Hans Jonas: Tecbnology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Task of Etbtcs

H A N S J O N A S

I I5

r.9Iturert. Avest-nagi-r the

Te ch nology alnd Resp onsib ility :Refunions on the \Iew Thsk of Ethics

Hans Ionæ is one of a relatively small number of mrentieth-century philosophers whohave reflected carefrrlly on the relationship between technology and ethics. He is alsoknown for his writing on topics in biomedical ethics. He ended his professional career asAlvin Iohnson Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research.

In this essay that originally appeared n Social Resea.rth ln ry73, ]onas develops theview that traditional ethics is incapable of handling the kinds of ethical problems that arebeing created by our contemporary global technological civilization. His view is that inorder to adequately evaluate the ethical significance of contemporary science and technol-ogy, we need to do so through the lens of a new kind of ethics, what he terms an "ethicsof responsibility." He subsequently expanded the ideas presented in this essay in a bookpublished in rq8+ entided Tbe Imperative of Responsihility: In Sedrdt of an Ethicsfm theTeclmolagical'49e.

Focas Qwstions

r. What are the three characteristics of traditional "neighbor ethics" that Jonas isolates,and in what respects has modern technology made traditional ethics obsolete|

z. IIow does ]onas'view that "man himself has been added to the objects of technolog/compâre to the discussion of the ethics of human cloning by Robert Wachbroit (selec-tion U.s)l

3. What do you think |onas means when he says, "We need wisdom the most when webelieve in it the leasC'f

Kelwords

behavior control, environmental ethics, ethics, genetic engineering, morality, utopia

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ArL pREvrous ETHrcs-whether in the form of is-suing direct enjoinders to do and nor ro do certainthings, or in the form of defining principles forsuch enjoinders, or in the form of establishing theground of obligation for obeying such principles-had these interconnected tacit premises in com-

From Philnsophical Essays by Hans Jonas. Copyright A ryz+ byPrentice-Hall. Reprinted by permission of Eleanore Jonas.

mon: that the human condition, determined by thenature of man and the nature of things, was givenonce for all; that the human good on that basis wasreadily detcrminable; and that the range of humanaction and therefore responsibility was narrowlycircumscribed. It will be the burden of my argu-ment to show that these premises no longer hold,and to reflect on the meaning of this fact for ourmoral condition. More specificallp it will be mycontention that with certain developments of our

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r irtt i sincc ethics is c<lrtce rucrl rt i th .tction. it shtltr lt l

f ir l lou that thc clt.tngcci n.rtl lrc <tf hr.rrttrtt ' t ùcIi()lt

c . r l ls f i r r i r chr t t rqc i t r e t l ' r ics. rs r tc l l : th is r to t t r tcrc l r '

irr thc scnsc th:rt r)rj\\ ' ot-rjects of .rcrit l t l hrrr.c lrc.lt lctl

to t l tc c . tsc r r t , r tcr i . i l or r r r h ich rccc i r c . l n t lcs ot 'cot r -

eirrct lrc trl bc lppliccl. [tttt irt t l tc t lorc rrrclic.rl scrtsc

th.rt the clu.rl i t.rt ivclv rtove l l)Jt[ lrc t ' tt 'ccrtrritr of our

f,cti()ns hrrs openc.l trp l u'holc ncrv r' l irrrcnsiou of

etiric.rl relcr'.rncc fbr u'hich thcrc is uo prcccricnt iu

thc st.rr.rt l-rrcis ;urLl crln()ns tif tr lcl it ion;rI cthics.

IThe noiel p()\\ 'crs I lr lvc irr rtt iurl i lrc. of coursc.tlrosc of rnorlcln trltrtoloq.t,. trlv iï'st 1'roint. rrccorti-inqh'. is to rrsk hou this tcchnologv irf lccts thc n.r-trrre of our .rcting. in u'h.rr l.rvs it l ' lrùkcs rrcting r.rrr-r. lcr its rlominion difi i 'rut f i-rtm rr' lr lt ir h.rs l ' tccr-rthroLrgh thc rlqcs. Sincc tlrrough<lut those .lgcs l ' l t. 'ut\\ ' irs l ' lcVe r u ithoLrr tcchncllttgt'. thc tltrestion in-rrrlves tlrc hurr.r.rn t ' l i l fcrcnce <.t[ ttndcnt f l-onr prcr i-ous tcchuoloqr'. Lcr us strlrt u' ith ;rrr i ' t l tcicl ' l t voicc()u uri.ln's [ro\\'crs ;rne1 tlcet]s u'hich in irn irrclrcn'[-'rrlscnsc itsclisrrikcs. i 'rs it \\ 'crc. ;r tcchnological uotc-the f)nrrrrrs Chonrs i i '<lur Sophoclcs' ,ùtti iTortt.

,\Irrrrv thc rlonrlcrs [rut norhirrg lt]orc n orlrlroust]r.irt n-r.rrt.

This thing cr()sscs thc se .r irr thc u'irrre r's storut.rn:iki l lg his p.rth rhrouqh thc ro.rl ing u ru'cs..\n.l shc. t)ic qlc.rtcsr of qo.ls. t l ie E.rrtlr -

rlclthlcss slrc is. .rnrl trrln clric.l- hc rvclrs hcr lrr. ir '.ts t ltc plour{hs !l() up .rnel rion r"r l l 'onr vclr t() \ 'c,lr;ur t l h is r lu lcs nrr r r up t l tc so i l ,

- l- l ic tritres o1'rl ie I ighrhe.rltccl lr ircis irc cusrr.rrcs.;rnrl

rhc rrtccsoil l l r lrc rvil. ' l bc.rsrs.ut,. l thc s.rln t rootl oi 'rhc sc.r.u ith thc nvistctl ntesh ot' lr is rrcrs. hc lc.rds c.rf.t ir c.

rh is c lcve r r l . rn .I Ic controls i i irh cr.rf i rhc be.tsts ot'thc open .i ir ' .n ho rorrnt thc lrrl ls. Thc holsc u ith his shlggl nr.rnchc lrolcls rrr.rt i hlrne sscs. r okctl .rtrorrt thc ncck.ant l thc st ronq [ r t r l l < t f - t l rc nrorrnt . r in .

Sl.ccclt lntl r ltotrght l i l ie thc n intl

lrrt ' l r l ic f l 'cl irrgs thlt nt.i l ic t ltc trls t.t.

Irc h.rs trruqht hinrsclt, .rncl sltcltcr .rg.tinst t ltc col.l.

rctirge fionr rl in. Evcr rcsourcctirl is hc.

