Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1985 bv the American Psychological Association, Inc.1585. Vol. 48, No. 1, 150-170 ' 0022-35I4/85/W0.75

If It Changes It Must Be a Process: Study of Emotion andCoping During Three Stages of a College Examination

Susan Folkman and Richard S. LazarusUniversity of California, Berkeley

This natural experiment provides substantial evidence for the following major

themes, which are based on a cognitively oriented, process-centered theory ofstress and coping: First, a stressful encounter should be viewed as a dynamic,unfolding process, not as a static, unitary event. Emotion and coping (including

the use of social support) were assessed at three stages of a midterm examination:

the anticipation stage before the exam, the waiting stage after the exam andbefore grades were announced, and after grades were posted. For the group as a

whole there were significant changes in emotions and coping (including the useof social support) across the three stages. Second, people experience seemingly

contradictory emotions and states of mind during every stage of an encounter. Inthis study, for example, subjects experienced both threat emotions and challenge

emotions. The complexity of emotions and their cognitive appraisals reflectsambiguity regarding the multifaceted nature of the exam and its meanings,

especially during the anticipation stage.

Third, coping is a complex process. On the average, subjects used combinationsof most of the available forms of problem-focused coping and emotion-focusedcoping at every stage of the exam. Different forms of coping were salient during

the anticipation and waiting stages. Problem-focused coping and emphasizing thepositive were more prominent during the former, and distancing more prominent

during the latter.Finally, despite normatively shared emotional reactions at each stage, substantial

individual differences remained. Using selected appraisal and coping variables,

and taking grade point averages (GPA) into account, approximately 48% of thevariances in threat and challenge emotions at the anticipation stage was explained.Controlling for variance due to the grade received, appraisal, and coping variables

accounted for 28% of the variance in positive and negative emotions at the

outcome stage. Including grade, 57% of the variance in positive emotions atoutcome and 61% of the negative emotions at outcome were explained.

The essence of stress, coping, and adapta- changing meaning or significance of what is

tion is change. The emotions one experiences happening as the encounter unfolds. Coping,

in a stressful encounter, for example, are too, is characterized by change. One might

characterized by flux. At first one may feel at first engage in avoidant or denial-like strat-

anxious; after a few moments of further in- egies to ward off the significance of an event,

terchange, angry; then guilty; then loving and then decide to deal head-on with the problem;

joyful. The sequence of feelings reflects the or at the stressful outset a person might cope

by avoiding contact with others but a little

later seek emotional support from a friend.

We wish to thank Anita DeLongis, Christine Dunkel- Indeed, stress implies a disturbed person-Schetter, Darlene Goodhan, and Rand Gruen for their environment relationship that coping is meanthelp in this study and particularly for their valuable - phanee Therefore nnlp« we fn<-m onsuggestions regarding the Stress Questionnaire and the l° Ctlan6e- Iheretore, unless we focus onfactor analysis of the Ways of Coping. We would like to change we cannot learn how people come togive special thanks to Rand Gruen for his help in data manage stressful events and conditions,collection and coding and to Christine Dunkel-Schetter To be concerned with change is to befor her extensive and thoughtful comments on an earlier concerned with process as opposed to Struc-

X^st reprints should be sen, to Susan Folkman, ture' Structure refers to Stabl5 factors »*Department of Psychology, University of California as personality traits or Static features Of theBerkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. environment. Even though the importance of

150

EMOTION AND COPING 151

process is recognized (e.g., Mechanic, 1962;Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan, & Mullan,1981), research on stress and coping hastended to emphasize stable, structural prop-erties of the person or the environment.Studies of coping, for instance, focus predom-inantly on coping traits (e.g., Goldstein, 1973;Krohne & Rogner, 1982; Moos, 1974). Sim-ilarly, social support, which is related tocoping as a mediator or buffer between stressand health, is usually described in terms ofthe relatively stable size or character of one'ssocial network, or how emotionally supportedone generally feels (for review see Thoits,1982). Structural approaches such as thesedo not provide information about whetherand how a person actually copes, seeks oruses social support, or actually feels supportedin a particular stressful encounter. Further-more, structural approaches cannot revealchanges in stress-related phenomena, includ-ing emotion, as a specific encounter unfoldsor from encounter to encounter.

The research to be reported here is designedto elicit information about two stress-relatedsets of processes: emotion and coping, includ-ing the use of social support. The setting is anaturalistic stress situation—a college mid-term examination. Like many experimentalsituations and real-life events such as naturaldisasters and medical examinations (for re-views see Baker & Chapman, 1962; Lazarus,1966; Thompson, 1981), a college midtermhas three distinct stages: an anticipatory stagewhen the student must prepare for the examunder ambiguous conditions (i.e., not know-ing exactly what it will be like or what theoutcome will be); a waiting stage, whichoccurs after the exam has been given andbefore grades are announced; and an outcomestage, after learning how he or she has done.These stages and their concomitant demandsare to a certain degree experienced uniformlyby all students and to a certain degree differ-ently. A midterm exam, with its three stages,is thus like a natural experiment with threeconditions or treatments, and provides a goodcontext for systematically observing processand change as a stressful encounter unfolds,from the perspective of both normative effectsand individual differences.

The study of examination stress usuallyfocuses on the student's anxiety, evaluatedeither as a trait or as a state, which summa-

rizes the emotional distress a person experi-ences over the entire event (e.g., see Gaudry& Spielberger, 1971; Heinrich & Spielberger,1982; Sarason, 1972, 1975). The goal of mostsuch research is to evaluate the effects ofanxiety on performance. Little attention isgiven to how anxiety or other emotions mightincrease and decrease throughout the exam-ination or to the coping processes or changesin the environment that might mediate thesechanges. Although several recent studies havelooked at anxiety during the anticipation orperformance of an examination (Becker, 1982;Heckhausen, 1982), to our knowledge, withthe exception of Mechanic (1962) and Epstein(1979, 1982), research has not been directedat changes in anxiety across these phases.Epstein (1962, 1982) has also examined

changes in anxiety across time in researchwith sports parachutists (Fenz & Epstein,1962). In addition, most studies of exami-nation stress focus on normative effects or

individual differences. The likelihood thatstress processes comprises both socially sharedand individual reaction patterns is generallyignored.

The present research, in contrast, looks atchange during an examination, with attentiongiven to both normative effects and individualdifferences. Although the setting of the re-search is a midterm exam, we see its princi-ples as applicable to most stressful contexts,and we are therefore using it as a vehicle fora broader set of issues. In Part I of this articlewe examine changes in emotions, coping, andthe use of social support from a normativeperspective, by looking at how students as agroup responded to the exam during theanticipatory stage, before the exam (Time 1);the waiting stage, after the exam and beforegrades were announced (Time 2); and theoutcome stage, after grades were announced(Time 3). In Part II we turn our attention tothe explanation of individual differences inresponse to the same stressful event. Therewe focus on emotion at the anticipatory stage(Time 1) and the outcome stage (Time 3)and, guided by our cognitive theory of stressand coping, which is described later, andtaking ability and performance into account,analyze the extent to which individual differ-ences in emotion can be explained by cog-nitive appraisal and coping.

152 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

The Theory of Stress and Coping

The theory on which this study is basedhas been developed by Lazarus and his col-leagues over a number of years (Coyne &Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus, 1966, 1981; Lazarus,Averill, & Opton, 1974; Lazarus, Coyne, &Folkman, 1982; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984a,1984b; Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980;Lazarus & Launier, 1978). Within this frame-work, stress is defined as a relationship be-tween the person and the environment thatis appraised by the person as relevant to hisor her well-being and in which the person'sresources are taxed or exceeded.

Cognitive appraisal includes two compo-nent processes, primary and secondary ap-praisal. Through primary appraisal a personjudges whether an encounter is irrelevant,benign-positive, or stressful. An irrelevantencounter has no significance for one's well-being, and the person has no stake in itsoutcome; in a benign-positive encounter onlya good outcome is signaled; stressful apprais-als are characterized by threat, challenge, orharm-loss. Threat refers to the potential forharm or loss; challenge refers to the potentialfor growth, mastery, or gain; and harm-lossrefers to injury already done, as in harm toa friendship, health, or self-esteem. In sec-ondary appraisal the person evaluates copingresources and options, addressing the question"What can I do?"

Primary and secondary appraisal processesoperate interdependently. For example, ifcoping resources are adequate for dealingwith a threat, the degree of threat is dimin-ished. On the other hand, an event that atfirst might seem nonthreatening can becomethreatening if coping resources turn out tobe inadequate for countering environmentaldemands or overcoming environmental orpersonal constraints.

Emotions are products of how people con-strue (appraise) their ongoing transactionswith the environment. Emotions are thus oftremendous diagnostic value, because theirintensity and quality reveal how people thinkthey are managing what is important to themin any particular context. As a person's ap-praisals of a transaction change, so too willhis or her emotions.

