Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security

Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls ofconflating ontological and physical securityBahar RumeliliKoc University, Rumelifeneri yolu, Sariyer, Istanbul 34450, Turkey.

How can the Self move from a securitised to a non-securitised relation with the Otherwhile its very identity depends on its relation to the Other? Within the existing criticalapproaches to security, this question, which encapsulates the complex interrelationshipbetween identity and desecuritisation, has not been explored in a systematic manner. Thisarticle builds on the emerging literature on ontological security to develop a two-layeredframework of security as both ontological and physical, wherein the relationship betweenidentity and desecuritisation can be better analysed. I argue that the conflation of ontologicaland physical security within the existing critical approaches to security has generated aninsufficient appreciation of how identity expands the possibilities for desecuritisation whileimposing new limits. In particular, the framework offered in this article highlights the pos-sibilities for achieving ontological security in the absence of securitisation and limits todesecuritisation that stem from ontological insecurity.Journal of International Relations and Development advance online publication,20 September 2013; doi:10.1057/jird.2013.22

Keywords: desecuritisation; identity; ontological security; self/other relations

Introduction

Questions of identity and security remain inextricably intertwined in many con-temporary political issues, including migration, minority rights, and protractedconflicts, such as in Cyprus, Israel-Palestine, and Bosnia. In relation to such issuesand conflicts, critical approaches to international relations have emphasised thecontingent and socially constructed nature of dominant conceptions of identity andsecurity. A driving agenda of critical theories of security has been that security,threat, danger, and risk are not objective conditions, but social constructs that areshaped by dominant discourses. We inhabit a securitised world of our own making,where issues and concerns are approached as threats to our survival that meritemergency and exceptional measures (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Williams2003). Hence, issues such as migration and minority rights come to threaten majoritygroups because they are framed and acted toward as security issues. And conflicts inBosnia, Cyprus, and Palestine become intractable not because they are inherently so,but because the respective issues of constitution, territoriality, and status of

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Jerusalem, for instance, are politically elevated into matters of survival. Similarly,critical theories of identity have underscored the significance of identity as aconstitutive basis for social action, but at the same time have drawn our attentionto the discursive production of difference (Campbell 1992; Weldes et al. 1999).Thus, the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Bosnian Muslims andSerbs, majority and minority identities, do not stem from pre-given incompatibilitiesbut ‘exist’ only because they are continuously re-produced through dominantdiscourses.

No critical theorist would ever claim that securitisations and difference-producingdiscourses are easily reversible. However, to stress that this is a world of our ownmaking invites reflexivity, and at least for some scholars it also opens up thepossibility that securitised issues can be brought back to normal politics, redefined asnot threatening to our survival, through a process of desecuritisation (Huysmans1995, 1998; Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004; Roe 2004; Jutila 2006). Yet, apart from theidentification of this possibility, questions such as how desecuritisation takes place,under what conditions and through which underlying processes, have not beensufficiently addressed (Aradau 2004; Hansen 2012).

While critical approaches to security (CAS) have developed to encompass diversebodies of literature, which makes general critiques difficult, in this article I highlighta widespread limitation of this literature1 in theorising the identity/security nexus in theprocesses of securitisation/desecuritisation. How does the Self move from a securitisedto a non-securitised relation with the Other while its very identity depends on itsrelation to the Other? As Wæver (2009) notes, reminding existentially threatenedconflict parties, such as the Israelis and Palestinians, of the socially constructed andcontingent nature of their identities is not likely to work as a desecuritisation strategy.At the same time, however, the continued reproduction of antithetical identity positionsundermines political attempts to remove the perception of existential threat. Thus,proper theorisation of the identity/security nexus necessitates making assumptionsabout how processes of securitisation/desecuritisation and identity constructionimpinge on one another and conceptualising the ways in which different identityconstructions enable and limit the processes of securitisation/desecuritisation.

My claim is that the extant literature on critical approaches to security is presentlyunequipped to properly theorise this identity/security nexus because it fails todistinguish between the ontological security to constitute a distinct Self (security-as-being) and physical security defined as the freedom of a pre-constituted Self fromharm, threat, or danger (security-as-survival). This conflation obscures the ways inwhich identity constructions both enable and limit desecuritisation. As recentlyunderlined by Lene Hansen, the process of desecuritisation is ultimately ‘one ofshifting interrelatedness’, which, in order to be possible, ‘must instantiate the non-threatening identity of the Other’ (Hansen 2012: 533). Yet, given this condition ofpossibility, the critical security literature has not explored how the shifting of issuesout of the security realm may be both enabled and limited by alternative identity

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constructions. Instead, most security theorists (e.g. Wæver 1998; Williams 2003; Roe2004; Stern 2006) have chosen to focus so exclusively on how discourses andpractices of security-as-survival condition and constrain processes of identityformation that they have left no theoretical space for the emergence of alternativeidentity constructions that would enable desecuritisation. On the other hand, others(e.g. Huysmans 1995, 1998; Aradau 2004) have based their strategies of desecur-itisation on the transcendence and the blurring of Self/Other distinctions, but whiledoing so, neglected how the pursuit of the freedom to constitute a distinct Self (i.e.ontological security) may limit desecuritisation.

Therefore, the theorisation of desecuritisation needs to incorporate processes ofidentity reconstruction and transformation, and I argue that the literature on ontologicalsecurity provides a promising point of departure in advancing critical theories of securityin this respect. The notion of ontological security highlights the intimate relation betweenidentity and security, while underscoring that the pursuits of ontological and physicalsecurity in international relations are characterised by different dynamics, processes, acts,and discourses. Ontological security is intimately connected with identity, and as such itspursuit requires differentiation and in that sense presupposes an Other. It stems fromhaving a stable relationship with the Other; yet, it does not necessitate the securitisationof an Other in the sense of defining it as a threat. The pursuit of physical security, on theother hand, from a critical perspective, entails both the naming and identification ofthreats to survival, which often involve the securitisation of an Other, and thedevelopment of measures to defend the Self against those threats. In this article, Idevelop a two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological. Throughthis two-layered conception of security, I theorise the ways in which the pursuit of astable identity in relation to the Other both enables and limits desecuritisation, andsuggest ways in which desecuritisation processes may overcome these limits.

