IDEALISM AND THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree

■pU'L-Master of Arts

In

Philosophy

by

John Ishmael Odito

San Francisco, California

May 2015

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Copyright by John Ishmael Odito

2015

CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read Idealism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness by John

Ishmael Odito and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in

Philosophy at San Francisco State University.

Carlos Montemayor, Ph.D Associate Professor

Alice Sowaal Ph.D Associate Professor

David Landy, Ph.D Associate Professor

Idealism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

John Ishmael Odito San Francisco, California

2015

In this paper I argue that consciousness is both epistemically and metaphysically

primitive, and I offer reasons why, given David Chalmers’ commitment to a certain view

of fundamentalism, he should reject both reductive and nonreductive explanations of

consciousness. I then offer reasons why I think idealism is a better resource for

understanding consciousness, and I explain how I can advocate idealism on the basis of

the epistemic and metaphysical primitiveness of consciousness. Finally, I give a reason

for why idealism is a better alternative to dualist views.

I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this Thesis

Chair, Thesis Committee Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my father, Chris Odito, and my mother, Doris Odito for instilling in me

the curiosity and adventurousness that has led to my formal study of philosophy.

I would also like to thank professors Carlos Montemayor, David Landy and Alice Sowaal

for their support and guidance in developing this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction................................................................................................................................ 1

Section 1.....................................................................................................................................7

A. Consciousness is epistemically primitive..............................................................9

B. Consciousness is metaphysically primitive..........................................................12

Section 2................................................................................................................................... 17

A. Why I believe that idealism is true given the preceding reflections .................17

B. How I can have an idealist view that is based on the epistemic andmetaphysical primitiveness of consciousness........................................................ 19

C. Why idealism is better than other dualist view s.................................................20

Conclusion...............................................................................................................................21

Bibliography........................................................................................................................... 22

1

Introduction

David Chalmers has a specific formulation of the hard problem of consciousness

in his paper “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”:

There is no question that experience is closely associated with physical processes

in systems such as brains. It seems that physical processes give rise to experience,

at least in the sense that producing a physical system (such as a brain) with the

right physical properties inevitably yields corresponding states of experience. But

how and why do physical processes give rise to experience? Why do not these

processes take place “in the dark, ” without any accompanying states o f

experience? This is the central mystery of consciousness.1

I agree with Chalmers’ claim that this is the central mystery of consciousness.

Chalmers also thinks that, true to its title, the “hard problem” is so hard that reductive

explanations of this problem all fail.2 1 also agree with him about this claim as well. A

reductive explanation of consciousness, as Chalmers defines it, explains how and why it

is that physical processes are associated with experience wholly on the basis of physical

principles that do not themselves make any appeal to consciousness.3 A nonreductive

explanation is one in which consciousness (or principles involving consciousness) is

1 David Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature, ” in Blackwell Guide to2 Ibid., 23 Ibid., 3

2

admitted as a basic part of the explanation.4 He gives an example of a reductive

explanation. He says: “To explain the gene, for instance, we needed to specify the

mechanism that stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the

next. It turns out that DNA performs this function; once we explain how this function is

performed, we have explained the gene.”5 But he does not think that this type of

explanation will work for consciousness, because consciousness, unlike the gene, is not a

matter of the performance of a function. Rather, consciousness is a matter of experience,

a matter of there being something it is like to be conscious. And this fact of experience

cannot be explained in terms of functions.6

It is important to note here that there is a difference between the reductivist and

the identity theorist. The identity theorist is the most reductive of the reductivists, but

there are reductivists who are not identity theorists. The identity theorist holds that mental

states are identical to brain states, but there are other types of reductivists who do not

hold this. For instance, there are reductivists who hold that mental states supervene on

brain states; other reductivists hold that brain states necessitate mental states. This is

important to note because the identity theorist is but one version of the reductivist, and

4 Ibid., 35 D. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal o f ConsciousnessStudies, 2(3):200-19, 1995, 5

6 Ibid., 5

3

though Chalmers does not make the distinction himself, there are other alternative ways

of being a reductivist.

