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I will start off this IG Complaint with the above “Values” from the Defense Contracting Management Agency’s own web page. http://www.dcma.mil/values.htm Start Quote -They are commitments we make to our country, as well as to our customers, our stakeholders, and ourselves. Loyalty Bear true faith and allegiance to our nation, DCMA, our customers and stakeholders. Our people are loyal citizens. We demonstrate our loyalty to DCMA, our customers, and our stakeholders by striving to meet the highest standards of quality performance. Duty Fulfill your obligations. When we make commitments to our teammates, our customers, and ourselves, we keep them. We fully understand our mission and the vital role it plays in supporting our nation's war-fighters. Respect Treat people as they should be treated. People are DCMA. We value their opinions and ideas. We believe diversity is a force multiplier. We trust, respect, and help one another. Honor Live up to all the DCMA values. Our values promote personal dignity, integrity, and pride. Integrity Do what's right - legally and morally. We value personal and organizational integrity. The American taxpayer and our war-fighting customers deserve and demand nothing less than the highest possible level of personal integrity. We are fully accountable for the resources entrusted to our care. End Quote Along with that I will give some background information. I am an Air Force Reservist who volunteered to serve in Iraq working for the Defense Contracting Management Agency. I arrived in the International Zone 15Nov04 and began working at the DCMA office located in Room M213 which is in the middle wing of the Baghdad Palace. The Commanders at the time were Colonel John Miles (AF) and Deputy Commander was

IG - Iraq 2005

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I will start off this IG Complaint with the above ³Values´ from the Defense Contracting Management Agency¶s own web page. http://www.dcma.mil/values.htmStart Quote -They are commitments we make to our country, as well as to our customers, our stakeholders, and ourselves.Loyalty Bear true faith and allegiance to our nation, DCMA, our customers and stakeholders. Our people are loyal citizens. We demonstrate our loyalty to DCMA, our customers, and our stakeholders by striving to meet the highest

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Page 1: IG - Iraq 2005

I will start off this IG Complaint with the above “Values” from the Defense Contracting Management Agency’s own web page.

http://www.dcma.mil/values.htm

Start Quote -They are commitments we make to our country, as well as to our customers, our stakeholders, and ourselves.

Loyalty Bear true faith and allegiance to our nation, DCMA, our customers and stakeholders. Our people are loyal citizens. We demonstrate our loyalty to DCMA, our customers, and our stakeholders by striving to meet the highest standards of quality performance.

Duty Fulfill your obligations. When we make commitments to our teammates, our customers, and ourselves, we keep them. We fully understand our mission and the vital role it plays in supporting our nation's war-fighters.

Respect Treat people as they should be treated. People are DCMA. We value their opinions and ideas. We believe diversity is a force multiplier. We trust, respect, and help one another.

Honor Live up to all the DCMA values. Our values promote personal dignity, integrity, and pride.

Integrity Do what's right - legally and morally. We value personal and organizational integrity. The American taxpayer and our war-fighting customers deserve and demand nothing less than the highest possible level of personal integrity. We are fully accountable for the resources entrusted to our care. End Quote

Along with that I will give some background information.

I am an Air Force Reservist who volunteered to serve in Iraq working for the Defense Contracting Management Agency. I arrived in the International Zone 15Nov04 and began working at the DCMA office located in Room M213 which is in the middle wing of the Baghdad Palace. The Commanders at the time were Colonel John Miles (AF) and Deputy Commander was LTC John Howell (Army). My job was to work with Lt Baum (Navy) who was the Administrative Contracting Officer responsible for expenditures of LOGCAP Task Order 100 monies and other previous Task Orders for the previous 12 months. I became well versed on what LOGCAP was all about and that it was a pot of money obligated to support the “War Fighters” in the Theater. This pot of money however was 60% Department of State money and 40% Department of Defense. So we actually had someone from the Department of State, Harold Price who actually sat in our office and said if “someone, and organization, or country” actually qualified for support from DCMA. That support was for Life Support such as food, housing, laundry, and then additionally support could include vehicles, fuel, building repairs, and a host of other repairs and items that might be found at any military base. The main provider of those services and support was Kellogg, Brown, and Root, also known as Halliburton. DCMA gave direction and customers, and we had 1,000 Acronyms of customers, that we

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supported. To give you an idea on some of the customers that we responsible for let me name a few:

MarinesArmyAir ForceUS MarshalsFBINSAAmbassadors from the United States (30)United NationsNATOUSAIDEGlobal (British company who had 1,300 plus security workers from Nepal) that the Embassy relied heavily upon for security.US Justice Department

If you name the acronym and they were most working in the Palace and dependent upon KBR for their life support and dependant upon DCMA to ensure that the contracted services were indeed being provided according to the Statement of Procedures – a binder with 42 different areas in it.