The following section of the article critically defines the concepts of ontologicaland physical security in relation to one another, and to other concepts of security, anddevelops the two-layered framework of security, where ontological and physicalsecurity constitute two distinct but interrelated layers. Their distinction gives rise to agreater set of possible states of security than previously accounted in the literature,and by developing a 2×2 analytical matrix, I discuss how ontological and physicalsecurity relate to one another across different states of security. Then, the subsequentsection of the article underscores how the failure to distinguish between the twolayers of security has constrained the existing literature in its analysis of processes ofsecuritisation and desecuritisation. The section situates these processes within theanalytical matrix in a way that highlights the possibilities for achieving ontologicalsecurity in the absence of securitisation and the ways in which ontological insecuritymay limit desecuritisation. These possibilities and limits are then briefly illustrated byreferences to protracted conflicts and minority rights debates.

Taking note of the ways in which ontological insecurity limits desecuritisation,the penultimate section of the article draws on the post-structuralist IR literature on

Bahar RumeliliIdentity and desecuritisation

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Self/Other relations to explore the possibilities and conditions for attaining and main-taining ontological security in the process of desecuritisation. The various typologiesof Self/Other relations put forward by this literature present us with alternative formsof securitised and non-securitised Otherness and therefore suggest that the main-tenance of a stable identity in relation to the Other does not necessitate thesecuritisation of the Other. I further infer from this literature that the reinstitution ofontological security in the process of desecuritisation necessitates a transition fromsecuritised to non-securitised distinctions on temporal, ethical, spatial dimensions,and not the transcendence of differences between Self and Other. I develop a numberof heuristic examples on how such non-securitised distinctions may be instituted inprocesses of the desecuritisation of minority rights, protracted conflicts, and migration.The conclusion summarises the contributions of the conceptual framework of securityintroduced in the article and identifies some avenues for further research.

States of security as both physical and ontological

The concept of ontological security has given birth to a burgeoning literature in IR(Kinnvall 2004; Steele 2005, 2008; Mitzen 2006a, b; Krolikowski 2008; Roe 2008;Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2010; Zarakol 2010; Croft 2012; Lupovici 2012),mainly drawing on Giddens (1991). Giddens (1991: 38–39) emphasises how themaintenance of habits and routines helps ‘to constitute ‘a formed framework’ forexistence by cultivating a sense of being and its separation from non-being.’ Thisframework of ontological security enables individuals to answer existential questionsabout ‘basic parameters of human life’, such as the nature of existence, the distinctionbetween human life and the external world, the existence of other persons, and self-identity (ibid: 48–55), and to take for granted existential parameters of activity(ibid: 37). Applying this concept to the study of IR, Mitzen (2006a: 341) has arguedthat, in addition to physical security, states also seek ontological security, which isthe ‘security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, whichenables and motivates action and choice’ (Mitzen 2006a: 344). According to Steele(2005: 526), ontological security entails ‘knowing both what one is doing and whyone is doing it’. Certainty, which gives rise to stability and continuity of being, is itspre-condition. According to Roe (2008: 783), ‘it is a security of social relationship,that is to say a sense of being safely in control of a cognitive situation’. Zarakol(2010: 6) stresses that ‘it entails having a consistent sense of self and having thatsense affirmed by others’.

Although this is a relatively new literature in IR, it is already characterisedby different approaches, in particular regarding the relationality and the constitutionof identity.2 Steele stresses that identities emerge endogenously, not just ‘in thedialectic between self and other but within the internal dialectic that arises from theontological security-seeking process’ (2008: 32). On the other hand, Mitzen (2006a)


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and Roe (2008) underscore the relational nature of identity by placing emphasison routinised practices with significant others, which can be cooperative orconflictual and entail positive or negative identification with others (on this point,see also Zarakol 2010). Adopting a relationist and a post-structuralist approach,I emphasise firstly that identity is constituted not through any routine, but speci-fically those that articulate difference and distinctiveness. Precisely because identitylacks a pre-given, objectively identifiable essence (Campbell 1992), we secureourselves as beings mainly by discourses and practices that differentiate ourselvesfrom Others. Second, I underline that ontological security rests on the reproductionof a rich set of identity markers that distinguish Self from Other on the basis ofmultiple dimensions and not only of more basic type (i.e. friend/enemy) distinctions(cf. Mitzen 2006a).

The literature stresses that the pursuit of ontological security constitutes anadditional basis and motivation for state behaviour and that the pursuits of ontologicaland physical security in international relations are characterised by different dynamics,processes, acts, and discourses. The pursuit of ontological security leads actors to‘routinise relationships with significant others’ (Mitzen 2006a: 341) and choose‘courses of action comfortable with their sense of identity’ (Steele 2005: 526). Incontrast, the pursuit of physical security entails both the naming and identification ofthreats, and the development of measures to defend the Self against those threats. Thedistinction between the two layers of security locates the us/them distinction in therealm of security-as-being and the friend/enemy dichotomy in the realm of security-as-survival. Ontological security requires differentiation and in that sense presupposes anOther. Yet it does not necessitate the securitisation of the Other in the sense of definingit as a physical threat (security-as-survival). Although the pursuit of ontological securityentails practices that reproduce the stability of a Self/Other relation, the pursuit ofphysical security is productive of a particular form of Self/Other relation where the Selfand Other view each other as physical threats.

It needs to be emphasised at this point that the separation between the two layers ofsecurity treats neither identity nor security as prior to and independent of the other(McSweeney 1999). Rather, it highlights the intimate linkage between identity andthe particular layer of ontological security, while undermining the unproblematicassociation often made in the literature between identity and the construction of anOther as a threat to physical security.

The notion of ontological security challenges the exclusive association thatconventional theories of IR make between security and survival, physical threat anddefence. Despite their contributions in expanding and deepening the notion ofsecurity, CAS have maintained this association albeit in a more qualified form.Ontological security differs from other related non-traditional security concepts suchas positive security, human security, and societal security. It is associated with theadjectival use of security, which, as McSweeney (1999: 14–15) underlines, carriesa positive connotation and performs an enabling function as a ‘property of a


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relationship, a quality making each secure in the other’. Yet, ontological security alsousurps the value distinction between positive and negative security; it stresses thatwhat makes the Self secure in the Other could be a negative relationship of enmity aswell as a positive one of friendship and amity (Roe 2008: 779).

