AD-A274 441

Identification of Decisive Terrain:Useful Concept or Historical Label?

A Monographby

Major Harry D. Scott, Jr

Infantry

E LECTEJAN 0 4 1994

93-31519

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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IDENTIFICATION OF DIECISIVE TERRAIN:USEFUL CONCEPT OR HISTORICAL LADEL?(U)

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MAJ HARRY D. SCOTT JR.

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Harry D. Scott Jr.

Title of Monograph: Identification of Decisive Terrain:Useful Concept or Historical Label

Approved by:

__' ____TCBenL._______,__A__Monograph DirectorLTIC Ben L. leM

/ 1 Director, School ofCJames R. McDonough, S Advanced Military

Studies

_ _ _ _Director, GraduatePhilip J Brookes, Ph.D Degree Program

f'JT IS

1U ,, . .,- . :

J,,. :'t, - , .

Acceptei] this 1 day of _'!;,v 1993By

ir ' - . ...

ABSTRACT

IDENTIFICATION OF DECISIVE TERRAIN: USEFUL CONCEPT ORHISTORICAL LABEL? by MAJ Harry D. Scott Jr., USA- 47pages.

This monograph analyzes the concept of decisiveterrain to determine if a commander can identify decL.'iveterrain at the operational level of war. The monographbegins by examining the introduction of decisive terraininto doctrine and provides a more comprehensivedefinition based on several theorists and research. Nextan analysis is made of how the United States Army'scurrent publications address decisive terrain. Thedocuments reviewed include FM 100-5, FM 34-3, FM 101-5-1,FM 34-130, and ST 100-9. The purpose of tLe next sectionis to examine how the Russians, British, Germans, andChinese armies study key terrain. Two case studies, theGettysburg Campaign and the Austerlitz Campaign, provideexamples of commanders who successfully andunsuccessfully identified decisive terrain. Thecommanders who failed to recognize decisive terrain atthe operational level of war suffered massive casualtiesthat had a significant impact on the future of theirarmies.

The monograph concludes with a section on theimportance of decisive terrain and recommendations on howbetter to define decisive terrain and increase theawareness of decisive terrain in our literature andmilitary schooling. Decisive terrain can be identifiedat the operational level of war. However, theidentification of decisive terrain by a commander orrecommendations by the staff demands determining if anarea has a combination of geographical advantages,affords a marked advantage, becomes so critical that itsloss would mean destruction to the defender, and requiresthe commander to have experience in analy;.ing terrain.Failure to identify decisive terrain can lead to defeator, the next battlefield.

iii

Table of Contents

Title Page. . . . . . . . . . . i

Approval Sheet . . . . . .

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table of contents . .. . . . .... . iv

Introduction . . . . . * . * * . * 1

An Explanation of Decisive Terrain . . .. . . 4

Decisive Terrain as Expressed in the Current UnitedStates Army Publications .... .. . . 10

Terrain as Addressed by Other Armies .... . 15

The Gettysburg Campaign 19

Napoleon Bonaparte and the Austerlitz Campaign . 28

Conclusions and Implications . . . . . . 35

Maps:

1. Lines of Site from Little Round Top . . . . 212. Elevation of the Gettysburg Battlefield . . .. 223. Elevation of the Austerlitz Battlefield .. . . 30

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

iv

INTRODUCTION

Weather and terrain have more impact onbattle than any other physical factor,including weapons, equipment, or supplies.The terrain on which battles are foughtwill present opportunities to both sides.In some cases the advantages areunmistakably clear. Indeed, most battleshave been won by the side that used terrainto protect itself and to reinforce firesto destroy the enemy. 1

Two of the many challenges facing the armed forces

today are providing a common base of understanding in

terms of standardized operational terms and analyzing

the terrain. Terms such as key terrain, decisive

terrain, decisive points, decision points, critical

point, strategic decision point, decigive geographic

point, decisive points of maneuver, and geographic

decisive points are important, but unfortunately are

frequently interchanged and sometimes thought to be

synonymous. Each of these terms should be clearly

defined and understood, not only in United States Army

doctrine, but also in joint and combined doctrine. In

an attempt to solve this dilemma and the difficulties

associated with terrain analysis at the operational

level of war, this monograph will address the most

important of these terms, decisive terrain, and answer

the question: Can decisive terrain be identified at the

operational level of war?

It appears that the obvious answer to the research

-1-

question is an indisputable yes. However, research

indicates that very few commanders had or have the

capability to identify decisive terrain prior to a

battle. The problem is threefold: the current

definition of decisive terrain is vague; the military

education system fails to provide formal instruction on

how to identify decisive terrain; and the doctrine fails

to elaborate on decisive terrain.

To answer this question, I will examine six areas:

an explanation of decisive terrain; decisive terrain as

expressed in the current United States Army (USA)

publications; terrain as addressed by other armies; a

case study of the Gettysburg Campaign; a case study of

Napoleon Bonaparte and the Austcrlitz Campaign; and the

conclusions and implications.

The first area is an explanation of decisive

terrain which examines the introduction of decisive

terrain into the doctrine, the current definition of

decisive terrain, and an examination of how three

predominant theorists, Carl Von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and

Antoine Henri Jomini viewed terrain. A more

comprehensive definition of decisive terrain will be

provided based on research.

The next area is a review of how decisive terrain

is expressed in United States Army publications. The

publications include Army field manuals: FM 100-5 (1993

-2--

Final Draft and 1986), FM 34-3, FM 101-6-1, and

FM 34-130 (1992 Preliminary Draft and 1989) and student

texts from the Command and General Staff College at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. The review of publications

highlights how the literature emphasizes the importance

of decisive terrain. It also notes the absence of

guidance on how to identify decisive terrain, the

variances in the definitions of decisive terrain, and

the general lack of attention paid to the subject of

decisive terrain.

The focus on key terrain by the Russians, British,

Germans, and Chinese armies is analyzed in the third

section. The goal is to determine if these established

armies analyze terrain and identify significant terrain

features at the operational level of war.

Another section provides a case study of the

Gettysburg Campaign. The intent of this section is to

provide an example of decisive terrain at the

operational level of war and show how various commanders

successfully and unsuccessfully conducted their terrain

analysis.

