80
IDENTIFYING CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION COMPONENTS FOR A DRIVERS SAFETY PROGRAM IN THE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI FIRE DEPARTMENT Executive Leadership BY: Jeffrey A. Grote, Deputy Chief Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department An applied research project submitted to the National Fire Academy as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program August 2004

Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    5

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION COMPONENTS FOR A

DRIVERS SAFETY PROGRAM IN THE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI FIRE DEPARTMENT

Executive Leadership

BY: Jeffrey A. Grote, Deputy Chief Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department

An applied research project submitted to the National Fire Academy as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program

August 2004

Page 2: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

2

ABSTRACT

Fire apparatus in the United States are routinely involved in preventable traffic

accidents. The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department is not immune to its share of

preventable accidents. The effects of fire apparatus accidents on our department are wide

spread. Economically, fire apparatus accidents require costly repairs which are usually

non-budgeted expenditures. Additionally, personnel costs are impacted due to injuries

incurred during these accidents. Furthermore, legal costs are becoming routine when an

emergency vehicle is involved in an accident. Fire Department public opinion is

damaged; the public is becoming increasingly intolerant of fire truck vs. passenger car

accidents.

The problem addressed by this Applied Research Project is that the Kansas City,

Missouri Fire Department does not have a Drivers Safety Program; the effects of the

absence of a comprehensive proactive program are realized each day.

The purpose of this research was to determine the departmental need for a drivers

training program, identify key components of successful driver’s safety programs,

determine what departmental attitudes must be addressed to enhance the success of this

program, and to recommend specific objectives towards the implementation of a

program. This study used an action research methodology. The research questions to

be answered were:

1. Why are driver training programs necessary?

2. Have driver training programs been effective in reducing accident rates?

3. What are current departmental attitudes regarding emergency vehicle

operation?

Page 3: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

3

4. What must an effective driver training program address?

5. How can an effective program be developed, financed, administered, and

evaluated?

A literature review was conducted utilizing publications from the Learning

Research Center (LRC) at the National Emergency Training Center (NETC). Additional

literature reviews were conducted using a range of Internet and web-based resources.

The results of this study found that the Kansas City, Missouri must implement a

driver’s safety program. Several random sample focus groups were conducted internally

utilizing personnel that respond on fire apparatus daily. The findings from both the

literature review and the focus groups were used to develop a recommendation to the

department’s Labor/Management Steering Committee.

Two distinct recommendations were addressed regarding this study. The first

recommendation identified what important elements should be considered regarding the

development of a driver’s safety program. This recommendation was issued to the

labor/management project team tasked with the development of a driver’s safety

program. The second recommendation was issued to Fire Chief Richard Dyer regarding

the department’s culture and attitudes, and how these impact fire apparatus accidents

within the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department.

Page 4: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Abstract ………………………………………………………………. 2

Table of Contents ……………………………………………………. 4

Introduction ………………………………………………………….. 5

Background and Significance ………………………………………... 6

Literature Review ……………………………………………………. 8

Procedures …………………………………………………………… 18

Results ……………………………………………………………….. 25

Discussion …………………………………………………………… 45

Recommendations …………………………………………………… 47

References ……………………………………………………………. 49

Appendix A General Administrative Guideline 2-4 ……………….. 52

Appendix B General Administrative Guideline 2-5 ……………….. 56

Appendix C Personal Interview Questions ………………………… 57

Appendix D Focus Group Discussion Points ……………………… 58

Appendix E Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department 2005-2006 Budget 60

Appendix F Safety Manual ………………………………………... 72

Appendix G Project Team Memo …………………………………. 77

Appendix H Fire Chief Memo …………………………………….. 78

Page 5: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

5

INTRODUCTION

Reduction of fire fatalities, both firefighter and civilian, is the primary objective

of the United States Fire Administration and the American fire service. While fire

departments focus much attention on fire prevention and improving safety in fire

suppression activities, motor vehicle accidents involving fire apparatus and response

activities are equally dramatic—and possibly even more controllable. Accidents

responding to or returning from emergencies constitute the second leading cause of

firefighter death (IAFC, 2004).

The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department has become increasingly concerned

about apparatus accidents, especially collisions during emergency response. While the

department has regulations and procedures regarding emergency driving, these have not

achieved desired results. We must therefore examine driver training to determine if there

are changes that might impact accident rates and severity. The problem statement is that

the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department does not have a driver’s safety program nor

have we researched what steps would be necessary to create and implement an effective

program.

The purpose of this research was to determine and identify key components of

successful driver’s safety programs, and to determine departmental attitudes that must be

addressed to facilitate the success of this program and prevent the culture from working

in ways that might block necessary change. The research also sought to recommend

specific objectives towards the implementation of a comprehensive driver safety

initiative.

Page 6: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

6

This study uses a descriptive research methodology and the research questions are

as follows:

(1) Why are driver’s safety programs necessary?

(2) How effective have driver training programs been in reducing accident rates?

(3) What are current departmental attitudes regarding emergency vehicle

operation and how might these support or inhibit necessary changes?

(4) What must an effective driver training program address?

(5) How can an effective program be developed, financed, administered, and

evaluated?

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

Kansas City, Missouri is the nation’s 36th largest city in population (441,500) and

the 13th largest in land area (317 square miles). Located along the state line between

Missouri and Kansas, Kansas City is, geographically speaking, the “Heart of America”

(Kansas City, Missouri Web Page, April 2005). Since its incorporation in 1821, Kansas

City has developed a complex transportation infrastructure, including an extensive

interstate system. Kansas City is governed by a Council/City Manager form of

government and is divided into six council districts. The city employs over 6,000 full-

time employees. The public safety system is comprised of professional fire and police

departments, and a public utility model ambulance service.

The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department currently has over 950 employees.

The fire department has 34 fire stations that cover Kansas City’s large geographical area.

Within these fire stations, the fire department utilizes 33 engines, 3 rescue companies,

Page 7: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

7

and 12 aerial apparatus. In the year 2004, the fire department responded to over 50,000

emergency and non-emergency calls for service.

In the last year, the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department has tragically

experienced the loss of one of its own. While responding to an apartment fire, a fire

apparatus was involved in a motor vehicle accident. One fire fighter lost his life; three

other fire fighters were hospitalized, as was one civilian. In another motor vehicle

accident, one civilian was killed and ten others were sent to hospitals. Several other

accidents resulted in major damage to front line fire apparatus, resulting in unanticipated

repair costs and apparatus down time. The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department is in

dire need of an ongoing driver’s safety program.

This paper was prepared to meet the requirements of the Executive Leadership

course. The research presented relates to the unit discussing influencing styles. The

overall importance of an organizational commitment on reducing emergency vehicle

accidents and creating a safety minded department is paramount. Changing long standing

cultural attitudes and beliefs will require significant influencing, negotiating, and

networking. The development of a comprehensive driver’s safety program will benefit

not only the fire department and city government, but it will also enable the department to

fulfill its mission statement focusing on protecting the citizens of Kansas City.

This paper was also prepared to meet one of the operational objectives of the

United States Fire Administration. Emergency vehicle accidents are a significant

contributor to fire fighter line-of-duty deaths. The third operational objective of the

United States Fire Administration is to reduce the loss of fire fighter lives. Since the

long-range success of a comprehensive driver’s safety program will decrease the amount

Page 8: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

8

of emergency vehicle accidents responding to fires, the link between this project and the

United States Fire Administration is clear.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review used in the formulation of this applied research project

included periodicals, books, instructor’s manuals, and a range of Internet and web-based

resources.

Line of duty deaths are one of the hardest challenges a fire department must face

if ever encountered. According to the United States Fire Administration, motor vehicle

accidents are the second leading cause of line-of-duty deaths, contributing to 20-25% of

fire fighter deaths since 1980 and almost 65% in 2003 (Tilyou, 2004). Jay Lowry (2002)

states in Fire Chief Magazine that “73 fire fighters died as a result of apparatus accidents

from 1994 to 2000”. In the last 10 years, more than 225 fire fighters have been killed in

the line-of-duty while responding to or returning from emergencies (IAFC, 2004).

Statistics regarding fire fighter fatalities involving motor vehicle accidents are well

documented and published throughout leading fire service organizations and numerous

publications. There is no dispute that fire apparatus accidents are a significant problem

facing our nation’s fire service.

Driver’s safety programs are not only proven methods that decrease risk to

emergency personnel when responding to emergencies, but have become a necessity.

“The International Association of Fire Chiefs believes that no fire fighter should be killed

in the line-of-duty while responding and returning, especially from vehicle crashes,”

IAFC President Chief Bob DiPoli said recently regarding emergency vehicle safety

Page 9: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

9

(IAFC, 2004). Leading fire service organizations have formed a partnership to reduce the

number of fire fighters killed while responding to or returning from the emergency scene.

This coalition includes the United States Fire Administration (USFA), the International

Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF),

and the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC). The day has long since passed when a

fire fighter could jump into the driver’s seat and just drive (Lowry, 2004). The leaders in

America’s fire service have officially deployed resources to help fire departments

eliminate emergency vehicle accidents.

Although previously cited literature has outlined the frequency of fire fighter

fatalities in motor vehicle accidents and leading fire service organizations have placed a

premium on decreasing these deaths, a closer examination is due regarding other reasons

why a driver’s safety program is imperative. Personnel injury or death, peripheral injury

or death, equipment loss, and long term impact are four areas of concern for fire

departments regarding emergency vehicle accidents (USFA, 1996). Injury and death to

our professional fire fighters is the most dramatic and probably the simplest reason for a

driver’s safety program. One other area of concern is the injury and death to others

involved in these accidents, our citizens! Automobiles are among the very few potential

deadly weapons that are given to people with so little training (Lowry, 2004). A 34,000

pound fire engine striking a fixed object at 15 miles per hour carries three times the force

of impact absorbed by each vehicle in a head-on collision between two 3,400 pound

sedans traveling at 50 miles per hour (Gist, 2004). Almost every fire department’s

mission statement contains elements pledging to protect and save citizens, we must use

this logic in regards to driver’s safety training.