Unlike human security, ontological security applies both to individual andcollective actors (Roe 2008). It stresses that states, just like individuals, are socialactors that seek security in each other as well as from one another. Moreover, unlikehuman security, ontological security is not associated with an emancipatory normativeagenda that seeks to empower the individual in relation to the state (cf. Booth 1991;Bilgin 2003). While ontological security focuses on the socio-psychological needs ofstability and recognition, even at its broadest conception, human security concernsitself primarily with physical human needs (freedom from violence, poverty, anddisease, etc.).

Ontological security also differs from societal security, which focuses on threatsto national and societal identities, in at least two ways. First of all, concerns ofontological security are not limited to a specific referent or sector of security.Certainty and stability of identity remain a concern of states as well as of societiesand individuals regardless of whether the threats are located in the cultural or non-cultural (military, economic, environmental) realms. Second, societal securityremains very much wedded to a survivalist and threat-based conception of security(Wæver 1993: 25). Defined by Wæver (1993: 23) as ‘the ability of a society to persistin its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’,societal security refers to the security of a pre-constituted society/identity from harm,threat, and danger. Ontological security does not presuppose a threat to identity butunderlines an ongoing concern with its stability.

Physical security or security-as-survival also remains imprecisely defined, despiteits prominence in the mainstream IR literature. The survival motive is broadly used todenote concerns about the physical survival of citizens of a state, the preservationof its government apparatus and the maintenance of authority over its territory.However, states, under usual circumstances, do not face an imminent threat of death,and sometimes even ‘choose to die’ (Paul 1999; Howes 2003). The distinctionbetween ontological and physical security does not necessitate that I establish certainthreats as purely physical and serious enough to put survival at stake. As a criticaltheorist of security, I focus on how concerns about survival are produced and theireffects on political debate and policy; I underscore that concerns about survival andbeing motivate different politics (see also Wæver 1993: 26).

Although mainstream theories of IR have omitted ontological security, in CAS,ontological and physical security remains very much conflated. On the one hand,CAS have been able to incorporate non-physical security concerns, as in the case ofsocietal security. On the other hand, by defining security issues by reference to thecriterion of whether it is presented as an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 24),they have associated security exclusively with the dynamics, processes, acts, and


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politics of security-as-survival, including the naming of threats, legitimisation ofemergency defence measures, and empowerment of security actors. In contrast,ontological security is associated with those dynamics, processes, acts, and politicsthat centre around the reproduction of narratives, habits and routines and the main-tenance of a system of certitude.

This article not only highlights ontological security as a distinct concern thatmotivates behaviour, but also develops a two-layered framework of security withinwhich we can explore how ontological and physical security are interlinked. Theirdistinction highlights the possibility of attaining ontological security in the absenceof the construction of and mobilisation against a threat to survival. At the same time,their relatedness intimately connects the question of whether we securitise, that is,perceive and construct certain actors and issues as physical threats, with how wesecure ourselves as beings and whether we feel secure as beings, thus underscoringhow ontological insecurity may limit desecuritisation.

In exploring how ontological and physical security are interlinked, I start from theassumption that actors in international relations seek both ontological and physicalsecurity. From that I deduce that at a single point in time, they will be in one ofseveral states of security, which has both an ontological and a physical dimension.Following Wæver (1998: 81), I define three states of security— asecurity, insecurity,and security — but disaggregate the ontological and physical dimensions. I define astate of physical security as one where the Self experiences concern about imminentharm, threat, and danger, but considers itself adequately protected against these threats.This state is produced when ‘a threat is articulated but sufficient counter-measures arealso [presented] to be available’ (ibid.). In a state of physical insecurity, on the otherhand, the security discourse is framed so that the Self experiences concern aboutimminent harm, threat, and danger, but also regards itself as inadequately protected.Because security itself is a practice, security/insecurity are not exhaustive states. Whenthe situation is taken out of the security discourse and practice, the realm of emergencypolitics and exceptional measures, we arrive at a state of physical asecurity, where theSelf does not experience concern about imminent harm, threat, or danger. Like Wæver,this article emphasises the commonalities between states of physical insecurity/security, that is, physical (in)security, and concentrates on their distinction from a stateof physical asecurity.

With regard to ontological security, the distinction between security and insecurityis the more critical one. In a state of ontological insecurity, the Self experiencesinstability and uncertainty of being. Ontological insecurity refers to a state ofdisruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and,consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing,acting, and being (Kinnvall 2004). It may arise from deep uncertainty (Mitzen 2006a)and/or from the failure to have its sense of Self affirmed by others (Zarakol 2010).Conversely, in a state of ontological security, the Self experiences a stable, certain,and consistent social existence, where it remains in control about its identity and


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capacity for action. While I do not rule out the possibility of a state of ontologicalasecurity, where the Self is simply not concerned with the stability and certainty of itsidentity, I do not explore this possibility and how it varies across different states ofphysical security in this article.

Having identified different states of physical and ontological security, I make thefurther assumption that since ontological and physical security are distinct, states ofsecurity do not vary uniformly across the ontological and physical layers of security.One can be at a state of physical insecurity while being at a state of ontologicalsecurity, and vice versa. Consequently, Table 1 charts out the four possible states ofsecurity based on the conception of security as both ontological and physical.

The state of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security is one where the Selfexperiences concern about physical harm and the instability and uncertainty of itsbeing. Ontological insecurity tempts actors to engage in practices that mark Others asnot only different, but also as morally inferior and threatening (Campbell 1992).Ontological insecurity and physical (in)security reproduce one another. As actorsseek ontological security through constructing Others as threats to their security-as-survival, they mobilise their physical defences in the pursuit of physical securitythrough representing the sources of threat as different and morally inferior.

