ICOMMANID - apps.dtic.mil · 001 between NDU.CCRP and the Harvard Program on Information Resources Policy. Dr, Lewis Sorley of Asonic Services Corp., Potomac, Maryland, proof-read

ICOMMANIDAND

LCONTROL0V) WAR

ANDNm PEACE

TI'llil)NMAS P[ COAIK LIKIY

4s4

('MMANI) ANn (JONTHOI.RPRANNARI PRO(]INAM

The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) is a partof the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU,Established in 1983, the CCRP directs research on emergingnational issues in command and control, including ways to"improve instruction on this vital topic in joint Professional

P Military Education, The CCRP provides an active constituencywithin Joint Professional Military Education for command andcontrol while performing a "bridging" role between the Jointdoctrine, operational and engineering, and technologicalcommunities. The CCRP also promotes general understanding

1J. of command and control through efforts such as this book, Theglobal scope of command and control and the three-dimensionalinteraction of command, control, and the world-wide

..... cummunications that support the command and control processare symbolized by the CCRP logo.

The cover illustration is based on Washington Crossing theDelaware, an 1851 oil on canvas work by Emanuel GottliebLeutze, John Stewart Kennedy gave the painting to theMetropolitan Museum of Art In New York in 1897.

7V

PTIS GRA61DTIC TABUnancuoncaedJust

Availability Codes

* : 1,

For salm by the Superlnntendnt of Documents, U.S, Government Printing OfficeWashington, DO 20402ISBN 00-a18.000337.3

PTo QUAIJTTY BFOrn

COMMAND AND CONTROLFOR WAR AND PEACE

I..S-.... . . . . . . . . . .

COMMANDAND

CONTROLFOR

WARAND

PEACETHOMAS P. COAKLEY

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

ROBERT T. HERRES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS'Washington, D.C.

I .•93 1 04 050

.................................. ...J....J.

National Defense University Press Publications. To increase generalknowledge and inform discussion, NDU Press publishes books on sub-jects relating to U,S. national security. Each year, in this effort, TheNational Defense University, through the Institute for National Strate-gic Studies, hosts about two dozen Senior Fellows who engage In originalresearch on national security issues, N DU Press publishes LAe beat of thisresearch, In addition, the Press publishes especially timely or distin.guished writing on national security from authors outside the Universi-ty, new editions of out-of-print defense classics, and books based onconferences concerning national security affairs,

The figure on page 59 is printed by permission- the rest of this publica-tion is not copyrighted and may be quoted or reprinted without permis-sion, Please give full publication credit,

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied with.In are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent theviews of The National Defense University, the Department of Defense,or any other Government agency, Cleared for public release; distribu-tion unlimited,This book was supported by the Command and Control Research Pro-gram of National Defense University under contract DAHC-3.-89-C-001 between NDU.CCRP and the Harvard Program on InformationResources Policy.

Dr, Lewis Sorley of Asonic Services Corp., Potomac, Maryland, proof-read the page proofs of this book under contract DAHC 52-91-M-1928.Shirley Rosenberg of SSR, Inc,, Washington, DC, indexed this bookunder contract DAHC 32-91.00045,

NDU Press publications are sold by the U,S. Government PrintingOffice, For ordering information, call (209) 788.5328, or write to:Superintendent of Documents, U,S, Government Printing Office,Washington, D,C, 20402.

Library of Congress Cataloging.In-Publiestion Data

Coakley, Thomas P.Command and control for war and peace/Thomas P, Coakley.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index,1, Command and control systems. 2. Command and control

systems-United States, 1. Title,UB212.C62 1991 91-2855355.S'3041 -dc20 CIPFirst prditng, J.suary 1992

Vf.......-......

.,|

FOR KATHY

Today's world is one of exploding itformation, of the potential formaking smarter decsions faster and of using smaller forcesoverall to respond quickly-hopefully in time to head off directinvolvement in conflict.

-ADMIRAL BOBBY R. INMAN, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

tj- iJ

CONTENTS

F orew ord ................................................................... Ki

Acknowledgments ............ ...... ................................. xiii

Introduction by General Robert T. Herres................... xv

1. The Broad View of Command and Control ........ S2. C2: Process and System .............. 6.. ... ................... 17S. C2 T echnology ................................................. 554. The Human and Organizational Aspectso f C 9 .................................................................. 9 5

5. An Impossible Dream: Information That IsComplete, True, and Up-to-Date ............. . ...... 125

6. A Matter of Balances ...................................... 1417. Fighting Sm art ....... ........... ....... ..... .............. 177

N otes ......................................... , ................ .. 185

Ind ex ...................................................................... 2 0 1

Harvard Univerity Center for Information PolicyResearch Affiliates ................................................... 215

The Author ................................................ .. ... 219

tt

FOREWORD

With the passing of the Cold War, the United Statesis leaving a forty-year period of great danger but adegree of certainty and entering a new era of re-duced danger but greatly increased uncertainty.Leaders face the challenge of meeting growing re-sponsibilities with fewer resources and people, in lesscertain surroundings, and in even more distant cor-ners of the globe. In this post-Cold War era, theneed for effective command and control (C2) is morepronounced than ever.

In Command and Control for War and Peace,Thomas Coakley attempts to resolve what formerVice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GeneralRobert Herres calls in his introduction "the mysterythat seems to cloak the world of command and con-trol systems." Accepting this challenge and en-couraged by General Herres to write a bookexplaining command and control in p lain English,Coakley has demystified the arcane C1 world. Withcommon sense and with ordinary historical illustra-tions, he leads the reader to a clear understanding ofthe human, organizational, budgetary, and proce-dural elements fundamental to command and con-trol,

This broad view enables the reader to deal bet-ter with communication technology and its often be-wildering jargon. It also helps him understand why

S4 1i!

'jy

FoREWoRD

C2 has grown by steps to what many now call"CS12"-command, control, communications, intelli-gence, and Information, It encourages the readerneither to fear the technical side of command andcontrol nor to expect perfect C2 in combat. For allthose reasons, this book should be useful to thosehaving to deal with the extraordinary responsibilitiesof modern warfare,

J. A. BALDWINVICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVYPRE.SIDENT, NATIONAL DEFFNSE UNIVERSITY

IX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The list of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitudefor help with this book is extensive. It includes Dr.Fred Kiley, Director of NDU Press, who conceivedthe absurd notion of an English professor writing abook about command and control, and Dr. AnthonyG. Oettinger, Chairman of Harvard University'sProgram on Information Resources Policy, who notonly seconded Fred's idea but also spent three yearshelping me research and think about the material inthis book and a previous one.

The Program on Information Resources Policy,which Dr. Oetting,,er chairs, was established in 1972with a novel funding mechanism. Because it wouldbe dealing in areas of high stakes and corporate andpolitical self-interest, it set out to establish a broadbase of financial support from all sides on an issuethat the Program addrisses*, The Program has par.ticipants from all segments of the information busi-ness, as well as organizations that are consumers ofinformation. Competing industries and competitorswithin industries are represented. (Contributors cur-rent to publication of this book are listed on page215.)

I'm grateful also to Brigadier General Erlind G.Royer, Dean of Faculty at the Air Force Academy(USAFA) and Colonel Jack M. Shuttleworth, Headof the Department of English, who gave me the time

'di'

I

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

to work on the project; to Lieutenant Colonel .ner H. Schaeffer and his staff at the USAFA Libri-ry-especially Mr. Robert E. Jennings and Ms.Florence Klemm-for their friendly and enthusiasticsupport of my research; to NDU's Dr. Stuart E.Johnson, Director of the Strategic Concepts Devel-opment Center, and Dr. Tom Julian, Director ofCommand and Control Research, who financed theproject; to Dr. Oettinger's colleagues and staff atHarvard, especially John F, McLaughlin, Oswald H.Ganley, Claire Bishop, Maria Waite, and MaryWalsh, who helped with everything from developingideas to proofing manuscripts; to Lieutenant Colo-nels Paul Taibl and John Clements, Ms. Laura Hall,and other members of the NDU Press staff-esp.-cially my very patient, thorough, and accommodat-ing editor, Ms. Jan Hietala; and to my good andgenerous friends Jim Gaston and Doris Miller, whoread, critiqued, and made very helpful suggestionsthroughout my work on the project.

Finally, I owe a special "thank you" to my wife,Kathy, and our children-Katrina, Tom, Sue, andBekka-for their encouragement and support at alltimes, but especially over the past three years, dur-ing which period they spent an extraordinaryamount of time hushing each other--"sshh . . Dad'swriting"-and rushing me to and from the airport.And, on top of all that, they read the manuscript.

xiv

Id

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INTRODUCTION

The mystery that seems to cloak the world of com-mand and control systems has confounded a goodmany military people and defense specialists foryears. The reasons for this are as elusive as are thehopes for ready solutions to the problems that con-stantly plague the stewards of these systems-theirarchitects, managers, and users.

Although much has been written about specificcommand and control system problems over the pasttwo decades, there is surprisingly little in print thataddresses this business from a broad, conceptualviewpoint. Each of the practitioners tends to see theprocess from perspectives that vary widely and at thefrequent expense of the balance such an approachdemands. Users are not good students of the com-mand and control process because there is far toolittle available to them to study without wadingthrough either legions of technically oriented mate-rial or else simplistic, operationally focused treat-ments of exercises or "after-actions" work thataddresses specific scenarios rather than concepts.

With his text, Thomas Coakley has done greatservice to those who aspire-or dare-to peer intothis mysterious world and get at its basics, His de-"lineation of the basic principles of command andcontrol is as thorough and comprehensive as I haveseen on the subject. While he orients his treatment

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INTRODUCTION

of the subject toward the operational practitioner, Iwould suggest it as fundamental reading for any ofthe specialists in the wide variety of fields that per-vade the command and control world, from thetechnical architect to the operational manager andthe ultimate user, It adds measurably to the body ofknowledge that must eventually emerge from schol-arly treatment of the business and take an enduringform for future and aspiring practitioners to study,Senior commanders and novices on the threshold ofa new career will benefit alike from the time theyspend reading this material and reflecting upon howit all must play together.

Absorbing a new discipline into the hierarchy ofmilitary activities is never done without at least somepainful adjustment and accommodation; but the sud-den growth in dependence upon the various hightechnology instruments that enable commanders oftoday's forces to control them effectively has pre.sented unique challenges in this regard. The reason,of course, is that these enabling tools and instru-ments cut so pervasively, not only across organiza-tions but into every kind of endeavor within, Someof the tools are creatures of disciplines that are wellestablished in the military infrastructure-commu-nications being the most prominent example-whileothers have evolved with the exploitation of newlydeveloped technologies. Data automation is the bestexample of the latter because it has not only trans-formed a great many weapon system capabilities butalso the means by which they are directed and con-trolled, The niche in the infrastructure for this fast-moving "ADP" technology is typically tenuous: eve-ryone agrees it is here to stay, but "where" is another

Xv,

INTiObDUCrION

question. The cost and technical complexity of thesekinds of systems are additional factors which darkenthe mystery In this fascinating world,

For some years now I have espoused the needfor development of a new military career field thatwould cultivate field grade and senior officers whocould help commanders cope with the complexity oftheir command and control world. These new spe-cialists (who will probably evolve, sooner or later, nomatter what I espouse) could be described as "Com-mand and Control System Operational Managers."While not technical specialists, they would be wellversed and educated in the fields of communicationsand data automation, sensor systems, electronic war-fare, and so on, and possess more than superficialknowledge of the operational charmcteristics of theunits and weapons systems to be directed and con-trolled. The vast resources needed to feed moderncommand and control systems demand the best pos-sible matching of the characteristics and capabilitiesof the various systems, techniques, and proceduresinvolved in the entire force employment process, ofwhich command and control Is such a major part.

But evolution of such expertise into a profes-sional career field is not likely in the absence of anauthoritative body of knowledge, documented andaccepted by operational, technical, and academiccommunities alike. Fulfillment of that need is slow incoming, as no one, until Coakley came along, seemsto have had the time to sit down and think throughwhat needs to be written down-and then, to do itl

ROBERT T. HERRES

1 . - -. . .... .. .. .. ..

COMMAND AND CONTROL

FOR WAR AND PEACE

.t

-....... I. ..

II

THE BROAD VIEW OFCOMMAND AND CONTROL

magine yourself in a position comparable to thatfaced by General Norman Schwarzkopf in the war

with Iraq, You're in charge of and responsible forthe coalition forces from eighteen or more nationswho face the forces of Saddam Hussein. Thoseforces speak different languages, fight with differentweaponry and tactics, and in some cases harbor mu-tual and ancient enmities,

You must direct all those forces and, indeed, thewhole war from within a command post that givesyou and your staff at least the appearance of protec-tion and that houses the technology that makes itpossible for you to know what is happening on thefar-flung fields of battle,

Should all the radar screens and televisionscreens in your command post suddenly go blankand all the radios silent, you would find yourselffighting blind, with little idea of what your forces, letalone the enemy's forces, were doing.

At that point you would be justified in sayingyour command and control process had failed, eventhough some part of the process might be survivingin the shape of plans formed and sent to your forcesbefore the battle began, Had those plans allowed forthe possibility of catastrophic system failure, givingoperational control to commanders on the scene if

I'..............

I. ..... ..... .......... .... .. .. ......... .. .. .... ........ ...... ... ....). .. : . .. .. . .2 1:=• . _ . .. ..

COMMAND AND CON-r.OL FOR WAR AND PF.ACF.

communications failed, perhaps not all would belost. Of course, specific operational plans establishedbefore the battle began would soon be of little valuesince, unless adapted to the rapidly changing condi.tions on the battlefield, they could quickly becomecounterproductive.

If you can empathize with the plight of a com-mander in such a situation, you can understand thecritical importance of strong command and control,Fortunately, from the perspective of the UnitedStates and its coalition allies, it was Saddam Husseinwhose command and control failed in 1991, whoseforces ended up flailing impotently in the darkness.

"Command and control" (C2-pronounced"see-two" or "see-squared") has been getting a lot ofattention in recent years. It was a hot topic for Con-gress during discussions leading up to the Goldwa.ter-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, thefirst major overhaul of the defense establishment inmore than a quarter century. Command and controlbecame a hot topic for nearly everyone with theoutbreak of the Gulf War in early 1991, as CNN andother news organizations offered hourly reports onthe intense allied efforts to knock out the heavilyprotected Iraqi C2 facilities.

This is a book about command and control forthe general reader, General reader in the sense usedhere includes specialists and military commanders, aswell as people for whom the topic is a new interest.The book is designed to be inclusive rather thanexclusive, to offer potential readers a broader per-spective thai they would be likely to encounter else-where.

4

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THK, BROAD VIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

THE NATURE OF C2

Command and control involves the complex collec-tion of functions and systems an executive draws onto arrive at decisions and to see they're carried out,Thus, the acronym C2 may be used to refer to any-thing from information to sophisticated communica-tions and computer equipment, to the executive'sown mind-the last involving education, training,experience, native intelligence, and other aspects ofcognition,

The particular executive with whom we're con.cerned here is the military commander: the term C2

is usually thought of in a military context, However,much that is said about C2 will apply to other deci-sionmaking contexts as well,

DIFFERENT THINGS FOR DIFFERENT PEOPLE

Because C2 has come to mean many different thingsto many intelligent, well-meaning people, discussionsof this important topic can be very confusing andeven aggravating. An engineer or contractor whothinks of C2 in terms of technology-of computersor radars or radios-may be put off by discussionsthat focus on the human or organizational aspects ofthe topic, Likewise, behavioral scientists who see C2

as a matter of information processing may be dis-,1 mayed when debates concern budget Issues. Other

parties involved in C2 discussions-military peopleand members of Congress, for example-are likelyto fix their attention on still other aspects of C2 , such

IS

_____ _ ___ ___ _ __ __ ___.......____ _.......__

VJ

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PE.ACE

as strategies or vulnerabilities, Yet, C2 comprises allof these things, as well as others,

This confusion about the nature of the topiccauses many people to quickly lose interest whenconversation turns to C2 , particularly when it's to anaspect of C2 seemingly irrelevant to their special fo-cus, This is when you see their eyes begin to glazeover and their heads begin to nod, Such Pavlovianresponses can be funny, but they're also dangerous,

Command and control issues are matters of crit-ical importance for our national security-all C2 is-sues, They're all of critical importance becausethey're interrelated. The C2 technology can be use-less or counterproductive if it isn't designed with aneye to the functioning and limitations of the imper-fect human beings who will use it, Designing newsystems will itself be an exercise in futility if theprocess ignores the issue of costs. And minimizingcosts will be a false economy if the lowest possiblecost results in an unusable system,

THE IMPORTANCE OF C2

Command and control is important because even theperception of vulnerability in our C2 invites attackby enemies who believe they can have their way andescape retribution, It's important because our world-wide responsibilities, combined with the distant loca-tions of most potential theaters of war, make fornumerical inferiority vis-a-vis most potential ene-mies-an Inferiority which can be mitigated by theextraordinary responsiveness superior C" makes pos-sible, It's important because rapid mission changes

6

THe BROAD VIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

dictated by shifts in focus-from Europe to the Mid-dle East or Central and South America, or from

superpower threats to terrorists and drug lords-require a degree of flexibility only highly capable C2

can provide. And C2 is important because vulnerableC2 makes a joke of sophisticated scenarios for wag-ing a controlled nuclear war,

Despite its importance, C2 traditionally has beenslighted by U.S, defense planners more concernedwith weapons systems than with the means of orches-trating their use. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nix-on, and Ford were all concerned with improving C2,particularly nuclear C2 , but time and again the goodIntentions of chief executives came to naught whenthe time came to iron out budgetary details,

This tradition of unintentional neglect startedto change significantly during President Carter's ad-ministration, and President Reagan made C2 a prior.ity during his eight years in the White House. Whendefense budgets began their general decline in theearly 1990s, funding for C2 remained relatively sta-ble. Yet, even in the face of this increased interestat the national level, C2 has continued to be littlemore than a vague clich6 for many people who couldbenefit from knowing more about it.

THE NEED TO EXPAND THE C2 COMMUNITY

Continuing breakthroughs in the information tech-nologies which extend the reach and application ofC2 ensure that intelligent approaches to C2 issueswill remain critical. It's crucial, therefore, that thesmall group today making up the "C2 community" be

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEACE

expanded to include more than a few engineers, be-havioral scientists, communications specialists, de-fense contractors, and military people.

Some in that community will argue there arealready enough people involved in C2 debates, Keep-ing the C2 community small certainly should have theadvantage of making it easier to reach agreements,although few would characterize the paths to pastaccords as smooth. Limited inputs, though, can leadto narrow thinking, and C2 issues are too importantto be left to a few self-designated experts.

THE GOALS OF THIS BOOK

The primary goals of this book are to make C2 atopic accessible to anyone with a stake in the nationalsecurity of the United States and to suggest a practi-cal approach to difficult C2 issues,' Stakeholders in-clude members of the armed forces, who dedicatetheir lives to maintaining national security; office-holders, elected and appointed, who shape nationalsecurity by making decisions about policies andbudgets; engineers and contractors who design andprovide the defense systems to support national secu-rity; reporters, editors, and analysts who monitorand critique the systems, decisions, and people in-volved in national security; and taxpayers, who in-clude all of the above groups and, directly orindirectly, every other citizen,

Thus, the intended audience for this book isevery interested person. In a sense which we'll ex-plore later, C2 is the nervous system that coordinatesthe muscles of our national security system, every-

8

Tnfw BROAD VIEw oP COMMAND AND CONTROL

thing from weaponry to diplomacy, Therefore, re-gardless of one's place or lack of a place in thegovernment hierarchy or of one's position along thepolitical spectrum, everyone has a stake in C2 , a keyelement in waging war or maintaining peace.

BREADTH OF TOPIC

The breadth of C2 is one of the central difficulties indealing with the topic, "One of the least controver-sial things that can be said about command and con-trol is that it is controversial, poorly understood, andsubject to wildly different interpretations," writesone analyst, In the view of Colonel Kenneth Molil,U.S. Air Force (Ret.), "The term can mean almosteverything from military romputers to the art ofgeneralship: whatever the user wishes it to mean,'"2

Everyone agrees the topic is too broadly de-fined, and everyone wants to remedy the problem bylimiting C2 to the narrower definition his or hergroup would choose. So the cycle of debates contin-ues.

People can, for example, get lost in the termino-logical thicket-debates concerning whether oneshould talk about "command," "command and con-trol," "command, control, and communications,""command, control, communications, and intelli-gence," and so on, right up to one wag's proposalthat it be

C27E: command, control, communications, computers, co.hesion, counterintelligence, cryptanalysis, conformance,collaboration, conceptualization, correspondence, camara-derie, commissaries, camouflage, calculators, cannon, cais.

9

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FoR WAR ANDI) PEA(E

soils, canteens, canoes, catapults, carpetbaggers, caddies,carabineers, carrier pigeons, corn whiskey, camp ftllowers,calamine lotion, etc,

Eventually it becomes apparent most argumentsabout terminology are really arguments about moresubstantial issues, such as what our C2 prioritiesshould be,

Other C,2 debates focus on technological issues,For example, is "interoperability" or "redundancy"more important? In other words, should the goal beto connect all C2 equipment-radios, computers, de-coding devices, etc,-iaao one big network? Or,should we aim at smaller, overlapping networks, sothat, when one fails, its functions can be picked upby others? Should we attempt to give our armedforces the most advanced, most capable equipmentwe can produce? Or, should we buy larger quantitiesof less advanced equipment?

