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GeoJournal 46: 79–87, 1998. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 79 Identity building and social transformation: the cases of Namibia and Botswana compared Fred W. Krüger Institute of Cultural Geography, University of Freiburg, D-79085 Freiburg, Germany E-mail: [email protected] Received 11 May 1998; accepted in revised form 19 October 1998 Key words: ethnicity, nation-building, socio-economic transformation, society, state, tribalism, vulnerability. Abstract Namibia and Botswana differ from other sub-Saharan nations in their record of stable political performance. However, both countries have to face increasing social problems. In the case of Namibia these are still mainly related to the process of post-apartheid national reconciliation and identity building, in the case of Botswana they refer to issues of growing tribal tensions and of a gradual interior restructuring of society. This paper analyzes the various patterns of social transformation in the two countries and examines in what ways state-society relations are different from other African nations. Amidst the social turmoil and civil strife sub-Saharan Africa has been associated with for many decades, two nations in the southern part of the continent are being looked upon as possible examples for a peaceful way towards identity building and self-determination of their people: Namibia and Botswana. The former only gained independence in 1990 and may truely be classified as a multi-ethnic nation. The efforts in Namibia to overcome ethnic tensions and the apartheid legacy have gained a lot of international atten- tion and praise. Botswana has also been a stable multi-party democracy since independence, but contrary to Namibia never had to experience apartheid. Botswana can look down on over 30 years of political stability now, and to many outside observers presents an image of having a very small ethnic or tribal conflict potential. However, the civil societies of both states are undergoing rapid changes and may carry more conflict potentials than might be suggested from the efforts of their legitimately elected governments to establish or maintain a stable nationhood. With social tensions grow- ing, a closer examination of the patterns and causes of these transformations seems timely. Looking at the social structure of both countries on a national level, the most striking difference is the number of major ethnic groups: In Namibia the cultural and lin- gual diversity is much higher than in Botswana; 11 different African languages with 26 major dialects are spoken apart from Afrikaans, German, and English as the official lan- guage (Klimm et al., 1994, p. 59). In Botswana, over 80% of the entire population are Setswana-speaking, while only 10–15% belong to the 2nd most dominant group, Kalanga. Of course, Botswana’s population is far from being ethni- cally homogeneous, but as can be seen in Figure 1 it is considerably less fragmented than Namibia’s. 1 The case of Namibia: nation-building and social transformation after independence After independence, the foremost aim of the new Namibian government was to minimize all racial and ethnic divisions which had been imposed on the country by the former apartheid regime. Under colonial and apartheid rules differ- ent communities had been segregated not only socially, but also economically and geographically. Basically, indigenous African communities had been separated from the Whites, and the majority of non-white ethnic groups had to settle down in ‘homelands’ which were usually located in periph- eral areas which were far less suitable for agriculture than the lands owned by white farmers, and which had almost no in- frastructure. This spatial division was matched by economic inequity: just before independence the white settler commu- nity and a tiny black elite, which had emerged during the late stages of the apartheid system, comprised about 5% of the population, but controlled an estimated 71% of the GDP (cf. Tapscott, 1993). National reconciliation and the promo- tion of greater social equality, therefore, were the two most important issues to be addressed by the new government and most opposition parties after independence. The constitution of Namibia guarantuees equality of every citizen. Eight years after gaining independence, how- ever, even high ranking government officials admit that the goal of abandoning racial discrimination has not yet fully been achieved. Tertiary Education Minister N. An- gula, in a newspaper comment on the eighth anniversary of Namibia, noted that ‘the debit side [of the national reconcil- iation ledger] is depicting racial, regional, ethnic and tribal 1 In both countries a large number of smaller ethnic groups, some- times comprising only a few hundred members, exist, and, depending on definition, numerous dialects are spoken.

Identity building and social transformation: the cases of Namibia and Botswana compared

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GeoJournal46: 79–87, 1998.© 1998Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

79

Identity building and social transformation: the cases of Namibia andBotswana compared

Fred W. KrügerInstitute of Cultural Geography, University of Freiburg, D-79085 Freiburg, GermanyE-mail: [email protected]

Received 11 May 1998; accepted in revised form 19 October 1998

Key words:ethnicity, nation-building, socio-economic transformation, society, state, tribalism, vulnerability.

