Identifying and Overcoming Operational Challenges Steve Prisoc, New Mexico Judiciary CIO [email protected]

Identifying and Overcoming Identifying and Overcoming Operational ChallengesOperational Challenges

Steve Prisoc, New Mexico Judiciary CIOSteve Prisoc, New Mexico Judiciary CIO

505-476-6901505-476-6901

[email protected]@nmcourts.gov

Two States: Wisconsin and Illinois

The Illinois justice systems integration effort (IIJIS) began in earnest in 2000 and was spearheaded by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. The Wisconsin effort began formally at about the same time.

Illinois Integrated Justice Information System (IIJIS) Program began at the Illinois Criminal Justice Information

Authority, a justice research, information services and justice funding agency.

First step was to define a multi-layer governing body that was comprised of elected officials, state justice officials, local justice officials and justice agency staff.

Next step was to secure initial funding Applied for and received NGA/BJA $25,000 planning grant Applied for and received NGA/BJA $973,000 grant

Governance Board agreed that creation of a scenario-based strategic plan was prerequisite to actual project work.

Scenario-based strategic planning began in 2001, after Governor Ryan issued an executive order supporting IIJIS.

Strategic Planning participants were divided into “planning” and “technical” groups with the former developing a justice information sharing scenario and the latter creating an analysis of the gap between the current state and the desired state.

IIJIS strategic planning process has been used as a best-of-breed example.

IIJIS Strategic Planning Process

IJIS Institute and SEARCH Report on IIJIS, August 2004 The IIJIS Board finds itself in state of “paralysis by

analysis.” After a solid beginning and successful development of a

comprehensive Strategic Plan, the IIJIS Board is faced with the daunting task of translating strategic vision into a tactical plan.

[Uncertainty] was made apparent by the conflicts noted above and by the uncertainties concerning the next steps of the integration initiative. For example, should the state, through the IIJIS project, be fostering or providing state-developed applications for local use such as police records management systems, or should the state set standards for what data those applications provide.

IJIS Institute and SEARCH Report on IIJIS - continued

The following threaten the success of the project: conflict over I-CLEAR and PIMSNet, the proposed portal and uncertainty concerning state and local roles

It was observed that the IIJIS Board was encountering difficulties in defining a unified sense of direction.

The project was experiencing uncertainties vis-à-vis state and local roles, future system roles, and the development and implementation of standards.

Illinois Challenges Long-standing republican control of governor’s office switched in

2003, which substantially changed the power relationships among the main state and local justice participants

The NGA Grant, which was the first information large sum awarded to the State for information sharing seemed to cause state and local justice agencies to pressure for sub-awards for single agency projects

Large chunks of IIJIS funds were earmarked for local projects that weren’t closely related to a statewide information sharing approach

Certain state-level justice agency staff perceived IIJIS as a threat to both personal and agency autonomy and control

Illinois Outcomes Funds earmarked for local agencies were never used

Disagreement over standards and technical architecture stalled momentum

Disagreement over which projects to undertake stalled actual progress toward deliverables

Feuds between the Governor and local law enforcement officials led to creation of a separate organization for delivery of law enforcement systems such as RMS and mobile data applications

Policy development for privacy-related issues was initiated and led to model privacy research documents

Wisconsin’s WIJISThe Wisconsin Justice Information Sharing program (WIJIS) promotes and coordinates information systems among local, county, and state justice agencies.

Administered by the [Wisconsin] Office of Justice Assistance, WIJIS is develops policies and technical standards for a statewide integrated justice system that will allow agencies to electronically share and transfer data currently stored in local systems.

WIJIS Projects

Online statewide courts case management systems (CCAP)

Online statewide prosecution system (PROTECT)

Law Enforcement Messaging Switch (TIME/E-TIME)

New Justice Gateway (in process)

Wisconsin Outcomes

Implementation of state-level justice systems for prosecution and courts

Significant work completed on justice exchange standards

Justice Gateway – read-only access to multiple justice data sources

Comparison: Wisconsin and Illinois

WIJIS IIJIS

Year Formally Initiated 2001 2001

NGA 2001 Grant $972,000

Agency Sponsor Wisconsin Department of Justice Assistance

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority

Authority Executive Order/statute

Executive Order

Initial Objectives

Governance Grass roots with justice agency IT leads and experts

First defined by charter and included elected officials, association directors, IT leads

Comparison: Wisconsin and Illinois Justice System Implementations

Wisconsin – Court Emphasis Illinois – Law Enforcement Emphasis

Statewide Prosecutor System (PROTECT)

I-CLEAR joint Chicago/ISP arrest/incident data repository for local and state LEAs

Statewide Court System (CCAP) Statewide Criminal History System, which replaced old text-based system (LEADS 2000)

Justice Gateway for transfer of local data (in progress)

New statewide police mobile data systems (IWIN and ALERTS.NET)

Law Enforcement messaging switch (TIME/E-TIME)

New RMS for 50 police agencies (PIMSNET)

Strong executive leadership can defuse dysfunctional conflict

A determined governor can force antagonistic agencies to play reasonably well in the sandbox

Desire on the part of a governor and his/her key staff for justice information sharing can convince individuals within agencies that it is in their best interest to cooperate

Leadership by a key executive at the state, county or municipal levels can convince agency heads that their political futures depend on project success.