Some specialists think of C2 primarily in termsof human issues, How do human beings make deci-sions? Can we design equipment or procedures tohelp commanders make decisions easier? Faster? Bet.ter? Should C2 equipment be designed to accommo-date the needs and styles of commanders? Or, shouldcommanders be trained to adapt their procedures tothe equipment available? What can we do to ensurecommanders have all the information they need butare not overwhelmed by receiving too much infor-mation? How can we give commanders the informa-tion they need and keep the enemy from getting thatinformation?

Others see C2 in terms of organization, Shouldour defense establishment be organized along geo-graphic or operational (focused on a particular mis-

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THF. BROAD VIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

C 2 as Toohnology C g as People

C2 as Organization

Different contexts of C2 debates

sion, such as strategic defense)-lines? Should ourorganizational scheme emphasize specialization-i.e,, air warfare, naval warfare, ground warfare, am-phibious warfare-or "jointnLss"? Is our emphasison civilian control of the military an inefficient baseupon which to organize our defense forces? If so, isefficiency more important than civilian control?

These arguments about terminology, and tech-nical, human, and organizational issues are impor.

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COMMAND AND CONTrROL FoR WAR AND P.ACE

tant, but the rhetorical dust they stir up canunintentionally obscure the central topic.

HOLISTIC APPROACH

If we see C2 as the nervous system which coordinatesthe muscles of our iiational security system, then wemust admit each element of that system deservesattention. As specialization among physicians can bebeneficial, so can specialization among those inter-ested in C2. But, as anyone knows who has sufferedfrom it, uncoordinated prescriptions from non-com-municating specialists can be dangerous to one'shealth.

Recognizing the multi-dimensional complexityof C2 and admitting the legitimacy of all the dimen-sions involved may enable us to develop a more bal-anced and consistent approach to improving C2, Asthings are now, "too many people," in the view of aformer commander of the Army's Information Sys-tems Command, "want to skin the cat differently,"4

We tend to lurch-first in one direction, then backto the starting point, then off in a completely newdirection-as first one group, then another, gainsthe ears of the decisionmakers, or as decisionmakerschange. This book attempts to give decisionmakers,from taxpayers to presidents, a balanced view of thewhole spectrum-the "big picture" of C2-and apractical way of bringing that view to bear on C2issues.

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rHE BROAD VIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

C2 -INFORMATION INTENSIVE

Some 2,600 years ago, Sun Tzu wrote,

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need notfear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself,but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will alsosuffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself,you will succumb in every battle.6

While the face of war has changed considerably inthe intervening centuries, C2 is still information in-tensive. Commanders need information about theenemy, about the environment in which an encoun-ter may take place, and about the status and capabili-ties of their own forces. They need informationabout objectives: not only must they be clear abouttheir own, but they must know those of superiorcommanders and, ultimately, those of the nation.They need a sense of what is possible-a data bankof options based on their own knowledge of history,their training and experience, the advice of theirstaffs, and any other available sources, They want toknow what has been tried in comparable situations,what has worked and what has not. Once a com-mander's decision is made, it takes the form of anorder. Orders are also information-informationabout what is expected of each player in the opera-tion, When the action begins, the commander needsinformation in the form of feedback, Is the planworking? How must it be modified?

Information is at least as critical to today's com-manders as it was to those of Sun Tzu's day. Indeed,one writer goes so far as to describe today's navalbattle group as "a distributed offense/defense tiedtogether by an information network."6 According to

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Dr, Eberhardt Rechtin, "Information is going to beso important in future conflicts that it may well de-termine their outcomes."7 Ensuring the proper flowof critical information among friendly forces is,therefore, an essential C2 function. And interrupt-ing the enemy's information flow is just as impor-tant.

TECHNOLOGY OF THE INFORMATION AGE

The technology of the Information Age has pro-duced and continues to produce spectacular in-creases in the amount of data available for C2 andthe speed with which it is delivered.

The more commanders know and the fasterthey know it, the more likely it is they'll be able tooutwit and confuse enemy commanders, However,the mass of data available today can overwhelm com-manders; it can also disappear suddenly. Therefore,the quest for those intent on improving C2 must beto find better ways to shape and protect the data andits sources.

"Quest" seems the best way to describe the en-deavor because, with every development changingthe terms of the search, it must continue for so longas national defense is a concern. And national de-fense must always be a concern for anyone familiarwith mankind's history. One of the ironies of thepost-Cold War period has been the realization thatthe world is becoming "more conflict-ridden as eth-nic strife and resource competition in an increasinglypopulous world are no longer held in abeyance bysuperpower rivailry." 8 Only someone blind to both

14

THE BROAD VIEW OF COMMAND AND CON'rROL

CtOMMAND|A

S OM I NUCLIAR

IQ INFORMAION

GIT"ING THROUGH

C2 in the Information Age

history and current events would have predicted theCold War would be the last war, or that concern fornational security would become an anachronism.When worries about deficits and perceptions of di-minished threats lead to further reductions in man-power and weaponry, the significance of C2 becomeseven more pronounced.

"The forces of the future will emphasize high-technology and quality," writes Colonel John E.Rothrock, a former chief of intelligence planning for

15Ii

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the Air Force. "Both sides will depend lest on num-bers and more on suppleness and responsiveness-attributes almost totally dependent on improvedcommand and control capabilities." 9

Those attributes of "suppleness and responsive-ness" will be critical whether the next war involvesEast and West or North and South or Haves andHave-nots,

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2

C2 : PROCESSAND SYSTEM

The DoD definition treats C2 as first, a collection of commandfunctions and ,second, those systems of people, procedures, andequipment which support command, Which aspect of the definitionone emphasiszes has much to do with the kind of Stake a particularobserver has in C2; the emphasis will also be affected by theobserver's position in the hierarchy. Emphasize what we will,though, the weblike nature of C2 demands the consideration of allits aspects as w# triV* to improve it,

T he Department of Defense (DoD) defines com-mand and control this way:

The exercise of authority and direction by a purposely des.Ignated commander over assigned forces in the accomplish-ment of the mission, Command and control functions areperformed through an arrangement of personnel, equip.ment, communications, facilities, and procedures employedby a commander In planning, directing, coordinating, andcontrolling forces and operations in the accomplishment ofthe mission, I

Command and control, in other words, are both verbsand nouns, As verbs, they are what a commanderdoes; they constitute a process, As nouns, they arethe "arrangement" of people, equipment (includinghardware and software), and procedures that helpscommanders do what they do; they name a system,

f17

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THE SCOPE OF C2

To get a sense of the scope of C2 , let's look at asports analogy. It's often noted that conceptual simi-larities between football and battle abound, ex-tending beyond a shared vocabulary that includes"bombs," "ground attacks," "aerial bombardments,""interceptions," "blitzes" and so on.2 One exampleof those similarities is the support provided footballcoaches by as close an approximation of perfect C2

as one is ever likely to encounter-far better C2

than commanders could ever expect to have in thelife and death situations of actual combat:

Imagine you're the head coach of the ColoradoSprings ZUbs, a semi-pro football team in the Gulf-West-ern League, Your club's owner has told you that, as far ashe's concerned, your upcoming game with the San AntonioCowpokes is the most important game of the season, Hisstrongf[eelings are apparent in the daily discussions youhave with him as you prepare for the game.

You've sent a trusted assistant to watch the Cowpokes'last two games and asked another to analyze the SanAntonio Light's reports on all the Cowpoke games thisyear. You've personally reviewed film highlights broadcastby a San Antonio TV station and recorded by a friend wholives in New Braunfels, You're familiar with the CowpokeStadium and know that it sits at 400feet above sea level.

Your daughter has videotaped all of the Zebs' gamesand you've continued your practice of closely reviewing themost recent ones, One of the things you've noticed lately isthat two talented halfback have been getting their signalscrossed regularly. In talking to your head trainer, you'velearned that one is dating the other's "ex."

!~Ii

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEACE.

SOME PARALLELS

Football is not combat, and a one hundred-yard play-ing field is a far cry from the global battlefield, butthe parallels between the activities of a coach and theactivities of commanders can help us better under-stand C2. Our football coach, like commanders, re-ceives his mission from a superior to whom hereports throughout the process-in this case, theteam owner,

Next, the coach learns everything he can aboutthe opposition, using scouts and analysis of news-paper reports and television films; this is analogousto military commanders gathering intelligence.

The coach incorporates what he knows aboutthe playing environment-the altitude of the Cow-poke stadium-into his game plan, just as com-manders use what they can learn about the missionenvironment in their battle plans.

When the coach studies the videotapes of hisown team's games and talks to the trainer about theproblem with the halfbacks, he is evaluating his ownresources, just as commanders must.

As the coach assigns offensive and defensivetasks to his assistants, commanders divide a missioninto tasks and assign those tasks to subordinate com-manders, The coach, aided by his assistants, watchesthe start of the game, spots a problem in the poorperformance of the halfbacks, decides on a correc-tive action which is based on previously acquiredinformation about the halfbacks, and goes back tomonitoring. Similarly, commanders monitor the car-rying out of assigned tasks and make whatever ad-justments they decide are necessary.

20{:I

Cl: PROCESS AND SYSTEM

Coach incorporatee the "Known" into the game plan

Finally, as the coach compares the action on thefield to his game plan in order to determine whatelse he needs to do, so commanders compare theresults their forces are achieving with mission re-quirements. When the results and the requirementsdon't match, commanders will attempt the samekind of problem analyses our coach used in the sce.narlo. They too will modify tactics or make person-nel changes as necessary to achieve the desiredresult.

21

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I


OBSERVATIONS

One benefit of the football analogy is that it can leadto some useful observations, For example, with allthe facilities available to them, coaches still lose foot-ball games. That's partly because good informationdoesn't guarantee good decisions; nor does it elimi-nate the role that chance plays-from the coin tossonward. It's also a reflection of the fact that "enemy"coaches have comparable support systems,s

It's also worth noting a C2 process can existindependently of technology: owners, coaches, andassistants worked together quite capably beforeheadsets and radio systems came along, The same istrue of commanders and their subordinates, Themassive amounts being spent on what is broadlycharacterized as C2 should not mislead us into as-suming the process and the equipment are synony-mous, At the same time, we should keep in mindthat, like the systems which allow coaching assistantsto place themselves strategically throughout the sta-dium and still be in touch with the head coach, tech-nical improvements in C2 open new possibilitiescommanders can't afford to ignore.

The team's "play book" is an essential part of afootball coach's C2. The play book is the repositoryof the tactics the team has studied and practiced, aswell as the code phrases for the plays. When thecoach says the next play will be "27-right," for exam-ple, he counts on every player knowing what hemeans. The play book, in effect, contains the team'sshared knowledge and is based upon coaching exper-tise-a sense of what works and what doesn't.

22V

i,1

CV: PROCESS AND SYs'rEM

PJ

Sources of C2 "procedures"

PROCEDURES: DOCTRINE, PRINCIPLES

The "procedures" mentioned in the DoD) definitionof C2 are comparable to the football play book,

They're derived from experience, commonsense, the lessons of military history, and theory:and, they constitute "shared knowledge," the com-mon thread which, ideally, unites the minds of com-manders from the top to the bottom of the chain ofcommand. The procedures range from Service doc-

23

14


trines, which govern the use of weapons systems, tothe "principles of war," which guide commanders intheir choices of strategies and tactics,

Two of the best known formulators of the prin-ciples of war are Sun Tzu and Karl von Clausewitz.Sun Tzu's Art of War and Clausewitz' On War werewritten nearly 2,500 years apart. The two works dif-fer considerably In scope, emphasis, and even intent.Yet, for all their differences, Art of War and On Warshare fundamental principles, For example, whileemphasizing maneuver-an aspect of war withwhich he is often identified-Sun Tzu is clear aboutthe desirability of massing a superior number oftroops at the point of battle, Likewise, Clausewitz,though sometimes ridiculed as the "Mahdi of Mass"by unfriendly critics, understands the effectivenessof deceit and maneuver against an enemy's superiorforces.

In essence, the principles of war have remainedfundamentally unchanged from Sun Tzu's day to thepresent, although they have been articulated differ-ently from age to age, In 1921, for example, theWar Department of the United States listed nine"basic and immutable" principles of war:

The "principle of objective" required a commander tomake the unit's assigned objective the basis Fbr interpretingorders, making decisions, and employing forces,

The "principle of the offensive" reminded commandersthat only through offensive action could an encounter withthe enemy be made decisive, although defensive operationscould be useful in delaying for a more propitious momentor taking advantage of the terrain to compensate for one'sown force's weakness,

Including as "mass" everything that contributes to"combat power"-" numbers, weapons, tactical skill, fight-

24i

A.

C2. PROCESS AND SYSTEM

Ing ability, resolution, discipline, morale, and leadership"-the "principle of mass" called for concentrating a force "in amain effort at the proper time and place for the accomplish.ment of a definite purpose,"

Closely related to the "principle of mass" were those of"economy of effort" and "movement" which would have thecommander move forces engaged In non-critical efforts tothe most critical point In the battle, or to a point suitable forcounterattack in a defensive operation,

'The important "principle of surprise" could take anyform-"time, place, direction, force, tactics, or weapons,"

The "principle of security" covered any measure takento protect agaiuist "observation and surprise,"

The "principle of simplicity" called for uncomplicatedoperations, direct and clearly stated orders, avoidance offrequent changes to a plan, and "unity of command."

The "principle of cooperation" required "teamwork" of"all military persons" and was based upon thorough coordi.nation,4

These "principles"-like those of Sun Tzu, Clause-witz, and other theorists-are "immutable" in thesense that they're derived from common experienceand common sense and have continued to be usefulthrough the ages, despite dramatic changes in weap-onry and other aspects of war.

NOT HARD AND PAST RULES

Being "useful," however, does not mean that theprinciples are rules which, if followed, will guaranteesuccess in warfare. Nothing guarantees success inbattle or war, Goliath lost to David; Alexander theGreat with his 80,000 men triumphed over the Per-sian king Darius and his 200,000 plus at Issus; andthe Viet Cong and North Vietnamese won the battlefor Vietnam.

25


We may say that, in the case of Goliath andDavid, "mass" as tactics, coupled with "surprise," tri-umphed over "mass" as bulk, At Issus, "mass" in thesense of resolution and leadership overcame "mass"in the sense of numbers. It could be argued that inVietnam, "mass" as a combination of resolution andnumbers helped the Viet Cong and the NorthVietnamese deny the United States a victory.

LONGING FOR CONSISTENCY

It quickly becomes apparent that, when they are de-fined as broadly as the War Department defined"mass," the principles start to look pretty meaning-less, They are like a lens which, if pushed and twist-ed into the right shape, can always be counted on toreveal the same image, regardless of what the objectbeing viewed might be. They suggest that militarytheorists value consistency over reality,

The fact is, we all do, A consistent world is asafe world. In such a world, we need only learn andplay by the rules in order to survive. Unfortunately,wishing doesn't make it so. If we substitute our vi-sion of a safe, consistent world for the reality, weimperil ourselves, When we assume the rules we'vedefined will always apply, we allow our enemies touse the rules as weapons against us.

When the rules say, "Never fight uphill" (as theydo in Sun Tzu's formulation), and our forces are onthe top of the highest hill, we may either assumewe're safe or spend all our time watching the sky. Insuch circumstances, an alert enemy can surprise anddefeat us by climbing up the hill when we're not

26

t

CR: PRocUss AND -SYSTFM

looking, as the English general Wolfe did to theFrench general Montcalm at Quebec, during theFrench and Indian War. We could say GeneralWolfe emphasized the rule of surprise over the nev-er-fight-uphill rule,

BALANCING RULES

More often than not, battles are won by achievingthe right balance among the rules, The Japanesemight have done better at the World War II Battleof Midway if they had put more emphasis on theprinciple of security and less on the principle of co-operation,5 Some critics say the U.S, invasion ofGrenada might have been even more successful thanit was if planners had put more emphasis on theprinciple of cooperation and less on the principle ofsecurity. Unfortunately, the only way to determinethe "right balance" with perfect certainty is retro-spectively.

Initial post-war analyses suggest the UnitedStates and its allies found most of the right balancesin the campaign against Iraqi forces in the Gulf Warof 1991, Certainly the technical superiority of theU.S-led coalition forces was a critical factor in thequick, lopsided victory, but as the U.S. experience inVietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistandemonstrated, vast technical superiority is no guar-antee of victory.

In the Gulf War, the coalition forces orchestrat-ed the use of their technical superiority with ex-traordinary effectiveness. They translated their goalof freeing Kuwait into an initial military objective of

27

|I

ix _____ __________________ _________________________________________________ _____ _________


isolating the occupying forces, They accomplishedthat objective by blinding the Iraqi high commandalmost Immediately through gaining air superiorityand launching devastating attacks on C2 facilities inboth Iraq and Kuwait. The air superiority, which theallies maintained throughout the conflict, gave themunimpeded access to detailed reconnaissance whileseverely limiting enemy reconnaissance. Destructionof the C2 facilities restricted coordination among theIraqi forces and the sharing of any intelligence thatmight have been available, Interdiction of groundtransportation between Baghdad and the theater ofoperations completed the isolation of the Iraqiforces,

With Baghdad blinded, Iraqi air operations ef-fectively shut down and their ground forces isolated,confused, and demoralized by six weeks of relentlesspounding from the air, the coalition forces begantheir ground offensive. In roughly 100 hours offighting, they routed the Iraqi forces with a strategythat included tactical feints such as a much anticipat-ed amphibious attack which never occurred, themassing of forces to punch through Iraqi defenses atcarefully prepared points, and a surprise envelop-ment that cut off the Iraqi retreat toward Baghdad,

In a nutshell, the United States and its alliesperformed brilliantly. As more details about the con,flict emerge, we'll undoubtedly discover that the fogof war was indeed present and not all operationswent as smoothly as hoped or as we initially thought,That's the ugly reality of war. In terms of C2,though, Operation Desert Storm appears to havebeen a clear success. While some observers havemaintained that superior tactics and leadership rath-

St..

III

__ _ . -- - - _ _ _ ------- -I_ __ _ _ _ _ . . . . - . . . . . .

C2: PROCESS AND SYSTEM

er than high tech weaponry were responsible for therapid U.S. victory, their argument ignores the factthat high tech weaponry destroyed the enemy's C2early on, making it difficult if not impossible for himto discern U.S. tactics,6 Superior technology, theemployment of which was orchestrated by superiorC•--including "tactics and leadership"-gave theUnited States and its allies the necessary edge, the"right" balance,

FORCE MULTIPLIER

The classic modern C2 success story, the exampleusually cited when the topic is the force multipliereffect of capable C2 , is that of Air Marshal HughDowding's Fighter Command in the Battle of Britainin 1940. While the Luftwaffe had superiority In bothnumbers and technology, Fighter Command had su-perior 02. And it used that C2 to defeat the Germanplan to bomb Britain into submission.

Peter Townsend, one of the British pilots, de-scribes the British system in these words:

The "eyes" of Fighter Command, 60 Group, comprised anetwork of some fifty radar stations, They detected enemyaircraft and passed the plots to Fighter Command FilterRoom, where they were sorted out and passed on to FighterCommand Ops Room, from where they were passed onagain to group asd to sector op. rooms. The sector control.ler guided or "vectored" the fighters to Intercept, Overland, the Observer Corps took over from radar and passedon direct to group ops rooms up.to-the-mlnute informationon everything within view or earshot,?

The "eyes" referred to by Townsend were radarsdeveloped by a British team with the motto "Second

29

. I"

I' _______________ .

COMMAND AND CONTROL FoR WAR AND PEACE

Best Tomorrow," meaning that their goal was some.thing immediately useful, rather than a "best" systemwhich wouldrV' f e available for years,8 In fact, itwasn't British technological superiority that madetheir C2 superior to the Luftwaffe's, The Germanradars-the Freya and Wurzburg systems-weremore sophisticated and capable than those of theBritish,9 Rather, It was the British organization-thesetup that linked radars, observers, and pilots to theOperations rooms-that gave them the upper hand,In Townsend's words, "The Germans knew aboutBritish radar but never dreamed that what the radar'saw' was being passed on to the fighter pilot in theair through such a highly elaborate communicationssystem.'I

Information gleaned from radars and observerscame together in the big picture assembled in Oper.ations, Initial radar reports were passed through a"filter room," where conflicts were resolved, In theOperations room, the filtered information from theradars was combined with reports from observersand data on friendly forces, At this point, the "bo.gies" (unidentified aircraft) or "bandits" (enemy air.craft) were assigned to a sector selected by theGroup commander, The sector controller wouldthen guide assigned aircraft to meet the enemy. The"big picture," in other words, became the basis fordeciding which planes to send where,

Fighter Command used the unprecedented ca.pabilities of its C2 system to anticipate the Luftwaf-fe's attacks (security), to link observers, planners,and pilots (simplicity, cooperation), and to move allavailable planes to critical points (mass, economy ofeffort, movement) where its pilots surprised and at.