Hc t.rccs no titttrrc hclplç55. Orth' .rg.rittsr rlclthsh.r l l I rc c . r l l i i r r l . l i r r r . r i r r . l ' ] r r t l i t rnr l ' r . r t l i i r r r '

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Clcvcr bcr'<>url .t l l t lrcitnrs

thc irrle ntivc cr.rf i t lr irt hc h;rsu lt ich rn;.rr cirivc him onc tir lc or itrtclthcr to rr cll

or i l l .\\ 'hcn he houors thc l iru s oit lrc l.rntl the gotls'

su orn rir l lrthieh inclecd iu his cin ; b'ut st.rtclcss thc rrrlnrvho cilrcs to rlo n hrrt is slr;rnrctirl.

-fhis lNestft lcl i honri] l lc t() nri 'rn's P()\\ 'c[s tells of his

violcnt rrncl violrrt iug i lrr.rfrt iorr irtto thc c()snlic ()r-

r ' lcr. thc sclflrrsscrtivc invrrsion of nlture's vi. lr i()us

rlorl.rins bv his rcstless clcvcrncss; bLtt .rlso of hisbu i lcl ing - th rough the sclÈrlughr P6r1'1'1'5 r)f ' spçcçh

lncl thought rrurl soci.rl scutinrcnt-thc honte ti lr his\cn'lrLll ' l ' lùuin'. the irft i f i lct of rhc cin', Thc rûPing oi

nJturc i rnLl thc c iv i l iz ing of I r i l rse l f go l t i r r t t l i r rh lnr l . I lo th are in r le t l . rncc of t l rc c lcn ' rcr r ts . thc oncbv venturiug inro thcnr ;rnrl ovcrPon crirtg thcircrc.ltr lrcs. fhc othcr lrv secrrrir.rg rrn cilcl itvC ;lg:l i l lstthenr in thc shcl tcr of thc c in aucl i ts l lus. . \ l r r r isthc urrrl ie r of his l i tè {/rd hunr.ur. lrcueling circurrr-strluccs to his $il l .rncl rree.is. .ul(i e\cept . lgJinsttlc.rrh hc is ncvcr hclplcss.

\i ' t rhe rc is .r sutrclued rl lrrl evcn .rnriotrs rltrrrl in'rr[ 'r<lut this l;rpr.risrl of rhe nrrrrlcl rh.rt is rrrrrn. .rnclncl[ 'ror]r ' ciur nristrike ir t i lr inrnr<lrlcst [rr.rqgirrg.\\ ' i th ;rl l his boLrncllcss res<'xrrccttrhtess. n.r.rn is sri l l

snr . r l l bv thc rnc: lsurc of thc e lcnrcnts: prcc isc lv th ismrrkcs his srrl l ics inro thcnr so ti.u' ing .rrrri .r lkru'stht lsc c lcments to to lcr r r te h is f i l r r r ' . r r r ' lness. \ I . ik i t rgiicc u ith rhe ticnizcns of l lrr.1 .rrrcl sc.r .rur' l . i ir. hcvct Ic i t \ .es the cncontpJssi l tg l t r t t r l rc of thr lsc c lc-r t te nts unchi ln{cr l . ln t ' l rhc i r gcncr . r t ivc p( ) \ \ 'c rs

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- l ' l tcv l . is t . u 'h i lc

his schcn'rcs h.rr c rhcir- slrolt lrr c,-i rr.rr '. tr ltrclt .rs hch.rrrics Hlrth. thc grc.rtcsr of gorls. \ 'cJr Jficl ' \ 'c.rr

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with his plough-she is ageless and unwearied; herenduring patience he must and can trust, and hemust conform. And just as ageless is the sea. Withall his netting of the salty brood, the spawningocean is inexhaustible . Nor is it hurt by the plyingof ships, nor sullied by what is jettisoned into itsdeeps. And no matter how many illnesses he con-trives to cure, mortality does not bow to cunning.

All this holds because mân's inroads into nature,as seen by himself, were essentially superficial, andpowerless to upset its appointed balance. Nor isthere a hint, in the Antigona chorus or anywhereelse, that this is only a beginning and that greaterthings of artifice and power are yet to come -rhat

man is embarked on an endless course of conquest.He had gone thus far in reducing necessity, hadlearned by his wits to wrest that much from it forthe humanity of his life, and there he could stop.The room he had thus made was filled by the city ofmen-meant to enclose and not to expand-andthereby a new balance was struck within the largerbalance of the whole. All the well or ill to whichman's inventive craft may drive him one time or an-other is inside the human enclave and does nottouch the nature of things.

The immunity of the whole, untroubled in itsdepth by the impornrnities of man, rhar is, the es-sential immutability of Nature as the cosmic order,was indeed the backdrop to all of mortal man's en-terprises, between the abiding and the changing:the abiding was Nature, the changing his ownworks. The greatest of these works was the city, andon it he could offer some measure of abidingnessby the laws he made for it and undertook to honor.But no long-range certainty pertained to this con-trived abidingness. As a precarious arrifact, it canlapse or go astray. Not even within its artificialspace, with all the freedom it gives ro man's deter-mination of self, can the arbitrary ever supersedethe basic terms of his being. The very inconsrancyof human forhrnes assures the constancy of the hu-man condition. Chance and luck and folly, the greatequalizers in human affairs, act like an entropy ofsorts and make all definite designs in the long runrevert to the perennial norm. Cities rise and fall,rules come and go, families prosper and decline; no

TT7

change is there to stay) and in the end, with all thetemporary deflections balancing each other our, thestate of man is as it always was. So here too, in hisvery own artifact, man's control is small and hisabiding nature prevails.

Still, in this citadel of his own making, clearly setoff from tÏe rest of things and entrusted to him,was the whole and sole domain of man's responsi-ble action. Nature was not an object of human re-sponsibility-she taking care of herself and, withsome coaxing ând worrying, also of man: notethics, only cleverness applied to her. But in thecity, where men deal with men, cleverness must bewedded to morality, for this is the soul of its being.In this intra-human frame dwells all traditionalethics and matches the nature of action delimitedby this frame.

ilkt us extract from the preceding those characteris-tics of human action which are relevant for a com-parison with the estate of things today.

r. All dealing with the non-human world, i.e.,the whole reùm oî techne (with the exceptionof medicine), was ethically neutral-in respectboth of the objea and the subjea of such ac-tion: in respect of the object, because it im-pinged but litde on the self-sustaining natureof things and thus raised no question of per-manent injury to the integrity of its object, thenatural order as a whole; and in respect of thesubject it was ethically neutral because tecltne asan activity conceived itself as a determinatetribute to necessity and not as an indefinite,selÊvalidating advance to mankind's majorgoal, claiming in its pursuit man's ultimate eÊfort and concern. The real vocation of man layelsewhere. In brief, action on non-humanthings did not constitute a sphere of authenticethical significance.

z. Ethical significance belonged to the directdealing of man wifh man, including the deal-ing with himself: all traditional ethics is anthro-pocentric-

Hans Jonas: Tecbnology ond Responsibility: Reflections on the New Thsh of Ethics

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I I8 PART I: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES

3. For action in this domain, the entity *ma.n"

and his basic condition was considered con-stant in essence and not itself an object of re-shaping techne.

