WORKING PAPERS SERIES, No. 79, WPS/MC/2010IIM Kozhikode

Ben Franklin’s Precepts of Virtue: Or, Anxiety and Desire in Self-Management

SHIVA KUMAR SRINIVASAN

My intention being to acquire the habitude of all these virtues, I judged it would be well not to distract my attention by attempting the whole at once, but to fix it on one of them at a time; and, when I should be a master of that, then proceed to another, and so on till I had gone through the thirteen…

- Benjamin Franklin (1784, p. 77)

IntroductionBenjamin Franklin is known to have followed an ethic of speech which dictated that he should speak ill of no one and all the good that he knew about everybody. This ethic is interesting from both a social and a psychoanalytic point of view. It also gives us a clue to the secret of how the speaking subject attempts to constitute his identity through speech (De Certeau and Logan, 1983). What exactly is at stake in such an ethic of speech? How is the subject to discover the secret of his identity? What, furthermore, is the relationship between the modalities of speech and the subject’s attempt to forge his own sense of identity? Is there, for instance, a form of identity without speech? What, if any, is the correct manner of speech? How much provocation, for instance, should the subject or a nation tolerate before it is possible to speak up in the context of diplomacy? Does a diplomatic approach mean that issues should be glossed over? Or is there a tactful way of ensuring, through the diplomatic process, that justice is done in a given situation? These and many other questions must have been important for the young Franklin given his later success as a diplomat, leader, scientist, social philosopher, and statesman. There are no easy answers to these questions however since the modalities of working-

1

through the challenge posed by such questions must be understood by an analyst of decision making who wants to formalize these learnings on a case-by-case basis. The acceptable approaches to problem solving will also differ from society to society. That is why it is important to try and understand the specific dimensions in a case rather than convert it symbolically to mean whatever a person wants it to mean.

If we decide to use the example of Benjamin Franklin as an interesting case study in not only the realm of diplomacy, but in order to understand the relationship between diplomacy and the modalities of decision making, then, we will be able to generate interesting insights that are not only informed by psychoanalysis but can also serve as a contribution to a theory of self-management. But we must begin with a caveat: Franklin’s position of speaking diplomatically must not be mistaken for naïveté. Franklin was not only a social philosopher, but someone who had an acute understanding of the follies of human nature (Bowen, 1974). The problem of being diplomatic in speech then had to do with his understanding that mere ‘fulmination’ will not solve social problems; it must therefore not be conflated with denial. It is more a case of knowing when to invoke candour, and when to invoke diplomacy since both have their uses in problem solving situations. Franklin’s predilection for a structural analysis and description of a problem stems from appreciating the need to understand problems clearly before trying to solve them. A case study then can either be read as a ‘symbol’ or as something ‘specific’ depending on the situation. It is only in so far as we know when to invoke the symbolic, and when to be specific, that we will understand the significance of Franklin’s work. This is all the more necessary when we are dealing with a protagonist who is not a contemporary but an important figure

2

in colonial America, and who is therefore removed from us in ethos, space, and time.

Modalities of SpeechWhat are the modalities of speech that befit any given occasion? This is an essential question in diplomacy, and can be thought through by anybody who is interested in the relationship between the modalities of speech, thought, and symbolic behaviour. This is, again, an interesting problem in terms of the differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal communication. Should the speaking subject, for instance, be as careful in how he speaks to himself as he speaks to others? What are the implications of the answer to the problem of ‘interiority’ in a theory of subjectivity? These are not just questions pertaining to cognitive modalities per se, but are linked to the internal relationship between ‘cognition and culture’ (Nair, 2002). Literary critics and linguists, for instance, are interested in how these cognitive-cum-cultural differences can affect the process of literary interpretation and the flow of meaning in a text; which, needless to say, has implications for a theory of subjectivity as well since the subject’s psyche is also a text that requires constant interpretation lest the knowing-subject lose touch with himself (Wright, 1998). This process of interpretation of not only the subject’s quest for meaning, but the modalities involved therein must be understood by all decision makers in the context of self-management, since the ‘self-that-manages’ is not the same as the ‘self-that-is-managed’ just as the ‘self-that-speaks’ is not the same as the ‘self-that-is-spoken-about’, though it is the fond hope of all speakers to narrow the gap between these selves as much as possible. The modalities of working-through the continuum between these notions of selves, and the relationship