Page 10: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

10

The legal impacts of emergency vehicle accident are becoming more and more

significant. Twenty years ago, nobody dreamed of suing a fire department (Graham,

2005). With the gradual erosion of governmental immunities in an increasingly litigious

society, fire service agencies are being sued – and they are losing some of the litigation

(Graham, 2005). When it can be proven that a fire apparatus did not stop at a red light

and was speeding, fire officers and drivers could be held criminally liable and could go to

jail (Wilbur, 2005).

In some jurisdictions, there may be exemptions for emergency vehicles regarding

driving regulations. These exemptions allow emergency vehicles to disregard posted

speed limits, direction of travel, direction of turns, and parking if they are responding to a

reported emergency (IFSTA, 1999). The exemptions mentioned only apply if the

operator has the vehicle under control and is exercising care for the safety of others.

Some common legal definitions that may be used to determine the guilt of a criminal

charge are “negligence” and “with reasonable care”. The legal definition of negligence is

described as “failure to use a reasonable amount of care, when such failure results in

injury to another” (Wilbur, 2004). An example of an emergency vehicle operator not

driving “with reasonable care,” would be speeding through a red light and striking

another vehicle while responding to a call (Wilbur, 2004). The fire service is responsible

for the behavior of its emergency vehicle operators; not stopping at red lights is a losing

argument in court.

The cost of lawsuits can be crippling for most fire departments. In January 2001,

the Detroit Fire Department was found liable for a traffic accident to the sum of 2.35

million dollars (Stepardsen/Claxton, 2001). The headlines on firehouse.com have

Page 11: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

11

become very familiar, “Fire Apparatus Accident: Injures Firefighter and Civilian”, and

“Local Fire Department is Sued for Accident”. Fire administrations must realize the risk

of emergency vehicle accidents before being confronted with costly legal battles.

Various organizations, both public and private, have realized significant success

in decreasing motor vehicle accident’s after implementing a driver’s safety program.

One of the nation’s largest trucking corporations, Yellow Freight, claims that a

comprehensive driver’s safety program is one of its most proud achievements. It is a

mandatory company policy that requires all drivers to wear seatbelts. Yellow Freight

believes that Safety is more than a program: it is a company vision, reputation, and a

commitment to safety (Yellow Roadway, 2005). United Parcel Service (UPS) boasts a

remarkable driving record. UPS drivers are among the safest on the road, logging over 2

billion miles a year on United States roads and averaging less than one accident per

million miles driven (ups, 2005). For over 50 years these two organizations have realized

the benefit of developing safety minded drivers.

Several fire departments have also developed and implemented successful

driver’s safety programs. One of the most progressive driver’s safety programs is the

Sacramento Regional Driver Training Facility. This facility has collaborated with the

Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, Sacramento City Police Department, Sacramento City

Fire Department, and the Sacramento Metro Fire Department to develop a program that

will serve the driver training needs of area public safety agencies (SRDTF, 2005). The

number of liability claims for the County of Sacramento hovered around 300 in the mid

1990’s and has steadily dropped to 149 for the year 2000-2001 (SRDTF, 2005). Also, the

number of accidents has dropped resulting in a reduction in the severity of accidents.

Page 12: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

12

Two other model training programs are the Ventura County Fire Department and the

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The Federal Emergency

Management Agency has listed these three driver training programs as programs that the

nation’s fire service can utilize in the development of their own drivers safety programs

(FEMA, 2004).

Through attitude and behavior, organization leaders must reflect the importance

of safety in all aspects dealing with vehicles (FEMA, 1992, p. 46). Excessive speed,

reckless driving, failing to slow down or obey signals, disregarding traffic rules and

regulations, and failing to heed warning signals are prime factors in emergency vehicle

accidents ( VFIS, 2001). The United States Fire Administration states in the “Emergency

Vehicle Driving Training” publication FA-110 (1996) that before a person is selected to

drive, he or she should be closely screened as to habits, aptitudes, limitations and, most

important, his or her attitude. As the driver of a Fire Department vehicle you have a

tremendous responsibility. Your capacity to meet that responsibility is a function of both

your driving skill and your driving attitude (Tempe, 1993). Operate an emergency

vehicle as you would if all those in your vehicle and on the road around you were your

family (USFA, 1996). The first element in learning to drive safely is to develop a safety-

conscious attitude (IFSTA, 1991, p. 56). An important element of this research topic

revolves around driver attitude, both personally and organizationally.

Several sources were used to determine the key components of a successful

driver’s safety program. A review of specific course curriculum, articles focusing on

driver’s safety, and International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) manuals was

Page 13: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

13

conducted to recommend specific course topics that should be included in a driver’s

safety program. The specific course curriculum reviewed is outlined below.

Defensive Driving

Acquired ability to drive 34,000 pound emergency vehicles is gained by

experience and length of time exposed to actual driving an emergency vehicle. Certain

specific skills have been identified as crucial to safe operation. The four areas covered by

defensive driving are reaction time, braking distance, stopping distance, and physical

elements (VFIS 1999). Cushion of safety is an example of explaining the theories of

braking distance (NSC, 1999). Sound defensive driving skills are one of the most

important aspects of safe driving. The International Fire Service Training Association

has highlighted the following elements that must be addressed regarding defensive

driving: (1) anticipating other driver’s reactions, (2) estimating visual lead time, (3)

knowing braking and reaction times, (4) combating skids, (5) knowing evasive tactics, (6)

weight transfer (IFSTA, 1999).

Review of Departmental Policies

Departmental Policies and Procedures are important parts of any driver’s safety

program. The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department has several policies that have a

direct and indirect impact regarding the operation of fire apparatus. The safe arrival and

return of fire apparatus are key components of the departmental guideline dealing with

emergency and non-emergency response procedures (KCFD, 2004). This guideline is

attached to the applied research project as Appendix A. This guideline defines the

responsibilities of both the company officer and the fire apparatus emergency operator.

This guideline further defines the meanings of emergency and non-emergency response

Page 14: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

14

and what restrictions apply to each. One other important administrative guideline focuses

on parking of fire apparatus. This guideline reviews and defines what is expected when

parking the emergency vehicle on both emergency and non-emergency calls (KCFD,

1999). This guideline is attached as Appendix B.

Equal to or of greater importance than departmental policies is the review of the

local Traffic Code. The legal authority to respond to emergencies is granted by the

Kansas City, Missouri Code of Ordinances, Chapter 70. This code is listed below:

Section 70-79. Privileges of drivers of authorized emergency vehicles.

(1) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an

emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected

violator or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire

alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject

to the conditions stated in this section.

(2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

(a) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter.

(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after

slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation.

(c) Exceed the maximum speed limits, so long as he does not

endanger life or property.

(d) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or

turning in specified directions.

(3) The exemptions granted in this section to an authorized emergency

vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of audible

Page 15: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

15

and visual signals meeting the requirements of this chapter, except that

an authorized emergency vehicle need not be equipped with or display

a red light visible from the front of the vehicle.

(4) The provisions of this section shall not relieve the driver of an

authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard

for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the

driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of

others.

A driver’s safety program must be able to deliver insightful information to anyone

currently driving and any one that may in the driving emergency apparatus in the future.

Legal Perspective

Emergency vehicle operators need to be educated on local driving regulations as

stated above. Interpretation of the law regarding emergency vehicle accidents is

changing frequently. The following definitions should be defined for all program

participants: (1) negligence (2) true emergency (3) due regard (4) reasonable care (VFIS,

1999). Participants of a drivers training program should have a greater understanding of

Vehicle and Traffic Laws and their rights and obligations under the law. Drivers should

have a heightened awareness of their responsibilities and the liabilities when they drive

(Wilbur, 2003). As mentioned earlier in this literature review, the definitions of various

legal terms and how they impact emergency vehicle response must be incorporated in a

driver’s safety program.

Page 16: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

16

Accident Investigation

Developing an accident investigation team is recommended. The authority

having jurisdiction shall be responsible for developing and implementing a crash

investigation procedure (NFPA, 2002). What you and your department does following a

traffic accident may make a significant difference in a future court case (Comstock,

1999). The New York City Fire Department utilizes an Injury and Accident Investigation

Unit that investigates all emergency vehicle accidents (FDNY, 2004). An integral part of

a successful driver’s safety program is identifying an accident investigation team.

Functional Training

Two National Fire Protection Agency standards were used exclusively to

determine what needs must be addressed regarding actual training regarding driving

vehicles. The first standard reviewed was NFPA 1002 Standard on Fire Apparatus

Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications 2003 Edition. The second standard reviewed

was NFPA 1452 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program

(NFPA, 2002). There are certain criteria that must be addressed regarding actual hands

on training; these criteria are summarized and bulleted below:

(1) Preventive Maintenance – students should be able to perform routine vehicle

inspections prior to actual driving of an apparatus. Each student should

demonstrate functional knowledge regarding the following components:

Batteries, braking system, coolant system, electrical system, fuel, hydraulic

fluids, oil, tires, steering system, and belts.

(2) Departmental maintenance requirements, defining what reports or

documentation is required to be completed daily, weekly, and monthly.

Page 17: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

17

(3) Operate the vehicle in the following situations:

(a) Four right or left turns.

(b) A straight section of urban two lane road, 1 mile in length.

(c) Two intersections where a stop has to be made.

(d) One railroad crossing.

(e) One curve, either left or right.

(f) Section of road that will allow for two lane changes.

(g) A downgrade that will require down-shifting.

(h) An upgrade that will require gear changing to maintain speed.

(i) One underpass or low clearance bridge.

(4) Back a vehicle from a roadway into restricted spaces.

(5) Maneuver a vehicle around obstructions in a roadway while moving forward

and in reverse.

(6) Turn a vehicle 180 degrees within a confined space.

(7) Maneuver a vehicle in and through areas of restricted horizontal and vertical

clearances.

(8) Operate a vehicle using defensive driving techniques.

(9) Operate all fixed system and equipment pertaining to a given fleet.

(10) Operate all vehicles an individual may be required to drive on any given

day.

Whenever a fire department is developing a driver’s safety program, the NFPA

standards should drive the development process. Also reviewed were two “off the shelf”

training programs. Each program has been previously mentioned regarding certain

Page 18: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

18

program elements. Also, reviewed in detail were various successful fire department

drivers’ safety programs.

This literature review was conducted in order to identify various issues regarding

driver’s safety programs in the fire service. First, sufficient material was reviewed that

outlined the scope of the problem both nationally and locally. Secondly, this literature

review highlighted several private industry success stories regarding safe driving.