30

II

CV: PRocEss AND SYSTEM

tacked the enemy (surprise, offensive). In doing so,Fighter Command defeated the German attempt togain control of the air over Britain (objective). Inretrospect, it's clear the Royal Air Force found "theright balance" in applying the principles of war. Itwas good C2 that allowed the "few" to do "somuch,"l

NOW AND THEN

For each of the components of today's C2 systems,Dowding's system had its analogue. Whereas DesertStorm commanders could draw data from satelliteand aircraft sensors, as well as highly sophisticatedradar systems, those in Dowding's system relied onprimitive radar and human observers, In place oftoday's computerized fusion centers, Dowding's sys-tem had operations rooms staffed by skilled officerswho distinguished "friendlies," "bogies," and "ban-dits" on the basis of shrewd analysis and intuition,Instead of today's advanced and complex "decisionaids," Dowding had women pushing colored markersacross map tables. Dowding's system had its "doc-trine"-rules about when and how to engage enemyaircraft; its communication system of radio-tele-phone links between ground and air; and, most im-portant, a commander-Dowding himself-who,for the duration of the battle, was able to resist pres-sure to abandon his objective of providing a defenseagainst the German bomber fleet. 12

Fundamentally, there's little difference betweenthe C2 system the British used during the Battle ofBritain and any modern one. For that matter, a ge-

S.

1i ______ _______________ _______________ ________


neric "model" of C2, suc!, as the one proposed byJoel S. Lawson, would probably be as applicable tothe C2 systems of an Alexander or a Napoleon as Itwould to Dowding's system, or that of any command-er in the 1990s..

LAWSON'S C2 PROCESS

The Lawson model accommodates flve functions:sense, process, compare, decide, and act. The sins# func-tion gathers data on the -environment-the world"lout there," including friendly and enemy forces,allied forces, terrain, weather, and so on, The processfunction draws together and correlate. the data togive the commander information about the environ-ment. The compare function juxtaposes the existing

Lawsons modl of he C2 roces4ore lxne ei n POMcau DtATA

Inviron32

ow1CMPRI'~r ____________________ ___________ _______________________


state of the environment-the relative strengths,weaknesses, positions, etc.-with the desired state,the commander's view of what the state of the envi-ronment should be, The decide function choosesamong available courses of action for reconciling theexisting state of the environment with the desiredstate. The act function translates the decision intoaction.

Working with a similar C2 model, Colonel JohnBoyd, a pilot and combat theorist influential in theso-called Military Reform movement of the late1970s and 1980s, combined what he knew of aerialwarfare with C2 lessons gleaned from military histo-ry to conclude that the key to military victory-regardless of the relative sizes of the opposingforces-is "getting inside" the enemy's decision cycleor C2 process."3 In other words, whether we're en-gaged in a dogfight between two airplanes or a ma-jor ground battle, the way to win is to work throughthe sequence of functions that constitute C2 fasterthan the enemy does, In the words of the MarineCorps' manual, Warfighting, "Whoever can make andimplement his decisions consistently faster gains atremendous, often decisive advantage," 14 Havingfaster C2 processes allows us time to figure out whatenemy commandcrs are trying to do, and time to cutoff their opportunities for doing those things, It al-lows us to determine what indicators enemy com-manders will key on, so we can manipulate thoseindicators to mislead the enemy, In short, faster C2

is the key to playing with the enemy's mind, This iswhat military briefer. meant when, during the 1991Gulf War, they spoke of "getting inside the enemy'sdecision cycle," though some members of the press

]'

! JI

!I

I'


interpreted the phrase as a reference to some sort ofintelligence coup, 15

OBJECTIVE: THE ENEMY'S MIND

This playing with the enemy's mind should be acommander's primary goal, according to some stu-dents of warfare, Lieutenant General Raymond B.Furlong writes,

Our object In war or strategy is the behavior of a limitednumber of people, We wish to conduct our affairs in ouch away that these people will act in a way that we prefer-ourgoal in strategy is to Influence human behavior in a wayfavorable to our objectives. I suggest, then, that our strate-gies ought to seek this as their principal object-the mindof the opposing commander,

Speaking of the enemy's "mind," in this sense, isequivalent to speaking of C2, In ancient warfare, thecommander's "mind" was the core of a force's C2.An Alexander, for example, would rely largely onhis own observations and knowledge of the enemy,his own experience in war, ani his own genius informulating his battle plans, Gradually, though, theincreased scale and complexity of war-abetted, per-haps, by a norm of commanders less gifted than Al.exander-caused C2 functions to be externalized inthe form of staffs.

"COMMAND" OR "COMMAND AND CONTROL"

In Alexander's day, C2 functions would have beenreferred to as "command" functions, The phrase

.44

CR: PROCE•ss AND SYSTEM

One theory about differences between"command" and "conti'oi"

command and control didn't come into widespread usein place of command until after World War I1,17 Forthousands of years, command had covered every.thing, the leader filfilled all of the functions that aretoday labelled as C2 functions. Some people feel theword command Is still adequate,

Any attempt to explain how and why commandevolved into Cz is speculative, One theory ties thechange to the evolution of military forces.

Vi I

______ _________

- I


As armies grew in size and complexity, it be-came increasingly difficult for a single leader to doeverything. Tribal chiefs standing in front of theirwarriors could usually look over the enemy crowdand make an on-the-spot decision about how to bestuse their own people to combat the enemy, GeneralEisenhower, on the other hand, faced too complex atask to do his job without the help of large training,logistics, maintenance, planning, and intelligence or-ganizations. While he retained command over all hisforces, he delegated control of supporting organiza-tions. Command is strategic-concerned with the"big picture"-while control is tactical or operationaland focused on the more immediate management offorces,18 Unfortunately for advocates of this theory,very large armies appeared on the %cene centuries.before command became command and control.

According to another theory, the linguisticsplintering of command into command and control canbe traced to the automation of some functions dur-ing and after World War I1, It made more sense tosay someone controlled a system c,')mposed of radarsor computers than to say one commanded such asystem, One commands people; one controls things,The problem with this theory is that "things," fromrocks to missiles, have been a part of war for as longas people.

Perhaps the emergence of control Is a responseto an increased reliance on "things" in war. Or may-be there is something about automation that evokesa new term-a term to describe the relationship be-tween a commander and an automated thing; com-mand and control came into use about the same time

136

14 .........._ _......

C2: P KocEss AND SYSTEM

computers started playing an important role in the"control" of industrial processes,

The desire to establish safeguards or "controls"to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of atomicand nuclear weapons may also have been a factor, Aview frequently expressed in military circles is thatthe concept of "control" originated In the desire ofcivilian officials to have a say in the disposition ofmilitary forces, especially those involving nuclearweapons: being outside the military chain of com-mand, the civilians "invented" control as a synonymfor a type of management which transcended thechain of command and was imposed on it fromabove, In any case, the phrase command and control(and some enhancements which we'll get into later)is today used where command once sufficed,

Somewhat analogous to different theories aboutthe coupling of control with command are the views ofthe former held by the different military services.20

In the Army, control seems to be viewed largely as anorganizational issue: does Commander A have oper-ational control or administrative control (or both) of'Force B? In the Air Force, control appears to be anapplication of command: In directing an aircraft to atarget, a weapons controller Is applying a command-er's order. The person sitting in front of the radarscreen may be telling the pilot what to do, but nopilot would accept that as an instance of command.The Navy seems to take a more negative view ofcontrol than do the Army and the Air Force-to seeit as a constraint. 21 This probably has something todo with control emerging about the same time ships'"captains were losing some of their autonomy-thetime when advances in communications technology

17

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PF.ACE

were strengthening the links between shore andship.

In still another view-one not associated with aparticular Service-control is seen as a commander'sknowledge of his own forces, as "friendly" intelli-gence. At one point during the Cuban Missile Crisis,President Kennedy directed General Maxwell Tay-lor to find out whether the U.S, Air Force hadmoved its airplanes In Lhe southeast out of their vul-nerable wingtip-to-wingtip apron formations. U-2photos revealed they had not been moved.2h Presi-dent Kennedy's use of reconnaissance In this in-stance might be seen as an exercise of control ,

A PUSH-PULL DICHOTOMY

It may be useful to combine some of these differentviews and think about command and control interms of a push-pull dichotomy: command sends orpushes forces out into the environment to do some-thing; control pulls them back or restrains them,through monitoring and Imposing limits on how farthose forces can go In accomplishing their mission,In this oversimplification, control works like a leash.When a medieval English king sent an army off tofight on the European continent, he did so withoutworrying much about the fate of individual soldiersor even the outcome of particular battles. He wasexercising command in sending the army out, but hehad no control over them-no leash-once they hadtravelled any distance from his realm. Only withgreat difficulty could he pull them back or even findout what they were doing.

w...........

or een he otcoe ofpariculr bttle, H waexerisin comandin endig te ary ot, bt h

haIocnrlovrte-n esh-nete a

C2 : PROCESS AND SYSTEM

Today's technology gives a chief' of state such asthe president of the United States the ability to exer-cise both command and control over forces, Withnuclear weapons, "controls" (in the form of electron-ic locks called "Permissive Action Links" or "PALs")have made it possible to divorce possession from theability to use a weapon. A nuclear weapon may be inthe possession of a military unit, but the presidentretains control of it until he or she transmits a codedsignal which "unlocks" it.

MORE ACCOUN'rABIIITY, MORE CONTROL

In terms of conventional (non-nuclear) forces, presi-dents don't normally exercise their control; theyusually leave that to their military commanders, Thefact that they sometimes exercise control results asmuch from the increased likelihood of their beingheld responsible for the actions of their forces as itdoes from technology's enhancement of their abilityto do so.

The same technology which allows the presidentto communicate directly with the soldier in the fox-hole allows the citizenry of the United States toknow almost immediately what Is going on In thatfoxhole or anywhere else in the world, When a sol-dier-who is also a citizen and someone's belovedchild, sibling, or spouse--is killed, the president canexpect to face a barrage of questions about his or herresponsibility for the death, Was the soldier ade-quately trined? Equipped? Protected? Was the mis-sion really necessary?

{J19

COMMAND AND CONI ROL FOR WAR AND PE.ACE

If medieval monarchs ever faced such questions,it was only if their entire force had been decimated.Even then, the questions would sometimes come solong after the loss they'd be meaningless, particular-ly in cases where the monarch had remained at homewhile the army went abroad,

It might be fair to say twentieth century presi-dents give their commanders shorter leashes becausecltjzený have the presidents themselves on shorterleashes. Indeed, in a world endargered by nuclearweapons, short leashes may oe the most appropriatekind, though they're unlikely ever to be popularwith those constrained by them, There's also a trendtoward shorter leashes as one moves down the chainof command.

LOST CAUSE

In the final analysis, the line between command andcontrol is blurry but established by usage. It is signif.icant to some people, unimportant to others. Simi-larly, control means one thing to some people, otherthings to others, Clues to its meaning in a particularusage have to be derived from the context,

Were it possible to move back the clock to thetime when most people used command rather thanC2, it might, for the sake of simplicity, be desirableto do so, However, it seems quixotic to avoid use ofcommand and control or C2 today, Though linguisti-cally inelegant, C2 carries with it a connotation ofcomplexity, as well as a somewhat mathematical or A"high-tech" look. Given the nature of command inthe modern world, both are probably appropriate.

40

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C2: PROCE~SS AND SYSTEM

RADARSATELLITE

AI. NOSOR

Air

BRAIN:NEVOUS SYTEM:COMANDE:C

ogyforC 2 is heNervous systemC whchsupotsth

human body.The sensory nerves detect what is going on both

within and outside the body and send the findings tothe brain. The brain interprets the findings, corn-pares the exisitng condition to the desired condition,decides on a course of action, and sends the appro-

P 1 41


C2 SYSTEM

CaSYSTIM

1 OMMANDINOMM"61

COMMANDER COMMANO1

COMMANDER

Commander's relationship to C2 systems

priate orders to the muscles by way of the motornerves.

Just as some people see the brain as a part of thenervous system and others see it as something whichstands apart from and directs the system, debatesrage about whether or not the commander is a partof C2 .

One way to approach the issue is to go back tothe system-process dichotomy. One might say Com-mander A stands apart from the C2 system that sup.ports him, though he is a part of the C2 system whichsupports superior commanders, Similarly, the coachmay be distinguished from his coaching system,though he is a part of the team owner's coachingsystem.

On the other hand, all commanders are a part oftheir own C2 processes as well as the C2 processes of

42

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superior commanders. Even the president is kept ona leash by the sovereign people of the United States;he (or she) is part of our democracy's C2 process.

HIDDEN AGENDAS

In reality, the issue is largely a territorial matter. Ifcommanders are part of C2 , then at least some re-search and development efforts should be directedtoward determining how these human componentsfunction under various circumstances, how theymake decisions, how information mnight best be dis-played for their use, and so on; in other words, ifcommanders are part of C2 , part of the C2 researchpie should belong to psychologists, behavioral scien-tists, sociologists, and others who study human be-ings. If commanders are not part of C2, then most ofthe research and development can be allotted to en-gineers. The bigger the pie gets, the hotter the de-bates grow.

In the Information Age, the C2 "pie" has grownbigger than ever. References to C2 abound-in dis-cussions of everything from President Reagan's Stra-tegic Defense Initiative to the latest tank design-and improving C2 has been an announced goal forCongress as well as the Department of Defense. Be-tween 1977 and 1986, funding for C2 equipmentjumped nearly 150 percent, from less than $10 bil.lion to nearly $25 billion a year, as computers, com-munications systems, and surveillance systemsacquired status comparable to the most advancedbombers and submarines.2 5 Furthermore, concernfor C2 in its broader sense was a leading force be-

4~3i 4'

. . . . . ,- ..- -


hind the Goldwater-Nichols Defense ReorganizationAct of 1986. So, the debates continue.

TERMINOLOGY

Besides the thinly veiled territorial disputes, anyonewishing to get a handle on C2 must deal with incon.sistencies in terminology, Each of the alternative la.bels (command and control or command, control, andcommunications or command, control, communicationi,and intelligence, etc,) can and has been justified by itsemphasis on a vital element of the system, For exam-ple, without communications, a commander is isolat-ed; without Intelligence, a commander Is blind.

Sometimes elements are combined on a prag-matic basis: Command, control, communications and in.telligence (C01), for example, gained currency Iin theDepartment of Defense largely for fiscal and person-nel reasons. Since C2 on the one hand and communi-cations on the other involve similar types ofequipment, It seemed to make sense to lump themtogether for funding purposes; later, intelligencewas added to CJ, partly because it too involved a lotof computers and communications equipment andpartly because the Secretary of Defense wanted toassign responsibility for intelligence without increas.ing the size of his staff,2 4 Thus, the Deputy Undersec-retary of Defens# for C3 became the DeputyUndersecretary of Defense for CJ1.

The reasons for using the C2 label in this bookare similarly pragmatic and philosophical, Firstmore people seem to use command and control or Cthan use any of the alternatives. Second, command

44 p

__________

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'I

C2 : PROCESS AND SYSTEM

and control are, from a commander's perspective,functions, Communications and intell•ge.nc. are ele-ments that support C2. If our purpose were to em-phasize one element, such as intelligence, therewould probably be more effective ways to do thatthan by lumping it together with C2. Furthermore,grouping elements like communications and intelli-gence with C2 functions contributes to the mislead-ing impression that C2 problems are essentiallyequipment problems, None of this, of course, ismeant to imply that communications and intelli.gence issues are not germane to the discussion of C2.

FUNCTIONAL AND HIERARCHICAL PERSPECTIVES

Many of the difficulties described thus far-in-cluding the territorial disputes and the debatesabout terminology-are linked directly or indirectlyto the diversity of groups which have a stake in CHistorically, the military services have seemed anx-ious to downplay C2 equipment, emphasizing insteadthe muscles of defense-the planes, ships, tanks, andguns. Confronted with day-to-day shortages in weap.ons, people, spare parts, fuel, and ammunition,they've tended to assume C2 will "be there" whenneeded, Until faced with inadequate C2, their atten-tion has usually been focused on the muscles ratherthan the nervous systems of defense. Some criticscomplain that members of the military are short-sighted with respect to C2. Others say it's more amatter of the budget process distorting perceptions

? •'of the military attitude toward C2; commenting onthe Gordian nature of C, Colonel Harry G, Sum-

45

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I.

__________ ____ ______ _____________________________________________ __________________

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PKACE

mers, a former Army strategist and the author of OnStrategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, writes,

Unfortunately, the Constitutional requirement to justify Ar-my needs to Congress in monetary terms can cause thiscomplexity to be overlooked. Listening to only such testi.mony an otherwise uninformed observer might believe, forexample, that Army command and control is solely a matterof telecommunications and electronic equipment, Whatwould not be apparent is the critical role of doctrine, train.ing, and mission-type orders in battlefield command andcontrol,25

Engineers naturally tend to focus their attentionon the technology of C--the radios, computers,satellites, local area networks, and so on. Thatdoesn't mean they ignore the human aspects of C2-as is implied by critics who use terms like"wireheads" or "techies" in referring to engineers.Scientific and engineering backgrounds predisposepeople to think of C2 in terms of the equipment,communications, and facilities aspects of the DoDdefinition. Some engineers' interest in the personnelaspect is limited to ensuring users are trained wellenough to be able to clearly articulate their needsand to employ systems without screwing them up;some think of procedures in terms of red tape orbureaucratic tangles that hinder timely develop-ment. However, like Robert Watson-Watt, who leddevelopment of Britain's "Second Best Tomorrow"radar for World War II, most experienced C2 engi-neers know meeting the commander's needs is moreimportant than always being on the leading edge oftechnology.

Theorists approach C2 with still a different per-spective. They often insist on modelling as the firststep in the complicated process leading to improved

46

JS

i .. _•... . . ... .. ......

C9 : PROCESS AN) SYS'tEM

C2 . Start anywhere else and we risk losing sight ofimportant requirements for a system, Everythingmust be mapped out-how the commander's mindworks, the steps a mind goes through in reaching adecision, how and where a new system must connectwith existing systems, etc,-ln advance of physicaldevelopment. Some critics view theorists as irrele-vant and lost in abstractions- as dedicated to endlesshaggling about definitions, models, and wiring dia-grams; to writing unreadable articles in journals in-accessible to anyone other than theorists. However,most people involved with C2 recognize the value ofthe "front end" insights theorists provide,

A new group emerged in the early 1980s whenCongress decided the defense establishment was notgiving C2 enough attention. This group of seniorgovernment officials and high-ranking military of-ficers found themselves appointed to newly createdposts in DoD and the Joint Staff-posts establishedto coordinate C2 policy in DoD and among the mili-tary services. As their offices lacked regulatory au-thority and control over budgets, they took on rolesas advisers, mediators, and advocates of C2. In theeyes of some observers, the members of this groupwere victims caught between a rock (Congress and,to a lesser degree, the operational commanders-seebelow) and a hard place (the administration and themilitary services).

By the mld.1980s, the military services-i.e,,the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force-in a flur-ry of enthusiasm triggered by the Carter and Reaganadministrations' interest In' C2, began submittingbudget requests crammed with communications sys-tems and related technologies. At that point, the

47

I)


conimanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the operational orfighting commands decided they had better get intothe act lest they find themselves saddled with anabundance of shiny new equipment which would notmeet the needs of their commands.

The CINCs argued that people who have to usesystems should have some voice in their design, Be-cause most of the operational commands involvemore than one military service and frequently themilitary services of more than one nation, the CINCswere especially concerned with interoperability-the ability of one system or set of procedures to belinked to another. They worried, for example,whether Navy and Air Force pilots would be able tocommunicate with each other or with ground corn-manders.

The military services, on the other hand, havealways argued that the system requirements for anaircraft radio differ considerably from those for ashipboard radio or the radio carried by an infantry.man. They maintain that the best approach to C2

equipmenat acquisition is to have the military servicesdetermine the systems and then have the operationalcommands determine the "interfaces"-techncIca] orprocedural connections-needed to allow one sys-tem to communicate with another.

Other groups involved in the debates about C2

include defense contractors, whose views tend toparallel the engineers' and the theorists', though thecontractors' closest ties seem to be with the militaryservices' procurement organizations; and politicians,whose concerns run the gamut of issues discussedhere and on to budget issues and more parochialmatters pertinent to their constituents. Sometimes

48


the interests of different groups overlap; other timesthey are at odds,

One's position in the hierarchy can also affectperspective, The fact that modern communicationawill allow the president to talk directly to the soldierin the foxhole may be perceived as a plus by thepresident, while the soldier (or the soldier's com-mander) sees it as a distraction. The military servicesmay see a new approach to acquiring C2 equipmentas streamlining, while Congress sees it as an invita-tion to fraud. A restriction an intelligence officersees as necessary to protect sources may be perceivedas an obstacle to thorough planning by an operation-al commander, While the White House focuses onhow to improve information flow upward, from thefield to the commander-in-chief, the military may bemore concerned about getting needed informationto the battlefield commander. In short, C2 issuesoffer many opportunities for honest men and wom-en to disagree about what constitutes an improve.ment.