A case study of where decisive terrain was

identified by the commander and was successfully seized

is the purpose of the fifth section. Napoleon

Bonaparte, prior to the Austerlitz Campaign, was able to

identify decisive terrain and shape the battlefield for

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a major victory.

The final area is conclusions and implications.

This section discusses the importance of decisive

terrain and serves as a summary of the previous areas.

Recommendations for the introduction of decisive terrain

into the programs of instruction at the various levels

of military schooling and incorporation into more of the

doctrinal literature is provided.

AN EXPLANATION OF DECISIVE TERRAIN

The identification of decisive terrain on the

battlefield can be extremely important, provided it can

be done prior to the battle. Once a terrain feature or

features is (are) idetitified as decisive terrain,

commanders and staff should direct their efforts in

terms of resources and personnel toward seizing or

retaining it.

In 1981, the term decisive terrain was introduced

into US Army doctrine. The definition provided ,- the

Infantry Officer Advance Course in 1981 was,

any area or locality, whose seizure orcontrol affords a marked advantage toeither opposing force, covers primaryavenues of approach, and whose loss 2would mean destruction to the defender.

In 1982, in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the

definition was modified to, "key terrain is decisive

terrain if it has an extraordinary impact on the

-4-

3

mission. "

The difference between these definitions is

suostantial. The first definition is more specific and

provides clear guidelines for identifying decisive

terrain. The second definition is more open ended and

in fact too vague. It requires the commander to

determine what is considered an extraordinary impact on

the mission.

To help clarify decisive terrain, an examination of

works by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, ,.nd J)mini was conducted.

Sun Tzu directs that war be studied in terms of five4

fundamental factors, of which terrain is one. By

terrain he means "distances, whether the ground is

traversed with ease or difficulty, whether it is open or5

constricted, and the chances of life or death." In

his often quoted verse, "Know the enemy, know yourself;

your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground,6

know the weather; your victory will then be total,"

-he tells the reader the importance of analyzing the

terrain. In several verses, he stresses the

significance of knowing the conditions of mountains,

forests, dangerous defiles, marshes, and swamps and the

degree of difficulty of the terrain.

Very similar to decisive terrain is Sun Tzu's

classification of one of the nine varieties of ground

which he refers to as key ground. Key ground is defined

-5-

as "ground equally advantageous for the enemy or me to7

occupy." Tu Mu, in the footnote on the verse, calls8

this ground "strategically important." Sun Tzu

Ae-rees that key ground should not be attacked if9

occupied.

Antoine Henri Jomini made numerous observations of

topography in his book, Tht Art of War. He provides

many terms and definitions, but he highlights one term

which parallels decisive terrain and "whose importance10

is constant and immense", that term is decisive

strategic point. He defines decisive strategic point as

being "capable of exercising a marked influence either

upon the result of the campaign or upon a single11

enterprise." 'le providcs guidance in how to

determine the decisive point of a battlefield by

examining "the features of the ground, relation of the

local features to the ultimate strategic aim, and12

positions occupied by the respective forces." His

guidance could be expressed as looking at the

interrelationships and impacts of physical, economic,

and cultural geography on the battlefield.

In Qn War, Carl Von Clausewitz provided a chapter

on terrain and in separate chapters addressed how to

handle situations based on various types of terrain such

as mountains, swamps, forests, rivers, and streams. He

highlights the importance ýf the correlation between

-6-

terrain and warfare:

This relationship, to begin with, is apermanent factor - so much so that onecannot conceive of a regular army operatingexcept in a definite space. Second, itsimportance is decisive in the highestdegree, for it affects the operationsof all forces, and at times entirelyalters them. Third, its influence maybe felt in the very smallest feature ofthe ground, but it can also dominateenormous areas. 13

He cautions the use of expressions such as "a dominating

area" and "key to the country," if an area is selected

without first knowing the relative quality of the two14

armies and their commanders.

Clausewitz suggests that only a commander with

talent, experience, imagination, and a sense of locality

can accurately grasp the topography of an area and

overcome the disadvantage of not being able to15

completely reconnoiter the terrain. In reference to

decisive terrain, he discusses terrain as being decisive

if the ground selected is combined with other

geographical advantages, such as the surroundings and

the nature of the ground in relation to one's16

opponent.

Based on the writings of Sun Tzu, Jomini,

Clausewitz, and other research, a more comprehensive

definition of decisive terrain at the operational level

of war might be any area or locali'.,y that is a

combination of geo'7raphical advantages, affords a marked

-7-

advantage to either opposing force, loss that would

mean destruction to the defender, and should be

recognized by the practiced military eye.

There are clearly distinct components to this

definition. The first component of decisive terrain

(e.g., "any area or locality that is a combination of

geographical advantages") accounts for incorporating

the interrelationships and impacts of physical,

economic, and cultural geography. The specific

interrelationships of the terrain are its dimensions,17

composition, form, and dynamics.

The physical features include the topography,

hydrography, and climate and weather. At the

operational level of war, analyzing the topography

includes examining the interrelationships of the natural

and man-made features. This includes studying surface

features such as mountains, rivers, valleys, swamps, and

marshes and their relationships with cultural features

like buildings, towns, road systems, and dams. The type

of vegetation, relief, and drainage patterns are

assessed to determine the impact on air corridors,

avenues of approach, iines of communication, and landing18

zones.

The next physical feature, the hydrography of an

area, includes inspecting all the areas affected by

water, including coastlines, stream beds, and regions

-8--

subject to snow melt and lava flow. The last physical

feature, climate and weather, must be addressed by

examining the current and projected temperature,

humidity, precipitation, and visibility, and the impact19

on operational maneuver, fires, and logistics.

The economic features encompass transportation,

communications, and plutology. An area is viewed in

terms of railroads, airfields, roads, waterways, and the

storage facilities associated with the transportation

network. The communications assessment examines the

available phone lines, cable, television, and radio

assets. The plutology encompasses the financial

facilities, industrial infrastructure, commerce,

agriculture, labor force, public works and facilities,20

and other economic infrastructure.

The cultural features comprises the sociological

and political aspects of the area. The sociology covers

the language, religion, population parameters, social

attitudes, and other similar factors. The politics are21

how an area is governed and organized.

The second component of decisive terrain (e.g.,

"affords a marked advantage to either opposing force")

means the area seized or occupied provides distinct

advantages to the occupying lorce. The advantages

provided are in terms of observation, fields of fire,

and cover and concealment.

