IDSA Oct 1 to Oct 15

KIIW IDSA Oct 1 to 15

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Notes by vineetpunnoose on www.kiwipaper.com

Content

Making India a Defence Manufacturing Hub 1

Reinventing India's "Make" Procedures for Defence Acquisitions 2

Pakistan's Dangerous Game of Brinkmanship 2

Settling border disputes with Nepal and Bangladesh 3

Ceasefire in Ukraine: An Assessment 4

Hong Kong Protests: What it means for the Chinese leadership? 6

Kurds sole 'boots on ground' against Islamic State 7

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Notes by vineetpunnoose on www.kiwipaper.com Page 1

Making India a Defence Manufacturing Hub Tue, Oct 7, 2014manufacturing, defense, IDSA,

The Make-in-India initiative of the government is focussed on 25 sectors that includedefence manufacturing.

India's current requirements on defence are catered largely by imports. The openingof the strategic defence sector for private sector participation will help foreign originalequipment manufacturers to enter into strategic partnerships with Indian companiesand leverage the domestic markets and also aim at global business. Besides helpingbuild domestic capabilities, this will bolster exports in the long term. Opportunities toavail defence offset obligations to the tune of approximately INR 250 Billion duringthe next 7-8 years. The offset policy (which stipulates the mandatory offset requirementof a minimum 30% for procurement of defence equipment in excess of INR 3 Billion)introduced in the capital purchase agreements with foreign defence players would ensurethat an eco-system of suppliers is built domestically. The government policy of promotingself-reliance, indigenization, technology upgradation and achieving economies of scaleand developing capabilities for exports in the defence sector. The country's extensivemodernization plans, an increased focus on homeland security and India's growingattractiveness as a defence sourcing hub. High government allocation for defenceexpenditure.

The strategic sector was opened to private participation more than a decade back. Theoffset policy was introduced in 2006. The 'Make' procedure was introduced in 2006to promote indigenous research, design and development of high technology complexsystems.

For sure, the change in government - widely seen as investor-friendly, decisive andkeen to improve the eco-system - is an important factor. But investment decisions aremade on more tangible considerations. Ease of doing business, security of investmentand intellectual property rights, and returns on investment are more important thanatmospherics.

The government seems determined to make it easier to do business in India but the taskis daunting. Many steps, such as those related to acquisition of land, labour laws andtaxation, require legislative action, cooperation of the states and a huge attitudinalchange in the bureaucracy. More importantly, all necessary steps need to be takenconcurrently. Disjointed efforts do not pay expected dividends.

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Reinventing India's "Make" Procedures for Defence Acquisitions Wed, Oct 1, 2014defense, Defence Procurement , IDSA,

Of the five principal categories of capital acquisitions permitted under India's

Defence Procurement Procedure

(DPP), two prominently outshine others as regards their potential to implement the"Make In India" mantra invoked by the Prime Minister recently

1.

: (i) "Buy and Make (Indian)", where RFPs are issued to Indian entities for supply andmanufacture of defence equipment with

higher-than-normal

indigenous content requirements, leveraging technology partnerships with domesticand foreign entities in the process; and (ii) "Make", being a hybrid R&D-

cum

-productionisation procurement process akin to traditional defence procurement in theUS

2.

and the EU while also being conceptually similar to "pre-commercial procurement"

3.

and "innovation partnerships"

4.

rapidly evolving under EU regulations in a non-defence context.

Pakistan's Dangerous Game of Brinkmanship Fri, Oct 10, 2014Pakistan, IDSA, international,

Insecure Pakistan in the backdrop of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is faced withthe twin dilemma of international marginalization as part of fast receding regionalrelevance and political and economic instability. These fears are heightened by India'srapidly developing economy, political stability and fast paced modernization of itsarmed forces.

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Within the above backdrop the firing along the LoC has three possible manifestations.At one level it is an attempt to keep the pressure on Kashmir and create insecurity alongthe border by the combined nexus of Pakistan army, ISI, the terrorists under the UnitedJihad Council (UJC) supported by the separatists in the J&K. It is also to gain publicsympathy and support for the army providing it greater flexibility in the flawedcivil-military relations.