While there are at least two areas of convergence between Chalmers and myself,

there is a further claim on which we diverge. Chalmers claims that where reductive

explanations of consciousness have failed, nonreductive explanation will succeed7.1

disagree with this claim: I will argue that nonreductive explanation will fail as well. The

reason I disagree with this claim has to do with a further claim that Chalmers makes in

order to support his claim that nonreductive explanation will succeed. This claim is the

following: experience is fundamental, that is, it cannot be explained in terms of

something else:

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental.

We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something

fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with

the absence o f consciousness. We might add some entirely new non-physical

feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a

feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental

feature of the world, alongside mass, charge and space-time. If we take

7 Ibid., 13

4

experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a

theory of experience.8

He articulates this idea even further in terms of the concept of ontological novelty in the

“Interlude” in his paper “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”:

If consciousness is not necessitated by physical truths, then it must involve

something ontologically novel in the world: to use Kripke’s metaphor, after fixing

all the physical truths, God had to do more work to fix all the truths about

consciousness. That is, there must be ontologically fundamental features of the

world over and above the features characterized by physical theory. We are used

to the idea that some features of the world are fundamental: in physics, features

such as spacetime, mass, and charge, are taken as fundamental and not further

explained. If the arguments against materialism are correct, these features from

physics do not exhaust the fundamental features of the world: we need to expand

our catalog of the world’s basic features.9

My objection is that once Chalmers admits that experience is fundamental and

novel, he is thereby also committed to the claim that we cannot have a theory of

conscious experience at all, let alone a nonreductive theory of consciousness. This is

8 Ibid., 149 Chalmers, Consciousness, 28

5

problematic for Chalmers because he claims that we can have a theory of consciousness

once we accept that experience is fundamental.

Fundamentalism, as Chalmers depicts it, is the idea that if a feature of the world is

taken as fundamental, then no successful attempt can be made to explain this feature in

terms of anything simpler:

Although a remarkable number of phenomena have turned out to be explicable

wholly in terms of entities simpler than themselves, this is not universal. In

physics, it occasionally happens that an entity has to be taken as fundamental.

Fundamental entities are not explained in terms o f anything simpler. Instead, one

takes them as basic, and gives a theory of how they relate to everything else in the

world. For example, in the nineteenth century it turned out that electromagnetic

processes could not be explained in terms of the wholly mechanical processes that

previous physical theories appealed to, so Maxwell and others introduced

electromagnetic charge and electromagnetic forces as new fundamental

components of a physical theory. To explain electromagnetism, the ontology of

physics had to be expanded. New basic properties and basic laws were needed to

give a satisfactory account of the phenomena.10

What Chalmers seems to be missing is the connection between fundamentalism and

explanations: what he seems not to realize is that once experience is taken to be

10 Chalmers, Facing, 14

6

absolutely simple, then this metaphysical move is also, ipso facto , an epistemological

move that predetermines whether we can understand experience as a concept in terms of

other, more basic concepts. And this is what my objection comes to: we cannot have

absolute knowledge o f any feature once it is taken to be fundamental.

In section 1 of this paper I develop more fully the thesis that nonreductive

explanation fails; I do this by articulating the difference between the epistemic and

metaphysical primitiveness of consciousness. I argue that consciousness is both

epistemically and metaphysically primitive: consciousness is epistemicallyprimitive in

that we cannot conceive it to be reducible to structures and functions or to anything more

basic; consciousness is metaphysically primitive in that there is no way the world could

be such that consciousness is physical, and therefore consciousness is absolutely basic. In

arguing for the epistemic and metaphysical primitiveness of consciousness, I will in

effect be arguing for the thesis that nonreductive explanation also fails to explain

consciousness.

In section 2 of this paper I will answer the following questions in an attempt to

provide an alternative account of consciousness: a) Why do I believe that idealism is

true? b) How can I have an idealist view that is based on the epistemic and metaphysical

primitiveness of consciousness? c) Why is idealism better than other dualist views?

7

Section 1

Summary o f different views on the metaphysics o f consciousness and their relevance

In his paper “Consciousness and its place in Nature”, Chalmers provides an

overview of the different views that are prevalent in the metaphysics of consciousness. In

this section, I will summarize these views and explain their relevance to the project in this

paper.