The third component of decisive terrain (e.g.,

"loss that would mean destruction to the defender")

states the extreme importance of decisive terrain. The

physical disregard, loss, or failure to seize the

feature translates into heavy casualties, rendering the

forces combat ineffective, or forcing the withdrawal or

surrender of the defenders.

The last component of decisive terrain (e.g.,

"should be recogniz'd2 by the practiced military eye")

means that the commander needs to use his experience to

identify the terrain as decisive. This involves the

commander sensing space and time relationships, war

gaming the battle through visualization, and constantly

reflecting upon the actions he would take on the

battlefield. HE reconnoiters the ground for

restrictions and specific soil and vegetation

conditions, determines the roughness of the terrain, and22

calculates how the terrain will protect his forces.

DECISIVE TERRAIN AS EXPRESSED IN THE CURRENT UNITEDSTATES ARMY PUBLICATIONS

These two factor's - weather and terrain -have decisively influenced the outcome ofbattles throughout the history of warfare.Yet, incredibly, military planners canstill be found who are willing to casttheir operational mold in ignorance of, orwith disregard for, the dictates of thesetwo vital considerations. 23

-10-

It is important to review the current United States

Army doctrinal and academic literature in order to gain

a better understanding of how decisive terrain is

addressed. Decisive terrain is mentioned in some of the

doctrine, but unfortunately no guidance is provided

reference how to identify it. There are no field

manuals, field circulars, or training circulars that

offer procedures or techniques in how to identify or

utilize decisive terrain.

The keystone doctrinal manual of the Army, FM

100-5, Operations (Final Draft), has a discussion on the

commander's view of terrain at the strategic,

operational, and tactical level. A detailed explanation

and a definition of decisive points is provided, but is

lackirg for decisive terrain. The presentation on

decisive terrain is limited to remarks in the sections

on movement to contact, offensive terrain and weather

considerations, and defensive terrain and weather

considerations. In the section on movement to contact,

a decisive terrain feature is mentioned as the objective

of two forces striving to obtain its occupation.

Offensively, decisive terrain "can become the focal24

point of the attack", while defensively "some

terrain may be so significant to the defense that its25

loss would prove decisive.

In the 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations,

-11--

decisive terrain is mentioned several times. In a

discussion on defeating enemy forces at the operational

level, it is recommended that the occupation of decisive

terrain by friendly forces can force the enemy to fight26

under unfavorable conditions. The paragraph on

decisive terrain is very similar to the definition

provided in FM 101-5-1.

The commander may designate key terrainas decisive terrain if accomplishmentof his mission depends on seizing orretaining it. Many battlefields willnot have decisive terrain. Thecommander designates decisive terrainin his concept of operation tocommunicate its importance to his staffand to subordinate commanders. 27

One more difference in terms of decisive terrain

between the draft FM 100-5 and the 1986 version is that

the 1986 version mandates that when decisive terrain is28

identified it becomes the focal point of the attack.

The 1993 final draft implies that it is optional in

making decisive terrain the main focus.

FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, defines decisive

terrain as "that terrain which, if not controlled or if

controlled by the opponent, significantly degraded the

commander's ability to successfully accomplish the29

mission." An example is provided that compares

decisive terrain with key terrain. The crossing sites

on the Fulda River in Germany are considered decisive

terrain because crossing the river without fording

-12-

capabilities is impossible because the river is too wide

and difficult to cross. The Harmn River is considered

key terrain, but not decisive terrain because it is not

an obstacle to movement, but does hinder enemy30

movement. The definition of decisive terrain

provided is vague and differs from the one provided in

FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics.

Operational Terms and Symbols, FM 101-5-1, provides

the following definition of decisive terrain.

Key terrain is decisive terrain if it hasan extraordinary impact on the mission.Decisive terrain is rare and will not bepresent in every situation. To designateterrain as decisive is to recognize thatthe successful accomplishment of themission, whether offensive or defensive,depends on seizing or retaining it. Thecommander designates decisive terrain tocommunicate its importance in his conceptof operations, first to this staff and,later, to subordinate commanders. 31

The Command and General Staff College at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas publishes ST 100-9, The Command

Estimate Process. This student text is not doctrine,

but offers a description of the tactical decision making

process, and offers examples of how to implement the

doctrine found in FM 101-5. In the chapter on

intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the section

on terrain briefly addresses decisive terrain.

Decisive terrain is defined as "key terrain that has an

extraordinary effect on the accomplishment of the

-13-

mission. Accomplishing the mission normally depends on32

seizing or controlling decisive terrain." Once

again, no mention is made of how to identify decisive

terrain.

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the

Bateield, has the same two sentences on decisive

terrain that were previously stated in ST 100-9. It

does emphasize the importance of normal y seizing

decisive terrain in order to insure accomplishment of33

the friendly mission. Regrettably, this is the

extent of the explanation on decisive terrain.

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the

kt&1lgIigid, (1992 Preliminary Draft) has an excellent

discussion on analyzing terrain as part of describing

the battlefield environmen- and considerations for

terrain analysis at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels of war. Unfortunately, there is only

one paragraph on decisive terrain. This paragraph

describes decisive terrain as being rare and not always

present. It also mandates the success of the mission on

seizing or retaining decisive terrain and requires the

commander to select it and convey its importance to34

staff and commanders.

This review of the United States Army doctrinal

literature reveals some of the problems associated with

decisive terrain. Very few of the manuals address

-14-

decisive terrain and those that do, only mention it in

several sentences. There is not a single publication

that tells the commander specifically how to identify

decisive terrain or how to assist the intelligence and

operations officer in making recommendations to the

commander. A distinction should be made for the

commander in how to identify decisive terrain at all the

levels of war.

TERRAIN AS ADDRESSED BY OTHER ARMIES

Ccnformation of the ground is of thegreatest assistance in battle. Therefore,to estimate the enemy situation and tocalculate distances and the degree ofdifficulty of the terrain so as tocontrol victory are virtues cf thesuperior general. He who fights withfull knowledge of these factors iscertain to win; he who does not willsurely be defeated. 35

Chinese Gereral, Sun Tzu

It is important to study how other armies analyze

terrain, especially with respect to the identification

of key terrain and possibly decisive terrain. The

Russian, British, German, and Chinese successes and

failures in battles throughout history have been related

to terrain.

