Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century A.D.Author(s): Michael BrettSource: The Journal of African History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1969), pp. 347-364Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179670Accessed: 23/05/2009 15:08

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Journal of African History, x, 3 (I969), pp. 347-364 347 Printed in Great Britain

IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE FROM THE TENTH TO THE TWELFTH

CENTURY A.D.

BY MICHAEL BRETT

IFRIQIYA is the early Arabic name for the eastern Maghrib, basically modern Tunisia, but including also a section of modern Algeria. It was consolidated into a dominion by the Aghlabids in the ninth century A.D., and served the Fatimids in the tenth century as their base for the conquest of Egypt in 969. From the departure of the Fatimids for Egypt in 972 until the Almohad conquest in i 60, Ifriqiya was characterized by the Zirids, a dynasty sprung from the Sanhaja Berbers of the central Maghrib, which was left in charge of their Maghribi dominions by the Fatimids and sur- vived until the Norman capture of Mahdiya in II48. Until the mid- eleventh century the capital was Qayrawan, inland on the plains; but thereafter the dynasty lost its hold over most of the country, Qayrawan was abandoned, and the Zirids in the coastal city of Mahdiya became only one of a number of petty dynasties. Meanwhile in the west from the early eleventh century onwards, the central Maghrib had fallen to the Hammadids, a junior branch of the Zirids, whose original capital on the high plains, their Qal'a, was similarly abandoned in the second half of the eleventh century for the port of Bougie.

The earlier part of the period, to the mid-eleventh century, is commonly held to have been one of great economic prosperity1 especially remarkable for its agriculture. Qayrawan was a political, economic and cultural metropolis,2 and Professor Goitein is in the process of demonstrating on the basis of the Geniza documents3 that Ifriqiya was also a major com- mercial and industrial centre. The remaining hundred years, however, are usually thought of in terms of political and economic catastrophe, when the state disintegrated, agriculture was ruined, and the coastal cities were reduced to piracy rather than trade by the growth of European political and economic supremacy in the Mediterranean.4

It has been the traditional view that this conversion from prosperity to poverty resulted from the invasion of Ifriqiya by the nomad Hilali Arabs at Fatimid instigation from about 1050 onwards. The central image is ibn Khaldun's metaphor of a swarm of locusts, and the destruction of agriculture

1 Cf., for example, Ch.-A. Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, II (Paris, 1961), 70. 2 See H. R. Idris, La Berberie orientale sous les Zizrdes (Paris, 1962), 411-27, for a

description and list of references. 3 Cf., for example, S. D. Goitein, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leyden,

1966), 308-28; also A Mediaeval Society, I (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967). 4 Cf., for example, Julien, op. cit. II, 74-5.

23 AH X

is envisaged as the prime cause.5 There is no looking beyond Ifriqiya for the sources of its previous prosperity. Apparent reinforcement, however, is provided by a second argument according to which the Hilalis also cut the trade-routes across the Sahara into Ifriqiya, thus depriving the country principally of gold. This view, which is embryonic in Amari,6 who deduces from the luxury of the Zirid court before Io507 the presence of Sudanese gold in quantity, is sweepingly stated by Lombard,8 whose thesis it is that Muslim prosperity in the early Middle Ages was based on a good gold coinage. As far as North Africa is concerned, Lombard attributes Fatimid prosperity and success in the tenth century to control of the terminals of the gold trade across the Sahara. The Hilali invasion is then seen as a disaster for Ifriqiya, and ultimately the entire Muslim east, because it cut off these lands from 'the Sudanese Eldorado'.

Lombard's article lacks any discussion of the evidence, but its argument is restated for Ifriqiya by Hazard9 on the evidence of the coinage. From the absence of Zirid coinage after 459 AH I066-7, Hazard infers the cutting off of gold supplies from the Sudan by the Arabs.10 This he associates with a period of reduced prosperity, just as later11 he associates the plentiful Almoravid gold coinage (1058-1147) with supplies of Sudanese gold and an 'extraordinary prosperity'.

This argument is carried a long way further by Idris,12 who utilizes not only the chroniclers and the numismatic evidence but also the long series of fatwds or legal opinions contained in the Mi'yar al mu'rib of al Wan- sharishi. The fatwas in the first place provide him with evidence of regular purchases of Sicilian grain by Ifriqiya from at least the last quarter of the tenth century onwards, in return for gold. From this he argues13 important reserves of gold before I050, capable of making up for inadequate agri- cultural production in Ifriqiya. A further fatwd provides the basis of his conclusion for the crucial period after the Hilali invasion:14

...l'or monnaye est rare. D'une part l'invasion hilalienne a tari l'afflux d'or soudanais, et, d'autre part, l'anarchie est telle que l'Ifriqiya doit plus que jamais acheter du grain a la Sicile. Comme les Normands exigent d'etre payes en or, on assiste a une veritable hemorraghie du metal jaune. D'ou a Mahdiya: penurie d'or, obligation de s'en procurer pour acheter du ble, et necessite de la course (capture de marchandises precieuses, de pieces d'or, et de Chretiens rendus contre rancons payes en or).

5 Ibid. II, 74. 6 M. Amari, Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia, 2nd edn. revised by C. A. Nallino, ii

(Catania, 1937-9), 420. 7 Cf., for example, ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-mughrib, ed. G. S. Colin and E. Levi-

Provencal, i (Leyden, 1948), 272. 8 M. Lombard, 'L'or musulman du VIIe au XIe siecles,' Annales, Economies, Societes,

Civilisations, ii (April-June 1947), I43-60. 9 H. W. Hazard, The Numismatic History of Late Mediaeval North Africa (New York,

1952). 10 Ibid. 55. 1 Ibid. 6i. 12 Idris, op. cit. 13 Ibid. 663. 14 Ibid. 655.

348 MICHAEL BRETT

IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE

With this thesis the implications of the 'gold theory' of Ifriqiya's pros- perity and poverty becomes clearer. A mechanism has been proposed to explain the operation of Lombard's theory with regard to Ifriqiya, but in the process the older view of the Hilali invasion has been undermined. The invasion is still regarded as a catastrophe, but for somewhat different reasons. Ifriqiyan prosperity before the invasion is seen as a precarious thing, dependent upon imports of gold to provide for a population too large for its agricultural resources. Commerce rather than agriculture has become the dominant feature of the economy, and the destruction of agri- culture merely an aggravating factor, bringing Ifriqiya the more rudely face to face with economic reality.