3

between the affects and ideas attached to these selves, have caught the attention of not only theorists but also managers and other decision makers. They have, needless to say, encountered this gap in not only the modalities of decision making but in terms of the interpersonal dynamics that characterizes life in organizations. There is a good reason for this: we are moving towards organizational and social formations where the relationship between the self and the world will become not only increasingly turbulent, but marked by an unprecedented amount of socio-economic change and uncertainty. In such circumstances, there is a strong need to understand the relationship between the ‘management of the self’ and the ‘management of meaning’ as prerequisites to not only decision making, but to the theory and practice of leadership since both the notions of ‘self’ and ‘meaning’ are split by the linguistic difference between a ‘statement’ and an ‘utterance’ given that subjectivity is mediated by language (Benveniste, 1958; Jakobson, 1960). That is why the resonant example of interesting and ‘influential predecessors’ like Benjamin Franklin is important for understanding the constraints and demands of diplomacy and leadership in these difficult times. Invoking Franklin as a case study in self-management then is a pragmatic way of making literary knowledge useful for present circumstances.

Symptomatic DecisionsThe questions enumerated above are however not reducible to the personality of Franklin per se since they also partake of the structural relationship between anxiety, desire, discourse, speech, language, and the unconscious, which are the constitutive factors that are presupposed in a theory of subjectivity (Cadava, 1991); and which, if understood in the context of self-management, will help us to formalize the dilemmas experienced by decision-makers who must make decisions under pressure without letting trying circumstances open up

4

their unconscious (i.e. without acting-out repressed conflicts in the socio-symbolic). This is because the presuppositions about the nature of decision making are related to a theory of desire given that the decision maker must not only know ‘what’ to decide, but also ‘how’ to decide, and ‘whether’ or ‘not’ to decide in a given situation. The subject who is undergoing a formal analysis either in response to the suffering caused by a form of psychopathology or in order to get to know himself better often reveals that he has a problem with decision making. Understanding how subjects with a neurotic disposition handle the crisis of decision making in everyday life then can serve as a theoretical ‘magnifier’ of the difficulties in decision making as such. For most so-called neurotic subjects, decision making in everyday life is extremely complicated (including simple decisions) since they are accompanied by ritualized forms of activity, bouts of anxiety, irrational fears, mood swings, procrastination, etc. While the neurotic subject may have a fairly good understanding of the modalities of the neurotic forms of decision making that hold him in its grip, he will not be able to break the constraints merely through will-power since there could be an unconscious need to suffer the symptom. The modalities of rational decision making, which proceeds through a systematic listing of choices and the evaluation of these choices through prioritized criteria of evaluation, then, will come across as nothing short of a fairy tale for the neurotic subject. So while all decision making, insofar as it involves making choices, is mediated by a ‘symptomatic’ structure, the neurotic subject is more likely to provide an endless set of excuses for either not taking decisions or timing them incorrectly. Analogously, it is possible to argue that these neurotic afflictions have a bearing on how organizations function as well not only in terms of decision making, but in terms of its over all culture (Kets de Vries and Miller, 1985). So, in these cases, what we wind up with is a ‘rationalization’ of choices

5

dictated by the unconscious rather than rational decision making with as few symptomatic impediments as possible.

Decision MakingWhy is the neurotic subject unable to make decisions without subjecting himself to hell? The answer, according to psychoanalysis, is that there is a cost factor in a neurosis. This cost factor pertains to the fact that not only is the psyche preoccupied with unconscious conflicts; the subject does not understand why certain things affect him in a particular way, or why certain problems have a particular resonance. The point of the psychoanalysis is to acquaint the subject with a better understanding of the situation in which he finds himself thereby making it easier to make choices or take decisions. This is why patients are advised not to take important decisions during the course of the treatment and wait until they have a better understanding of who they are, where they are coming from, what challenges they have had to overcome, and what is it that they would now like to do at the end of the treatment. This is especially the case if they have to carry the responsibility for decision making in the firm since the consequences and implications of a decision will affect not only the decision maker but the other members of the firm as well. These then are the types of situations, which may or not have an element of psychopathology, that are of interest to those who work on the relationship between psychoanalysis and management (Kets de Vries, 1995; Kets de Vries, 2004). The locus in which an embryonic version of these possibilities can be glimpsed though is in the area of decision making. What a firm decides to do, how it decides to go about thinking through the implications of a given decision, and the modalities of implementation will give us an opportunity to understand the internal differences between the styles of decision making that characterize its key set of managers. It will also throw light on how the unconscious and

6

conscious dimensions of the organizational structure represent the perennial conflict between the demands of a ‘libidinal economy’ and the corrective resolutions of a ‘symbolic economy’. Firms which do not have a clear understanding of their value systems, or which exploit their customers, employees, and other stakeholders will incur a cost in the medium to long-term by way of reputational risk, even if they continue to be in denial about the consequences of their actions in the short term. Decision making then is not reducible to a technical exercise, but nonetheless partakes of a technical dimension. In other words, the criteria of evaluation that are used to choose between a list of options by decision makers can include a wide range of possibilities, and must therefore be carefully thought through by those who have been entrusted with the task of decision making.