Combat success to a great degree dependson the exactness with which terrain isstudied and evaluated and on the abilityto detect difficult and beneficialconditions which it creates for subunitoperations. 36

-15-

This quotation by P.T. Savchenko suggests that the

Russians are concerned abcut terrain analysis. A

concerted effort is made by the Russians to analyze

terrain in order to calculate its best utilization for

mission success. Special emphasis is placed on the

ground force officers' training to include terrain

analysis as part of the study of military topography.

The Russian officers are trained to approach terrain

analysis as a science and evaluate terrain by using

aerial photographs, maps, other terrain data, and most37

importantly personal reconnaissance. "Military

topography, in its broadest sense, is one of the most

important components in the tactical training of

officers, sergeants and enlisted men in all arms of the38

service."

However, in the same study conducted by the US Army

Russian Institute, it was concluded that the operational

and tactical commanders suffered several major

weaknesses in analyzing terrain. The time allocated by

the higher headquarters to conduct personal

reconnaissance was insufficient. Additionally, the

officers' ability to correctly evaluate terrain was

limited, because of only being exposed to one specific

type of terrain during training. Finally, their methods

of conducting terrain analysis were scientific, but the

Russians were weak in practicing the art of terrain

-16-

39

analysis.

The Russians' terrain analysis at the operational

level did include som' • intification of key terrain.

In the 1 9 30s, operational targets were assaulted by

using airborne forces at the same time as massed armored

forces were deployed. The mission of the airborne

forces was to seize key terrain in order to block the

withdrawal or reinforcement of enemy soldiers, while the40

armored forces advanced rapidly to link up.

More recently, prior to the end of the cold wa"-

the Russian war plans called for the seizing and denying

of key terrain that would serve as future battle41

positions for the deployment of NATO forces. Also

decisive strategic and operational points were planned42

as part of the Russian deep attack.

The British acknowledge the concept of key terrain,

especially in conducting the defensive operational

battle. Key terrain is defined as "an area the holding43

of which gives a marked advantage to either side."

In establishing their main defensive battle, the

positional defense or mobile defense is emplcyed. The

selection of the type of defense depends on the presence

or absence of key terrain, tactical nuclear weapons and44

air superiority.

The Germans, similar to the British, place enormous

emphasis on holding key terrain. Commanders are

-17-

required to identify key terrain within their assigned

sectors. Their key terrain is very similar to the US

Army decisive terrain. The commanders are instructed to

defend key terrain against all attacks and to

immediately counterattack to seize the terrain if45

lost.

The Chinese armed forces or People's Liberation

Army (PLA) view terrain in several aspects. China's

current focus is on a defensive land strategy with

offensive actions oriented at the operational and

tactical levels of war. Also China's geography and

climate causes seasonal analysis of the terrain. The

severe winter season in the northern part of China

limits the construction of defenses and aerial support,

while freezing lakes, rivers, and swamps provide

additional avenues of approach to consider. Finally,

because of the dominant mountainous terrain, emphasis is

placed on seizing key heights and passes and defending46

these positions even if enveloped.

The Russians, British, Germans, and Chinese

practice varying degrees of terrain analysis. They all

identify key terrain, similar to decisive terrain, but

fail to provide detailed instruction on how to identify

decisive terrain.

-18-

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

... that hill (Little Round Top) was, as isuniversally admitted, the key to the wholeposition, and the issue of the battle andprobably the destiny of the governmentdepended upon its occupation. 47

The American Civil War provides numerous examples

of how terrain was viewed by crmmanders as decisive.

The Gettysburg Campaign provides an example of decisive

terrain at the operational level of war. The commanders

who successfully recognized Little Round Top as decisive

terrain were Generals: Robert E. Lee, George G. Meade,

James Longstreet, Jubal A. Early, and John Bell Hood,

and Colonel William C. Oates. However, one commander,

General Daniel Sickles, fails to recognize Little Round

Top as decisive terrain.

I will prove that Little Round Top was decisive

terrain by using the components of decisive terrain

(e.g., "any area or locality that is a combination of

geographical advantages", "affords a marked advantage to

either opposing force", "loss that would mean

destruction to the defender", and "should be recognized

by the practiced military eye").

The first component of decisive terrain (e.g., "any

area or locality that is a combination of geographical

advantages") is portrayed very well by Little Round

Top. From Little Round Top the view is limited only by

-19-

Seminary and Snyder's Ridges, "its western face cleared

by chance the year before the battle, afforded the

finest panoramic view then available of the countryside48

south of Gettysburg." The land between Seminary

Ridge and Cemetery Ridge consisted of cultivated ground

covered with wheat and corn, peach orchards, and cow

pastures. The ground "was open to the foot of the hill,

and an advance of the enemy from that direction could be49

plainly seen from the main line" (See Map #1).

Because the ground was open on the western face of

Little Round Top, artillery could be drawn up its slopes

more readily and thus provided excellent coverage of the

avenues of approach by fire.

Little Round Top exemplified another component of

decisive terrain (e.g., "affords a marked advantage to

either opposing force") in terms of its elevation (See

Map #2). Little Round Top can best be described as one

of the most predominant terrain features in the vicinity

of Gettysburg. It is about fifty feet higher than

Cemetery Ridge and affords a view of several miles to

include Seminary Ridge and the southern part of

Gettysburg. Little Round Top enabled a very small force

in the defense to control a very large force in the

attack. If anyone tried to attack Little Round Top,

he would first have to ascent a very steep hill so

"thickly strewn with huge rocks, so that no deployment

-20-

0 C,001)1133

G GETET YSBURG

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ui

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Ll TL ROUND TOP 5-0-MAP I

I LINE OF(FROMSIGHT x

IG RO ND TOPA

-21-

GETTYSBURG

~)LI 1fLE ROUND TOPL5 1 -E L E VAT10N

IG ROUNjlD TOP B

52

of troops could be made." Additionally, the faces

of Little Round Top were open, having been deforested to

provide lumber for casslons, and thus limited

concealment for the attacker while providing the

defender excellent fields of fire.