INTERACTION NEEDED

While such a variety of perspertives can be fruitful,being so requires that holders of the various perspec-tives talk with each other, Without interaction,different perspectives can lead to distrust, misunder.standing, and unnecessary confusion.

In the old tale of the blind men and the ele-phant, each one of the men fooled himself into be-lieving the part of the elephant he had in his graspwas the key to the elephant's essence and that his

49

................. .... 4... ..


peers were both literally and metaphorically blind.Thus, In the absence of real dialogue, differences ofperspective can lead to long and fruitless pursuitsdown multiple blind alleys. That has often been thecase in the domain of C2,

The fruitful development of that domain re-quires the participation of the military-Servicesand CINCs-with their knowledge and experienceof operational conditions; of engineers, with theirgrasp of what is possible; of theorists, who can pro.vide insights into the functioning of the human ele-ments in C2 systems, as well as the broader picture ofwhat such systems should be designed to do and howtheir elements should fit together; of contractors,with their sense of economic realities; of politicians,who can articulate both political and fiscal require.ments; and of taxpayers, who will be asked to pay thebills,

COSTS OF EGOCENTRICIrY

The exclusion of one or more of these perspectivescan result in costly, tragic C2 failures. Historically,many such failures have resulted, not from a lack orbreakdown in C2 equipment but from shortcomingsin other aspects of the C2 process. Half a centuryago, a "coordinating" failure at Pearl Harbor costthe United States 3,472 casualties, 18 ships, androughly 200 airplanes. 28 Both Admiral Husband E,Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the U.S. PacificFleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, com-manding general of the U.S. Army's Hawaiian De.partment, were charged with "dereliction of duty"

50

4,,

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CO PROCESS AND SYSTEM

for their failure to coordinate with each other ondefensive preparations for the island,27

More recently, according to Raymond Tate, for-mer deputy director of the National Security Agen.cy, a coordination failure involving confusion andpoor jud ment in multiple lines of command led tothe North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968with both loss of life and embarrassment for thenation.t

In the controversies surrounding the failure ofthe mission to rescue American hostages held in Iranin 1080 aAd the terrorist bombing of the Marinebarracks in Beirut in 1983, one recurrent note con.cerns "planning" failures. Some critics argu e thatplanning for the rescue mission was unnecessarilycomplex, allegedly because the planners wanted tomake sure all the military services got a piece of theaction, and unrealistic in failing to allow adequatelyfor the friction of war,29 Whatever other shortcom-ings may have played roles in the loss of 280 U.S.Marines in the Beirut bombing, the failure to takeinto account Intelligence and security needs was cen.tral,30

Clearly, multiple factors were at work in theseand other incidents, such as the failure of the USSStark to defend itself from an Iraqi attack in 1987and the USS Vincennes' unwarranted downing of anIranian airliner a year later, but all were in somesense C2 failures, In a nuclear confrontation, thecost of C2 shortcomings would likely be far greater.

s5'


SENSE OF DIRECTION

The first step toward avoiding such shortcomings isdeciding where we're headed. To that end, thisstatement of CR "philosophy" by General John W,Vessey, Jr,, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, offers useful guidelines, The statement's par-ticular value lies In its imqlScat recognition of thebalancing acts Involved In C :

Our philosophy of command and control is disciplined bythe underlying principle that decisions are made at the low-est possible level so that flexibility is given along with theresources, authority and responsibility to those who can usethem to best advantage-the commanders on the scene.Employing C2 in a disciplined way means providing the real-ly important Information, not superfluous data, to the rightpeople in a timely way up and down the chain, and laterallyas well, We do not tie the infantry squad to remote com-mand centers Just because we have the capability to di no,nor do we choke important channels to the point we be.come information rich and execution poor, Our commandphilosophy requires that we develop systems, concepts, andprocedures which provide critical information to the rightpeople at the right time, We must be disciplined enough toprovide commanders at ill echelons the necessary informa-tion and resources and then give them the "rattle roomi" toexploit situations or to resolve problems iunder a system inwhich orders are given in broad descriptions of the intend-ed outcome-rather than as detailed prescriptions of whatprecisely Is to be donea1

Technical capacities and warfighting needs consti.tute one of the balances; Information and action,another, One of the most important-and most sen-sitive-is the balance between control and the com-mander's autonomy. Getting these and the manyother balances involved "right" is an ongoing strug-

52

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C21 PROcMSs AND SYSTI.M

gle, rather than a one-time adjustment. Therein liesthe real challenge of C2,

THE DEFINITIONS WE'RE USING

Before we begin to examine the nature of that chal-lenge more closely, a little housecleaning seems Inorder, As we've spent this chapter juggling some-times overlapping, sometimes contradictory views ofwhat constitutes C2, it may be useful to close bystating the C2 definitions we'll uae throughout thisbook:

In gen•ral terms, C2 is everything an executive uses In mak-ing decisions and seeing they're carried out; it includes theauthority accruing from his or her appointment to a posi-tion and involves people, information, procedures, equip-ment, and the executive's own mind. A C' process is a seriesof functionk which include gathering information, makingdecisions, and monitoring results. A C2 system is a collectionof people, procedures, and equipment which Aupports a C2process,

Like the "official" definition of CR on which it'sbased, this statement Is very broad, and C2 specialistswho wish to will have no difficulty finding fault withit. However, as we've seen in the course of this chap-ter, any narrower view of the topic is difficult tojustify.

C 2 TECHNOLOGY

While the fundamental nature of what we call C2 has remainedunchanged throughout history, modern technology has extendedits reach, Today's C2 allows commanders to see further, controllarger forces, access and digest more data, and-in theory--makedecisions faster and more reliably. However, while our technologi-cal edge is vital and must be maintained, we can't dump the entireburden of C2 on technology. Most C2 failures of this Century havertsulted from human mistaAes rather Ahan a laCA of equipment orequipment failure. Furthermore, advanced technology brings withit its own limitations and vulnerabilities. The bottom line is thatC2 technology won't be a "force multiplier" unless we acquire,maintain, and use it intelligenly,

A s we observed in the last chapter, a commo..misconception equates C2 with equipment or

technology.' Most engineers, military commanders,theorists, and contractors know better. They knowtechnology can be used to support C2 , but they alsoknow C2 transcends technology.

Let's take another look at the Lawson model ofC2 as we consider how technology can support theprocess. Because it's relatively simple, Lawson'smodel avoids the pitfalls of efforts that try to ac-count for all the nested, parallel, and iterative activi-ties characteristic of real-life C2 processes. In otlserwords, anyone who tries to build a model coveringeverything that goes on in C2 ends up with some-thing too complicated to be much use in understand-ing the process. A simple, abstract model like!.awson's misses most of the details but aids under-standing, as long as we remember the model shows

5i


just a tiny piece of the process. It's like a still pho-to-a frozen moment at one of many levels,

What elements in the C2 process can be sup-ported or improved by technology? Well, satellites-which can take pictures of extraordinary resolutionover just about any target area, or eavesdrop oncommunications, or intercept telemetry (the signalsused to track and monitor the status of missiles), ormonitor weather patterns-can provide invaluablesupport for the sense function, as can radars andother sensors. Computers that sift through and ana-lyze the mountains of raw data made available bysatellites and other high tech sensing systems canmake the process function feasible, They can alsoshape the data in ways that allow them to comparM theactual state of natural conditions and enemy andfriendly forces with the desired state, Computers canalso support the decide function by giving the com-mander fast access to relevant maps, environmentaldetails, and expert advice-anything from a databank of principles, doctrine, military history, politi-cal obj. ,ctives, and so on to sophisticated syntheses ofthese elements, Finally, secure communications sys-ten-s linking commanders and subordinates can helptranslate decisions into actions, thereby supportingthe act function,

PROCESS VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

Even this sketchy outline of the ways technology canbe brought to bear on the C2 process makes themistaken identification of C2 with technology more

understandable. Because the technology of the In-S.56

i' ___ ___

C9 TECHNOLOOY

formation Age lends itself to supporting every phaseof the C2 process and because, being expensive, itgets a lot of attention in budget discussions, it's quiteeasy to overlook less flashy elements of the process.However, as we noted in discussing the football anal-ogy, the process existed long before the technologycame into the picture. General Robert Herres, U.S.Air Force, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, asserts that C2 functions are essentiallytimeless:

When Alexander stood on top of a hill, maybe in his chari-ot, and hollered to his troops, "That company over theremove ahead 100 yards, and that company over there movesideways 50 yards, and that company charge," or whateverhe told them, he was using a cnmmand and control system.He may have communicated with runners, he may haveused flag signals, he may have just hollered at them. He wasstanding on a hill because lie could see better, and he wasusing his eyeballs for sensors. He was probably listening,because you can tell a lot by what you hear. If one companyis hollering a little louder than another, then it's bound tomean something to an experienced field commander. Heputs all that together in his mind, he makes decisions, andhe gives direction to control his forces. He gets feedback bywatching what's going on, what the enemy's doing, what hisforces are doing, and how they're progressing as they en-gage.,

Whether it takes place primarily in the mind of acommander or over a computer network linking thepresident, CINCs of the operational commands, andbattlefield commanders, the C2 process has its ownidentity, independent of any technology involved.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOA WAR AND PEACE

TECHNOLOGY'S SUPPORT OF C2

With that important caveat in mind, let's look atspecific ways technology has been brought to thesupport of C2 in the last decades of the twentiethcentury. In this chapter, we'll look at some existingand projected uses of C2 technology, as well as someof its drawbacks and limitations.

In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter real-ized existing C2 facilities severely limited a presi-dent's options for responding to a nuclear attack.Because those facilities were vulnerable, presidentscould not be sure they or any of their links with U.S.military forces would survive an initial nuclear at-tack, This meant that upon receiving warning of anincoming nuclear attack, a president would have todecide-probably within a few seconds-whether ornot the warning was valid, from where the attack wascoming, and whether to respond by launching allU.S. nuclear missiles and bombers-in "one orgas-mic whump," as one presidential adviser put Its-orto sit out the attack and risk losing the ability torespond in any form, End the world or capitulate:those seemed to be the alternatives a presidentwould face.

In a series of presidential directives, PresidentCarter called for measures that would strengthenstrategic C2. Command posts were to be "hard.ened"-,.e., physically protected against the effectsof a nuclear attack-facilities for warning upgraded,and communications made more resilient, through acombination of hardening and redundancy.

The impact of Carter's initiatives, coupled withgrowing enthusiasm for theories like Colonel Boyd's

J58

C2 TECHNOLOGY

to A9ULLITI CARRYING .... SA . TIL 1 T0 SATIt I CARRYING"UCLIA•,UAINPOIION CARRYING LONG WAVE SHiM T*WAVI Ik ahAgoOhTC'rONS a ?EPII C@IO TTLnsisoPi

LONS*WAVEINPMRID

RADIAIlON AIRCRAPT CARRYINGLON6,WAVI

INR•AP NOILISCOPISHORT-.WAYS

Satellites and improved radar systems forattack warnlng~and assessment

Source: Basned on a fligure by As ton B, Carter In "Command andControl of Nuclear War, copyriglht Sc.€•i¢ tflcAuren l1985,

All rights reservedt,.

about executing C2 faster in order to get "inside" theenemy's decision cycle, led to an unprecedented in-terest in enhanced C9 at all levels as the 1980s be-gan,4 As we noted earlier, President Reagansustained and extended Carter's C2 initiatives. Ac-cording to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., the C2 programquickly became "the fastest growing part of the DoDbudget."5

Budget equals doilar's, and most of the C2 dollarsS~of the 1980. were spent on technology. At the stra-S~tegic level, they bought the president more re-,, sources for evaluating an apparent nuclear attack.

RA

PLINA1,


For example, the C2 budget paid for the contin-ued development and deployment of the DefenseSupport Program (DSP), a system of satellites whichcarry short-wave infrared sensors capable of de-tecting the heat of a missile exhaust plume.8 An.other C2 development was the Nuclear DetectionSystem (NDS) carried aboard satellites of the GlobalPositioning System. The NDS combines light, X-ray,and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sensors to provideimmediate location, height, and yield assessments fornuclear explosions. 7 The DSP satellites provide in-formation about launches of ground-based mis-siles-the most accurate type and greatest threat toour own intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs);the NDS would detect impact of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which couldstrike the United States ten to twenty minutes beforethe ground-based missiles. Between them, the twosystems give the president more timely and accurateinformation about the dimensions of an attack. TheNDS also provides damage assessment, allowing usto determine quickly the kinds and extent of damagedone to us as well as the impact an initial U.S. re-sponse has brought on the enemy. 8

The Carter and Reagan C2 budgets also provid-ed for the modernization and expansion of groundradar systems for detecting missile attacks. The com-puters and software of the Ballistic Missile EarlyWarning System (BMEWS) radars were updated andreplacement of the older radars at Thule, Green-land, and Fylingdales Moor, England, with newphased array radars was begun.9 Additionally, twonew "Pave Paws" radars improved our ability to de-tect SLBMs. 10

60

S---i. -. . . . . . . . .

I'

C2 TECHNOLOGY

The C2 budgets of the 1980s also funded theconstruction of over-the-horizon backscatter radars(OTH-Bs) to detect and track threatening aircraftand cruise missiles. According to Donald C. Latham,assistant secretary of defense for C31 under Presi-dent Reagan, the OTH-B system provides "completecontinental United States coverage against air-breathing threats."1 '

Additionally, the C2 initiatives of the 1980sstrengthened the links between the president andthe sources which would provide attack warning andassessment, and the links to forces that would carryout presidential orders to respond to an attack orother threat. The Defense Satellite CommunicationsSystem (DSCS III) was upgraded to provide moredependable Super High Frequency (SHF) communi-cations.12 Two other satellite systems, the Military,Strategic, Tactical, and Relay Satellite Communica-tion System (MILSTAR) and the Navy's Fleet Satel-lite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) weredesigned to provide Extremely High Frequency(EHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) communi-cations channels.IS MILSTAR, hardened againstphysical threats, including high-powered lasers andEMP, would supplement the more capable but vul.nerable FLTSATCOM and DSCS in times of crisisor war. 14 All of these systems could be used in con-junction with relay aircraft and rockets as alterna-tives to vulnerable telephone land lines. The GroundWave Emergency Network (GWEN), another com-munications system developed in the 1980s, consistsof a series of low frequency (LF) towers that canrelay low data rate messages between command cen-ters.15

61


Part of the C2 budget was devoted to providingalternative shelters and command posts for the na-tion's leaders. The National Emergency AirborneCommand Post (NEACP, usually pronounced "knee-cap"), a specially configured Boeing 747 developedin the 1970s, would carry the president or the presi-dent's successor to an altitude where line-of-sighttechniques would link the commander-in-chief to thestrategic forces, Under President Reagan, the fourNEACPs were "hardened" to protect them against avariety of potential threats, including EMP.- 6 TheReagan C2 money also'bought additional fixed andhardened command posts, as well as ground mobilecommand posts. 17

Richard S. Beal, who, until his death in 1984,directed crisis management planning for PresidentReagan, helped bring technology to bear directly onthe decide phase of the Lawson model,18 Prior toBeal's arrival, the president and his chief advisers ina crisis had met in a room equipped with little morethan tables, chairs, and pencils. Beal put together astate-of-the-art command post, complete with thelatest capabilities in digital and graphic displays, database access, and communications equipment. He fo-cused much of his attention on gathering all thebackground information and "real time" data avail-able pertaining to the crisis at hand and "crunching"it into an easily assimnilable furm-usually graphic-for a president h;,rried by an avalanche of informa-tion from around the world,

The interest in C2 impacted lower levels of thenational security structure as well, with the develop-ment and fielding of tactical equipment. The GlobalPositioning System (GPS), a satellite system designed

62

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C2 TECHNOLOGY

to provide an instantaneous navigational fix for air-craft, ships, submarines, ground vehicles, and evenindividuals, belongs in the grey area where strategicand tactical concerns overlap. As mentioned earlier(see page 60), the GPS satellites carry the NuclearDetection System packages.

A major tactical communications system devel-oped in the 1980s for the Army, the Marines, andthe Air Force is the Single-Channel Ground and Air-borne Radio System (SINCGARS). SINCGARS iscapable of switching frequencies roughly 100 times asecond to avoid jamming and interception,19 Thesystem was designed as a replacement for the stan-dard FM field radio used since Vietnam.20

Development of the joint Tactical Communica-tions Program (TRI-TAC), a system supposed to al-low different military services to communicate witheach other as well as with allied forces, continuedunder Presidents Carter and Reagan, supported withvarying degrees of enthusiasm by the military ser-vices. One element of the TRI-TAC system is theArmy's Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), de-signed to link all units-from the corps to brigadecomponents-at a cost of over four billion dollars,"the largest procurement of tactical communicationsin the history of the Army." 2' MSE provides voice,data, and facsimile services over a network similar tocivilian cellular systems. 22

Even more ambitious is the Joint SurveillanceTarget Attack Radar System USTARS), JSTARSuses a synthetic aperture radar system, capable ofproviding images of targets at great distances, in amodified Boeing 707, the E-8A. 23 The E-8A ac-quires targets and relays target data to attackers

63

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PLACE

through AWACS and mobile ground stations devel-oped by the Army.

The Joint Tactical Information DistributionSystem (JTIDS) was designed to provide U.S. andNATO forces with a secure, jam-resistant, high-ca-pacity data link, from both internal and externalsources, of "near real-time" data on enemy aircraft:the JTIDS data link can provide detailed informa-tion about the location and identity of many differ-ent targets.2 4 A variety of airborne warning andcontrol aircraft and fighters can carry the system;ground and shipboard terminals can also be used inair defense applications ofJTIDS,25

INTEGRATED SYSTEMS

Calls for C2 development at all levels grew steadily,from the early 1980s, when Lieutenant GeneralJohn H. Cushman assessed theater C2 as "gravelydeficient," through the 1986 passage of the Goldwa-ter-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act motivated,in part, by a desire to give the CINCa of the opera-tional commands more control over the design andacquisition of C2 equipment. 28 One approach tomeeting that demand is the integration of strategicand tactical systems. We can get a sense of what anintegrated system might be like-ideally-by look.ing at Vice Admiral Jerry 0. Tuttle's concept of acommon data base for military users:

By everyone having a common database, only changes tothat database from any sensor source need to be tranimit.ted, which will reduce communication requirements, Admi-ral Crowe will be concerned with the world, Admiral Hayes

64

C2 TECHNOLOGY

in Hawaii will be concerned about his AOR [area of respon-sibility), and will determine what he pulls up from thedatabase. All he wants to know is where blue [friendly]forces and the major red [enemy] combatants are. WhereasRear Admiral Tony Less, the Joint Task Force Commanderin the North Arabian Sea, wants to know more about hisenvironment to a greater granularity, and he does it byprofiling the database by emitters, geography, and range ofweapons sweep, both the enemy's and his, The database canbe further tailored right on down to the ship commandingofficer who wants to get a Tomahawk or Harpoon targetingsolution. He has got to know more about his environment sohe doesn't have a false target and can achieve target dis-crimination, All of the foregoing can be served by the samedatabase,2

7

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

The Gulf War of 1991 provided many examples ofadvanced technology being brought to bear effec-tively in warfare. The opening round saw F-i 17AStealth fighters eluding Iraqi radars to attack C2 f,-cilities; Tomahawk cruise missiles carrying and fol-lowing their own digital maps en route to targetshundreds of miles from launch pads on ships in thePersian Gulf; "smart bombs" guided by TV camerasand lasers into air shafts and other small apertures inheavily fortified bunkers; and an array of night vi-sion devices for turning night into day,

Thousands of commercial receivers rushed tothe Gulf allowed allied forces to draw navigationalsupport from the GPS satellites, Both DSCS III andFLTSATCOM satellites carried allied communica-tions, and weather satellites kept watch on clouds,

65

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEACF

sand storms, and other phenomena that might im-pact military operations.

In terms of dramatic effects, though, nothingoutscored the C2 process that enabled the US. Ar-my's Patriot missiles to intercept and destroy IraqiScuds. First, various sensors detected Scud launchesby infrared means, They relayed data on thelaunches to NORAD's underground facilities nearColorado Springs, Colorado, There, Space Com-mand analysts computed the missiles' flight pathsand fed the information back to the Middle East,where Patriot crews combined it with data fromAWACS and other sensor systems to derive intercep-tion points. All of this took place within the roughlyseven minutes required for a Scud to go from launchto impact' 8

THE FUTURE: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Most of the C2 or "battle management" systems envi-sioned for the twenty-first century would rely heavilyon capabilities provided by artificial Intelligence(Al), a field focused on building human-like intelli-gence into machines, Initial AI efforts were aimed atdesigning systems that could replace human deci-sionmakers.

By the late 1980s, most of those efforts werebeing redirected toward a subset of Al called "ex-pert systems.'29 An expert system consists of a chitabank of "rules"-often in the form of IF-THENstatements-and a software package that meshesdata on a particular problem with the rules in thedata bank•0 For example, an expert system de-

66

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C2 TECHNOLOGY

signed to analyze engine problems might reasonalong these lines:

RULE 1.IF: the exhaust is smoky, and

the car is backfiring, andthere is a lack of' power,

THEN: the carburetor fuel mix is too rich,

RULE 2.IF: there is a lack of power, and

there is a gray deposit on the spark plug., andthe engine overheats,

THEN: the carburetor fuel mix is too weak.