Coping refers to cognitive and behavioralefforts to manage (master, reduce, or tolerate)

a troubled person-environment relationship.We view coping as having two major andwidely recognized functions (see Folkman &Lazarus, 1980): the regulation of distressingemotions (emotion-focused coping) and doingsomething to change for the better the prob-lem causing the distress (problem-focusedcoping). Folkman and Lazarus (1980) foundthat both functions of coping were representedin over 98% of the more than 1,300 stressfulencounters that were reported by 100 middle-aged men and women over the course of ayear. Problem-focused coping was used morefrequently in encounters that were appraisedby the person as changeable than in thoseappraised as unchangeable. In contrast, emo-tion-focused coping was used more frequentlyin encounters that were appraised as un-changeable than in those appraised aschangeable. In subsequent analyses, a numberof types of emotion-focused coping have beenidentified, including minimizing threat, seek-ing emotional support, wishful thinking,and self-blame (Aldwin, Folkman, Schaefer,Coyne, & Lazarus, 1980).

Research Design

Subjects were students in an undergraduatepsychology course in stress, coping, and ad-aptation at the University of California,Berkeley, who were asked to participate inthe study during class time as part of thecourse. Those who did not wish to participatecould refuse. This was a nonrequired, lower-division course that attracted students fromdiverse fields as well as from psychology.Their classifications ranged from first-yearstudent to senior. Only those who were takingthe course for a letter grade (not pass-fail)were included in the analysis. Out of a totalof 261 students, data were obtained from 189subjects at Time 1, 140 at Time 2, and 136at Time 3. One hundred and eight studentscompleted all three assessments. These stu-dents were compared with those who did notcomplete all three assessments on GPA andon the grade they expected to receive in theexam, and the two groups did not differ.Subjects who did not complete all threeassessments were therefore retained in thesample to maximize the « at each stage.Approximately 60% of the subjects at eachassessment were female and 40% male. The

EMOTION AND COPING 153

distribution of midterm grades reported bysubjects at Time 3 suggests that, comparedwith the class as a whole, the sample wasbiased in favor of students who performedwell (B or above). Specifically, of the gradesgiven to the entire class, 50% were B or aboveand 50% C or below. Of the grades reportedby subjects in the study, 70% were B or aboveand 30% were C or below.

Students were asked to complete a speciallydesigned Stress Questionnaire in class onthree occasions: two days before the midterm(Time 1), five days after the midterm andtwo days before grades were announced (Time2), and five days after grades were announced(Time 3). The subjects were asked to describetheir state of mind with respect to the ex-amination at the time of each assessment.Thus, to the extent that these instructionswere followed, the data for the three stagesof the examination reflect appraisal, emotion,and coping at each stage. The questionnaire,which had been piloted in a preliminarystudy and revised for the present research,was designed to assess a number of psycho-logical variables relevant to stress and copingin the examination, including cognitive ap-praisal, emotion, and coping (including useof social support) as well as GPA and theexam grade actually received. The items inthe questionnaire will be described in greaterdetail with respect to each of the separateanalyses reported in Part I and Part II.

Part I: Examination Stress Processes

Three variables are examined in Part I innormative fashion, that is, as group tendenciesto react and change over the three stages ofthe examination. These variables include re-ported emotions, coping, and the use of socialsupport at each stage, each measured by theStress Questionnaire.

Emotion

From the perspective of a cognitive theoryof emotion, the quality and intensity of anyemotion—anxiety, jealousy, sorrow, joy, re-lief—is generated by its own particular ap-praisal (Beck, 1971; Ellis, 1962; Lazarus,Kanner, & Folkman, 1980; Lazarus & Lau-nier, 1978; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler,1982). For example, depending on the natureof an encounter and its appraised threat, a

person might experience foreboding or worry.An appraisal of challenge might evoke eager-ness or excitement. However, an appraisal ofan encounter as harmful might elicit anger,disgust, disappointment, or sadness; and anappraisal of an outcome as positive (beneficial)might generate exhilaration, happiness, orrelief. Findings from a preliminary pilot studywith students in a different undergraduatepsychology course and previously formulatedtheory (e.g., Lazarus et al., 1980), suggestedthat certain emotions were indicative of threat,challenge, harm, or benefit appraisals in anexamination setting. These emotions are listedlater in the description of the measures weused in this analysis.

The first question addressed in this sectionis whether or not emotions change from onestage to another during the process of anexamination. According to our theoreticalformulation, threat and challenge appraisalsare anticipatory; they are evaluations of apotential harm or benefit, and deal with anupcoming event. We therefore expected emo-tions indicating challenge and threat to beexperienced most intensely at the anticipatorystage (Time 1) and to decrease in intensityas the exam proceeded to the outcome stage(Time 3). Conversely, because harm and ben-efit appraisals are evaluations of an eventthat has already occurred, that is, they areoutcome appraisals, we expected that emo-tions indicating harm and benefit would beleast intense at Time 1 and become moreintense as the likely outcome came into view.

The second issue explored here concernsthe effects on emotion of changes in ambiguityor uncertainty. At Time 1 ambiguity is at itsheight; the student does not know exactlywhat will be on the exam or what the outcomewill be. At Time 2 the student has alreadytaken the exam and the ambiguity is reducedsomewhat, although the grade is not yetknown. Ambiguity is at its minimum at Time3, when grades have been announced.

In situations that are highly ambiguous, itis difficult to evaluate what the likely out-comes will be. The person can see possibilitiesfor both positive and negative outcomes(Folkman, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1979), whichmeans that both threat and challenge emo-tions are apt to be experienced. Therefore,regardless of the stage of an encounter, aslong as the person makes appraisals about an

154 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

ambiguous future, he or she can experienceboth threat and challenge emotions.

In contrast to threat and challenge apprais-als, which are anticipatory, harm and benefitappraisals primarily look backward; they areevaluations of what has already transpired.As an event unfolds and information is added,there is less ambiguity, and the significanceof the encounter for well-being should becomeclearer. Thus, the more an encounter unfolds,the more firmly the person should be makingeither a negative (harm) or a positive (benefit)appraisal at the outcome (unless, of course,the encounter has multiple, conflicting out-comes, as when a person is given a promotionthat involves an unwanted move, a conditionwe do not consider here). We hypothesizedthat during the highly ambiguous anticipatorystage (Time 1), the correlation between theemotions associated with harm and benefitappraisals would be low, reflecting the highdegree of uncertainty about the outcome andhow the students felt. We expected that thecorrelation would become increasingly nega-tive as they learned more about the outcome,and reach its greatest magnitude at Time 3,after grades were announced and it becameclear whether they had done well or badly.

Method

As part of the Stress Questionnaire, subjects wereasked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not atall; 4 = a great deal) the extent to which they felt each

of the following 15 emotions, which are grouped hereinto their appraisal categories:

Anticipatory:1. Threat emotions—worried, fearful, and anxious;2. Challenge emotions—confident, hopeful, and eager;

Outcome:1. Harm emotions—angry, sad, disappointed, guilty,

and disgusted;2. Benefit (mastery-gain) emotions—exhilarated, pleased,

happy, and relieved.

Scales were scored by summing the ratings for each item.The reliabilities for each of these rationally devised scaleswere calculated for each of the three administrations.The mean alpha for the threat emotions scale was .80;.59 for the challenge emotions scale; .84 for the harmemotions scale; and .78 for the benefit emotions scale.The relatively low reliability of the challenge scale suggeststhat findings with respect to challenge should be inter-preted cautiously.

Results

The first step in the analysis was to examinechanges in the four emotions scales from

Time 1 to Time 2, and from Time 2 to Time3. Differences in emotions were examinedwith paired t tests. To reduce the chance ofa Type I error, an experiment-wise error rateof. 10 was used for the two sets of tests (Time1 vs. Time 2 and Time 2 vs. Time 3),meaning that a t value had to have a proba-bility of ^ .01 to be considered significant.The results are shown in Table 1.

The intensity of threat and challenge emo-tions did not change significantly from Time1 to Time 2, but decreased significantly fromTime 2 to Time 3. Harm and benefit emo-tions, in contrast, increased significantly fromTime 1 to Time 2, but did not change fromTime 2 to Time 3.

The second step was to examine the rela-tions between threat and challenge emotions,and harm and benefit emotions, across stages.At Time 1, 94% of the subjects reported boththreat and challenge emotions (that is, theyhad a score of 1 or greater on the threat andchallenge emotions scales), confirming ourprediction that under conditions of maximumambiguity people are likely to experienceboth threat and challenge. Threat and chal-lenge emotions were not significantly relatedat Time 1 (r = -.05), Time 2 (r = .03), orTime3(r = -.15).

There was no relation between harm andbenefit emotions at Time 1 (r = .08). At Time2, however, the correlation was —.25 (p =.003) and at Time 3, -.50 (p < .001). Therelation between harm and benefit emotions,or negative and positive outcome emotions,thus increased in magnitude in the expecteddirection as the encounter unfolded.'

