups. First, migrants can enter a country illegally by crossing

border, either by avoiding border controls or sometimes with the help of smugglers and labour

trafficking or by using false documents. Second, migrants might have entered the country legally

12

but they stay illegally; either they entered with a tourist visa but did not leave and overstayed, or

they entered as asylum seekers and stay even if their application has been rejected. Third,

migrants might have entered legally, they might live under regular conditions but they could lose

their legal status as a consequence of administrative or political changes in granting residence

permits. The same might happen to refugees once they lose their status because their country of

origin has moved back to more peaceful conditions with no danger to life for minorities. Thus,

they are no longer granted a permit to stay and they become illegal if they do stay. Fourth,

migrants could enter legally, stay legally, but they might work illegally. It is important to

establish that Illegal work does not concern foreigners only. Similarly, citizens are active in the

underground economy or work illegally without declaring it, in order to avoid social security

contribution and income taxes.

4. MIGRATION ROUTES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

According to the International Organisation of Migration13 (IOM), 116,692 migrants and

refugees entered Europe as at 6 August 2017 by sea with almost 85 percent arriving Italy and

other Greece, Cyprus and Spain. This is compared with the 263,446 arrivals across the region

through 6 August 2016 as seen in the table below.

TOTAL ARRIVALS BY SEA AND DEATHS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 2016 - 2017

1 JANUARY – 6 August 2017 1 JANAURY – 6 August 2016

Country ofarrival

Arrivals Deaths Arrivals Deaths

Italy 96438 2,240 (Central Med.route)

99727 2,713 (Central Med.route)

Greece 11713

45 (Eastern Med. route)

160888 383 (Eastern Med.route)

Cyrus 358

(as of 8/07)

345

13 See weekly update of IOM migration flow

13

Spain 8,183 120 (Western Med.route)

2,476

(as of30/06/16

97 (Western Med.route)

EstimatedTotal

116692 2405 263436 3193

Data on deaths of migrants complied by IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre.All numbers are minimum estimates. Arrivals based on data from respective governmentsand IOM field offices.

Looking at the data, shows that there is a slightly (3.3 per cent) fewer in the numbers of migrants

in comparison with the previous year. IOM observes that there is slower traffic to Italy during

mid-summer, and fewer deaths. This narrative of 'invasion' and ever increasing mixed migration

is echoes by the fear of terrorists and political interest. Jahn and Straubhaar (1999) expressed that

most of the data on illegal migration are politically biased and misused, which is echoed in the

case of Italy. Furthermore, the authors argue that, some countries might have incentives to

record exaggerated figures to get international financial assistance or to legitimise political

actions against illegal migrants. Other countries might be afraid of high figures because they

could transmit the signal to foreigners that it is relatively easy to be an illegal migrant in that

particular country. A practical example is the case of Italy calling for burden sharing of migrants

from the Mediterranean in July 2017 or else they will give these migrants temporal visas to entry

other EU countries, because their facilities have been overstretched. Also, complaining that other

Member states have left them alone to suffer with the refugee crisis. A country with a high

tolerance is more likely to be affected by illegal immigration than under similar conditions with

strict enforcement of immigration laws.

Over the years, migration routes in the Mediterranean Sea have evolved and according to

FRONTEX there are three main routes namely: the central, western, and eastern Mediterranean

routes.

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Central Mediterranean Route has continually received migration influx since 2008 and tagged

the most tragic route with high numbers of causalities heading to Italy from Libya. Though there

was a drop of migrants in 2015 as a result of the Syrians shifting to the Eastern Mediterranean

route and shortage of boats by smugglers. The Smuggling networks is well established in Libya,

which remains the point of departure by sea to Europe. Even though there is a long antecedents

until 2010. The nation prosperity gave good job opportunities to migrants from African

countries. However, with the collapse of Gaddafi regime in August 2011, the flow almost

entirely stopped. By 2013, smugglers network had reorganised and took advantage of the failing

state of Libya without law enforcement to continue their criminal activities. Migrants mostly on

this route are from Tunisia, Nigeria, Somalia, Eritrea and Sub-Saharan countries. Illegal border

crossings on the Central Mediterranean route also includes disembarkation at Apulia and

Calabria. Illegal migration via Libya is entirely dependent on the services provided by smuggling

network.

Western Mediterranean Route is the Morocco to Spain route by sea. In 2015, thousands of

sub-saharan migrants tried to climb over the fence in the Spanish enclave of Melilla. Illegal

migrants on this route fluctuates between 6,500 - 10,231 from 2008 to 2016, as a result of

various measures put in place to curb the influx. It is worthy to note that this route also faces

challenges with drug smugglers and cocaine dealers towards a lucrative market in the EU. The

different measures used to curb the flow are as follows: cooperation between Spain and

Morocco, bilateral agreements with Mauritania and Senegal which includes a repatriation

agreements, more coastal patrols and installed maritime surveillance system along its southern

border. Migrants through this route are from Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria and Mali.

Eastern Mediterranean Route has seen an increasing number of migrants, in 2015 over

885,000 migrants arrived EU through this route. Due to the increasing wars and conflicts in the

Middle east is the reason for the outburst of the influx. The vast majority arrives on several

Greek Islands, especially on Lesbos. Throughout 2015, Frontex deployed more officers and

vessels to the Greek Islands to assist in patrol and registration of migrants. In December 2015,

Frontex launched Poseidon Rapid Intervention to assist Greek authorities after a request. Most

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migrants from this route originate from Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia and small amount from sub

Saharan Africa. The EU – Turkey agreement has also help to reduce the influx through this

route.

UNHCR data for midyear report of 2016 shows that Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have received

much higher numbers of people fleeing conflict than EU member States. UNHCR further reveals

that 2.8 million refugees live in Turkey, 2.8 million in Lebanon and 755,892 in Jordan. In

contract, to EU which now host 2.1 Million refugees (Geddes and Schloten; 2016).

With focus on the central Mediterranean route and reason for these illegal migration shows that

Illegal migration will remain a major security issues for quite some time to come, if the disparity

between this regions is not addressed. Recently, the common assessment of the issue has

evolved. It is now considered a common issue, not Europe against the Mediterranean partners,

but rather an issue where all regional partners will collectively have to fight criminal networks of

major importance. Therefore, there is a need for a dialogue at a political level, between the EU

and the South of the Mediterranean and between the sub-Saharan Africa (Calleya: 2013).

5. TYPES AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION

Migration is broadly categorised into voluntary migration and forced migration. From the table

below in a glance, one can see the pull and push effect of the types of migration.

VOLUNTARY MIGRATION

PUSH FACTORS TYPES PULL FACTORSJoblessness; bad

working conditions / bad

pay

Labour migration New work / job; Better

conditions / pay

Sinking living

standards /poverty;

(general situation of

poor countries)

Economic migration Social stability / affluence

(example of rich country)

16

FORCED MIGRATION

PUSH FACTORS TYPES PULL FACTORSReligious / ethnic

conflicts; persecution;

xenophobia; human

rights violation

Political / Civil war Refugees Safety and freedom from

persecution, human rights abuse,

or generally from violent

conflicts

Heavy environmental

damage; drought:

hunger, health risk

( Egypt 96% dessert)

Environmental refugees Safe Haven: security of

nourishments and / or health

Endangered basic needs /

poverty

Economic refugees Social stability / Security

survival

Under international law as stated in 1951 Geneva Convention on the rights of stateless people to

which all EU member states are signatories gives forced migrants who are fleeing persecution

protection. On a contrary, only a small number of international migrants fall within the remit of

this convention. Migration policy is made within institutional settings that do not always

facilitate the translation of policy objectives into policy outcomes (Geddes & Scholten: 2016).

An interesting debate is, are migrants voluntary or forced if they leave their countries as a result

of unemployment and poverty? Should economic migrants be treated as forced migrants or

priority should be given to forced migrants than economic migrants? This creates a perception

that the flexibility on immigration policy depends solely on the economic and political situation

of the host country.

This is due to the fact that there is a thin line between formulation of policy objectives and

implementation, there exist the political decision making process with 28 Member states who

might agree or disagree on the migration policy. For example, the Czech Republic, Hungary,

Slovakia and Romania never agreed to relocation of the 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece,

17

Italy and Hungary to other EU member state but were outvoted due to the decision making

process (Geddes & Scholten: 2016). Even though their votes were outweighed, their position is

still fixed on this issue on the acceptance of migrants and that why the problems persists today

even the infringement procedure levied against them, their refusal to take these migrants in the

name of resettlement still stands.