Similarly, in a state of ontological security/physical (in)security, actors experiencestability and certainty of being in a relationship where the Other is constructed asthreat to their security-as-survival. Consequently, they remain locked into conflict-producing routines to maintain their certainty of being (Mitzen 2006a). In protractedconflicts such as in Cyprus and Israel/Palestine, this state of security sustains a stableSelf/Other relationship based on enemy roles. When in such a state of security,minority and majority groups, migrants and host societies perceive and representeach other’s identities as radically different and inherently incompatible, andreproduce these perceptions and representations through acts of securitisation inorder to ensure their ontological security. The states of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security and ontological security/physical (in)security are both securi-tised states; however, whereas the former compels actors to construct new narrativesof difference and threat and engage in the securitisation of new issues to regain their

Table 1 States of ontological/physical security

Physical asecurity Physical (in)security

Ontologicalinsecurity

The Self experiences instability and uncertaintyof being/does not experience concern aboutphysical harm

The Self experiences instability anduncertainty of being/experiencesconcern about physical harm

Ontologicalsecurity

The Self experiences stability and certainty ofbeing/does not experience concern aboutphysical harm

The Self experiences stability andcertainty of being/experiencesconcern about physical harm


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certainty and stability of being, the latter compels actors to reproduce the existingnarratives and continue the securitisation of existing differences and conflicts tomaintain it.

The state of ontological security/physical asecurity is certainly the most attractivestate of security from a normative point of view. Security communities in interna-tional relations, and in particular, the European non-war community (Wæver 1998)and the Nordic community (Browning and Joenniemi 2012) constitute the bestexamples of such a state of security in international relations. A collective identitydiscourse makes it possible for states in security communities to maintain the us/themdistinctions, which are necessary for the certainty and stability of being, whileremaining in a state of physical asecurity vis-à-vis one another (Mitzen 2006b;Browning and Joenniemi 2012). In this state of security, conflicts are sustainablyresolved; issues that have propelled conflict in the past are either settled or have shedtheir physical security-ness, and are negotiated in normal political channels. Yet,identity differences maintain their ontological security-ness as groups reproduce theirdistinct identities through various social and cultural practices.

Finally, a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity is one where Self doesnot construct the Other as a threat to its security-as-survival, but experiencesinstability and uncertainty of being in its relationship with the Other. The Otherdestabilises and challenges Self’s identity and sense of being. Such a state of securitymay arise in many ways; for example, during the first encounter with previouslyunknown difference (as in the encounter with the New World or when an isolatedcommunity encounters new migrant groups) or following the resolution of protractedconflicts, which challenges the previously ingrained conflictual identities. As will belater discussed, a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity is likely to quicklytransform into a state of ontological insecurity/physical insecurity because concernsabout instability and uncertainty of being can easily be politically mobilised andmanipulated into concerns about survival. As the renowned psychiatrist R. D. Laing,who pioneered the term, stressed, in the context of ontological insecurity, ‘the ordinarycircumstances of everyday life constitute a continual and deadly threat’ (1990: 43).Similarly, Mitzen (2006a: 345) underlines that ontological insecurity is an ‘incapacitat-ing state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore’.

Thus, the distinction between ontological and physical security gives rise to anexpanded set of security states than previously acknowledged in the literature. Forthe purposes of the article at hand, the table highlights two critical possibilities. First,that it is possible to attain ontological security in a state of physical (in)security or in astate of physical asecurity. Second, the desirable state of physical asecurity can becoupled either with a state of ontological security or with the less stable state ofontological insecurity. The next section of the article will situate the processes ofsecuritisation and desecuritisation within this expanded set of security states anddiscuss how these possibilities have been overlooked within the existing criticalliterature on security as a result of the conflation of ontological and physical security.


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Securitisation/desecuritisation: processes of moving from one state ofsecurity to the other

Securitisation and desecuritisation are conceptual twins. The former refers to politicalprocesses, discourses, and practices entailed in the production of certain issuesas security issues: posing imminent threats to survival, legitimising urgent andextraordinary responses, and justifying exceptional politics. The latter, accordingly,refers to shifting issues ‘out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargainingprocess of the political sphere’(Buzan et al. 1998: 4). By virtue of being definedas a derivative of securitisation, the concept of desecuritisation and its underlyingprocesses and conditions have remained relatively undertheorised. Nevertheless,a number of strategies (Roe 2004) and forms (Hansen 2012) of desecuritisation havebeen identified.

The two-layered framework of security highlights that processes of securitisationand desecuritisation not only move actors to different states of physical security, butalso impact their ontological security. Securitisation involves a movement toward astate of physical (in)security. This may take the form of a direct movement to a stateof ontological security/physical (in)security, where the pursuit of physical securitythrough the identification of and mobilisation against a particular threat maintains aconsistent identity. Alternatively, especially if it involves the naming of new threatsthat unsettle established definitions of identity, securitisation may initially generate astate of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security. However, this remains a transientstate, especially when followed by the continued reproduction of the same threatperceptions, consolidating the new friend/enemy distinctions. As continued secur-itisation reifies the new identity definitions (Williams 2003), ontological securitycomes to depend on their stability and maintenance, and securitisation becomes asource of ontological security. The state of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security consequently evolves into one of ontological security/physical (in)security.For example, the securitisation of the events of 9/11 have initially generated a state ofontological insecurity/physical (in)security, as it has challenged the Americans’ post-Cold War self-perceptions as a nation with no enemies. The confusion was veryevident in the popular reaction: ‘Why do they hate us?’ However, the continuedsecuritisation of the global terrorist threat subsequently consolidated new definitionsof Self and Other and became a source of ontological security.

Desecuritisation, on the other hand, is a process that leads to a transition from astate of physical (in)security to one of physical asecurity. However, as Figure 1indicates, the two-layered framework of security underlines that desecuritisation mayalternatively culminate in a state of ontological security/physical security or a state ofontological insecurity/physical asecurity. As previously discussed, the former embodiesthe possibility of attaining ontological security in the absence of securitisation, andcorresponds to the stable state of security realised within security communities and/orafter the definitive resolution of conflicts. Desecuritisation processes that culminate in a


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state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity, however, are unstable and easilyreversible because concerns about instability and uncertainty of being can easily bepolitically mobilised and manipulated into concerns of survival.