1 The pattern of increasingly negative correlations be-tween positive and negative outcome emotions is consistentwith findings from the preliminary pilot study with

students in a different undergraduate psychology coursementioned earlier. Subjects described a recently experi-enced stressful event of their own choosing, whetherongoing or concluded. In the case of ongoing events,subjects reported the extent to which they were currentlyexperiencing positive and negative emotions in relationto that event, and in the case of concluded events,reported how they felt when the event was over. Thetiming of the assessment of emotions in ongoing eventsis analogous to Time 2 in the present study in that theevent had begun and was not yet over. Similarly, thetiming of the assessment for concluded events, for whichthe outcome was known, is analogous to Time 3 in thepresent study. Despite differences in the two studies (e.g.,in the pilot study a wide variety of stressful events wasreported; distinctions between anticipatory and outcome

EMOTION AND COPING 155

Table 1Changes in Emotion from Time 1 to Time 2 and Time 2 to Time 3

Variable

Threat emotions

Challenge emotions

Harm emotions

Benefit emotions

Number

of cases

129107

127

105

122102

129105

Time

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2

Time 3

T 1

Time 2Time 3

M

5.04.4 (4.5)1.8

4.94.8

3.4

2.13.13.8

1 7

4.7 (4.8)

5.6

(

value

2.199.34

.404.54

-2.79

-1.36

-9.41-1.72

df

128106

126104

121

101

128104

2-tailed

probability

.030•c.OOl

.686<.001

.006

.178

<.001.089

Note. The mean for Time 2 that was calculated for the second comparison (Time 2 with Time 3) is indicated inparentheses if it differed from the mean calculated for the first comparison (Time 1 with Time 2).

Discussion

There were significant changes in the fourtypes of emotions as the examination un-folded. Threat and challenge emotions wereelevated at Times 1 and 2 and droppedsignificantly at Time 3; harm and benefitemotions rose significantly from Time 1 toTime 2 and remained elevated at Time 3.During the waiting period (Time 2) there wassubstantial engagement of both threat andchallenge emotions, and harm and benefitemotions. During this waiting stage the stu-dents had already taken the exam and mayhave had some clues as to how they hadperformed, but until the grades were an-nounced they could not know clearly howthey had done, especially when, as in thiscase, the instructor graded on a curve. Time2 is thus not distinctly an anticipatory or an

emotions were not made; the data in the concludedevents were retrospective; and the two stages were elicitedin connection with different encounters rather than re-ferring to different stages of the same encounter), the

same pattern of increasing negative correlations wasfound. Positive and negative emotions at the ongoingstage (analogous to Time 2) were correlated —.21, andin the concluded stage (analogous to Time 3) the corre-lation was —.40. Thus, the results can be said to havebeen replicated in the present study. However, what isperhaps even more important, having subjects recall howthey felt at an earlier stage (pilot study) produced findingscomparable to having them report feelings at the presentmoment.

outcome stage, but a combination of both,which may explain why the emotions asso-ciated with both anticipation and outcomewere elevated.

The significant changes in emotions thatoccurred as the examination unfolded areconsistent with our theoretical position thatas the person's appraisal of a stressful en-counter changes, so too will its associatedemotions. As noted earlier, in the anticipatorystage, people are concerned with evaluatingthe demands and possibilities connected witha future event; at the outcome stage, theirconcerns turn to the significance of what hasalready happened. In this study, anticipationconcerns how one might do on the exam andwhat must be done to prepare for it and/orto regulate feelings; outcome concerns one'sperformance and its implications. One mightbe disappointed or pleased about the exami-nation after the grade has been announced;however, such feelings are not relevant beforethe exam. Conversely, one is more likely tobe worried and/or hopeful before the examthan after.

Notice what would happen if a person'semotions for the whole stressful encounterwere aggregated and represented by a singlesummary state score. The aggregate wouldcontain a mixture of emotions whose situa-tional and cognitive bases would in all like-lihood be ignored. Furthermore, changes inthe emotional state, reflecting changes in the

156 SUSAN FOLK.MAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

person-environment relationship during theexamination, would be entirely masked. Inother words, a summary score would misrep-resent how the person was actually feelingthroughout the encounter and would buryimportant indicators of the person's ongoingevaluations of how well he or she was man-aging the demands of a stressful encounter.

With respect to the role of ambiguity, wesuggested that the greater the ambiguity, thegreater the probability that people wouldexperience both positive and negative emo-tions at the same time. Conversely, as ambi-guity gives way to clarity, people will be morelikely to experience either positive or negativeemotions. Our findings offer strong supportfor this line of reasoning. Threat and challengeemotions, which reflect anticipatory appraisalsin an ambiguous context, were not signifi-cantly correlated at Time 1, Time 2, or Time3. In contrast, positive and negative outcomeemotions, that is, benefit and harm emotions,which reflect appraisals about what has al-ready transpired, became increasingly nega-tively correlated at the encounter unfolded toits conclusion. The important point is thatwhen anticipating an ambiguous outcome,people are likely to feel both positive (chal-lenge) emotions and negative (threat) emo-tions, whereas when evaluating an outcomethat has clearly transpired, they are likely tofeel either positive (benefit) emotions or neg-ative (harm) emotions.

Notice too what this says about analysesof the dimensions of emotions (e.g., Daly,Polivy, & Lancee, 1983; Russell, 1980; Wat-son, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984). Most dimen-sional analyses, which correlate and factor-analyze ratings of emotion, are based on theemotional responses to specific and relativelyunambiguous events. The contexts of theseratings therefore correspond to our outcomestage when the implications of the encounterare relatively unequivocal. Under these cir-cumstances we would expect positive andnegative emotional states such as relief anddisappointment, or happiness and sadness,to display strong negative relations. But whenencounters producing emotions are ambigu-ous as to outcome—a common experiencein living—the expected negative relations andthe clear dimensional structures based onthem would probably not be found.

The pattern described above can also bethought of as the microgenesis of a cognitive-affective structure, after the classic Europeanwork on the microgenesis of perception. Aperson probably has many such structures,some transitory, some stable, each reflectingparticular areas of experience. When thesestructures repeat themselves, they can operatein the same manner as beliefs, by affectingsubsequent perceptions and emotional pat-terns. In the present instance, a subject'semergent cognitive-affective structure isprobably specific to the examination outcomeand its implications; it may be transitory, butit may also reintegrate similar experiencesand reemerge when the person faces anotherexamination. Its stability can only be evalu-ated by observing the same cognitive-affectiveprocess again in the same persons. Our useof the examination setting made it possiblefor us to observe the evolution of a specificcognitive-affective structure from its genesisin an ambiguous condition to its articulationthrough substantial cognitive and hence emo-tional clarity.

Coping

We noted in the introduction that thedominant approach to the measurement ofcoping has been to assess coping as a trait,that is, as a stable person property that affectsactions and reactions under a variety ofstressful circumstances. Yet coping traits areoften poor predictors of the ways peopleactually cope in a specific context (for reviewssee Cohen & Lazarus, 1973; Folkman &Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus & Launier, 1978).The power of trait measures to predict copingprocesses is limited because, by definition,they are concerned with person characteristicsthat transcend situational characteristicswhose properties are apt to produce variabilityrather than stability in how people cope (e.g.,Krohne & Rogner, 1982).

Three criteria must be satisfied to studycoping as a process: (a) Coping must beexamined within the context of a specificstressful encounter; (b) what the person ac-tually does (as contrasted to what the personusually does, or would do, which is asked bythe trait approach) must be described; and(c) there must be multiple assessments during

EMOTION AND COPING 157

the encounter in order to examine changes

in coping over time as the encounter unfolds.

In an earlier effort to move toward a process

approach to coping (Folkman & Lazarus,

1980), we studied coping thoughts and actions

in the same people over numerous stressful

encounters, thereby meeting criteria (a) and

(b). We found changes in coping from en-

counter to encounter, but we were not in a

position to evaluate how coping changes dur-

ing the course of a single encounter. These

three criteria of process were met in the

present research by evaluating what the stu-

dents actually did (as reported by them) to

cope with the particular stressful transaction

at three points in time.

Method

Coping was assessed with the Ways of Coping Checklist,which is a modification of the 68-item list reported byFolkman and Lazarus (1980) and Aldwin et al. (1980).The revised 66-item self-report measure retains the broadrange of cognitive and behavioral strategies people use tomanage stressful demands. However, the response formathas been changed from a yes-no answer to a 4-pointLikert scale (0 = does not apply and/or not used; 3 =used a great deal). Redundant and unclear items havebeen deleted or reworded, and several items, such asprayer, were added at the suggestion of subjects in ourprevious research. The checklist was administered in thepresent study as part of the Stress Questionnaire at Timel.Time 2, and Time 3.

A three-step procedure was used to develop scalesfrom the revised checklist. First, 9 items were eliminatedbecause they showed high skewness and restricted variance.The remaining 57 items were then factor-analyzed. Onlythose subjects who completed the series of three ques-tionnaires were included in the factor analysis in orderto avoid overrepresentation in the factor structure of theTime 1 questionnaires, which were returned in greaternumber than those at Times 2 and 3. Thus, the samplefor the factor analysis consisted of three questionnairesfrom each of 108 subjects, yielding an A^ of 324.2

A six-factor solution, using common factor analyseswith oblique rotation, yielded the most conceptuallyinterpretable set of factors. Fifteen items that did notload clearly on any one factor were deleted. One of thesix factors contained three distinguishable groups ofemotion-focused items. Thus, in the final step, the threegroups of items were rationally assigned to three factorsto provide greater theoretical clarity.