To answer the question of the tackling the roots causes of migration is discussed in three

category namely: demographic imbalances of a country, the economic and social effects and

finally the political instability and conflicts.

Demographic imbalances: from the 1920s onward, on the continents has been used to authorise

vastly different policies of migration management. Similarly, EU has always wanted to import

labour from Africa but the EU also wants full liberty of choice in deciding who and how many to

admit so as to effectively organise migrants to those sectors presently lacking labour shortages.

Also, the EU's migration policy towards Africa at the early stage is not of EU- African win-win

dynamics and African development gains, but rather of how Brussels, in a practical sense,

believes itself capable of generating a win-win dynamics between its own security-oriented fight

against illegal migration on the one side, and its neoliberal for growth and competitiveness on the

other. In the 1930's during the economic depression, Africa was discussed as a solution for

Europe's problem of overpopulation in the view of the Philosopher Max Grunewald (1935;

Hansen and Jonsson: 2011). Guernier (1933); Hansen and Jonsson (2011) suggested a three step

strategy to reduce the overpopulation in Europe: First to select the brightest brains and send them

to Africa to draw up concrete plans and projects of development. Then these elites will prepare

ways for “troupes de choc”, like engineers, contractors, entrepreneurs, builders to 'improve the

standard of life in Africa'. The final stage with the 'Eurafrican order' is mass migration of an

annual 500,000 people between the ages 30 to 50 years about twenty million people to Africa

(Hansen and Jonsson 2011). However, today the reverse is the case with the decline of the

working age group in the EU more intake of labour migrants from poor countries are needed to

meet the overall economic growth, the functioning of the internal market and competitiveness of

the EU enterprises (Hansen and Jonsson: 2011).

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According to the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2016), In order to assess the

growing demographic imbalance in Europe a diversity of data was observed such as the

economic performance, population age composition, employment levels for young people,

women and older persons, investment in research and development and also pollution of the

atmosphere with carbon dioxide, a climate gas . Stating that all countries in the EU are faced

with problems that they need to solve, some have good ideas. But others are with no possession

of 'a magic formula' for the growing demographic imbalances.

Furthermore, the assessment shows that best scores were given to regions in northern Europe,

which is led by Iceland with the high fertility rates, exceptionally prosperous and highly

developed nation. Also, Stockholm, Oslo, Ireland, UK, Benelux countries, and France,

Germany's southern regions, Austria, some regions in northern Italy and northeastern Spain have

relatively stable demographic structure as well as high aggregated value added, good education

and impressive employment levels. In contrast, remote rural regions scored low rating for

instance southern Italy or Greece are affected with low fertility rates, massive outward migration

of young people and marked the aging of the remaining population.

Due to low fertility rates in Italy and Germany, they will thereby need the highest net rates of

immigration to maintain their working-age population at a constant level. The more equality

given for both men and women in working life, the more children are born. Education is the most

important capital to provide jobs in Europe. University graduates are less likely to be

unemployed than people with low education levels, and unskilled workers account for a

particularly high share of the long term unemployed.

One special challenge facing European societies is immigrant qualification and levels of

integration, which remains a relevant aspect of the migration policy that needs to be addressed.

According to the UN world population projection suggests that Africa has the highest population

growth rate, and between 2015 and 2050, Africa is expected to account for more than half of the

world's population. A good indication for the reason of the ever increasing flow from Africa to

Europe is as a result of rise in unemployment, rise in poverty, low standard of living, political

instability and unattractive economic benefits.

19

However, migration can contribute to reducing slowing the long-term trend towards population

aging. Because international migrants14 tend to comprise larger proportions of working-age

persons compared to the overall population which is a positive net migration. In addition,

supporting entrepreneurial investment in Africa and Europe will address the increasing rising

unemployment rate which answers to the rising poverty level and low standard of living.

Economic and social problems: according to International Migration report 2015, of the 157

million international migrants born in a middle income country, nearly 49 per cent were residing

in a high-income OECD country, 28 per cent in a high-income non-OECD country, 20 per cent

in another middle-income country and 3 per cent in a low-income country. Migrants from high-

income OECD countries were primarily residing in other high-income OECD countries (83 per

cent), while migrants from high-income non-OECD countries were almost evenly split between

high-income OECD countries (46 per cent) and middle-income countries (49 per cent). Over half

of all migrants originating from low-income countries were living in a middle-income country

(57 per cent), compared to 19 per cent in high-income OECD countries, 5 per cent in high-

income non-OECD countries and 19 per cent in other low-income countries. This clearly shows

that inequalities of income and wealth is essentially the drive for economic migration. That is the

gap between the rich and poor and the gap between the rich countries and poor countries will

continue to contribute to reason for migration. Migration is a phenomenon that comes about

wherever there is an economic, political or social differential between region of origin and region

of destination. The above statistics further shows that people naturally move to countries where

they find the best economic benefit.

Jahn and Straubhaar (1999) explain the economic answer of illegal migration is categorised into

two points. First point is based on the response to inefficient (too costly) market regulations

which favours illegal migration. Stating that some migrants and some employers think it is

“economically beneficial to break laws” then to bear the consequence of fines or punishment

which is based on the microeconomics of the market of illegal immigrants. This further shows,

there is an oversight of people willing to enter income countries. For whatever reason, ‘the

14 Migrants crossing borders to work and live

20

already there's’ (natives, former immigrants) do not want to accept open borders and free

immigration. They define an immigration law, declaring who is able to enter, stay and work and

what would be the consequences of breaking the law. To become illegal workers in reality, there

is also a need for a demand for illegal foreign workers. Second point focuses on the “optimal

degree of illegal migration is greater than zero”. This means that beyond a certain level the costs

of avoiding illegal migration by control measurement becomes more expensive than the damage

that is caused by illegal migration. Therefore, it is cheaper for a society to accept some illegal

migrants but to ‘save’ the exorbitant cost of ‘complete’ border controls or the negative impacts if

an extremely severe enforcement of internal controls. This further shows the politico-economic

approach for the host country. Politician or the law makers choose an immigration policy to the

country’s economic benefit. The authors further stressed that, those winners from legal and

illegal immigration tend to be skilled workers and owners of capital. In the views of the analysts,

if immigration law is to be enforced the bargain is usually between skilled workers, owners of

capital and unskilled native workers (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango: 1999).

The obvious explanation for the tolerance of illegal immigrants is a non-traded benefit as a result

of their services into a specific sector. With increasing illegals entering the economy, the supply

of labour in that sector will increase and therefore wages will decrease. These lower labour costs

are of benefit to the rest of the society which therefore tolerates those illegal immigrants. Using a

cross country approach (Bratsberg: 1995), shows that illegal immigration flows are more

sensitive to changes of GNP per capita than legal immigration. Therefore, illegal immigration

depends even more than legal migration flows on the economic conditions in the sending and

receiving countries. Consequently, it can be seen as a very flexible reserve of labour.

The fundamental element in understanding the determinants of illegal immigrants is the

behaviours of employers and measures taken by the government. Employers of illegal

immigrants can face severe penalties such as money fines, when they are detected by internal

controls. However, other forms of punishment also exist such as exclusion from public contracts.

Consequently, employers hire illegal immigrants up to the point where the marginal benefit for

them is equal to the marginal expected loss when such behavior is discovered. For wage setting

21

this means that illegal will get a salary below their marginal productivity and below the wage

paid to legal workers.

The fact that the economically optimal level of illegal immigration is greater than zero stresses

the need for a specific policy on illegal immigrants. Some illegal immigration is beneficial, too

much is not. Illegal migrants have some qualification not possessed by legal migrants and they

will take job opportunities not taken by legal workers and will do other jobs more cheaply. So, at

least for a certain level of illegal immigrants, they will increase the welfare of the receiving

countries as a whole. As the benefits are not equally distributed in the society, a bargaining

procedures will decide to what extent illegals are accepted and how severe should be controls

and punishments. Since in the 80’s the economic analysis of illegal migration have concentrated

on either the employment impacts of illegal immigration (international migration legal or illegal)

or on the effects of illegality (focus on the analysis of illegal work as in the underground

economy), does not matter if workers are citizens or foreigners.