Agency and SubjectivityWhatever be the relevant criteria, the element of desire affects decision making because decision makers are affected by the problem of risk analysis in terms of their personal style as decision makers, irrespective of how risk is defined or situated within the formal criteria of evaluation. Those who have an excessively high risk appetite or those who have no risk appetite will partake of a style of decision making that will be unable to handle either threats or opportunities effectively since their style of decision making says more about them as decision makers rather than about either the situation that requires a decision, or about the criteria of evaluation that helps a firm to negotiate the ‘threats-opportunities continuum’ without making mistakes. Such decision makers are prone to acting-out ‘compulsively’ since the threats-opportunities continuum is the context in which the relationship between anxiety and desire is meant to be worked through both in terms of personal and professional decisions. Not understanding the relationship between anxiety and desire will also

7

lead to a misunderstanding of the cost factor in the risks inherent to decision making, especially when decision makers are haunted by unconscious conflicts that make it difficult to prioritize the criteria of evaluation correctly. This may also be because they are not clear if they are acting from the locus of the agent or the locus of the subject, and what proportion of a range of decisions will come under the ambit of ‘agency’ as opposed to that of ‘subjectivity’. That is also why a sense of restraint is as much a virtue in a good decision maker as the habit of decisiveness. Furthermore when decision makers take pride in behaving as unethical agents, they encourage other levels of employees in the organization to emulate these ‘worst-practices’ as well until the entire organization is vitiated with cynicism. Understanding these decision making dynamics is also interesting because it will then become possible to formalize practices of decision making from a range of areas and institutions like the armed forces, bureaucracies, diplomacy, educational institutions, industrial organizations, multi-national companies, professional service firms, non-profits, etc. That is why the case method of practicing with process-based decision making situations is not reducible to management education, but is widely deployed by a number of professional schools in the Anglo-American world where decision making skills have to be inculcated in students. In this model of case-based education, Franklin can be put to work in other contexts as well.

Acting versus Acting-OutUnderstanding the relationship between anxiety and desire in theory of subjectivity, I will argue, is important because it will help us to situate the challenges of rational decision making, given especially the ubiquitous propensity to acting-out in decision making situations. There is, needless to say, a thin line that separates decisiveness that should serve as an ideal since it is animated by the need for ‘a bias for

8

action’ (Bruch and Ghoshal, 2004) vis-à-vis acting-out which stems from the inability to work-through ‘unconscious conflicts’ in the decision maker’s psyche (Arnaud, 2002; Evans, 1996; Kets de Vries, 2009). Since this conflict is neither formally acknowledged nor worked-through quietly by the decision maker, there is a danger of externalizing the conflict in situations that go beyond those in which the subject is used to taking decisions. In situations however that are not reducible to the usual decision making modalities and which might have settled into organizational routines, and where the unintended consequences cannot be accurately predicted, the propensity to acting-out can be extremely high since the decision maker will come under enormous pressure to take a quick decision. While decisions can be taken quickly, the consequences and implications of such decisions may take some time to develop into a full-fledged crisis if they are ‘impulsive’ rather than quick. In such situations, it will not suffice to merely work on managing perceptions if a mistake has been made and the cost factor in being in continual denial can be quite high. This element of denial on the part of the decision maker may be related either to his inner-world or the outer-world. Most decision makers are able to own up to complexities in the outer world which made it difficult for them despite their best attempts to take a correct decision; the level of resistance is actually in admitting that there exists a ‘correlative’ in the inner world as well, i.e., in the unconscious. It is almost as though the unconscious conflict was waiting for an opportunity to push the decision maker into a series of irreversible decisions that cannot be undone even if he decides to do so. This level of denial is linked to the ideal of rationality; since, after all, decision makers aspire to as much rationality as possible (given that their sense of pride and self-worth are linked to making effective choices for themselves and for those who work in their firms). Recent attempts to develop theories of emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Goleman,

9

1999) within the context of managerial psychology and self-management are important then precisely because they are attempting to codify thought patterns that add value, and in order to develop strategies of self-management that will substantially reduce the possibility of transferential and counter-transferential turbulence between the parties to a transaction which requires a rational decision or resolution (Kets de Vries, 2004).