The argument nevertheless seems fallacious. Lombard's contention that prosperity accrued to the Fatimids and Zirids from political control of the northern terminals cannot stand, if only because political control in itself cannot be envisaged as a means of acquiring gold, and hence prosperity, except by customs duties.15 The Fatimids may have been fortunate in having a supply of gold to demand, but since its source lay outside their dominions, some equivalent payment would be required. Hazard might seem to supply evidence for the disappearance of gold from Ifriqiya, but it is doubtful if this can be made to bear his interpretation. That no more gold coins were apparently struck by the Zirids after 1066-7 does not in itself indicate a lack of gold, or even indeed that gold coins ceased to be minted. The fact is that within his own numismatic field Hazard does not discuss the ways in which the coins he describes have survived, and thus the extent to which this corpus may be taken as representative of the various amounts issued. Zirid coinage even before 1050 is sparse; on the other hand, Almoravid gold (1058-II47) accounts for almost half the total described, twice as much as Almohad gold (1147-1269). Is this to be taken as a true indication of the relative prosperity of the three empires? Objections of this kind must prevent any firm conclusions about the economy and the gold supply from the evidence of the coins alone. Idris appears to have established the regular import of Sicilian grain into Ifriqiya even in normal years; yet it seems unlikely that this represented a continual gold drain. It is true that thefatwds dealing with the Sicilian trade are almost all concerned with the cash purchase of grain. Sicily, however, seems to have been equally dependent during this period on Ifriqiyan olive oil for example,16 so that over-all payments between the two countries may well have been in balance.

All these theories, moreover, appear to share certain radical weaknesses. On the one hand they lack a convincing demonstration of the relationship of gold and gold coinage to economic prosperity under medieval conditions;

15 Cf., for example, ibn Hawqal, Surat al-Ard, ed. Kramers (Leyden, 1938-9), 99-o00; trans. Wiet, Configuration de la terre (Beirut and Paris, 1964), 98. Fatimid political control of, for example, Sijilmasa was in any case occasional and brief.

16 Cf. Amari, Storia, I, 33I-2, 332 n. I, II, 509, 558; al Bakri, Description de l'Afrique septentrionale, ed. and trans. de Slane (Paris, 1965), 20, trans. 46.

23-2

349

on the other, they not only make the unsupported assumption that all the gold in question was Sudanese gold, they also fail to show how in that case it might have been 'cut off'. Is it that the Hilalis deliberately prevented or deterred caravans from approaching Ifriqiya? For this reason it is regret- table that the latest contributor to the debate, J. Poncet,17 while casting grave doubt on the responsibility of the Hilalis for the Zirid collapse, nevertheless restates the 'gold theory' with the substitution of other agents. According to him,18 supplies of Sudanese gold were cut off over the previous half century by Zirid loss of political control over the central Maghrib and

, T/V^-^ ^" Bougie Qayrawan

y ̂ -^;7T Tlemcen \ )

f Dj er^ Tripoli

J/ Aghmat /Wargla \ o Sijilmnsa

?j~Az 1fi u/ / ?~ Zawila

o Azugl/ / Kuwar | 0 / Tadmakka

K

\ o Awdaghast

Fig. I. Diagrammatic sketch-map of the main trade-routes discussed, tenth to twelfth century. By the twelfth century the route Azugi-Aghmat-Fez-Tlemcen had replaced the route Awdaghast-Sijilmasa-Tlemcen as the principal western route.

southern Ifriqiya, thus occasioning an economic crisis by the middle of the eleventh century.19 While this has the merit of drawing attention to the existence and activity of Berber nomads prior to the Hilalis, it is in effect a return towards Lombard's original hypothesis of Ifriqiyan prosperity, and suffers from the same criticism. What is lacking is any description or

theory of the mechanism of Saharan trade at this period to enable any statement to be made regarding the effect upon it of nomadic activity. It is the aim of this article to propose in broad outline a reconstruction of this

mechanism, in the hope of demonstrating that the evidence for conditions

17 J. Poncet, 'Le mythe de la catastrophe hilalienne', Annales, Economies, Societes, Civilisations, xxII (September-October, 1967), 1099-II20.

18 Ibid. IIIO-II. 19 Ibid. IIII.

35? MICHAEL BRETT

IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE

of life and trade in the Sahara during this period points to a different con- clusion. A straightforward theory of economic demand will be utilized, according to which it will be suggested that Saharan trade depended on markets both inside and outside the desert. Such markets would con- stitute the requisite demand to set in motion what appears as a fairly com-

plicated commercial machine. While particular markets might fluctuate, it will further be suggested that the evidence points to a continuance if not an increase in demand as reflected in the over-all volume of traffic. Gold will be treated as only one among other luxury commodities which formed the stuff of long-distance trade in the Middle Ages, and it is hoped that in the event the presence of this particular metal, with all its mercantilist associations, may seem irrelevant.

At the same time an attempt will be made to place the activity of nomads into perspective. No conjecture will be offered regarding the cause of the intrusion of the Hilalis into the Maghrib. They will be regarded as nomads, and as such indistinguishable from other nomads of Berber origin already occupying the northern Sahara. As nomads, living at a low level of sub- sistence, their attitude to other sectors of the economy would depend on the opportunities offered for gain. According to circumstances, it might vary from participation to destruction. Thus, in relation to agriculture, it might range from growing crops to destroying them, and in relation to trade from engaging in commerce to robbing merchants. In between would come a variety of positions from employer to employee, nearly all within the category of 'protection'. Again depending on opportunity, such economic activity might graduate to the political level and enter into the realm of dealings with established powers. The history of the northern Sahara over the hundred years prior to the Hilalis affords examples of various types of such behaviour,20 and the subsequent century of an even greater variety within this range,21 which will be taken to be characteristic of nomads irrespective of race. As a factor of economic and political significance, however, the dependence of this behaviour on opportunity would seem to render it a secondary feature, a symptom rather than a cause. Under conditions of prosperity and strong government, nomads might be expected to co-operate to a certain extent with other sectors of the general community; under conditions of declining prosperity they might be expected to resort to violence in an attempt to retain their previous income. If successful, their relative share in the 'national' income would

20 Cf., for example, SfSrat al Ard, 70, trans. 66-7; Bayan, I, 258-9, 260-I; Idris, La Berberie orientale, 162-7. Naturally only the more dramatic incidents tend to be reported.

21 Cf., for example, Idris, op. cit. 624 (employment of nomads as guardians of crops); Bayan, I, 290-I (nomads taking villages under their protection); ibn KhaldOn, Kitab al 'Ibar, 7 vols., vI (Bilaq, 1284 H), 169-70 (protection becoming political); Idrisi, Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne, ed. and trans. Dozy and de Goeje (Leyden, I866), 92-5, trans. 107-8 (see below p. 363); Goitein, A Mediaeval Society, I, 279-80. This last is a particularly good example of the relationship of nomads to trade. For examples of nomad behaviour in the western Sahara, cf. R. Mauny, Tableau geographique de l'ouest africain au Moyen Age (IFAN, I961), 400-I.