RULE S.IF: the carburetor fuel mix Is too rich, or

the carburetor fuel mix Is too weak,THEN: the carburetor fuel mix needs to be adjusted,

PROBLEM DATAi There Is a lack of power.

RECOMMENDATION: Adjust carburetor,51

An expert human mechanic receiving this rec-ommendation might say, "Wait a minute, The prob-lem could be water in the gasoline, If that's the case,adjusting the carburetor could do more harm thangood," In other words, a human expert's commonsense might tell him there were possibilities not In-cluded in the expert system's rule base,

Whereas an expert system simply recommendsand may be ignored, an earlier AI initiative mighthave attempted to automatically implement the rec-ommendation without human interference. Forthose kinds of efforts, common sense was a stum-bling block, Al researchers discovered commonsense doesn't lend itself to the kind of symbolic rep-resentation required for computerized manipulationof data.3 2 In more concrete terms, Al systems were

67

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COMMAND AND CONrROL FOR WAR AND PEACE

unable to cope with "questions of relevance, cortext,and background" as intelligent people do.35 Expertsystems, by keeping people in the loop, try to side-step that problem.

SOME Al PROGRAMS

All this is not to say more recent AI Initiatives lackambition, Indeed, expert systems attempt to extendhuman capabilities at every stage of the C2 process.

The Advanced Feature Extraction System(AFES), for example, was designed to help photointerpreters establish a bank of rules for object rec-ognition,5 4 In turn, the AFES would use those rulesas a basis for picking specified objects out of intelli-gence photos. AFES would support the sense, process,and compare functions in the Lawson model.

Another system, the Automated Exploitation ofLarge Area Surveillance Sensor (AELAS), woulddraw d,,t, from a variety of technologically basedsensors.85 AELAS would use the data to Infer theactivities of military units under observation, In thisway, AELAS would support Lawson's process, com-pare, and decide functions,

The Language Access to Distributed Data withError Recovery (LADDER) system would allow adecisionmaker to formulate natural language ques-tions-ime., questions in human language, as opposedto questions put in the coded form called "machinelanguage," the traditional medium of computers-to

query several data bases,3 One proposed applica-tion of LADDER would provide the capability to

68 I•

AI

S. . = .. .. .. ..... • . ... .. .... ... . .. .. ... . . .... . . .. . ..... . ..... . . . . . . ... . . . . .. ... .. .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . ... . . . . . . M .• • .. . _ . - , .,

C2 TECHNOLOGY

track and match friendly and enemy ships and there-by support the process and decide functions,5 7

Wags accustomed to faulting the U.S. Navy forits misuse of th• English language might find theNaval Onboard Message Analyzer and Dis-ambiguator (NOMAD) especially Impressive-theirony of its name notwithstanding. "I The systemwould help message originators produce clear, effi-cient, unambiguous messages. After the originatorprepared the initial message, NOMAD would feed itback, displaying alternative interpretntions andphrasings. The results might look like this:

INPUT: Periscope sighted by Constellation abt 2000yds off port qtr, and hs helo vectored todatum, Green flares sighted after visual onperiscope. Hs gained active ctc andconducted two attacks,

OIL _rPUT

(first): The Constellation identified an enemysubmarine that was at 225 degrees 2000yards from its location, A helicoptersquadron pursued the enemy submarine,The helicopter squadron identified somegreen flares. By using ani active sonar, thehelicopter squadron identified the enemysubmarine, ant they fired twice at the enemysubmarine,

(best): (same as abuve, except 3rd sentence, whichreads: The Constellation identified somegreen flares,)39

After the originator got the feedback, it wouldbe up to him to decide which form of the message tosend. He might decide NOMAD's output was toowordy or too redundant, or that the clarity of theNOMAD version was worth the extra words, Per-

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEAcr

haps he'd decide to change the original mes&age onlyto the extent of clarifying who saw the flares, NO-MAD would have done its job in highlighting possi-ble ambiguities and giving him options. With itsimpact on communications, NOMAD would be rele-vant to Lawson's decide and act functions,

Another initiative with C2 implications is theTactical Planner (TACPLAN) system which wouldelicit decisionmakers' plans and then highlight anyconflicts with a rule base founded on doctrine, prin-ciples, "expert" experience, and mission restric-tions,4 In terms of the Lawson model, a system likeTACPLAN would support the decide and act func-tions.

One of the most ambitious Al initiatives of the1980s was the Pilot Associate Program which wouldgive fighter pilots computerized sidekicks-a laR2D2 of the Star Wars movies fame--capable ofmonitoring the plane's systems, assessing combatthreats, adjusting the current mission plan in theface of a changing situation, and proposing tactics.In some situations, the Pilot Associate might evenswing into action on its own:

For each threat and proposed response, the manager [PilotAssociate] will either wait for pilot confirmation, or, in someconditions, automatically initiate a response with the oppor.tunity for a pilot override, 4 1

In effect, the Pilot Associate could support all of theC2 functions identified in Lawson's model: sense, pro-cess, compare, decide, act.

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C2 TFECHNOLOOY

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SHORTCOMINGS

Despite the promise of AI, reflected in these aridhundreds of comparable initiatives, the field hasbeen consistently blocked by one gerious obstacle:the difficulty of making the transition from "toy"problems-the narrowly defined, artificially con-strained problems of the laboratory-to real worldproblems. Artificial intelligence proponents and ex-perts have remained optimistic, but most of theiroptimism is tied to an elusive future.4 2 In the view ofStephen J. Andriole, former director of the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA's)Cybernetics Technology Office, "Al hype" exceeds"the Al community's ability to produce reliable sys-tems,"

43

Despite some success in programming rudimen-tary planning and targeting procedures, even thefastest computers are far too slow to make theperformance of complex AI tasks practical in a com-bat context,

Furthermore, our "knowledge engineering" ca-pabilities-that is, our ability to collect informationfrom human experts and translate it into a machinecode for computers-is quite primitive:

We do not have any reliable methods for determining howdeep knowledge bases need to be, how fast they must besearched to be useful, or how best to represent them insoftware, It is possible today to ask two knowledge engineersto estimate the size and characteristics of a knowledge basein a specific domain and receive at least two completelydifferent answers, each of which may in fact be "correct,"44

71

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REASONS FOR OPTIMISM

Andriole and others are guardedly optimistic aboutthe ability of "neural networks"-problem solvingsystems based on parallel processing and capable of"learning"-and advances in automated knowledgeengineering to move Al toward productivity.4However, few A! experts seem inclined to disagreewith the view of Paul Lehner, author of ArtificialIntelligence and National Defense, that "most" initia-tives of the eighties and nineties-including pro.grams such as AFES, AELAS, LADDER, NOMAD,TACPLAN, and the Pilot Associate-"will eventual-ly fall short as operational systems." 46

Many believe what will sustain Al funding andresearch is not the potential for near-term applica-tions, but the demands of programs focused on thefuture, ambitious programs like President Reagan'sStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI),47 The require-ments of SDI -the full range of C2 functions withinincredible time limitations-make it, a fertile contextfor envisioning Al applications,

Even on more conventional battlefields, tech-nology may put victory beyond the reach of the sidethat doesn't turn tactical decisionmaking over to ma-chines, 48 The modern battlefield is becoming toolethal and fast changing for men to cope with, asactions and reactions occur with a speed beyondhuman comprehension. One need look no furtherthan the interplay of Iraqi Scud missiles and Ameri-can Patriots during the Gulf War to see this. Indeed,what we today refer to as Al capabilities are quicklybecoming necessities rather than the stuff of visiona-ry dreams,

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C2 TECHNOLOGY

At any rate, while Al has generally failed todeliver on its most ambitious promises, we've alreadyseen that's not true of other, only slightly less exotictechnologies of the Information Age, Command andcontrol technology has become an essential part ofU,S, national security.

WHAT C2 TECHNOLOGY CAN'T DO

However, we must not allow ourselves to be victim.ized by what might be called the "principle of gad-getry." C2 involves more than technology, andefforts to improve C2 will fail if we limit them totechnical fixes. The best equipment In the worldwon't do us much good if our people don't knowhow to use and maintain it, or if our commandersdon't recognize its capabilities or understand how tomake the best use of those capabilities and to workaround the equipment's limitations. Great gadgetswill never make up for incapable or poorly trainedusers,

Looking back on American military calamitiesof the past fifty years, what's apparent is that inmany cases our C2 disasters occurred despite thepresence of advanced technology. The radar at PearlHarbor, for example, "saw" the ,-nemy planes on themorning of 7 December 1941; radios transmittedthe warnings. The tragic loss of lives in the Mayaguezincident in 1975 occurred despite good C2 equip-ment.49 And in the incidents involving the USS Starkand the USS Vincennes in the late eighties, state-of-the-art technology simply wasn't able to compensatefor mistakes in human judgment: the Stark didn't

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COMMAND AND CONTROL. FoR WAR AND PEACE

arm its defenses until too late and lost thirty-sevencrewmen as a result of an allegedly accidental missileattack by an Iraqi plane, The crew of the Vincennesmistakenly turned its Aegis defense system against acivilian airliner, killing 290 people. Even the besttechnology will not always be enough to keep usfrom being blindsided as a result of such mistakes orof policy errors.

We also need to remind ourselves that heavyreliance on technological solutions to C2 problemsbrings with it its own risks, While it reduces uncer-tainty by providing more sensors and communica-tions channels, C2 equipment also increasesuncertainty to the extent it's vulnerable, While itprovides extraordinary sensors, intercept devices,communications functions, and storage capacities,modern C2 equipment also creates the problem ofinformation overload, While it allows commandersto do more with less, high-tech C2 equipment alsodiminishes the "teeth-to-tail ratio," i,e,, the ratio ofcombat power to support requirements. While it canstabilize a situation by bringing the power of logic tobear on a problem, C2 equipment can also limit com-manders' options unnecessarily. While it can givecommanders almost magical abilities to see farther,hear clearer, and think deeper, it can also deceivecommanders with illusions of timeliness and accura-cy. While it can make more of the external worldaccessible to commanders, C2 equipment can alsodeceive them with hidden flaws,

In short, C2 technology can't do everything, Itcan help commanders do more, but it can't replacethem, And it can't always compensate for poorhuman judgment.

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J. . _ - ._.. .__-. . . .. ._.. . . . . . . . .

C2 TECHNOLOGY

UNCERTAINTY

Ultimately, the goal of the C2 process is to reducethe uncertainty with which commanders must deal.We've seen that technology can support every func-tion of the process. It's clear, therefore, that C2

technology can help reduce commanders' uncertain-ty.

However, another category of uncertainty en-ters the picture when we think about how dependentwe've become upon C2 technology and how vulnera-ble that technology is. John Grimes, President Rea-gan's director of national security communications,cautions,

We have become so dependent an some of these tools thatwhen we do lose the capability under certain circumstancesor for a certain function, it causes chaos.... In any decisionprocess, from a corporate decision to a national decision,you can soon see that if you don't do some smart things withthis technology it can get you in trouble- it's like putting allyour eggs in one basket.50

OVERCONFIDENCE

Every military theorist and every combat veteranrecognizes the unpredictable aspects of war-the"friction" and "fog" of war. Yet, American self-confi-dence, "can do" attitudes, and faith in our techno-logical capabilities have promoted a view of warwhich allows little room for fog or friction, a viewthat emphasizes terms like "surgical strikes" and"zero CEP" (circular error probability).,1

Daniel Bolger, author of Americans at War:1975-1983, observes that while modern technology

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-- - - - . -. , - .--..--- -. - ._ _ _ _


has made possible "a quantum improvement" in theaccuracy with which ordnance is delivered, it's stillmisleading to compare the tools of war with thoseused in the operating room.5 2 Addressing the 1983U.S. bombing of Libya, which he regards as a highlysuccessful undertaking, Bolger writes,

It definitely did not constitute a "surgical strike," despiteSecretary Weinberger's remarks to the contrary on 14April, unless one normally does precision medical work withone-ton munitions. Bombing Libya with laser-guided weap-ons was akin to doing oral surgery with a drill press; it wasbetter than a chain saw, but not as precise as a finely honeddentist's drill,S3

Closely related to exaggerated perceptions of accu-racy are unrealistic expectations about reliability. Asanyone who has lost several hours of work as a resultof one spark of static electricity knows, it doesn'ttake much "friction" to knock out a computer. Thefriction of war is likely to have more impact on thedelicate innards of chip-based weaponry, communi-cations equipment, and decision aids than it ever didon carbines, signal flares, or Plexiglas boards.

In addition to the threat posed by EMP effectsin a nuclear attack, much of the sophisticated C2

equipment of the Information Age would be vulner-able to more conventional threats, such as jamming,interception, and espionage. Consider the impact es-pionage, for example, can have on technological ad-vantages: the actions of spies can make thoseadvantages disappear rather quickly.

In the 1970s, the Rhyolite program gave theUnited States virtually unimpeded access to Sovietmissile tests for several years, until two spies alertedthe Soviets, leading them to begin encrypting missile

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C2 TFCHNOLOGY

telemetry. 54 The work of another spy compromisedthe results obtained by the KH-I 1 satellite; the Sovi-ets began covering their missile sites whenever thesatellite was overhead after they bought a KH- IImanual for $S,000,55 In both cases, the spies wereU.S. citizens who volunteered to sell the informa-tion. More recently, the Walker family compromisedour ability to track Soviet submarines.

Countermeasures, counter-countermeasures,and counter-counter-countermeasures are always be-ing sought and discovered. Weak, unhappy, or un-balanced individuals are always available-amongthe thousands of people involved in the design, pro-duction, deployment, operation, and maintenance oftoday's complex systems-to betray secrets. Andwith that betrayal comes the sudden loss of techno-logical advantage.

Such potential loss is the kind of threat usuallyonly the pessimistic or farsighted will consider. Ourplanning and exercises have tended to assume per-fect information flows-without the complicationsof interference or interception."6 The resulting un-certainty is particularly subtle and dangerous: an en.emy weapon detonated in the right spot, an effectivejamming device, or a nice piece of espionage workcould suddenly blunt the leading edge of technology,leaving those dependent upon it deaf, dumb, andblind.

INFORMATION OVERLOAD

Another problem inherent in the particularstrengths of Ilformation Age technology Is informa-

77


tion overload. As one admiral puts it, "It used to betough to find out the location of an aircraft. Now Iget not only that but also the aircraft oil pressure,fuel remaining, and other aircraft in the vicinity."5 7

We're very good at collecting huge amounts of data.We're good at storing that data. We're also gettingbetter at manipulating data electronically to put It inmore useful forms, These are major technologicalaccomplishments of the Information Age,

Unfortunately, having the most data isn't neces-sarily a component of victory. Decisionmakers, in-cluding commanders at all levels, often needparticular pieces of information rather than moun-tains of data, It's probably more important to knowthe single fact that an enemy is massing forces onour border than it is to have a vast array of detailedtechnical data on all the weapons systems that enemypossesses. Even if our mountain of data contains keyinformation, that information will have no value if itisn't available at the right moment to help the deci-sionmaker,

We can alleviate the overload problem by put-ting a filter system or a fusion system between thecollection point and the decisionmaker, A filter sys-tem would pull out and make available to the deci-sionmaker only those bits of data which would behelpful to him or her. A fusion system would, likeBeal's crisis management system, "crunch" all avail.able data into a condensed, easily digested form-eig,, pictures, pie charts, etc, One problem with suchsystems is that pieces that don't fit tend to get re-shaped or dropped out. Inconsistencies, which mightotherwise alert the decisionmaker to flaws in theInformation, disappear; quantitative discrepancies

. .

C2 TECHNOLOGY

get averaged out. Furthermore, a potential for con-scious or unconscious manipulations arises as soon asa decisionmaker tolerates the intervention of a filteror fusion system between himself or herself and theraw data, regardless of whether the intervening sys-tem is human or computer based, In bureaucraticterms, a new power center comes into being.

Overload is a problem for all decislonmakers,from the White House-where the president is con-fronted by over 600 high-priority messages everyday 5 8-- to tactical headquarters, on the receivingend of "downlinks" from satellites and AWACS andlinked as well with superior, subordinate, and paral-lel headquarters. So, the positive impact of our col-lection systems is undermined by shortcomings inanalysis capacity.

HIGH SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Another paradox of C2 technology concerns the im-pact of the technology on the "teeth-to-tail" ratio,Ideally, superior C2 equipment should enable com-manders to use their forces more efficiently: to de-"velop creative strategies and tactics, to anticipate theenemy's moves and counter them, to spot criticalpoints as they're developing, to mass forces wherethey're most needed, and so on, In other words,superior C2 equipment should allow commanders todo more with less,

What happens in practice is the C2 equipmentdesigned to sharpen a combat unit's "teeth" alsotends to swell its support "tail." Advanced C2 equip-ment, like complex weaponry, requires extensive

* 79


training of users as well as maintenance people. Iron-ically, while the extent of the training grows, its ap-plication narrows. According to Lieutenant GeneralClarence E. McKnight, U.S. Army (Ret.), former di-rector for CS systems for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"With rapid obsolescence of new electronics devices,some would say that new generations of equipmentare being introduced every three to five years." 59

Military training programs are highly focused: theindividual does not study communications but istrained in the use or maintenance of a particularradio, or computer, or antenna. All those "new gen-erations of equipment," therefore, make necessarynew generations of trained maintenance people andusers. Furthermore, because the military servicescan't afford to discard an older generation of equip-ment every time a new one appears, they must beable to build the "interfaces" which enable old andnew equipment to work together. Thus, the train.ing, maintenance, and engineering requirementsgenerated by C2 equipment offset some of the capac-ity to "do more with less" such equipment is sup.posed to offer.

NARROWNESS OF VISION

Another strength of computers, as mentioned earli-er, is the potential to bring a measure of stability tothe chaos of the modern battleground by providingcommanders with access to automated expertise-data banks of principles, doctrine, objectives, rulesof engagement, current conditions, and so on. Asystem such as TACPLAN, for example, would

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C2 TrCHNOLOOY

sound an alarm if a commander's decision violatedany of the "rules" contained in the system's databank, With TACPLAN and comparable systems,technology could give the most junior and inexperi-enced commander immediate access to the wisdomof the ages,

There is, unfortunately, a downside to this boonalso. The data bank of such a system could become ablinder to a commander, The primary componentsof such a data bank would be history and logic, His-tory would contribute the "rules"; logic would drivetheir application to a battlefield or crisis situation.

Without the history, there could be no "princi-ples" or "doctrine." Even "objectives" and "rules ofengagement" are usually based on lessons from thepast. But history can be misapplied. It can misleaddecisionmakers who make faulty or incomplete anal-ogies,

In the early stages of what was to become theCuban Missile Crisis, the Central Intelligence Agen-cy (CIA) argued that, as the Soviets had not putnuclear missiles In Eastern Europe, it was unlikelythey would put them in Cuba.8 0 Viewing the crisisretrospectively, analysts realized medium range mis-siles in Eastern Europe could be turned against Mos-cow, while the same missiles in Cuba would never bea threat to the Soviets. The CIA had drawn its analo-gy too narrowly,

Not every compromise in international relationsis an act of appeasement, a replay of Munich; notevery division of forces ends in a Little Bighorn. 6 1And no battle-proven principle of war is necessarilyapplicable to the battle at hand. Thus, a tool such asTACPLAN, driven by history but lacking in intui-

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COMMAND AND CoNTROL FOk WAR AND PE:ACE

tion, could induce a commander to make decisionsmore appropriate to past wars than to tlie presentone, to display "the same deficiency thet generals inthe past have so often been accused of--fighting thenext war in the way that ended the last."62

Logic, also, can be misleading, Ironically, It'shistory which allows us to see this. Alexander's as-sault on Darius' much larger force didn't seem logi-cal-but it worked. Wolfe's climb to confrontMontcalm flew in the face of traditional logic-but itworked. As Anthony G, Bohannan, a former seniorofficer in the British Army, observes,

Military history tells us time and again that it is the com.mander who has the courage to defy conventional logic andprecedence and who reacts to his instincts contrary to theavailable information and consensus, who more often sur.prises his opponent and wins,63

The Marine Corps' manual, Warfighting, makes es-sentially the same point:

A military decision is not merely a mathematical computa-tion, Decision making requires both the intuitive skill torecognize and analyze the essence of a given problem andthe creative ability to devise a practical solution, This abilityis the product of experience, education, Intelligence, bold.ness, perception, and character,n>l

"Conventional logic" tends to be narrow in scope.When an Alexander or a General Wolfe devises astrategy beyond the limits of that scope, the plansappear illogical to someone with a conventional per-spective. One of the most impressive aspects ofhuman intelligence is Its capacity to range beyondthe conventional, So far, computers have not beenable to emulate that talent,

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Shortly after BMEWS came into operation in1960, computers designed to interpret the readingsmade by BMEWS radars reported a massive missileattack on the United States, One of the officers in agroup convened to determine whether the warningwas accurate happened to remember that NikitaKhrushchev, the Soviet premier, was in New York atthe time, That bit of information helped convincethe group the alert was false; it seemed unlikely theSoviets would attack this country while their leaderwas in such a vulnerable position,8" Analysis eventu-ally determined that the BMEWS radars, much morepowerful than the ones they had replaced, had re-ceived radar echoes from the moon-a possibilitynot considered when the software for the computerwas being written,88

Could a computer have reached the conclusionthe humans reached? Only If it had been program-med to. And what programmer would be likely toinclude a search for Khrushchev's whereaboutsamong the commands to be executed in response toa positive radar echo? If such an omniscientprogrammer existed, would the computer's database be equal to the ambitious task set for it? WouldKhrushchev's location be updated every day? Everyhour?