Thirdly, the literature review identified key components of driver’s safety programs.

PROCEDURES

Two methods were employed to address the research questions for this project. A

comparison of current departmental practices and the findings of literature reviews were

used to address several of the research questions. Focus groups were used to explore

departmental attitudes that could either enhance or hinder the success of a driver safety

initiative. Several key informant interviews were conducted with key departmental

leaders to attempt to identify organizational commitment to safe driving. The procedures

used for each question were:

1. Why are driver’s safety programs necessary?

This question was separated into two parts. The first portion addressed what

national statistical evidence there is that can help determine the scope of the problem. A

literature review was used to determine this scope. Personnel interviews with several key

department leaders were conducted to determine specific views of necessity regarding

driver training. Five individuals were interviewed: the current Fire/Chief (Richard Dyer),

Page 19: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

19

the current president of each labor union (Louie Wright & Pat Dujakovich), the assistant

to the Fire Chief (Dr. Richard Gist), and the current Deputy Chief of Professional

Development (Paul Berardi). The researcher chose the five participants not only because

they are key departmental leaders, but they also represented a wide range of views and

influencing factors that identify a certain level of bias. Fire Chief Richard Dyer

represents the fire department as the primary contact with both city government and the

citizens of Kansas City. He also has served as the president of the International

Association of Fire Chiefs, he has been directly involved with almost all of the IAFC

initiatives over the last ten years. Battalion Chief Dujakovich not only represents the

formal International Association of Firefighters Local 3808, he also holds a significant

role as a fire ground commander and an informal labor voice. Deputy Chief Berardi has

held the responsibility of training, research, and development within the department for

over five years. He also is highly motivated and concerned with developing operational

based training. Captain Louie Wright was chosen because he clearly represents the

formal labor movement within in Kansas City and the Midwest. He is also a licensed

attorney of law. Assistant to the Fire Chief, Dr. Richard Gist is known throughout both

the academic and fire communities as a researcher that focuses on empirical analysis.

The personal interviews were conducted during May of 2005; each interview lasted

approximately 30 minutes. Although certain questions in the personal interview were

used to answer several other research questions, the three questions that address this

research question specifically were as follows:

(a) How serious a problem do you believe apparatus safety to be in our industry?

(b) What do you think are the roots of that problem?

Page 20: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

20

(c) What role do driver training programs play in promoting safe driving?

A copy of the interview questions is attached to this Advanced Research Project

as Appendix C.

2. How effective have driver training programs been in reducing accident rates?

This question examined several specific drivers’ safety programs. The programs

that were examined were successful programs within fire departments and in the private

sector trucking industry. A literature review was used to evaluate the reported results of

these programs.

3. What are current departmental attitudes regarding emergency vehicle operation

and how might these support or inhibit necessary changes?

Focus groups, personal interviews, and a literature review were used to attempt to

answer this research question.

Three focus groups were utilized to determine what, if any, departmental attitudes

were present that would enhance or hinder the success of a driving program. The general

discussion points were as follows: determine if departmental procedures and policies

were actually known, determine if these procedures and policies were being followed,

determine if interpretations of policies differ due to culture or current systems, and to

determine how culture and attitudes may support current performance and sabotage

change. The first rationale used to select the participants of each focus group was

geographic location. Kansas City covers a large geographical area; therefore one focus

group was selected from the north, south, and east regions of the city. The next selection

Page 21: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

21

criteria used was that each focus group would consist of 2 engines and 1 aerial company,

1 Battalion Chief, and 1 District Safety Officer with a total of 12 to 13 participants in

each focus group. Each focus group discussion was conducted during the second week of

May 2005; each focus group discussion lasted approximately one hour and fifteen

minutes. A copy of the discussion points is attached to this Advanced Research Project

as Appendix D.

Five personal interviews were conducted during the month of May, with key

departmental leaders. They were the current Fire/Chief (Richard Dyer), the current

president of each labor union (Louie Wright & Pat Dujakovich), the assistant to the Fire

Chief (Dr. Richard Gist), and the current Deputy Chief of Professional Development

(Paul Berardi). Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. Although certain

questions in the personal interview were used to answer several other research questions,

the three questions that address this research question specifically were as follows:

(1) What approaches would be most likely to work within our department?

(2) What obstacles would we need to overcome to implement a driving program

in KCFD?

(3) What role does culture play regarding fire apparatus safety?

(4) What beyond training and regulations needs to be done to ensure success in

KCFD?

A copy of the interview questions is attached to this Advanced Research Project as

Appendix D.

A literature review was conducted to determine other views regarding attitude,

behavior, and culture, and to explore how each affects the safe handling of fire apparatus.

Page 22: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

22

4. What must an effective driver training program address?

A literature review was conducted to determine what industry consensus

standards were regarding drivers safety training programs. The industry standards were

addressed in three specific areas: classroom instruction, actual driving training, and

training recertification. Three specific documents were used in detail, which identifies

fundamental elements of drivers safety programs, these documents were the Emergency

Vehicle Safety Initiative FA-272 produced by the Federal Emergency Management

Agency, NFPA 1002 Standard on Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional

Qualifications 2003 Edition, and NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle

Operations Training Program 2002 Edition.

5. How can an effective program be developed, financed, administered, and

evaluated?

This research question was broken into five separate parts to identify important

factors that must be addressed to administer a driver’s safety program.

(1) Development – the departments’ current labor/management agreement and

committee structures were utilized to identify the most successful avenues to

utilize regarding development.

(2) Finance – the current fire department budget was reviewed to identify funds

that could be utilized for this program. The Kansas City, Missouri Fire

Department budget was used, and is attached to this Advanced Research

Page 23: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

23

Project as Appendix E. The current FIRE ACT federal grant process was also

examined to determine possible funding sources.

(3) Administration of a program is much more than writing rules, enforcing

discipline, and monitoring compliance. The strategies and practices for

administration communicate the nature and strength of the Kansas City,

Missouri Fire Department’s commitment to a cultural change.

(4) Administration – several literature review sources were utilized to determine

roadblocks and best practices regarding the administration of a program of

this type.

(5) Evaluation – Data available through several literature review sources were

utilized to determine evaluative processes that could be employed.

Suggestions are made for specific criteria and measurement mechanisms.

Limitations

Several limitations were encountered in the process of this ARP. The

geographical sample used in the selection of the three focus groups was used more for the

convenience of the research rather than a sample from all three platoons within the fire

department. One other limitation encountered while using a descriptive research method

is that inferences formulated from the attitudes and behaviors outlined in the three focus

groups might be said to hold potential to reflect researcher bias. Yet another limitation

encountered was the abundance of literature referring to driver training. Finding the most

recent literature seemed not only prudent, but some times difficult. The researcher also

chooses not to include former Applied Research Projects from other Executive Fire

Officer Participants regarding driver’s safety programs. The reason for this discussion

Page 24: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

24

was to attempt to provide what the actual problems confronting the Kansas City, Missouri

Fire Department was currently, and offer fresh conclusions and specific

recommendations.

Definition of Terms

Battalion – this term is used in specific reference to the Kansas City, Missouri

Fire Department. Currently, the department has seven battalions on each of the

departments’ three platoons.

Council/Manager form of government – A system of local government that

combines the strong political leadership of elected officials with the strong managerial

experience of an appointed local government manager.

Focus Group – is a group of people in which the researcher can experiment with

going beyond the present to what can and ought to be, the researcher can discover beliefs

and behavior, how to persuade, how to teach, and how to communicate.

Labor/Management agreement – Currently within the Kansas City, Missouri Fire

Department both labor unions and the fire department administration have collaborated

resources to formulated a network of structured committees that address and handle

departmental issues. The ruling concept of these committees is that decisions are made

by consensus.

Platoon – The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department utilizes the three platoon

work schedule with each platoon or work shift responsible for 24 hours of consecutive

work time.

Page 25: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

25

RESULTS

1. Why are driver’s safety programs necessary?

As described within the procedures section of this ARP project, this research

problem was separated into two separate parts. The first part focused on what external

departmental statistical evidence there is that driver’s safety programs are actually

necessary. For most of the fire service leadership in America, the growing problem of

fire apparatus accidents has been increasingly visible. Forty years ago, the majority of

fire fighter fatalities occurred on the fire ground. With advanced fire protective clothing,

use of personal protective devices, and an increased focus on Incident Management, fire

ground fatalities have decreased, bringing more focus to fire fighter fatalities actually

occurring responding to or returning from an emergency call.

Fire apparatus accidents have represented the second leading cause of fire fighter

fatalities in the United States for over a decade. This problem facing the fire service has

been recognized from all major fire service representatives. These industry leaders have

collaborated resources to for an Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative. The results of this

initiative have been published as a handbook for fire service leaders to refer to when

making departmental decisions regarding fire apparatus training programs. Everyone that

joins the forces of America’s fire service accepts some amount of risk involved with the

profession but nobody ever thinks about losing his or her life on the way to a fire.

The second part of this question was addressed within the first three questions

asked of five Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department leaders in a personal interview. The

three questions and the responses of all five participants are listed and summarized

below.

Page 26: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

26

(a) How serious a problem do you believe apparatus safety to be in our industry?

• Chief Dyer – I believe that apparatus safety and especially the

response of fire apparatus to emergency incidents is a very important

issue to the American fire service. In terms to safety to our public, it

may be the most critical safety issue facing the fire service.

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Huge. Even if we take the loss of life

and all the pain caused out of the equation, the monetary cost alone

of our apparatus accidents are going to drive the fire service to take

drastic steps. We can not continue to consider this the cost of doing

business.

• Deputy Chief Berardi – One of the most serious problems we face.

Perhaps the top priority that is not being aggressively addressed.

• Captain Louie Wright – Based on my experience in Kansas City and

with union locals across the International, I am convinced that

apparatus safety is a significant problem in our industry.

• Dr. Richard Gist – Prevention of fire fighter death and injury is a

major concern in every element of the fire service. We have long

realized that the greatest contributors to line-of-duty injury and death

involve things other than fireground operations per se. The largest

source of duty related death is cardiac engendered, and apparatus

safety is a similarly complex but equally pressing problem. These

events also lead to civilian injury and death, and can create serious

strains between departments and those they serve.