This procedure produced eight scales, including oneproblem-focused and six emotion-focused scales, and theeighth scale containing both problem- and emotion-focused items. These eight scales are characterized asfollows:

Problem-focused coping (11 items): e.g., "I try toanalyze the problem in order to understand it better";"I'm making a plan of action and following it";

Emotion-focused coping:

Wishful thinking (5 items): e.g., "Wish that I canchange what is happening or how I feel"; "Wishthat the situation would go away or somehow beover with";

Distancing (6 items): e.g., "Try to forget the wholething"; "I'm waiting to see what will happen beforedoing anything";

Emphasizing the positive (4 items): e.g., "Lookfor the silver lining, so to speak; try to look on thebright side of things"; "I'm changing or growing asa person in a good way";

Self-blame (3 items): e.g., "Criticize or lecturemyself"; "Realize I brought the problem on myself";

Tension-reduction (3 items): e.g., "Try to makemyself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking,using drugs or medications, etc"; "I jog or exercise";

Self-isolation (3 items): e.g., "Avoid being withpeople in general"; "Keep others from knowing howbad things are";

Mixed problem- and emotion-focused coping:Seeking social support (7 items): e.g., "Talk to

someone to find out more about the situation";"Accept sympathy and understanding from someone."

Scores were calculated by summing the ratings. Theaverage reliabilities and intercorrelations among the eightscales are shown in Table 2. The intercorrelations amongthe scales averaged across three occasions are similar tothose reported by Aldwin et al. (1980).3

Results

Our first objective was to confirm our

previous finding that people typically use

both problem- and emotion-focused forms of

coping rather than just one form or the other.

At Time 1, the period prior to the midterm

exam, 99% of the subjects used problem-

focused coping (that is, had a score of 1 or

2 The factor analysis could also have been performedseparately for each occasion, or with scores averagedacross the three occasions for each subject, which wouldhave had the advantage of providing independent obser-vations. However, we wanted a common metric withwhich to compare coping on the three occasions basedon as large a sample size as possible. For this reason, wedecided to pool observations across the three occasions,even though this involved dependence in the data.

3 The above eight scales are similar in content to thosefound in an earlier analysis (Aldwin et al., 1980). Problem-focused coping, wishful thinking, self-blame, and empha-sizing the positive (previously called growth coping) havesimilar items in both versions. The earlier version had ahelp-seeking/avoidant scale. The help-seeking componenthas its counterpart in the present social support scale.The previous version also contained aminimization ofthreat scale, which resembles the present distancing scale.Separate scales called tension-reduction and self-isolationhave been added.

158 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

Table 2

Reliabilities and Intercorrelations of Coping Scales Averaged Across Three Occasions

Measure

Scale

1 . Problem-focused coping2. Wishful thinking3. Distancing4. Seeking social support

5. Emphasizing the positive6. Self-blame

7. Tension-reduction8. Self-isolation

.85,84.71.81.65.75.56.65

.41 .20 .64.51 .42

.24

.58

.29

.13

.54

.46

.63

.34

.39

.42

.38

.50

.34

.42

.36

.31

.31

.54

.41

.18

.23

.53

.37

greater on the problem-focused scale) and atleast one form of emotion-focused coping (ascore of 1 or greater on at least one emotion-focused scale). At Time 2, 95% used bothforms of coping, and at Time 3, 94%. Aninspection of the range of coping strategiesused at each occasion gives further evidenceof the multidimensionality of coping. A max-imum of eight types of coping were availableto the subjects at each occasion. At Time 1subjects used an average of 7 types of coping;at Time 2, 6.5; and at Time 3, 6.2.

Our second objective was to examinechanges in the eight types of coping fromTime 1 to Time 2, and from Time 2 to Time3. This was done using paired t tests. Anexperiment-wise error rate of .10 was usedfor the two sets of tests (Time 1 vs. Time 2and Time 2 vs. Time 3), meaning that toattain significance, a t value had to have aprobability of s.006. The results are shownin Table 3.

Problem-focused coping, seeking social sup-port, emphasizing the positive, and self-isolationdecreased significantly from Time 1 to Time2, whereas distancing increased significantly.Wishful thinking and distancing decreased sig-nificantly from Time 2 to Time 3.

There was no significant increase in anytype of coping from Time 2 to Time 3. Thisfinding suggested that the coping tasks atTime 3 may have been determined more byindividual differences in reaction to the out-come (grades) than by consensually perceiveddemands. We followed up this possibility byexamining the effects on coping of the gradereceived in the examination. Using analysisof variance (ANOVA) with grade (A, B, C) as

the independent variable, and the eight copingscales as the dependent variables, we foundsignificant effects for five of the eight typesof coping: wishful thinking, F(l, 117) = 9.32,p < .001; seeking social support f\2, 118) =3.01, p < .05; self-blame, F(2, 119) = 13.89,p < .001; tension-reduction, F(2, 118)= 6.09,p < .003; and self-isolation, F(2, 120) =12.14, p < .001. In every case, the pattern ofthe effect was the same: The means on thecoping scales increased as the grades de-creased.

Discussion

That at least 94% of the subjects used bothproblem- and emotion-focused forms of cop-ing at each of the three stages confirms ourprevious finding that both functions of copingare represented in most stressful encounters.The complexity of the ways people cope isespecially evident in the wide range of copingstrategies used at each stage. On the average,subjects used between six and seven differenttypes of coping. People do indeed cope witha single stressful encounter in complex ways.

The changes in coping from Time 1 toTime 2, and Time 2 to Time 3, demonstratethat coping changes as a stressful encounterunfolds. The changes from Time 1 to Time2 in particular reflect a normative responseto changes in the obvious situational demandsfrom one phase of the examination to another.Problem-focused coping was at its height atTime 1, presumably in the service of studyingfor the exam. Two forms of emotion-focusedcoping, emphasizing the positive and seekingsocial support, were also at their height atTime 1.

EMOTION AND COPING 159

The most dramatic shift from Time 1 toTime 2 was a large decrease in problem-focused coping, / = 11.36, p < .001. Nothingmore could be done to change the outcomeof the exam at Time 2, which probablyaccounts for this drop. Seeking social supportand emphasizing the positive also decreasedsignificantly. The second most dramatic shiftwas a large increase in distancing, whichpeaked at Time 2. That distancing was sig-nificantly elevated at this stage suggests thatit is used especially in contexts where thereis nothing to do but wait.

Two types of coping decreased significantlyfrom Time 2 to Time 3, namely, wishfulthinking and distancing. The decrease in dis-tancing is especially marked and is consistentwith the idea that this form of coping is usedparticularly in waiting for an outcome, whenproblem-focused coping has no useful func-

tion. The absence of a significant increase inany type of coping from Time 2 to Time 3suggests that no one situational demand wasexperienced by the group as a whole aftergrades were announced. Instead, as indicatedby the follow-up analysis in which the effectsof grade on coping were examined, coping atTime 3 was influenced by individual differ-ences in grades. The students who receivedpoorer grades reported using more emotion-focused forms of coping, presumably in aneffort to manage distress concerning theirdisappointing performance, than students whodid well.

Elsewhere we have argued that emotion-focused modes of coping can facilitate prob-lem-focused coping if they are used to manageemotions that would otherwise impede prob-lem-focused activity (Lazarus & Folkman,1984a, 1984b). In the present study, problem-

Table 3Changes in Coping from Time 1 to Time 2 and Time 2 to Time 3

Variable

Problem-focusedcoping

Wishful thinking

Distancing

Seeking socialsupport

Emphasizing the

positive

Self-blame

Tension-reduction

Self-isolation

Number

of cases

123100

124

103

125105

123103

126102

130104

126104

128104

Time

Time 1Time 2

Time 3

Time 1Time 2

Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2

Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2

Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

M

15.29.5 (9.7)

10.5

5.2

4.63.9

3.5

6.5 (6.3)3.6

7.05.1

4.4

4.2

3.3 (3.2)2.8

3.33.23.2

2.62.32.0

2.31.9 (2.0)1.6

t

value

11.36-2.00

2.15

4.76

-9.288.55

6.182.22

3.901.69

.92-.36

1.942.17

2.97

2.70

df

12299

123

102

124104

122102

125

101

129103

125103

127

103

2-tailed

probability

<.001.049

.034

<.001

<.001

<.001

•c.OOl.029

<.001.094

.362

.723

.054

.033

.004

.008

Note. The mean for Time 2 that was calculated for the second comparison (Time 2 with Time 3) is indicated inparentheses if it differed from the mean calculated for the first comparison (Time 1 with Time 2).

160 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

focused coping was strongly correlated withemphasizing the positive and seeking socialsupport. The correlation between seeking so-cial support and problem-focused coping av-eraged across three occasions was .64. Thiscorrelation may be due in part to the prob-lem-focused strategies for seeking informa-tional support, which are on the scale thatmeasures seeking social support. The corre-lation between problem-focused coping andemphasizing the positive, however, was .58averaged across three occasions, which sug-gests that the latter form of emotion-focusedcoping goes hand-in-hand with problem-fo-cused coping.