The third component of decisive terrain is that the

occupation of a key terrain feature would mean

destruction of the defender which is also the situation

with Little Round Top. If the Confederates were to

occupy Little Round Top, the last Union position on the

left flank, they could place effective artillery fire on

the flank of the Army of the Potomac, be poised to cut

off communications, and force the Union to withdraw from

Cemetery Ridge. Besides forcing the Union to withdraw

to low open terrain, the Confederates could seize

control of the Taneytown Road. Control of the

Taneytown Road would mean the seizure of General Meade's

entire supply trains, his artillery reserves, and the

elimination of one of only two roads he could use to53

conduct a retrograde operation.

Supporting the last component of decisive terrain

(e.g., "should be recognized by the practiced military

eye") are some observations of Little Round Top made by

Union and Confederate leaders. The Commander- of the

Army f Northern Virginia, Gcneral Robert E. Lee, first

visualized the importance of Little Round Top when he

-23-

decided to conduct a spontaneous two front attack with

General Ewell in the north and General Longstreet in the

south. General Lee determined that General Meade would

place more emphasis on his right flank in preparation

for an attack from Ewell than on his left, neglecting

the natural bastions of Little Round Top. Lee would

then attack from the southwest

... to overlap the enemy's left flank androll him up to the north of the Ru',nd Tops.When the enemy flank was completely turned,the Confederates would push on to the highground of the ridge and take and hold theplateau. The Federal troops ... would becaught in enfilade and forced to abandonthe position. 54

General George G. Meade, Commander of the Army of

the Potomac, also identified Little Round Top as being

vitally important. He emphasized that it was more

elevated than the terrain the Confederates were on and

consequently the artillery was provided greater range.

General Meade also alluded to the fact that the terrain

to the west of Little Round Top was open and diminished

the chance of surprise. Besides these advantages, ".

the enemy must advance to the attaok up an ascent, and

must therefore move slower, and be, before coming upon

us, longer under our fire, as well as more55

exhausted."

Other leaders felt that Little Round Top was the

key to the Union defense. According to General James

-24-

Longstreet, Commander of the First Corps, Army of

Northern Virginia, Little Round Top not only provided

outstanding protection, but also served as a rallying

point. It inspired Federal troops so much by its

massive defensible boulders, that it was transformed

into an impregnable defense, stopping the Confederate56

advance. General Jubal A. Early, division commander

under Ewell, believed that if the harsh terrain of

Little Round Top was defended either on top or at the57

bottom of the hill no defender could be moved.

General John Bell Hood, division commander under

Longstreet, made the following comment concerning Little

Round Top:

it seemed to me that the enemy occupied aposition so strong - I may say impregnable- that, independently of their flank fire,they could easily repel our attack bymerely throwing or rolling stones down themountain side as we approached. 58

Finally, Colonel William C. Oates, Commander of the 15th

Regiment under Longstreet, was astonished when he

climbned Big Round Top, overlooking Little Round Top, and

determined that it would only take thirty minutes to

transform Little Round Top into a Gibraltar capable of59

defending against ten times his numbers.

These leaders all recogn±1.vd tne importance of

Little Round Top as a decii.vý. t-Žriin feature.

However, one man, General Daniel Sickles, Commander of

-25-

III Corps, Army of the Potomac, failed to realize the

importance of Little Round Top. He felt that his

defensive sector along Cemetery Ridge and Little Round

Top was too low and would spread his forces too thin.

He also believed the terrain along the Emmitsburg Road,

if occupied by the Confederates, would provide them with

the capability of placing effective artillery fire on

Cemetery Ridge. General Sickles regarded the area

between Little Round Top and Emmitsburg Road as

providing the Southerners with good cover and60

concealment.

Believing the Confederates would have these

advantages, General Sickles, without orders, moved

forward and positioned one division along the Emmitsburg

Road and formed a right angle with his other division

stretching from the Peach Orchard to Devil's Den. This

formed a line twice the length of the mile long stretch

of ridge vacant to his rear (Little Round Top and

Cemetery Ridge). This move physically separated his

corps from the rest of the Union army and allowed his

flanks to be fired upon simultaneously. "As a result,

thc position had little depth, practically no reserves

or physical feature to fall back on, and was unsupported

on both ends. To some, it seemed an outright invitation61

to disaster

General Sickles' mistake was a fatal one. His

-26-

defensive line broke wide open when the most extended

part of his formation was hit on all sides. Sickles'

Third Ccrps, rendered combat ineffective, attempted to

retreat to Little Round Top. While III Corps was

retreating, a foot race was taking place between Union

General Warren and Confederate General Hood, both

realizing the first one to occupy Little Round Top could

win the battle.

Brigadier General G.K. Warren, Chief of Engineers

on General Meade's staff, rode along the Union line, as

General Sickles' III Corps was being decisively

engaged. General Warren discovered the bald, unoccupied

knob he was standing on, Little Round Top, was a very

important position. He saw a long line of enemy

soldiers approaching it and knew, if it was occupied by

the Confederates, they could enfilade the entire length

of Cemetery Ridge. At the same time, General Hood, who

outflanked Sickles' III Corps, sent a six man

reconnaissance party to investigate Little Round Top.

The scout party

climbed to the summit of Round Top, lookeddown on the Federal army with its trainsand artillery reserve that had been parkedwith a scant guard in the rear of the RoundTops, and discovered that its flank was infront of these eminenc-5. Thousands ofFederal soldiers could be seen along linesextending to the no-th but rnone were on theSummi.ts. 62

The race continued between General Warren and

-27-

General Hood to seize Little Round Top. The winner was

General Warren, for he was able to convince Colonel

Strong Vincent, a brigade commander under General

Barnes, to place his brigade along Little Round Top,

without waiting for orders. Colonel Vincent's brigade

arrived ten minutes before the Confederates and held

Little Round Top after one and one half hours of

gruesome combat. Holding Little Round Top meant the

Union left flank was protected and the trains and

artillery reserves kept intact.