Abstract

Namibia and Botswana differ from other sub-Saharan nations in their record of stable political performance. However, bothcountries have to face increasing social problems. In the case of Namibia these are still mainly related to the process ofpost-apartheid national reconciliation and identity building, in the case of Botswana they refer to issues of growing tribaltensions and of a gradual interior restructuring of society. This paper analyzes the various patterns of social transformationin the two countries and examines in what ways state-society relations are different from other African nations.

Amidst the social turmoil and civil strife sub-Saharan Africahas been associated with for many decades, two nations inthe southern part of the continent are being looked uponas possible examples for a peaceful way towards identitybuilding and self-determination of their people: Namibiaand Botswana. The former only gained independence in1990 and may truely be classified as a multi-ethnic nation.The efforts in Namibia to overcome ethnic tensions and theapartheid legacy have gained a lot of international atten-tion and praise. Botswana has also been a stable multi-partydemocracy since independence, but contrary to Namibianever had to experience apartheid. Botswana can look downon over 30 years of political stability now, and to manyoutside observers presents an image of having a very smallethnic or tribal conflict potential. However, the civil societiesof both states are undergoing rapid changes and may carrymore conflict potentials than might be suggested from theefforts of their legitimately elected governments to establishor maintain a stable nationhood. With social tensions grow-ing, a closer examination of the patterns and causes of thesetransformations seems timely.

Looking at the social structure of both countries on anational level, the most striking difference is the numberof major ethnic groups: In Namibia the cultural and lin-gual diversity is much higher than in Botswana; 11 differentAfrican languages with 26 major dialects are spoken apartfrom Afrikaans, German, and English as the official lan-guage (Klimm et al., 1994, p. 59). In Botswana, over 80%of the entire population are Setswana-speaking, while only10–15% belong to the 2nd most dominant group, Kalanga.Of course, Botswana’s population is far from being ethni-cally homogeneous, but as can be seen in Figure 1 it isconsiderably less fragmented than Namibia’s.1

The case of Namibia: nation-building and socialtransformation after independence

After independence, the foremost aim of the new Namibiangovernment was to minimize all racial and ethnic divisionswhich had been imposed on the country by the formerapartheid regime. Under colonial and apartheid rules differ-ent communities had been segregated not only socially, butalso economically and geographically. Basically, indigenousAfrican communities had been separated from the Whites,and the majority of non-white ethnic groups had to settledown in ‘homelands’ which were usually located in periph-eral areas which were far less suitable for agriculture than thelands owned by white farmers, and which had almost no in-frastructure. This spatial division was matched by economicinequity: just before independence the white settler commu-nity and a tiny black elite, which had emerged during thelate stages of the apartheid system, comprised about 5% ofthe population, but controlled an estimated 71% of the GDP(cf. Tapscott, 1993). National reconciliation and the promo-tion of greater social equality, therefore, were the two mostimportant issues to be addressed by the new government andmost opposition parties after independence.

The constitution of Namibia guarantuees equality ofevery citizen. Eight years after gaining independence, how-ever, even high ranking government officials admit thatthe goal of abandoning racial discrimination has not yetfully been achieved. Tertiary Education Minister N. An-gula, in a newspaper comment on the eighth anniversary ofNamibia, noted that ‘the debit side [of the national reconcil-iation ledger] is depicting racial, regional, ethnic and tribal

1In both countries a large number of smaller ethnic groups, some-times comprising only a few hundred members, exist, and, depending ondefinition, numerous dialects are spoken.

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Figure 1.

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schisms. Racism in Namibia is alive and well. Sometimesit is subtle. In most cases it is open. . . . Unfortunately, theNamibian society is poisoned by stereotyping. Stereotyp-ing and group-psychology are the enemies of reconciliation.Stereotyping appears to be the source of other negative. . . isms’, such as regionalism.’ (The Namibian,1998a). Theminister then drew on what he called the persistence of the‘North-South divide’ in Namibia, referring to the fact thatunder colonial and apartheid rule the country had been di-vided into two zones, with the northern part designated astribal labour reserves, and the southern part set aside forcolonial, i.e. white, settlements. In Namibia today, stereo-type attitudes towards people from the ‘North’ (‘illiterate’,‘stupid’, ‘poor’, etc.) and from the ‘South’ (‘reflecting theold colonial order’, ‘racists’, etc.) are not uncommon.