Page 27: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

27

(b) What do you think are the roots of that problem?

• Chief Dyer – I believe that the root of the problem is the culture of

the fire service. For over two hundred years, our response times

have been critically important to the industry. As an example, in

Kansas City, the fire chief in the early 1900’s was recognized as a

world fire service leader due to his innovations including fast horse

hitches and fire poles, both a significant part of improving response

time for our citizens. In the days of horse drawn apparatus the

companies with the fastest horses were recognized as the better fire

companies. Fire fighters tend to be very committed to their mission

and they desire to arrive at the scene of a request for help from a

citizen as soon as possible.

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Common sense – why are we running

a pumper, truck, and chief to an auto accident. Discipline, both self

discipline and punishment for bad behavior. We need to develop a

safe culture; our history has always been all out as fast as possible.

We enjoy being dangerous and pushing the limits.

• Deputy Chief Berardi – The root of the problem may be that

society’s expectation of a fast response has not changed even though

there is more traffic on the streets in more quiet cars, louder music,

and the use of cell phones.

• Captain Louie Wright – Deferring maintenance is often used to save

money in fire departments of all sizes. Additionally, lack of

Page 28: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

28

adequate safety and inspection programs and trained “specialists”

qualified to work on fire apparatus are problems.

• Dr. Richard Gist – The fire service has built a culture of speed with

respect to response –for a good reason, overall. Historically,

limitations of staffing, water supply, pumping capacity, and such

meant that even slight delays in arrival held devastating potential as

a fire progressed. Being first, fastest, and most ferocious became

ingrained. It is a standard that still prevails. Until safety is accepted

as a primary moderator of speed, it will be hard to impact the

problem as significantly as we must.

(c) What role do driver training programs play in promoting safe driving?

• Chief Dyer – Driver training programs can provide the techniques

that are important in reducing the probability of being involved in an

accident or reducing the severity of an accident that can not be

avoided. With increased training there is hopefully increased

knowledge that will help to educate the fire apparatus driver for the

needed change in behavior.

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Not as big as we would like to believe.

What is learned in the Academy can be quickly untaught by a

veteran captain. Even if not blatantly told to drive faster, the young

fire fighter will see others doing it and getting respected.

Page 29: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

29

• Deputy Chief Berardi – A driver training program would promote

safety because it will be a good way to begin to address the culture

as well as skill training.

• Captain Louie Wright – I believe inadequate driver training and

experience contributes significantly to safe vehicle operations.

Obviously, appropriate driver training and safety programs could

play a big role in enhancing safe vehicle operations. In my view,

such programs should have mechanical components, at least

sufficient to train drivers to check and identify mechanical problems

and efficiencies.

• Dr. Richard Gist – Driver training programs are critical to provide

the fundamental skills and knowledge that make safety attainable.

The end result we wish to modify – most specifically, vehicular

collisions - comes most frequently as the proximal result of a

decision made very quickly in the process of a many faceted set of

actions. These must be learned by doing, rehearsed behaviorally in

context, and reinforced consistently to have a lasting impact.

The summary of the findings of this research question are as follows:

(1) National data is recognized to be well documented and reported that the second

leading cause of fire fighter fatalities is fire apparatus accidents.

(2) National fire service leaders have committed resources to identify and promote

the development of driver’s safety programs.

Page 30: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

30

(3) Leaders with the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department recognize the need for

the development of a driver’s safety program to try to decrease the overall

departmental accidents.

2. How effective have driver training programs been in reducing accident rates?

The success of driver’s safety programs have been well documented in the private

sector. For over fifty years, two leading trucking corporations, Yellow Freight and

United Parcel Service, have achieved remarkable results regarding driving safety. As

stated in the literature review section of this ARP, UPS has logged over 2 billion miles a

year on United States roads and averaged less than one accident per million miles driven.

Both organizations make the wearing of seatbelts a condition of employment, if someone

is found to have violated this policy, they are terminated. Safe driving has been

engrained into both of these organizations culture.

The success of driver’s safety program is somewhat more difficult to determine.

Common sense tends to make the connection that, with proper training, vehicular

accidents will decrease. The researcher was able to find one organization that has

achieved documented results of an ongoing driver’s safety program. The Sacramento

Regional Driver Training Facility has reduced accidents within the organizations

participating in the program by over fifty percent. One reason for the lack of documented

fire service successful driving programs is the lack of data collection within fire

departments. Most importantly, no evidence was encountered to suggest that driver

training programs were ineffective or counter-productive. Done well, there is evidence

that they work.

Page 31: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

31

3. What are current departmental attitudes regarding emergency vehicle operation

and how might these support or inhibit necessary changes?

To determine what departmental attitudes and behaviors must be addressed in

regards to emergency vehicle operations, the research chose to use three separate

approaches. The first approach used was to conduct three focus group discussions with

suppression personnel within the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department. The group

discussion began by a brief explanation of ground rules and informing all participants

that no names or work locations, other than what battalions were used, will be identified

within this research. The questions discussed and there responses are summarized below:

(1) Please, one at a time, give your rank and length of employment with the Kansas

City, Missouri Fire Department.

(a) 3 Battalion Chiefs, 8 Captains, 8 Fire Apparatus Operators, and 19

Fire Fighters participated with a total of 38 participants.

(b) The average experience of each participant was 11.2 years of service.

(c) The average time of service of the Battalion Chief participants was 21

years, the average time of service for the Captain participant was 18.5

years, the average time of service of the Fire Apparatus Operators

participating was 17.1 years, and the average time of service for the

Fire Fighter participants was 4.7 years.

(2) What preparation were you given for driving fire apparatus?

(a) 14 of 38 (36.8%) participants had actually attended some sort of formal

training given by the fire department.

Page 32: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

32

(b) The remaining of the participants received informal training given

within the firehouse, or otherwise on-the-job training.

(3) How many people have been involved in any type of fire apparatus accident?

(a) 30 out of 38 (78.9%) participants of been involved in some sort of fire

apparatus accident.

(4) Would anyone like to share any details of an accident they were involved in?

(a) The nature of the accidents that were described by the participants

ranged from road conditions, backing of fire apparatus, and 6

participants were involved in accidents in intersections.

(5) How many people have attended some type of drivers training program outside of

the fire department?

(a) 8 (21.1%) participants had attended some sort of training outside the

fire department.

(6) Does anyone here know of any local or departmental policies regarding

emergency driving?

(a) The range of answers to this question varied. No two participants

seemed to agree on what the departmental policy was regarding

emergency response (Appendix A). Some participants believed that a

fire truck had to stop at red lights, while others believed you only had

to slow down at a red light. The response from this question generated

unexpected results.

(7) As a group, does anyone feel that the department needs more drivers training?

(a) Unanimously, all 38 participants felt that more training was needed.

Page 33: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

33

(8) Does anyone feel there is a need for actual hands on training other than classroom

instruction?

(a) Participants had several responses regarding the actual hands-on

training. The responses ranged from wanting training on braking

distance, skid pad, and training on a computer simulator.

(9) What do you believe are contributing factors to fire apparatus accidents?

(a) Participants listed road conditions, speed, human error, lack of

training, maintenance, alertness, and being familiar with local streets

as contributing factors to accidents.

(10) How many people here run to the fire apparatus when an alarm is received and

how come?

(a) 32 out of 38 (84.2%) participants acknowledged that they run to the

fire apparatus. Reasons given on how come they run ranged from

tradition, getting to the address faster, sense of urgency, getting out of

the fire station first, getting to the scene first, and competition.

(11) How many people know that there is a departmental regulation (Appendix C)

stating that you should walk to the fire apparatus when an alarm is sounded?

(a) 37 out of 38 (97.4%) participants were aware of the departmental

policy.

(12) How many people put on their protective clothing while enroute to an

emergency call?

(a) 35 out of 38 (92.1%) participants answered yes.

Page 34: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

34

(13) How many people are aware there is a departmental policy regarding this

practice?

(a) 38 out of 38 participants responded yes.

(14) How many people here wear seat belts on an emergency response?

(a) 5 participants out of 38 (13.2%) confirmed that they actually wore seat

belts on an emergency call.

(15) Does anyone here believe that our tradition, attitude, or beliefs are contributing

factors to fire apparatus accidents?

(a) 38 participants out of 38 answered yes.

(b) A common response after asking this question was that everything we

are taught from the first day we come on the department is about being

fast. How fast we put on our clothing, to how fast we get on the fire

truck, how fast we can secure a water supply, the word fast is

hammered into our heads. Some participants believed that we will not

be able to stop fire apparatus accidents, it just a part of doing business.

(16) Does anyone here believe that if we get to emergency calls safer with fewer

accidents, do you become or have the risk of becoming less of a fire fighter?

(a) The majority of the responses to this question were answered yes. The

theme of tradition and we are better than everyone else came out

during all three focus group discussions. Most of the fire fighters

believed that this would endanger who they are or who they perceive

themselves to be.

(17) What has more impact on how we drive each day?

Page 35: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

35

(a) 20 (52.6%) participants answered competition.

(b) 6 (15.8%) participants answered tradition.

(c) 12 (31.6%) participants answered peer pressure.

(18) What would it take to shift the importance of how we drive each day?

(a) Answers to this question ranged from knowing the driving regulations,

training, discipline, holding the Captains responsible, public awareness

and some participants thought that anything we did would not shift the

importance.

(19) Are you likely to drive any differently after having this conversation?

(a) 9 participants out of 38 (23.7%) answered yes.

The overall importance of this research question may drive the theme of why fire

apparatus accidents are so prevalent in Kansas City, Missouri and in the fire service as a

whole. The lack of a formal driver’s safety program and that the employees feel that one

is needed is very clear from the data gathered. Attitude, tradition, and behaviors are

contributing factors of fire apparatus accidents and fire fighters know this, but they do not

feel the need to change.

The second part of this question was addressed in five personal interviews with

key departmental leaders. The participant’s answers to four questions are summarized

below:

• What approaches would be most likely to work within our department?

• Chief Dyer – The most effect approach is something I call “cultural

reengineering”. The organization from within needs to recognize

the value of driving safely rather than getting to the fire fast, first

Page 36: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

36

or any other informal reputations of competency that can exist

within a fire department.

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Standardized training across the

board. Institute discipline for violators of departmental policy.