+. The good and evil about which action had tocare lay close to the act, either in the praxis it-self or in its immediate reach, and were not amatter for remote planning. This proximity ofends pertained to time as well as space. The ef-fective range of action was small, the time-spanof foresight, goal-setting, and accountabilitywas short, control of circumstances limited.Proper conduct had its immediate criteria andalmost immediate consummation. The longrun of consequences beyond was left tochange, fate, or providence. Ethics accordinglywas of the here and now, of occasions as theyarise between men, ofthe recurrent, typical sit-uations of private and public life. The goodman was he who met these contingencies withvimre and wisdom, cultivating these powers inhimself, and for the rest resigning himself tothe unknown.

All enjoinders and maxims of traditional ethics,materially different as they may be, show this con-finement to the immediate setting of the âction."Love thy neighbor as thyself'; 'Do unto others asyou would wish them to do unto you'; "Instructyour ôild in the way of truth"; "Strive for excel-lence by developing and actualizing the best poten-tialities of your bengqaa mân"; "Subordinate yourindividual good to the common good"; "Nevertreat your fellow man as a means only but alwaysaho as an end in himself"-and so on. Note that inall those maxims the agent and the "other' of hisaction are sharers of a common present. It is thosealive now and in some commerce with me thathave a claim on my conduct as it affects them bydeed or omission. The ethicai universe is composedof contemporaries, and its horizon to the furure isconfined by the foreseeable span of their lives. Sim-ilarly confined is its horizon of place, within whichthe agent and the other meet as neighbor, friendor foe, as superior and subordinate, weaker andstronger, and in all the other roles in which humans

interact with one another. To this proximate rangeof action all morality was geared.

ilIIt follows that the hnowledge that is required-be-sides the moral will-to assure the moraliry of ac-tion, fitted these limited terms: it was not theknowledge of the scientist or the expert, but knowl-edge of a kind readily available to all men of goodwill. Kant went so far as to say that "humân reasoncan, in matters of morality, be easily brought to ahigh degree of accuracy and completeness even inthe most ordinary intelligence";' that "there is noneed of science or philosophy for knowing whatman has to do in order to be honest and good, andindeed to be wise and vimrous. . . . [Ordinary intel-ligence] can have as good a hope of hitting themark as any philosopher can promise himself';'and again: "I need no elaborate acuteness to findout what I have to do so that my willing be morallygood. Inexperienced regarding the course of theworld, unable to anticipate all the contingenciesthat happen in itl'I can yet know how to act in ac-cordance with the moral law.3

Not every thinker in ethics, it is true, went so farin discounting the cognitive side of moral action.But even when it received much greater emphasis,as in Aristotle, where the discernment of the situa-tion and what is fitting for it makes considerabledemands on experience and judgment, such knowl-edge has nothing to do with the science of things.It implies, of course, a general conception of thehuman good as such, a conception predicated onthe presumed invariables of man's nâture and con-dition, which may or may not find expression in atheory of its own. But its translation into practicerequires a knowledge of the here and now, andthis is entirely non-theoretical. This "knowledge"proper to virnre (of the "where, when, to, whom,and hou/') stays with the immediate issue, inwhose defined context the action as the agent's owntakes its course and within which it terminates. Thegood or bad of the action is wholly decided withinthat short-term context. Its moral ouaiiw shines

53

I{ans lonas: Technology and. Responsibility: ReJlections on the New Tnsh of Ethics I I9

rge forth from it, visible to its witnesses. No one washeld responsible for the unintended later affectsof his well-intentioned, well-considered, and well-performed act. The short arm of human power didnot call for a long arm of predictive knowledge; theshortness of the one is as little culpable as that ofthe other. Precisely because the human good,known in its generality, is the same for all time, itsrelation or violation takes place at each time, and itscomplete locus is always the present.

UAll this has decisively changed. Modern technologyhas introduced actions of such novel scale,,objects,and consequences that the framework of formerethics can no longer contâin them. The Antigonechorus on the d.einotes, the wondrous power, ofman would have to read differendy now; and itsadmonition to the individual to honor the laws ofthe land would no longer be enough. To be sure,the old prescriptions of the "neighbor" ethics-ofjustice, chariry honesty, and so on-still hold intheir intimate immediary of the nearesr, day by daysphere of human interaction. But this sphere isovershadowed by a growing realm of collective ac-tion where doer, deed, and effect are no longer thesame as they were in the proximate sphere, andwhich by the enormity of its powers forces uponethics a new dimension of responsibility neverdreamt of before.

Take, for instance, as the first major change inthe inherited picture, the critical trulnerability of na-fLlre to man's technological intervention-unsus-pected before it began to show itself in damage al-ready done. This discovery whose shock led ro theconcept and nascent science of ecology, alters thevery concept ofourselves as a causal agenry in thelarger scheme of things. It brings to light, throughthe effects, that the nature of human action has de

facto changed, and that an object of an entirely neworder-no less than the whole biosphere of theplanet-has been added to what we must be re-sponsible for because of our power over it. And ofwhat surpassing importance ân object, dwarfing a-ll

previous objeas of active man! Nature as a humanresponsibility is surely a noyun to be pondered inethical theory. What kind of obligation is operativein itf Is it more than a utilitarian concernl Is it justprudence that bids us not to kill the goose that laysthe golden eggs, or saw offthe branch on which wesit) But the "we" that here sits and may fall into theabyss is all future mankind, and the survival of thespecies is more than a prudential duty of its presentmembers. Insofar as it is the fate of mon, as affectedby the condition of nature, which makes us careabout the preservation of nature, such care admit-tedly still retains the anthropocentric focus of allclassical ethics. Even so, the difference is great. Thecontainment of nearness and contemporaneity isgone, swept away by the spatial spread and time-span of the cause-effect trains which technologicalpractice sets afoot, even when undertaken for prox-imate ends. Their irreversibility conjoined to theiraggregâte magnitude injects another novel factorinto the moral equation. To this take their cumula-tive character: their effects add themselves to oneanother, and the situation for later acting and beingbecomes increasingly different from what it was forthe initial âgent. The cumulative selÊpropagationof the technological change of the world thus con-standy overtâkes the conditions of its contributingacts and moves through none but unprecedentedsituations, for which the lessons of experience arepowerless. And not even content with changing itsbeginning to the point of unrecognizability, the cu-mulation as such may consume the basis of thewhole series, the very condition of itself. All thiswould have to be co-intended in the will of the sin-gle action if this is to be a morally responsible one.Ignorance no longer provides it with an alibi.