To the answer the question, why illegal immigration to date is a problem is categorised into five

points. First, Illegal immigrants do not receive or pay into the national social security system.

Unlike illegal immigrants, legal immigrants are integrated into the economy. Therefore, illegal

immigrants’ direct impact on publicly financed activities is clearly negative. This is the case in

Italy, Spain, and Greece. Illegal immigrants use public welfare programmes, education or

medical treatment without paying taxes. Therefore, there is an increase on tax burden of natives

and legal immigrants. Second, a rather legalistic string of arguments builds on the assumption

that a state cannot tolerate illegality with its jurisdiction. If it does so, it suffers a decline in its

legitimacy which spills over to other areas (eg tax honesty). This argument says that the state

must enforce all given laws, however, it does not explain how the laws come into existence.

Third, Illegal immigrants are often pushed into the areas of the shadow economy. There is much

concern that they tend to commit more criminal acts than other foreigners because they have less

to lose and are more ready to accept risks. Hence, this line of arguments says that illegal

immigrants commit more crimes and make life for natives and legal immigrants more dangerous.

Fourth, Illegal immigrants are subject to exploitation, because they have 'weak legal position'

22

which gives them a lesser bargaining positions. Arguments of this kind are often incorporated

into systemic theories of migration. For instance, in the case of producing tradable goods

(manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, mining, trade, hotels, transport and utilities etc sector),

exploitation of foreign labour takes place in the foreign country, in the case of non-tradable

goods (construction, finance and real estate, barber shop, salons and Public services), cheap

labour is imported into the industrialised country. Fifty, there exist the competition of legal

immigrants and minorities on the labour market with illegal immigrants. As long as this trends

continues, it reduces the opportunities for those who follow the rules (Baldwin-Edwards and

Arango:1999)

Political instability and conflicts in many countries of the Mediterranean region tend to

encourage the flow of illegal immigration. As already discussed in the introductory section that

the geographical proximity of these continents then to drive migrants to the safest continent at

the moment. For example, in the past, Arab-Israeli conflict, war in Algeria and the Gulf War; and

the ongoing conflicts war in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and the spread of Islamic

fundamentalism has cause migrants to migrate to Europe, which seems to be the safest for now.

Moreso, after the horrific attack of September 11, 2001 and the Arab Spring 2011 in the North

Africa, the Middle East has never been the same with the continuous military intervention by

NATO members and terrorists attacks. This fight against terrorism has led to increasing

refugees’ crisis and different cells of terrorist groups growing in Europe. For instance, the Spain

van terror attack in August 2017 was organised by a terrorist cell unit in Spain in which the

perpetrators are mostly Moroccans, even though ISIS claims victory further shows the spread of

Islamic fundamentalism into Europe. Even though these young children were raised in Spain,

they were still radicalised by the Imam at the Mosque who resided in Spain (Albdelbaki Es Satty,

a Moroccan born preacher who accidentally died in Alcanar, trying to manufacture explosives)15.

This picture shows vividly that extreme measures are necessary to monitor those under

surveillance, the preaching by Imams, online and offline materials of radical Islam.

Furthermore, environment degradation as a result of wars and climate changes make these

countries inhabitable and encourages migration.

15 See article on RT, Imam suspected of organising Spain attacks avoided deportation, was labeled 'no threat',

23

6. A SURVEY OF THE CASE OF ITALY

A brief history of immigration policy in Italy can be dated back in the 1950's and 1960's, where

there was large scale emigration from Italy to other European countries with an estimates of 8 to

10 percent of population relocating. The transition to being immigration country began in 1980's

and accelerated in the 1990's accompanied by the development of immigration policy. Italy was

once an emigration country that moved to immigration country. According to Jahn and

Straubhaar (1999), there has been an expansion of an Italian underground economy since 1984

and half a million illegal foreigners are illegal workers.

History has shown that workers from Italy were an important component of the 'reserve army' of

labour that fueled post-war economic reconstruction in countries such as Belgium, France,

Germany and Switzerland. It was also at the pressing of the Italian government that free

movement for workers was developed as a core EU principle in the 1950s. (Geddes and

Schloten; 2016). These perspectives shows that the migration has its positive benefits to a nation

if managed well. Looking at the world in a broader sense, migration has made tremendous

impact economically and socially to the existence of a nation state. Though there are pressing

question that still need insightful views, the question of legality and illegality after deriving the

benefits from these people. When the negative impacts outweighs the positive effects, what can

be done? Should the media hike of 'invasion' and terrorism be analysed objectively?

There is no doubt that Italy is considered a 'Frontline' country because of its geographical

position to the Mediterranean Sea. It has been an increasing terrifying experience for migrants

crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya with rubber dinghy, overcrowded boats recording

high numbers of death. Among other tragedies, for example in October 2013, more than 360

men, women and children mainly from Eritrea, Somalia and Ghana died 120 kilometers off the

coast of Italian Island of Lampedusa. This tragedy shows the negative effects of risk involved

crossing the Mediterranean.

According to Geddes and Scholten (2016), the two important ideas that is clear in European

immigration politics are as follows; first, Italy is under siege from migrants and criminal gangs

24

that facilitate their movement. Second, Italy is at a geographical porous southern border and a

gateway to the rest of the EU. These narrative is played out in domestic politics and have

encouraged xenophobic Lega Nord (Northern League) led by Matteo Salvini in EU politics. In

July 2017, a group called 'Defend Europe’, believe that NGOs search and rescue missions in the

Mediterranean act as a “pull factor,” encouraging migrants to take to the sea because they know

they will be rescued and carried to Europe. They claim these NGOs “are working as water taxis,

ferrying migrants from the Libyan shore to Italy, and basically cooperating with human

traffickers. Although, 'Defend Europe' claim they will rescue and return migrants back to Africa.

It is interesting to note that through crowdfunding they were able to raise more than $150,000 to

charter a 130-foot ship called the C-Star, which they plan to use to monitor the rescue missions

in the Mediterranean. However, the hire ship had a technical fault and halt operations16. Migrants

are drawn to Italy due to social and economic transformation. A vivid picture is given by Geddes

and Scholten (2016) stating that in 1990, only 100,000 resident foreign citizens lived in Italy but

by 2012 there was increase to 4.3 million. However, the post 2008 economic crisis had powerful

effects on Italy, which led to further emigration to other European countries.

In addition, the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors that benefit from illegal immigrants are,

industry, construction, agriculture, hotels and restaurants, housekeeping, street-hawking and self-

employment: this involves a range of activities including prostitution which is predominate in

Italy (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango:1999).

To respond to the question of informality and illegality in Italy; a person can be employed in a

building site or as a domestic worker either formally (taxes and social contribution paid) or

informally (taxes and social contribution unpaid). Looking at the statistic given by Geddes and

Scholten (2016) of contribution of the informal economy in Italy from 1999 to 2007 show an

estimate of 27 percent of national income. This compared to estimates of 12.5 percent, 15

percent and 16 percent in Britain, France and Germany respectively, shows the economic

benefits derived from informality.

16 See article, This group wants to ‘defend Europe’ from migrants at sea,

25

Geddes and Scholten (2016) argue that the advantages of informality and illegal migration arise

from a tradeoff between the lower costs from employers who avoid tax and social costs and the

benefits from migrants who obtain employment and earn more than they would in their country

of origin. For States, the tolerance of some informality can be less costly than strict controls and

tight social regulation.

According to Baldwin-Edwards (1999), there are three preconditions to large workers in the

underground country in the southern Europe which includes Italy. First, the coexistence of high

and low productivity sectors, partially corresponding with the urban-rural division. Second, the

rapid transfer of indigenous workers from high to low productivity sectors, often through internal

migration. Third, a rapid decline in the rural population in the 1970s to date. This clearly show

that these economic sectors cannot raise wages or they will become internationally

noncompetitive, therefore their very survival depends on the works of the often illegal immigrant

labour. It is important to note that four countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) located in

the southern Europe heavily dependent on tourism, which creates a problem for the

implementation of a tight immigration policy as a result of colonial ties and geographic position.

Since the 80's, regularisation have been an essential policy tool in Italy. Baldwin-Edwards and

Arango (1999) argue that frequent regularisations could encourage more illegal migration which

has been the case. Although, Geddes and Scholten (2016) argue that this the principal policy

instrument used by southern Europe to portraits the common EU policy response less effective.