Speech and Decision MakingWhile it is not possible to answer all the difficult questions and address all the problems of ‘rational’ decision making in this essay, it must be noted that Franklin abhorred idle speech since he had an intuitive notion that speech is linked to the problem of desire; and, by implication, to the modalities of decision making. Whether we define speech as an expression of desire, or as a medium to discover what sort of desire animates the subject of decision making, or a bit of both, it was necessary for him that some social benefit should accrue from speech, especially when he could be ‘overheard’ by others, as was the case in the social situations that he found himself in as a diplomat, in England, France, and elsewhere (Schiff, 2005; Wood, 2004). When this was not possible, it was better to remain silent since speech as an end in itself becomes a symptom of futility, especially in the context of decision making and the management of the self. Furthermore, Franklin’s preoccupation with the role of persuasion in diplomacy meant that he preferred to strike a modest tone whenever possible rather than waste political capital in unseemly speech. Franklin preferred to discuss a problem in such a way that the solution would emerge from within the context of the discussion itself rather than make it seem like an external imposition on his interlocutors, but did not hesitate to return to a topic tactfully if the quality of the discussion were to slacken. The interesting thing about people like Franklin is that

10

they represent the evolution of both identity and difference in society, since the process of negotiating change is not reducible to just one of these states. Franklin is, in a sense, what he has always been but every generation reads the ‘significance’ of his life and work differently. While Franklin’s designated status as one of the founding fathers of the United States remains unchallenged, we cannot but describe his work differently in order to put him to work once again not only in the cause of the ideals that he represents, but for the manner in which he set out to discover them. That is why he is of interest to a contemporary audience given that the onus of professional education in a range of disciplines today is based on the primacy of ‘process’ in the classroom over the end-product, not only in terms of the grading modalities but also in terms of the structure of a case discussion. Understanding the notion of prudential decision making that Franklin practiced then will make it possible for decision makers to function from the pragmatist locus of good habits rather than invoke a metaphysical notion of the Good, which will plunge them into cynicism, despair, and ‘learned helplessness’ when they are not able to sufficiently negotiate the complexities of human nature and organizations.

Franklin & DruckerHow will the precepts of virtue that Franklin identified, in his autobiography, serve as a guide to those who are struggling to find their way ahead? I will argue that it is not so much the contents of these precepts that matter per se since sensible people can disagree on these (given their emergence in a specific context even though they sound astonishingly contemporary), but the fact that Franklin was willing to subject himself to the process of thinking through and

11

developing his own guide like a citizen of the Enlightenment. Franklin was able to do this despite or precisely because of his lack of formal education in colonial America. Franklin, in a sense, is an interesting predecessor to Drucker, the philosopher of both management and self-management, who passed away recently; both were printers at heart. Franklin, incidentally, worked in one to earn his livelihood. It was through the process of working in a printer’s shop, and while managing one, subsequently, that Franklin first experienced the joy of learning. The word ‘Drucker’, as Peter was fond of reminding everyone, is the Dutch word for ‘printer’. The revolutionary impact of Gutenberg’s printing press made itself known in the American context through these two philosophers of self-management (Drucker, 1999). In the robust world of individuals that constitutes the essence of American society, self-management will always be as important, or even more important than other forms of management, since the terms ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ presuppose the availability of individuals who not only pursue the founding ideals of the Declaration of Independence vigorously, but are also aware of the need to develop the psychological and political frameworks necessary to bring it to pass in the communities and the society to which they belong (Boorstin, 1964; Boorstin, 1967; Boorstin, 1974; Bailyn, 1990; Vidal, 2003).

Self-ManagementFranklin, I argue, was not only successful in developing this strong sense of self that was necessary in the era in which he lived, but was the first to formalize the modalities of self-development, self-management, and self-renewal in the unabashed way that the world has come to term, ‘American’. Franklin is not only a founding father of the United States, but the patron saint of all those who believe that an enterprising notion of self-management can be a perennial source of ‘self-renewal’ for not only the world of business, but for the polity at

12

large. Franklin, incidentally, was not content to merely list these virtues, but wanted to ‘internalize’ them along with the accompanying precepts as a necessary framework for what managers now understand to be self-management. The modalities of internalization are set out in the form of a process wherein the subject will embark upon a set of spiritual exercises, albeit within a secular frame of ‘working-through’, in order to determine the level of progress on any given day (Freud, 1914). The quest for this moral code then becomes a substitute for a paternal identification, and the notion of moral perfection that Franklin contemplates becomes a way of negotiating the implicit severity in the code. The fact, again, that Franklin did not attain moral perfection is not an argument against him. There are those who will argue that it is probably doing well, or as well as a subject is capable of doing, that Franklin has in mind even though perfection is the term that he is actually invoking here. While perfection is not empirically possible for the human subject, what is actually of consequence here is the passion with which he sought to find his way in a world marked by change and uncertainty.