Knowledg e, under these circumstances, becomesa prime duty beyond anything claimed for itheretofore, and the knowledge must be commen-surate with the causal scale of our action. The factthat it cannot really be thus commensurate, i,e.,that the predictive knowledge falls behind the tech-nical knowledge which nourishes our power to act)itself assumes ethical importance. Recognition ofignorance becomes the obverse of the duty toknow and thus part of the ethics which must

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out-siz-etl uright. No previotts cthics h.rc1 to corr-

sicler thc global cortclit iott of hut-uln l ifc .rncl thc

trrr-ofï f irtnrc, clcn c\isrcucc. of the rlce . Tlrcrc

nou' being itn issuc clctnrrnrls. in lrrict. ir Ire\\ ' c()n-

cept of c' lutics rnLl rights, f irr u lr iclr prcvious cthics

rrncl mctirphvsics proviclc not cvcu tl-re principlcs,

lct rrkrrrc .r rcrrc1r' cloctrtnc.

Anrl u'hat if thc neu' kinrl of humln ùctiol ' l

u'or,rlcl nre.ln that r.nore thiu'l the intercst of mirn

alonc is ro bc consic.lcrccl-thirt our clun' crtenc-ls

firrthcr iurcl thc rurthr()p()ccntric conflneme nt of for-

nrcr cthics uo krugcr holcis? It is at least rxrt scnsc-less ;.rnvmorc to lsk u hethcr thc conclit ion of crtra-

hunran niltLlrc. thc biosphere i. ls ir l 'holc ;rnc1 in its

pirrts. l1o\\' strbjcct t() oLlr po\\'er. lras trccome ir hlt-

nrirn tmst ancl l-l.ls s()mcthing of ir more clainr o|r r.rs

not onlv fbr otrr lr lterior srrl<c br.rt f irr its ou u lnd inits on n right. If this \\ 'cre thc c.rsc it u'oulcl rcquircrluitc son'rc rcthinli ing in trirsic principlcs of ethics.

It u'or.rlc{ l-nci. ' lu to scck rrot onh' the humln goocl,

but also tl 'rc goocl of things c\trir-hunrùn, th.rt is, toc\tel ' lr l thc rccognitiou <lf "enr' ls in thenrsclvcs" bc-

voncl thc sprltcre of man rrntl r.n;ilic thc hurliur gooti

inch.rrlc thc crrrc fbr thcm. For sr.rch a role of sten -

lrt lshiP tt<t p'r1cf i1l115 ethics It.ts preparccl tts-.rttt ' lt lrc rlonriurnt. scie ntitrc vicu- of Nntrn'c eve n lcss.Irtclcccl. t lrc l irttcr enrph;rtic.rlh' ricnics us irl l conccp-tlt;r l nrcrrns to thiuk of Nrrure .rs son'rcthing to bclronorcrl. hrrving rec-lucccl it to rhe inclifÈrence ofnccessitv rrnci accir' lcnt. lncl ciivestcd it of env c'l ig-rrin'of crrcls. Br-rt sti l l . .r si lcnt plca fbr spirring its in-tegrin'sccurs to issr.re fronr thc tl ' lrcrlteucd prlcr-rituclcof the l iving u-orlc'1. ShoLrlcl uc l.reccl this plea.shotrlcl \\ 'e grùnt its chiur i 'rs srlnctioncd bv the n.r-tr,rre <;f thincs. or t ' l ismiss it ls rr mcrc scrrti l lcnt oltollr p;rrt. rvhicl-r \\ 'c ut.lv inrltr lge ls t.rir .rs s,c l ' ishilnrl crn .rf ' tort1 to doi If rhe fbrnrcr. rt s'otrlcl (if

t l l<.cn scrioush' in it.s thcorcric.rl inrpIicirt ious) i-rushtltc ncccssrrn' icthirrking bcvonrl t l 'r i . loctrine of ,rc-t ior r . i .c . . c th ics, iu to t l rc t ' loct r ine of bc ing. i .c . .nrct r rphvsics. iu u h ich r r l l c th ics nrusr u l t iur l tc lv bcgrourrclccl. On this spccrrlrrt ivc subject I rvil l hcrcsrtv rl() l ' l t()rc thi 'ut t ltr lt \\ 'c shoulcl kccp'l olrrsch'es()pcn t() the thought th.rt nrrtr.rral scicncc l-nr1\' l tottell thc u'hrl lc st()11' rrb()ut Nltr.rrc.

VRcturning ti l strictlt ' i ntrrr-htt trt:rtt cotr sirlcr.rt ior.rs.

thcre is irr)()t l ' ler cthicirl rtspcct to tltc gr'ou tlr of

tcclnrc u l pursuit l 'rexrnrl the priruttt.rt icl lh' l inritccl

tcnrs ()f t i lrntcr t itttes. 'f l tctt.

s() \\ 'c f irtrnrl. ttchttt

\\'irs rl nrcAsr,rretl tribrrtc t<l ncccssin'. r'tot thc l-().rr'l to

mrrnkinr.l 's choscrr grlrl-.r n'tc;uts tt i th ;r f lnitc tttcr-

surc of lcicclurcv to u'cll-clefinccl pr<lrinr;rte cnrls.

Non'. teclrrr in thc ft,rm <lf rttoclertt tccltnokrgv lus

tnnrecl ir-rto :rn inf-rnitc firnr':rrci-thrttst of tltc rrrcc. its

most sigr-rifrcrurt entcrprise. irr u' ltosc pcnl' l . lrtcr)t,

seh--transccnc-ling aclr':rncc t() cvcr grciltcr thirtgs thcvociltior.r of nrirn tcncls to ['re sccn. rrtrcl u hrtsc strc-

cess of mlrimal control o\ cr things lnrl himsclf ;rçr-

pe ars as the cousuurnratiou of his clcstinr'. Tl 'rus thc

triun-rplr of lmno .fnltet' c.lcr his cxtcnril olrjcct

lneùns also his triunrplr in the intcrnrrl coustitr.rt ion

of ltotrto snpiens, of u'hom he useri t<l lrc rt suttsi,-]i.tn'

part. In othcr u'or.1s. tcchnologr'. i[ri11-1 tirtrn its ob-jectivc s'orks, ùssunres ethical significirncc lrv thc

central plrrce it nou occul-rics in human purlrose. Its

cumul;rt ivc crcatiou, thc crp.rucling .lrt if lci. l l cnvi-

ronmel.rt i c()r ' l t inuor.lslÏ rcintirrccs thc ;urricul.rrpo\\ 'ers in r.nirn thirt cre.rtecl it. [ 'rv conrl 'rt l l ing thcir

r-rnceasing irrvcntive enrPls1 111(' '1r irr its ln.ur.rgc-r.r-rcrtt lrtcl furtl-re r ach'lrtce, .rncl lrt' rcrr'.tt'rlinq the rlrrvith acitl ir iouirl succcss-u'l 'r ich onh' rrr.Lls t() thc rc-

lcntlcss chim. This positivc fcct' l lrack of f irnctiorr:rl

uccessin' lrtc.l rervlrcl-in u'h<tse ch'nrrmics frrir lc otirchicvcnrcnt r-nust not be firrcotten-irssu[es theqrou'ing rrsccnrllncv of ouc sic{c <lf ulrlu's l l . l tr lrcovcr rl l t lrc others, ancl irrclir:rtrh' lt their c\p9115g.