According to Geddes and Scholten (2016), between 1986 and 2014 in Italy around 1.4 million

migrants – had their status regularised. It is interesting to note that almost half of these

regularisation occurred between 2002 to 2005. These regularisations are considered as creating a

back door into EU. Though, Spanish regularisation in 2005 led to protests from other EU

member states because it was seen as creating a back door entry. Evaluating these facts from

history portraits a picture why some Member States have refused the resettlement plan from

Italy, because they are classified more of economic migrants not forced migrants. Moreso, the

fear that some terrorists are amongst them has eaten deep into the debate of the illegal migration

crisis.

26

In the eyes of Geddes and Schloten (2016), irregularity and informality raise three important

points that demonstrates the important elements of internal politics of immigration in Italy. First,

illegal migration shows the per-eminence of market and social factors, rather than the state in

labour migration and demonstrates limits to control. Second, there exist an economic pull factor

of strong demand for migrant’s workers in the country. In Italy, there was demand from small-

scale manufacturing companies in the north, as well as from agricultural employers. In Italy,

there is a continued demand in the domestic and healthcare sectors is strongly related to the

structure of the welfare state and a reliance on family and household provisions. This creates a

vivid picture of why there is a strong presence of women migrants in the care and domestic

sectors. Women migrant workers have play a key role in sustaining and reproducing this types of

welfare and care provision in Italy. Third, this system influences the labour market controls with

a high degree effects on both the “migrants who have little political power” and employers “who

tend to be well organised and politically influential”.

As a form of policy response, legalisation of illegal immigrants in Italy is not a cure for serious

structural factors which perpetuate, encourage or even require the illegal employment of workers

(Baldwins-Edwards and Arango: 1999).

I. ITALY IMMIGRATION POLICY STYLE

In the 90's the Italian government adopted the key elements of EU policy and in March 1998

joined the schengen area. During the 1980s, Italian immigration policy concentrated on

legalising and regularising migrants flows rather than reducing them (Pugliese, 1998: 5 -28 as

cited in Geddes & Scholten, 2016:182). The Martelli law of 1990 was the first immigration

legislation that focus mainly on illegal migration. This law was aimed at creating a visa system

to limit inflows while also strengthening border controls and making provisions for increased

deportations. The non-soviet bloc countries were given right to asylum through this Martelli law

then regularisation was initiated.

According to Geddes & Schloten (2016:182) the failure factor of the Martelli law was identified

by Reyneri (1998:314) stating that it did not address illegal migration but rather sent a message

27

that Italy was relatively open to illegal flows. In Italy, the centre-left government in 1998

introduced the Turco-Napolitano law which maintained strict elements linked to Italy's EU

obligations through reinforced measures dealing with entry, residence and expulsions. The whole

idea is to eliminate the back door recruitment to a 'managed system' through an annual

immigration quota, a sponsorship scheme17 and creation of reception centres for illegal

immigrants. However, the right wing parties had wanted illegal entry to be classified as a crime

but the left resisted it. One can clearly see, that the benefits from the flow through the economic

contribution to the economy influences the political debate and the legislation of immigration

policy. It is interesting to note that the politicisation of migration and the tension between right

and left has distinguished Italy. In 1998, the Centre-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi's

Forza Italtian party opposed the Turco-Napolitano law and on assuming office, immediately

sought to replace it with a stricter measure focused on border controls. The Bossi-Fini law

(Xenophobic and Post fascist leaders) chose a more security driven approach with the

elimination of the sponsorship scheme and linking of work and residence permits would last only

as long as the contract of employment.

At a glance below are the amendments:

WHAT WHERE WHEN – TIME FRAME

Suspected illegal entrants Detained in reception centres Increased from 30 to 60 days

Undocumented migrantssecond time arrest

6months to 1 year in prison

Third arrest 1 to 4 years behind bars

Family reunification Only foreigners with workcontracts would be able toback family members foradmission

17 A scheme that allowed Italian citizen to legally resident foreigners, regions, local administration, unions and voluntary organisations to sponsor migrants who would be issued with a temporary permit.

28

Permanent residence Increased from 5 to 6 years

Despite the discrepancies between the center left and centre-right government on a security-

driven legislation in Italy, regularisation is still the “most suitable instrument to repair the

disfunctionalities of the Italian migration regime” (Fintelli, 2013:49-50 as cited in Geddes and

Scholten 2016:183). Without a doubt different measures have been taken to manage or control

the growth of illegal entry but an arguable view is “whether the greater emphasis on security and

border controls” has further given the need for a back door entry.

According to Einaudi (2007), regularisation is seen to provide a basis for family reunion and a

stabilisation of the immigrant population. Thus, the impact is seen economically and socially

with the recruitment of migrants In Italy which tends to limits state capacity to regulate

admissions. Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) states that Italy is heavily dependent on

tourism which shows why there exist a problem for the implementation of a tight immigration

policy.

The various analysis of the case of Italy can be seen through the eyes of Jahn and Straubhaar's

(1999) in 'a survey of the economics of illegal migration' focusing on the need for a good labour

market policy valid to fight illegal employment. Thereby, creating an economic strategy that

disallows the supply of and demand for illegal foreign workers especially in the agricultural,

construction, hotel and tourism and healthcare sector but rather a political market for the supply

and demand of border controls and labour market regulations. Geddes and Scholten (2016)

argues that the internal controls necessary to tackle relatively high levels of informality could be

politically costly because they would impinge on the lives of employers (employing migrants in

their businesses) and ordinary Italian citizens (employing migrants in their homes). Hollifield's

(2006) as cited in Geddes and Schloten (2016) argues that external control or cooperation with

the EU could constrain domestic ideas and institutions with the necessary measures. From the

various views, the problem in Italy can be seen as having relatively weak internal controls

concerning the demand of and supply of illegal migrants.

29

According to IOM below are the known entry point and exist point in Italy:

Entry points: Main ports of disembarkation are Augusta, Catania, Pozzallo, Trapani and

Lampedusa (Sicily), Reggio Calabria and Vibo Valentia, (Calabria), Cagliari (Sardinia), Salerno

and Naples (Campania), with few autonomous landings recorded in the southern part of Apulia

(Lecce), Sicily (Portopalo di Capo Passero) and Sardinia (Teulada)..

Exit points: Migrants arrived by sea and trying to move on towards other European countries are

tracked in formal camps and informal transit points close to border areas with neighbouring

countries (France, Switzerland and Austria). Migrants are often stopped or pushed back to Italy

when found on streets or trains close to Italy. Ventimiglia (Italy/France border) and Como

(Italy/Switzerland) are the two border cities where most transiting migrants are gathering, and

where official transit centres have been opened. Over the last month, increasing tensions between

humanitarian needs of migrants outside formal reception centers and authorities’ controls have

been registered in border areas as well as in Rome and Milan (main transiting hub towards

North). The hotspot in Taranto is reported to receive weekly buses of migrants blocked by the

Italian authorities at border areas to prevent them to move outside the country. .

As of 30 June, the status of relocation of migrants in total is 7,390 persons from Italy. In the first

6 months of 2017, there have been 4,736 departures (56% of all departures from Italy). Overall,

main countries of destination for relocated migrants are Germany (40%), Norway (11%),

Switzerland (10%), Finland (10%), the Netherlands (9%), followed by France, Portugal,

Sweden, Belgium, Spain and others with lower numbers.

After the tragic death of 360 people at the coast of Lampedusa, Italy in October 2013. With the

financial support from EU, Italy launched Mare Nostrum which is a search and rescue operation.

In late 2014, even though there was unwillingness to continue funding the project by the British

government who argued that since the operation begun 150,000 people have been rescued, it is

seen as a pull factor to smuggling networks for the transportation of migrants.

Similarly, different measures have been taken to control illegal entry or influx but the extent of

illegal immigration depends on the ability and willingness of a country to enact its immigration

30

laws. For instance, permanent control of entry, exit residence and working permits. Moreover,

some countries tolerate illegal migrants more easily because they assume that they act only as

transit hosts and that most of its foreigners are moving ahead to another destination country. For

example, some eastern European countries with regard to movements to Germany eg Poland.