Nevertheless, the conflation of ontological and physical security in the extantliterature has constrained the theorisation of the ways in which processes ofsecuritisation/desecuritisation and identity construction impinge on one another.First, much of the critical literature on security has reduced identity either to a subjectposition constituted by discourses of physical security or to a sector of physicalsecurity. Those who have focused on discourses of security have emphasised ‘howrepresentations of danger make us what we are’ and how ‘politics of security,constituting and mobilizing difference … specifies who we are and what we areallowed to be’ (Dillon 1996: 34–35). For example, Maria Stern (2006: 192) hastraced how identity emerges in the context of discourses of security and is essential totheir functioning: ‘In order for the subject of security to be secured, it must be named,represented, and given an identity’. In her conceptualisation, the definition of anOther has followed the naming of danger and the identification of threat and thus theOther necessarily becomes radical and dangerous. Similarly, in securitisation theory,identity is only one among the many issues that can be framed as security issues,and it enters the picture only if and when it is explicitly discussed as a securityissue. According to Wæver (1998: 69), identity remains an ‘external factor’ whenother issues are being securitised or desecuritised. Similarly, Williams (2003) hasneglected the question of whether and how identity allows for desecuritisation, andhas focused instead on how securitisation reifies identities and challenges theirnegotiability and flexibility.

Thus, critical security theorists have predominantly focused on the state ofontological security/physical (in)security, and on how discourses and practices ofphysical (in)security condition and constrain processes of identity formation and thepursuit of ontological security. As a result, the security of the capacity to constitute adistinct Self, that is, ontological security, has been conflated with discourses ofphysical (in)security and acts of securitisation. The possibility for attaining ontolo-gical security in alternative states of physical security, and in particular, the questionof whether and how the pursuit of a stable identity allows for a move to a state ofontological security/physical asecurity have remained unexplored.

securitisation

desecuritisationOntological security Physical asecurity

Ontological security Physical (in)security

Ontological insecurity Physical asecurity

Ontological insecurity Physical (in)security

Figure 1 Processes of securitisation/desecuritisation


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In fact, the conflation of physical and ontological security forms the very basis ofRoe’s (2004) controversial argument that ‘securitisation is an inherent condition ofminority rights’. According to Roe (2004: 290), for a minority group, the maintenanceof a distinct identity is necessarily imbued with security-ness, which if taken out, maymean the very death of the minority. Thus, desecuritisation of issues, such as minorityrights, may be logically impossible. Here, Roe is referring to the concern forontological security on part of an ethnic group and its freedom to maintain itsdistinctiveness, yet he is positing securitisation, which is an act associated with thepursuit of physical security, as its inherent condition. As a result, according to Roe(2006: 433), even an us/them dichotomy becomes a securitised relation.

In contrast, the two-layered conception of security leads me to argue thatdesecuritisation (of minority rights and other issues) is possible, and that it is onlypossible because ontological security is distinct from and not reducible to physicalsecurity. Desecuritisation of minority rights and identities does not necessarily under-mine group distinctiveness (ontological security), but it ends the reproduction of thisdistinctiveness through the representation of the majority as a threat (physical (in)security). Although securitisation does generate ontological security, the latter is notdependent on the former. The distinction between ontological and physical security alsoopens up the possibility of attaining ontological security in a state of physical asecurity.In this case, as noted before, the Self maintains the stability and certainty of its being bydifferentiating itself from significant Others, without identifying a particular Other as asource of imminent harm and danger. This state of security does not bring the ‘death’ ofidentities, but maintains us/them distinctions, which are necessary for the certainty andstability of being, without constructing the Other as an imminent threat to the group’ssurvival (see also Browning and Joenniemi 2012).

Second, the conflation of ontological and physical security in the existing literaturehas also led scholars to overlook how desecuritisation may generate a state ofontological insecurity/physical asecurity. This neglect has manifested itself in differentways. The prevailing tendency in securitisation theory has been to treat identity as anexternal and derivative factor, and predicate desecuritisation strategies on desecuritisingspeech acts, that is, not talking about issues in terms of security, avoiding the generationof security dilemmas and moving security issues back into normal politics (Roe 2004:284). Similarly, identity is not accorded a key role in Huysmans’ (1995) objectivist andconstructivist desecuritisation strategies, which are based respectively on invalidatingperceptions of threat through information and on promoting reflexivity about the socialconstruction of insecurity, in contrast to his third, deconstructivist strategy, which isdiscussed below.

Changes in security practices necessarily implicate identity constructions, how-ever. Desecuritisation, even in its more conservative forms (i.e. change throughstabilisation; see Hansen 2012), does not and cannot leave the existing identityconstructions intact. At the very least, moving security issues into normal politicsnecessitates that parties recognise each other as legitimate counterparts. Even this


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entails a critical reconstruction of identities, especially in ethno-secessionistconflicts, where securitising practices are premised on the ‘illegitimacy’ of theOther. Similarly, Huysmans’ objectivist and constructivist strategies both imply a‘we’ that first agrees X is not a threat and then agrees to stop speaking of X interms of security (Hansen 2012: 533). Yet, such agreements cannot be reachedindependently of a rethinking of who ‘we’ are in relation to X. Thus, the treatmentof identity as an external and derivative factor does not render identity irrelevant,but it has led scholars to overlook the ways in which desecuritisation processesimpact ontological security.

On the other hand, some scholars, both within and outside of the CAS tradition,have accorded identity change a central role in the transformation of security relations,though they have been inattentive to how the transcendence of differences between Selfand Other may generate ontological insecurity. Wendt (1992, 1994: 421), for example,has drawn attention to the strategy of altercasting, which entails inducing the Other totake on a new identity by treating the Other as if it already had that identity, and dis-cussed how treating the Other as part of an extended Self in this fashion may bring with ita positive-sum conception of security as with the Other rather than against the Other.Claudia Aradau (2004: 403–5) has stressed that in order to disrupt the exclusionary logicunderlying security, ‘what is first needed is a process of disidentification’, where thosewho are securitised disidentify from their assigned identity and demand to be recognisedwithin more universal and encompassing identity categories, that is, not as migrants butas residents with rights. Jef Huysmans’s deconstructive strategy, based on ‘identityfragmentation’, operates by underscoring the complexity of identities in order to unmaskthe differences that are silenced by securitisation, that is, ‘the migrant is not simply amigrant, but a complex being in whom many identities are invested: e.g. woman, black,worker, mother, etc.— just like the natives are’ (1995: 67–68).