The first view that Chalmers covers is Type-A materialism. According to Type-A

materialism, there is no epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths; or at

least, any apparent epistemic gap is easily closed. According to this view, it is not

conceivable (at least on reflection) that there be duplicates of conscious beings that have

absent or inverted conscious states. And on this view, on reflection there is no “hard

problem” of explaining consciousness that remains once one has solved the easy

problems of explaining the various cognitive, behavioral, and environmental

functions.1 'Type-A materialism is relevant because those who hold this view claim that

consciousness is both epistemically and metaphysically reducible, which is what I argue

against in this section of the paper.

The next view is Type-B materialism. According to this view, there is an

epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal domains, but there is no ontological

gap. According to this view, zombies and the like are conceivable, but they are not

metaphysically possible. And on this view, while there is a hard problem distinct from the

11 Chalmers, Consciousness, 9

8

easy problems, it does not correspond to a distinct ontological domain. Type-B

materialism is relevant because those who hold this view claim that while consciousness

is epistemically primitive, it is nevertheless metaphysically reducible. I argue against

them as well in this paper.

Another view that is commonly held is Type- D dualism. Type-D dualism holds

that microphysics is not causally closed, and that phenomenal properties play a causal

role in affecting the physical world. On this view, usually known as interactionism,

physical states will cause phenomenal states, and phenomenal states cause physical

states. The corresponding psychophysical laws will run in both directions. On this view,

the evolution of microphysical states will not be determined by physical principles alone.

Psychophysical principles specifying the effect of phenomenal states on physical states

will also play an irreducible role.13 The relevance of this view is that in its most familiar

version it is a sort of substance dualism on which there are separate interacting mental

and physical substances or entities. This view is relevant because the thesis of idealism

that I argue for challenges the claim that one of the types of substances that this dualist

holds to exist actually does exist: namely the substance of matter.

Finally, there is the view known as Type-E dualism. This view holds that

phenomenal properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties, and that the

phenomenal has no effect on the physical. This is the view usually known as

epiphenomenalism (hence type-E): physical states cause phenomenal states, but not vice

12 Ibid., 1413 Ibid., 29

19

9

versa. On this view, psychophysical laws run in one direction only, from physical to

phenomenal. The view is naturally combined with the view that the physical realm is

causally closed: this further claim is not essential to type-E dualism, but it provides much

of the motivation for the view. This view is relevant because, as with Type-D dualism,

the thesis of idealism that I argue for challenges the claim that one of the types of

substances that this dualist holds to exist actually does exist: namely the substance of

matter.

A. Consciousness is epistemically primitive

As discussed above, the concept of epistemic primitiveness entails that

consciousness cannot be conceived as reducible to anything more basic, such as

structures and functions. The first and most important step in arguing for the fact that

consciousness is epistemically primitive is to constantly keep in mind just what the

phenomenon of consciousness is. As I explained in the introduction, the way I am using

the word “consciousness” is to refer to the phenomenon of experience; it is the fact that

there is something it is like to see the color red or to taste peppermint or to feel joy.

Now if consciousness is to be identified with matter or anything more basic, we

must be able to see that in virtue of which this identity holds. In other words, it must be

possible to articulate just what it is about consciousness that makes it identical to

something more basic. My claim is that the concept of consciousness is toto genere

different (different in every respect) from any other state, including physical states.

10

As I will show in the next paragraph, the justification for this claim comes from

the fact that the concept of consciousness is not intelligible in terms of other concepts

such as the concept of matter: because they are toto genere different, different in all

respects, material states and mental states stand in an arbitrary relationship to one

another, and it is not possible to see just what it is in the one type of state, that identifies it

with the other type of state. In other words, it is not conceivable that there is any reason

to identify material states and mental states.

Why is this so? What is it about the relationship between material states and

mental states that makes this relationship so stubbornly arbitrary? The answer I have to

give has to do with the properties or attributes that we use to conceive these different

states: these properties are categorically different for matter and consciousness, and so

whenever we conceive or imagine material states and mental states juxtaposed it is easy

for our imagination to pry them apart on the basis of the categorical difference between

the different properties that characterize these different states.