In 1960, wide-ranging human speculation ledhumans to override the computer's judgment, Com-puter-generated false alerts in 1979 and 1980 werealso subjected to human judgments and overridden:the North American Aerospace Defense Command'sprocedures for checking and cross-checking attackwarnings are reassuringly extensive and dominatedby human judgment,07 Still, computers carry an au-

83

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ra of authority that could overwhelm the judgmentof too credulous commanders.

ILLUSIONS OF TIMELINESS AND ACCURACY

Sometimes enthusiasts confuse ideal capabilities andrealities. We see this in the stereotypical "nerds" whotry to use their computers to compensate for limita-tions in their own interpersonal skills: shy andtongue-tied in person, they are able to move gliblyamong the exchanges on electronic bulletin boardsand believe they are developing their social skills.Presidents in their situation rooms and commandersin their control centers are liable to face analogousillusions if they equate their sophisticated graphicdisplays with the realities of the battlefield or crisisscene. One observer compares Richard Beal's datacompression and display techniques with those to befound in the USA Today weather page: "You look atit, you don't have to read a thing and you can under-stand what that weather Is just by colors."68 But the"colors" seen by a reader in Chicago may not resem-ble the reality experienced by a rancher looking atthe sky in Colorado. The colors are based upon indi-cations read and assumptions made at the time thepaper was being put together, but the rancher's in-formation is "real time," Readers in Chicago would

,- understand this distinction if they stopped to thinkabout it, but chances are they won't do that.

John Keegan points out that Hitler In his head-quarters was "deluded by the apparent instantanei-ties of the radio, telex and telephone" into believing

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technology was providing an accurate picture of re-ality:

Floods of information, collected and transmitted apparentlyin "real time," arrived at his situation conferences with sig.nificant delay- precise and detailed orders, seemingly at-tuned to realities, returned from him to the point of action"only after realities had moved on. The disjunction betweenintention and effect resolved itself In the undignified andimpotent tirades to which the Fuhrer subjected his subordi-nates, both in headquarters and at the front when eventswere revealed to have escaped his directions, 9

As a result, writes Keegan, Hitler's judgment was"affected by all that was and is worst about both thechateau generalship of his own youth and the elabo-rately mechanized or autom•,ted command centersof our day," 70

One might argue that the pace of informationcollection and relay today has increased well beyondthat of Hitler's day-in the time of "radio, telex andtelephone"-and that the information displayed inthe situation room or command post today is closerto "real time." However, the pace of change, re-flected in greater force maneuverability and speedi-er weapons, has increased as well. Furthermore, theincreased volume of collection means more timemust be devoted to analysis and correlation with oth-er sources, and that extra time is added to the delaybetween collection and display. Ultimately, today'sgraphic displays could be as misleading as Hitler'scharts and force maps.

Commanders depend on information that, to agreat extent, has been collected and analyzed elec-tronically:

S~a,...

I8i


Those remotely derived assessments will be presented tocommanders and staff through electronic displays that &up.press or mask uncertainty resulting from such factors assenior range/resolution limitations, environmental con.straints, human assumptions and bias, imprecise or ambigu.ous language, interference, enemy deception andcountermeasures: In sum, the fog and the friction of war,7 1

As Clausewitz observed, such hidden uncertaintiesare especially dangerous. 72

MeanvIllo, InaM theCommand4 Pee,..

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CR TpCHNOLOGY

"According to Stuart E, Johnson and AlexanderH. Levis, experiments suggest information "arrivingin message format or displayed on a screen" hasmore credibility than information presented by an-other human being.7 3 When comman-iers receiveadvice from their staffs, they usually treat it with adegree of skepticism, They know the people on theirstaffs, and they know those people are not perfect.They realize the information they provide may beincorrect or incomplete; their advice, flawed, Thesacrifice of such healthy skepticism to an illusion ofcertainty is dangerous.

Future generations, raised in a computer-orient-ed world, may be more realistic about both thestrengths and limitations of computers. They may beappropriately skeptical, less likely to be victimized byeither irrational fears about computers or misguidedfaith in their aura of infallibility, Unfortunately,such balanced views are still rare,

HIDDEN FLAWS

Computers and the software that drives them aredesigned and put together by human beings asflawed as any others. Even the best, most thoroughlytested software carries hidden glitches that canfreeze the computer at a critical moment. This factwas driven home to AT&T on January 15, 1990,when a software problem at a switching center dis.rupted long-distance telephone service for the wholecountry,

One of the most popular and capable word pro.cessing programs, a program first marketed in 1982

j "


after extensive testing, was by 1990 in its fifth edi-tion. That's four major overhauls in seven years.And, even in the fifth edition, the company market.ing the program was offering almost monthly up-dates. Some of those updates involved additional orimproved features. Most simply fixed problems dis-covered by users In attempting to issue a rare anduntested sequence of commands or to use the soft-ware with "standard" machines that turned out to bealmost standard.

A minor engineering difference in a machinemay seem completely insignificant until a particularmachine meets up with a particular piece of soft-ware. Because the aspect of a program that causes asystem to "crash"-that Is, causes the computer tofreeze and refuse to do anything else, even leave theprogram-can remain hidden for years, the user cannever be 100 percent sure he won't encounter aglitch with the next keystroke.

This element of uncertainty applies to militarycomputers and software at least as much as it does tothe computers and software used in the private sec-tor. While thousands of users will push a word pro.cessing program and related hardware to their limitsevery day, it's hard to do that with a military systemonce it's in use.

One big difference between military systemsand privately owned systems is that while the individ-ual or private company may decide to buy the mostexpensive system In order to have the most capableand reliable one available, the military is usually re-quired to go with the lowest bidder. There are ex-ceptions to that rule, and it would be inaccurate tosay military computers are less reliable than those

88

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C2 TECHNOLOGY

"Our computer Is down"

found in private companies. However, the assump-tion that military computers are somehow betterthan the ones so often "down" at the local bank orthe ones that send us other people's bills is simplyunwarranted.

In fact, while the bank is probably using a sys-tem marketed recently, the bureaucratic intricaciesof the military procurement system ensure thatmany systems in use by the military are ten to fifteenyears behind the leading edge of technology,74

DEPENDENCE

Another problem associated with technology is de-pendence, Some parents today worry that use ofelectronic dictionaries may cause their children toforget how to spell on their own, Parents ten yearsago voiced comparable concerns about calculators,They were afraid a child used to pulling out a calcu.lator when faced with any arithmetic function wouldsoon forget how to add and subtract "in his head,"

............... ............-- -


Those fears haven't been realized, and it's likely thatelectronic dictionaries will help build good spellinghabits rather than contribute to illiteracy.

However, it would be foolish to claim that de-pendence on technology never causes problems.When calculators fail, we can temporarily resort tothe use of fingers or a slide rule, if anyone has oneand remembers how to use it. When electronic dic-tionaries crash, we can drag out the battered oldmanual dictionary, Other manifestations of "hightech" are harder to replace.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, fighter pilotsassigned to the Air Defense Command (ADC)-thecommand then charged with protecting U.S. skiesfrom enemy intrusions-relied heavily on a C2 sys-tem called the "Semi-Automated Ground Environ-ment" (SAGE). SAGE managed their interceptionsof unidentified violators of the airspace, assigningindividual fighters to specific intruders, guiding thefighters to an appropriate intercept point, telling thepilots when to arm and fire their weapons, and so on,Just about the only thing the pilots had to do wastake off and land. SAGE had its problems, and bothpilots and controllers often cursed it, But many ofthem relied on it more than they realized,

This reliance became evident when formerADC pilots found themselves assigned to the Tacti-cal Air Command (TAC) and flying missions overNorth and South Vietnam. Without SAGE, they feltlost. Most of the new TAC pilots made the adjust-ment. Some did not,

As we seek and acquire increasingly sophisticat-ed and capable C2 systems, we would do well to con-tinually remind ourselves of the lesson learned by

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C2 TECHNOLOGY

the ADC pilots: some days, it's just us and the seatsof our pants, SAGE was far too big to move around.Much modern C2 technology is a lot more flexible,but it's also likely to be a high-priority target for anyenemy, as Iraqi C2 technology and facilities wereduring the Gulf War of 1991. We better be preparedto operate without a system, unless we've built into ita lot of redundancy. And redundancy is expensive,

USING C2 TECHNOLOGY INTELLIGENTLY

To be able to function independently of high-techC2 equipment when necessary, we have to practicedoing so. Realistic training exercises must includesudden, catastrophic losses of supporting C2 equip-ment, Current exercises, though infrequent, are be-ginning to include such scenarios,.7 Our goal shouldbe exercises that occur frequently and with enoughvariation to keep all commanders aware of the sup-port made possible by sophisticated C2 equipment.Such exercises should also prepare commanders tocompensate for the loss of such equipment,

Given the high cost of exercising-both interms of money and capabilities revealed to alertenemies-it's often advisable to use advanced simu-lators to re-create combat scenarios. This use ofcomputer-driven simulations offers a good exampleof technology employed to maximize human poten-tial-the logic and memory of computers stimulat-ing the creativity of humans.

Human flexibility and common sense transcendthe realm of logic. For that reason, human mindscan go where maihines do not and explore possibili-

9)

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ties that would never occur to a machine, Until thetime when computers are driven by a more flexiblesystem of logic-and there is little to suggest thattime is near- Al is unlikely to deliver on its mostambitious promises,

In the meantime, however, computers offer theadvantages of more thoroughgoing logic and moredependable memory searches than humans. Whilethe human mind can go beyond the grasp of a com-puter, it won't always do so, Sometimes, as in thecase of computer-simulated war games, computersand other types of C2 equipment can supply thenudge human minds may require,

Today's computers aren't capable of the kind ofimprovisation displayed by the human crew of Unit-ed Flight 242 in mid-1989 as their DC-10, crippledby the loss of all three hydraulic systems, struggledtowards its crash landing in Sioux City, Iowa, With.out the capacity for such skill and heroic effort, com-puters can't replace human commanders on thebattlefield.

It's Important to remember, though, that com-puters did fly the United plane while its human crewconcentrated on the hydraulics problem, The com-puters took care of the standard operating proce-dures, while humans coped with the non-standardemergency.

Technology has its vulnerabilities; human be-ings have theirs. Both have special strengths, too,We may find one of the benefits of distinguishing"between C2 on the one hand, and the technologywhich supports C2 on the other, Is that doing so

4I opens the possibility of discovering creative ways to

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draw on the best which both human minds and com-puters have to offer.

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THE HUMAN ANDORGANIZATIONAL

ASPECTS OF C2

The commander is the linchpin of C2. The commander is alsohuman and brings to C2 all the flaws we associate with humanbeings, As we learn more about human nature and cognitivedevelopment, we may ba able to increase the capabilities of com-manders. However, human strengths and weaknesses will alwayshave an impact on C2, as will the pluses and minuss of variousorganizational schemes.

T he effectiveness of C2 ultimately depends uponthe human commander at the heart of every C2

process and system. Genghis Khan shaped the fight-ing formations and established the harsh, effectivediscipline which made his Mongol forces legendary.Alexander the Great conceived and made work thebattle plan which enabled his 30,000 troops to over-come the Persian king Darius' 200,000 plus at Issus.General Douglas MacArthur dared to engincer theInchon landing during the Korean War,

THE COMMANDER AND THE C2 PROCESS

Like all human beings, military commanders arecomplex bundles of personality, education, experi-ence, emotion, and physical sensation. Like allhuman beings, military commanders have individuallimitations, and no C2 process is better than the com-mander running it. As General Cushman observes,

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AADOTAPP.

COMMANDBRt

The CR cycle-commander as "nodal point"Sourceý Robert T, Herres

sometimes the best fix for a C2 problem is to replacethe commander.1

In The Functions of the Executive, Chester Barnardargues that the primary role of executives is to facili-tate the movement of information-"to serve aschannels of communication so far as communica-tions must pass through central positions.'"2 The mil-itary commander is the particular executive in whomwe're interested. "War is primarily concerned withtwo sorts of activity-the delivering of energy andthe communication of information," according toNorman Dixon, and military commanders occupy"nodal points on a complex communication net-work,"3

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THE HUMAN AND ORGAN IZATIONAL ASPECTS OF C2

The commander's function in this network isclear as one reflects on the list of command activitiesoffered by General Herres: "The commander mustbring together knowledge about his forces and theircapabilities, combine that with a review and under-standing of his adversary and select the timing, loca-tions and force structure for engagements." 4 Notsimply a communications channel, this particular"nodal point" does something to the information itreceives: it transforms that information into deci-sions,

PSYCHE COLORS DECISIONS

The commander's whole psyche is a matrix fromwhich those decisions derive; they cannot but becolored by that psyche.

Thus General MacArthur's enthusiasm for his-tory influenced his plan to land at Inchon: emulatingWolfe's strategy against Montcalm, he used surpriseto defeat the North Koreans whom he correctly as-

experhuce

Brilliance

Stupidity ---. Declilons

Direcutive

The commander's psyche colors decisionsI9

.. .. ..


sumed would think a landing at Inchon impossible.5

By the same token, the obstinacy displayed by Doug-las Haig, whose refusal to consider the advice ofpolitical superiors, military subordinates, and hisown intelligence service led to disastrous Britishlosses at Passchendaele in 1917, has been attributedto his "authoritarian personality."8

It is ultimately within the mind of the command-er that all information-about goals, enemy andfriendly forces, the environment, logistics, and soon-combines with the commander's own back-ground and perceptions to provide the basis uponwhich decisions about force employment are made,This is true whether the commander is supported bypersonal knowledge only, the advice of staffs, or bycomplex data banks.

MODELS TOO NEAT

Considered in the abstract, the decisionmaking pro-cess sounds pretty tidy. And, when illustrated by anyof the many C1 "models," including Lawson's, itlooks neat too. The problem with these unclutteredabstractions is that they can mislead us into thinkingof the commander's job in clinical terms that havenothing to do with the reality.

In combat, all on-scene commanders-regard-less of who they are, how much training they've had,or how rational they are under normal circum-stances-will experience feelings of fear, indecisive-ness, confusion, doubt, fatigue, anger, andloneliness-just like other combatants. They will al-so live with pain, hunger, and thirst. In addition,

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what they can accomplish will be limited by theirown intelligence, the intelligence of subordinatesand superiors, and that of the enemy.

There will be nothing abstract or clinical at allabout their jobs. They will be dealing with real peo-pie and real death. Dixon observes there's a greatgap between the ideal commander-"who may beviewed as a device for receiving, processing andtransmitting information in a way which will yieldthe maximum gain for the minimum cost"-and thereal one who must juggle the "incompatible roles" of"'heroic' leader, military manager and technocrat... politician, public relations man, father-figure andpsychotherapist."7

And then there is the "no!,e." If we think interms of a telephone or radio, noise is anything .4:which interferes with the transmission of the sig.nal-static, other signals, background noise, etc. Ap-plied to the commander, noise serves as a metaphorfor anything that interferes with perfect "receiving,processing, and transmitting." Noise in this sense in.cludes the emotional and physical elements men.tioned above, as well as other factors.

In the processing stage, noise may be a precon-ception that limits a commander's ability to acceptinformation which contradicts his current view ofthe situation, The unexpected fact, while conveyingmore information, also is less readily absorbed thansomething expected.

Dixon illustrates this point with the story ofthree commanders, each of whom receives wordfrom an intelligence source that the enemy is aboutto attack. 8 For Commander A, who has been expect-ing this attack, the news is easy to absorb, but not

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEAClE

particularly useful; its information content is low be.

cause it's confirming something already anticipated.For Commander B, who is not expecting the attack,the news is full of information value, and B is soonscrambling to get ready for the attack. Like B, Com-rmander C has not anticipated an attack. Because anattack now would completely overturn C's firmlyheld view of the enemy's strategy, C ignores the newdata, and disaster ensues.

While it's easy to condemn Commander C, espe-cially if C's decision has cost many lives, we should,before rushing to judgment, look at C's mistake interms of human nature. Each of us is called upon tomake various judgments in the course of any oneday. Some of our judgments prove to be correct;others, incorrect, The more experience we gain inlife, the more likely we are to make the correct deci.sion (or to hedge our bets safely). But we can nevereliminate mistakes.

Because commanders' mistakes can cost otherpeople their lives, we tend to judge them by a har-sher standard than the one we use to judge otherexecutives whose errors involve only money. Butcommanders and corporate executives suffer fromthe same flaw, one they share with each of us, theflaw of being human.

The harder we have worked to accumulate theinformation on which we have based a decision, themore difficult it is for us to overturn that decisionbecause of a new fact. 9 This is not a characteristic ofbad people or incompetent commanders, but a char-acteristic of all people and all commanders. It is oneof the oft cited axioms of military life that com-manders should be decisive, and, while decisiveness

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Tia HUMAN AND ORGOANIZATrIONAL ASPECTS OF C2

does not require one to stick to a clearly incorrectchoice, wishing to avoid the appearance of indeci-

siveness may make a commander slow to rescind anorder once it has been issued, In other words, theinstitutional emphasis on decisiveness-- reasonableemphasis, generally Justified by history-could be-come part of the noise that affects a commander'sdecisionmaking,

IDEAL OF THE "STRONG COMMANDER"

Our Commander C may well be an example of whatBrigadier Richard Simpkin, British Army (Ret,),calls the "strong commander," a proud and self-con-fident leader who "burns to impose his will," 10 Sucha commander can be incredibly effective when thesituation and his conception of the situation match.Such was the case in the last year of World War Iwhen events came into sync with the perceptions ofthe British commander-in-chief, Douglas Haig, con-vincing some observers he was "the driving force ofthe Allied armies."1

Never slowed by indecisiveness, the strong com-mander is always taking the initiative, Simpkin notesthat the image of the strong commander was a popu-lar one in the American, British, and Soviet armiesof the Second World War,12

Being a strong commander has its drawbacks,though. Like Commander C, strong commandersmay see only what they have anticipated seeing.They may impose their wills on the situation "to theextent of ignoring it."'Is That happened to Haig atPasschendaele, where Haig's stubbornness cost the'1 _01_,_

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rI


British 300,000 casualties, and at the Battle of theSomme, when the British suffered 57,000 casualtieson the first day, their worst one-day loss ever. 14

NOISE AT ALL LEVELS

Apply this complex picture of commanders and theelements which have an impact on their decision-making to all the levels in the typical command chainand you begin to understand the chancy nature ofcombat, As a matter of fact, this same degree ofcomplexity may be attributed to every individual in-Volved-directly or indirectly-in combat, Everycombat soldier, sailor, marine and airman must dealwith comparable "noise," While the burden of re-sponsibility may be lessened as one proceeds downthe chain of command, that burden is replaced by afelt lack of control and the awareness that one isperceived as expendable,

A study of the combat effectiveness of soldiersinvolved in the Normandy Invasion of 1944 offers adramatic illustration of the impact combat "noise"has throughout the chain of command,15 During thefirst three to four days of the invasion, high numbersof soldiers suffered from severe anxiety, For the av-erage soldier, that intense anxiety ended around thefifth day in combat, and the soldier entered a periodof maximum efficiency which lasted twenty to twen.ty-five days. After that, symptoms of "combat ex.haustion" increased steadily. Soldiers became subject

,a to intense fatigue which even forty-eight-hour restperiods did not relieve. They lost their ability todistinguish between friendly and enemy fire, Their

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THE HUMAN AND ORGAN IZATJIONAL ASP•CTS OF C9

primary interest became finding cover, They ceasedto show any initiative. After about forty days in com-bat, soldiers could no longer be counted on to per-form even the simplest tasks, such as digging in, orto remember training or orders, Speculating aboutthe impact of such conditions on C2 effectivenessstrains the imagination.