Social Support

A person's social network or social supportsystem can be viewed as a coping resource,to be cultivated, maintained, and used or notused in many different ways. This resourcecan be drawn upon for emotional support,which contributes to the feeling that one isloved or cared about; for tangible support,which involves direct assistance in terms ofservice or material goods; and for informa-tional support, which includes informationand advice (Schaefer, Coyne, & Lazarus,1982). The type of support that is usedshould be determined in part by the demandsof the situation. For example, with respect tothe examination stages, we expected thatsubjects would seek informational support tohelp them with preparations for the exam atTime 1, and shift to emotional support forreassurance during the waiting period (Time2) and for comfort after grades were an-nounced (Time 3). Thus, informational sup-port should be used more extensively beforethe exam than afterwards, whereas emotionalsupport should be used more after the examthan before. We had no basis for predictinghow tangible support, which seems least rel-evant, might be used.

Method

Questions about social support were posed at Time 1,Time 2, and Time 3 as part of the Stress Questionnaire.Subjects were asked to think of all the people they hadspoken with at each stage of the exam and to indicateon a checklist which person was most helpful (e.g., afellow student taking the course, a friend outside thecourse, a teaching assistant, the professor, a family mem-

ber, no one). The subject was then asked three questionsabout the most helpful person. Responses were made ona 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely).The questions were:

How much had this person: (1) given you information,suggestions and guidance? (2) given you tangible assis-tance (e.g., helped you with chores, errands, etc.)? (3)given you emotional support (e.g., boosted your spirits,made you feel he/she cares)?

Results

Seventy-one percent of the students indi-cated that someone was helpful at Time 1,50% at Time 2, and 44% at Time 3. Thisfinding indicates that the provision of helpdecreased over the three stages. There is,unfortunately, no way to know whether sub-jects who found no one helpful were unableto obtain support or whether they simply didnot desire it.

Changes in the type of support that wasused from Time 1 to Time 2 and From Time2 to Time 3 were examined with paired ttests. An experiment-wise error rate of .10was used for the two sets of tests (Time 1 vs.Time 2 and Time 2 vs. Time 3), meaningthat a t value had to have a probability of.017 to be considered significant. The resultsare shown in Table 4.

As predicted, there was a significant de-crease in informational support, and a signif-icant increase in emotional support, fromTime 1 to Time 2. No significant changeswere found from Time 2 to Time 3. Tangiblesupport did not show any significant changes.

Discussion

These findings, consistent with our expec-tations, strongly suggest that the kind ofsocial support people use is to a large extentdetermined by the demands of the stressfulencounter and by changes in these demandsas it unfolds. Informational support was morecommonly used before the exam, when thesituational demands called for preparationfor a specific task (i.e., the exam), and emo-tional support was more frequently used afterthe exam, when there was nothing more thatcould be done about the task and all thatremained was to deal with the outcome ofthe exam. The lack of change in the use oftangible support indicates that no one phaseof the examination called for tangible assis-

EMOTION AND COPING 161

Table 4

Changes in Social Support from Time J to Time 2 and Time 2 to Time 3

Variable

Informationalsupport

Emotionalsupport

Tangiblesupport

Number ofcases

4129

4330

4027

Time

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

Time 1Time 2Time 3

M

3.42.22.1

2.23.13.1

1.51.51.4

1value

5.42.53

-.39.30

-.28.66

iff

4028

4229

3926

2-tailedprobability

<.001.602

<.001.769

.781

.515

tance more than any other. In fact, the rela-tively low level of tangible support that wasreported throughout the examination suggeststhat there was little perceived value in thiskind of social support in the context of theexamination. Because we only asked aboutthe most helpful person at each time point,we do not know whether subjects receivedalternative kinds of support from other peopleat each occasion.

Our findings indicate that it is importantto think of the use of social support as acoping process that changes over time inaccord with shifts in a specific person-envi-ronment relation. This view does not negatethe importance of also looking at social sup-port as an antecedent of long-term healthoutcomes, which is the more traditional for-mulation (e.g., Cobb, 1976). Having a socialsupport system, for example, whether or notone draws on it, may contribute to whethera person feels generally challenged or threat-ened, or committed rather than alienated,which in turn may be related to health (Ko-basa, Maddi, & Courington, 1981; Kobasa,Maddi, & Kahn, 1982). Clearly, however,how people draw on available support inspecific stressful encounters should also besystematically studied, because it varies withthe particular context.

Part II: Individual Differences in Emotion

Despite the strong main effects of theexamination stages on emotion shown in PartI, there were also large individual differences.According to our theoretical formulation, in-

dividual differences in emotion in a stressfulencounter are due in large part to cognitiveappraisal and coping. In Part II we draw onthis theoretical formulation in order to explainindividual differences in emotions at Time 1and Time 3.

Threat and Challenge Emotions (Time 1)

According to our theoretical framework, atransaction is appraised as stressful only ifthe situation engages a significant motive,that is, the person judges that something isat stake (Lazarus, 1966). In other words,having a stake in the outcome is a necessary(but not sufficient) condition for threat andchallenge. The greater the stake, the higherthe potential for emotion in the encounter.We therefore predicted that both threat andchallenge emotions would be associated withthe level of personal stakes.

Whether or not a transaction is stressful isalso influenced by an evaluation of copingresources (Lazarus, 1966), which we call sec-ondary appraisal. Secondary appraisal in thisstudy was assessed by questions about howdifficult the student expected the exam to beand how much in control he or she wasfeeling. Grade point average was also includedin the assessment of secondary appraisal, asan indicator of relevant skills and abilities.These variables provided the basis for pre-dicting: (a) the more difficult the personanticipates the exam will be, the higher thethreat emotions; (b) the more in control theperson feels, the higher the challenge emotionsand, conversely, the less in control the personfeels, the higher the threat emotions (cf.

162 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

reviews in Silver & Wortman, 1980; Thomp-son, 1981); and (c) the better the subject'sprior academic performance (GPA), thehigher the challenge emotions, and the worsethe prior performance, the higher the threatemotions.

The conceptual bases for predicting rela-tions between coping and threat and challengeemotions are less clear. Emphasizing the pos-itive aspects of the examination should de-crease threat emotions and perhaps increasechallenge emotions. We made no other pre-dictions about threat and challenge from anyof the other types of coping.

Harm and Benefit Emotions (Time 3)

The grade a student receives should havea strong influence at the outcome of theexamination. The higher the grade, the betterthe person should feel about the exam and,conversely, the lower the grade, the worse heor she should feel. However, a central tenetof our conceptualization is that the meaningof the outcome to the individual and the wayit is handled (coped with) is a key factor inemotion. Therefore, we would expect ap-praisal and coping processes to contribute toindividual differences in harm and benefitemotions over and above the differences ex-plained by the grade itself.

The same variables shaping appraisal andemotion in the anticipatory phase of theexamination should also be relevant at theoutcome. For example, the more the studenthas at stake in the exam, the greater thesignificance of the grade. Thus, we wouldexpect this variable to contribute to bothharm and benefit emotions.

Perceived difficulty of the exam could havedifferent effects on harm and benefit emotionsthan on threat and challenge emotions. Onthe one hand, difficulty attributed to internalfactors such as lack of ability and/or effortcould result in harm emotions; yet if thedifficulty is attributed externally to the taskitself, for example, "The exam was unusuallydifficult," the way is open for the person torationalize his or her performance and hencereduce feelings of guilt or disappointment (cf.Meyer, 1980; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman,1979). Because we did not obtain the infor-mation on attributions that is needed tointerpret the personal meaning of this vari-

able, we could not make any predictionsabout its role.

The extent to which a student felt incontrol should operate in the same way withrespect to harm and benefit emotions as ispostulated for threat and challenge emotions,in effect, by raising the intensity of positiveemotions when feelings of control are high,and raising the intensity of negative emotionswhen such feelings are low.

There are no compelling theoretical orempirical bases for predicting the relationsbetween specific types of coping and harmand benefit emotions. However, intuitively weexpected that emphasizing the positive wouldbe associated with benefit emotions and self-blame with harm emotions. We made nopredictions regarding the remaining six typesof coping.

Method

Stakes were measured with a 4-item scale administeredat Time 1 as part of the Stress Questionnaire. The studentwas asked to respond on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = doesnot apply; 4 = applies a great deal) to the followingquestion:

Below is a list of reasons why exams can be stressful.Please indicate how much each item applies to you bycircling the appropriate number. In this exam there isthe possibility of:

(a) not achieving the grade 1 want(b) appearing incompetent to others(c) jeopardizing my view of myself as a capable

student(d) losing the approval or respect of someone im-

portant to me.

Two other items ("jeopardizing eligibility for scholarship,fellowship, or financial assistance" and "harm to myphysical health") were not included in the analysis,because they were infrequently endorsed. The scale wasscored by summing the ratings on the four items. Thereliability (alpha) of the four-item stakes scale was .78.

Difficulty was assessed with the following items(Time 1): How difficult do you think this exam

will be?(Time 3): How difficult did you find the exam?

Responses were reported on a 5-point Likert scale (1 =not at all difficult; 5 = extremely difficult).

How much in control the subject felt was assessed atTime 1 and Time 3 by asking the subject to indicatehow much in control he or she was feeling "now aboutthis exam." The response was indicated on a 5-pointLikert scale (0 = not at all; 4 = a great deal).