II. THE ROLE OF NGO ON THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN SEA VS CODE OF CONDUCT

According to Amnesty International Report June 201718, a brief history of the role of Non-

Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the Central Mediterranean Sea is analysed as giving

private rescue operations that is funded by civil society. Stating that the first NGO to send vessel

(the Phoenix) is the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) operating jointly with Médecins Sans

Frontières (MSF) medical team to assist refugees and migrants on board. Its activities is dated

between August to September 2014 and between 2 May and 28 September 2015 to date. Since

the beginning of the works of gap-filling responsibility of the NGOs, nine (9) NGOs vessels have

been operating in the Central Mediterranean namely, MOAS (Malta), MSF (France), Jugend

Rettet (Germany), Life Boat (Germany), Proactiva Open Arms (Spain), Save the Children, Sea-

Eye (Germany), Sea-Watch (Germany), SOS Mediterranée (France). However, with the event of

the revised code of conduct by Italy, MSF and Life Boat suspends it activities in July 2017

because several commitments could result in a “decrease in efficiency and capacity of the current

SAR with dire humanitarian consequences”19.

In addition, on 22 June 2015, "the EU launched EUNAVFOR MED, a joint military operation

with the mission to "identify, capture and dispose of vessels used by smugglers and traffickers"

in order to "disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the

Southern Central Mediterranean".

Generally, It is on record that at the end of 2015 rescue at the sea was 152,343 people, providing

a breakdown as follows (41,341 - the Italian coastguard, 29,178 - Italian Navy, 6,290 - Italian

Custom police including with assets co-financed by Frontex, 16,158 - merchant ships, 20,063 -

18 Report titled : A Perfect Strom - the failure of European policies in the Central Mediterranean

19 http://www.msf.org/en/article/msf-committed-saving-lives-mediterranean-will-not-sign-italian-code-conduct

31

NGO rescue boats; 15,428 - Frontex Triton assets - excluding Italian assets and 23,885 -

EUNAVFOR MED and foreign navies. The statistics of death or missing at the sea are 2014 -

3,165 persons, 2015 - 2,876 persons, 2016 – 4,581 persons (Amnesty International: June 2017)

and as at 16 August 2017 IOM states that the death toll is 2,410 persons. The activities of the

NGOs has no doubt contributed to reducing the death toll as seen from the figures. But Is the

SAR mission really a pull factor or compliance to International law? Can this revised code of

conduct reduce the increasing influx of migrants?

Amnesty International further states that, in 2016 the Italian coastguard coordinated 1,424 SAR

cases 52% more than in 2015 and 46.5% more than in 2014. As of January to July 2017, NGOs

coordinated 40% rescue operations on the sea20. For the past two years the role of NGOs

position on the sea is usually between 20 and 50 nautical miles from Libyan Coasts which has

saved several lives. Even though some politicians accuse NGOs of colluding with smugglers

which serves as a pull factor for migrants, is still an ongoing debate.

After consultations with NGOs, European Commission and relevant authorities the 12 points

commitment was revised and signed by 7 NGOs except for Life Boat and MSF21. In addition

MSF, states that due to the means at their disposal the commitment that vessels should disembark

survivors to a place of safety as a rule instead of transferring migrants to other ships will create

unprecedented limitations. As a consequence, it will reduce the presence of NGOs in an already

insufficient gap-filling responsibility, which will lead to more mass drownings. Furthermore,

MSF argues that the presence of armed police officers on board is a breach of the “fundamental

humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality”. Again, this will subjugate

humanitarian aid organisations to the political interests of EU member state. Some of the fears of

Amnesty International and HRW22 on the draft code of conduct was addressed in the revised

version in order not to impede rescue operations and priority of Italy.

20 https://www.savethechildren.it/blog-notizie/le-ragioni-cui-abbiamo-firmato-il-codice-di-condotta-le-ong-impegnate-nel-mediterraneo

21 http://www.msf.org/en/article/msf-committed-saving-lives-mediterranean-will-not-sign-italian-code-conduct

22 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/12/eu-draft-code-sea-rescues-threatens-lives

32

Generally, it is important to note that illegal entry into Libya is criminal by Libyan law and

anyone found guilty are given fines and can also face prison sentence. In Libya, there is no

asylum framework (asylum-seekers and refugees) which means automatic detention applies to

illegal migrants. According to UN agencies and Amnesty International, there have been several

records of human rights violation, torture, ill-treatment, beatings, exploitation and sexual

violence by guards in government-run detention centres or those run by armed groups outside the

control of the government (Amnesty International; 2017).

Despite Libya having been part of the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and

Rescue, Libya has not the capacity of the search and rescue due to the conflict and political

instability of the country. However, it is necessary to note that peace and stability in Libya is an

essential tool for the success of any coordination of SAR operations. The political instability in

Libya has further contributed to the increasing migration influx through the sea. According to

personal experience gathered by Amnesty International, migrants prefer to cross the sea than go

through the Sahara desert back to their countries of origin.

Moreso, Amnesty International suggests that a similar 2015 operational coordination of Italian

authorities should be in place in the Mediterranean Seas and should be driven by search and

rescue operations rather than push back to Libya State. Save the Children claims they were

forced to respond if - “we would rather stop our search and rescue operations completely, and

risk people drowning, than return migrants and refugees back to Libya?” On 15 August 2017,

the vessel, run by Proactiva Open Arms was operating 27nm from Libyan shores, an area which

many believe to be International waters. Due to the Libyan authority confrontation, they left for

the fear of their safety and security23. Though in the capacity of gap-filing vaccum which

essentially should be the State, is under serious threat in the view of looking for solution to curb

the influx of migrants on the Mediterranean. Hostilities to NGOs by the Libyan authorities as a

result of the new Libyan SAR zone is not the way either because insecurity of NGOs team could

lead to their withdrawal which lead to further loss of lives. This seems to be the card played by

the EU, death in the camp of others and not theirs.

23 See: save the children response to reported hostilities towards NGO vessel operated by Proactive Open Arms

33

What is then the preferred policy to limit the influx? Is striving for peace in Libya a key factor?

What are the options against the fear of invasion by terrorists? Peace and stability seems to be an

essential tool for the control of the migration influx because the death of Gaddhafi this problem

was controllable. As already stated above that, in July 2017, there was a slight decrease in the

influx into Italy but an increasing number in Spain. This data shows that either the measures

taken by the EU needs to be changed or modified because migrants or smugglers just change

routes rather than deter the influx24. Has the EU strategy planned on border controls rather than

search and rescue mission being successful? Who then really benefits terrorists, citizens or

Member states?

7. ILLEGAL MIGRATION AS A GATEWAY TO SECURITY THREAT

The challenge of terrorism is not a new security phenomenon; however, since the horrific attack

of September 11, 2001 in the US, this form of combat has taken new dimension. The Post – Cold

War world has, however, unleashed international terrorist operatives whose mandate knows no

borders. Al-Qaeda, ISIS and similar terrorist cells are present everywhere, including along the

borders of the Mediterranean, in Europe and easily radicalised individuals through online

materials.The ideological content of Islamism is Islamic fundamentalism, which, on the one

hand, is a theological teaching and a movement to restore certain primary values, norms and

relations that were proclaimed in history (these can be religious, ethical, family, domestic, etc).

It is important to note that not all Muslims are terrorists or radicalised but those exposed to

radicalised Islam have to tendency to commit the act of terror in the name of being sympathetic

to extremism or recruited by ISIS (Le Beau: 2013).