While the negative impact of these occasional stereotypeattitudes on the process of national identity building shouldprobably not be valued too high, the reconciliation policyfaced a number of more serious problems immediately afterindependence, and many of these dilemmas are still latenteight years later:(1) Elites, who had been granted access to all institutionaland economic resources during the apartheid era, see theirprivileged status quo endangered by political attempts tolead society towards a more broadly based equity. On theother hand, many Namibians who had been put into dis-advantage under white rule fear that pre-independent gainsof the minority are legitimized and entrenched by a pol-icy which protects apartheid beneficiaries in order not tojeopardize the social peace process.(2) Like in many other sub-Saharan states, traditional powerand the execution of customary law are still in place inmost rural areas, at least in the ex-homeland regions, ofNamibia. At the village level, traditional local authorities,i.e. tribal or village chiefs and headmen, continue to holdpolitical and juridical power (cf. Forrest, 1994). Under thepolicy of national reconciliation, de-ethnicised notions of acommon public citizenship are promoted. While the diversetraditional and ethnic cultures and values of different pop-ulation groups are officially acknowledged, the pursuit of acommon national identity is constantly being emphasized.There is a clear conflict between the recognition of ethnic,tribal or linguistic identity on the village level, and an atti-tude which condemns tribalism in its broader political sense.Ethnicity is seen as a threat for the creation of a more or lessuniform national identity, but in pratice political and admin-istrative institutions sometimes find it difficult to distinguishbetween local cultural elements which are to be encouraged,and ethnicised attitudes which have to be challenged anddenounced.(3) Apart from the ethnic/tribal conflict potential there is arapid social transformation process, which on its part is trig-gered by urbanization and growing unemployment and haslittle to do with racial or ethnic factionalism. For the Namib-ian government, to find a solution to these problems is atleast as pressing as to overcome the elite formation inheritedfrom the apartheid period.

ad 1The dilemma of the politics of national reconciliation be-comes evident when questions of land rights have to beaddressed, and when the conditions of service in the pub-lic sector are evaluated. Under constitutional law, no ethnicgroup or sub-group is allowed special, i.e. preferential, treat-ment. The obvious aim is to forestall any legal abuse onethnic or tribalistic grounds. However, under these legalpreconditions it seems almost impossible to settle the ques-tion of land redistribution (which still is an urgent issue,keeping in mind the extremely unequal land distributionwhich is a legacy from the apartheid era). When it comesto the point where groups claim access to land from whichthey had been driven away under colonial or apartheid rule,they find it extraordinarily difficult to succeed. This is espe-cially true for ethnic splinter groups who had been forcedout of the country and are now trying to return, such asthe refugee Herero who had stettled down in neighbouringBechuanaland (now Botswana) in order to avoid Germanpersecution. The repatriation process of these groups provedto be far more difficult than was originally anticipated (see,e.g. Maletsky, 1998). Other communities originating fromthe central and southern parts of the country and forcedto live in the ‘North’ are equally affected, not to mentionthe San who live dispersed and have not been granted anyland rights for decades (cf. Widlock, 1995). Would all thesegroups be granted access to land in the areas they originallycame from, this would inevitably be to the disadvantage ofthe population living there today, and it would mean pro-moting the interests of one ethnic group while disregardingthose of another. Thus, the status quo of unequal land distri-bution is largely maintained on the constitutional grounds ofethnic balance, while the same constitution, of course, doesnot intend the assertion of apartheid conditions and strictlyprohibits any ethnic or tribal inequity and discrimination.Groups who had already gained from the apartheid system(mainly the whites, but to some respect – among others– also the Rehoboth Basters and a small black elite) stillbenefit today.