GPA was reported by the subjects at Time I andTime 3.

Grade received on the exam was reported by thesubjects at Time 3. Grades were indicated by letter (A,B, C, D, or F).

EMOTION AND COPING 163

Table 5Correlations Among Predictors of Threat and Challenge Emotions

Measure

Measure 1

1. GPA2. Stakes3. Difficulty4. Feeling in control5. Problem-focused coping6. Wishful thinking7. Distancing8. Seeking social support9. Emphasizing the positive

10. Self-blame11. Tension-reduction12. Self-isolation

2 3 4 5

-.07 -.17 .18 -.01.30 -.15 .20

-.47 .01.20

6

-.22.33.28

-.29.33

7

-.33.20.19

-.15.14.55

8

-.15.27.08.06.56.33.20

9

-.02.07

-.10.16.51.16.11.42

10

-.22.29.23

-.23.33.65.41.29.30

11

-.09.22.08

-.09.35.47.34.45.35.36

12

-.21.23.20

-.13.22.40.45.07.19.52.21

The eight coping scales and the four emotion scales(threat and challenge emotions; harm and benefitemotions) were described in Part I.

Results

Threat and challenge emotions (Time 1).GPA, stakes, anticipated difficulty of theexam, feeling in control, and the eight copingscales were used to explain the variance inthreat and challenge emotions. The zero-order correlations among the predictor vari-ables are shown in Table 5. These variableswere entered into a regression equation in aforward stepwise procedure. The results ofthe regression analysis for threat emotionsare shown in Table 6 and for challenge emo-tions in Table 7.

In all, 48% of the variance in threat emo-tions was explained. Wishful thinking, stakes,anticipated difficulty of the exam, and seekingsocial support accounted for 44% of thevariance. The standardized regression coeffi-cients for these variables were all positive, asexpected. An additional 4% was explained bythe remaining coping scales, feeling in control,and GPA.

Approximately 48% of the variance inchallenge emotions was also explained, al-though a somewhat different pattern of vari-ables was evident than for threat. Feeling incontrol, stakes, problem-focused coping, andtension-reduction accounted for 44% of thevariance. One of these variables, tension-reduction, had a negative Beta coefficient.

Table 6

Regression of Threat Emotions on Appraisal, Coping, and GPA

Variable

" Standardized regression coefficient"p^.05.

R2change

Wishful thinkingStakesAnticipated difficulty of examSeeking social supportDistancingFeeling in controlTension-reductionSelf-blameGPAProblem-focused copingEmphasizing the positiveSelf-isolation

.23

.35

.41

.44

.46

.47

.48

.48

.48

.48

.48

.48

.23

.12

.06

.03

.02

.01

.01

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

.31*

.26*

.21*

.19*-.13-.15-.07

.08

.03

.04-.03-.02

164 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

Table 7

Regression of Challenge Emotions on Appraisal, Coping, and GPA

Variable

3 Standardized regression coefficient• p £, .05

R' R2 change

Feeling in controlProblem-focused copingStakesSelf-isolation

Wishful thinkingAnticipated difficulty of examEmphasizing the positiveSeeking social supportDistancingGPATension-reduction

.35

.40

.42

.44

.45

.46

.47

.47

.47

.48

.48

.35

.05

.02

.02

.01

.01

.01

.00

.00

.00

.00

.63*

.16*

.14'-.15'

.19*

.12

.10-.10-.07

.05

.04

The remaining coping scales, perceived dif-ficulty, and GPA accounted for an addi-tional 4%.

Harm and benefit emotions (Time 3). Acombination of hierarchical and forwardstepwise regression analyses was used to pre-dict the variance in harm and benefit emo-tions. The grade received on the exam wasentered into the equations first because weviewed it as the precipitator of appraisal andcoping processes at Time 3. The remainingvariables were entered in a forward stepwiseprocedure. The predictor variables thus in-clude grade received (entered first) and stakes,feeling in control, perceived difficulty of theexam, and the eight coping scales. The zero-order corerlations among these variables areshown in Table 8. The results of the regression

analysis for harm emotions are shown inTable 9 and for benefit emotions in Table 10.

Sixty-one percent of the variance in harmemotions was explained by these variables.Grade on the exam accounted for 37%, andthree types of coping—self-blame, wishfulthinking, and seeking social support—ac-counted for an additional 20%. The remaining4% was explained by the appraisal variablesand five remaining types of coping. Theregression coefficient for grade on the examwas negative, as expected. The regressioncoefficient for seeking social support .was alsonegative, although not significant.

Fifty-seven percent of the variance in ben-efit emotions was accounted for. Grade onthe exam accounted for 33% of the variance.An additional 24% was accounted for by the

Table 8Correlations Among Predictors of Harm and Benefit Emotions

Measure

1.2.3.4.

5.6.7.

8.9.

10.11.12.

Measure

Grade on examStakesDifficultyFeeling in controlProblem-focused copingWishful thinkingDistancingSeeking social supportEmphasizing the positiveSelf-blameTension-reduction

Self-isolation

1 2 3 4 5

-.05 -.36 .47 -.19.31 .09 .25

-.16 .18.16

6

-.37

.31

.38-.28

.48

7

-.13.14

.19-.18

.30

.57

8

-.22.23.18.03.71.43.26

9

-.11

.10

.05

.20

.59

.30

.10

.59

10

-.43.38.30

-.21.57.62.37.44.42

11

-.25.07.32

-.10.41.50.38.41.38.31

12

-.39.07.31

-.25.41.61.47

.24

.27

.54

.48

EMOTION AND COPING 165

Table 9

Regression of Harm Emotions on Grade, Appraisal, and Coping

Variable R2 change

GradeSelf-blameWishful thinking

Seeking social supportStakesPerceived difficulty of examFeeling in control

DistancingTension-reduction

Emphasizing the positiveProblem-focused copingSelf-isolation

.37

.52

.55

.57

.58

.59

.60

.61

.61

.61

.61

.61

.37

.15

.03

.02

.01

.01

.01

.01

.00

.00

.00

.00

-.28*

.41*

.27*

-.17-.13

.13-.11-.09

.05-.05

.06-.03

" standardized regression coefficient* p £ .05

appraisal variables and coping, with seekingsocial support, feeling in control, self-isolation,and stakes accounting for 20%.

A second set of regression analyses wasdone for harm and benefit emotions, whichemployed only the forward stepwise proce-dure. We were interested in determiningwhere grade on the exam would be enteredinto the equation according to strictly empir-ical criteria. The equation for benefit emotionsusing the forward stepwise procedure wasidentical to the hierarchical and forward step-wise regression shown in Table 10. Grade onthe exam still accounted for the major pro-portion of variance in benefit emotions. Incontrast, the resulting equation for harmemotions showed that self-blame was entered

first, accounting for 39% of the variance,followed by grade on exam, accounting foran additional 13%.

Discussion

In order to simplify the discussion of theabove findings, we shall confine ourselves tothose variables that together account for 90%of the explained variance in each of the foursets of emotions. These variables are shownin Table 11.

Threat and challenge emotions (Time 1).Three important points emerge from thefindings on threat and challenge emotions.First, GPA is notably absent as an importantexplanatory variable; the emotions experi-enced during the preparation for an exam

Table 10

Regression of Benefit Emotions on Grade, Appraisal, and Coping

Variable

a standardized regression coefficient* p <, .05

R2 change

GradeSeeking social support

Feeling in controlTension-reduction

StakesSelf-blameDistancingEmphasizing the positivePerceived difficulty of examWishful thinkingSelf-isolationProblem-focused coping

.33

.44

.49

.52

.53

.54

.55

.55

.56

.56

.57

.57

.33

.11

.05

.03

.01

.01

.01

.00

.01

.00

.01

.00

.52*

.20

.23*

.14

.17*-.17

.13

.13

.09-.13

.04-.03

166 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

Table 11

Key Explanatory Variables in Regression Analyses of Emotions

Variable R2 change

Threat emotions (total explained variance = 48%)Wishful thinkingStakesDifficultySeeking social support

Challenge emotions (total explained variance = 48%)Feeling in controlProblem-focused copingStakesSelf-isolation

Harm emotions (total explained variance = 61%)GradeSelf-blameWishful thinking

Benefit emotions (total explained variance = 57%)GradeSeeking social supportFeeling in controlTension-reduction

.23

.12

.06

.03

.35.05.02.02

.37

.15

.03

.33

.11

.05

.03

Note. Key explanatory variables account for approximately 90% of explained variance.

are apparently more heavily influenced bypresent, immediate concerns than by pastperformance. Second, the variable of stakesis involved in threat and challenge emotions,accounting for 12% of the variance in theformer but only 2% in the latter. We expectedthat stakes would be associated with boththreat and challenge emotions. However, thestakes assessed in this study had more to dowith potential loss than gain, which mayexplain why stakes accounted for so littlevariance in challenge emotions. Third, asidefrom stakes, the appraisal variables and copingprocesses associated with threat emotionswere different from those associated withchallenge emotions. Feeling in control, forexample, was correlated with challenge emo-tions and not negatively correlated with threatemotions as we had expected. Similarly, an-ticipating that the exam would be difficultwas positively correlated with threat emotions,and not at all correlated with challenge emo-tions.