HUMAN LIMITATIONS

Once we recognize the various manifestations ofcombat noise, we can begin to understand, withoutcondoning, what appear to be instances of extraordi.nary military Incompetence. Historian WilliamManchester points to numerous examples amongsome of Oie most accomplished and seasoned mili-tary commanders:

Napoleon lost at Waterloo because he was catatonic thatmorning, Douglas S, Freeman notes that Washington was"in a daze" at the Battle of Brandywine, During the crucialengagement at White Oak Swamp, Burke Davis writes,Stonewall Jackton "sat stolidly on his log, his cap far downon his nose, eyes shut.... The day was to be known as thelow point in Jackson's military career, though no one was tobe able to present a thorough and authentic explanation ofthe general's behavior during these hours," Like Bonaparteand Washington, Old Jack was unable to issue orders oreven to understand the reports brought to him .... Thepuszle may be explained by a bit of computer jargoni inputoverload, If too much data is fed into an electronic calcula.tor, the machine stops functioning. J

Manchester observes that something like "input"overload" paralyzed General MacArthur on themorning of December 8, 1941, when, in the wake of

10)

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the Pearl Harbor attack, he was apparently over-whelmed by the conflicting worries and recommen-dations of his staff,17 The result was "one of thestrangest episodes in American military history: thedestruction of MacArthur's air force on the ground,nine hours after word had reached him of the disas-ter in Hawaii,"1 8

Some of MacArthur's most gifted Japanese op-ponents fell victim to the same kind of paralysis afterDoolittle's bombing raid on Tokyo in 1942, Accord-Ing to Roger Beaumont, "Japanese Admiral Yama-moto withdrew to his quarters for several hourswhile Admiral Nagano stared into space, murmur-ing: 'This shouldn't happen; this simply shouldn'thappen,'"19

A very concise and illuminating picture of warand its attendant noise appears in Hirsh Goodmanand Zeev Schiff's report on the attack against theUSS Liberty. The Libtriy, an American intelligenceship, was attacked by Israeli aircraft and gunboatsduring the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, The resultingcasualties stirred outrage in both the United Statesand Israel, Goodman and Schiff's article is based ondetailed research of Israeli military documents, someof them still classified, and shows clearly how thenoise and fog of war can be insurmountable obsta-cles.2 0

On the U.S. side, the story of the Liberty is astory of lost, delayed, and misdirected messages Inone of the world's most sophisticated communica-tions networks. On the Israeli side, it is a story ofextreme tensions, misidentifications, miscommunica-tion, misread radars, and tragic coincidences in amilitary organization widely deemed one of the

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THE HUMAN AND OROANIZATIONAL AspEcts OF C2

world's most efficient. The conclusion of Israeli in-vestigators was that the attack on the Liberty was "agenuine mistake," due largely to five factors: a re-port that El Arish, a city occupied by the Israelis, wasunder attack from the sea; a report that the Liberowas moving at thirty knots; a report from Israelipilont that it was a ship of war; an Identification ofthe ship as the Egyptian El Quseir; and the ship'scloseness to a hostile shore in time of war,

The perception that El Arish was being attackedfrom the sea was traced to the explosion of an Egyp-thin ammunition depot in the city, The report thatthe ship was moving at thirty knots-a sign of hostil-ity according to Israeli standard operating proce-dure for the 1967 war-was due either to a "radarjump," an erroneous reading, or an erroneous log.ging by the radar operator, The raisidentifications ofthe ship by the pilots and gunboat crews were attrib.uted to a series of unfortunate coincidences com-bined with combat tensions, The ship's position wasdue to failures in the US, communications system,As Goodman and Schiff present them, all of themistakes are readily understood. No one or two ofthem in isolation would have led to the attack,

In examining two events involving U.S, forces in1985, the bombing of the Marine barracks In Leba.non and alleged foul-ups in the Grenada invasion, wefind the same kinds of errors-understandable mis.takes-no single one of which would have been ofconsequence by itsel', In Beirut, a convoluted chainof command, a mismatch between intelligence capa-bilities and the situation, ambiguity about the natureof the mission, and perhaps a degree of service paro.chialism were factors,9 1 In the case of the Grenada

,.,3' :

t


invasion, the needs for secrecy and thorough plan-ning conflicted, and the latter was slighted-a ra-tional decision, though arguably not the best, Bymost standards, the Grenada operation was a suc-cess, so we really can't say the decision was "wrong."In both cases, Lebanon and Grenada, more judiciousdecisions are apparent only in retrospect,

MILITARY MISTAKES

Military commanders always have and always willmake mistakes, Historian Martin Van Creveld listsNapoleon's victory at Jena in 1806 as "probably thegreatest single triumph In his entire career,"28 Andyet, Napoleon's errors and misjudgments In that bat-tie were extraordinary:

Napoleon atJena had known nothing about the main actionthat took place on that day; had forgotten all about two ofhis corpsi did not Issue orders to a third, and possibly to afourth; was taken by surprise by the action of a fifth- and, tocap it all, had one of his principal subordinates display thekind of disobedience th'tt would have brought a lesser mor-tal before a firing squad.4

Perhaps Napoleon succeeded at Jena, despite his er-rors, because of the way he had organized his armyinto independent units, or because fear of his namehad caused the main Prussian army to flee right intothe path of his 3rd Corps,25

If we conclude it was the way Napoleon orga-nized his army which resulted in the victory at Jena,we might say he proved himself an adept at the "artof war"-a statement unlikely to stir much conten-tion (unless we're addressing a horde of Wellington

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THE HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF C•

fanatics). If we conclude the Prussian fear of hisprowess in war panicked them into making a mis-take, we'd probably say a combination of art andluck determined Napoleon's victory,

"GENERAL'S LUCK"

"Nowadays," writes Simpkin, "luck stays with thegood general who has a good system of commandand control,"9 8 Simpkin's analysis of "General'sluck" is really an answer to those who treat the "art"of war as something ultimately unfathomable, ablend of mystical knowledge and good fortune,

Such "luck," he argues,

surely comprehends three distinct though related ele.ments-the creation of opportunity, the spotting of oppor.tunlty, and the exploitation of opportunity, Only in thesecond of these does pure chance, the unpredictable whimof destiny, play a part,!?

What Simpkin calls the "creation of opportunity"Involves structuring a plan that takes potential op-portunities into consideration without being depend-ent on their realization for success, The mosteffective way to do this is to get "Inside the enemy'sdecision loop" by deceptively misleading his expecta-tions and evoking a blunder on his part, For exam-pie, Feint A leads our enemy to think we mightattack from the north- Feint B reinforces that im-pression, and the enemy realigns his defenses sothey're oriented toward the north, Then we attackfrom the south, In the meantime, the force withwhich we're attacking from the south Is strongenough to give us a good chance of victory, even If

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COMMAND AND CoNT'RoL FoR WAR AND PEACE

the feints have not tricked the enemy into turninghis defenses.

"Exploitation of opportunity," Slmpkin's thirdcomponent of "General's luck," is a function of flexi-bility, Such flexibility, he argues, is not available tothe commander whose "subordinates and theirstaffs, and his troops, are trained only to act on de.tailed orders and to obey complex SOPs [standardoperating procedures] to the letter regardless of cir.cumstance,"28 Rather, flexibility is encouraged by acommand structure in which a superior makes hisIntention clear but does not impose detailed tasks onhis subordinates, It Is up to the latter to define theirtasks in ways that ensure the superior's Intention issupported, That's the way Napoleon worked withmost of his marshals, allowing them wide discretionIn the operation of corps organized to function Inde-pendently for limited time periods, 9 It's an ap-proatch that saved the day for the French on October14, 1806, when Davout's 5rd Corps beat the mainPrussian Army at Auerstadt, while Napoleon andmost of his forces had been engaging what turnedout to be a mere flank guard at Jena.30 Simpkin callsthis approach to command "directive control";others refer to It as the use of "mission-type orders."

"GENERAL'S LUCK" AND C2

Whatever the terminology, the approach requiresthe sharing of information and point of view overseveral levels of command, It. depends, therefore, on

,4 the availability of very capable C2 systems, Forsuperiors and subordinates to be able to reach a

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THE HUMAN AND OROANIZA'IONAL ASPeCTS OF C2

common sense of the situation-a shared sense ofwhat's going on--they must be able to pass informa-tion up and down the chain of command freely. Inorder for superiors and subordinates to share thesame mind-set, superiors must make their overall in-tentions clear, The minds of superiors and subordi-nates must be, as Simpkin puts it, "well-attuned toeach other,"5 1 Capable C -encompassing clearlyunderstood doctrine, thorough training, frequentand realistic exercises-is a prerequisite for suchharmony.

The kind of flexibility Simpkin is talking aboutmeans that when a subordinate realizes his superior'sintention will not be furthered by the carrying out ofa given task, he is free to redefine the task. He doeswhat he now believes will further his boss's Inten-tion,

A lot of mutual trust is involved in such a situa-tion. The superior trusts the subordinate's judg-ment; the subordinate trusts his superior not tocrucify him if he makes an honest mistake. In thewords of the Marine Corps' manual, Warflghtinj,"trust is an essential trait among leaders--trust byseniors In the abilities of their subordinates and byjuniors in the competence and support of their se-niors."53 According to the manual, mistakes by ju.,nior leaders are "a necessary part of learning" andshould be dealt with leniently,

CREATIVITY

The component of "General's luck" which demandsthe complicity of destiny or chance is the "spotting

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of opportunity." That, at least, is what Simpkin saysinitially. However, he goes on to say,

what matters here is the ability to spot the possible signifi-cance of something that seems at once trivial and whollyirrelevant, This Is really an aspect of the creative thinkingthat lies at the root of all Innovation and may manifest Itselfin literary or artistic talent, entrepreneurial flair, manage-ment (and thus command) ability, or the pioneering spark inthe di lest and hardent of scientific flelds., 4

Ultimately then, skill in the art of war proceeds fromprofessional knowledge (Simpkin calls it the "physicsof war"), flexibility, and creative thinking.

As we noted earlier, what Simpkin is trying todo is admirable: to get beyond the vagueness wesense in the phrase "art of war." It's not satisfying tolabel something as critical as generalship "art," be-cause that term carries with it not only a presump-tion of professional knowledge but also a suggestionof mysticism and intuition, of a component depend-ent upon the beneficence of God or Fate or Chance,something beyond our ability to give or develop,

Simpkin's interesting and appealing argumentfor reducing Chance to the three categories of"luck," which, in turn, reduce to a combination ofprofessional knowledge, flexibility, and creativity,sounds good, but does it really get us anywhere?How do we foster the development of creativity insoldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen?

FOSTERING CREATIVITY

To date, no one has found a way to create creativity.There are plenty of theories flying around about

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nurturing creativity-from the uterus to the class-room. Many are somewhat fanciful, having to dowith things like the kinds of music a mother listensto while pregnant. Some of the more rational oneslink creativity with cognitive development and drawon the work of Jean Piaget and William Perry.Others derive from Henri Bergson's analysis of theintellectual and intuitive components of creativity. Aconsiderable body of anecdotal evidence suggeststhat the study of literature and mathematics pro-motes creativity, 5

But no one has provided evidence to contradictthe poet John Keats' assertion: "That which is crea-tive must create itself."38 Creativity appears to be asmuch a gift of God, Fate, or Chance as "art" is. Wecan use the personality profiles developed by behav-ioral scientists to try to select creative people to be-come leaders. We can support curricula strong inliterature and mathematics. But we can't create crea-tivity ex nihilo. To guarantee the development of acreative genius comparable to a Thomas Edison, aWilliam Shakespeare, a Frank Lloyd Wright, or aGeneral Patton, we would have to recreate the lives,environments, and experiences of those individuals.And that, of course, is impossible.

CREATIVITY AND HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

Do we do things now that actually inhibit the devel-opment of creativity in soldiers, sailors, marines, andairmen? Simpkin suggests that use of the hierarchicalstructure of the military fosters conformity, and in asense he's right, though he offers no alternatives,. 7

...............


The top boss's view is likely to be reflected in theview of the individual who works for that boss; theview of that individual (which is really the top boss'sview) will probably be reflected In the views of thepeople who work for her or him, and so on down theline. With the same view being echoed from top tobottom, not a lot of room is left for creativity.

Or is there? Picture the hierarchical chain ofcommand. Because all Individuals in that chain arehuman and therefore subject to the nonfelicities ofhuman nature, all probably assume they're at least alittle more creative and original than the average Joeor Josie. Many will also be disposed to think the bossis unimpressive. Being politic, they will echo theboss's ideas in public, while privately nurturing theirown objections, Thus, in moving from top to bottomof the command chain, we're likely to encounter awide range of views on any given issue, Views whichdiffer from the going party line will be represseduntil a crisis stimulates the command chain to shedthe upper layers of its peacetime accretions. Suchshedding takes place at the beginning of mostwars, 38

Perhaps this is an excessively cynical view, butit's likely to be the case for at least some of the nodesin a lengthy command chain, A lot of the conformityrides pretty close to the surface,

"NEW CORPORATE SHAPES

Furthermore, while the corporate world talks a lotabout the "bureaucratic pyramid" of traditional or-ganization disappearing as "the distributed web of

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the network becomes the symbol of corporate orga-* nization in the information age," specific examples

of that happening are hard to come by.8 9 Sure, someintermediate levels of middle management are disap-pearing as chief executives discover it's faster andcheaper to do data checks themselves, through thecompany's computer network, than it is to maintaina staff to pull out information the old way. Function.al spinoffs-Company A's security office becoming aseparate company which supplies security services tocompanies A, B, and C-are also changing the shapeof the organization.

The net effects are shrinkage and modifiedchannels of communication, formal and informal.It's really too early to say what shape will typify cor.porate America in the future-the web, hub andwheel, atomic particle, or whatever. And while it'slikely computer networks and technologies will com-bine with shrinking budgets to reduce the size ofmilitary organizations, the hierarchical, pyramid-based shape of military organizations is likely to en-dure for some time yet.

C2 AND ORGANIZATION

There is a sense, though, in which changing technol-ogy and concepts of C2 have already had an impacton the highest levels of the national security estab-lishment. The Goldwater-Nichols Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986 did not alter

f ithe shape of the military hierarchy, but it did haveL :an important impact on the way it does business.

...-.- -.. . . . - .,,. ,........


Organizational issues affect C2 in at least twoways. The first concerns how the C2 process is setup, both at the national level and within a combatelement. Is the process adapted to the deci-sionmaker's style, or vice versa? How are informa-tion sources and assets protected, shared, and used?At what point does a necessary safeguard becomemicromanagement?

The second way organizational Issues affect C2concerns how C2 equipment is acquired. We've seenthat C2 is much more than a matter of equipment,but equipment is important. And the Reagan admin-istration's emphasis on C2 made it a matter of power,status, and budgets.

Since World War II, DoD has been set up insuch a way that the Services enlist and train people,buy weapons and other equipment (including C2

equipment), and determine weapons doctrine.The combatant commands get their people,

their weapons and equipment, and weapons doctrinefrom the Services. It's up to the CINCs to harmonizeArmy, Navy, Air Force, and Marine people, weap-ons, equipment, and doctrine. In the view of somecritics, increasing specialization, especially in com-munications and other CR systems, and various formsof inter-Service rivalry have made the CINCs' jobsvery difficult.

In the early 1980s, warnings about the inade-quacies of operational C2 helped draw the attentionof the House and Senate to the issue of DoD organi-zation, One of the most outspoken critics of existingC0 systems was Lieutenant General John H.Cushman, U.S. Army (retired), who had commandedmajor combat organizations in Vietnam and Korea.

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STHE HUMAN AND ORGANIZATrIONAL ASPECTS OF C2

Prldent

sereotary forfDeFenie

Womfle of the UsaetPAz

1"AIM NTAIN MIP

jointmulitar WON of I tstall

Departisents (Joe)Joint owil

DoD Organization, 195841986Source: Archie D, Barrett

General Cushman's indictments were dramatic andclear:

Our performance in providing the full range of means nec.essary for command and control systems for theater forceshas been, and all too likely continues to be, gravely defl.cdent. Although the means of command and control in thehands of US and allied field forces may possibly be adequatefor conditions short of war, they are seriously inadequatefor war and hence for war's deterrence.40

Cushman and others argued that the CINCs of uni-fied commands-commands made up of componentforces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines-or combined commands-composed of US. and al-lied forces-could not count on having dependableC2 links with their own forces, In other words, theCINCs had to deal with the fact that under condi.

•. . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - .......


tions of combat (or even a realistic exercise) theywould probably lose communications with at leastsome of their forces, that their forces might not beable to talk to each other-not even to coordinatecovering naval or artillery fire-that some intelli-gence sources would become Inaccessible and thatthey might be left unaware of the status of some orall of their own forces, In short, the CINCs had toexpect to find themselves fighting blind, in igno-rance of the enemy situation, the situation of otherfriendly forces, and the situation on other fronts.

Many argued that the inadequacies of opera-tional C2 were directly attributable to a power imbal-ance, with the military services-the Navy (andMarines), Army, and Air Force-having all the pow.er, and the unified and combined commands havingall the responsibility, For example, the military ser-vices would go through the procurement process fornew systems without input from the unified andcombined commanders whose forces would be em-ploying those systems:

For the typical senior commander, allied or US, whoseforces must use these systems, they represent the largelyunplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components whichhave been delivered to his forces by relatively independentparties far away who have coordinated adequately neitherwith him and his staff nor with each other. And they neitherexploit the present capabilities of technology nor does thesystem for their development adequately provide tha, fu.ture system. will. 41

As a result, commanders might find the "latest" com-munications equipment wouldn't mesh with equip-ment already in use, They might be unable to talk toI ,subordinate or allied units, or they might be forced

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THE HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL AsPiC'rS OF C9

to use different systems for handling different kindsof data,

This two.tiered system-military services-com-bat commands-sometimes led to confusion or con-flict over administrative control and operationalcontrol. The Marine Corps was responsible for train-Ing, equipping, and supplying a force for use in Leb.anon in ) 985--administrative control, The chain ofcommand following operational control fell to anArmy general, Who then was to bear the brunt ofthe blame when the Marine barracks was bombed?Were their inadequate defenses the result of short-comings in their training, a matter of administrativecontrol? That would mean responsibility would restwith the Marine Corps, Or were they the result ofmistakes in deploying the force, a matter of opera.tional control? That would put the responsibility onthe shoulders of the Army general at the military topof a long chain of command, The president assumedthe blame and the immediate issue went away, butthe uncertainty remained,

Just as problematical were the military services'holds on component forces, Though such forceswere designated to fight under the operational com-mander, they had to rely on their parent militaryservices for supplies, equipment, pay, promotions,and just about everything else-a relationship sureto encourage divided loyalties.

For example, US. forces in Europe formed theEuropean Command (EUCOM), The forces thatmade up EUCOM were the US, Naval Forces, Eu.rope (USNAVEUR), the US, Air Forces, Europe(USAFE), and the US. Army, Europe (USAREUR),t USNAVEUR, USAFE, and USAREUR were compo-

jji

COMMAND AND CONrROL FOR WAR AND PEACE

nent commands of EUCOM; their commanders(CINCUSNAVEUR, C[NCUSAFE, and CINCUS-AREUR respectively) worked for the EUCOM com-mander (CINCUSEUCOM),

But CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, andCINCUSAREUR received their promotions and payfrom the Department of the Navy, the Departmentof the Air Force, and the Department of the Armyrespectively. If CINCUSNAVEUR needed moreships or sailors, he had to get them from the Depart-ment of the Navy. If CINCUSAFE needed moreairplanes or airmen, he had to get them from theDepartment of the Air Force.

The same arrangement applied to C2 systems.For example, the radios used by CINCUSNAVEURand his forces were radios designed, paid for, andsupplied by the Navy, The radios used byCINCUSAFE and his forces were Air Force radios.The radios used by CINCUSAREUR and his forceswere Army radios. CINCUSEUCOM would proba-bly be able to stay in touch with CINCUSAREURand his forces because both CINCs were Army com-manders using Army radios. Would theCINCUSEUCOM, however, be able to communicatewith USNAVEUR and USAFE forces? Maybe.Would USNAVEUR and USAFE forces be able tocommunicate with each other and with USAREURforces? Maybe.

If the military services were feuding about howto best achieve the EUCOM mission, wouldCINCUSNAVEUR and CINCUSAFE loyally throwtheir support behind CINCUSEUCOM? Probably

S. .. ... not,' 118

. - .,

THE HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL AsPEcTs OF C1

Prior to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Actin 1986, some critics also argued that inter-Servicecollusion, a rcaction to the bloody inter-Servicesquabbles of the late 1940s, had diminished thevalue of military advice provided by the JCS, Theymaintained that the Service chiefs were primarilyconcerned with protecting the interests of their ownmilitary services, and that one of the strategies forprotecting those interests was to make sure no mili-tary service lost any ground-a quid pro quo ar-rangement, Thus, they said, JCS advice to thenation's leaders was often determined by a "lowestcommon denominator" process focused on the mili-tary services' rather than the country's interests.

Those opposed to major changes to the struc-ture of DoD argued that putting the right people inthe important jobs-appointing a strong and aggres-sive JCS chairman, for example-would solve mostproblems in the existing system. Others said theweaknesses in the existing structure were intention-al: "The reason is that people in this country havenever wanted a strong military; we have wanted tofragment military authority," 4X Some expressed con-cern that if operational commanders got involved inbudgetii and procurement, as they might if ruleswere changed to allow them input regarding selec-tion of equipment for joint (multi-Service) use, theywould be, distracted from their primary mission ofpreparing fighting forces. Some feared the move toreorganize would strengthen the hand of "purple-suiters" (people in unified or combined organiza-tions); that military service specialization was beingsacrificed for "Jointness,"

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Defenae Reorganization: The 1986 ActSource: Archie D, Barrett

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The result of thousands of hours of research, hear-ings, and debates was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Actin 1986.