35I

increase, perhaps to the extent of an absolute increase, but only at the risk of accelerating a general decline.

The implication of this hypothesis, together with the similarity of nomad behaviour before and after the mid-eleventh century, is that whatever activity is to be associated with the Hilalis or their Berber precursors, it was symptomatic of the economic situation in Ifriqiya throughout the eleventh century, rather than causative of the situation in the second half of the century. To suggest how their activity may be regarded in this light as a secondary feature, the following theoretical statement of the development of the Ifriqiyan economy over the period is therefore proposed.

Various considerations point to the concentration of a fairly high pro- portion of the population in major urban centres. From the descriptions of the region before I050, the neighbourhood of large towns seems characterized by market gardening. In the case of the Qammuda, the large plain south of Qayrawan, this seems to have stretched a long way from the city. Such agriculture would be the more specialized in that Qayrawan was able to take advantage of its proximity to the area of rainfall agriculture to draw on the north-eastern region of Beja for its cereals. The proximity of Sicily with its grain may have permitted similar increased specialization in the coastal regions, where a further element is provided by the cultivation of commercial crops such as olives for export. Thus the agricultural economy seems to have been dominated by the urban in a manner true also to a certain extent of the pastoral, which provided meat, leather and wool. Again in the case of the Qammuda and the area around Qayrawan, the

pastoral economy had been further developed from the eighth century onwards by sustained investment on the part of the rulers of Qayrawan in water-storage works.22 The impression is of a series of city states rather than a unified economy, except for a large central area dependent on the demand of Qayrawan and the economic interests of its rulers. Politically this would correlate with the absence of a loyal aristocracy; the Sanhaja appear to have been permanently dissatisfied with their rewards. By successive expropriations the Zirids seem to have built up a huge holding of property, but to have been unable to use it to buy political support. Individual governors appear to have identified themselves with their

provincial cities, jealous of the capital. Just as the sultan was isolated, so was Qayrawan. Geographically it was alone in the middle of a country whose other major centres were all round the edge. Its size depended only on its role as a capital; as such it might attract commerce and industry, but otherwise it had no good economic reason for its existence.23 Its survival was therefore bound up with the political unity of Ifriqiya and the survival of the dynasty.

22 M. Solignac, 'Recherches sur les installations hydrauliques de Kairouan et des steppes tunisiennes', Annales de l'Institut des Etudes Orientales, xi (I953).

23 Pace Idris, La Berberie orientale, 412, who considers the prosperity of Qayrawan to derive from that of the countryside.

352 MICHAEL BRETT

IFRiQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE

The effect of the Hilalis would be to precipitate a development already well advanced. The provincial cities seized their opportunity to revolt; the Ifriqiyan state disintegrated and Qayrawan was ruined. The dynasty chose for itself an economically viable city-state on the coast. With the drastic reduction in the size of Qayrawan, its demand collapsed and the economy of the area from which it had drawn was curtailed; land went out of pro- duction and was occupied by nomads. Elsewhere an arrangement was reached between cities and nomads which ensured the continuance of agriculture for the remainder of the period. Individual cities may have experienced some gradual decline; the end of political unity may have reduced commerce in a way unforeseen by those jealous of Qayrawan; but on the whole they probably continued to thrive. It may be noted that this hypothesis, unlike those hitherto discussed, would not envisage an economic disaster as the accompaniment or cause of the political collapse, but would see this collapse in terms of a process of economic development, perhaps of growth, and restrict the economic damage involved. As far as inter- national trade was concerned, the main effect would be the elimination of Qayrawan and its wealthy court.

The sources for such an account are various, but a basic framework is provided by the three geographers: ibn Hawqal writing for the years 950-70,24 al-Bakri writing up to io68,25 and al-Idrisi writing up to II53.26 This apparently convenient spacing is not perfect; a major source for al- Bakri is ibn al-Warraq, who died in 973-4. This, however, has the advan- tage that ibn al-Warraq as reported by al-Bakri tends to corroborate ibn Hawqal, a much less thorough writer who nevertheless had the advantage of travelling through most of the places he describes. Between them, there- fore, quite a detailed initial picture emerges, while al-Bakri sometimes completes the description with a mention of some contemporary develop- ment. This is not to disguise the lack of an equivalent description for the mid-eleventh century; such, however, is provided for the end of the period by Idrisi. This author, writing in Sicily, was a Moroccan from Ceuta. Like al-Bakri, he never visited Ifriqiya or the Saharan regions he describes. He was, however, more editor than author, drawing his information from a team of informants whose reports he collated. Whatever the date of specific items of information over the previous three-quarters of a century, the picture he presents may be taken as drawn from the post-Hilali situation in North Africa. Within the bracket thus provided by the geographers, significant details may be gleaned from the historians, notably from ibn 'Idhari, whose Baydn draws largely on contemporary Zirid historians.27 It is these sources which will be used in detail for the following argument, though with occasional reference elsewhere; for example, to the Ibadi texts

24 Sarat al Ard, trans. Configuration de la terre; see note I5 above. 25 Description de l'Afrique septentrionale; see note i6 above. 26 Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne; see note 2I above. 27 See note 7 above.

353

published by Lewicki,28 which appear to supplement and confirm the authors in question.

Projecting the account of the development of Ifriqiya for the purpose of Saharan trade, a central feature of the period to 1050 is the existence of a powerful state with a court and capital wealthy enough to attract not only staples but also luxury items. Gold was used for ostentation in metalwork and textiles.29 However, while it may be thought likely that a proportion of this gold was provided by Saharan trade, there is virtually no direct evidence.3 More easily identifiable and much better documented are the 'abid or slave soldiers. While 'abid at this period was a technical military term without colour connotation,31 and while the Fatimids in Ifriqiya possessed both white and black slave troops,32 it seems possible that the recruitment of 'abid sudan, black 'abid, reported for about the year 98o,33 represents the

beginning of a corps of Sudanese soldiery that lasted up till the mid- eleventh century.34 The bulk of these 'abid probably came from the central Sudan via Zawila in the Fezzan.35 Those forming the sultan's personal escort would doubtless have been mounted,36 but the majority were most probably disciplined infantry.37 Such an army if properly supported by light cavalry,

28 T. Lewicki, 'Quelques extraits inedits relatifs aux voyages des commercants et des missionaires ibadites nord-africains au pays du Soudan occidental et central au Moyen Age', Folia Orientalia, ii (I96I), and ' L'Etat nord-africain de Tahert et ses relations avec le Soudan occidental i la fin du VIIIe et au IXe siecle', Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, viii (I962).