Virtue as Good HabitsThe Other, for Franklin, is a locus and not the occupant of the locus. This however does not mean that there is no notion of the transference in Franklin’s work; there is. Otherwise Franklin would not have made it as a diplomat given that diplomacy necessarily involves the strength to negotiate culturally mediated transferences without incurring a loss of self or meaning. It is therefore important for Franklin to demarcate the difference between self and Other as carefully and tactfully as he can, albeit with a well-honed notion of power. Or, to put it formulaically: the self and Other matter and do not matter. The psychoanalytic tenor of Franklin’s advice has to do with the idea that both the self and the Other must be able to take decisions and intervene when necessary,

13

but must not allow themselves to be subsumed by the loci in which they find themselves. This is not easy to do since loci, like prices, can be ‘sticky’, but differentiation between the locus and the occupant of the locus must be attempted as a matter of learning to think clearly. This is what Franklin means by the art of cultivating virtues. For Franklin, a virtue is akin to a good habit rather than an invocation of the Aristotelian Good. It is not possible to pursue the Good without giving it some thought, since the formal content of the Good is subject to differences. Neither its form nor its content has been spelt out completely by the philosophers; that is why Franklin’s advice is still relevant. What Franklin takes away from the philosophers is not the final content of the Good but the modalities necessary to invoke and work-through the essential forms of ethical discovery; which, no doubt, are subject to individual and cultural differences. The transformation of the Good into a set of good habits will make it possible for a large number of people to foray into the realm of the Good even if they are not able to spell out its formal content. Franklin, in other words, is invoking a pragmatist notion of the Good rather than a metaphysical invocation of the Good. The absence of transcendental ethical criteria is however not a justification for doing whatever the subject wants to do. What the subject must do in order to develop ‘character’, according to Aristotle, is to begin with some inherent capacity and then build upon what is given (Coplestone, 2003).

The American AdamFranklin, it must be remembered, is not attempting to account himself to his Maker, but is instead trying to chart his way through an increasingly complex world that had suddenly become haunted by the possibility of freedom from colonial rule. This is a world where the notion of self and Other had to be rethought by the colonial subject. This process of rethinking gave rise to a genealogy of concerns about

14

the need to promote freedom in America and, by implication, for those inspired by the American example, in other parts of the world. Franklin’s consciousness, however, at the point at which he found himself, wavered between these two manifestations of the Other that constituted the world of his time: the ‘God of the Herein’, and the ‘God of the Hereafter’, since they represent two different attitudes for the colonized; and, by implication, the colonial subject towards not only the world, but to the problem of ‘duration’, since the approach to the former would decide what kind of life was worth living or even possible, in principle, in the New World. It is these concerns on the nature of human freedom that will also henceforth mark the spirit of the American Adam (Lewis, 1959). It is from this set of concerns on the nature of human freedom that the notion of American identity will begin to impress itself upon the modern world until a more equitable notion of the relationship between freedom and equality was worked out in the United States itself in the horrific aftermath of the Civil War.

The ‘Americanization’ of FranklinFranklin, incidentally, spent a considerable portion of his life abroad even though he was born and brought up in colonial America. While we situate Franklin in retrospect as a founding father of the United States, it is important to remember that the modalities of his transformation from a colonial subject, who lived abroad in Europe for the better part of his career, to becoming an ‘American’, have not been widely understood (Wood, 2004; Wood, 2006). This notion of identity however is marked by two existential co-ordinates: anxiety and desire. Developing the good habits that constitute the thirteen virtues is actually a robust strategy to manage the self and its relationship to the locus of the Other, such that the American subject will henceforth be able to embark on the pursuit of freedom without being overwhelmed by either anxiety or desire. The history of presidential discourse in the

15

United States, for instance, can be read along these co-ordinates. It is the task of the President to summon his fellow countrymen and women to action, but also to advocate restraint when necessary. The trade-off then between anxiety and desire in human action is an important clue to what is at stake when a leader addresses his followers, and helps to mediate the notion of national identity and its symbolic implications. The modalities of this trade-off then are what are at stake in symbolic addresses by the President to Congress and the American people. The term that mediates the relationship between anxiety and desire, in popular parlance, is fear. That is why the discourse of leadership is preoccupied with helping the people at large to distance themselves from fear since neither anxiety nor desire can be worked-through in the presence of fear. The object of fear is the actual or potential loss of equality and/or liberty in American society that would negate the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.