I i noth i r rg succccr is l i l< .c sLrcccss. not l r i r rq . r l i , l cn-

tr.rps l i l ic slrcccss. Outshining in prcsrigc rrurl strln'-

ing in re source s u'hrtevcr clse bclougs to tl ' le

tir lhress of rlrrn. thc crp:rnsion of lr is pou'cr is .rc-

c<lurlr.rnic'rl bv rr contr,rction of his sclt:conccpti()lr

; lt 'rr l bcil lg, In rhe inrrge hc entert.rins ol hinrsclf-

thc çr<ltent se l i:t irnuul.r u'hich tictcrnrines his rrcnr.rlbeinq .rs l lruch .rs it rcflccts it--nrrrn nclu is cvcr-

morc tltc l'nrrl(cr of l'h:rt hc h,rs rrr.rc'lc .rntl tlre r'l<>cr

of rvhlt he c;rn clo. ;rnrl mtlst of .rl l rhc prepru'cr of

l 'hlt he n'i l l bc ,r[ 'r lc to clo rrcxt. l]ut rrot vou or I: i t

is the irqqrcgrtc. u()t rhc intl iviriurrl clocr or clectlthrrt t 'n.rttcrs hcre : . inrl rhe irrrlcfirritc f lturc. r 'rrthcr

5ç

than the contemporary context of the action, con-stitutes the relevant horizon of responsibility. Thisrequires imperatives of a new sort. If the realm ofmaking has invaded the space of essential action,then morality must invade the realm of making,from which it had formerly stayed aloof, and mustdo so in the form of public policy. With issues ofsuch inclusiveness and such lengths of anticipationpublic policy has never had to deal before. In fact,the changed nature of human action changes thevery naftlre of pol-itics.

For the boundary between "city'' and "nature"has been obliterated: the city of men, once an en-clave in the non-human world, spreads over thewhole of terrestrial naftre and usurps its place. Thedifference between the artificial and the natural hasvanished, the natural is swallowed up in the sphereof the artificial, and at the same time the total arti-fact, the works of man working on and throughhimself, generates a "nature" of its own, i.e., a ne-cessity with which human freedom has to cope inan entirely new sense. Once it could be said Fiatjustitn, perea,t ntundus, "Iæt justice be done, andmay the world perish"-where "worldj' of course,meant the renewable enclave in the imperishablewhole. Not even rhetorically can the like be saidanymore when the perishing of the whole throughthe doings of man-be they just or unjust-has be-come a real possibility. Issues never legislated oncome into the purview of the laws which the totalcity must give itself so that there will be a world forthe generations of man to come.

That there oaght to be through all future timesuch a world fit for human habitation, and that itought in all future time to be inhabited by a man-kind worthy of the human nârne, will be readilyaffrrmed as a general axiom or a persuasive desirabil-ity of speculative imagination (as persuasive and un-demonstrable as the proposition that there being aworld at all is "better" than there being none): butas a m.oral proposition, namely, a practical obligati.ontoward the posterity of a distant future, and a princi-ple of decision in present action, it is quite differentfrom the imperatives of the previous ethics of con-temporaneity; and it has entered the moral sceneonly with our novel powers and range of prescience.

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The presence of man in the world had been a firstand unquestionable given, from which all idea ofobligation in human conduct staned out. Now ithas itself become an object of obligation-the obli-gation namely to ensure the very premise of all ob-ligation, i.e.,thefoothoWlor a moral universe in thephysical world-the existence of mere candidatesfor a moral order. The difference this makes forethics may be illusuated in one example .

wKanCs categorical imperative said: '?\ct so that youcan will that the maxim of our action be made theprinciple of a universal lawl'The "can" here invokedis that of reason and its consistency with itself:Gfuen the existence of a community of humanagents (aaing rational beings), the action must besuch that it can without selÊcontradiction be imag-ined as a general practice of that community. Markthat the basic reflection of morals here is not itself amoral but a logical one: The "l c&nw'rll" ot"I ca.nnatwill" expresses logical compatibility or incompati-bility, not moral approbation or revulsion. Butthere is no selÊcontradiction in the thought that hu-manity would once come to an end, therefore alsonone in the thought that the happiness of presentand proximate generations would be bought withthe unhappiness or even non-existence of laterones-as litde as, after all, in the inverse thoughtthat the existence or happiness of later generationswould be bought with the unhappiness or even par-tial extinction of present ones. The sacriJice of thefuture for the present is hgirnlly no more open to at-tack than the sacrifice of the present for the future.The difference is only that in the one case the seriesgoes on, and in the other it does not. But that itraght togo on, regardless of the distribution of hap-piness or unhappiness, even with a persistent pre-ponderance of unhappiness over happiness, nayeven of immorality over moralitya-this cannot bederived from the nrle of self-consistency within theseries, long or short as it happens to be: it is a com-mandment of a very different kind, lying outsideand "priot''to the series as a whole, and its ultimategrounding can only be metaphysical.

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Ân impcrativc responcling to the nes' n'pe ofhunran action irncl acldressed to the nerv n'pe ofagencv thrt operates it mighr run thlls: 'Act so thltthe ctlects of vour action are conrpatible rvith thepennancnce of genuinc human lifè"; or expressedncgativelr': 'Act so that thc eflècts of r'our irctiol)are not clcstructivc of the tuture possibilin' of suchlifè"; or simplr': "Do not cornpromise the condi-tions fbr arr inclcfinite continuation of humanin, onearth"; or nrost generallr': "hl vollr present choices.incluc-le the fr.rture u'holeness of NIan among theobjects of r,our n'il l."