29 Cf., for example, Baytan, I, 26I, 272; ibn Abi Dinar, Mu'nis (Tunis, 1350 H), 8I. 30 Idris, La Berberie orientale, can only instance one case of the import of gold from the

south (op. cit. 676). It is incidentally of twelfth-century date. 31 Cf. al-Bakri, 93-4, trans. I87-8, for 'abid al saqaliba, European slaves, and Idrisi, p. 3,

trans. 3, for abid wa ajnad, slaves and soldiers, in the Sudanese context of Takrur. 32 Cf., for example, al-Bakri, 98, trans. I94. 33 Baydan, I, 238. 34 The 'abid originally belonging to the Zirid Mansur, whom we may take to have been

sudan from the incidence of cannibalism reported for the year 988 (Bayan, I, 244); al Nuwayri, Historia de los Musulmanes de Espaia y Africa, ed. and trans. G. Remiro, ii

(Granada, 1917-9), I12, were on parade in 1024 with the 'abid of Mansur's successors Badis and Mu'izz (Bayan, I, 273). Since in 996 the 'abid of Mansuir had procured the succession of Badis (Bayan, I, 247), and in ioi6 those of Badis had procured the succession of Mu'izz (Bayan, I, 266), there would seem to be a strong case for regarding the 'abid in 1024 as a homogeneous corps all of whose members were black. The 'abid of Mu'izz at the battle of Haydaran in I052 would thus also be sudan; cf., for example, Baydn, I, 289-9o.

35 In I031 Mu'izz received a present of raqiq from a malik al-sudaln (Bayan, I, 275).

Raqiq seems to be the designation for a slave before sale; cf., for example, al-Bakri, 3, trans. 9: a slave merchant is a tdjir al-raq7q. This present is presumably from the same bildd al sutddn that sent a present to Mansur in 992 (Bayan, I, 247), which in turn appears to be the same as that reported for the same year by ibn Abi Dinar (Mu'nis, 77) from ibn Khattab, governor of Zawila. The tradition is apparently continued by the present to the Hafsid Mustansir in 1257 from the 'king of Kanim and lord of Burnu' ('Ibar, I, 428). It may be taken that the raqzq in o03 1, who would naturally be only the best young men, were princi- pally recruits to the 'abid.

36 Cf. Levi-Provencal, Documents ingdits d'histoire almohade (Paris, 1938), 113, trans. i86.

37 Cf. The Almoravid formation described by al-Bakri, i66, trans. 3I4. It would be anachronistic to suppose that the procession of the Zirid army (Bayan, I, 267) consisted of trained cavalry over and above the light cavalry of the Sanhaja.

354 MICHAEL BRETT

IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE 355 would certainly account for the constant military success of the Zirids.38 After Haydaran, however, the force seems to have been broken up and not reconstituted for political and economic reasons;39 later such infantry was out of date,40 and by I 123 the core of the ZirId army consisted of a small force of trained cavalry.41 For the period to 1050, however, the 'abTd may be regarded as a notable item in Ifriqiya's trans-Saharan trade, and one moreover entirely dependent upon the existence and politics of a united Ifriqiyan state.

The 'abid who came up from Zawila, however, formed only part of a regular slave-trade. Al-Ya'qibi in the late ninth century speaks of the 'extraction' of al-raqiq al-suddn by the people of Zawila from neighbouring tribes;42 raqiq are exported from Zawila to Ifriqiya and its neighbours;43 they come up through Tripoli, passing through the customs at Labda (Leptis).44 At the same time ibn Hawqal reports the export from Ifriqiya to the east of khadam imported from the bildd al-suddn.45 It would seem likely that the suddn in question were given some kind of training before their re-export.46 Such slaves would represent only a proportion of those arriving in Ifriqiya, and only the best; others of similar quality would be retained in the country, as would the inferior majority. In a prosperous economy use could probably be found for slaves imported in excess of demand but left with nowhere else to go. Ibn Hawqal supplies the interest- ing information that parts of the Cap Bon peninsula were unhealthy for strangers, but szudn flourished there, going to their work with a good heart.47 This compares with a similar report in al-Bakri from Morocco,48 and might suggest the colonization of marginal land by suddn, either as labourers or as squatters.

On the other hand it would not seem correct to think of such a population as entirely or even mainly the result of an organized slave-trade along one

38 If the battle of Haydaran in fact took place as described (e.g. Bayan, I, 289-90), it would have been lost because of the desertion of the cavalry.

39 Cf. Bayan, I, 294, also, for example, Baydn, I, 299. Tamim destroyed the 'abid of his father Mu'izz; since the battles of Sallaqta in 1063 and Sabiba in 1065 were won for him by Arabs, he may have preferred to spend his limited resources on retaining the tribes rather than recreating an independent force.

40 Cf., for example, R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (Cambridge, I956). 41 Al-Tijani, Rihla (Tunis, 1927), 240-3. 42 Al-Ya'qubi, Kitab al-Buldan, ed. de Goeje, Bibliotheca Geographicorum Arabicorum,

vII (Leyden, 1892), 345. 43 Al-Bakri, ii, trans. 29. 44 Surat al-Ard, 69, trans. 65. 45 Khadam, a collective word meaning servants, possibly a plural of khddim, may mean

eunuchs (cf. al Muqaddasi, Description de l'Occident musulman, ed. and trans. Pellat (Algiers, 1950), 56-7), but in this passage ibn Hawqal seems to be in the tradition of ibn Khurradadhbih (Description du Maghreb et de l'Europe, ed. and trans. Hadj-Sadok (Algiers, 1949), 15 ff.) in using the word in a more general sense.

46 Doubtless many would in fact be eunuchs; others would be female. Cf. Bayan, I, 261, for slave girls presented to Cairo.

47 Surat al-Ard, 69-70, trans. 73. 48 Al-Bakri, 87, trans. 176.

particular route. No such trade is reported for a second Saharan route attested for this period, one moreover linking Ifriqiya much more directly with the Sudan, that from the Niger bend through Tadmakka and Wargla, of which Ifriqiya formed the northern terminal.49 According to one account, Abu Yazid, the tenth-century rebel against the Fatimids, was born in the Sudan to a merchant from the Djerid of Ifriqiya by a negress bought in Tadmakka ;50 at least his colour seems to have been notable, since elsewhere he is designated al-Habashi al-aswad, the black 'Abyssinian'.51 His case

might seem typical, not only because of what Leo Africanus says about the

population of Wargla in the sixteenth century,52 but because of what

appear to be similar conditions on the western route accounting for al- Bakri's suddn in Morocco.53 The possibility may be envisaged of a steady infiltration of suddn into Ifriqiya as the property of Ifriqiyan merchants, or as the result of petty raiding by nomadic tribes taking place along this route. It would moreover be surprising if merchants engaged in the Zawilan traffic had not also brought sudadn across the desert as members of their households. Alongside the organized slave-trade must be set a much more casual introduction of suddn into Ifriqiya.