• Deputy Chief Berardi – Hands-on operation on a driving course

where common troubled situations can be simulated.

• Captain Louie Wright – Labor-management developed programs

(training, certification programs, etc.).

• Dr. Richard Gist – This department has evolved an increasingly

effective climate of labor management partnership. It is that

climate which will prove most effective in building the levels of

change needed to impact this problem. More importantly, it is

only that climate which can promote the peer-level reinforcement

that will be needed to move from a culture of speed to a culture of

safety.

• What obstacles would we need to overcome to implement a driving

program in KCFD?

• Chief Dyer – Costs are always an obstacle in addition to logistics

of providing a driver safety program in such a large department.

The way the department is organized is almost all individuals in

the operations bureau may have the need to be an emergency

vehicle driver.

Page 37: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

37

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Impressing upon our people that this

is for real. If the training just satisfies a paper requirement or is

designed so everyone who shows up passes, it will fail. We need

buy in from all the leaders on this issue both formal and informal.

• Deputy Chief Berardi – Only logistics. (We can and will

implement a good program that will have a positive affect).

• Captain Louie Wright –Money and culture.

• Dr. Richard Gist – “Fire truck” and “driving fast” are concepts that

have been paired in our minds from childhood. That’s a hard, hard

connection to reshape.

• What role does culture play regarding fire apparatus safety?

• Chief Dyer – In my opinion, fire department culture is the critical

issue involving fire apparatus safety. The bureaucracy can create

all of the regulations, policies and procedures but without a

significant change in cultural values, then the formal leadership

should anticipate very little change in outcomes.

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Our culture works for us and against

change. But once changed, it will work for us again. The

changing is the hard part.

• Deputy Chief Berardi – There are those who get very excited when

the bells go off and our culture encourages us to be first on the

scene.

Page 38: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

38

• Captain Louie Wright – Funny you should ask! A lot!!!! “ All to

the wall, pedal to the metal, red lights and siren on everything” is

what we love to do and what, among other things, we must change.

This response could take hours, but you get what I mean.

• Dr. Richard Gist - Safety has to be a cultural value that trumps

“speedy” as a cultural icon. Until that’s accomplished, change will

be difficult to sustain.

• What beyond training and regulations needs to be done to ensure success

in KCFD?

• Chief Dyer – Cultural reengineering needs to occur within every

fire department concerning emergency response. That means that

the informal leaders must be engaged and an effort must be made

to receive their “buy-in” with the change. The key informal

leadership must be sold on the idea that a change in our driving

practices is needed for the safety of the public and for fire

personnel.

• Battalion Chief Dujakovich – Strong leadership. In my 17.5 years

of service I have only seen 2 cases of discipline for unsafe driving.

Both involved leaving the tiller man. Nothing else counted. Our

culture is that accidents happen and you can’t be touched for

accidents.

• Deputy Chief Berardi – The labor-management process of training

will be very beneficial in our success.

Page 39: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

39

• Captain Louie Wright – A first step seems to me to be “educating

ourselves as to why we must change, as opposed to just what we

must do. Too often training in the Fire Service focuses on the

“What” and not the “Why”.

• Dr. Richard Gist – Social psychologists recognize three ways that

behavior is regulated: conformity, compliance, and obedience.

Conformity occurs where a behavior is so ingrained at the cultural

level that it requires no specific prescription to elicit it – like facing

forward in an elevator. Compliance is where the prescription is

accepted as reasonable and valid, and behavior is brought more or

less willingly into line due to that acceptance. Obedience is where

behavior is conscripted on the basis of enforced consequences - it

breeds resistance and marginal compliance at best, and often

invites resistance and rebellion. Regulations are critical, but they

must be engineered to promote compliance – if targeted toward

obedience, outcome is likely to be a wash at best.

Each departmental leader expressed that culture is a problem. Each leader

presented common themes on what road blocks there are regarding changing culture.

Each participant felt that training is needed, but it will take a culture change to realize

success.

A literature review was conducted to explore what contributing factors represent a

significant reason for fire apparatus accidents. Industry leaders contribute attitude as

60% of safe driving. When a person climbs behind the wheel of a fire apparatus, they

Page 40: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

40

must be physically capable to perform the job, they must be properly trained, and they

must posses the proper driving attitude. One realistic approach found during this

literature review is that all fire fighters need to operate a fire apparatus as if the other cars

around them contained members of their own family.

4. What must an effective driver training program address?

The results from this research question were separated into three distinct

elements. The first element of research addressed the classroom educational components

that must be included in a formal driver’s safety program. The findings are summarized

below and classified as classroom instruction, practical driver training, and departmental

attitude. These elements are summarized below:

• Current Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department policies that have a related impact

on driving fire apparatus. These policies are the Departments Rules &

Regulations, the department Safety Manual, and General Administrative

Guidelines 2-4 and 2-5. The reason why a review of these departmental policies

is fundamentally crucial is because there were no participants that expressed

agreement on what the policies actually allowed a fire apparatus operator to do

when enroute to an emergency.

• Legal responsibilities of a fire apparatus operator should be included during

classroom instruction. Examples of litigation regarding fire apparatus accidents

should be used to explain the possible liabilities that are placed on driving. One

other legal topic that should be addressed is legal definitions and their meanings

when defining legal matters.

Page 41: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

41

• Technical instruction on defensive driving. This segment of classroom instruction

should provide sufficient instruction on braking distance, following distance,

intersection safety, vehicle maneuvering, and vehicle load shifting. There are

several adequate shelf training programs available that would satisfy the element

of classroom instruction.

The second part of a formal driver’s training program should include functional

driving. NFPA 1002 Standard on Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional

Qualifications 2003 Edition and NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle

Operations Training Program 2002 Edition identify required elements of functional

training. These elements are summarized below:

• Preventive Maintenance – students should be able to perform routine vehicle

inspections prior to actual driving of an apparatus. Each student should

demonstrate functional knowledge regarding the following components:

Batteries, braking system, coolant system, electrical system, fuel, hydraulic fluids,

oil, tires, steering system, and belts.

• Departmental maintenance requirements, defining what reports or documentation

is required to be completed daily, weekly, and monthly.

• Operate the vehicle in the following situations:

• Four right or left turns.

• A straight section of urban two lane road, 1 mile in length.

• Two intersections where a stop has to be made.

• One railroad crossing.

• One curve, either left or right.

Page 42: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

42

• Section of road that will allow for two lane changes.

• A downgrade that will require down-shifting.

• An upgrade that will require gear changing to maintain speed.

• One underpass or low clearance bridge.

• Back a vehicle from a roadway into restricted spaces.

• Maneuver a vehicle around obstructions in a roadway while moving forward and

in reverse.

• Turn a vehicle 180 degrees within a confined space.

• Maneuver a vehicle in and through areas of restricted horizontal and vertical

clearances.

• Operate a vehicle using defensive driving techniques.

• Operate all fixed system and equipment pertaining to a given fleet.

• Operate all vehicles an individual may be required to drive on any given day.

The third necessary element of a driver’s safety program focuses on fire

department culture. Attitudes and behaviors discovered during the focus group

discussions must be addressed. Research conducted regarding this question has proven

that both industry and departmental leaders believe that driving attitude is a paramount

factor affecting safe driving. Although this important element of driving is highlighted,

no specific guidance is given regarding developing or changing attitudes.

5. How can an effective program be developed, financed, administered, and

evaluated?

Page 43: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

43

(a) Development. The curriculum suggested for an effective program is readily

available from a number of sources. The USFA Emergency Vehicle Safety

Initiative provides an excellent template and its components are available

from many sources. These programs and training strategies, however, have

not been built to address the cultural factors noted to be critical in achieving

actual behavior change. The Department must effectively utilize its labor

management partnership to make the practice of safety a priority from both

labor and management perspectives, and to ensure that reinforcement of that

priority is consistent at all levels of both the formal and informal. This will

mean not only training, but also modifications to policy, procedural, and

investigatory elements.

(b) Financing. Driver safety training is acceptable to the Missouri Board of

Emergency Medical Services as a continuing education topic and can

therefore be included in routine EMS CEUs, which touches all personnel and

is already budgeted. This will allow a basic classroom segment to be

accommodated. The Department has also instituted a new design for

certification of its apparatus operators, and driving performance features are

funded elements of that certification process. This avenue can be used to

incorporate practical driving course skills testing without incurring additional

expense. Acquisitions of certain training aids, most specifically simulator

equipment for critical decision instruction, will most likely require external

funding. Utilization of the FIRE Act application process to seek such

assistance in the area of Safety and Operations is a recommended strategy.

Page 44: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

44

(c) Administration. This is where the commitment to cultural change will be

most critical. The training aspects of the program can be accommodated

through the Professional Development Bureau, but the emphasis and

reinforcement needed to make it effective must come at the first level of

management and supervision. Specific safety objectives must become a part

of the accountability established for company officers and battalion chiefs,

and must be reviewed to ensure that the needed emphasis and consistency is

maintained. Accident investigation procedures involving both labor and

management are essential to ensuring that events are analyzed and understood.

Most importantly, the results of investigations need to generate corrective

actions to ensure continuous quality improvement in all aspects of apparatus

safety.

(d) Evaluation. Will these efforts result in fewer collisions, fewer injuries, and

reduced losses? It has been surprisingly difficult to locate systematic data on

baseline levels. Until data is systematically collected, analyzed, and reported

there is no way to determine whether the steps taken have in fact resulted in

departmental change. The department will need to identify data which need to

be collected, establish procedures to gather and store such data, and

mechanisms to report the data and act upon the implications. Among the data

to be collected would be accident rates, injuries, apparatus downtime, costs to

repair, legal actions, and settlement costs.

Page 45: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

45

DISCUSSION

Several areas of driver’s safety programs require little discussion. The

achievements from national leaders in America’s fire service regarding these programs

are very impressive. The National Fire Protection Agency has outlined the qualifications

of fire apparatus drivers and the requirements of a drivers training program. Several

industry leading organizations have collaborated resources to produce a handbook (or in

slang, “cookbook”) of how to implement driver’s safety programs within the fire service.

The formal leaders of America’s fire service have done their part regarding driver’s

safety programs; it is now time for each fire department to do their part.

The Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department must utilize the products currently

available and guard against trying to re-invent the wheel. Both classroom instruction and

the functional driving component of a driver’s safety program should be fairly simple to

develop using the department’s current labor/management process. The KCFD training

academy has the proper facility to accommodate both segments of this training.

Discussing the fundamental element of what makes a safe driver becomes

increasingly difficult, especially when focusing upon the Kansas City, Missouri Fire

Department. Several findings of the focus group discussion provide valuable insight into

the thought process of Kansas City fire fighters. Tradition, competition, and attitude may

very well be the most important contributing factors of fire apparatus accidents not only

within the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department but nationally as well.

The first difficult task that lies ahead for our department is to departmentally

recognize the organizational contributing factors of fire apparatus accident. Key

departmental leaders must become increasingly insistent about fire apparatus safety. This

Page 46: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

46

commitment to safety must be broadcast to the organization at every chance possible.

Departmental newsletters, labor/management meeting minuets, e-mail communications,

and departmental training avenues such as our closed circuit television program must

continually carry the safe driving message. Driver’s safety must become common

kitchen table chatter.

The next difficult task that presents itself is the lack of accountability regarding

accidents. The department must begin to address the issue of holding fire fighters

accountable for ignoring departmental policies that ultimately end in an accident. Every

member of the department should know the consequences of wrecking a fire apparatus.

The labor/management steering committee that determines all major decisions

within the fire department must generate uniquely different approaches that begin to

address departmental culture. Using Fire Chief Dyer’s concept of “cultural

reengineering” the department has the difficult task of changing the very attitudes that

have been taught to every fire fighter from the moment they become a member of the fire

service.

In summary, the researcher understands that the formal curriculum relating to

driver’s safety programs have been nationally published and developed. The transition of

these programs should be accomplished without difficulties. The researcher further

understands that all programs must be reviewed and endorsed by the department’s

labor/management process. To truly determine the effectiveness of a driver’s safety

program within the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department, a empirical analysis of the

program must take place after the implementation.

Page 47: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

47

RECOMMENDATIONS

A comprehensive driver’s safety program will enhance the safety of the Kansas

City fire fighters and the citizens. The first recommendation will be summarized in a

memo to the Labor/Management Project Team that has been tasked with the development

of a driver’s safety program. Within this memo (Appendix E), recommendations will be

given regarding important elements that should be addressed with a driver’s safety

program. A copy of this applied research paper will also be given to the formal chair of

this project team. Hopefully, the research conducted will provide valuable insight on the

needed program elements, these elements are summarized below:

• The department should utilize both NFPA 1002 and 1451 to determine specific

criteria that should be addressed with a driving program. These criteria have been

mentioned within this applied research project but they have been summarized,

therefore requiring closer examination.

• Classroom curriculum must address the following issues:

• Departmental policies.

• Defensive driving – there are several education programs mentioned in

this research that may fulfill this topic.

• Legal responsibilities.

• Functional driver training must address all the criteria contained with NFPA 1002

and 1451. Once again, both of these documents will need to be reviewed in

detail. The current Kansas City Fire Department Training Academy should

provide ample space to accommodate this segment of training.

Page 48: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

48

• The department should develop accident investigation procedures. Certain

guidelines and responsibilities will be required be this recommendation. The

project team must recommend additional training to whom is responsible for these

investigations.

• Data collection will also need to be formalized. Records of all investigations,

injury reports regarding fire apparatus accidents, legal fees and settlements,

damage costs and any other data associated with these accidents must be located

in one location within the department, Currently, this does not tale place.

• Discipline and accountability issues should be addressed. All embers should be

made aware of consequences of being involved in a fire apparatus accident.

The second recommendation will be issued to Fire Chief Richard Dyer in a memo

(Appendix H) and then a follow-up meeting. The researcher will discuss the current

departmental attitudes that must be addressed regarding emergency response. The

researcher believes that departmental leaders must verbally recognize and endorse the

much needed culture change. This “cultural reengineering” must start at the

Labor/Management Steering Committee level by the fire chief and the two union

presidents.

Using a sufficient cross sample of fire fighters within a given department is

crucial for researchers wishing to replicate this study. Each department has formal key

leaders within their own organizations; these individuals should be chosen for personal

interviews. Curriculum involving driver’s safety programs will continually be updated

on a periodical basis, I recommend using the latest educational material available for

researchers wishing to develop their own driving safety programs.

Page 49: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

49

REFERENCES

City of Kansas City, Missouri (2003, September 2). Web posting at

http://www.kcmo.org/kcmo.nsf/web/aboutkc?opendocument. Accessed April 24, 2005.

Claxton, M., & Shepardson, D. (2001). Detroit Settles Fire Department Lawsuit

for $2.35 Million. The Detroit

Comstock, D. (1999). Crash, Fire Chief, 39(4), 33-36.

Emergency Vehicle Operations (2003, September ). Negligence and the

emergency vehicle operator. Web posting at

http://www.emergencyvehicleresponse.com/wilbur.php. Accessed April 24, 2005.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2004). Emergency Vehicle Safety

Initiative. Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication No. FA_272.

Washington, DC: Author.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1992). Alive on arrival: Tips for safe

emergency vehicle operation. Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication No.

L-195. Washington, DC: Author.

Fire Department, City of New York (FDNY). (2004) Strategic Plan, 2003-2004.

New York, NY: Author.

Gist, R. (2005, March). Narrative, FIRE Act grant application, Kansas City,

Missouri Fire Department. Available from author.

Graham Research Consultants. Enhancing firefighter safety. Web posting at

http://www.gordongraham.com/pdfs/GREFS_NPCCR.pdf. Accessed April 19, 2005.

International Association of Fire Chiefs. (2004, October 15). IAFC and other fire

service organizations form Emergency Vehicle Safety Partnership. On Scene, 18(18), 6.

Page 50: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

50

International Fire Service Training Association. (1999). Pumping apparatus

driver/operator handbook (1st Ed.). Stillwater, OK: Author.

Lowry, Jay. (2002, October). Obstacle course. Fire Chief, 42(10), 41-42, 68.

National Fire Protection Association. (2002). Standard for a fire service vehicle

operations training program. Quincy, MA: Author.

National Safety Council. (1999). CEVO II fire: Coaching the emergency

operator II. Itasca, IL: Author.

Sacramento Regional Driver Training Facility (2005). History. Web posting at

http://www.srdtf.com. Accessed April 27, 2005.

Tempe Fire Department (1993). Driving attitude (Section 403.01). Policies &

procedures. Tempe, AZ: Author.

Tilyou, B. (2004). Crash tests. Fire Chief, 44(10), 31-32.

United Parcel Service. (October 7, 2003). 181 elite rrivers join UPS’s Circle of

Honor. Press release posted on World Wide Web at

http://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressreleases/archives/archive/0,1363,4341,00.html.

Accessed April 27, 2005.

United States Fire Administration. (1996). Emergency vehicle driver training.

Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication No. FA-110, Washington, DC:

Author.

Volunteer Fireman Insurance Services. (2001). Dynamics of emergency vehicle

response (instructors guide). York, PA: Author.

Volunteer Fireman Insurance Services. (1999). Emergency vehicle driver

training manual. York, PA: Author.

Page 51: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

51

Wilbur, M. (2005). Negligence and the emergency vehicle operator. Web

posting at http://www.firecompanies.com/training_center.php. Accessed April 24, 2005.

Wilbur, M. (2004). Apparatus accidents: Nobody wins. Web posting at

Accessed April 24, 2005.

Yellow Roadway. (January 1, 2005). Yellow Roadway Corporation Core

Values. Press release posted on World Wide Web at

http://www.Yellowroadway.com/about/.com

Accessed May 3, 2005.

Page 52: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

52

APPENDIX A General Administrative Guideline Subject: EMERGENCY AND NON-EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES Effective Date: 10-1-04 GAG: 2-4 Applies to: ALL FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL Supersedes: GAG dated 2/1/00 Page 1 of 4 PURPOSE: To promote the Department’s concern for safety of our personnel and citizens. SCOPE: These guidelines shall apply to all members of the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department. GUIDELINES: The Labor/Management Safety Committee has jointly recommended the following procedure. This procedure is being implemented to promote the Department’s concern for the safety of our personnel and the citizens of the community we serve. I. COMPANY RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Company Officer or Working Out Of Class (WOC)/Captain

1. The Company Officer or Acting Company Officer will be responsible for the safety of all persons riding and operating fire Department apparatus. The Company Officer shall:

a. Make certain that seat belts shall be worn when operating or riding in any City owned vehicle. b. Make certain that the Fire Apparatus Operator or Acting FAO operates the apparatus in a safe manner,

in accordance with this procedure and other pertinent Department rules and policies. c. Monitor the vehicle speed, advising the FAO if it is too fast. d. Be alert of other vehicles, especially at intersections. e. Operate the sirens and air horn during an emergency response. f. Conduct regular intervals of pump and/or aerial training for all members of the company.

B. The Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) or WOC/FAO

1. The Fire Apparatus Operator or Acting FAO is responsible for their actions and the safety of the

apparatus’ passengers. The FAO or WOC/FAO shall:

a. Perform the required daily or weekly Apparatus Checklist at the beginning of each shift of duty. b. Be in control of the apparatus at all times when driving. c. Make certain that seat belts shall be worn when operating or riding in a vehicle equipped with seat

belts. d. Have a good knowledge of the apparatus being operated. (weight, height, width, length, know the

acceleration and braking characteristics). e. Secure all equipment and compartment doors before operation. f. Operate the apparatus in a safe manner, in accordance with this procedure and other pertinent

department rules and policies.

Page 53: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

53

APPENDIX A General Administrative Guideline Subject: EMERGENCY AND NON-EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES Effective Date: 10-1-04 GAG: 2-4 Applies to: ALL FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL Supersedes: GAG dated 2/1/00 Page 2 of 4 II. RESPONSE MODES

A. Non-Emergency Response

1. Non-emergency vehicle driving is considered normal city or highway driving. Standard defensive driving techniques shall be utilized. The below listed non-emergency driving procedures shall be followed when dispatched to respond “non-emergency” or “non-emergency without delay”:

a. Obey the posted speed limit. b. All emergency-warning lights shall be off. c. The apparatus shall be operated with the headlights on. d. Accelerate and decelerate slowly, use the “Jacobs Brake, weather permitting.