It is inrrncdiately obvious that no rational cou-traclictiou is involved in the violation of this kind ofimperative . I cnn *'ill the present good u,ith sacrr-f-rce of the future good. It is also evident thar theneu' imper,rtive adclresscs itscli to public policvrather than private conduct. u.'hich is not in thecausal dimension to u'hich rhat imperative applies.Kant's catcgorical imperadve n'as acldressecl to theindividual, ancl its critcrion u'as insti.rntaneous. Itenjoinecl each of us to consicler u'hat u'ould happenif rhe mnrim of mv presel-lt action n,ere made. or atthis nroment alrcadr'\\ 'ere, the principle of e univer-sal legislatiorr; thc self-consistencv or irrconsisrcncvof such t l4tpotlteticnl r-rnivcrsalization is made thetest for nx'prirntt choice. But it s'as no part of thereasoning that thcre is anv probabilin'ot mv privatechoice in .fhct bccoming universal lau', or rl 'rat itmight contribute to its L'recoming that. The univer-saliz;rtior-r is a thoLrght-experiment bv the privrreagent not to test the immanent nroralin' of his ac-tion. Indccd. real consequences are not consicleredat all. anci the principle is one not of objectivc re -

sponsibilin' br-rt of the subjective qualin, of rnv self--determination. Tlrc ucu' irnocrative invokes r clif:tèrent consistcncr,: not rhat of the act u,itl-r itself.but that of its cventu al qfJbcts u,ith the conriuurrr-rccof human .rgencv in times to come . Anci the "uni-versalizatior-r" it contcmpl;rtes is bt'no nterrns hvpo-thetical-i.e., il pllrclv loeical rransfèrencc fion-r theinclividLral "ntr:" to an imaginan,, causallt' un relirtccj"all" 1ur1 cvcn'boch, actecl like that"); on the con-tran'. the actions subject to the ncu' imperative-actions of the collectivc n'hole -hat'c their urrivcr-sal refèrcnce in thcir acual scope of etlicacr': thcv"totaliz-c" therlsclvcs in the prrourcss of thcir nto-

n'rcl'ltum lncl thus arc bouncl to terrlinrrtc in shirp-ing the universarl c'lispensation of things. This aclds atitne horizorl to tl'rc moral calculus l'hiclr is entirelvabsent fiom the iustrrrrtirneous krgical opcration ofthe l(antian imçrerrtiYe: $'herc:rs the l:rtter cxtrapo-l:ltcs into Jn cvcr-prcsent orclcr of ;rbstrirct conrpat-ibilin', our iurperittivc cxtrapolatcs into a pre-dictable rea,l ftfitre rrs the opcn-enc'lecl climension ofour responsibilin'.

WISimilar compirrisons could bc maclc u'ith all thcother historical fbrms of the etliics of corltcrxp()-ranein' and immediircr'. The neu' orcler of humanaction requires 11 col'l'lnrensurate ethics of foresightand responsibilin'. u'hich is as neu'âs are thc issucsu'ith u'hich it has to cieal. \\'e hirve sccn that thescare thc issues posed bv the u'orks of homo faber intl-re age of technologr'. But anlong those novelu'orks u,'e haven't urentioned vct the potentialh'nrost ominous class. \Ve have consiclererl ftcltnconlv as rppliecl to the non-human rerlnr. But n'ranhimself has been .rdcled to the objects of technol-ogt'. Honto _fhbn' is turninq upon himsclf urcl getsrcaclv to makc over the maker clf rrll the rest. Thisconsummetion of his pou'eq rvhich nl:r\' \\ 'cll por-tend thc overprou'ering of nr.rn. rhis flnirl irlpe5i-tion of lrt on uatLlre. c;rlls upon the uttcr resourcesof ethicai thoueht, u'hich never befbre has becnfrcecl $'irh clectiYe irlternatives tO $'hirt \\ 'crç c()n-sicle red the cletir-rite tcrurs of the humirn conclition.

a. Tâkc, for inst:rnce. the most hrasic of tl 'resc"qiveus," men's mortalin,. \\'ho ever bcfbre hld tonrakc up lris minrl on its desir,rblc anrl diniltb ntea-sure) There u'rs nothing to choose about the Llppcrlimit, thc "three scorc' \,ears ;lnci tcn. or bv rcasonof strength fourscore." Its irrcxorirblc rule wirs thcsubyect of laurent, sr,rlrrtrission, or vair-r (not to sirvfbolish) u,ish-clrc;rrns rrt-rout 1'rossible cxceprions -

strangeh' enough, rlmost ncver <tf rfllrmation. Thcintcllectual inrlgin.rtictn of .r Gcclrqe llcrnrrd Shas'ancl :r fonathan Su'itt sprccul;rtecl olt the privileec ofnor having to clic, or rhc cnrsc of not beinu lt'rlc toclie. (Su'ifi u'itlr tl-re latter \\'rts the morc pcrspricl-cirxrs of thc nvo.) r\{r'th rrrcl leqcncl toved u'irl 'r

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such themes against the acknowledged backgroundof the unalterable, which made the earnest mânrather pray "teach us to number our days that wemay get a heaft of wisdom" (Psalm 9o). Nothing ofthis was in the realm of doing, and effective deci-sion. The question was only how to relate to thestubborn fact.

But lately, the dark cloud of inevitability seemsto lift. A practical hope is held out by certain ad-vances in cell biology to prolong, perhaps indefi-nitely extend the span of life by counteractingbiochemical processes of aging. Death no longerappears as a necessity belonging to the nature oflife, but as an avoidable, at least in principle tract-able and long-delayable, organic malfunction. Aperennial yearning of mortal man seems to comenearer firlfillment. And for the first time we have inearnest to ask the question "How desirable is thislHow desirable for the individual, and how for thespeciesl" These questions involve the very meaningof our finitude, the anitude toward death, and thegeneral biological significance of the balance ofdeath and procreation. Even prior to such ultimatequestions are the more pragmatic ones of whoshould be eligible for the boon: persons of particu-lar quality and meritf of social eminence I those thatcan pay for itf everybody! The last would seem theoniy just course. But it would have to be paid for atthe opposite end, at the source. For clearly, on apopulatior'wide scale, the price of extended agemust be a proportional slowing of replacement,i.e., a diminished access of new life. The resultwould be a decreasing proportion of youth in anincreasingly aged population. FIow good or badwould that be for the general condition of manlWould the species gain or losef And how rightwould it be to preempt the place of youthf Havingto die is bound up with having been born: mortal-ity is but the other side of the perennial spring of"a natality'' (to use Hannah Arendt's term). Thishad always been ordained; now its meaning has tobe pondered in the sphere of decision.

To take the extreme (not that it will ever be ob-tained): if we abolish death, we must abolish pro-creation as well, for the laner is life's answer ro theformer, and so we would have a world of old agewith no vouth. and of known individuals with no

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surprises of such that had never been before. Butthis perhaps is precisely the wisdom in the harshdispensation of our mortality: that it grants us theeternally renewed promise of the freshness, imme-diacy, and eagemess of youth, together with thesupply of otherness as such. There is no substitutefor this in the greater accumulation of prolongedexperience: it can never recapture the unique privi-lege of seeing the world for the first time and withnew eyes, never relive the wonderwhich, accordingto Plato, is the beginning of philosophg never thecuriosity of the child, which rarely enough lives onas thirst for knowledge in the adult, until it wanesthere too. This ever renewed beginning, which isonly to be had at the price of ever repeated ending,may well be mankind's hope, its safeguard againstlapsing into boredom and routine, its chance of re-taining the spontaneity of life. Also, the role of themrmento nnri in the individual's life must be con-sidered, and what its attenuation to indefinitenessmay do to it. Perhaps a non-negotiable limit to ourexpected time is necessary for each of us as the in-centive to number our days and make them count.