The character of the trading community thus becomes important. A feature shared by both routes so far mentioned, those through Tadmakka and

Wargla and through Zawila, with the more westerly route from Awdaghast to Sijilmasa, is a large proportion, if not a preponderance, of Ibadi merchants.

Ibadiya, the region of the Ibadi Kharijites, extended in the ninth century from Tahert in the central Maghrib through the Djerid of Ifriqiya to

Tripoli and beyond.54 In the first half of the tenth century the Ibadis were evicted from the central Maghrib by the Fatimids,55 but found some

compensation in the occupation of important trading centres deep in the

Sahara, notably Wargla56 and Zawila.57 Primarily they were Berber tribes of the north and north-eastern Sahara, both settled and nomadic, among whom lived a class of shaykhs each with his following of disciples.58 Their

heartland, since it was easily the most densely populated area under their

control, was the south of Ifriqiya, otherwise known as the Djerid (Jarid),

49 For this route cf. al-Bakri, I81-3, trans. 338-43, and Lewicki, 'Quelques extraits

inedits...', passages mentioning Tadmakka. 50 Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn., s.v. Abu Yazid. 51 Al-Bakri, 40, trans. 88. 52 Encyclopaedia of Islam, ist edn., s.v. Wargla. 53 Pace Trimingham, History of Islam in West Africa (Oxford, I963), 44 and n. 2 (whose

translation of al-Bakri, 177-8, trans. 333, I cannot accept) no regular slave-trade is noted for this route before Idrisi, p. 4, trans. 4. However, some slaving there must have been for

Maghribi merchants (cf. al-Bakri, I68, trans. 3I7). 54 Cf. Lewicki, 'L'Etat nord-africain de Tahert', I3-I4.

55 So that in this period the 'frontier' lay somewhere south and east of Biskra and Tehouda (cf. al-Bakri, 5I-2, 72-3, trans. II-I2, I48-9).

56 Cf., for example, Lewicki, loc. cit. 34-5. 57 Cf. .Sarat al-Ard, io6, trans. 104; Idrisi, 37-8, trans. 44. 58 For their bibliography, cf. T. Lewicki, 'Les historiens, biographes et traditionnistes

Ibadites-Wahbites', Folia Orientalia, III, I96I.

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IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE

a well-cultivated oasis area with an eastward extension in the Jabal Naftisa;59 and this remained true until the second half of the eleventh

century, in spite of the defeat of Abu Yazid in 947, which is commonly held to have entailed the eradication of Kharijism as a force in the Maghrib.60

The Djerid was a turbulent region, with much fighting between shaykhs, clans and tribes.61 It was insecurely held by the government of Qayrawan,62 whose chief concern was the safety of communications, continually threatened by Ibadi nomads.63 Nevertheless the economy throve, with an important production for export of dates, pistachios and woollen cloth, which seems also to have been produced in the Jabal Nafusa.64 Moreover, it seems likely that, thanks to the Ibadi colony in Wargla, Ibadi merchants from the Djerid were able to monopolize the Tadmakka route to the Niger bend,65 and also, in concert with the Ibadis of Zawila, the Fezzan route.66 This seems the more likely in view of their part in the Awdaghast-Sijilmasa route, which seems to have been preponderent in spite of the fact that Sijilmasa was not an Ibadi centre.67 Without any wish to construct a variant on 'Religion and the Rise of Capitalism', Saharan trade along three routes may be envisaged as largely in the hands of a particular Berber group of

particular sectarian affiliations, from a particular area of North Africa. In view of the importance of the Ibadi community in this respect, the

mention of sudan in the Cap Bon area becomes more suggestive. The extension of the sect was not only to the south. A large Ibadi community is reported for Qayrawan itself,68 and a chain of agricultural and pastoral communities along the coast and inland encircled the capital,69 including one in the peninsula of Cap Bon.70 It would seem not at all improbable, in view of the Saharan connexions and known clannishness of the Ibadis,71 that the sfddn of Cap Bon were in origin slaves or clients of members of

59 Cf., for example, Suirat al-Ard, 92-3, trans. 94-5; al-Bakri, 47-9, 74-5, trans. 100-5, 152-3; Idrisi, 104-5, trans. 121-4.

60 Cf., for example, Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, ii, 64. 61 Cf., for example, al-Shammakhi, Kitab al-Siyar (Cairo I301 H), 359-60. 62 Cf. Idris, La Berberie orientale, 104, I62-3, I65-7. 63 Cf., for example, Suirat al-Ard, 70, trans. 66-7. 64 Cf. ibid. 69, trans. 65, re cloth exported from Tripoli. 65 See above, p. and note 49. 66 Although al-Bakri, 9-10, trans. 25-7, reports a numerous Jewish population in the

Naftsan town of Jadu, which may have been mercantile. 67 Thus of Awdaghast, al-Bakri, I68, trans. 317, says that the population is divided into

mutually hostile Arabs and Zanata. Previously, however (158, trans. 300), he is more specific: the population is composed of people of Ifriqiya, of the Barqajanna, the Nafusa, the Luwata, the Zanata and the Nafzawa, who are the most numerous. Of these, all except the people of Ifriqiya-the Arabs of the previous reference ?-and possibly the Zanata, are Ibadi Berbers of the Djerid. There are also small numbers from other Muslim cities (amsdr). On pages I58-9, trans. 301, mention is made for the tenth century of a merchant of Awdaghast, Abu Rustam al-Nafusi.

68 Cf. T. Lewicki, 'Les Ibadites en Tunisie au Moyen Age', in Conferenze pubblicate a cura dell'Accademia Polacca di Scienze e Lettere, fasc. 6 (Rome, 1959), p. 15.

69 Ibid. 14-15. 70 Cf. al-Shammakhi, Kitdb al Siyar, 382-4, reported in Idris, La Berbgrie orientale,

749. 71 Cf. Idris, op. cit. 750.

357

the sect, and that an informal introduction of the kind proposed for the Tadmakka-Wargla route, through merchants' households, individual commissions and so forth, was responsible for the presence of suddn not only in the Djerid, as might be expected, but throughout Ifriqiya.