According to Sergei Sarkisyan (Le Beau: 2013), in the opinion of a number of experts, including

analysts of the security services of France and Germany, almost all Islamic communities in

Europe contain a certain percentage of radicals. This points “the simple conclusion that the

degree of radicalisation and the level of dissemination of the ideas Islamic terrorism are in direct

proportion to the size of the Muslim Diaspora”. It is worthy to note that the money factor plays

24 Source: Migratory flows in July: Numbers fall in Italy, remain high in Spain - Frontex 2017

34

an insignificant role in the recruitment of naturalised or long established immigrants to Europe,

but plays relatively larger role in finding potential terrorists in the latest wave of immigration,

especially from North African countries. A good example is the arrest in Spain, in May of 2007,

of 14 Moroccan citizens and two Algerians, who recruited penniless immigrants from the

Maghreb to go to terrorist training camps, or even straight to Iraq and Afghanistan25. In addition,

just from January to August 2017 , Europe has experienced 8 attacks26 just to name the major

attacks either claimed by ISIS or sympathiser to extremism or lone terrorists and in most cases

chatting “Allahu akbar”,

Timeline Terror attacks

03/02/17 Paris (France)

18/03/17 Paris (France)

22/03/17 London (UK)

07/04/17 Stockholm (Sweden)

22/05/17 Manchester (UK)

03/06/17 London (UK)

18/07/17 Triple attack - Barcelona and Cambrils (Spain) then house explosion

19/07/17 Turku (Finland)

The worrisome concerns are the identities and age group (usually 17years old to last 30's) of

these perpetrators, either they were asylum-seekers, or rejected asylum-seekers, or North African

descent, or from North African countries or from the Middle East. These terror attacks further

show that Europe is potentially a target as ISIS loses ground in the Middle East. Some analysts

25 See the chapter by Sergei Sarkisyan, Recruitment by Terrorist Organisations in Europe’s Muslim Communities, pp 184

26 RTE, timeline - Terror attacks in Europe, updated 17 August 2017

35

have argued that the attacks in Europe is a call for the Western Powers to leave the Middle

Eastern territories. Could this be a lasting solution to this growing epidemic?

There is no doubt that due to the refugee crisis and the open door policy presented by Germany,

has encouraged some ISIS fighters to return to Europe, in guess of seeking refuge or returning

home. This feared perception can be seen as evidence in several attacks in Europe. For example,

the Berlin terror attack on 19 December 2016 at the Christmas Market was committed by Amri,

24 yrs who was rejected asylum and plans was on going to deport him to Tunisia. Also, a Syrian

27 years old failed asylum seekers committed suicide in July 2016 at Ansbach, Bavaria killing 15

people, terror claimed by ISIS. Similarly, in the terror case in Spain in August 2017, organised

by an Iman - Albdelbaki Es Satty27 - a Moroccan born preacher who was detained in 2010 for

committing crimes against public health and was sentenced to four years and one month behind

bars. However, he served from 2012 to 2014 without details why the term was reduced. It is

recorded that during his time in jail he made contact with Rachid Aglif one of the jihadists

behind the Madrid train bombings in 2004. In 2015, he escaped expulsion for drug trafficking

and the list goes on. This growing epidemic raises a lot of questions concerning the capacities of

the security agencies to act promptly. Do the security agencies need more staff? Which means

more jobs for the Member States. In most cases these men are under surveillance by security

agencies but in reality it seems difficult to curb these attacks. Is extreme vetting and monitoring

of Imams, migrants or returning foreign terrorists fighters (FTFs) a possible solution?

According to Annie Machon, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bfv),

which is the domestic security agency in Germany, says that they estimated about 10,000 Salafist

- fundamentalist Islamist were in Germany and 680 are currently under investigation because

they were potentially radicalised and potentially violent28. This shows that the intelligence

agency is going through an ever increasing battle against terrorism. With the increasing attacks

in Britain, Brussels, France and Germany speaks volume of a new threat and fear of lone wolf

attackers and radicalised individuals.

27 Source RT - Imam suspected of organising Spain attacks avoided deportation, was labeled 'no threat'

28 See - European Knee-Jerk reaction - Arab psycho or criminal is sees as terrorist', RT, 3 August, 2017

36

Furthermore, Europol’s Chief Rob Wainwright, in February 2016 said that between 3,000 and

5,000 EU citizens trained in Islamic state terror camps have returned back into Europe from the

Middle East. Nonetheless, Wainwright refused to link the ongoing terror threat with the refugee

crisis. Though he states that 'Europe is currently facing the highest terror threat in more than 10

years'. He further states that there is an expectation by ISIS to stage attack in Europe 'with the

aim of achieving mass groups’ attacks'. This is clear in the August 2017 Spain terror attack at a

popular street in Barcelona killing 13 people and injuring more than 100 persons. The Second

attack in Cambrils injuring seven people, one of whom later died29. It is necessary to state the

over 2,500 Muslims in Spain were on the street supporting the victims and condemning Islamist

terrorism, which shows a proactive way to show the world what true Islam stands for30. On the

other hand, is this march convincing to bring unity?

Another interesting case to consider occurred in May 2017, Salman Abedi, a 22 year old Briton

of Libyan descent, committed suicide bombing at the Manchester concert in London, who had

visited Syria and Libya before the attack and who must have been radicalised during his visit.

This clearly show the fear must European have against the refugees or illegal migrants is

justifiable, even though not all the illegal migrants are radicalised. This increasing fear concerns

the next generations of kids or teenagers who might easily be radicalised to commit more attacks

is worrisome. What can really be done to avoid further security threats? Taking this security

threat as normal gradually shows a cross road of no solution, which cannot be sustainable for a

long time before citizens will revolt by taking laws into their hands.

In contrast, it is interesting to also look within the growing threat amongst the returning FTFs

who are EU nationals. On the 29 June 2017, the European presents the 8th report progress on

countering radicalisation - online and offline of terrorist and returning foreign terrorist fighters

(FTFs). The methods includes identifying and removing online terrorist contents. However, a

more challenging task is the EU nationals returning FTFs and their families to EU. Some are

battled hardened combatants, while others are disillusioned teenagers. Among those returning are

29 Source - RT, Police still searching for one person after Barcelona attacks

30 See RT, 1000s Muslims march against Barcelona terrorism

37

increasing numbers of children, some of them born abroad. The RAN manual gives enormous

responses to returnees and their families focusing on an overall approach of creating a tailor

made approach for each returnee, an immediate risk assessment, multi-agency case management,

mechanism coordination across government agencies and communication strategy. Of course,

one can argue that the returning of foreign terrorist fighters poses high degree of threats as illegal

migrants. Thus, a combination of returning FTFs and illegal migrants’ fears is what seems to be

unbearable and unimaginable for the future of Europe.

Ruth Mueller et al. (2016) argues that the geographic proximity and longstanding political and

economic ties mean that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is of great

importance for Europe. Increasing destabilisation in the region would further hinder the process

of constructive exchange. The rise in refugee numbers from MENA countries would also

increase the danger of terrorist attacks and relocate the region’s conflicts to Europe. Conversely,

stabilising the region would create key markets for both economies31.

8. EU POLICY ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION

There is no doubt that the EU policy has influence migration, immigration and policy dynamics

in Europe especially in Italy over the years. Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) note that EU

pressure have played a general role in policy development in all Southern European countries.

The authors further state that in the case of Italy, EU's impact has particularly been on the strict

aspects of policy on external frontier controls. This clearly show the EU competence is focused

on the regulatory issues associated with border control and not on distributive issues such as

entry levels and migrants progress on arrival in Member States. Moreso, the Treaty of Lisbon

affirms that exclusion of the EU from matters relating to immigrant integration (Geddes &

Scholten: 2016).

The EU and Member states are committed to borders security and repressive immigration policy.

A clear picture of role play is seen as member states control admission to their territory by TCN

migrants. The role of the EU is based on operations which support policy development and

31 See - MENA: a region in Crisis, The influence of demographic change on developments in the Middle East and North Africa, and what this means for Europe

38

border control capacity. It is important to note that new Member state are required to show the

legal and administrative capacity to regulate borders as a condition for membership. (Geddes &

Taylor, 2013; Geddes & Scholten: 2016). The European Union and its Member States have

progressively laid out a stronger and more articulated policy response to save lives and better

manage migratory flows in the Central Mediterranean.

In 2015, the Commission presented a broad European agenda on Migration. A permanent EU

presence at sea has since been established, rescuing hundreds of thousands of people. Following

the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015, the EU has stepped up its cooperation with

partners in Africa, including through the “Migration Partnership Framework”, launched in June

2016, which has taken cooperation with key countries of origin and transit to a new level. “An

External Investment Plan for Africa and the neighbourhood” has also been created to support this

new approach and has the potential to raise €44 billion in investments - and up to €88 billion if

Member States contribute.

The European Union's support to rights-based migration management in Libya includes capacity-

building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard, as well in supporting the Libyan authorities

(GNA) in providing essential services to the Libyan population, displaced persons, migrants and

refugees through ongoing programmes worth over €20 million. The EU further supports Libya

through its Common Security and Defence missions such as EUNAVFOR Med, Operation

SOPHIA and EUBAM Libya.

Operation Triton is the successor of Operation Mare Nostrum, which is coordinated by Frontex

and with support from 18 Schengen member states. Triton operation is a border security mission

with limited mandate and not involved in SAR operation. It was launched in November 2014

with a budget of 2.9 Million euros per month.