Problems of reinforcing a pre-independent social statusquo also arise through policies regarding the public sector.Specific segments of the society are benefitting more directlythan others. Ironically enough, this is sanctioned by the con-stitution (cf. Tapscott, 1993), which affirms that any personholding office in the public sector on the date of indepen-dence is allowed to maintain his or her position. This clausenot only implies that individuals employed by the colonialgovernment must not lose their job, but that they may alsokeep all their employment benefits, such as housing provi-sions, medical aid or car allowances. After independence,the SWAPO government chose to treat all existing and in-coming civil servants equally, resulting in the fact that civilservants today profit from beneficial salary and provisionstructures while other segements of the population have noaccess to such gratuities. As the majority of civil servantsis working in Namibia’s capital Windhoek, public funds arenot only spent disproportionately in a social, but also in a

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spatial sense: it is largely anurbanelite which gains from theretention of the status quo in the public employment sector.

ad 2With the uncertainty of policy-making institutions of how todeal with local tribal customs, the traditional authorities, i.e.chiefs or village headmen, have been excluded from manypolitical decisions. Even consultative roles in national or re-gional planning have frequently been denied to traditionalleaders (Forrest, 1994), and it has often been impossible tobring the interests of local groups to the attention of po-litical institutions. Interestingly enough, this state of legalambivalence and uncertainty has also its advantages. AsForrest points out, it provides both the state and the tradi-tional authorities with a wide range of undefined politicalspace within which to manoeuvre. Ethnically significant is-sues, which probably would not have been attended to indue time under official policy guidance, could sometimesbe solved to the satisfaction of all on an informal, pragmaticbasis. However, without a mainstream standard procedure ofhow to deal with ethnic-regarding issues, there is a dangerthat political decisions are based on good-will rather thanon balanced evaluation of the issue. Eight years after inde-pendence, there is a growing concern in Namibia about ageneral lack of accountability regarding the government, andan obvious increase in corruption (The Namibian, 1998b).

ad 3The overall and foremost political aim of national recon-ciliation is overlapped by growing pressures to solve socialtendencies which have only little to do with ethnic or tribaldivision. Like in many other African countries, in Namibia,too, a new social stratification seems to emerge that tran-scends racial and ethnic boundaries. Characteristics of thisprocess will be discussed in the Botswana section of thispaper, below. It is important to mention, however, that whilesocial well-being is not necessarily related to racial or ethnicaffiliation, it is highly dependent on the part of the countrywhere one lives. A UNDP regional study revealed that theHuman Development Index (HDI) of Namibia’s northern ar-eas was significantly lower than in the central and southernparts of the country. Ohangwena next to the Angolan borderhad an HDI of 0.487 (calculation based on Nam$), Karas inthe south one of 0.779, while the HDI of Khomas (Windhoekand surrounding areas) was 0.832 in 1995 (UNDP, 1996).Despite the fact that in Windhoek, too, a large number ofpeople have to live under deplorable circumstances, theav-erageliving conditions in the former communal areas of thenorth are obviously far worse than those in the capital, sup-porting the assumption above that many of those who benefitfrom post-apartheid policies live in the urban areas.

The case of Botswana: tribalism and socio-economictransformation, a growing concern after decades ofstability

Contrary to Namibia’s, Botswana’s population is largelydominated by one major ethnic group, the Tswana (Fig-

ure 1). Moreover, Botswana never had to experienceapartheid rule, and achieved independence peacefully, inparts even actively supported by the British. Without thetraumatic experience of apartheid, and with a colonial powerwhich neglected its protectorate and, by colonial standards,had only little influence on the traditional social sphere, openracial discrimination was and still is practically unheard ofin Botswana. Since independence in 1966, Botswana hashad a stable multi-party system, and what may be called a‘democratic attitude’ is deeply rooted in society. The ma-jor course of action taken by policy-making institutions,therefore, is not to overcome discriminatory structures, butrather tomaintaina social status quo of wide-spread politicalparticipation. However, 30 years after independence, a num-ber of shortcomings have become obvious. Both tribalismand biased political actions towards ethnic minorities havebecome a growing concern, and although Botswana’s eco-nomic performance was brilliant over the past decades, thesocio-economic situation of large sections of its populationis unsatisfactory. This paper focusses on two issues whichcharacterize the latest social developments:

(1) Tensions between Tswana-tribes, who compriseabout 80% of Botswana’s population, and other ethnicgroups, especially the Kalanga and the San, have been grow-ing over the past few years. As will be shown below, this ispartly caused by some shortcomings in the country’s con-stitution, but in the case of the San (‘Bushmen’) it must beassumed that there are also economic reasons: governmentofficials view the indigenous San groups as a hindering fac-tor for the touristic development of the Kalahari, and thediamond industry sees them as a disturbing element for itsongoing exploration activities.