It would thus seem possible to propose a trading community predominant along three Saharan routes, which, besides supplying an international quality market with luxury items such as gold and high-class slaves, provided by the nature of its society and geographical distribution within Ifriqiya its own demand and its own market for a much more bread-and- butter trade from community to community across the Sahara, a market which would be readily extensible to the non-Ibadi population of Ifriqiya. One may suspect that such a trade flourished particularly along the direct route from Djerid to the Sudan through Wargla and Tadmakka, although it is the one least described by the geographers, perhaps because it was notable neither for gold nor for slaves. One may also suspect that it provided the necessary foundations for the 'grand trades', and that it was the products of the Djerid such as dates and cloth which helped to set the machine in motion.72

The proposition, therefore, is that up to the mid-eleventh century a pattern of trade was in existence whereby an ordinary commercial network supported certain trans-Saharan luxury trades. The dependence may have been mutual to the extent that each encouraged the growth of the other. By the tenth century at least, it seems possible to envisage the network as an elastic mechanism capable of transmitting new demands across the desert and expanding accordingly. Such indeed might be the interpretation put upon the gold trade itself, and on the Awdaghast-Sijilmasa route with which it is initially associated. This may perhaps be considered as developed or greatly expanded by members of the Ibadi community under the auspices of the Fatimids of Ifriqiya, not out of regard for any fleeting political control of Sijilmasa, but in response to a sharp demand for gold to further imperial designs in the east.73 Certainly it is in the tenth century, speci- fically in the interval between the late ninth-century al-Ya'qubi and the tenth-century ibn Hawqal, that the gold trade in the sources turns from

legend to actuality, and the significant connexion of Sijilmasa with

72 Thus al-Bakri, i , trans. 29: raqiq were purchased at Zawila for pieces of red cloth (thiyab); ibid. IIo, trans. 216: linen (kittan) had been used as money in north Morocco (cf. Goitein, Studies, 308-28, for the use of silk as money); Idrisi, 4, trans. 5: dates were exported to the Sudan from Sijilmasa and the Zab via Wargla. Salt was easily obtainable, e.g. at Biskra (cf. al-Bakri, 51-2, trans. 111-12).

73 For Fatimid fiscality and their use of bribery in the conquest of Egypt, cf. G. Marcais, La Berberie musulmane et l'Orient au Moyen Age (Paris, I946), 142-7, and G. Wiet, L'Egypte arabe (Paris, I937), I42-56. For Fatimid use of trade as a political weapon, cf. B. Lewis, 'The Fatimids and the route to India', Revue de la Faculte des Sciences econo- miques de ' Universite d'Istamboul, xI (I949-50). From this point of view, the revolt of Abi Yazid, 943-7, would have been an irritating complication in Fatimid relations with the Djerid. Relations between the Ibadis and Mu'izz, the last Fatimid caliph in the Maghrib, 951-72, seem to have been extremely cordial (cf. Idris, La Berberie orientale, 746-8).

358 MICHAEL BRETT

IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE 359

Awdaghast is made.74 At the same time the predominantly Ifriqiyan character of the trading community might suggest a similarly Ifriqiyan source of demand. The Ibadi merchant would then be acting in effect as a Fatimid agent, although the route once exploited and colonized might be expected to develop a life of its own.75

In these circumstances it may seem no accident that the pattern of trade under consideration appears centred in the Djerid and its community; it seems possible to look beyond and envisage an Ifriqiyan market whose demand had stimulated and in turn had been stimulated by the activities of that community to a point at which it governed Saharan trade along three routes. In relation to the Ifriqiyan economy such a market might be thought to represent an important constituent factor, especially as a likely contributor to formation and growth. Whatever the original primacy of state demand, it might be expected that an increasing proportion of the market would consist of the less ostentatious demand of other sectors of the community, corresponding to my tentative description of the mechanism of supply. Such a distribution of demand might in turn reflect the economic development of urban centres other than the capital, which has been suggested as a feature of the country in the eleventh century. It might in fact be thought that Saharan trade and the Ifriqiyan economy at this time developed in association with each other.

If this picture of an Ifriqiyan role in Saharan trade is correct up to I050, how may the political developments of the eleventh century be envisaged in respect of that trade? It would seem impossible to agree with Poncet that the prosperity of the Djerid was at the expense of Ifriqiya, cutting the latter off from the gold of the Sudan by permitting the rejection of Zirid control.76 On the other hand, Zirid political difficulties over the first half of the century would appear symptomatic of Qayrawan's growing isolation, and so of an economic development towards which Saharan trade may have made a significant contribution. The denouement of this situation, it

74 While some traffic in gold across the western Sahara for some centuries previously may be admitted, it was perhaps of less significance for Muslim North Africa than the more easterly routes. Mauny's references for the eighth century (Tableau geographique, 390-I, 428) seem too slight for the stress he lays on them. Lewicki, 'L'Etat nord-africain de Tahert', infers the existence of a route through Sijilmasa in the ninth century, but his texts refer if anything to Gao rather than Ghana, and it seems unnecessary to suppose with him (op. cit. 531) that this place was approached otherwise than through Tadmakka. Al- Ya'qubi, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, VII, 359, is the first to associate Sijilmasa with gold, but his gold is a vegetable that grows in the neighbouring Dra; it is not associa- ted with the subsequent mention of a bilad Ghast. Levtzion attributes the difference be- tween al-Ya'qubi and ibn Hawqal in this respect to the fact that al-Ya'qubi collected his information at Zawila, while ibn Hawqal gathered his at Sijilmasa (D. Levtzion 'Ibn IHawqal, the Cheque, and Awdaghost', J.A.H. ix, 1968). It may be thought that this is not patible with increased exploitation of the route in response to a Fatimid demand bringing the trade for the first time to the active attention of the east.

75 Cf. Mauny, op. cit. 276-7, for a calculation of the small number of camels required to transport gold alone. The activity reported for Awdaghast and Sijilmasa would suggest much greater quantities of merchandise.

76 Poncet, 'Le mythe de la catastrophe hilalienne', I Io5, II I.

has been suggested, was provoked by the arrival of the Hilalis. The result, then, might appear to be an important loss of demand to Saharan trade following the elimination of Qayrawan and its Zirid court. Two observa- tions may be made. In the first place it seems possible that the demand of the Zirid court in Qayrawan may have represented a decline over that of the imperial Fatimid court thus reflecting the difference between the two dynasties in ambition and effort. Moreover, the establishment at the same time of the Fatimids in Egypt,77 and subsequently of the Almoravids in Morocco, may be expected to have produced increased demands at either end of northern Africa. It may be possible to envisage the central position of Ifriqiya in Saharan trade as reaching a climax in the tenth century and falling off thereafter with a growing diversification of markets. In such circumstances the effect of the Hilalis, as in the proposed case of Ifriqiya as a whole, would merely be to accelerate a process already in existence.