Are there any unconditional successes? Anecdotal evidence indicates that most multi-agency

information sharing projects suffer from turf and control issues

Inter-agency information sharing is extremely complicated and is beyond the capabilities of many justice agencies

Years of agency-centric funding have created competitive agency mindsets that are difficult to change

Change-averse IT staff and management staff naturally avoid potentially disruptive projects

State versus local States must provide centralized criminal history information repositories and

supporting infrastructures, as well as create and maintain efficient and effective means of gathering and disseminating such information

States are situated to create standards for the exchange and storage of information so that municipalities and counties are not forced to develop their own local standards

States should not establish an arrest-to-disposition integration schemes for local agencies. Moreover, such a once-size-fits-all approach would fail to capitalize on existing local investment in justice information systems.

Responsibilities should be shared in a way that will establish a statewide network for information sharing, but still allow local entities to integrate their own systems in order to preserve their autonomy and make the most of existing systems investment.

Local efforts At the local level, integration must focus on the operational objectives of

police, prosecution, probation, courts and other allied agencies.

Local efforts can be made much easier if the state develops standards for communications, data definitions and even off-the-shelf software. These standards can then guide the procurements and development efforts of local agencies.

County efforts are probably made easier in certain instances by strong leadership by county commissions and county managers who frequently are seeking return on investment.

County information sharing efforts have historically delivered value even when counties have been forced to build criminal history repositories to compensate for state repository deficiencies.

Significant local projects

LA County San Diego County McLean County Maricopa County Davidson County Harris County

Conflict

Interpersonal Conflicts Intra-group Conflicts Inter-group Conflicts Inter-organization Conflicts Inter-regional Conflicts

A disagreement between two or more parties who perceive that they have incompatible concerns. Conflict is inevitable and can be productive.

Inter-group conflict

Dysfunctional changes between groups causes Increased hostility and distrust Distorted perception Negative stereotyping Decreased communication Increased stress and burnout

Inter-group conflict Changes within Groups

Increased group cohesiveness Increased loyalty to the group rather than to the

organization Rise in autocratic leadership Groups become more task-oriented Increased stress and burnout

Why inter-group conflict occurs

Limited resources Different values Different perceptions Different time horizon Different role expectations Different information environment Different knowledge base Mutually exclusive goals

Dysfunctional conflict

Increases stress and burnout

Reduces morale and job satisfaction

Reduces loyalty to organization

Reduces organizational effectiveness

Greatly amplifies project risk

Wastes resources and time

Conflict manifests itself as: Strategic Noncompliance

agreeing upfront to take action or cooperate and then waiting until the last minute to back out

Information Manipulation Withholding or interpreting information in a such a way as to prevent particular initiatives from progressing.

Occupation Monopolizing resources (people, time) to prevent them from being reallocated to the a particular initiative

Discredit Using personal criticisms to diminish the competence or credibility held by other agency staff

Invisible Walls Covertly blocking forward momentum by creating logistical roadblocks or establishing bogus prerequisite tasks that must be completed before going forward

Camouflage Diverting people with irrelevant issues or projects to keep them away from initiatives.

Powerful Alliances Using relationships and political alliances to prevent initiatives from proceeding.

Filibuster Talking long and hard enough in order to squander time, leaving issues unresolved.

Other conflict factors

Vendor influence may contribute to conflicts surrounding an information sharing technical approach, particularly since certain vendors may lose business depending on the technical direction

Justice agency IT staff will have definite preferences for particular IT solutions and vendor products and thus will tend to diminish the viability of other vendors’ products or technical solutions

Information sharing roadblocksInformation sharing roadblocks Despite availability of technical assistance and a

relatively rich literature describing best practices, decision makers are typically uniformed about integration.

Agency-centric attitudes have created attitudes that allow for information sharing funds to be diverted to initiatives that are only tenuously linked to integration objectives.

Turf motives and change-averse attitudes have caused many agency representatives to overtly support integration but covertly fight it.

More information sharing More information sharing roadblocksroadblocks

Electronic information sharing is technically difficult and complicated. The capabilities required to successfully implement significant information sharing initiatives is simply beyond the capabilities of many state and local agencies.