However, Calleya (2013) argues that continuing with the current policy of neglect in the areas of

integration of immigrants runs the risk that many EU countries will see as an increase of the new

form of immigrant ghettos and security threats, which are characterised by extreme social

marginalisation and exclusion and often have little to do with the traditional black ghettos in the

39

US or other urban ethnically defined communities such as ‘little Italies’ or ‘little Polands’. A

comprehensive integration policy will also require more efforts to integrate immigrants into the

national labour market. Policy measures like the development of skills enhancement programmes

and the creation of job placement centers for immigrants. Moreover, there is a need to provide

young immigrants with adequate educational programmes so as to facilitate their access to the

labour market. About 70 to 80 per cent of undocumented immigrant landing in EU apply for

political asylum, which shows a challenge that connects all member states.

Nevertheless, there is need for the revision of the Dublin rules to include corrective burden

sharing mechanism or responsibility sharing. However, will the inclusion of this clause actually

change the stands of Member States with the increase in terror attacks? In September 2015, EU

member states agreed to a scheme to relocate up to 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece,

Hungary and Italy but there were tensions within the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary,

Slovakia and Romania opposed the scheme but were outvoted which has also raised major

implementation challenges on the migration policy in EU (Geddes and Scholten: 2016).

Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) argues that the Treaty of Amsterdam included the

Schengen agreement in the EU treaty and transferred some important competences from the

national to the common EU level. On the other hand, the internal enforcement, the weight of

employer sanctions or the possibility to carry out regularisations remains within national

competences.

In a nutshell, Member States in the EU face heterogeneous picture of illegal immigration as a

result of own national specific problems. For example, southern European countries are more

concerned with illegal migrants from Africa than the northern European countries, while eastern

or western countries are more concerned with other immigration issues due to demographic

imbalance or economic reasons. However, the flows from Italy or other border countries

concerns all member states now because the Schengen policies further show how closely

connected national migration policies have become. How best can the authorities reduce or even

stop illegal immigration at the external borders or within the country by internal controls through

enforcement of residence and work permits?

40

I. AN ASSESSMENT OF EU POLICY AS REGARDS THE MALTA DECLARATION

According to the Malta Declaration in February 2017, a key element of a sustainable migration

policy is to ensure effective control of the EU external border and stem illegal flows into the EU.

Indeed, from the statistics discussed above, there has been fluctuations in the migration flows

due to various mechanisms that have been used to curb illegal migration on the Mediterranean.

Thus, ten (10) areas was given priority by the Commission: First, training, equipment and

support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies through Operation SOPIA

and Seahorse Mediterranean Network. Second, further efforts to disrupt the business model of

smugglers through enhanced operational action with Libyan countries on the coast, International

and regional organisations. Third, support where possible the development of local communities

in Libya especially in coastal areas and at Libyan land borders on migratory routes, to improve

socio-economic situation. Fourth, seeking to ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions

in Libya for migrants, together with the UNHCR and IOM. Fifty, supporting IOM in

significantly stepping up assisted voluntary return activities. Sixth, enhancing information

campaigns and outreach addresses at migrants in Libya and countries of origin and transit.

Seventh, helping to reduce the pressure on the Libya's land borders, working both with the

Libyan authorities and all neighbours of Libya. Eighth, keeping track of alternative routes and

possible diversion of smugglers' activities through cooperative efforts with Libya's neighbours

and the countries under the Partnership Framework. Ninth, continuing support to efforts and

initiatives from Individual Members States directly engaged with Libya, in this respect the EU

welcomes and is ready to support Italy in its implementation of the Memorandum of

Understanding. Tenth, deepening dialogue and cooperation on migration with all countries

neighbouring Libya, including better operational cooperation with Member States and the

European Border and Coast Guard on preventing departures and managing returns.

John Redwood argues that the Malta declaration has two main problems. First is the EU is

shifting the responsibility to stem the rapid flow of migrants across the Mediterranean to the

Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. Stating that a government that is struggling to

exert control over Libya, which remains a deeply divided country with a rival government in

41

Tobruk and areas of the country under tribal and rebel control. No doubt it will welcome the

money promised to strengthen its coastguard and for related purposes, but can it spend it

nationally to achieve the EU’s aims? Will it be tempted to spend it for other purposes related to

its own difficult position? The second is the request for a policy to return people who have

already arrived in the EU following illegal routes. How are they going to do this? Why do they

bring people into the EU in the first place if they want to take them back to countries like Libya?

What will they do if they refuse? What is expected under International law? These are salient

questions that the EU must considers in this policy direction in order to create a tailor made

response to this influx. Will increasing information and outreach campaigns help deter more

migrants when they hear woes with sounds and pictures of this horrific journey of doom?

LADDER32 also, expresses disappointment on the 'Malta declaration stating that: First, a focus

on Libya-shows that efforts is made to keep migrants out of Europe, which a 'double wall', one at

the Libyan Borders and the second at the European ones. They are extremely concerned for the

situation for migrants within Libyan Borders and the stability and safety of the country with such

vulnerable populations. Second, the policy of return ensuring respect for international law and

Human rights - they reiterate that the focus of the action plan should be focused on “assisted

voluntary Return rather than forced return”; Third, instead of deferring smugglers at the risk of

creating new dangerous routes for migrants, they suggest a more safe and regular channels of

migration to Europe which increase safety of migrants; Fourth, a focus of security measure, a

short-term and unsustainable policy - the allocation of international funding should tackle with a

long term and increased funding to development aid and humanitarian assistance to tackle the

root causes of migration and ensure stable and safe countries for people to live in.

Looking critically at the Malta Declaration some measures as analysed above need to be revised

in order to get a progressive solution on the Central Mediterranean route. Knowing that illegal

migrants is considered as a crime in Libya; why should migrants be sent back to die in the

country rather than on the sea. More emphasis should be laid on creating peace and stability in

32 LADDER consortium is composed of 27 Co-applicants (coming from 20 countries: 16 Members States and 4 from the neighborhood and the Balkans) that will be actively involved in the implementation of the project in order to enable Local Authorities to act as drivers for DEAR policies.

42

Libya from a regrettable action from NATO countries. Illegal sale of arms and weapons to rebels

fighters in the Libyan territory should be curb to established peace and security in the Libya and

the region. An aggressive information sharing and outreach campaigns through all media outlet

showing the various woes and horrific conditions of crossing the desert and the Mediterranean

sea and living conditions in the reception camps should be published in country of origin and

country of transit which is constantly essential to reorient the mind of potential migrants and

families. Furthermore, there seems to be no doubt that the necessary resources to execute the

objectives as outline in Malta declaration is available in the Official Development Assistance for

Africa amounts to €31 billion during this financial year. The Commission has taken the decision

to mobilise an additional €200 Million for the North Africa window with priority on Libya.

Even though, peace and stability cannot be bought, direct coordinated investment is important to

tackle the flow from the country of origins of migrants because the statistics of Libyans amongst

the influx is very limited.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

EU Member states must insist and cooperate with allies to ensure peace and stability in the Libya

and the Middle East because when the wars stop, the refugee crisis will be reduce to the

minimum.

EU Member states should collaborate with countries of origin or transit of migrants and

implement an aggressive media campaign showing the woes, testimonials and risks of

journeying through the desert and crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Promoting legal routes and

benefits rather than the illegal routes. There is a deer need for the media to play the role of

educating the citizens and parents, especially the region or state that has the highest numbers of

illegal migrants. The country of origin of migrants show the disparity and instabilities in the

countries that urgently need assistance, therefore, there should be a strengthened Partnership

Framework agreement. Similarly, ensure an effective and secure financial transfer funds

mechanism and Global partnership between EU and sources countries.

43

Strengthen external and internal border controls by regular vetting, monitoring and registration

of migrants or citizens can help close the gap between a restrictive control rhetoric and an

expansionist immigration reality. Also, closing the gap between the legal and illegal economic

benefits to the economy and regulations can further reduce the incentives for illegalities;

Restructure the rehabilitation procedure for these migrants where extreme vetting and counseling

of migrants on issues that concern, life history, work experience, skills, possible economic

contribution to the economy, reasons for taking this dangerous journey, future ambition, etc.