So it could be that what by intent is a philan-thropic gift of science to man, the partial grantingof his oldest wish-to escape the curse of mortal-ity-turns out to be to the deriment of man. I amnot indulging in prediction and, in spite of my no-ticeable bias, not even in valuation. My point is thatalready the promised gift raises questions that hadnever to be asked before in terms of practicalchoice, and that no principle of former ethics,which took the human constants for granted, iscompetent to deal with them. And yet they must bedealt with ethically and by principle and not merelyby the pressure ofinterest.

b. It is similar with all the other, quasi-utopianpowers about to be made available by the advancesof biomedical science âs they are translated intotechnology. Of these, bebapinr nntrol is muchnearer to practical readiness than the still hypothet-ical prospea I have just been discussing, and theethical questions it raises are less profound but havea more direct bearing on the moral conception ofman. Here again, the new kind of intervention ex-ceeds the old ethical categories. They have not

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equipped us to rule. tbr e.rample, on mental controlbv chemical means or bv direct electrical action ofthe brain via implanted electrodes-undcrtaken, letus assllme, for defensible and cven laudablc ends.The rnixtr.rre of beneficial ancl dangerous potentialsis obviolrs, br.rt the lines are not casv to drau'. Reliefof mental patients fiom clistressing ancl clisablings\4nptoms seems unequivocallv bcncficial. Butfronr the relicf of the pntienT, a goal entireh' in thstradition of thc medical art, thcre is an casv passageto the relief of socien from the inconvenience of dif:ficult individual behavior among its members: thatis, the passage fiom mcdical to social application;and this opens up an inclcfinite fleld u'ith grave po-tentials. The tror.rblesome problems of rule and un-ruliness in modcrn mass society make the extensionof such control methocls to non-medical categoriesextremclv tempting for social management. Nu-merous questions of human rights and digniwarise. The clifllcr.rlt question of preemption care ver-sus enabling care insists on concrcte ansrve rs. Shallrve induce learning attitudes in school children bvthe mass administration of drugs, circumventingthe appeal to autonomous motivationf Shall u'eovcrcon're aggression bt, electronic pacification ofbrain areasf Shall u,e generatc sensÀtions of happi-ness or pleasure or at least contentment through in-deprenclent stinrulation (or tranqr,ril izing) of the ap-prop'rriate cente rs - inde pcnde nt, that is, of theobjects of happiness, pleasure, or content and theirattainment in personal living ar-rd achio,ing) Candi-dacies cor-rld be multipliecl. Business tirnis mightbecome interestcd in some of these techniques forperformance-increase among their cmplovces.

Regardlcss of the question of compulsion orconsent, lnd regardless also of the question of un-clesiraLrle sidc-cftècts, each time \\'c rl-Ius bypass thchuman u'av of dcaling rvith human problems,short-circuiting it bv an impersonal mechanrsm, u'ehavc taken a\\/a\f s()ntething fiom thc dignin'of pcr-sonal selfhoocl and advanccd a further stcLr on theroircl from responsible subjecrs to progr,rmlneil bc-l'ravior svsteffts. Social functionalisnt. important asit is, is onl1, çy11s side of thc question. Decisiye is thequestion of rvh:rt kincl of inclivicir.rals the sociew iscomposed of to makc its existencc valuablc as au,holc. Sorreu,here along thc linc of incre.rsir-ru

social manageabilin' at the price of individual au-tonom\', the question of tl're s''orthu'hileness of thehuman enterprise must pose itself. Ansu'ering it in-volves the image of man u'e entertaiu. Wc tnustthink it anerv in light of the thir-rgs \\'e cât'r do to itnou' and could never clo bctbre .

c. This holds e'r'en more u'ith rcspect to the lastobject of a technologv applied on man himsclf'-thegenetic control of future men. This is too rvicie asubject fbr curson'treatnent. Here I nrerell ' prointto this nrost ambitious clream of homo fnlter,summecl up in the phrase thrt man s'ill tlke hisorvn evolution in hand, rvith the aim of rrot just

presen'ing the integrity of the specics but of nrodi-ff ing it bv improvements of his orvn design.Whether u'e have the right to do it, u'hether \\'e arequalified for that creativc role, is the most seriousquestion that can be posed to man fincling hin'rsclfsuddenh'in possession of such failed pou.'ers. Wholvill be the image-makers, by u'hat stanclarcls, andon the basis of u'hat knou,leclge ) Also, the questiouof the moral right to experiment ou f-utttre humanbeings mLrst be asked. Thcse encl sinrilar questions.lvhich demand an answer before l'e cmbark on ,rjournev into the unknon,n, shou' r'r'rost vivicllv hou'fàr our powers to act are pr.rshing us bet'ond theterms of ,rll fbrnrer cthics.

wilThe ethicallt'relevant commoll f-eature in ;rll thc cx-amples adduced is u'har I like to call the inhererrrlv"utopian" drift of our actions uncier the conclitionsof nrodern technologr', u,'hether it s'orks on non-human or on human nâtllre. and u'hether rhe"utopia" at the end of the road be pl:mnecl or Lln-plannecl. By the kind ancl size of its snou'b.rlling eflfècts, technologicalpo\\'er propels us ir.rto go;rls of an'pe that u,as fbrmerh,the prcscn'e of Utopirs.

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put it diflèrentl1,, technolosical po\\'er lus turncclu'hat uscrl ancl ought to be tentativc, perhaps cn-lightening. plavs of speculative reeson irtto compet-ing blr-reprints for projccts, ancl in choo.siug be-m'cen them u'e havc to choosc bcnvccn ertrerncs ofrenrote cfle'cts. The one thing u'c cln rcrrlh'lurou'ofthem is thcir c.rtrcnrism as such-that thev conccrlr

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the total condition of nature on our globe and thevery kind of creatures that shall, or shall not, popu-late it. In consequence of the inevitably "utopian"scale of modem technology, the salutary gap be-tween everyday and ultimate issues, between occa-sions, closing. Living now constandy in the shadowof unwanted, built-in, automatic utopianism, weare constandy confronted with issues whose posi-tive choice requires supreme wisdom-an impossi-ble, and in particular for contemporary man, whodenies the very existence of its object: viz., objectivevalue and truth. We need wisdom most when webelieve in it least.