Second is the "K" factor. Over the last few years there has been a perceptible declinein militancy and cross border terrorism. Kashmiri separatist leaders like Syed Ali ShahGeelani are too old and Mirwaiz Umar Farookh too weak to sustain the so calledseparatist struggle. Other leaders like, Yasin malik and Shabir Shah are attempting topick the gauntlet but have yet to establish their credibility.

Third is the impending election in J&K. Successful elections which could throw upelectoral arithmetic in which centrist forces become powerful power brokers wouldresult in a government that would follow strong nationalist policies thus severely curbingthe separatist space. The manner in which India reacted to the Huriyat leaders meetingPakistan's High Commissioner should have made absolutely clear to Islamabad thatNew Delhi with growing international support will brook little or no dissidence fromthese groups operating outside the constitutional process.

First, a swift, sharp and effective response backed by controlled escalation to Pakistan'sprovocations. India should be in no doubt that Pakistan could attempt at escalationmisreading Indian resolve. Second, India should expose Pakistan's crass attempts torake up tensions in the subcontinent by adequately exposing its nefarious designs bothin Kashmir and rest of the country. There should be no talks till such time Pakistanmends its ways and agrees to meaningful dialogue. Third, Kashmir post-flood reconstructionwork must gain momentum and fair distribution. The state administration must beencouraged to show empathy in distribution of relief.

Time has also come for another round of dialogue with all shades of opinion in Kashmirincluding separatist leadership but strictly within the confines of the Indian constitution.In so far as dialogue with Pakistan is concerned it should be made clear that India wantspeace but will not bow down to such provocations.

Settling border disputes with Nepal and Bangladesh Fri, Oct 10, 2014IDSA, international, Bangladesh, Nepal,

While border disputes with China and Pakistan would be difficult to resolve in immediatefuture given the intense rivalry and huge territorial claims, borders disputes with Nepaland Bangladesh can be settled amicably in the coming years as the disputes are positionalin nature,

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India and Nepal agreed to address all their border related issues through a bilateralmechanism. For this purposes, they decided to constitute a Boundary Working Group(BWG) which would devise technical frameworks for resolving the contentious boundaryissues including disputes over Kalapani and Susta.

Similarly, the India-Bangladesh boundary has been completely delineated on the map.The work for settling the entire boundary had started after the constitution of theIndia-Bangladesh Joint Working Groups (JWG) I and II in June 2001 While JWG Idealt with the issue of delineating the 6.1 km of undemarcated stretch, JWG II concentratedon devising a framework for settling the issue of exchange of 162 enclaves and surrenderof approximately 6000 acres of adverse possessions between the two countries. In 2007,India and Bangladesh conducted a joint survey of all the enclaves and adverse possessions.Subsequently, in July 2011, a joint Census was conducted in the enclaves to ascertainthe number of population.

Subsequently, in September 2011 additional protocol to the India-Bangladesh LandBoundary Agreement (LBA) concerning the demarcation of land boundary betweenIndia and Bangladesh was signed and in February 2013, the strip maps of the boundarywere exchanged during the second meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint ConsultativeCommission in Dhaka. Unfortunately all efforts to arrive at a final resolution of theboundary dispute came to a naught as India failed to ratify the LBA.

It appears that the onus of settling the borders disputes with Nepal and Bangladesh nowlies with India. To Nepal, India has given a commitment that it would discuss the issuesof Kalapani and Susta with Nepal and would endeavour to find a solution. Given thecomplex nature of the disputes, both India and Nepal has to arrive at a political solutionto the problem. In this respect, India has its work cut out. As regards Bangladesh, nowthat the Modi government, backed by an absolute majority, has proclaimed that greatercooperation with neighbouring countries is its priority, it should understand the importanceof well settled international borders and ratify the LBA. Forty years is too long a timeto stall the implementation of an agreement which was designed to bring peace andbonhomie between the countries. It is time India delivers on its promise.

Ceasefire in Ukraine: An Assessment Tue, Oct 14, 2014IDSA, Ukraine, international, Russia,

agreements outlined steps to de-escalate the mounting tensions including cessation ofmilitary hostilities, exchange of prisoners, protection of Russian language and gradualdevolution of power. This key development came against the backdrop of a strongmilitary offensive by the Ukrainian troops against the pro-Russian supporters, whilethe threat of a Russian military intervention loomed large. It led ' Verkhovna Rada',the Ukrainian Parliament, to pass a law sketching the contours of local self-government

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in south-eastern part the country.