These findings suggest that threat and chal-lenge to a limited degree share one variablein common, namely, stakes; beyond that,individual differences in threat and challengeseem to be influenced by different facets ofthe cognitive appraisal process. Threat and

challenge emotions are also associated withdifferent forms of coping. Wishful thinkingand seeking social support are involved inthreat emotions, whereas problem-focusedcoping and self-isolation are involved in chal-lenge emotions. In short, with the exceptionof stakes, the profiles of appraisal variablesand types of coping are different for threatand challenge emotions. In Part I we con-firmed that threat and challenge emotionsare normatively independent. Here in Part IIwe begin to see the underpinnings of thisindependence.

Harm and benefit emotions (Time 3). Theregression analyses in which grade on theexam was entered first indicated that appraisalvariables and coping explained 24% of thevariance in both benefit and harm emotionsbeyond that which was explained by thegrade the subject received. That about 40%of the explained variance in these emotionswas due to appraisal and coping attests to theimportance of these variables, and supportsour argument that it is not just the outcomeof the exam itself, but also its meaning andhow it is coped with that affects the emotionalresponse.

Further support for this argument comesfrom the results of the forward stepwise

EMOTION AND COPING 167

regression analysis of harm emotions. Whenvariables were entered with the forward step-wise procedure, self-blame, and not grade,accounted for the greatest amount of variance.Although we did not ask about the personalsignificance of the outcome, the use of self-blame (e.g., "Criticize or lecture myself,""Realize I brought the problem on myself")suggests that students attributed performanceto controllable internal factors such as effortor skill, rather than external factors such astask difficulty. This interpretation would alsoexplain why the perceived difficulty of theexam was not an important explanatory vari-able in harm emotions.

Aside from grade, the variables that ac-counted for the variance in harm emotionsdiffered from those that accounted for thevariance in benefit emotions. Harm emotionswere correlated with self-blame and wishfulthinking, whereas benefit emotions were cor-related with seeking social support, feeling incontrol, and tension-reduction.

Contrary to our expectations, stakes werenot among the most important variables inharm or benefit emotions, although they fellamong the second tier of variables (see Tables9 and 10). We had expected that the meaningof the grade (and therefore the emotion in-tensity) would be influenced strongly by howmuch the student had at stake. It is possiblethat the outcome of a midterm examinationdoes not pose a very significant threat topersonal stakes because it is only one of manysuch assessments of academic performance.Stakes may play a part in outcome emotionsonly in major examinations (cf. Mechanic,1962).

General Discussion

Before discussing the principles that aresupported by these findings, two inevitablequalifications should be made. Both concernthe self-report nature of the data.

First, it is not possible to rule out thepossibility that rather than reflecting actualpsychological processes involved in emotionand coping with stress, our findings reflectthe implicit theories our subjects hold aboutemotion and coping based, for example, ontheir readings and course work. This inter-pretation is not, in our view, the best guessabout how to explain our findings, but it

remains a logical possibility that cannot bedismissed without check experiments thatdraw on other levels of response, for example,the physiological and behavioral.

Second, both our conceptualization ofvariables and the dependence of our obser-vations on self-report procedures can lead toblurred distinctions among appraisal, coping,and emotion variables in this research. Thesevariables all hinge on self-reports that couldconceivably overlap. For example, subjectsreport perceiving the exam as difficult and atthe same time report a lack of a feeling ofcontrol over the situation, or that they areanxious or worried. This problem exists inall research of this kind, as it also does inattributional studies on emotion. Moreover,some of the concepts are difficult to disentan-gle, not because of sloppy definitions, butbecause they are inherently fused. For ex-ample, cognitive coping, or what we havesometimes referred to as defensive reappraisal,is difficult to disentangle from primary andsecondary appraisal; both refer to how peopleconstrue what is happening for their well-being. Like the traditional concept of defense,without an indepth examination of mentalcontents in the specific context in which theprocess occurs, there are no reliable ways todistinguish when an appraisal is a form ofcognitive coping in response to threat andwhen it is not. Even additional physiologicaland behavioral observations might not help.For example, too little is known about auto-nomic and endocrine response patterns ascorrelates of different emotions to use themto validate inferences based on self-reportdata. That these patterns differentiate amongemotion qualities and intensities is itself ahighly controversial issue that cannot be testedwithout self-report data. Therefore, althoughwe acknowledge the problems inherent inself-report data, in the absence of a workablesolution it makes sense to proceed with pro-visional interpretations.

Given the above qualifications, four im-portant principles are supported by the find-ings of this study.

First, stressful encounter is a dynamic,unfolding process, not a static, unitary event.In the case of the midterm examination inthis study, there were objective changes in theenvironment as the encounter proceeded from

168 SUSAN FOLK.MAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

the anticipation stage to the outcome stage,and there were concomitant and appropriatechanges in emotions, coping, and the use ofsocial support. To examine a stressful en-counter without recognizing that its momen-tary properties may change can be misleading,and may also mean that one of the mostimportant features of human adaptation,namely, the way people change troubled per-son-environment relationships through cop-ing, will be ignored.

Second, at any given phase of an encounter,people are likely to experience seeminglycontradictory states of mind and emotions.This principle is illustrated by the findingthat subjects reported feeling both threat andchallenge emotions during each phase of theexam. The juxtaposition of threat and chal-lenge emotions reflects the fact that peoplesee multiple possibilities and meanings intheir relationships with the environment,especially when conditions are ambiguous.We need to know more about these multiplemeanings, including those aspects of the en-counter about which people feel threatenedand challenged; and the extent to whichappraisals are tied to the outcomes of theimmediate event (the exam) and/or to futureevents for which the immediate event hasmeaningful implications (further exams, ca-reer, etc.)

Third, people cope in complex ways. Inthis study people combined problem-focusedcoping with multiple forms of emotion-fo-cused coping at each stage of the encounter.This finding replicates previous results re-garding problem- and emotion-focused coping(Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). The variety ofcoping strategies that were used in this studycould mean that people were responding todifferent aspects of each stage of the exami-nation and/or that they were trying out avariety of strategies in dealing with just oneaspect. These possibilities need further explo-ration. What is clear from this study, however,is that to assess coping as a unidimensionaltrait, as is commonly done in stress andcoping research, is to seriously underrepresentand distort the nature of actual coping pro-cesses.

It is also noteworthy that how and whenpeople draw on social supports varies accord-ing to the stage and demands of the stressful

encounter. Thus, when social support istreated as an aspect of coping, it is not astable feature of the social world, but aprocess that changes in systematic ways.

This study also raised issues concerninghow emotion-focused coping may facilitateor impede problem-focused coping. Problem-focused coping was associated with a specificform of emotion-focused coping, namely,emphasizing the positive. This pattern, whichwas also found by Aldwin et al. (1980),suggests that emphasizing the positive aspectsof a stressful encounter facilitates problem-focused coping. Conversely, it is possible thatsome forms of emotion-focused coping, suchas self-blame or wishful thinking, impedeproblem-focused coping.

Another interesting finding is that oneform of emotion-focused coping, distancing,was singularly prominent during the waitingperiod after the exam and before grades wereannounced. Would this same pattern occurin other contexts of waiting, as in waiting tolearn the outcome of a job interview or amedical diagnosis? Further, is distancing aform of coping that is associated with waitingin particular, or is it elicited in a more generalclass of situations in which there are few ifany options for affecting change in the envi-ronment?

Fourth, at any given phase of a stressfulencounter there are substantial individual dif-ferences in emotion, and these in large partreflect individual differences in cognitive ap-praisal and coping. Specifically, appraisalsconcerning stakes, perceived difficulty, andhow much in control the person was feelingas well as various types of coping, accountedfor large amounts of variance in reportedemotions over and above traditional variablessuch as ability (GPA) and performance onthe exam (grade).

What is needed is further investigation ofthese appraisal and coping variables in otherstressful contexts, particularly those that aremore stressful than a midterm exam. Forinstance, stakes that contain the possibilityfor mastery or gain need to be identified.Knowledge of these stakes would increaseour understanding of individual differencesin challenge emotions. Also, the variable"feeling in control" needs to be examined ingreater detail. It would be useful to know the

EMOTION AND COPING 169

aspect of the encounter over which the personfeels in control. Is it a situational facet of theperson-environment relationship such as ashort-term outcome, for example, the task ofpreparing for the exam or the grade, or alonger-term outcome such as academic stand-ing, the good will of the instructor, or aninternal agenda such as managing emotionor the expression of feeling (cf. Folkman,1984; Silver & Wortman, 1980)?

We need also to explore individual differ-ences in the stability and variability of coping.Some individuals, for example, may havepersisted in just one coping pattern acrossthe three stages of the examination. Do suchindividuals experience different patterns ofemotion from those whose coping pattern ismore variable? And how do individuals whopersist in one pattern of coping differ fromothers in their performance? Individual dif-ferences in coping stability-variability maybe an important factor in coping effectiveness,and in short- and long-term adaptationaloutcomes in stressful encounters {cf. Folkman& Lazarus, 1981).