Little Round Top was decisive terrain. It was an

area of geographic advantages and it could have served

as a marked advantage to both the Union or the

Confederacy. The lo3s of Little Round Top would have

surely meant the destruction of the Union defensive

line. General Sickles chose to ignore Little Round Top

and his III Corps suffered substantial casualties.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE AND THE AUSTERLITZ CAMPAIGN

The greatest talent of a general and thesurest hope of success lie in some degreein the good choice of these poimnts(objective points). This was the mostconspicuous merit of Napoleon. To detectat a glance the relative ,-Lvantagespresented by the different zones ofoperations, to concentrate the mass ofthe forces upon that on- which gave thebest promise of success, ... such wasthe system followed by Napoleon in hisfirst campaigns. 63

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Napoleon decided to fight in Central Europe after

his plan to attack England was revoked by the major

defeat off Cape Trafalgar. He would fight the allied

powers of Tsar Alexander I of Russian and Emperor

Francis I of Austria. This significant battle would

take place near the village of Austerlitz in December

1805.

The Battle of Austerlitz provides another example

of how terrain was viewed by a commander as decisive at

the operational level of war. The commander who

successfully analyzed terrain and recognized Pratzen

Heights as decisive terrain was General Napoleon

Bonaparte.

By using the components of decisive terrain it will

be demonstrated that Pratzen Heights was decisive

terrain. First, Pratzen Heights was an area that

exhibited the combination of geographical advantages.

The relationship between the topography and hydrography

of the Austerlitz battlefield exposes Pratzen Heights as

decisive terrain.

Bordered by the Moravian Alps in the north and the

Littawa River in ":. south, the highest point of

elevation is the ',Atzen Heights, a three hundred meter

elevated plateau (See Map #3). It was almost three

miles in length and one and one half miles in width at

the widest point. On the northwest corner was one hill

-29-

MVAP 3 61A6ý& ELEVATION

-- TERLI-

- -

<z

l27

-30-

mass, the Stare Vinohrady and in the southwest was

Pratzeberg (340 meters). To the west of the plateau

were the Goldbach Brook, Goldbach Stream, and the

Bosenitzen Stream. Based on the warmer water

temperatures of the numerous streams, combined with the

cooler air temperatures, the formation of fog was

inevitable. The heights were high enough in elevation

not to be impacted by the formation of fog except to

limit the observation of lower terrain.

The Brunn-Vienna Highway and the Iglau-Brunn

Highway were the only roads that physically

accommodated an operational concentration of soldiers on

the battlefield. If the enemy used the ground south of

the Pratzen Heights he would have to use roads which

became narrow defiles as he approached the Goldbach

Brook. The river could easily be defended by a small65

force.

The Pratzen Heights exemplified another component

of decisive terrain by affording a marked advantage to

the French and the x7u-tjians in terms of its elevation

and observation. As previously mentioned, the Pratzen

Heights is the highest point of elevation between the

Moravian Alps to the north and the Menitz and Satschan

Ponds in the south. The heights provide observation of

the seven mile stretch from the town of Brunn to

Austerlitz and the only two major roads the Olmutz and

-31-

Brunn-Vienna.

The third component of decisive terrain was also

illustrated by the Pratzen Heights in terms of the

destruction of Tsar Alexander's forces. The abandonment

of the Pratzen Heights by Tsar Alexander I would split

his forces in two and subject their movement through

restricted terrain to the north and south of the

Pratzen Heights. If Napoleon could seize the heights,

he could cut off Alexander's line of communications,

sever his command and control, and fight only a66

fraction of the Allied forces one at a time.

The last component of decisive terrain is pertinent

to Napoleon. His experience and ability to see the

battlefield and prepare for this battle is best

expressed by his own words,

If I always appear prepared, it is becausebefore entering on an undertaking, I havemeditated for long and have foreseen whatmay occur. It is not genius which revealsto me suddenly and secretly what I shoulddo in circumstances unexpected by others;it is thought and meditation. 67

Napoleon's ability to visualize terrain and

identify key and decisive terrain was part of his

inherent genius. His time spent in terrain analysis was

thorough and extremely accurate. He required several

items to be completed prior to commencing an operation.

He would carefully study the terrain, making sure every

road was reconnoitered and march tables were prepared.

-32-

Next, he would inform his commanders, via letters and

verbal instructions of the objectives for the campaign,

and how to use the terrain. Finally, he constantly war

gamed the impacts of terrain on his and the enemy's68

operations.

On the evening of 21 November, more than one week

before the Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon completed

his ground reconnaissance and selected the Pratzen

Heights as the decisive terrain.

The Emperor slowly and silently went overthis newly discovered ground, stoppingseveral times on its most elevated points,looking principally toward the Pratzen.He carefully examined all its characteristicsand during this survey turned towards us,saying, "Gentlemen, examine this groundcarefully, it is going to be a battlefield;you will have a part to play upon it." 69

The following summary of the Battle of Austerlitz

stresses the importance of Napoleon's terrain analysis

and his focus on the Pratzen Heights. The Russians

under Alexander demonstrated on the Olmutz Road on

Napoleon's left flank. Alexander's forces advanced from

the village of Kobelnitz to Tellnitz using his forces

from the center and left, abandoning Pratzen Heights, in

an attempt to envelop Napoleon's right flank and cut his

line of communications to Vienna.

Napoleon maneuvered his secondary effort against

Alexander's secondary attack along the Olmutz Road.

Napoleon's main effort, using the heavy fog along the

-33-

Goldbach Brook and Bosenitzer River to cover his

movement ianeuvered his forces concentrated between

Puntowit,; and Jirschikowit2. and advanced for the Pratzen

Heights.

By seizing the Pratzen Heights, Napoleon was aole

to attack the flank of Alexander's center forces enroute

to Kobelnitz. He then divided Alexander's forces by

retaining the Pratzen Heights. He blocked the crossing

sites of the Goldbach Brook and forced the enemy in the

south into the frozen Satschen Pond. In the north,

Napoleon blocked Alexander's forces on the Olmutz Road

and forced them to withdraw.

The decisiveness of the Pratzen Heights and the

subsequent French victory at the battle of Austerlitz at

the operational and strategic levels of war are

demonstrated by the casualty figures and the political

significance. The French losses were 1305 killed, 6940

wounded and 573 captured. Alexander's forces suffered

11,000 Russian killed, 4000 Austrians killed, 12,00070

prisoners, and 180 guns and 50 colors captured.