Russia

Russia's stake in the ongoing crisis has been to retain its sphere of influence in theregion. it would have been detrimental for President Putin to see pro-Russian supportersget defeated by the Ukrainian forces. Ukraine is not Crimea and nationalist sentimentseven in the pro-Russian eastern Ukrainian cities run high. An intrusion could havefast-tracked Ukraine's NATO membership and possibly led Moscow to internationalpolitical isolation. Therefore, a surge in military support that would allow the rebels tofight back and establish new areas of control seemed to solve the dilemma. This moveenabled Russia to leverage its influence for policy decisions in Kiev.

The military setbacks suffered by government troops had left President Poroshenkowith few options. There was a real danger of pro-Russian separatists gaining furtherterritorial ground. NATO's refusal to strengthen Ukraine's military capabilities andinability of the 'West' to meet its energy needs against the onset of winter forced thehands of President Poroshenko.

A ceasefire suits both the US and EU since the only way to stop an imminent Russianmilitary intervention would have been to send in NATO troops. But it is unlikely thatthe 'West' retains an appetite for a direct military confrontation with the Kremlin. Theceasefire allows it to continue to provide Ukraine with modest support without takingfull responsibility for events there.

Consequently, the ceasefire allows all parties to recalibrate their positions while keepingthe door open for a political reconciliation in this chess game of Eurasian geo-politics.

First, with Parliamentary elections around the corner and having previously labelledthe pro-Russian separatists as 'terrorists', it remains to be seen how much devolutionof power is President Poroshenko willing to give in to.

Second, will the current outline of autonomy be acceptable to the pro-Russian separatistsin general and the Kremlin in particular?

Third, the degree of cooperation with the 'West' that Kiev is willing to gamble uponwithout antagonising Moscow. This is evident from its consistent push for an AssociationAgreement with the EU. Russia's core interests in the Ukrainian quagmire remain thesame i.e. restore Ukraine's status as a neutral country, establish federal principles ofgovernance, preserve economic ties with the eastern part of the country and maintainthe status of Russian language.

Fourth, the agreements delineate the positions of Ukrainian forces and pro-Russiansupporters on the ground. This is likely to lead to serious complications over themanagement of a frozen conflict.

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Fifth, the crisis is as much about Russia and Ukraine as it is about the geo-politicalrivalry between Russia and the 'West'. The NATO summit has identified Russia as anadversary while President Obama has labelled it as the second biggest threat to globalsecurity after the Ebola virus And contrary to popular perception, the US may notengage Russia to deal with terrorism in the Middle East despite the very convergenceof their interests. Moscow is not expected to oppose an initiative that tackles this scourgesince it is also in its interest that it be resolved.

Therefore, the Minsk agreements can be the first step towards finding a viable politicalsolution to the Ukrainian crisis. The key challenge lies in balancing Russia's coreinterests with that of geopolitical calculations of the 'West'.

Hong Kong Protests: What it means for the Chinese leadership? Sat, Oct 11, 2014Hong Kong, IDSA, international, Occupy Central,

Hong Kong is slated to have elections for the post of Chief Executive (CE) in 2017.However, there is a disagreement between sections of the Hong Kong civil society andBeijing on how these elections are to be conducted. In a nutshell, Hong Kong wants afree and fair democratic elections and not be told the list of candidates it can choosefrom. Beijing wants that it vets the final list of candidates, fearing probably a CE, whowould be critical of government policies. Beijing's desire to manage the political processin Hong Kong stems from the 'one country two systems' model whereby it continuesto retain its influence.

This movement is led by a group of faculty from Hong Kong University and a teenagerJoshua Wang Chi-fung, who has become the global face of Occupy Central. Its participantscome from university students and the middle class. Hong Kong business community,with their business linkages with the mainland, have stayed away from the movementand even criticised it from time to time for fears of its impact on their business. Thereare three factors that deserve attention; First, the legitimacy of the leadership, second,Chinese nationalism and third, the regional implications.

recent official policy guidelines such as 'China Dream' and the 'Great ChineseRejuvenation' are based on the revival of nationalism the 'China Dream' expressesan economically, militarily stronger and unified China. However, the recent unrest inHong Kong is perhaps as big a challenge to this dream as the unrest in Xinjiang.