Secondly, it has been argued that the demand of court and capital represented only a part, and possibly a diminishing part, of the total demand of Ifriqiya. Following the elimination of Qayrawan, demand in the re- maining urban centres of the country might be expected to continue and even to increase in partial compensation, since it would be these centres which to a large extent produced the wealth previously accumulated in the capital. The Ifriqiyan market for Saharan trade would thus be revised, spreading out and splitting up in the manner proposed for the northern African market as a whole. It would continue to play an important part in that trade, though less perhaps in the matter of the 'grand trades'. From this point of view the effect of the Hilalis would be to emphasize the correlation proposed between the previous development of the Ifriqiyan economy and the growth of a basic commercial network in the Sahara.

This hypothesis naturally depends upon the possibility of a direct effect of the Hilalis on life and trade in the desert itself. If it were to be proved that this was extensively inhibiting, then it might be necessary to envisage the cutting off from Saharan trade of the remaining cities of Ifriqiya to their probable detriment, not in the sense of depriving them of indispen- sable commodities, but in the sense of reducing their level of commercial activity. Assessment here is confused by what may appear largely as a social rather than an economic phenomenon, the decline of Ibadiya. From the second half of the eleventh century the Ibadis in Ifriqiya and the Djerid seem steadily to have declined in number by conversion to Maliki orthodoxy.78 In the years immediately following the advent of the Hilalis, moreover, the Ibadi nomad tribes of the Libyan coast and the Djerid seem either to have fallen under Hilali dominance or to have been pushed away,79

77 Cf. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I, p. 32, for a statement of a notable drift of Jewish merchants from Ifriqiya to Egypt from the early eleventh century onwards, presumably reflecting a growing commercial attraction of Fatimid Egypt.

78 Cf. R. Brunschvig, La Berberie orientale sous les .Hafsides, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940, 1947), I, 330-I, echoed by Idris, La Berberie orientale sous les Zirzdes, 757.

79 Cf., for example, Bayan, I, 294; Idrisi, I30, trans. I55.

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IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE

while Idrisi makes clear that Ibadi merchants had lost control of the western Saharan route to the Moroccans.80 On the other hand, faced by the Arabs, the settled communities of the Djerid, whatever their denomina- tion, seem to have united to place themselves under the protection of the Banu'l Rand in Gafsa;81 the dynasty lasted down to the Almohad conquest in II59,82 while the region apparently retained its former prosperity,83 as did the Jabal Naffisa.84 The tribute paid to the Arabs by the Banu '1 Rand85 in no way differed from similar arrangements made with Ibadi nomads by the Zirids.86 There seems no evidence to suppose that the region did not continue to serve as a gateway to Ifriqiya.87

Turning to the more general picture, that presented primarily by Idrisi

appears to confirm this impression of a minimum of Hilali interference with the pattern of economic life. The western route throughout this period was

beyond their reach; it had been displaced still further westward,88 the

simplest explanation for which would be that, whatever the motives

originally involved in the Almoravid conquest,89 with the Almoravid

empire an attractive new market had been created in Morocco. The

easterly Saharan routes, moreover, seem to have flourished, though an

apparent increase in their activities may merely be due to the fact that Idrisi, writing in Sicily and at a later date, had more information at his disposal about these routes than al-Bakri writing in Spain. Wargla in particular is

prominent,90 its community perhaps reinforced by an Ibadi emigration from the Djerid.91 Its people are paired by Idrisi with those of al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (Morocco) as representing the Maghribi merchant presence in the Sudan.92 Significant in this respect is the gold of Wangara, the bulk of which is bought by the peoples of Wargla and al-Maghrib al-Aqsa,93 and the position of Wangara, which for Idrisi94 is the jazira formed by the Niger bend.95 The position ascribed to Wangara, and its connexions with

80 Cf. Idrisi, 32, 59-6i, 66-7, trans. 38, 68-70, 76-7. 81 Cf. ibn Khaldin, 'Ibar, vI, 165-6. 82 Cf. Idris, La Berberie orientale, 396-9. 83 Cf. Idrisi, 104-6, trans. 121-4. 84 Ibid. 85 'Ibar, loc. cit. 86 Cf., for example, ibn al Athir, Kitab al-Kamilft 'l Ta'rzkh, ix (Cairo, I30I H), 147. 87 Cf. Idris, La Berberie orientale, 676, for an interesting report of the mechanics of

trade in the Djerid in the first half of the twelfth century. 88 See note 74 above, also Mauny, Tableau geographique, map, p. 430, with the reserva-

tion that Aghmat rather than Sijilmasa should be the terminal. 89 Cf. P. Farias, 'The Almoravids; some questions concerning the character of the

movement', BIFAN, xxix, B, 3-4 (I967), pp. 809-o0, for the suggestion that the Almora- vids may have been hostile to the Ibadls.

90 Cf. Idrisi, I20-I, trans. 141. 91 In contrast to the situation up to the mid-eleventh century, the majority of Ibadi

shaykhs reported by al-Shammakhi for the later part of this period seem to have connexions with Wargla or other southern oases; cf. Idris, La Berberie orientale, 754-6.

92 Idrisi (e.g. 9, ii, trans. 9, I4). 93 Ibid. 8, trans. 9. 94 Ibid. 95 Cf. J. D. Fage, An Atlas of African History (London, I958), map 5, p. 9. There

seems to be general agreement that Wangara was in fact the Mandinka region within the headwaters of the Senegal and the Niger, cf., for example, Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, 54, n. 2.

36I

Wargla, may indicate that in the uncertain political conditions of the western Sudan in the twelfth century, between the fall of pagan Ghana in the late eleventh century and the subsequent rise of Mali, merchants along the Tadmakka-Wargla route were able to increase their share of the gold trade. Idrisi goes on to attribute to Wargla a gold mint,96 although such a mint is not confirmed by Hazard.97 At the same time, Wargla figures in the kind of trade between desert communities whose existence has been inferred for the earlier period.98 To the east, a similar situation is reported for the Zawilan route. Ibadi Zawila continues to flourish,99 while behind it a whole Muslim trading community has appeared south of the Djado plateau in the towns of the bildd Kuwar-Kawar.100

Since at least the old market of Qayrawan was lacking from Ifriqiya, where were the northern markets for these two prosperous routes? First of all, it would seem that the desert communities themselves were developing, and that east-west trade within the desert itself was beginning to tie

together the north-south routes, which may be supposed to have had their own internal unity for a long time. It is clear from ibn Hawqal and al- Bakri that the Libyan oases had long formed a wide community irrespec- tive of the trade-routes down to the Sudan.101 For Ankalas, capital of the Kiiwr, Idrisi reports a trading connexion through Wargla to the Maghrib al-Aqs,102 and for Wargla with the Zaghawa in the direction of Kiuwr.l03 Trade is also reported between Wargla and Sijilmasa.104 One may suspect that a centre like Ghadames, otherwise barely reported,105 was quietly significant in this respect.