If the new nature of our acting then calls for anew ethics of long-range responsibility, coextensivewith the range of our power, it calls in the name ofthat very responsibility also for a new kind of hu-mility-a humility not like former humility, i.e.,owing to the litdeness, but owing to the excessivemagnitude of our power, which is the excess of ourpower to act over our power to foresee and ourpower to evaluate and to judge. In the face of thequasi-eschatological potentials of our technologi-cal processes, ignorance of the ultimate implica-tions becomes itself a reason for responsible re-straint-as the second best to the possession ofwisdom itself.

One other aspect of the required new ethics ofresponsibility for and to a distant future is worthmentionirlg: the insufficiency of representativegovernment to meet the new demands on its nor-mal principles and by its normal mechanics. For ac-cording to these, only present interests make them-selves heard and felt and enforce their condition. Itis to them that public agencies are accountable,and this is the way in which concretely the respect-ing of rights comes about (as distinct from theirabstract acknowledgement). But the future is notrepresented, it is not a force that can throw itsweight into the scales. The non-existent hâs nolobby and the unborn are powerless. Thus ac-countability to them has no political reality behindit yet in present decision-making, and when theycan make their complaint, then we) the culprits,will no longer be there.

This raises to an ultimate pitch the old quesrionof the power of the wise, or the force of ideas not

allied to selÊinterest, in the body politic. Whatforceshall represent the future in the presentf F{owever,before rûar question can become earnest in practicalterms, the new ethics must find its theory on whichdos and don'ts can be based. That is: before thequestion of whatforce, comes the question of whatinsight or value-knowledge shall represent the fu-ture in the present.

uAnd here is where I get stuck, and where we all getstuck. For the very sarne movement which put usin possession of the powers that have now to beregulated by norms-the movement of modernknowledge called science-has by a necessary com-plementarity eroded the foundations from whichnorms could be derived; it has destroyed the veryidea of norm as such. Not, fomrnatelp the feelingfor norm and even for particular norms. But thisfeeling, become uncertain of itself when contra-dicted by alleged knowledge or at least denied allsanction by it. Anyway and always does it have adifficult enough time against the loud clamors ofgreed and fear. Now it must in addition blush be-fore the frown of superior knowledge, as un-founded and incapable of foundation. First, Naturehas been "neutralized" with respect to value, thenman himself. Now we shiver in the nakedness of anihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired withnear-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowingleast what for. With the apocalyptic pregnancy ofour âctions, that very knowledge which we lack hasbecome more urgendy needed than at any otherstage in the adventure of mankind. Alas, urgenry isno promise of success. On the contrary it must beavowed that to seek for wisdom today requires agood measure of unwisdom. The very nature of theage which cries out for an ethical theory makes itsuspiciously look like a fool's errand. Yet we haveno choice in the matter but to try.

It is a question whether -itiro,rt restoring thecategory of the sacred, the category most thor-oughly destroyed by the scientific enlightenment,we can have an ethics able to cope with the extremepo\Mers which we possess today and constantly in-crease and are almost compelled to use. Regarding

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r2ô P. {RT I : PH I I ,OSOPHICAL PERSPECTIYES

those conscqLlcnccs imminent cnough still to hitcxrrseh'cs. fèar can c1o thc job-so ofieu the bcstsubstitutc tor gcnuinc virtuc or u'isclonr. But thismcilns fàils us tos'arc-ls the more clistant prospccts.u'hich hcre matter the urost. cspeciallv as the begin-nings sccrl urostlt' innoccnt in thcir smallness.Otrlr' .rn'c of thc sacrccl u'ith its r,u-rqui-rlificel veto isinclependcut to fir coml'rutations of mundane fèar,rncl the sr>lacc of uncertainn' about clistant conse-quenccs. But rcligion as a soul-dctcrmining fôrce isno lougcr there to bc suurnronecl to thc aicl ofethics. The latter must sr:tnd on its lr.,orldlt' fèer-thlt is, on reùson ancl its fltness fbr philosophv furdu'hilc of fàith it can bc saicl that it either is there oris not, of ethics it holds that it must be there.

It ntust bc therc bccausc men actj irnd ethics isfirr the rcorclcring of acrions anc'l for regulating thepo\\'er to act. It must bc thcrc all the morc, rhelt,the grcirter the pou'crs of ircting that itre to be rcgu-lirtccl; irncl u'ith their sizc. the orclering principletnust irlso flt thcir kind. Thus, novel pou'ers ro ecrreqttire novcl cthical rulcs ancl perhaps even ù ne\\,cthics,

"Thc>u shalt not kill" l'irs cnunciirtecl bccausen'rrur hûs thc pou'cr to kill ancl often the occirsronattcl cvcu incIination tbr it- in shorr. becrusckill ing is actuallv done . Ir is onlv under the prctsureof reil habits of eûion, ;rnrl gcneralh' of the factthat ;tl'u'irvs irction alreirclv takcs place, u'ithor-rt t/rÀhaving to bc commanderl first, thar erhics as the

ruling of such acting r.rnc-ler thc stirncl.rrcl of thegoocl or tlie permittccl cutcrs thc stage . Such aprc's--çrul? emiul:rtes from thc novel tcchnoklgicirl pron'crsof m:ru, lrhose excrcise is eir-cn u'ith their eris-tencc. If'thct' rcallv are irs uovcl in kincl rrs hcre colr-tenclecl. rnd if bv the kincl of thcir 1'rotcntial c()r'lsc-que l-rces thev rcallv havc abolisl-red the nrorllneutralin, ri 'hich thc technicirl cournrcrcc l ith mrrt-ter hitherto enjovecl-then their prcssurc bicls toscek tor nerv prescriptions in ethics rvliich arc colt-l-petcnt to ilssume thcir guiclirnce. but rvhich trrsr ofall cirn hold their o\\'n theoreticallr. agirinst that ve n'pressure. Tb thc clem<>ustrirtion of those prenriscsthis papcr u'as dcvotecl, If thev are acccptcd, thennc w'lto nrirke thiuking ()ur busincss hrrve rr task tolast us fbr our time. \\'e must c{o it in tinrc. fbr srnce\\'e ect f,n\\\'il\'rve sh;r[l lt:tve sor.llc cthic rlr odrcr inf,Il\' crse. lncl u'ithout ir supremc clfbrt to tleter-miue the right one. \\'c mrlv bc lefi n'itl-r a \\'rongone bv dclirult.

NOTES

t. Inrrrrarrtrcl I(urt. Grulrrrln,ork of tltr )Ittopltvics o.ftllornk, prefrrce.

z. Op. cit., chillrter r.+ Ittid. (I have fbllou'cci H. j. Pilton's rr.urslirtion rt itl.t

sornc ch;rngcs.)+. On this last point, the biblicrl Gorl chngecl his

mincl t<.1 an .rll-cnconrpitssing "r'cs" .rftcr thc Floocl.