Matter is characterized essentially by the properties of position, shape, size,

motion and mass. In other words, it is impossible to conceive of matter without thinking

of it in terms of position, shape, size, motion and mass. Unlike matter, consciousness, or

conscious experience, is characterized essentially by the fact that there is something it is

like to be in a conscious state. This type of state is toto genere, ‘in all aspects’, different

from material states. It is absurd to think of the experience of redness as having a

position, shape, size, motion or mass. More importantly, it is impossible to conceive of a

11

non-arbitrary relationship between such an experience and matter or material states,

which is what a solution to the hard problem of consciousness would have to offer.

Those who deny that consciousness is epistemically primitive, such as Type-A

materialists, are forced to deny the obvious and to claim that there is no such thing as

consciousness. Type-A materialism (I am following Chalmers in using this terminology)

is the view that there is no “hard problem” of explaining consciousness that remains once

one has solved the easy problems of explaining the various cognitive, behavioral and

environmental functions. For this materialist consciousness is neither epistemically nor

metaphysically primitive; rather, consciousness is both epistemically and metaphysically

reducible to matter and material states. This view often takes the form of eliminativism,

holding that consciousness does not exist and that there are no phenomenal truths. Since

for these materialists there is nothing about experience to be explained, consciousness is

not an explanandum at all and so they can comfortably assert the reality only of the

matter and material states without having to account for how experience could ever be

understood in terms of these material states.

But to deny the phenomenon of consciousness is disingenuous. Prior to our

knowledge of anything else about the world, we know of our own subjective mental

states: we know whether we are feeling cold, pain or love, and we know just what it is

like to feel cold, pain or love. Even matter and its material states are only known to us as

our own subjective mental states: when we see the size, shape or motion of some object,

we are first aware that these are states of our own mind before we can assert the reality of

12

the object as some independent thing or substance. Hence, Type-A materialists lose

credibility by denying something that is so central and intuitive to our experience of

ourselves. As Chalmers proclaims at the very beginning of his paper “Facing Up to the

Problem of Consciousness”, nothing is more intimately familiar to us than conscious

experience and nothing could be harder to explain14: the Type-A materialist denies both

of these aspects of our experience. The Type-A materialist denies that consciousness is

familiar to us, and he denies that there is anything to explain. As such, he corrodes his

own credibility either as someone with a genuine human experience in the world because

he doesn’t even think there is such a thing as the experience of joy or red or as someone

who is taking philosophical problems seriously.

Therefore consciousness, on our view, must be granted as an explanandum and,

more importantly, it must be granted that it is not conceivable in terms of structures and

functions, material states, or anything more basic. Hence, consciousness is epistemically

primitive.

B. Consciousness is metaphysically primitive

As we defined it earlier, the concept of metaphysical primitiveness is the concept

that there is no way the world could be such that consciousness is physical, and therefore

consciousness is absolutely basic. This may be understood as a stronger assertion than

14 Chalmers, Facing, 1

13

epistemic primitiveness, for we are no longer merely dealing with limits on our

knowledge or what is conceivable, but we are now dealing with the scope and limits of

what is metaphysically possible.

It is important at the outset here to note that unlike the Type-A materialist, who

holds that consciousness is both epistemically and metaphysically reducible to matter and

material states, there is another type of materialist, the Type-B materialist, who holds that

while consciousness may be epistemically primitive, it is nevertheless still

metaphysically reducible to matter and material states.

Here I think it is legitimate to charge the Type-B materialist with dogmatism:

since there is no way that, by his own admission, he could know or conceive of

consciousness as something physical, the further assertion that, in spite of that,

consciousness just is physical, is nothing more than a mere groundless assertion. The

burden of proof shifts to the Type-B materialist to tell us on what grounds he asserts that

consciousness is nevertheless reducible and physical; failure to meet that burden leaves

the assertion that consciousness is also metaphysically primitive intact.

It is at this point that we can see more clearly the charge that I raised against

Chalmers concerning fundamentalism: that his metaphysical move to make experience

fundamental is ipso facto an epistemological move as well. By granting experience

metaphysical primitiveness - that is, taking it to be fundamental - he is also thereby

granting it epistemic primitiveness. It would make no sense for him to claim that

14

experience was not epistemically primitive, but was metaphysically primitive: for in that

case we would be able to conceive of consciousness as reducible, but in fact it would not

be reducible. As such we can see why, given their primitive posture, both reductive and

nonreductive explanations of consciousness will fail: they fail because there is nothing

more basic in terms of which we can explain it. Explanation of consciousness, in terms of

the hard problem, is not the empirical, scientific pursuit of every possible relationship

that consciousness has with every possible variable: rather it is looking for a reason why

we have consciousness in the first place, which Chalmers has forfeited as we see in the

passage above.