(2) Botswana’s economic performance was almost un-matched by any other developing country (average annualGDP growth 1980–1993 was 6.2% and only surpassed byChina, Korea and Thailand; World Bank, 1992, 1995, 1996;see also Harvey and Lewis, 1990). However, income distrib-ution among households in Botswana is extremely unequal.In fact, only Brazil, Guatemala and Panama have a widerincome gap between the richest and the poorest households(World Bank, 1992, 1995, 1996; see also Krüger, 1994).While the richest 20% of all households receive almost twothirds of the total household income, the poorest 20% onlyget a 2.5% share. According to an unofficial governmentstudy, over 40% of Botswana’s population live below thepoverty datum line (AIA, 1998b), and poverty alleviationremains very difficult. With rapid urbanization, new vulner-ability patterns emerge. The ‘modern’ social differentiationof urban residential groups is remarkably different from thetraditional Tswana society.

ad 1In 1997, the Botswana government faced internationalprotests for its plans to relocate San groups from the cen-tral Kalahari to new settlements outside their ancestralhomelands. The San are populations which sometimes arecalled ‘Bushmen’ and are officially termed ‘Basarwa’ inBotswana. In general, all these terms refer to traditional

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hunter-gatherers living in the semi-arid Kalahari region.There is a debate on the most appropriate name to applyto these people, because most San groups do not recog-nize a single all-inclusive term for themselves, preferringinstead the use of local names, because the terms have some-times been used in a pejorative sense (Hitchcock, 1987).The existence of such a debate alone shows how difficultit is to ‘handle’ the San-issue. Indeed, although the exis-tence of racial or ethnic boundaries has always been deniedin Botswana, as a non-Bantu ethnic group the San havenever been fully included into the process of post-colonialnation-building. In Botswana, their number is estimated tobe some 20–30 000 people, living dispersed in the semi-arid and very sparsely populated central and western partsof the country. In an effort to develop all parts of the countryand to let all Botswana citizens take part in this develop-ment, the government launched a special programme forso-called ‘Remote Area Dwellers’ (RADs) in 1977. ThisRemote Area Development Programme can be seen as apolitical attempt to integrate all population groups into theprocess of economic and social progress. Also, the Botswanagovernment has implemented information campaigns andprojects on languages, art and lifestyles to change negativepublic attitudes towards the minority target groups. As mostSan groups live in remote areas, they can – in principle –benefit from these special development measures, which in-clude preferential food aid or medical treatment in times ofdrought, borehole drilling schemes, education programmes,etc. However, critiques now say that the governmental in-stitutions are using the RAD-programme as a backdoor toimpose a discriminatory relocation scheme on the San. SinceMay, 1997, a couple of hundreds of San people have beenmoved from their settlements in the Central Kalahari GameReserve and relocated to villages outside the reserve, andanother 1000 are awaiting their relocation in the near future.A small financial compensation has been promised to thosewilling to leave by their free will, but whether the sums haveactually been paid remains unclear (cf. Kiley, 1997). Theofficial purpose of this scheme is to let the San benefit fromthe national health and education systems. Health care andschooling, so the line of argument, can only be provided incentral villages and remain unaccessible for those who don’tlive near health posts or schools. The question remains tobe answered, however, why the San groups affected did notmove nearer to these institutions earlier, and by their ownwill. Also, officials have stated that the San were harmingwildlife, and in accordance with natural conservancy poli-cies and touristic development of the central Kalahari it wasnecessary to have them relocated. San representatives and anumber of Human Rights NGOs suspect that once the Sanhave moved they will be denied access to the wildlife, onwhich they depend for a living, and that the reserve will beturned over to cattle ranchers, who form a very powerfulpolitical lobby in Botswana. There are also fears that the di-amond industry, the most important provider of Botswana’snational income, views the San as a hindering element inthe possible future development of new diamond mines in

the central Kalahari, following recent and very promisingexploration activities.