These rehabilitation centres should teach the language of the country as to proper integrate these

migrants, entrepreneurship and mentoring should be provided based on area of interest because

no man is born empty. Informing them of the rules governing the country and possibility of

repatriation in views of misconducts. EU member states should encouraged individual return

package and structural assistance to country of origin. The EU should focus its efforts on the

reforms that stand the best chances of improving the economic and employment situation in the

target countries. No country can do this alone as tackling such a transnational phenomenon as

illegal migration requires sufficient resources and international diplomatic leverage (Calleya:

2013). Adopt a comprehensive long term plan on integration of immigrants such as employment,

economic, social consequences, education, housing, social security and medical benefits.

With the increase in terror attacks, EU member states should sensitise their children of radical

Islam and terrorism. Continuous education of online terror contents and monitoring of

radicalised Individual contents. This strategic in turn creates more employment in a country that

employs more personnel to get the job done. Member states should ensure the emotional,

psychological and cultural rehabilitation of FTFs in the EU and ensure that they mentally stable

to live among normal people.

European Member States must set up a dedicated and proactive search and rescue mechanism to

support Italy and recognise the country’s laudable efforts to save lives at sea in the face of an

insufficient response from other European Member States.

44

With regards to the creation of a Libyan MRCC and Libyan search and rescue area, a stable

Libya is necessary to ensure its smooth running. The Libyan coastguard should not carry out

SAR outside Libyan waters, ensure safety and security of NGOs from the EU. They should

accept the immediate mechanism to ensure constant monitoring of their conduct and operation at

sea and ensure transparency and accountability process in case of breaches of international law

rules. Also, EU Member States and institutions should have a conditional working cooperation

relationship pending when Libya ratify the Refugee convention, recognise UNHCR and allowing

access to all detention places of humanitarian agencies. EU Member States should ensure that

NGOs performing the task of search and rescue missions can continue to contribute to saving

live in compliance with relevant international law and standards and Italy's code of conduct

(Amnesty International; 2017).

A fundamental incentive for illegal work is the deductions for taxes and social security systems

which can reach up to 60 percent of actual income. Tax evasion and illegal employment is

stressed in European case. Employer sanctions form the key instrument in decreasing illegal

immigration, no work permit no work; Sanction employer of illegal migrants to fight illegal

migration is to deregulate the European labour markets. Bridging the gap between productivity

and net payments is one way to reduce illegal practices on the labour market. That means

reducing direct taxation of income and social security contributions from the employee and the

employer implying a shift to increased taxes on consumption. The only long term strategy

available to lower illegal immigration is to remove the economic incentives to employ migrants

(Baldwin-Edwards and Arango: 1999). A better alternative for immigration of both skilled and

unskilled labor through temporary workers programs as a way of limiting illegal migrants in the

underground economy;

Border protection is relatively costly and not very efficient. A complete control of the border is

impossible to achieve. On the other hand, border controls are extremely important for their

signally effects. People within the country feel safer, people outside feel not free to enter. So, the

solution is to find an optimum. It needs some border controls but their costs should not exceed

their potential benefits measured in terms of the apprehensions and deterrent effects.

45

10. CONCLUSION

Migration will remain a constant element of our lives as long as man lives because of the search

of better life, better conditions and environment. Migrants tend to move to countries where the

economic and social benefits is high which includes Europe. The Mediterranean Sea has for

many generations seen a number of threats and opportunities to the surrounding countries. Even

though economic migrants amount to the highest in the world, illegal migrants tend to question

the judiciary and political system of a sovereign state. There is no doubt that the principal issue

of the control of entry, stay and work of foreign people lies with national sovereignty. Illegal

immigrants challenges national control mechanisms and are an extreme provocations to national

authority. They test border guards and once inside the country penetrate the underground

economy, where they become evasive of taxes, social security contributions and overstretched

basic amenities meant for legal migrants.

The root causes of migration as a result of demographic imbalances can be addressed with

attractive parenting packages for the citizens and migrations of the relevant skill and persons into

the right sector not forgetting the challenges of the source country or transit country. Wars and

conflicts in the Middle East has been the major drivers of mayhem and the refugee crisis in

Europe, when Europe can influence the US and other allies military interventions in the region

then there will be hope for the end of this migration crisis. The influx from sub-saharan Africa is

majorly driven by economic reasons which with entrepreneurial investment and education in the

region, the matter will be solved or even reduced to the minimum.

Generally, the economic factor has always played a great role in the implementation and change

of immigration policies. An economically much more efficient way to handle illegal immigration

and illegal work starts at the economic roots of illegal employment of illegal foreigners. Illegal

immigrants work very often without written de facto contracts. If labour is not available on the

official labour market, employers have to recur to illegal sub-markets. Opening up the labour

market and giving easier access to newcomers is an appropriate strategy.

46

Illegal employment of natives and of foreigners is the consequence and not the cause of

inefficiencies in the labour market. Finding and eliminating the cause and nature of these

inefficiencies present the only possible long term strategy to lower the economic incentives for

illegal immigration. A good labour market policy is the only valid strategy fighting illegal

employment and will more or less automatically cure the most obvious problems of illegal

migration. Or to put it briefly, make European labour markets work efficiently and most of the

negative impacts of the illegal work of foreigners will vanish. Illegal migrants contributed to the

transition of Italy from an emigration country to an immigration country since in the 50s.

Illegal migrants has always been part of Italy immigration policy process for many decades but

as a result of the refugees crisis the narrative has changed to rather hostility. Nevertheless, there

is an increasing fear that the rise in refugee numbers from MENA countries would also increase

the danger of terror attacks and relocate the region’s conflicts to Europe. Even though the Malta

declaration is committed to stability in Libya, how will this be achieved is still in the open. In

order to generate lasting solution in Libya, requires some EU member states to stop sales of arms

to countries that influence conflicts in the region. There is no doubt that once there is peace and

stability in Libya other problems in curbing the flow will follow suite.

Extreme vetting, registration and rehabilitation of illegal migrants will ensure possibilities for

assisted and voluntary return packages for economic migrants are measures that strengthen the

fight against illegal migration. It is understandable for forced migrants due to security threat to

life and properties leave their home country so sending them back will be suicidal and

hypocritical. An aggressive media campaign in countries of origin and transit educating parents,

families and friends can deter more economic migrants taking this dreadful journey and can be

tagged shameful or disgraceful when caught. The emergence of security threats as a result of the

refugee crisis with several cases of migrants involved in the terror attacks in Europe further

shows the disapproval and bias against migrants in general. The fear of radical Islam as an

invasion through the open door policy has eaten deep into a debate. The terror attacks has not

help either than to show that ISIS is losing ground in the MENA and it is looking for other

breathing places to strives in Europe.

47

In order to tackle the immense security challenges like terrorism, illegal migration, proliferation

of arms, explosive manufacturing, unbiased and sustainable education is necessary to keep

citizens informed. The known causes of radical extremists should be addressed and not

politicalised. The EU counter-terrorism unit should step up its game in preventing the factors

which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment of citizens33. Furthermore, the four pillars of

the EU counter-terrorism strategy should be actively implemented.

On a final note, (Calleya: 2013) concludes that only by standing up for progress and serious

development across the sub-saharan Africa and Middle East, by promoting democracy, freedom

and the observance of human rights can the developed states of the Western world undermine

those championing intolerance and campaigns of terror.

33 See EU counter terrorism Strategy

48

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An Eides statt versichere ich, dass die Arbeit

Illegal Migration in the Mediterranean Sea: who benefits?

von mir selbst und ohne jede unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt wurde, dass sie noch keiner anderenStelle zur Prüfung vorgelegen hat und dass sie weder ganz, noch im Auszug veröffentlichtworden ist. Die Stellen der Arbeit – einschließlich Tabellen, Karten, Abbildungen usw. –, dieanderen Werken dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, habe ich in jedemeinzelnen Fall als Entlehnung kenntlich ge¬macht.

I declare by oath that the thesis,

Illegal Migration in the Mediterranean Sea: who benefits?

has been prepared by me alone and only with permitted means of help, that it has not beensubmitted to any other institution for evaluation, and that it has not been published either inwhole or in part. All instances in the thesis – including tables, charts, graphs, etc. – where otherworks have been quoted verbatim, paraphrased or consulted, have been clearly indicated asreferences.

(Place, Date, Signature)

Bonn, 31 August 2017, Faith Gabriel

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