However, these suggested reconfigurations of identities have all been based on alimited conceptualisation of Self/Other relations as situated on a single axis ofsameness-difference. Consequently, altercasting, disidentification, and identity frag-mentation all predicate desecuritisation on the transcendence and blurring of thedifferences between Self and Other, such that Other is desecuritised through castingits identity as similar to Self. Although some have expressed concerns regarding theloss of distinct identities, the question of how this loss matters in terms of impactingdesecuritisation processes has not been systematically explored. Huysmans, forexample, has noted that if carried to the extreme, the process of identity fragmenta-tion may create a situation of no identity and no belonging, and therefore ‘anintermediate strategy that allows the potential for identity creation as well as identityfragmentation’ may be more appropriate (1995: 68). Roe (2006) has warned againstthinking of desecuritisation ‘solely … in terms of deconstructing collectiveidentities’. Instead, Jutila (2006: 167) has proposed the re-telling of the ‘stories ofethnically defined collective identities in… a way that they do not exclude other suchidentities from the territory of a state’.


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The two-layered conception of security underscores the validity of such concernsand enables us to analyse their implications in a more systematic manner. Theframework, first of all, alerts us to the possibility that desecuritisation processes maylead actors to a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity, where the removal ofphysical security concerns and threat perceptions has left actors’ identities in a state ofuncertainty and instability. Especially when desecuritisation processes have beenpredicated on the transcendence and blurring of differences, the Self may experienceanxiety and uncertainty regarding how it may maintain its distinct identity vis-à-vis theOther in other ways. Efforts to resolve protracted conflicts, where antagonistic identitieshave solidified over the years, are particularly prone to generating such ontologicalinsecurity. It may be argued, for example, that the 2004 UN Plan for reunification inCyprus generated such a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity because itpresupposed a shared Cypriot identity and blurred the differences that constitute thedistinct Greek and Turkish-Cypriot identities. Similarly, it may be argued that despitethe strong international guarantees and commitments on physical security, the DaytonAgreement has left the different ethnic groups in Bosnia in a state of ontologicalinsecurity, which continues to undermine their collective efforts in political reform andeconomic development.

The two-layered framework of security also highlights how concerns about thestability and consistency of identity may limit and potentially reverse desecuritisationprocesses. The state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity compels actors toengage in practices that re-institute the identity distinctions that would ensure thecertainty and stability of their beings. At the same time, as was noted before,ontological insecurity triggers physical (in)security by undermining trust andaccentuating the perception of general threat from the outside world. It creates asetting conducive to the manipulation of this distrust and uncertainty by politicalactors and processes. Hence, when the freedom to constitute a distinct Self ischallenged, there is a high possibility that insecurity at the layer of being will becompensated by securitisation, by elevating any remaining issues and differences tomatters of survival. As indicated in Figure 2, from a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity, there is a high likelihood of a return to the state of ontologicalsecurity/physical (in)security. For example, it may be argued that the internation-ally mediated plans for the reunification of Cyprus are repeatedly failing becausethey generate ontological insecurity, and parties seek to overcome this ontologicalinsecurity by securitising any remaining issues and differences, and thereby makinga comprehensive settlement ever impossible.

It emerges that the success and sustainability of securitisation/desecuritisationprocesses depend on whether they are able to preserve the ontological security of theactors concerned or construct an altered state of ontological security. Consequently,sustainable desecuritisation needs to be conceptualised as a two-fold process wherethe removal of physical security concerns needs to be accompanied by a reconfigura-tion of the identity distinctions in such a way that maintains and/or re-institutes the


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certainty and continuity of being. The critical question thus becomes: If sustainabledesecuritisation depends on the preservation of ontological security in the process ofdesecuritisation, how may Self/Other relations be re-configured to remove theperception of threat while maintaining the distinctions necessary for security-of-being?

A full exploration of this question would require another article. Having laid thegroundwork for such an exploration with the two-layered conception of security, thearticle-at-hand will limit itself to presenting some preliminary insights. In particular,the literature on Self/Other relations has explored the multiple ways through whichidentities can be reconstructed and re-negotiated vis-à-vis one another; however, wefind that its insights have not been sufficiently incorporated in the study ofdesecuritisation. The next section of the article will discuss some of these insightsand integrate them into the two-layered conception of security.

Ontological security through reconfiguring Self/Other relations

Building on the seminal work of David Campbell on identity and foreign policy(1992), a number of scholars have investigated the implications of the Self/Otherdistinctions that underpin the relations among states in international politics(Neumann 1996, 1999; Weldes et al. 1999; Guillaume 2002; Rumelili 2004, 2007;Hansen 2006; Bukh 2009). The guiding premise of this post-structuralist literature,which is associated with critical theories of security to varying degrees (Hansen2011), has been that identity is constituted through difference; state identities lack astable, pre-given essence, and hence states are in permanent need of reproducing theiridentities by constructing Other(s) as different, morally inferior, and physicallythreatening. Recent contributions to the identity literature in IR have challenged theassociation between the reproduction of identity and the construction of threat in twodirections: Some have focused on the endogenous processes of constructing self-narratives, thereby attempting to delink identity formation from practices of Othering(Berenskoetter 2007, 2012; Steele 2008; Lebow 2012). Others have remained

Desecuritisation (Re)Securitisation

Desecuritisation

Ontological securityPhysical (in)security

Ontological insecurityPhysical asecurity

Ontological securityPhysical (in)security

Ontological securityPhysical asecurity

Figure 2 Ontological insecurity and (re)securitisation


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wedded to the role of external Others in identity constitution, but through detailedempirical analyses of representations of Self and Other in different encounters ininternational relations, stressed the need to recognise different forms and degreesof Otherness (Rumelili 2004, 2007; Diez 2005; Hansen 2006; Morozov andRumelili 2012).

As Prozorov (2011) recently underlined, the internal (through narratives, in time)and external (in relation to Others, across space) processes of identity constitutioncannot be dissociated from one another (also see Rumelili 2007: 21–28). Thepursuit of ontological security vis-à-vis the Other coexists with the endogenouspursuit of ontological security, and they are jointly impacted by processes ofsecuritisation/desecuritisation. Whereas securitisation of the Other shapes anddisciplines the internal process by suppressing alternative identities, desecuritisa-tion threatens to unleash the inherent instability and inconsistency of internal self-narratives. Therefore, the maintenance and reinstitution of ontological security inthe process of desecuritisation cannot solely or primarily rely on internal processesof self-(re)definition, and necessitates the reconfiguration of the constitutive Self/Other relationships.