Whoever has the better argument in this case is not theissue of this paper. The removal scheme, however, may beseen as a proof that beyond the official rejection of any racialinequity, there are policy decisions which are ethnically bi-assed and lead to unequal, if not discriminatory, treatmentof certain groups. Behind these decisions lie not only thesuspected economic interests of a cattle breeding, diamond,or tourism industry, but also profound misconceptions of theTswana majority about the land use and livelihood systemsof the different San groups (for an evaluation of these mis-conceptions see the detailed report of Hitchcock (1987)).The San have always basically been seen as ‘nomadic’ atbest, and as ‘non-civilized’ people at worst.

Another issue which has led to a growing threat of eth-nic tensions in Botswana is the fact that only Setswana andEnglish are recognized as official languages. The Kalangaand Yei, second and third largest ethnic groups in Botswana,have tried for years to have their mother tongues be taught atprimary schools in their home regions. Their attempts havealways been rejected by governmental institutions on thegrounds of ‘nation-building’ and national, i.e. Tswana, iden-tity. Also, similar to Namibia and other African states, tradi-tional chieftainship is an important element of Botswana’spolitical life, but the chiefs of non-Tswana tribes are notofficially recognized as legitimate representatives of theirrespective ethnic group (for details about political aware-ness and attitudes in Botswana see Van Binsbergen (1995)and Holm et al. (1996). The country’s constitution, whichis rightly praised for its democratic spirit and protection ofhuman rights, does have some shortcomings when tribal is-sues are concerned: it divides the nation’s ethnic groups intomajor and minor tribes. According to the constitution onlythe eight principle tribes, all Tswana, may have so calledParamount Chiefs who represent their tribe in the Houseof Chiefs. This is an influential parliamentary institutionwhich has the right to advise on all matters affecting customand tradition. The problem is that some non-Tswana ethnicgroups, e.g. the Kalanga, are larger than some of the sup-posed majority tribes, but are neither politically representedin parliament nor recognized by the Tswana tribal leaders asbeing entitled to having their own chiefs. An amendment ofthe constitution has been agreed upon by parliament in 1996,but so far this modification is still pending. Speakers of theminority tribes are increasingly stressing the fact that theconstitutional implementation of ethnic equity is overdue,and the national debate about an equal status of all tribeshas intensified to the point where both the retiring presidentMasire and his successor Mogae have expressed their deepworries that, should the matter remain unsolved, it couldendanger the country’s political stability in the near future(AIA, 1998a).

ad 2Botswana’s impressive macro-economic performance hasled to sound financial reserves and national revenues whichare used for the development of a nationwide basic in-

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Figure 2.

frastructure, especially in the communications, health, andeducation sectors. Schooling has expanded rapidly, withover 90% primary school enrolment, and, contrary to mostdeveloping countries, the growth rate of employment op-portunities has by far exceeded the growth rate of labourforce (UNDP, 1996). Unemployment has nevertheless risen,too, and is approaching 25%. As has been mentioned above,income distribution is extremely unequal. Also, Botswanaexperiences a rapid urbanization process which is mainly

concentrated on the nation’s two major cities, Gaborone andFrancistown. Both urban centres have a population increaseof about 6 to 8% per year. After decades of improvement,the general health status has dramatically declined in the pastyears due to the AIDS/HIV problem. In October, 1997, theHIV prevalence rate among the total population was 18.7%according to estimates by the Ministry of Health (personalcommunication by the author; on the AIDS problem seealso Macdonald, 1996), and was a lot higher among the

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Figure 3.