The findings that support the four princi-ples noted depended on two modes ofobservation: experimental (in Part I), whichconcerns normative or shared treatment orcondition effects that are produced by theenvironment, or, in this study, by the way acourse instructor organized the demands ofa college examination; and correlational (inPart II), which concerns individual differencesthat, despite shared patterns of reaction todifferent situational demands, always repre-sent a major portion of the response variance.Cronbach (1957) referred to these modes asthe "two disciplines of scientific psychology"which need to be integrated. Both modes arenecessary if we are to study process andchange; whether one is concerned with ex-tended crises such as loss and grief, life coursestudies of stress and coping (see Lazarus &DeJLongis, 1983), or very brief encounterssuch as the examination stress we have studiedhere.

References

Aldwin, C., Folkman, S., Schaefer, C, Coyne, J. C, &

Lazarus, R. S. (1980, September). Ways of Coping: Aprocess measure. Paper presented at meetings ofAmerican Psychological Association, Monteal.

Baker, G. W., & Chapman, D. W. (Eds.) (1962). Man

and society in disaster. New York: Basic Books.Beck, A. T. (1971). Cognition, affect, and psychopathology.

Archives of General Psychiatry, 24, 495-500.Becker, P. (1982). Fear reactions and achievement behavior

of students approaching an examination. In. H. W.Krohne & L. Laux (Eds.), Achievement, stress, and

anxiety (pp. 275-290). Washington, DC: Hemisphere.Cobb, S. (1976). Social support as a moderator of life

stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 38, 300-314.Cohen, R. & Lazarus, R. S. (1973). Active coping pro-

cesses, coping dispositions, and recovery from surgery.Psychosomatic Medicine. 35. 375-389.

Coyne, J. C., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). Cognitive style,stress perception, and coping. In I. L. Kutash & L. B.Schlesinger (Eds.), Handbook on stress and anxiety:Contemporary knowledge, theory, and treatment (pp.

144-150). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.Cronbach, L. J. (1957). The two disciplines of scientific

psychology. American Psychologist, 12, 671-684.Daly, E. M., Polivy, J., & Lancee, W. J. (1983). A conical

model for the taxonomy of emotional experience.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 443-457.

Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy.

New York: Lyle Stuart.Epstein, S. (1962). The measurement of drive and conflict

in humans: Theory and experiment. In M. R. Jones(Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp. 127-

209). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.Epstein, S. (1979). The econological study of emotions

in humans. In P. Pliner, K. R. Blankenstein, & I. M.Spiegel (Eds.), Advances in the study of communication

and affect. Vol. 5: Perception of emotions in self andothers (pp. 47-83). New York: Plenum.

Epstein, S. (1982). Natural healing processes of the mind:II. Graded stress inoculation as an inherent copingmechanism. In D. Meichenbaum & M. E. Jaremko(Eds.), Stress prevention and management (pp. 36-66).New York: Plenum.

Epstein, S. (1983). A research paradigm for the study ofpersonality and emotions. In M. M. Page (Ed.), Per-

sonality—Current theory and research: 1982 NebraskaSymposium on Motivation (pp. 91-154). Lincoln: Uni-versity of Nebraska Press.

Fenz, W. D., & Epstein, S. (1962). Measurement of

approach-avoidance conflict along a stimulus dimensionby a thematic apperception test. Journal of Personality,30, 613-632.

Folkman, S. (1984). Personal control and stress and

coping processes: A theoretical analysis. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 46, 839-852.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). An analysis ofcoping in a middle-aged community sample. Journal

of Health and Social Behavior, 21, 219-239.Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1981). Reply to Shinn

and Krantz. Journal of Health and Social Behavior,22, 457-459.

Folkman, S., Schaefer, C., & Lazarus, R. S. (1979).Cognitive processes as mediators of stress and coping.In V. Hamilton & D. M. Warburton (Eds.), Human,

stress and cognition: An information processing ap-'proach (pp. 265-298). London: Wiley.

Gaudry, E., & Spielberger, C. D. (1971). Anxiety and

educational achievement. New York: Wiley.

170 SUSAN FOLKMAN AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

Goldstein, M. J. (1973). Individual differences in responseto stress. American Journal of Community Psychology,1, 113-137.

Heckhausen, H. (1982). Test-irrelevant cognitions duringan exam: Incidence and effects. In H. W. Krohne &L. Laux (Eds.), Achievement, stress, and anxiety (pp.247-254). Washington, DC: Hemisphere.

Heinrich, D. L., & Spielberger, C. D. (1982). Anxietyand complex learning. In H. W. Krohne & L. Laux(Eds.), Achievement, stress, and anxiety (pp. 145-166).Washington, DC: Hemisphere.

Kobasa, S. C, Maddi, S. R., & Courington, S. (1981).Personality and constitution as mediators in the stress-illness relationship. Journal of Health and Social Be-havior. 22, 368-378.

Kobasa, S. C, Maddi, S. R., & Kahn, S. (1982). Hardinessand health: A prospective study. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 42, 168-177.

Krohne, H. W., & Rogner, J. (1982). Repression-sensiti-zation as a central construct in coping research. InH. W. Krohne & L. Laux (Eds.), Achievement, stress,and anxiety (pp. 167-194). Washington, DC: Hemi-sphere.

Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Psychological stress and the copingprocess. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lazarus, R. S. (1981). The stress and coping paradigm.In C. Eisdorfer, D. Cohen, A. Kleinman, & P. Maxim(Eds.), Models for clinical psychopathology (pp. 174-214). New York: Spectrum.

Lazarus, R. S., Averill, J. R., & Opton, E. M., Jr. (1974).The psychology of coping: Issues of research andassessment. In G. V. Coelho, D. A. Hamburg, & J. E.Adams (Eds.), Coping and adaptation (pp. 249-315).New York: Basic Books.

Lazarus, R. S., Coyne, J. C., & Folkman, S. (1982).Cognition, emotion, and motivation: The doctoring ofHumpty-Dumpty. In R. W. J. Neufeld (Ed.), Psycho-logical stress and psychopathology (pp. 218-259). NewYork: McGraw-Hill.

Lazarus, R. S., & DeLongis, A. (1983). Psychologicalstress and coping in aging. American Psychologist, 38,245-254.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984a). Coping andadaptation. In W. D. Gentry (Ed.), The handbook ofbehavioral medicine (pp. 282-325). New York: Guilford.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984b). Stress, appraisal,and coping. New \brk: Springer Publishing.

Lazarus, R. S., Kanner, A. D., & Folkman, S. (1980).Emotions: A cognitrve-phenomenological analysis. InR. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), Theories of emotion(pp. 189-217). New York: Academic Press.

Lazarus, R. S., & Launier, R. (1978). Stress-relatedtransactions between person and environment. InL. A. Pervin & M. Lewis (Eds.), Perspectives ininteractional psychology (pp. 287-327). New York:Plenum.

Mechanic, D. (1962). Students under stress. New York:The Free Press.

Meyer, J. P. (1980). Causal attribution for success andfailure: A multivariate investigation of dimensionality,formation, and consequences. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 38, 704-718.

Moos, R. H. (1974). Psychological techniques in theassessment of adaptive behavior. In G. V. Coehlo,D. A. Hamburg, & J. E. Adams (Eds.), Coping andadaptation (pp. 334-399). New York: Basic Books.

Pearlin, L. I., Lieberman, M. A., Menaghan, E. G., &Mullan, J. T. (1981). The stress process. Journal ofHealth and Social Behavior, 22, 337-356.

Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1161-1178.

Sarason, I. G. (1972). Experimental approaches to testanxiety: Attention and the uses of information. InC. D. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety: Current trends intheory and research (Vol. 2, pp. 383-403). New York:Academic Press.

Sarason, I. G. (1975). Test anxiety, attention, and thegeneral problems of anxiety. In C. D. Spielberger &I. G. Sarason (Eds.), Stress and anxiety (Vol. I, pp.165-187). Washington, DC: Hemisphere.

Schaefer, C, Coyne, J. C, & Lazarus, R. S. (1982). Thehealth-related functions of social support. Journal ofBehavioral Medicine, 4, 381-406.

Silver, R. L., & Wortman, C. B. (1980). Coping withundesirable life events. In J. Garber & M. E. P.Seligman (Eds.), Human helplessness: Theory and ap-plications (pp. 279-340). New York: Academic Press.

Thoits, P. A. (1982). Conceptual, methodological, andtheoretical problems in studying social support as abuffer against life stress. Journal of Health and SocialBehavior, 23, 145-159.

Thompson, S. C. (1981). Will it hurt less i f l can controlit? A complex answer to a simple question. PsychologicalBulletin, 90, 89-101.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1984). Cross-cultural convergence in the structure of mood: AJapanese replication and a comparison with U.S. find-ings. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47,127-144.

Weiner, B., Graham, S., & Chandler, C. (1982). Pity,anger, and guilt: An attributional analysis. Personalityand Social Psychology Bulletin, S, 226-232.

Weiner, B., Russell, D., & Lerman, D. (1979). Thecognition-emotion process in achievement-related con-texts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37,1211-1220.

Received January 4, 1983

Revision received August 30, 1983