The Notion of American IdentityThe task of presidential discourse then is not only to serve as an opportunity to renew this sense of commitment to the ideals of the United States, but to proudly let the world know that, in fact, is the case since life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are not events; but, more fundamentally, an ethical attitude to the notion of American identity. The modalities for forging such an identity then in relation to the thirteen virtues is an interesting instantiation of the fundamental questions that relate a ‘theory of anxiety’ to a ‘theory of desire’ in psychoanalysis. In other words, Franklin seems to have understood that there is a structural component to anxiety, which constitutes the underside of desire and is its constant companion. There is no space of desire like Eden that is existentially devoid of anxiety. The cultivation of virtues then is a way of building in a principle of moderation in the psyche. It is interesting that Franklin understood the need to avoid

16

excess despite the compulsions of being a revolutionary patriot. Franklin’s account is however marked by optimism since for him good habits can be acquired through sheer force of practice. It does not require an appetite for metaphysics like the invocation of the Good. Franklin’s attempt then to construct a durable notion of self in time will give us an opportunity to understand the relationship between anxiety and desire and the role of speech in mediating between these two existential concerns. The lessons from such a study are of interest not only to those interested in psychoanalysis, but to the ‘worldly philosophers’ at large since Franklin was, eminently, a man of the world; and his writings prefigure the notion of ‘actionability’, that was necessary to forward the quest for freedom from colonial rule in 18th

century America (Heilbroner, 1999; Becker, 2003).

The Function of VirtuesWhat exactly is the function of these precepts of virtue? The precepts, I argue, are psychic objects whose task is to alleviate anxiety. My focus however is not on anxiety per se but on the relationship between anxiety and desire. The relationship between anxiety and desire can be understood dialectically; it is possible to argue that ‘anxiety is a way of sustaining desire when the object is missing and, conversely, desire is a remedy for anxiety, something easier to bear than anxiety itself’ (Evans, 1996). I will argue that, for Franklin, the precepts of virtue were of great consequence since they were a barrier against a more fundamental anxiety that is present underneath the riveting narrative that he presents in his autobiography. This fundamental anxiety pertains to Franklin’s uncertain sense of self after he left home and reached Philadelphia in order to not only make a living but a place for himself in the colonial era (Morgan, 2002). The function of these thirteen precepts then is to help Franklin orient himself to a new world whose lack seems to mirror his. The task of the society in which he

17

found himself was ‘individuation’. But this act of individuation had to be situated within the larger context of the idea of freedom that Franklin was suddenly confronted with. It is important to ask however why Franklin felt compelled to undertake a theoretical examination of what is meant by the term, ‘moral perfection’. Franklin, for instance, did not experience any compulsion from the demands or strictures of his religion. The minister who preached his Sunday sermons was, if anything, quite undemanding and confined himself to only a few points as relevant to following the example of the apostle prompting Franklin to compose his own liturgy.

Franklin’s Moral Pre-occupationsFranklin, no doubt, knew that perfection was not actually possible. Why then did he even bother? What psychic function did it serve? What was the link between this quest for perfection and his sense of identity? One possible explanation for the invocation of Franklin’s moral preoccupations is that he did not have a paternal figure to report to in Philadelphia. He therefore needed a stronger super-ego in order to make up for a paternal deficit. Neither the church nor the state was a source of stability in the colonial era. Everything was in a state of flux and repair and everyone was trying to find his own way. There was no map that would lead him to where he wanted to go and no one else seemed to have one either. Franklin was distressed by the fact that there was no agreement amongst the ministers of the church themselves on what, if anything, constituted virtue given that different ideas were attributed to the name of the same virtue. The term ‘virtue’ can be defined here as the correct thing to do when the subject is assailed by uncertainty in the self and/or the environment. The theological certitudes of the churches of yore were not historically recoverable in colonial America. Decision making in such a situation is not a mere technical exercise, but is one that is necessarily mediated,

18

for Franklin, by ‘prudence’ since it was not possible to derive a decision from the guarantees of faith alone (Franklin, 1772, p. 254). It was therefore more important for the decision maker to work out the criteria of evaluation that he felt most comfortable with since there was nothing in the environment that could serve as a complete guide to action. The world that Franklin depicts is one that is marked by the demands of immigrants and others struggling to make their way in society, rather than one marked by stability. It was therefore even more important for individuals to constantly ruminate on what yardsticks, if any, were appropriate to take the measure of the times and their contributions to it in order to get a sense of progress. Perplexity then was not the exception but the rule during these uncertain times, and the individual was left to work out what must be done in any given situation.