Political reforms in China have always been initiated and led from the top. The middleand lower rung leaders take the flak for any failure while maintaining the hallowednessof the top leaders. By challenging the idea of the 'China Dream', the protests in HongKong is being perceived as a threat to the leadership in Beijing. The 'China Dream'and the revival of the Chinese nation are now seen in conjunction with Taiwan's

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reunification with the mainland. For President Xi, Occupy Central is undesirable.

There is a pattern of Chinese nationalism whereby outsiders seem to become easytargets if Chinese national identity is seen as being threatened. Beijing has drawn thered line on Hong Kong. will not take much time for mainland to see a foreign hand inthe islanders' pro-democracy movements. China has also already warned not to getclose to the Occupy Central in anyway

China had reacted extremely cautiously during the colour revolutions and during themore recent jasmine revolution that rocked the West Asian regimes. Some reports evensuggested that mainland websites restricted the unfolding of events in West Asia

The critical question is whether such development could lead to a hardened approachby the Chinese leadership. China's territorial competitions of claims and counterclaimswith a large number of its neighbours on land and at sea are linked with its domesticnationalism, in particular, the East China Sea. In this context, it remains to be seenwhether the leaders feel threatened and weakened due to Hong Kong protests andwestern support for these or whether China would respond by hardening its securityposture in some of its territorial disputes.

Kurds sole 'boots on ground' against Islamic State Thu, Oct 9, 2014isis, IDSA, international, Turkey, kurdistan, islamic state,

US President Obama's decision to fight the Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq w Belaadal-Sham (Daesh) by air has come under fire as the heroic Kurdish resistance in Kobane(Kurdish for Ain al-Arab) threatens to crumble with mercenaries storming the northernSyrian city, across the Turkish border. Daesh, meanwhile, got a morale booster whenthe Pakistani Taliban (October 4) offered allegiance and asked militants across theregion to help establish a global Islamic caliphate.

Bitter last ditch battles are being fought by Kurdish men and women, including boysand girls barely out of their teens, who are the sole 'boots on the ground' against theDaesh. Observers feel Western air cover is ineffective

Turkey remains the main transit route for foreigners intending to join the Daesh, andit is to Urfa (Turkey) that injured Daesh fighters go to hospitals for free medical care!

Kobane's fall will give the Daesh control over vast stretches of the Turkish-Syrianborder and provide a direct route to its units in the Syrian provinces of Aleppo andRaqqa (headquarters of Daesh). It is to achieve this goal that Chechen commander AbuOmar al-Shishani has made the conquest of Kobane a personal mission, especially asUS air power and ground action by Iraqis has made further progress in Iraq difficult.

Some analysts feel that to succeed, Washington must cooperate with the Syrian Kurds

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(YPG) as Kurdish fighters alone have proved willing and capable of taking on theDaesh. But that seems unlikely as Turkey (a NATO member) is unwilling to strengthenthe YPG or the PKK.

The Kurds are heavily outnumbered - Daesh has about 9,000 terrorists armed withtanks and rocket launchers - while Kurds have no heavy weaponry and are running outof ammunition.

The Daesh offensive coincides suspiciously with its mysterious release of 49 Turkishconsulate employees. Many Kurds, including Turkey's PKK, suspect that Istanbulhelped Daesh's sudden progress against the Kurds in Syria by releasing prisoners andallowing foreign fighters to cross its border. Other sources say Turkey may be unwillingto oppose the Daesh due to its indirect threats against "Constantinople" (the old nameof Istanbul) in a statement of September 22, which urged followers to kill Americans,Australians, Frenchmen and others by any available means.

Another consideration is the safety of Turkish soldiers guarding the tomb of SuleimanShah, grandfather of the first Ottoman Sultan, Osman I. The tomb, closely identifiedwith Turkish identity and culture, lies in Syria, in territory now controlled by Daesh.Under the Treaty of Ankara, 1921, which created the new nation of Syria, the Ottomantomb remained a Turkish exclave, flying the Turkish flag and protected by a guard ofhonour of Turkish soldiers.

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IDSA Oct 1 to Oct 15