Politically, Napoleon annihilated the armies of two

emperors and forced the collapse of Britain's Third

Coalition. Francis II, Emperor of Austria, signed the

Treaty of Pressburg and ceded territories to the Kingdom

of Italy and Bavaria. Alexander I, Emperor of Russia,

informed Napoleon that he was going away and it would

-34-

require a hundred years for his army to equal Napoleon's

forces. William Pitt, the British prime minister,

received no profitable returns for Britains financing of

Austrian, Prussian, and Russian forces and when hearing

of Napoleon's victory, replied "roll up the map of71

Europe. We shall not need it these seven years."

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Occupation of Cemetery Ridge and the twoelevations, especially Little Round Top,with enough Federal Troops would give theArmy of the Potomac an almost impregnableposition. 72

Napoleon drew the larger army from itsposition on a strategic height (PratzenHeights), captured those same heights andeasily annihilated much of the army thathad been sent to crush him. 73

The answer to the original question: Can decisive

terrain be identified at the operational level of war?,

is "yes". Several commanders at the Battle of

Gettysburg and Napoleon at the Battle of Austerlitz

identified decisive terrain such as Little Round Top and

the Pratzen Heights. The decisiveness of this terrain

had major impacts on the operational level of war.

The Battle of Gettysburg marked the turning point

of the Civil War and it was the last time the

Confederates were able to launch a major offensive into

northern territory. The victory by Napoleon at the

-35-

Battle of Austerlitz forced the Austrians and Russians

out the war the next day after the battle, and permitted

Napoleon to control most of continental Europe for the

next two years.

However, the identification of decisive terrain by

a commander demands determining if an area has a

combination of geographical advantages, affords a marked

advantage, becomes so critical that its loss would mean

destruction to the defender, and requires the commander

to have experience in ana.lyzing terrain.

lt is important to remember that it is a

commander's responsibility to designate decisive terrain

and that not all battlefields will have decisive

terrain. The intelligence and operations staffs need to

make recommendations and assist the commander in

identifying decisive terrain and therefore also need the

training in identifying decisive terrain. Based on

intervipws with students arid instructors at the infantry

and intelligence basic and advanced courses, Combined

Arms Staff Services School, Command and General Staff

College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, the

Pre-Command Course, and the Army War College, decisive

teýrrain ij briefly mentioned only in the advanced course74

instruction and only at the tactical level.

Our educational -nstitutions need to revise their

programs of instruction to include guidance on what

-36--

decisive terrain is and how to identify it. Formal

instruction must be provided on hcw the physical,

economic, and cultural geography interrelate and yield

advantages. The experience required of the commander

and staff can be gained by conducting exercises

involving decisive terrain and by examining historical

case studies.

To train commanders and staffs on how to properly

conduct a terrain analysis and identify decisive terrain

the United States Army, joint, and combined publications

need to standardize the definition and provide more

detailed guidance on what constitutes decisive terrain.

Manuals such as FM 100-5, Operations, FM 101-5, Staff

Organization and Operations, FM 34-3, Intelligence

Analysis, ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, FM

101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 34-130,

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and AR

310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms,

JCS Pub. 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms, and Army Field Circulars need to

adopt a bettLr and standardized definition of decisive

terrain and provide guidance on how to identify decisive

terrain.

The importance of decisive terrain needs to be

emphasized in our doctrine and schooling institutions.

History is replete with examples of commanders who

-37-

achieved overwhelming success by properly using

terrain. But the commanders who failed to recognize

decisive terrain at the operational level of war

suffered massive casualties that had a significant

impact on the future of their armies. Failure to

identify decisive terrain can lead to defeat on the next

battlefield.

-38-

ENDNOTES

1

US Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1982), 3-1.

Information presented during the Infantry: OfficerAdvance Course, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1982.

3FM 100-5, 3-4.

4Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (New York: Oxford,

1971), 63.

5Tzu, 64.

6Ibid, 129.

7Ibid, 130.

8Ibid, 130.

9Ibid, 131.

10Antonie Henri Jomini, Jomini and His Summary of

the Art of War, ed. Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle, Roots ofStrategy Book 2. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books,1987), 467.

11Ibid, 467.

12Ibid. 468.

13Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton, New

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 109.

14Ibid, 354.

-39-

15Ibid, 109.

16Ibid, 142, 353.

17Stanley M. Needleman, "Earth Science Applied to

Military Use of Natural Terrain," (Bedford,Massachusetts: Air Force Cambridge ResearchLaboratories. 1969), 75.

18Joint Chief of Staff Pub 5-021.1 Joint Operation

Planning System VolAme 1 Deliberate Planning Procedures(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), Appendix C-2.

19Ibid, Appendix C-2.

2)Ibid, Appendix C-4.

21Ibid, Appendix C-4, C-5.

Don T. Riley, "A Sense of Locality and TacticalAgility," (Monograph, SAMS, US Army CGSC, 1986), 8.

23Allan C. Bevilacqua, "Weather and Terrain

Forgotten Factors", Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA:Marine Corps Association, 1973), 42.

24US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Final. Draft),

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 11-3.

25Ibid, 13-3.

26US Army, FM 100-5. Operations, (Washington, DC:

Department of the Army, 1986), 29.

27Ibid, 80.

28Ibid, 121.

-40-

29US Army, FM 34-3. Intelligence Analysis,

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 4-10.

30Ibid, 4-10.

31US Army, FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and

Symbols, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,1985), 1-22.

32US Army Command and General Staff College, ST

100-9. The Command Estimate, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 7-3.

33US Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of

the Battlefield, (Washington, DC: Department of theArmy, 1989), A-31.

34US Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of

the Battlefield (Preliminary Draft), (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1992), 3-13.

35Tzu, 35.

36James P. Reams, "The Science and Art of Soviet

Terrain Analysis," (Garmisch, Germany: U.S. Army RussianInstitute, 1981), 6.

37Reams, 10.

38Reams, 3.

39Reams, 15-16.

40James L. Saunders, "Rear Operations,' (Monograph,

SAMS, US Army CGSC, 1987), 17.

41Ibid, 27.

42Ibid, 39.

-41-

43Christopher Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare,

(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 146.

44Bellamy, 147.

45Bellamy, 142.

46Bellamy, 160-162.

47Jacob Hoke, The Great Invasion, (New York: Thomas

Yoseloff, 1959), 350-351.

48William A. Frassanito, Gettysburg A Journey in

Time (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), 154.