Prudence in Decision MakingIn a letter on the modalities of decision making to Joseph Priestley, the famous chemist, Franklin argues that while his usual style is to list all the arguments pro and con for taking a decision, and then checking to see which one is better, he still finds it necessary to remind himself that a decision maker is less likely to make a mistake, and more likely to get it right, if he is willing to invoke a ‘prudential algebra’. In other words, decision making is not a science; there is no technique of decision making that will guarantee success. The decision maker must therefore be prudent and willing to live with ‘the uncertainty that perplexes us’ (Franklin, 1772, p. 254). Franklin’s comments on these themes are those of someone in his later years wondering how, if at all, he managed to find his way in the world. The technique that Franklin recommends in addition to that of a prudential style of decision making is to think for oneself since no one quite knows the answers or may even know the answers in principle given that there

19

are no control groups in history unlike, say, a scientific experiment which can control the play of variables. This was also, in a sense, the existential wager of the Enlightenment. Can the process of education give individuals the confidence to think for themselves? If so, what are the modalities of individuation that are inherent in such a process? What are the basic requirements for such a thought process? What is the assurance, if any, that such an exercise will not become an act of folly? What are the corrective measures that must be in place when the subject ventures forth to think through a difficult problem on his own? Assailed as Franklin was by questions such as these (though not always in the formal sense that they are enunciated here), it became necessary for him to think for himself. Like most people who try to think for themselves, Franklin stumbled, quite spontaneously, into the cognitive link between language and thought.

Affect, Cognition, and LanguageGiven Franklin’s interests and achievements in science, it is not surprising that he should proceed forth with some measure of confidence despite his lack of formal education. ‘I proposed to myself’, he writes, ‘for the sake of clearness, to use rather more names, with fewer ideas annexed to each than a few names with more ideas; and I included under thirteen names of virtues all that at that time occurred to me as necessary or desirable, and annexed to each a short precept, which fully expressed the extent I gave to its meaning (Franklin, 1784, p. 75).’ This then is what he proceeds to do like a linguistic philosopher or psychoanalyst who is aware of the affective burden that coagulates in language, especially when a term has to carry too much meaning. There comes a point when, as psychoanalysts know, a signifier begins to mean just about anything because of the ease with which affects are ‘displaced’ from one signifier to another. Thinking for oneself is the strategy that Franklin recommends to prevent the self from being

20

overwhelmed by affect and/or meaning in a complex situation. The precepts of virtue function then to anchor the subject by mediating between anxiety and desire, which, if left unchecked, will overwhelm the subject with affect.

ConclusionThe following then are the virtues that Franklin identifies as those that he found useful in the sequence in which he put them: temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and humility. The precept is the actual annotation that is attached to each of these virtues in Franklin’s list. Franklin’s strategy of self-management was to internalize them one by one and keep a record of his progress in doing so. The idea was not to work on all these virtues at the same time, but to practice handling their demands sequentially until he was reasonably sure that he had internalized them. It was then necessary to move on to the next virtue and have a go at it until it, too, became a part of his psyche. Franklin started off only with twelve items, but added the last one on humility (as a cure for ‘pride’) at the advice of a friend. This is because he found that most people are given to pride. There is something structurally problematic about pride since even those who are able to get the better of their sense of pride feel proud of having done so. Pride then is the virtue that is the most difficult to be done with given the structure of the psyche; hence, the importance of the precept that Franklin attaches to it: ’Imitate Jesus and Socrates’ (Franklin, 1784, p. 77). The significance of these virtues however cannot be understood until we are able to understand the actual precept that accompanies it. It is the precept that contextualizes a virtue by moving it from the realm of

21

moral philosophy to the domain of everyday life. It is the precept that defines and manages not only Franklin’s expectations of himself but our expectations of his quest for identity. It is therefore important to focus not on the virtues per se, but on the precepts in order to understand whether Franklin’s moral schema is strong enough to help him to navigate his way through the world. So whether or not Franklin’s delineation of the virtues is ethically correct, theologically viable, and structurally sustainable, the important thing to remember is that it makes it possible for him to attempt the art of prudential decision making in the contexts of change and uncertainty by taking the precepts of virtue seriously (Anderson, 1997). It would therefore be incorrect to quibble with Franklin’s actual choice of the thirteen virtues and the precepts that accompany them since he does not claim that these are the only virtues that matter. It is more important to understand the cognitive and psychic functions that they must have served him and those who followed his example. These precepts of virtue, again, are not merely the choices that a young man reached out to instinctively, but ones that Franklin recommends in retrospect after a life well-spent in both action and contemplation.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Douglas (1997). The Radical Enlightenments of Benjamin Franklin (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 54-89.