The previously discussed empirical analyses of Self/Other encounters in interna-tional relations bear relevance for how the Self/Other relationship may be reconfi-gured in the process of desecuritisation in ways that re-institute ontological security.Through her analysis of the Western discourses on the Balkans, Lene Hansen (2006:46–51), for example, has argued that constructions of identity and difference havetemporal, spatial, and ethical dimensions. In other words, the Self can constitute itselfas distinct from the Other by representing the Self as advanced and the Other asbackward along a historical path (temporal distinction), and/or by excluding theOther from its territory (spatial distinction), and/or by assuming a responsibility overthe Other (ethical dimension). According to Hansen (2006: 47), the Balkans havebeen constituted as a threat to the West in a particular discursive context where theBalkans were also constructed as ‘radically different, incapable of transformation’,and not under Western responsibility. However, the Balkans were not securitised inalternative discourses where the Balkans were constructed as ‘an object of admira-tion’, endowed with ‘the capacity for liberal political and economic transformation’,and when situated under Western responsibility.

The two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological allows usto better integrate the insights of this literature on Self/Other relations with theliterature on desecuritisation. First, by analysing the different constructions ofidentity/difference in international relations, the literature on Self/Other relationshas explored the different ways in which actors pursue and attain ontological securityin relation to one another. In addition, by stressing the need to recognise differentdegrees and forms of Otherness, it has highlighted that the pursuit and attainment ofontological security does not necessitate the securitisation of the Other; and that itdoes so only under certain conditions. Unlike the desecuritisation strategies of


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altercasting, disidentification and identity fragmentation, this literature does notcollapse Self/Other relations to the single axis of similarity and difference. It insistson the constitution of identity in relation to difference, but emphasises that con-structions of difference are situated on multiple dimensions and do not necessarilyentail the construction of an Other as a threat. Moreover, by identifying differentdimensions of identity-difference, it has suggested — only by implication, withoutmaking this an explicit purpose — ways in which the relation of identity-differencemay be reconfigured to remove the perceptions of threats to physical security whilemaintaining the distinctions necessary for ontological security.

For example, it emerges as a corollary from Hansen’s analysis that strengtheningand recasting the ethical and temporal dimensions in the representation of theBalkans— by promoting the ethical responsibility of the West, and/or by underliningthe capacity for transformation in the Balkans— would undermine the securitisationof the Balkans in Western discourse. While removing the perception of physicalthreat, neither of these discursive moves would undermine the Western ontologicalsecurity, because they would be reaffirming of the distinctiveness of the Westernidentity by underscoring its superiority and benevolence. In contrast, if Balkans weredesecuritised through the previously discussed processes of altercasting, disidentifica-tion, or identity fragmentation, this would have generated a state of ontologicalinsecurity in the West. Altercasting may have entailed the casting of the Balkansocieties as equipped to deal with the challenges of ethnic diversity, possibly citing theYugoslav legacy. Disidentification may have entailed the Balkan representations of itsidentity as Western and European. Identity fragmentation may have entailed therepresentation of the Balkans simultaneously as Balkan/European/underdeveloped/post-socialist, also making reference to ethnic secessionist demands within Westernsocieties (the Other in Self). While such reconstructions of the Balkan identity wouldhave obviated the immediate perception of the physical threat of conflict spillover, theywould have generated first ontological insecurity by undermining the distinctiveness ofthe Western identity, and then physical (in)security by underscoring the West’s ownvulnerability to similar ethnic crises. Consequently, they would pave the way fordiscursive practices that re-securitise the Balkans or construct another significant threat.

The insights derived from this example may be extended into the issues ofminority rights, migration, and protracted conflicts previously discussed in thisarticle. For example, to maintain ontological security in the process of desecuritisingmigration, the removal of survival concerns can be coupled with a reconstruction ofmigrant community-host society relations along the ethical and/or temporal dimen-sions through discursive moves that, for example, promote the ethical responsibilityof host societies and endow the migrants with the capacity to integrate. In contrast todisidentification and identity fragmentation, such a reconstruction of identities wouldnot erase but reinstitute the constitutive differences between migrant community andhost society along different dimensions, and enable a move towards a state ofontological security/physical asecurity.


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On the desecuritisation of minority issues, reconstructing majority-minorityidentities along the spatial or social distance dimensions could provide a solution,so that both group identities would be validated and strengthened through associatingwith the Other in the same territorial space. Instead of an exclusive identity that issecured by spatially dissociating from the majority and constructing it as a threat toits survival, the minority identity could be re-constructed as part of a broader, moreinclusive identity that encompasses but is not subsumed by the majority identity. Forexample, the minority Kurdish identity in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria could bereconstructed as founding unit of a broader, more inclusive Mesopotamian identity,which includes also the Turks, Arabs, and the Persians.

In cases of protracted international conflicts, such as Cyprus, it was previouslysuggested that internationally negotiated reunification agreements that presuppose ashared Cypriot identity may be repeatedly failing because this shared identity generatesontological insecurity within the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Ontologicalsecurity could be reinstituted if the removal of physical security concerns throughinternational agreements were coupled with a reconstruction of Greek and Turkish-Cypriot identities along the temporal dimension, so that both Greek and TurkishCypriots construct each other as different at present but recognise the capacity of theOther to Cypriotise in the future. In contrast to the existing reunification arrangementsthat presuppose the existence of a shared Cypriot identity and consequently destabilisethe Greek and Turkish-Cypriot identities, such a discursive move would maintain theexisting identities, and recognise the possibility of the emergence of a shared identity,on which political reunification depends, but defer it to the future.