KBR has an 8-year contract with the US Government to provide 42 different areas of service to the US Government. This is a contract that was agreed and DCMA was/is to ensure that they fulfilled their obligations. The contract is a performance based contract and their profit is based upon on how well they fulfill their obligation and that reporting done by DCMA at something called an Award Fee Board. If KBR gets high marks across the board then they are entitled to a full 3% profit. A lesser performance will cause them to lose percentage until they reach the lowest of 1% profit.

To document deficiencies in KBRs performance the “American taxpayer and our war-fighting customers deserve and demand nothing less than the highest possible level of personal integrity” from DCMA to report those deficiencies in something called a Corrective Action Report so that there is full visibility and accountability and that KBR take action to correct the problems.

And here is what I am going to report in this IG complaint.

KBR failed it’s contractual obligation in regards to Water Operations and were delivering untreated water to the (3) 98,000 gallon water tanks that supplied the Baghdad Palace and to the many Man-Camps in Tanker Trucks that were also used to haul sewage and fuel. Laundry Operations went down for 17 days because of KBRs lack of oversight and a fuel truck was allowed to bring a water delivery to the 4 tanks outside the laundry. That same fuel truck was delivering water to the man-camps causing people to complain that their showers smelled like fuel. The Statement of Procedures in regards to water states that KBR is responsible of ALL water operations. Read it for yourself. Don’t make a phone call there and ask. Get the SOP and read it. It says ALL water operations. Potable and Non-Potable. Camp Victory was processing water properly and laughed when I was told them what was going on at the Green Zone. I was able to go there and take some pictures of the proper way water was supposed to be processed and will provide that attached.

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--Specifically KBR failed to keep a log of each water delivery as required.--Failed to set the chlorination level for each water truck before delivering.--Failed to Super Clean each water truck once a week with a Super Chlorinated solution.--Failed to monitor the water tanks that they did supply to ensure a safe water supply.--KBR even failed to tell users of the water they delivered that it was not Potable water prior to February.

In Fact KBR had no Water Operations Management Team in place before February 2005 yet had been there since mid-2003. Presumably being paid to provide water operations even though they failed.

KBR failed to ensure that the emergency supply of MREs was protected from temperatures in excess of 80 degrees even after being warned by the Medical Squadron in writing in the Spring of 2004 to not let that occur. The manager who managed the MREs told me that KBR ignored his requests to insulate and protect the MREs and the Warehouse temperatures reached 130 degrees. Those $1.2 million worth of MREs which the International Zone depends upon may be spoiled and need to be replaced. The Warehouse still needs to be insulated and was written up again by the Medical Squadron as we approach another summer of inaction by KBR.

The Palace Kitchen was in such a poor state that when I contacted a health official he said that just by the pictures I provided that the facility should be shut down and not be allowed to reopen until all deficiencies are repaired.

The new dining hall that was being built is now going to be used as a Morale and Welfare building when $2.1 million in funds were obligated for a dining hall – not an MWR facility.

How did I come into a position to even know about this? In early February, John Golden, a GS-11 decided after 3 weeks in Iraq to resign. I was told in a staff meeting on February 5, 2005, that I would be taking his place until a replacement could be found in the States for him. I was trained by John Golden and also by Randy Sanders, a Quality Assurance Representative with 15-years experience and also Kelli Sipple, another very experience QAR with many years of experience.

I first discovered a problem with the Palace Dining hall and contacted a Health Inspector to get his opinion on the situation. At the time I was actually being told by KBR that the binder that I had with the Statement of Procedures was actually just an internal document and not contractually binding in any way. Randy Sanders, a 15-year QAR helped me convince KBR managers that that was not the case – it was a contract, agreed to in Huston, Texas, and the operations procedures that they were to follow at each and every single base – without exception.

The next thing I discovered was that KBR had no logbooks for the water trucks and no Water Operations Management team. The trucks, according to the SOP, were supposed to be “Super Cleaned” once a week. They were not and still are not.

After discovering that KBR was not following the Statement of Procedures at all in regards to the Water Operations and there were serious problems in the Palace dining hall, I reported the health inspectors warning on the dining facility to my commanders, now a Colonel McQuain (Army) and LTC John Howell (Army) I was told to destroy the message and not to talk about it to anyone. Oddly enough Taryk Ferris, KBRs project manager was in the office the next day with a $1 million estimate to perform repairs on the Palace Kitchen. (Those repairs were never completed according to KBRs Dining Facility Manager for the Palace – just another charade)

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I was told by the Lead QAR for Iraq, Chris Hennifer, that what I found was very serious and that I should write a CAR on KBR for the discrepancies. Yet when I talked about that to my commanders they were not backing me up at all and in fact were starting to remove me from the position of QAR by bring someone else and telling me that I was going to be replaced. I filed a Corrective Action Report on KBR for their lack of Water Operations and was told by Captain David the new QAR to retract it. I refused because I was advised by Randy Sanders that it’s a valid write-up and KBR needed to take corrective action.