Secondly, alternatives had been found. In the central Maghrib, Bougie had become an exit for Saharan trade;106 for Zawila, trade with Egypt seems more prominent.107 Finally, since the Djerid, Ibadi or otherwise, was apparently continuing to function as before, it would seem highly probable that, even in the absence of the old Qayrawan, Ifriqiya itself did indeed continue to serve as a market. The evidence, in fact, would appear to

point to that diversification of markets which has already been conjectured, and which it may be even possible to associate with an actual increase in traffic.

96 Idrisi, 120-I, trans. I41. 97 H. W. Hazard, The Numismatic History of Late Mediaeval North Africa. 98 Cf., for example, Idrisi, 35, trans. 41. 99 Idrisi, 37-8, 133, trans. 44, 158-9. 100 Ibid. 38 ff., trans. 45 if. 101 Cf. Sarat al-Ard, 66-8, trans. 64-5; al-Bakri, 5-12, trans. 14-30. 102 Idrisi, 39, trans. 45-6. 103 Ibid. 35, trans. 41. 104 Ibid. 4, trans. 5. 105 Cf., for example, al-Bakri, 182, trans. 340; Idrisi, 36, trans. 42. 106 Cf. Idrisi, 90, trans. Io5. 107 Cf. Idrisi, 44-5, 132, trans. 52, 157. Of the picture as a whole, it may be noticed that

it differs in certain details from Mauny's map of Saharan trade-routes from the eleventh to the thirteenth century (Tableau geographique, 430). While proposing such amendments, I would also be inclined to envisage a much more complicated pattern.

362 MICHAEL BRETT

IFRIQIYA AS A MARKET FOR SAHARAN TRADE

The twelfth-century picture, therefore, would not seem to provide evidence of direct interference with trade in the desert. Instead it would seem possible to maintain the concept of variations in demand as the

operative factor determining the direction of trade, and to affirm a diversifi- cation of markets as the predominant feature. Certain conclusions may then perhaps be drawn with regard to the evident changes in the pattern of

supply. The reduction in the importance of Ifriqiya as a market seems to have been accompanied by a loss of commercial pre-eminence by the

Djerid. Although economic activity in the region does not seem to have been unduly hampered, by the twelfth century merchants from other centres appear more predominant. In the west, the creation of a Moroccan market served by Moroccan merchants is perhaps sufficient explanation. On the other routes, centres deeper in the desert may have found themselves more strategically placed to handle a trade more diverse in outlets and direction. In this respect it may indeed be possible to attach a certain economic significance to the decline of Ibadiya in the Djerid. The suggestion might be made that merchant families tended to emigrate to Wargla, for example, and that it was no longer of such commercial importance for the remainder to retain sectarian connexions. However this may be, the system of supply corresponding to the pattern of markets seems to have been decentralized. The generaliza- tion might be ventured that Idrisi's picture represents the results by the first half of the twelfth century of a process of change which may well have been in operation from the tenth. The character of this process might be expressed by saying that, in contrast to the earlier period, the common feature of supply and demand at the later date was diversification as a result of growth.

In these circumstances, what can be said of the Hilalis, at least on the basis of Idrisi?108 That they did not interfere with the passage of trade is evident from the account of the route from the Qal'a of the Banu Harnmad to Bougie,109 along which the inhabitants lived in a state of uneasy truce with the Arabs which nevertheless permitted the passage of caravans. Can they then be held responsible for the widespread devastation described else- where by Idrisi?ll It is to be noted that in this particular passage the devastation ascribed to the Arabs, which at first sight embraces the whole of Libya, is limited in his examples to a short stretch of coast round the Gulf of Sirte. It is again the coastal strip whose devastation by the Arabs he describes between Tripoli and Gabes.111 This is perhaps significant. We

108 Goitein states (e.g. in Studies, loc. cit.), that the Geniza documents reveal inter- ruptions in caravan traffic in the Io6os attributable to hostile nomads. It may perhaps be remarked without prejudice to the general picture that this decade in particular might be expected to have been bad for trade, and hence productive of hostile nomad activity, not so much because of a fluid political situation in Ifriqiya and Morocco, but because of the pro- longed depression in Egypt, especially Cairo. It is necessary to use a longer perspective.

109 Idrisi, 92-5, trans. 107-8. 110 Ibid. (e.g. pp. 130-3, trans, I55-9). 111 Ibid. I2I, trans. 141-2.

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24 AH X

know that from the capture of Djerba by the Sicilian Normans in I135, to the Norman capture of Tripoli eleven years later, the North African coast from Algiers at least as far as Tripoli was subject to continual raids by the Norman fleet, keeping the people shut up in their towns, or driving them inland at least during the summer season.112 Is it not possible that Idrisi in his capacity as editor, writing shortly afterwards under the patron- age of the Norman king responsible, should have made the Arabs the scapegoats for the devastation along the coast that the Normans themselves had caused, and, in so doing, attributed to them widespread devastation inland that his own descriptions of individual localities do not bear out?

SUMMARY

Attempts to explain a collapse of the Ifriqiyan economy after 1050 by supposing an interruption of gold supplies from the Sudan appear to fail. The concept of collapse may itself be challenged, and the phenomena reinterpreted as a mani- festation of provincial prosperity following the decline of the capital Qayrawan. Nomadic activity may then be regarded as symptomatic rather than causative, and Saharan trade as governed by the laws of supply and demand. This trade would form an elastic network, consisting of a traffic in staples which sustained certain luxury trades. In the tenth century this network appears to have been in the hands of Ibadis, and centred in the Djerid. This seems to indicate the primacy of Ifriqiyan demand at this period, partly attributable to a special demand for gold. Such commercial activity would have promoted the further growth of the Ifriqiyan economy. In the eleventh century, Ifriqiyan primacy would have disappeared with the Fatimid emigration to Egypt, and the rise of Morocco. At the same time, provincial development would have involved the collapse of Qayrawan and its market. By the twelfth century, the northern African market for Saharan trade would have split up, entailing a more complicated pattern of supply. Over the period, the volume of trade may have risen.

112 Cf., for example, F. Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile, ii (Paris, I907), i6o.

364 MICHAEL BRETT