Arnaud, Gilles (2002). ‘The Organization and the Symbolic: Organizational Dynamics Viewed from a Lacanian Perspective’, Human Relations, 55:6, pp. 691-716.

Bailyn, Bernard (1990). Faces of Revolution: Personalities and Themes in the Struggle for American Independence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).

Becker, Carl L. (2003). The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

22

Benveniste, Émile (1958). ‘Subjectivity in Language’, in Identity: A Reader, Paul du Gay et al (Ed.) (London: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 39-43.

Boorstin, Daniel J. (1964). The Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York: Vintage Books).

Boorstin, Daniel J. (1967). The Americans: The National Experience (New York: Vintage Books).

Boorstin, Daniel J. (1974). The Americans: The Democratic Experience (New York: Vintage Books).

Bowen, Catherine Drinker (1974). The Most Dangerous Man in America: Scenes From the Life of Benjamin Franklin (New York: Little, Brown & Company).

Bruch, Heike and Ghoshal, Sumantra (2004). A Bias for Action: How Effective Managers Harness Their Willpower, Achieve Results, and Stop Wasting Time (Boston: Harvard Business School Press), passim.

Cadava, Eduardo (1991). Who Comes After the Subject? (London and New York: Routledge).

Coplestone, Frederick (2003). ‘Aristotle’s Ethics’, History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus (London and New York: Continuum Books), p. 335.

De Certeau, Michel and Logan, Marie-Rose (1983). ‘Lacan: An Ethics of Speech’, Representations, 3, Summer, pp. 21-39.

Drucker, Peter (1999). Management Challenges for the 21st Century (New York: Harper Business), pp. 161-195.

Evans, Dylan (1996). ‘Anxiety’, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 10-12.

Franklin, Benjamin (1772). ‘To Joseph Priestley, on Moral Algebra, or Decision Making’, in The Autobiography and Other Writings, Peter Shaw (Ed.) (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 253-54.

Franklin, Benjamin (1784). ‘Continuation of the Account of My Life, Begun at Passy, 1784’, The Autobiography and Other Writings, Peter Shaw (Ed.) (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 71-85.

23

Freud, Sigmund (1914). ‘Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through’, translated by James Strachey, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 12 (London: Vintage/The Hogarth Press, 2001), pp. 145-156.

Goleman, Daniel (1995). Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ (New York: Bantam Books).

Goleman, Daniel (1999). Working with Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam Books).

Heilbroner, Robert L. (1999). The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers (New York: Touchstone).

Jakobson, Roman (1960). ‘Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics’, in Style in Language, Thomas Sebok (Ed.) (New York: Wiley), pp. 350-377.

Kets de Vries, Manfred F.R. and Miller, Danny (1985). The Neurotic Organization: Diagnosing and Changing Counterproductive Styles of Management (San Francisco and London: Josey Bass Publishers).

Kets de Vries, Manfred F.R. (1995). ‘Touched by the Shadow of Freud’, Personnel Psychology, 48:2, pp. 471-474.

Kets de Vries, Manfred F.R. (2004). ‘Spotlight: Cultural Approaches to Management’, Management Decision, 42:7/8, pp. 925-931.

Kets de Vries, Manfred F.R. (2009). ‘Action and Reflection: The Emotional Dance between Consultant and Client’, INSEAD Working Paper, 2009/21/EFE/IGLC.

Lewis, R.W.B. (1959). The American Adam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Morgan, Edmund (2002). Benjamin Franklin (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

Nair, Rukmini Bhaya (2002). Narrative Gravity: Conversation, Cognition, Culture (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Schiff, Stacy (2005). A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America (New York: Henry Holt and Company).

24

Vidal, Gore (2003). Inventing a Nation: Washington, Adams, Jefferson (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

Wood, Gordon S. (2004). The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin (New York: The Penguin Press).

Wood, Gordon S. (2006). ‘The Invention of Benjamin Franklin’, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different (New York: The Penguin Press), pp. 65-90.

Wright, Elizabeth (1998). ‘Structural Psychoanalysis: Psyche as Text’, Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reappraisal (New York: Routledge), pp. 99-119.

25