49Oliver W. Norton, The Attagk and Defense of

Lttle Round Top, (New York: Neak Publishing Co., 1913)266.

50Theodore W. Howard, "A Terrain Study of the

Gettysburg Battlefield," (Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1986), 20.

51Howard, 16.

52Norton, 299.

53Jack McLaughlin, Gettysburg The Uog Encampment,

(New York: Appleton-Century, 1963), 90.

54Clifford Dowdey, Death of a Nation, (New York:

Alfred A. Knoff, Inc., 1958), 182.

55Frank A. Haskell, The Battle of Gettysbura,

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 27.

56Hoke, 351.

-42-

57Dowdey, 156-157.

58Shelby Foote, The Civil War, (New York: Random

House, 1963), 499.

59Glenn Tucker, High Tide at Gettysburg, (New York:

The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958), 254.

60Abner Doubleday, hgncellorsville and Gettysburg,

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882), 162-163.

61Foote, 496.

62Tucker, 245.

63Jomini, 468-469.

64Albert S. Britt, III, Cmpaign Atlas to Wars of

Napolqon, (West Point, New York: United States MilitaryAcademy Department of History, 1976), 22.

65Eben Swift, "The Development of Modern Strategy.

The Influence of the Terrain as Shown in the Campaignsof Napoleon," (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Army War College,1910), 9.

66Robert M. Epstein, "The Different Levels of War

in the Napoleonic Period - Austerlitz and Friedland,"(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and GeneralStaff College, 1989-1990), 18.

67US Army, FM 34-8. Combat Commander's Handbook on

Intelligence (Final Approved Draft), (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1992), 3-13.

68Swift, 8.

69Epstein, 16.

-43-

70Geoffrey Regan, The Guinnes Book of Decisive

Battles, (New York: Canopy Books, 1992), 152.

71Ibid, 152.

72McLaughlin, 76.

73Kenneth C. Davis, Don't Know Much About

Geography, (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1992), 229.

74Author interviews with two instructors in the

Infantry Officer Basic and Advance Courses, two studentsin the Intelligence Officer Basic and Advance Courses,three students and one instructor in the Command andGeneral Staff College, one student in the Army WarCollege, one instructor in the Pre-Command Course, andone instructor in the Tactical Commander's DevelopmentCourse, from 6-22 Jan 1993., (Due to the nonattributionpolicy the officers' names are withheld)

-44-

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Interviews

Author interviews with two instructors in the InfantryOfficer Basic and Advanced Courses, two students inthe Intelligence Basic and Advanced Courses, threestudents and one instructor in the Command andGeneral Staff College, one student in the Army WarCollege, one instrutor in the Tactical Commander'sDevelopment Course, and one instructor in thePre-Command Course, from 6-22 Jan 1993. (Due to thenonattribution policy the officers' names arewithheld)

Information presented during the Infantry OfficerAdvance Course, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1982.

Government Publications

Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 5-02.1. Joint OperationPlanning System Volume 1 Deliberate PlanningProcedures. Washington, DC: GPO, 1988.

US Army. FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis.Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990.

US Army. FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook onIntelligence (Final Apprcved Draft). Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1992.

US Army. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield. Washington, DC: Department of the Army,1989.

US Army. -FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield (Preliminary Draft). Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1992.

US Army. FM 100-5. Operations. Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1982.

xUS Army. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 1986.

US Army. FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft).Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993.

-45-

US Army. FM 100-i5-1 Corps Operations.(UneditedCoordinating Draft). Washington, DC: Department ofthe Army, 1991.

US Army. FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols.Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and GeneralStaff College, October 1985.

US Army Command and General Staff College. ST i00-9.The Command Estimate. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USArmy Command and General Staff College, July 1992.

Books

Bellamy, Chris. The Future of Land Warfare. New York:St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Britt, Albert S. CampaignAtlas to Wars of Napoleon.West Point, New York: United States Military AcademyDepartment of History, 1976.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Princeton, New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1976.

Davis, Kenneth C. Don't Know Much About Geography. NewYork: William Morrow & Co., 1992

Doubleday, Abner. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882.

Dowdey, Clifford. Death of a Nation. New Nork: AlfredA. Knoff, Inc., 1958.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War. New York: Random House,1963.

Frassanito, William A. Gettysburg A Journey in Time.New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975.

Haskell, Frank A. The Battle of Gettysburg. Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1958.

Hoke, Jacob. The Great Invasion. New York: ThomasYoseloff, 1959.

Jomini, Antonie Henri. Jomini and His Summary of theArt of War. ed. Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle, Roots ofStrategy Book 2. Harrisburg, PA: StackpoleBooks,1987.

-46-

McLaughin, Jack. Gettysburk the Long Encampment. NewYork: Appleton-Century, 1963.

Norton, Oliver W. The Attack and Defense of LittleRound Top. New York: Neak Publishing Co., 1913.

Regan, Geoffrey. The Guinness Book of DecisiveBattles. New York: Canopy Books, 1992.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1971.

Tucker, Glenn. High Tide at Gettysburg. New York: TheBobbs-Merrill Company, 1958.

Unpublished Dissertations, Theses, and Papers

Epstein, Robert M. "The Different Levels of War in theNapoleonic Period -- Austerlitz and Friedland."SAMS, US Army Command and General Staff College,1989.

Howard, Theodore W. "A Terrain Study of the GettysburgBattlefield." Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army WarCollege, 1986.

Needleman, Stanley M. "Earth Science Applied toMilitary Use of Natural Terrain." Bedford,Massachusetts: Air Force Cambridge ResearchLaboratories, 1969.

Reams, James P. "The Science and Art of Soviet TerrainAnalysis." Student Research Report, US Army RussianInstitute, Garmisch, Germany. 1981.

Riley, Don T. "A Sense of Locali-y and TacticalAgility." Monograph, SAMS, US Army Command andGeneral Staff College, 1986.

Saunders, James L. "Rear Operations: Protecting thePoints of Decision." Monograph, SAMS, US ArmyCommand and Genera] Staff College, 1987.

Swift, Eben. "The Development of Modern Strategy. TheInfluence of the Terrain as Shown in the Campaigns ofNapoleon." Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Army War College,1910.

Journals and PublicationsBevilacqua, Allan C. "Weather and Terrain Forgotten

Factors." Marine Corps Gazette, December 1973.

-47-