The political cycle is not conducive toward creating stable environments in which complicated technology initiatives can be designed, developed and implemented.

Justice information sharing project managers tend to have short tenures and are frequently replaced before information sharing initiatives are implemented.

Identifying and Overcoming Barriers to Change

Barriers to implementation of justice business process changes through IT are not reasoned disputes about the value of IT or confusion about how business processes should be altered to be more effective.

Instead, barriers lie in the resistance of individuals and in the informal social relationship structures of the agency.

From Reengineering Justice Business Processes: Identifying and Overcoming Barriers to Change, Michael R. Geerken Ph.D,

The inexperienced are often the most enthusiastic about integration Those furthest from the day-to-day action of

operations and from direct dealings with line personnel – executives or technical specialists who have not come up through the ranks – will often be the most ambitious about change.

The line worker or manager with long experience in operations will see change as much more difficult because they have a better understanding of the criminal justice complexity and the forces of resistance and inertia.


Technologists have the power to scuttle projects

Technologists can resist unwanted change by making that change seem impossible because it is too costly, dangerous, or not technically feasible.

If technologists as a group determine that a project is ill conceived, they usually have the ability to destroy it.


Opposition to change is a rational response Opposition by a justice executive, middle manager, or

line worker to technology driven innovation may be a rational response given their perception of the changes as a threat to them and to their relationships.

Their apprehension lies in the potential impact of IT-based reengineering on personal career survival and social relationships.

They will often have a better appreciation of the effects of proposed changes than the IT experts driving them.


Feudal government structures discourage improvements The coin of the realm in feudal structures is personal

loyalty. Advancement is achieved after suitable loyalty is

demonstrated. This requires that positions must exist that require

only minimal competence and the most blindly loyal tend to be the least skilled.

New business processes require employees with a wider range of skills so positions that can be filled based primarily on loyalty are reduced.


Politics creates a poor environment for positive change Since the holders of these jobs maintain their

positions by political loyalty, they will resist substantial changes in job requirements and resist the need to acquire new skills.

It will be difficult for the chief executive to force change on the loyal ones and he/she will be reluctant to fire them since that would affect the executive’s own career survival.

IT contractors who are campaign contributors may be difficult to manage for the same reason.


The favor market discourages free and open exchange of justice information Information is only a valuable commodity in the

favor market if it is hard to get. The market therefore encourages the restriction of information valued by others in the system.

When IT makes information instantly and easily available to anyone who needs it, the economy of information-based favors is destroyed along with the power of former information brokers.


Recommendations Select only team members who have needed depth and breadth of

knowledge Select people who have “inventor” characteristics Ensure complete, enthusiastic support from the chief executive Install chair or facilitator who has the power to set and enforce rules for

team interaction Implement a set of rules that encourage free exchange of ideas, allow

passion without personal confrontation, require critical reexamination of assumptions and decisions, and allow sufficient time but instill sense of urgency

Establish that the task of the design team is not to decide whether there should be reengineering but only how reengineering should be executed


Passive-Aggressive Organization*

Dysfunction is rooted in a fundamental misalignment of four basic building blocks of the organization: incentives/motivators; decision rights; information; and organizational structure.

It’s a place where more energy is put into thwarting things than starting them, but in the nicest way.

Ineffective Motivators - All factors, explicit and implicit, that affect anything an employee cares about

Unclear Decision Rights. Employees are unsure about the limits of his or her responsibilities end and others

The Wrong Information. Employees are more interested in learning about what goes on inside their company than about the competitive realities that affect the firm’s long-term survival. Employees are also reluctant to share information since doing so might benefit the recipient more than the sharer (or encourage others to interfere).

Misleading Structure. Employees lack clear measures on how they contribute and rely on org charts, etc., to confirm there relative status within the organization. * The Passive-Aggressive Organization by Gary L. Neilson, Bruce A. Pasternack, and Karen E. Van Nuys Harvard Business Review, October 2005

Fixing Passive-Aggressive Orgs Get their attention. A long

history of seeing corporate initiatives ignored and then fade away makes employees almost hopelessly jaded.

Bring in new blood. Outsiders often lead the change

Leave no building block unturned. The way to get their attention is to change everything so that the the problem cannot be denied

Spread the word and the data. No organization can make good decisions without having access to the relevant information.