Note: When John Golden resigned we knew that it would take over a month to get a qualified QAR out to Baghdad. But when I started finding the number of SOPs that were being violated, DCMA brought out another unqualified QAR in hopes that he wouldn’t write up KBR immediately from Kuwait.

I wrote to DCMAs 2-Star General, MG Darryl Scott about the problems that I was finding and the lack of support and the cover-up that I was experiencing. MG Scott never wrote me back and in fact these commanders went on with covering up the fact that KBR had no water operations and did not require them to comply with their obligations. 3 QARs agree that KBR should be written up for each violation because that is the right thing to do. It is not up to DCMA to cover-up the lack of performance by KBR so that Halliburton can make a financial gain by not performing, yet still being paid.

When I asked the Audit Agency for DCMA DCAA for numbers of water trucks making deliveries vs the numbers of sewage trucks and were they the same trucks – I was directed by Captain David to stop making inquiries into that. When I took this to the commanders they again failed to support me into the inquiry and failed to inquired themselves. I know because I asked DCAA staff.

When I asked DCAA to tell me if KBR was actually being paid for Water Operations managers or employees in that area I was again told to back off and stop making inquiries.

When I took the problem to my commanders they again failed to act and in fact ask why I was pressing on with filing a CAR on KBR. Why Commanders? Because as your own DCMA Values state “Integrity Do what's right - legally and morally. We value personal and organizational integrity. The American taxpayer and our war-fighting customers deserve and demand nothing less than the highest possible level of personal integrity.”

When I took the problem to MG Scott, he too failed to act by not ensuring that KBR met it’s contractual obligations. He failed to support me in my duties as a QAR trying to do the job a QAR is supposed to do.

When I asked Colonel McQuain and LTC Conklin to have KBR have all the water trucks tested to see if they were still safe to haul water – that request was denied. Both commanders allowed KBR to continue to deliver water in suspect trucks and also knowing that each load of water was still not being tested and set to a prescribed chlorination level. Colonel McQuain and LTC Conklin continued to allow water delivery even though the city water was know to have high metal content and had not been properly treated. These commanders continued to allow water to be delivered even though they knew the trucks were not being cleaned weekly as required by the SOP.

I reported to Captain David that I saw a Potable water truck being filled up with Non-Potable city water and I was told to again back off. This Potable water truck was taking water from Camp Prosperity to the Al Rasheed Dining Facility or DFAC and also to the KBR dining facility. For Captain David to allow this and again not write up KBR for failing to Super Clean the trucks was a complete charade and a total failure of those we were entrusted to provide with water.

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I had actually heard from Major McCullum, a Logistical Planner working in DCMA, and Lt Baum, and Harold Price that the water issue was never pressed because “No one ever got sick.” And they didn’t “feel” that it was needed. It was widely known that people coming to the Green Zone would experience the “Baghdad Crud” – diarrhea that would never go away. It was explained to me by Taryk Ferris in February, that KBR knew the metal content in the water was high and it did no good to even drill down 200 feet because the ground water was also contaminated with heavy metals.

Soldiers and Contractors that were in contact to this contaminated water should be aware of what they were exposed to from 2003 to present. I say present because the same practices that I discovered are still going on because of the lack of leadership in DCMA.

I will say it again. DCMA is to manage the contract – not allow KBR to profit by not fulfilling it’s obligations. And DCMA should back up and support the employees with the integrity to report the lack of performance by KBR rather than try to cover the situation up and remove a Quality Assurance Representative who is actually doing their job. Assuring Quality.

This IG Complaint is against:

MG Darryl Scott (Air Force)– Director of DCMAColonel John McQuain (Army)LTC Darryl Conklin (Army)Captain Roben David (Air Force)Colonel Miles (USAF) LTC Howell (Army)

I know for a fact that IG complaints against Army LTC and above are investigated at Pentagon level. And considering the number of people of are dependant upon a safe water and food supply at the US Embassy and surrounding man camps – I would consider this an urgent matter that should not be delayed.

Just for the lack of proper water operations alone and not complying with the Statement of Procedures and complying with Army Meds 576, which is the regulation for fixed base operations, which the Palace site is, also not being followed to the Army’s own guidelines is enough to say that the 4 Award Fee Boards that met to decide KBRs profits was nothing other than a charade and should be looked at again.

If DCMA wants employees with some integrity then they should respect and support them in the jobs they are doing. If not – perhaps DCMA is not qualified to oversee the KBR contract.

Keven L. Barnes, MSgt, USAFRDCMA

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