Finally, we are also in a position to evaluate the strength of the conceivability argument

that Chalmers presents in “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”15.

We can put the argument, in its simplest form, as follows:

(1) It is conceivable that there be zombies.

(2) If it is conceivable that there be zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies.

(3) If it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, then consciousness is non­physical.

15 Chalmers, Consciousness, 6

15

(4) Consciousness is nonphysical.

Let’s unpack each premise.

Premise 1 suggests that it is conceivable that there could be some aggregation or

configuration of matter or body that was itself in no way associated with consciousness

either as an attribute or a substance. It must be made clear here that what we are

conceptualizing is substance with a particular type of attribute, the attribute of extension.

As a zombie, therefore, there is nothing it is like to be such a thing; the physical systems

such as brains that are to be found in such zombies are not accompanied by any states of

experience. So that what we are claiming in effect is that it is conceivable that a

substance with the attribute of extension is toto genere different from and independent of

any other substance or attribute. So far, so good: nothing seems objectionable here.

Premise 2 claims that if it is conceivable that there be zombies, then it is

metaphysically possible that there be zombies, suggesting that conceivability entails

possibility. This is the most tendentious and controversial of all the premises. In light of

the earlier reflections in this section, the attribute of extension, which is the essence of

matter or body, does not seem to logically require any other attribute such as the attribute

of thought or consciousness: it can exist on its own, much like any substance to which it

16

may be attributable. An objection may be raised by materialists that any metaphysically

possible zombies would necessarily also be conscious, but this claim is completely

groundless: there is nothing in virtue of which the attribute of extension must be

accompanied by the attribute of thought; the most apt expression for this state of affairs

comes from Chalmers when he stated in the passage earlier that “everything in physical

theory is compatible with the absence o f consciousness. ” The materialist may object, but

nevertheless the burden is on him to show that this is false, at least conceptually, or else

he faces the charge of dogmatism.

Finally, premise 3 claims that if it is metaphysically possible that there be

zombies, then consciousness is non-physical. This too, like premise 1, is not

controversial, for the zombies in question would be wholly physical, wholly a matter of

extension, and therefore toto genere different from consciousness, which would have to

be non-physical, since consciousness would only be what it is in virtue of thought, not

extension.

Since it is a deductively valid argument, all that is left to test whether it is a good

argument is its soundness, which depends not only on the logical structure but also on the

truth of each premise. As we have just seen, there are good reasons why each premise is

acceptable, and so the argument is both valid and sound in virtue of the reflections we

have engaged in in this section.

17

Section 2

A. Why I believe that idealism is true given the preceding reflections

As Robert Adams writes in Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist:

A construction of the whole of reality out of perceiving substances and their

perceptions and appetites exemplifies a broadly idealist approach to metaphysics.

Leibniz was the first of the great modern philosophers to develop an idealist

metaphysics.16

He goes on to remark that ‘the most fundamental principle of Leibniz’s metaphysics is

that “there is nothing in things except simple substances, and in them perception and

appetite”.’17

The appeal of an idealist metaphysics, especially as a potential solution to the

hard problem of consciousness, lies in the fact that ab initio, from the beginning, it

privileges states of experience, states of perception, as constituting all objects, granting

from the outset that, metaphysically, at the deepest level of reality, all that exists are

states of experience, states of which we may say that there is something it is like to be

them. This is why a philosopher like Leibniz was drawn towards an idealist metaphysics

16 Robert Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford University Press, 1994), 117 Ibid., 1

18

in the first place: from the plethora of states of experience that are possible for a human

being as a subject of experience - love, hate, grief, hot, cold, red, yellow - Leibniz makes

the inference that each of these states of experience, or perceptions as he calls them, is the

state of some substance.

It is important to note that in attempting to imagine these substances, these simple

substances or substances without any parts, we should not try to conceive of them as

having any of the properties of matter: simple substances, or monads, as Leibniz calls

them, have no position, shape, size, motion or mass. They are toto genere different from

what material substances would be, and indeed they are presupposed by material

substances because for any motion or shape or size that we observe on some physical

object, there is also, in the very same situation, a perception or state of experience of a

corresponding subject that is conscious of these qualities of motion, shape and size.