16–45 year olds. Urban regions are more affected than ruralareas. All these factors lead to a profound transformationof society. The traditional Tswana society is characterizedby socially congregated groups whose respective membersall belong to one tribe (Figure 2). Within these groups so-cial contacts are close, between groups of different tribal orregional origin scarce, between Tswana and Non-Tswanaethnic groups almost non-existent. On top of each grouptribal chiefs and their clans form what may be called an‘elite’. Other members of the tribe rank below them, theirinfluence, authority, and reputation depending, among otherfactors, on age and wealth (not only in terms of mone-tary income, but also based e.g. on the size of their cattleherds). However, there is no clear class stratification withstrict and distinctive boundaries between members of onetribe (cf. Schapera and Comaroff, 1991). Figure 2A presentsan idealized model of the traditional Tswana society, whichto some extent can still be found in rural areas on the vil-lage level. Figure 2B shows the social differentiation on anational level today. Preferred social contacts now also tran-scend tribal boundaries, and the different Tswana tribes areclosely connected with each other, which can be seen as a re-sult of nation-building efforts after independence. However,as has been explained above, and contrary to what mightbe termed a widespread ethnic harmony if seen from a su-perficial point of view, there is still a gap between Tswanaand non-Tswana ethnic groups. There are occasional socialcontacts between Tswana and, for instance, Kalanga, but, asindicated in Figure 2, the San virtually represent a separate,and inferior, minority group in Botswana. On a local levelthese observations have to be modified. In the urban cen-tres, for instance, segregation tendencies and a trend towardsan explicit horizontal stratification of society have becomedominant features of modern social structures (Figure 2C).Having to generate monetary income is an important trait

of life in the cities. Food production on a subsistence basisis hardly possible in the urban context, and cash income isneeded to buy food, and to pay for accommodation. Over40% of the urban low-income households live in rented ac-commodation (Krüger, 1997), and for them dwellings area commodity for which money has to be paid on a regu-lar basis. This transition from rural subsistence economy tourban cash economy is leading to new social patterns. Inthe urban context, the dominant social gap is now basedon income disparities between wealthier and not so well-off population groups. The modern social differentiation ischaracterized by patterns where traditional social ties alongtribal lines give way to connections along income sections.In the cities, low-income and poverty groups of differenttribal affiliations and different regional origins are in closercontact with each other than with their fellow tribesmen whobelong to a higher income group. ModelC idealizes thesenew structures and sees low-income and poverty householdssocially clearly separated from the rest of the urban popula-tion. If these separation trends continue, there is a danger ofincreasing marginalization of a growing number of peoplein Botswana, despite the very satisfactory macro-economicdevelopment.

The social differentiation visualized in Figure 2C is notjust based on assumptions. There is enough empirical evi-dence today to prove these social trends (cf. Krüger, 1997).In order to generate cash income, urban households affecteddevelop a large set of coping strategies. One very effectivemeasure is to form small neighbourhood groups and engagein what might be called ‘rotating credit associations’. Eachparticipant pays a small amount of money into an informalcooperative savings’ account, and in a rotating system onepartner is paid out and may use the collected money as heor she sees fit. In the context of social restructuring it isimportant to notice that ethnic, tribal, or regional origins of

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the partners have little or no influence on their participationin this informal self-help scheme. There are not only eco-nomic reasons for the emergence of new patterns of socialstratification in Botswana’s cities. Town planning plays animportant role, too. Town planning in Botswana is basedon the conceptions of strict separation of functions, and ofzonation of urban housing extensions according to incomelevels of their proposed residents. The morphological frame-work of modern cities reflects these conceptions. There arehigh-density, self-help, and low-cost housing areas for low-income people, medium-density and medium-cost quartersfor medium-income households, and low-density high-costhousing areas for high-income residents. These morpholog-ical units are spatially separated from each other, and theresulting city structures clearly promote social segregationbetween different income groups. Since the mid-1990s therehas been a tendency to move away from this urban plan-ning ideal to reduce the degree of sociospatial polarization,but a less rigorous planning concept still awaits widespreadimplementation.