Match motivators to contribution. Unless those who contribute are rewarded nothing will change

Make decisions, and make them stick. Clarifying and articulating decision rights is often the first order of business

The Passive-Aggressive Organization by Gary L. Neilson, Bruce A. Pasternack, and Karen E. Van Nuys Harvard Business Review, October 2005

Turf wars and national security

An extreme version of influence activities is the turf war. An agent (or agency) can allocate resources either to productive activities or to gaining appropriations, personnel, or other advantages at the expense of another agency. Since the probability of victory in the turf war depends on the resources devoted to it, the less productive agency will devote more resources to winning and thus will tend to win…

Luis Garicano and Richard A. Posner, Intelligence Reform since 9/11: An Organizational Economics Perspective April 19, 2005

Intelligence Information Sharing Failures The intelligence community retards the sharing of information because sharing confers a benefit on the rival agency.

Agents may not share intelligence because they do not want to lose the rents derived from their control of the resulting knowledge.

An agent who has information may realize that passing this information to another agent or agency is the right thing to do. But if he does he will be dissipating some of the rents generated by his monopoly of the information

For an agent to share information in an electronic database decreases his uniqueness and expertise, and thus his power…

Garicano and Posner note that this weakness of the incentives for sharing, as a result of “information ownership” incentives, was emphasized in the 9/11 Commission’s report and continues to plague the intelligence system. The WMD Commission’s report found that “individual departments and agencies continue to act as though they own the information they collect” (WMD Commission, 2005, p. 14).

Members of an organization often have disincentives to share information

Public employees typically compete against each other for pay and promotion

There fixed number of slots at the different career levels Agents may try to sabotage each other concealing

information or providing false information. Agents may squander resources on “influence activities”

that manipulate the perception of their performance by superiors or otherwise gain the favor of those superiors


Posner and Garicano: “Centralization will improve information sharing” A single [intelligence] agency will tend to have a

common code, compatible data networks, uniform access criteria, and other common practices that facilitate the exchange of information Fewer turf wars because of centralized control over the potential

warriors

Weaker incentives to hoard information because the benefits that members of a single

Benefits generated by members of a single agency by sharing with other agencies will tend to further their own careers.


Recommendations Both the WMD and 9/11 Commissions noted that

information technology can improve the sharing of information.

To benefit fully from information technology, organizations usually need to change their structure: Become more decentralized Delegate more decisions to frontline employees because

they have more information at their fingertips Use higher-skilled labor; and to dispense with some of

their hierarchical layers by assigning broader spans of control to each manager


“One reason that government agencies, including intelligence agencies, have been slow to take advantage of the digital revolution is that it is easier for them to resist making the complementary organizational changes necessary to benefit fully from information technology because they do not face the same competitive pressures for efficiency that private businesses do.”


Business model and architecture

Collaboration ready Data assets and

requirements Governance Information policies Leaders and champions Organizational

compatibility Performance evaluation

Project Management Resources Secure environment Stakeholder

identification Strategic planning Technology acceptance Technology

compatibility Technology knowledge

CTG Capability Assessment Toolkit

Purpose of the Toolkit

To contribute to more effective information sharing in the justice enterprise by: supporting for assessing the information

sharing capability of those organizations involved

show how the assessment can be linked to strategies for addressing gaps in capability

provide guide for ongoing evaluation

Toolkit Examples ...

Governance

Limited or no governance mechanism

Clearly defined, organized,

empowered, and active governance

mechanism

Leaders & Champions

No one acting effectively to

lead & champion the initiative

Strong, effective leadership & championing

Toolkit URL’s

Toolkit paper versionwww.ctg.albany.edu/publications/guides/sharing_justice_info

Online Version:http://catoolkit.ojp.gov/introduction

Small successes in New Mexico

In early 2004, the multi-agency information sharing effort was running out of funds and had no legislative commitment for additional funding

The effort had long suffered from turf wars and reallocation of resources to agency infrastructure needs such as telecommunications improvements

The project manager presented a plan to wind down the program, layoff the employees, including himself, and transfer non-monetary assets to member agencies

Possibility of a future for New Mexico information sharing The members of the information sharing coalition agreed to

attempt to create a proof-of-concept system that would consolidate, on-the-fly, data from courts, corrections, probation and parole

The pilot effort is now in production and has gained a broad base of support from justice agency stakeholders

The project is funded at a level that allows ongoing, incremental improvements

During late 2005 the project was transferred from the courts to the New Mexico Sentencing Commission

Small suggestions that may increase the odds of success If possible, place the project under the protective wing of a

committed chief executive – governor, mayor, county manger, etc. Learn to recognize dysfunctional conflict and defuse it by whatever

means needed. While planning for the big picture, implement a small project that

will demonstrate success and attract support If possible, don’t amass too much money too quickly since to do so

may incite a feeding frenzy Every state, city and county has its own unique environment and

cast of players. Each situation may require a different approach – one size does not fit all.

Documents

Identifying and Overcoming Operational Challenges Steve Prisoc, New Mexico Judiciary CIO [email protected]