Certainly, the above examples are intended only for heuristic purposes. In eachcase, suggestions on how to maintain and/or re-institute ontological security in theprocess of desecuritisation would need to be fleshed out by taking into account thespecific political, historical, and cultural contexts. The preceding discussion merelysought to illustrate the wider range of possibilities identified by the poststructuralistliterature on Self/Other relations regarding the ways in which actors may achieveontological security vis-à-vis one another. Unlike the strategies of altercasting,disidentification, and identity fragmentation, which confine the possibilities ofreconstructing Self/Other relations to the single axis of sameness and difference,this literature presents us with forms of securitised and non-securitised Othernessthat are based not on the transcendence but the reconfiguration of constitutivedifferences. The two-layered conception of security as both ontological andphysical enables us to better integrate these insights into the study of desecuritisa-tion; it paves the way for future studies to more systematically analyse the ways inwhich ontological security may be maintained and reinstituted in the process ofdesecuritisation.

It must be noted, however, that these non-securitised forms of Otherness, whiledivorced from physical threat perceptions, remain imbued with power. They oftenreproduce constructions of moral superiority/inferiority, paternalism, and exoticism.


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While the reproduction of such social and normative hierarchies help maintain andreinstitute ontological security, it does raise important normative questions regarding theemancipatory potential of desecuritisation. This further validates Aradau’s point thatquestions about desecuritisation raise fundamental ‘questions about what kinds ofpolitics we want’ (2004: 388). By contending that sustainable desecuritisationnecessitates the maintenance and (re)institution of at least some of the constitutivedifferences between Self and Other, this article has adopted a political and normativestance that fundamentally differs from collective identity formation and disidentifica-tion. The article has further demonstrated that a normative commitment to the realisationof an ideal form of Self/Other relations, by denying the limits posed by concerns ofontological security, can reintroduce concerns of physical (in)security and furtherdistantiation from the ideal. Therefore, what is upheld as a normative commitment inthis article is not one ideal form of Self/Other relations, but a desecuritised ‘normalpolitics’ of identity that is continuously up for negotiation while laden with power.

Conclusion

This article put forward an analytical framework based on a two-layered conceptionof security as both ontological and physical. This framework has underlined thatsecurity-seeking is a ‘social practice that implicates identity’ (Mitzen 2006a: 363) aswell as being a political process that involves the naming of threats, deciding on theexception, and mobilising security actors. A major contention of this article has beenthat the conflation of ontological and physical security has led the relevant literatureto overlook certain possibilities for and limits to desecuritisation. By locatingprocesses of securitisation and desecuritisation within the two-layered conception ofsecurity, the article has underlined that both processes depend on and in turn impactthe layer of ontological security. In particular, desecuritisation is only possiblebecause ontological security is distinct from and not reducible to physical security, asdesecuritisation depends on the very possibility of maintaining certainty and stabilityof being in the absence of the identification of and mobilisation against threats. Inaddition, because of the way in which desecuritisation impacts ontological security,sustainable desecuritisation essentially entails a two-fold process where the removalof physical concerns has to be coupled with a reconfiguration of Self/Other relationsthat (re)institutes ontological security. Having underlined these possibilities andlimits, and having drawn on the literature on Self/Other relations, the article identifiedpossible ways in which Self/Other relations may be reconfigured to (re)instituteontological security in the process of desecuritisation.

The two-layered conception of security as both ontological and physical paves theway for further interaction and engagement between the literatures on ontologicalsecurity, critical theories of security and Self/Other relations. First of all, theframework introduced in this article could be the basis for a more comprehensive


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analysis of how ontological security and physical security relate to one another acrossdifferent states of security, and the identification of different forms of securitisationand desecuritisation. How is a securitisation process that generates a state ofontological security/physical (in)security different from one that generates a state ofontological insecurity/physical (in)security? Alternatively, is a desecuritisationprocess that leads to a state of ontological asecurity possible, and how is it differentfrom one that leads to a state of ontological security/physical asecurity? Second,having established the pursuit of ontological security as a distinct motivation, theliterature on ontological security would also be further developed through investigat-ing the relationship of ontological security to political processes of physical security.Third, further engagement between the literatures on ontological security and theliterature on Self/Other relations would shed light on the wider range of ways inwhich actors pursue ontological security in relation to one another.

Finally, as the empirical illustrations provided throughout the article indicate, thedeeply intertwined nature of identity and security poses key challenges for conflictresolution. This article contributes to the broader IR literature by providing a conceptualframework that bridges and links the more specialist literatures on ontological security,critical theories of security, and Self/Other relations. In the absence of such anintegrative framework, the interrelated questions of ‘how to remove the security-nessof issues?’, ‘how to transform the relationship with the Other?’, and ‘how to maintainstability and consistency of Self-narratives?’ have been addressed in distinction fromone another. Thus, this article has prepared the groundwork for the development of thecritical theories of security and identity into a more integrated critical approach toconflict resolution.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the ISA (2008), Center for Advanced Security Theoryin Copenhagen (2010), and at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (2011). I have benefittedextensively from the feedback of Pertti Joenniemi, Christopher S. Browning, Stefano Guzzini, Patrick T.Jackson, Iver Neumann, Ole Wæver, and the three anonymous reviewers and editors of JIRD. The usualdisclaimer applies. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of Turkish Academy of Sciences’Distinguished Young Scientist Program. The final revisions to the article were made during my sabbaticalleave at the University of British Columbia (2011–2012), which was partially supported by an outgoingfellowship granted by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey.

Notes

1 Critical approaches to security is a vast literature, divided into various approaches and ‘schools’ (C.A.S.E.Collective, 2006; see also Gad and Petersen 2011), but sharing a common critique of traditionalapproaches and concern with the politics and ethics of security (Browning and McDonald 2013). Thisarticle does not engage in a comprehensive analysis, but focuses in particular on the contributions ofMichael Dillon, Maria Stern, Ole Wæver, Michael Williams, Paul Roe, Matti Jutila, Claudia Aradau, andJef Huysmans.


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2 There is also a vibrant debate on the applicability of the concept of ontological security to states. Forcritical appraisals, see Krolikowski (2008) and Croft (2012).

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About the Author

Bahar Rumelili is Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department ofInternational Relations, Koc University, Istanbul. Her research focuses on inter-national relations theory, processes of European identity construction, and EU impacton Turkish domestic reform and Greek-Turkish relations. She is the author of Con-structing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia (Palgrave,2007). Her articles have appeared in the European Journal of InternationalRelations, Review of International Studies, Journal of Common Market Studies, andCooperation and Conflict. She is the 2009 recipient of Turkish Academy ofSciences’ Distinguished Young Scientist Award.


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Documents

Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security