Apart from planning ideals and income patterns, whichnourish segregation, the social transformation process is alsodetermined by a large variety of other factors: In the wakeof rural-urban migration and urbanization, rural values andlifestyles are replaced by urban livelihood patterns. To makea living in the urban context, proficiency acquired throughschooling or vocational training is needed rather than knowl-edge based on traditional, i.e. indigenous or peasantry,expertise. Linkages to home villages weaken gradually, clan-structures or family-bindings break up, and for all those whohave little assets new self-help social networks become es-sential to survive in the cities. Health risks, especially thegrowing impact of AIDS and associated illnesses, such astuberculosis, which is considerably higher in urban areas,contribute to threaten the livelihood systems of many ur-ban residents. It becomes increasingly difficult to classifyBotswana’s modern social structure through simple ethnic,tribal, cultural, ideological, or even mere economic factors.Adjusting ModelC in Figure 2 accordingly, a common char-acteristic feature of people belonging to the ‘lower’ strataof society is that of vulnerability, a concept which goes be-yond economic poverty (Figure 3). In the urban setting, thedominant gap between layers of society is no longer basedon tribal origins or simple income disparities, but on unsus-tained livelihoods in a much broader sense. With the numberof urban residents increasing rapidly in Botswana, this newpattern of social differentiation will apply to continuouslyexpanding segments of the population.

State-society relations: what makes Namibia andBotswana different from other sub-Saharan countries?

Parts of the social transformation process analyzed abovedo apply to Namibia, too. The difference between the twocountries, then, lies mainly in the extent of ethnic and socialinequity, which is larger in Namibia. Namibia is still in theprocess of social and racial reconciliation, and still carriesthe apartheid legacy as a heavy burden. The picture of an

ethnically homogenous, and entirely peaceful, Botswana,however, should be modified. As has been explained above,there are tribal and social tensions, and they are increasing.

Nothing in this paper has been said about discriminatorylaws and actions against women. This does not mean thatmen and women are treated equally. Indeed, there is enoughevidence for the contrary (cf. The Botswana Society, 1993;AIA, 1996; Barter, 1996), and it will have to be the task ofpolicy-making institutions in both countries to view socialreconciliation, identity building and transformation also inthe light of gender issues.

From a broader view, in treating ethnic issues and so-cial transformation patterns, Namibia and Botswana differsignificantly from many other sub-Saharan nations. In bothcountries, there is a popular and widespread will to settlepolitical issues by means of communication, consultation,and negotiation. The Botswana government has often beenpraised for its management skills and sense of prioritieswhen dealing with economic matters and foreign affairs(Harvey and Lewis, 1990), but this judgement may, to someextent, be applied to its handling of domestic social prob-lems, too. Politicians have, at least, recognized tensionsand conflict potentials, and are, in principle, willing to ad-dress them openly. Namibia’s state institutions, too, reflecta significant degree of what Forrest (1994) has called ‘statehardness’: Neither Botswana’s nor Namibia’s governmen-tal institutions are operating from a position of weaknessin regard to ethnic forces. Both governments need not bar-gain with ethnic or tribal leaders or representatives of othersocial groups to assure state survival, because they bothhave a legitimate mandate to be in power. Both governmentscan refrain from creating clientelist ties or allocating rev-enue to specific regional, ethnic, or social pressure-groupsto gain their participation or support. ‘Soft’ states – andmany African states are ‘soft’ in this respect – must rely onthese clientelist linkages in order to secure their own exis-tence, and constant adaptations and amendments of politicalactions are necessary to maintain a certain degree of stabil-ity. In Botswana and Namibia, state-society relationships arerather based on an atmosphere of co-operation and negotia-tion through which – as Forrest (1994) put it for Namibia –an already firm political support base is strengthened. Con-ciliatory strategies and approaches have proven viable for the‘young’ state of Namibia and the ‘old’ state of Botswana.

However, in both countries there is a struggle for ex-tended tribal authority and ethnic self-determination, whichhas to be addressed more openly by political institutions. Itis true that these issues are very difficult to handle, but theprocess of national reconciliation in Namibia and the exam-ple of the San dilemma in Botswana show that governmentalactions have sometimes been unnecessarily insensitive andeven awkward, and sometimes administrative institutionshave been unaware of the fact that cultural pluralism maybe turned into something favourable for social and eco-nomic performance, and may not necessarily lead into aloss of political stability. Vice versa: if, in the light of rapidsocial transformation und urbanization which has been pre-sented in this paper and cannot be halted anyway, certain

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degrees of self-determination or local authority are deniedand governmental flexibility makes way to political rigidity,there is a danger of the identity building process turninginto a growing fractioning of society which becomes moreuncontrollable, and less assessable.

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