So in response to the hard problem of consciousness, which asks how and why

physical processes are ‘accompanied by’ or ‘yield’ or ‘give rise to’ corresponding states

of experience, an idealist like Leibniz is able to respond that, in fact, physical processes

do not yield or give rise to these states of experience at all, because at the most

fundamental level of reality, there are no physical entities and no physical processes: all

that there are is things or substances that are engaged in different states of perception and

in different appetites that change these perceptions. That is all that one can find in a

simple substance: perceptions and changes in perception; and this description of simple

19

substances is quite faithful to the facts of what we are and how we experience ourselves,

insofar as we ourselves are monads.

Thus, idealists are in a position to readily confess the arbitrariness of the

correlation between mental states and brain states, for instance: rather than trying to solve

Chalmers’ formulation of the hard problem, they are in a position to dissolve the problem

entirely. The question now becomes not why there are perceptions or states of experience,

but what there are. And these things or substances that engage in perception and

appetition are the only type of thing that there are for the idealist.

B. How I can have an idealist view that is based on the epistemic and metaphysical

primitiveness o f consciousness

Actually the idealist view is not only compatible with the epistemic and

metaphysical primitiveness of consciousness, but it presupposes it. As we noted earlier,

the reason for the primitiveness of consciousness is our inability to reduce consciousness

to purely physical principles. Idealism claims that all that exists are states of

consciousness or experience, and so it gives these states a fundamental, novel, and

primitive status ab initio, from the very beginning.

With respect to epistemic primitiveness, the idealist too holds that consciousness

is not conceivable in terms of structures and functions or anything more basic; as for

metaphysical primitiveness, the idealist also holds that there is no way the world could be

such that consciousness is physical and therefore consciousness is absolutely

fundamental, novel and primitive.

20

C. Why idealism is better than other dualist views

Dualist views are views that there are two types of substance rather than just one,

and the most popular types of dualism are Type-D dualism (Cartesian substance dualism)

where physical states cause phenomenal states, and phenomenal states cause physical

states, and Type-E dualism (Epiphenomenalism) where physical states cause phenomenal

states, but not vice versa.

The great advantage of idealism over these dualist views lies in the fact that, for

lack of a better word, idealism has less metaphysical “baggage” accompanying it. The

baggage I have in mind is the metaphysical substance of matter: the whole genesis of the

hard problem of consciousness comes from trying to identify a non-arbitrary relationship

between material states and mental states, and if we assume that there are no material

states to begin with then we no longer have this particular formulation of the problem.

We are either after some reason for identifying material states and mental states, or some

reason why they stand in some causal relation to one another, or some reason for them to

stand in some other relation to one another. And idealism does not assume anything more

than is revealed empirically in our experience of the world: we never have any experience

21

of matter as an independent substance. We only have experiences of particular groups of

qualities, such as shape, size position, texture, velocity and weight, for instance. This

virtue of simplicity positions idealism to jettison all metaphysical baggage and to

describe faithfully only that which we experience, and what it is like. There is a sense in

which idealism evades the hard problem rather than solves it, but at least it offers a

bonafide metaphysical description of the world that it constructs out of simple perceiving

substances.

Conclusion

As we have seen, there are strong reasons to believe that consciousness is both

epistemically and metaphysically primitive. Matter and material states are different in

every respect from consciousness and mental states, and so the one type of state cannot

be identified with the other; there are no grounds for reducing the one type of state to the

other.

Also, I have given reasons to support the claim that idealism is true: all that we

find in monads - the substances that we are - are perceptions and changes in perception

and we never come across any other substance such as matter. And although the dualist is

at least partially right in asserting the existence of the substance of mind, there is no need

for him to commit to the existence of the substance of matter because all that we are

really aware of are groups of qualities that compose things and we never come across any

substance in which these qualities inhere.

22

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Robert. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford University Press, 1994.

Chalmers, David. “Consciousness and its Place in Nature” In Blackwell Guide to Philosophy o f Mind edited by S. Stich & T. Warfield. Blackwell, 2003

Chalmers, D. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” Journal o f Consciousness Studies, 2(3):200-19, 199