B. Emergency Response

1. These procedures set forth the exceptions permitted for emergency vehicles in the Traffic Code pursuant to

Kansas City, Missouri Code of Ordinances Chapter 70, while such emergency vehicles are parked at an emergency or are responding to, but not returning from, an emergency while operating emergency red and/or blue lights and siren. The exceptions include the following:

a. Parking in a manner that would otherwise be unauthorized. b. Proceeding past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for

safe operation. c. Exceeding the maximum speed limits, so long as the vehicle does not endanger life or property. d. Disregarding regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions such as

one-way streets. e. KCFD vehicle operators operating an emergency vehicle pursuant to any of the above exceptions shall

do so with due regard for the safety of the public and KCFD personnel.

2. KCFD vehicle operators shall be prepared to come to a complete stop for the following:

a. When directed to do so by other KCFD personnel. b. When directed to do so by a law enforcement officer. c. When a school bus with red operating flashing warning lights is encountered on the same roadway. d. When encountering a railroad crossing gate in the down position.

3. KCFD vehicle operators shall exercise caution and may proceed for a safe operation without coming to a complete stop when approaching:

a. A red traffic control signal. b. A stop sign. c. A negative right of way intersection. d. An unguarded railroad crossing.

4. KCFD vehicles shall be operated at a safe speed while ensuring response time efficiency.

Page 54: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

54

APPENDIX A General Administrative Guideline

Subject: EMERGENCY AND NON-EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES Effective Date: 10-1-04 GAG: 2-4 Applies to: ALL FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL Supersedes: GAG dated 2/1/00 Page 3 of 4

5. Fire department vehicles shall be parked in a manner that ensures operational effectiveness and to protect the public and KCFD personnel. If practical, support vehicles should be parked where they will not disrupt normal traffic flow.

C. Fire Companies and Chief Officers Responses

1. Fire companies and Chief Officers shall be dispatched and respond non-emergency to the

following incidents:

a. Automatic alarms, sprinkler alarms and manual pull stations. b. Smoke detectors. c. Natural gas leaks with no fire present. d. Carbon monoxide detectors with no medical symptoms. e. Wire down. f. Assist the police. g. Lockouts. h. Investigation of odors. i. Rubbish or trash fires with no reported exposure. j. Broken sprinkler or water pipes. k. Move-ups or fill-ins unless designated by Chief Dispatcher as an emergency move.

2. All other incidents shall be considered an “EMERGENCY” response.

3. If an alarm is dispatched as “non-emergency” and additional information is received by the

Communications Center indicating that life is in danger, persons are injured, there is a working fire, etc., Communications should upgrade the response to “emergency”.

4. The first company to arrive on the scene of any incident shall make an initial size-up and notify other

responding companies, through the Communications Center if the following occurs:

a. If other companies are responding emergency and there is no emergency, have the other companies respond in a non-emergency mode.

b. If other companies are responding non-emergency and there is an emergency, upgrade their response through the Communications Center to emergency.

III. DEFINITIONS:

A. Non-Emergency Response or Non-Emergency Move Up

1. Apparatus shall have headlights on and driven in a manner considered normal city or highway driving. 2. Companies shall proceed to apparatus immediately and respond to incident without delay in a non-

emergency manner as previously described.

B. Non-Emergency Without Delay Response or Non-Emergency Without Delay Move Up

1. Companies shall proceed to the apparatus immediately and respond to the incident without delay in a non-emergency manner as previously described.

Page 55: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

55

APPENDIX A General Administrative Guideline Subject: EMERGENCY AND NON-EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES Effective Date: 10-1-04 GAG: 2-4 Applies to: ALL FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL Supersedes: GAG dated 2/1/00 Page 4 of 4

2. The apparatus responds to the incident without delay. The apparatus shall have headlights on and driven in a manner considered normal city or highway driving.

3. However, given the nature of the incident or road and/or weather conditions should warrant a change in

the company’s response mode, the Company Officer may elect to do so. The Company Officer shall notify the Communications Center of this change in their response mode.

C. Emergency Response or Emergency Response Move Up

1. Apparatus responds with all emergency warning devices (lights, sirens & air horns) activated.

Page 56: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX B

56 General Administrative Guideline Subject: PARKING THE FIRE APPARATUS Effective Date: 8/1/99 GAG: 2-5 Applies to: All Fire department Personnel Supersedes: NEW Page 1 of 1

PURPOSE:

To ensure a method of parking Fire vehicles at emergency and non-emergency scenes that will provide safety to all Fire personnel and civilians.

SCOPE:

These guidelines shall apply to all members of the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department.

GUIDELINES:

All operators of Fire Department vehicles shall follow the guidelines listed below:

• Passenger cars, vans and light trucks shall be parked with the gear selector in "Park" • All other Fire apparatus shall be parked using a wheel chock on the rear tire in the direction of the down grade. If possible wheel chocks should be used in front and behind the tire All vehicles shall be parked with the emergency brake set All parked vehicles obstructing the roadway shall use emergency lighting. When the vehicle is not being used and is at idle speed, some lights may be turned off to prevent draining the battery

NON-EMERGENCY PARKING

Ion response to complaints that have been registered by citizens, the following guidelines shall be followed by all

companies on station shopping trips, all non-emergency inspections, and other non-emergency visits to grocery stores, convenience stores and shopping malls:

The vehicle shall not be parked near the entrance of the store or in any marked fire lane Someone shall be left with the parked apparatus at all times The motor on parked vehicles shall be shut down to conserve fuel unless it is necessary to use the lights The apparatus shall be parked in an area towards the back of the parking lot so the general public does not have to maneuver around it In double and triple houses, one (1) vehicle should go to the store for everyone. This will conserve fuel and save wear and tear on the other apparatus

Contact with the general public should be a pleasant experience for them and us. We want the general public to see that we are courteous, considerate and by all means a very professional organization. Always look your best -remember you are an ambassador for our department

Page 57: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX C 57

Applied Research Project for the National Fire Academy

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION COMPONETS FOR A DRIVERS SAFETY PROGRAM IN THE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

FIRE DEPARTMENT

Personal Interview Questions

The primary purpose of these personal interview questions are to identify what key departmental leaders feel are important aspects of fire apparatus safety and implementing a driver’s safety program within the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department. Each participant was informed that their names, titles, and comments would be documented within an applied research paper for the National Fire Academy. The questions asked of each participant were as follows:

1. How serious a problem do you believe apparatus safety to be in our industry?

2. What do you think are the roots of that problem?

3. What role do driver training programs play in promoting safe driving?

4. What approaches would be most likely to work within our department?

5. What obstacles would we need to overcome to implement a driving program in the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department?

6. What role does culture play regarding fire apparatus safety?

7. What beyond training and regulations needs to be done to ensure success in the

Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department?

Page 58: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX D 58

Applied Research Project for the National Fire Academy

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION COMPONETS FOR A DRIVERS SAFETY PROGRAM IN THE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

FIRE DEPARTMENT

Focus Group Discussion Points

The primary purpose of these focus group discussions are to determine if there are any critical departmental attitudes that can enhance or hinder the success of a drivers safety program.

• Began the discussion by an introduction of yourself • Explained the purpose of the focus group and what will be done with the

information gained • Discussed group rules – respect each others opinions, there may be differing

opinions, other than these two, and there are no other rules.

1. Please, one at a time, give your rank and length of employment with the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department.

2. What preparation were you given for driving fire apparatus?

3. Has anyone here had an experience with an accident?

4. Would anyone like to share the details of the accident?

5. How many people have attended some type of drivers training program ourside

of the fire department?

6. Does anyone here know of any local or departmental policies regarding emergency driving?

7. As a group does anyone feel that the department needs more drivers raining?

8. Does anyone feel there is a need for actual hands on training other than

classroom instruction?

9. What do you believe are contributing factors to fire apparatus accidents?

10. Does anyone here run to the Fire Truck when an emergency call comes in? • Why?

Page 59: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX D 59

11. How many people know there is a departmental regulation stating that you should walk to the fire apparatus when an alarm is sounded?

12. Does anyone here don protective gear in route to an emergency call?

• Why? 13. How many people are aware there is a departmental policy regarding this

practice? 14. How many people here wear seat belts on an emergency response?

15. Does anyone here believe that our tradition, attitude, or beliefs are contributing

factors to fire apparatus accidents?

16. Does anyone think if we get to emergency calls safer with fewer accidents, do you become or have the risk of becoming less of a firefighter?

17. Which has more impact on how we drive each day? 18. What would it take to shift the importance?

19. Are you likely to drive any differently after having this conversation?

Page 60: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

60

APPENDIX E

The appendix E was unable to be printed with a header or page numbers. This appendix is from pages 60 thru 71.

Page 61: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 62: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 63: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 64: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 65: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 66: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 67: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 68: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 69: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 70: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 71: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a
Page 72: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX F 72

Policy Manual Subject: FIREFIGHTER SAFETY MANUAL Effective Date: 8-01-99 SAFETY Applies to: ALL FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL Supersedes: NEW Page 1 of 1 PURPOSE: To establish safe work practices that are directed toward controlling or eliminating hazardous conditions which may result in numerous and/or serious injuries and property damage. To establish the responsibilities of supervisors, the employees, the Fire Department Safety Committee and the Human Resource Department when accidents occur. These procedures shall be consistent with the existing language of the Memorandum of Understanding between the City and IAFF Local 42, the Administrative Code of the City of Kansas City, Missouri and other pertinent statues, ordinances, directives and regulations. SCOPE: These guidelines shall apply to all members of the Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department. GUIDELINES: All information pertaining to this Firefighter Safety Manual is contained in the following Policy Manual.

Page 73: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX F 73

1.00 EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT

1.01 Every employee shall know and abide by established safety rules and safe work procedures, which includes the contents of this handbook.

1.02 Every employee shall be consciously alert to the hazards of this job, avoid unsafe acts and warn others

seen performing unsafe acts. 1.03 Every employee shall report all accidents and injuries immediately, no matter how slight or minor. 1.04 You must be alert to those around you. An unsafe act could endanger others. 1.05 All employees shall be responsible for keeping all assigned safety equipment readily available, clean

and in good repair. 1.06 All employee shall report all missing or defective equipment immediately to the supervisor for repair

or replacement. 2.00 SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITY

2.01 Supervisors shall be responsible for training and enforcing safe work practices. 2.02 Supervisors shall remove dangerous or defective equipment from service until repairs or replacement

has been made. 2.03 Supervisors shall be responsible for assuring all tools and equipment used by their personnel are

properly maintained. 2.04 Supervisors shall be responsible for recognizing, removing, neutralizing, or avoiding all hazards which

jeopardize themselves or their personnel. 2.05 Supervisors shall be responsible for firefighters working in isolated and/or dangerous areas. The

“buddy system” shall be used at all times and “free lancing” shall not be tolerated. 2.06 Supervisors shall be responsible for assigning the appropriate manpower for a given assignment, along

with the appropriate tools and/or equipment to safely complete the assignment.

3.00 STATION SAFETY

3.01 All Fire Department property, equipment and work areas shall be kept clean and orderly at all times. Aisles must be kept clear for pedestrians and traffic.

3.02 Do not allow rubbish of flammable materials to accumulate. 3.03 Exercise extreme caution when using wet floors (A). 3.04 When not in use, all mops, brooms, and cleaning supplies shall be stored in appropriate places. 3.05 Tripping hazards shall be recognized and corrected immediately in all work areas. 3.06 Access to higher levels shall be attained by the use of ladders or step stools. 3.07 All traffic areas including stairs and shower areas should have non-skid surfaces.

Page 74: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX F 74

3.08 All exits, fire extinguishers and hazardous areas shall be clearly marked by a sign and/or symbol. 3.09 All work areas shall be properly illuminated 3.10 First aid kits shall be properly maintained. 3.11 Combustible liquids shall be stored in approved storage cabinets, and dispensed from an approved

safety can which is clearly marked of its contents. 3.12 Compressed gas cylinders shall be stored and secured in designated locations. 3.13 Anytime a vehicle is operated inside the station, ventilation fans (when available), should be used as

well as assuring the overhead doors are open. Stations with exhaust elimination systems will utilize this function at the Company Officer’s discretion.

3.14 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) shall be compiled in a folder or binder and kept for the location

in the station watch office. 3.15 All stations with handicap access and female facilities shall maintain those features for public access

and usage. 3.16 Before and after using a lawnmower, police the area for bottles, wires, rocks, etc. Inspect the mower

for safe operations and use appropriate safety precautions while mowing. 4.00 RESPONSE SAFETY

4.01 When the alarm or pre-alert sounds, proceed to designated position on the apparatus or vehicle at a walk.

4.02 Firefighters shall sit in designated areas with seat belts fastened. There shall be no standing or sitting

on the apparatus while apparatus is moving. *The Company Officer shall be directly accountable for the enforcement of this guideline.

4.03 No vehicle shall move until all responding Firefighters are in position with full protective clothing to

suit the response needs. 4.04 The siren shall not be engaged until the apparatus has cleared the station doors. 4.05 When leaving the station, the driver shall proceed slowly enough to observe traffic entry conditions. 4.06 Personnel responding to alarm shall not don their SCBAs while en route, unless the apparatus has

come to a complete stop for that purpose. 4.07 Whenever possible, a spotter will be used to help the driver back the apparatus.

5.00 FIREGROUND SAFETY

5.01 Upon arrival at the scene and before departing the vehicle, make sure the apparatus has come to a complete stop.

5.02 All firefighting personnel shall wear their SCBA before entering any hazardous atmosphere or area.

SCBAs must be worn until the hazard area has been cleared of toxic fumes and/or smoke and the incident area thoroughly ventilated as determined by the Incident Commander or District Safety Officer.

Page 75: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX F 75

5.03 Effective communication between the fireground companies and the Incident Commander are essential to the safety of the personnel. Fireground personnel shall keep each other and the Incident Command informed of all existing and developing conditions of the incident.

5.04 The “buddy system” shall be used at all times during an interior attack, search and rescue, confined

space, or any time there may exist a possibility of being lost or trapped. “freelancing” shall not be tolerated. This action places undue risks on the other personnel on the scene, unaccounted for personnel can result in a needless search and rescue operation.

5.05 Firefighters efforts to extinguish the fire should be reasonably aggressive. They should be alert and

use good judgment when choosing the initial tactics. Evasive actions should be considered prior to, and during the initial attack.

5.06 An interior attack (when appropriate) directed toward containing the fire eliminates many potential

hazards when used with appropriate ventilation. 5.07 Hallways and stairways must not become crowded during interior firefighting operations, as this

places the attack companies in undue danger and slows their egress from the structure. 5.08 Be alert for the signs of structural collapse:

a) Mortar cracking and/or coming loose between bricks and stones b) The development of cracks in walls c) Bulging walls d) Smoke moving through cracks in wall e) Floors pulling away from walls f) Sagging or bulging floors g) Sounds of structural moving (i.e. cracking, groaning, snapping)

5.09 Be alert for the signs of backdraft:

a) Pressurize smoke exiting small openings b) Black smoke becoming dense gray-yellow c) Confinement and excessive heat d) Little or no visible flame e) Smoke stained windows f) Muffled sound g) Sudden rapid movement of air inward when an opening is made

5.10 Be alert for signs of flashover. This is characterized with high heat level from floor to ceiling and

usually can be avoided by directing the water in a narrow or straight stream toward the ceiling level and the room contents to cool materials below their ignition temperatures.

5.11 When operating either above or below ground level, establish at least two escape routes when

possible. Preferably the exits should be at opposite ends of the building or separated by a considerable distance.

5.12 Search and rescue activities shall be conducted with two or more firefighters in each group. 5.13 When using or operating forcible entry equipment, full protective clothing shall be worn (helmet, coat,

bunker pants, boots and gloves) and proper safety procedures followed. 5.14 When using cutting, chopping, or otherwise hazardous equipment, be sure to inform everyone in the

vicinity of your intentions and clear the immediate area of personnel before your start.

Page 76: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

APPENDIX F 76

5.15 When it is necessary to break windows for ventilation purposes, make certain the area on the opposite side, as well as the area below the window, is clear of personnel. Remove as much glass as possible from the frame and screen.

5.16 Do not direct hose stream at energized electrical equipment. 5.17 Except for direct orders from the Incident Commander, there shall be no exterior hoselines or master

streams operating through any window, door, or opening where it may compromise the safety of any personnel inside the structure. Interior companies must be informed prior to initiating this operation.

5.18 It shall be the responsibility of the Incident Commander to notify Fire Communications of the need to

evacuate the structure: a) Fire Communications shall notify all personnel on the scene with an “Emergency Traffic Tone”

followed by instructions for all personnel inside the structure to evacuate immediately b) The Incident Commander shall then issue any further instructions to Fire Communications as to

location the Company Officers or Sector Officers shall report with their SAFE c) Should the Incident Commander order horns to be sounded, all fireground apparatus should sound

repeated short blasts d) It shall be the responsibility of all personnel on the scene to immediately evacuate the structure

and notify their Company Officer and/or Sector Officer of the company’s personnel status e) The Incident Commander shall notify Fire Communications of the on scene personnel’s

disposition (i.e. “all clear”) as SAFE is completed 5.19 Be alert to all 704 or other HazMat placards attached to the structure or fences which are, or may

become involved in the incident. Report this information to the Incident Commander. 5.20 Be alert to all porches, cornices, marquees, and signs attached to the structure for possible falling

and/or collapse. 5.21 Ladder safety:

a) Check for electrical or overhead obstructions b) Check ladder for proper angle c) Make sure the ladder is secured at the top or butted at the bottom before climbing d) Check ladder-locks to be sure that they are seated securely over the rungs e) Climb rhythmically and smoothly f) Do not overload the ladder g) Choose the proper ladder the job h) Always wear protective gear, including gloves, when working with ladders i) Always tie in to ground ladders with a safety belt when working from the ladder j) A leg lock shall not be used on any aerial ladder

Page 77: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

Deputy Chief Ed Weixeldorfer 101 C-Shift Ed, I have recently completed my Executive Fire Officer applied research project regarding a driver’s safety program. I am writing you to apprise your project team of some significant findings I have discovered during my research. I used three documents to form the foundation of my research regarding course development; these documents are NFPA 1002, NFPA 1451, and the USFA Emergency Vehicle Safety Initiative. I recommend that your project team review these documents in detail. I also recommend the following elements be included in the classroom curriculum: (1) departmental rules and policies, (2) legal definitions, (3) defensive driving, (4) accident investigation, (5) data collection. As you know, NFPA 1451 clearly defines what requirements should be used during the actual hands-on driver training. I have attached to this memo a copy of my research regarding this topic. Please feel free to contact me regarding any of the issues I have presented. Respectfully, Jeffrey A. Grote Deputy Chief Emergency Operations Bureau A-Shift

Page 78: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

Fire Chief Richard Dyer Chief, I am writing you to inform you of some important results I have found regarding fire apparatus accidents within our department. During my recent research for my last EFO project I conducted several focus group discussions. During these discussions I found that no one individual could verbally express what the departmental regulations were regarding emergency operations of a fire apparatus. I also discovered that there are several traditions that may hinder the driving safety of our personnel. I would like to meet with you regarding these and discuss some possible solutions. I have also attached a copy of my last Advanced Research Project for your review. Respectfully, Jeffrey A. Grote Deputy Chief Emergency Operations Bureau A-Shift

Page 79: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a

National Fire Academy

Executive Fire Officer Program Graduate Certification Information

Graduates Name: Deputy Chief Jeffrey A. Grote Supervisor: Fire Chief Richard “Smokey” Dyer 635 Woodland Avenue, Suite 2100 Kansas City, Missouri 64106 U.S. Senator: Senator Kit S. Bond 274 Russell Senate Office Building Washington DC 20510 Senator Jim Talent 493 Russell Senate Office Building Washington DC 20510 U.S. Representative: Congressman Sam Graves 1513 Longworth House Office Building Washington DC 20515 State Governor: Governor Matt Blunt Office of the Governor Room 216, State Capitol Building Jefferson City, MO 65101 State Auditor: Claire McCaskill State Auditor’s Office Jefferson City, Mo 65102-0869 State Representative: Luann Ridgeway District 17 State Capitol Building Room 419 Jefferson City, Mo 65101

Page 80: Identifying Critical Implementation Components for a