The act made the chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff the principal military adviser to the presi-dent; previously, he had been spokesman for theJoint Chiefs, essentially a "first among equals," Gold-water-Nichols also made the chairman the managerof the Joint Staff and created a vice chairman toassist him.

The act extended the powers of the CINCs, giv-Ing them a voice in the assignment and evaluation ofcomponent commanders and the power to suspend

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THe HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF C2

subordinates. It also gave them an indirect role inresource allocation,

Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasizedthe importance of joint assignments-assignmentsthat take officers from their own military servicesand make them part of a multi-Service organization,It established education and experience require.ments for joint duty, set up safeguards to ensurejoint officers are treated equitably for promotionand assignments, and made experience in joint dutyassignments a prerequisite for promotion to generalor flag rank,

All in all, the Defense Reorganization Act shift.ed power from the military service departments andchiefs of staff to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs andthe CINCs, It addressed both the administrative-op-erational conflicts and the acquisition-use conflicts,At the national level, it also affected how the C2

system was set up, with the chairman replacing theJoint Chiefs as chief military adviser to the presi-dent.

PERFECT ORGANIZATION

Ironically, in the discussions that preceded passageof the Goldwater-Nichols Act, just about everyoneagreed on the symptoms indicating the existence of aproblem, but different parties called for radicallydifferent organizational solutions. While some calledfor more "jolntness," others advocated more special."ization; while some advocated less centralized con-trol, others wanted more, The upshot of all this isthat DoD organization is likely to continue as a hot

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COMMAND AND CONTrROL FOR WAR AND PFACK

issue, and we may see a persistent tendency for oneyear's solution to be perceived as part of the nextyear's problem. After reviewing the political andrhetorical twists which culminated in the act's pas-sage, it's tempting to attribute an almost serendipi-tous quality to the deliberations that took place.However, a comment made in 1985 by Dr. ArchieD. Barrett, House staffer and author of ReappraisingDefense Organization, offers a healthy counterbalanceto such temptations:

Even If a divine presence could give us a perfect organiza.tion today, it wouldn't be perfect a year from now becausechanging circumstances-weapons development and thosesorts of things-would blur those boundaries and you'dhave to redefine them, That means Service roles and mis.sions need constant examination and redefinition,45

Organizations are established, defined, and consti-tuted by people-human beings with all their at-tendant flaws and complexities, No organization willever be perfect, any more than any human being isever perfect.

Organizations can be improved, and human ca-pabilities such as "generalship" can be nurtured, butperfection will never be achieved-in this life atleast-by organizations or human beings, Our ideal-izations of both will be healthy so long as they simplyserve as goads to action and disturbers of our com-placencies, When they become the sine qua non ofnational security, we're In trouble,

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AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM:INFORMATION THAT ISCOMPLETE, TRUE, AND

UP-TO-DATE

Sometimes we sound and act as though perfect C2 were achievable,It's not. Even defining what we mean by *perfect C2" is verydifficult. The most succesIi*I commanders are those who under.stand the nature of the C process and recognize the flaws inher.ent in their own C sysiems-those "web-lh" collectons of people,equipment and procedures. Commanders who wait for informa.tion that is 'complete, true and up.to.date* will lose their battles.

H umanity's preoccupation with perfection isprobably as old as the human race. Twentieth

century anthropologists and scholars such as SirJames Frazer, Joseph Campbell, and Mircea Eliadebelieve primitive gods were made in humanity's im-age.

The gods represented human perfection, thefullest possible extension of knowledge and power,When people found themselves in trouble, theycalled on their gods to intervene in the normal orderof things and save them,

According to Frazer, magic and science areanalogous in that they both see the universe as adomain governed by "immutable laws."1 It Is thatperception which distinguishes both magic and sci-ence from religion, which brings with it "an impliedelasticity or variability of nature."2 To get what theyneeded or wanted, people had to find the right ap.

12!

1 .... .. . . .. . ,, iii

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEACz

Ancient peoples made their gods in their own images

proach to convince their gods-the anthropologists'embodiments of human perfection-to intervene inthe natural order of things, to suspend the law ofnature momentarily.

!n the view of Severo M. Ornstein, our latestreligion is founded on the computer, a new-fangleddeus ex machina, a source of perfection we turn towhen our salvation appears to be beyond the rangeof our own limited knowledge and powers

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COMPLETE, TRUE, AND UP-TO-DATE

Some say the computer is our deus ex machina

Ornstein, who helped develop the computer.based defense system, SAGE, mentioned earlier (seepage 90), subsequently chaired a group called Com-puter Professionals for Social Responsibility. He ar-gues that the "jam" we find ourselves in is thespiraling arms race, a contest that threatens to de-stroy humanity. Not knowing how to control thespiral, we pray to our surrogate, the computer withits perfect logic, to protect us from the results of ourillogical brinkmanship, to absolve "us of the terrible12

12


responsibility for our own fate,. 4 Citing a history offalse alerts generated by computer errors and illus-trating the types of flaws that commonly appear incomputer progi ams, Ornstein concludes,

Not only will computer-controlled systems fall to provideprotection, but if we really persist in relinquishing our re.sponsibilities and putting more and more higher and higherlevels of evaluation and decision making into their hands,we will be sealing our fate, If we continue on this course,that fate will be richly deserved.5

While Ornstein's concerns are reasonable,there's no indication that the United States has yetrelegated decisionmaking to computers. The falsealerts cited by Ornstein and his colleagues are cer-tainly frightening, They're frightening In the sameway the shelter practices of the 1950s were frighten-ing to children cowering under their school desks:they raise the specter of nuclear devastation, some-thing no one wishes to confront,

But they're also reassuring because, in everycase where computers warned of an attack, a ThreatAssessment Conference of senior duty officers at theNorth American Aerospace Defense Command,SAC, and the National Military Command Center inthe Pentagon was convened to evaluate the threat,6

Human judgment intervened, in accordance withwell-established procedures, and determined thealerts were false. Those procedures also call for an-other conference, involving the president and othersenior advisers, in a case where the Threat Assess-ment Conference determines that a warning mightbe legitimate.7 In other words, the only decision leftto computers is whether or not indications are seri-ous enough to bring in the humans, In no case do

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COMPLETE, TRUE, AND UP-TO.DATE

computers decide whether or how to respond towarnings of an attack. Nor should they.

Of course, a combination of a false alert by thecomputers and a series of mistaken judgments bypeople could result in nuclear war, That's somethingall rational human beings wish to avoid, but, untilnuclear weapons are eliminated, it will remain 9 hor-rible possibility. Imperfect human beings establishimperfect procedures and develop imperfect tech.nologies.

AMBIGUOUS WORDING

Recognizing the reality of those imperfections isprobably the best safeguard we have against the kindof thinking that worries the Computer Professionalsfor Social Responsibility, Unfortunately, well-inten.tioned rhetoric can sometimes give an unintendedboost to that kind of thinking, A statement by the1987 Defense Science Board Task Force on Com-mand and Control Systems Management, for exam-pie, contains these words:

The ideal command and control system supporting a com.mander is such that the commander knows what goes on,that he receives what is intended for him and that what hetransmits is delivered to the intended addressee. so that thecommand decisions are made with confidence and are basedon information that is complete, true and up-to-date.s

Now, ideal can be used as a synonym for stan-dard. If the Defense Science Board is using the wordin this sense, its statement could be paraphrased thisway: we must give commanders command and con-trol systems that guarantee "information that is corn-

12:

V. j i


piete, true, and up-to-date." Ideal can also mean"beyond an achievable level." If the Defense ScienceBoard is usinj the word this way, which seems likely,then "information that is complete, true, and up-to.date" is being held up as a goal beyond any possibili.ty of realization.

"Aiming for the stars" is certainly not an unrea-sonable approach to take in any worthwhile endeav-or, so long as everyone concerned realizes that noone is actually going to reach the stars. But a defenseestablishment that cherishes the use of phrases like"surgical strike" and "zero CEP" just may be the kindof outfit that responds to an exhortation to "aim forthe stars" by putting out contracts for nuclear sneak-ers,

There is the story of the two hikers who spot agrizzly bear stalking them. One hiker sits down andtakes off his hiking boots, replacing them with hisrunning shoes, "What good will that do?" asks hiscompanion. "You can't outrun a bear." Lacing up hisNikes, the friend responds, "I don't have to outrunthe bear. I just have to outdistance you." 9

SERIES OF ERRORS

To believe in the possibility of perfect C2 systems-systems that provide "complete, true, and up-to-date" information-is to set the stage for policiessuch as "launch on warning" which give credibility tothe nightmares of the Computer Professionals forSocial Responsibility. Imagine being the presidentand being awakened to read this message from theThreat Assessment Conference:

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COMPLETE, TRUE, AND UP-TO-DATE

A missile attack by the Soviet Union appears to be immi-nent, Missiles are likely to impact the East Coast, includingthe D,C. area, within five minutes of your receipt of thismessage. We recommend an Immediate, full-scale response,

At 0243 this morning, the SAC command post at Of-futt received indications of incoming ICBMs and SLBMs,

SEUCOM reports urgent message regarding unidenti-fled jet aircraft over Turkey,

At least 100 Soviet fighters have been detected in theair over Syria and have reportedly shot down a Britishbomber on a routine training flight in the areM,

Satellites have detected movement of a large, nuclear-capable fleet through the Dardanelles, The fleet appears tobe moving out of the Black Sea in preparation for hostilities,

Analysts suspect the Middle East will be the target of amassive conventional attack and that the preemptive nucle-ar attack on the United States is designed to preclude ourinterference.

Would you accept the recommendation for an imme-diate response? Or would you wait to "see" whetherincoming missiles were actually going to hit theWhite House? Would a national security policy of"launch on warning" affect your decision?

A scenario in which a president receives such amessage is not so far-fetched as one might imagine,This message was concocted by combining the ele-ments of two real "incidents," the false missile alertthat occurred on June 5, 1980, and the receipt of aseries of reports about MiGs, the British bomber,and the Soviet fleet on November 5, 1956-right inthe middle of the Suez Crisis and the HungarianRevolution.

1 0

The false missile alert was traced to a chip fail-ure.,1 According to Paul Bracken, the unidentifiedjets over Turkey turned out to be swans with partic-ularly intriguing radar profiles, the MiGi were an

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escort for the president of Syria, the bomber wentdown as a result of mechanical failure, and the fleetwas on a scheduled exercise,.1

SEEING IS BELIEVING

Clearly, a "launch on warning" policy is predicatedon reliable warning, But we better be careful abouthow we define reliable, General Richard H, Ellis,former commander-in-chief of SAC, recalls the un.reliability of intelligence data he had felt certainabout as a combat pilot In World War II:

We were engaged In low-level attack, We were right downon the targets, bombing and strafing them at treetop level,There were certain things we saw and reported, and yet itturned out, when we got the photographs back, that wewere wrong, And If you think that's changed today, you'rewrong, because it hasn't, What is reported about the battle-field or the airspace, and the actual fact of the case, may betwo entirely different things.15

Based on his personal experience, General Elliswarns, "When people talk about firing on warning,or launching on warning, they're in a very risky area,It's dangerous, in my opinion-very destabi.lizing," 14

DATA AND ANALYSIS

Warning, like other intelligence "products," resultsfrom gathering and analyzing data. After a satellitepicks up evidence of a missile launch, for example,the launch data-which should indicate what kind ofmissile is involved, where the missile originated, and

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COMPLETE, TRUE, AND UP.TO-DATt

where it's headed-will be put in the context of oth-er available data, Relevant data might include telem-etry from previous launches, information about the

* usual payload carried by the kind of missilelaunched, evidence of concurrent launches, informa-tion about the current political situation, and so on.

Analysis requires analysts, and analysts bringwith them many of the human flaws we looked atearlier, including preconceptions. Worrying aboutthese kinds of problems is one of the things thatkeeps the National Warning Staff awake at night:

You go into a problem trying to discover truth. You workyour way through it, collecting all the evidence, and you putforward a brilliant exposition, Now, having gone throughall that pain and soul.searching, you have become so wed.ded to your viewpoint that you will never question it, nevergo back and ask yourself what is wrong with it, I think wehave all been there, It is a very hard failing to avoid, Eventhough we warn our analysts that this Is going to happen,and not to let it happen, it happens time and time again, andI am not sure we will ever totally overcome it.,

Remember our Commander C?

PROMISES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND JUDGMENTS

* Unrealistic promises can lead to mistaken Judgmentsbased on unrealistic assumptions. Anyone whopromises a commander "information that is com-

* plete, true, and up-to-date" is promising the impossi-ble, The danger occurs when commanders translatethe promise into unwarranted assumptions about thereliability of the information they do receive. Argu-ments in support of a "launch on warning" policyillustrate the danger,

I ... .. . " ' " A W


The things human beings make-computers,radios, software, organizations, procedures, doc-trine-are imperfect. If people start talking aboutgiving a commander a perfect C2 system, they'repromising something neither they nor anyone elsecan deliver. When they talk about "information thatis complete, true and up-to-date," they're talkingabout something that is conceivable only in the ab-stract.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

What is "complete" information? Is it the amount ofinformation a commander needs to guarantee victo.ry? What is incomplete information? (Maybe thatwould be a message that told the commander friend.ly troops outnumbered enemy troops but neglectedto mention the enemy had massive reinforcementsavailable two miles away.) Who defines complete orincomplete in this context?

Picture a primitive bati lefleld, one on which twoforces come together head-to-head to fight until onedestroys the other or forces the other to flee. Pitt acommander in the middle of the melee, How muchC2 can that commander exercise? Obviously, verylittle. The commander can issue instructions and ex-hortations to warriors ,n the immediate vicinity, butthe range of the commander's voice, the din of bat-tIe, and direct involvement in the battle will signifi.cantly limit the commander's effectiveness as acommander.

Now put the commander in a balloon fixed twohundred feet above Lhe battlefield, Give the com.

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COMPLETt, Tiut, AND UP-TO-DATE

mander a megaphone for communicating withfriendly forces, From two hundred feet above thebattlefield, the commander has a good view of allforces, The c:ommander, being able to see the pointsalong the battle line where one squad needs rein-forcing or is getting too far ahead and risks being cutoff, has some ability to make the required adjust-ments-to move squads forward or back as necessa- ,:ry. The capacity for C9 is far greater than it waswhen the commander was on the ground. It's cer-tainly not perfect, though, The commander will stillhave trouble making directions clear over the noise,and being an excellent target may significantly Im-pact on the commander's decisionmaking ability.Furthermore, though the view of the battlefield ismuch better than it was from the ground, the com-mander still doesn't know what's going on over thenext hill that may affect the outcome of the battle,

Let's now push our fantasy to the limit: let's giveour commander an invulnerable craft that will movequickly to any point on the battlefield where thecommander wants to go, will move almost Instanta-neously from the floor of the battlefield to a positionmiles above the earth where the commander can seeanything, In any direction, for thousands of miles.18

On top of all this, provide secure communications.Our commander can see the entire battlefield, stag-ing areas any distanc•e from the battle, supply lines,storage areas, potential reinforcements-maybeeven something of the enemy's industrial and agri-cultural capacities; can give commands and direc-tions and count on their being heard; and canmonitor friendly and enemy status at any point onthe battlefield,

. .


Our commander's C2 capacity at this point isexcellent, but is it perfect? Perfect C2 presupposesperfect information, Perfect information must be atleast "complete, true and up-to-date." But even thiscommander can only be in one place at one time. So,no matter what pattern our commander uses formoving up and down and around the field and fortalking to a strategically chosen sampling of subordi-nates, there's always going to be something missing.At no single moment will the commander's informa-tion be "complete." In this situation, the commanderis better off than when on the ground or even in theballoon, but he can still lose the battle.

Now let's put our commander in a modern con-text. The battlefield will be unrecognizable. There'qno clearly defined line of battle because massive fire.power and great mobility have combined to make itinadvisable to mass great numbers of forces in anyone spot, Instead, pockets of friendly and enemyforces will dot the terrain, the sea, the sky, and evenspace. Put our commander in an air conditioned,nuclear-hardened command post some distancefrom the site of the battle. Provide a wonderfid ar-ray of small screens surrounding a large screen posi.tioned directly in front of the commander; on thosesmall screens display the sights provided by hun-dreds of mini-cams-some prepositioned, some fit-ted on remotely piloted vehicles that the commandercan direct; supply the capability to display a blow-tipof any scene depicted on one of the small screens.Furnish the commander with multiple, secure com-munications systems that allow conversations withindividuals In the battle-by means of radios fittedinto their helmets-as well as with peers who are

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directing other battles and with superiors, and whichprovide access to data banks of intelligence, back-ground information, and expertise.

Could commanders ask for even more? Well,they might feel guilty about asking for more, butchances are they'd miss the "feel" for the battle thatcomea of being on the scene; that's something nonumber of high-resolution cameras will replace. Wemight compare watching a battle unfold on a tele-vision screen with watching a lengthy documentwe re writing take form on the screen of a wordprocessor. With a word processor, there's always apart of the document hidden from sight. Thoughthe benefits of the word processor put the old penciland yellow pad to shame, some writers feel what'sgained is not worth sacrificing the "feel" one gets fora document that's spread out over the desk,

Those hundreds of mini-cams will allow com-manders to see a great deal, but not everything. Tosee everything that's going on they'd need an infi-nite number of cameras and screens. If they hadinfinite numbers of cameras arid screens, they wouldbe overwhelmed by the volume of information pro.vided. In fact, they might be overwhelmed by thevolume provided by a hundred cameras, How dothey decide which screen to look at for a given mo.ment? How can they know something c.ritical won'thappen on one screen while they're looking at an-other? What will they think if four or five of thescreens suddenly go blank-that the blinding Is thefirst step in a major initiative by the enemy, or thatit's a simple mechanical failure? Might everyone be-come so hung up about the status of their camerasand screens that they'd miss something vital on the

. .

I'


battlefield? Could the enemy have the capacity tointercept the genuine images and replace them withfalse ones? (Perhaps that's what Saddam Husseinthought when he saw CNN's pictures of his devastat.ed forces surrendering near the close of the GulfWar in 1991.)

WHAT'S "ENOUGH"?

All of these considerations should underscore thefact that "complete, true, and up-to-date" informa.tion is conceivable only in the abstract, In reality, nocommander has ever had perfect information, andno commander ever will have perfect information,On the other hand, nearly every battle has a winner,so it's not too far-fetched to say one out of two com-manders has enough information-enough, that is,to win, Determining just what constitutes "enough"is part of the art of war,

Anthony Oettinger divides information "sub.stance" into two categories: the substance known bya "Perfect Omniscience," which is the "universe ofall possible discourse" ("UAPD"); and the substanceknown by mortal decisionmakers, a very limitedpiece of the UAPD. 17

Each mortal decisionmaker's piece of the UAPDIs made up of knowledge gained from inside sources,knowledge gained from outside sources, and thedecisionmaker's personal knowledge,

Each decisionmaker's piece of the UA PD is sur-rounded by the unknown unknowns-" Unk-Unks,"One decisionmaker's piece may overlap with an-other's piece, or there may be no overlap, In the

lid

COMPLE•,rK TRuF., AND UP-TO-DATF

latter case, the one decisionmaker's piece is in thearea of the UAPD which to the second deci-sionmaker's perception is made up entirely of Unk-Unks, and vice versa, Oettinger says,

A Perfect Omniscience might have a totally clear and coher-ent overview of the boundless UAPD.... Mere mortal deci-sion makers, however, see only pieces of the UAPD andthose only through a fog, dimly. Although capable of sur-mising the exiotence of unk unks, a mortal can't act directlyon that surmise, since one surely cannot ask a pointed ques-tion about what one doesn't know one doesn't know.,I

The existence of Unk-Unks should be apparent toanyone who has ever written a research paper, Thefirst thing we do in writing such a paper is determinewhat we know and what we don't know about thetopic, What we don't know becomes the object ofour research, When we've completed our researchand gathered our sources and the results of the re-search together, we sit down to write the paper,(True, it doesn't always work this way, but, for pur-poses of illustration, we're not taking into accountthe "research" papers produced in the course of "all-nighters,") In actually writing the paper, we inevita.bly discover some pieces of information we need butdon't have, pieces not Included on our initial "whatwe don't know" list, Those pieces of informationwere Unk-Unks when we started. We didn't includethem on our "what we don't know" list because wedidn't know we didn't know them,

The Unk-Unks by their very existence belie thepossibility of Information that is "complete, true, andup-to-date." Every commander needs to acquire allavailable information pertinent to an operation asquickly as possible and in a format that is useful. But

. . .... . ..

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COMPLETE, TRUE, AND UP.TO-DATE

there will always he information the commanderdoesn't even know is needed. Oettinger sums up theissue this way:

Any organization that wants to survive must keep on gettingthe "right" information to the "right" people at the "right"time by whatever means are at hand, especially so while itsends are changing. All those, quoted "rights" signify thealmost total lack of agreement about what right Informationmight b,, who the r!,• people are, and what the right timeis, What consensus there Is tends to prevail retroactively,For mortals what matters is an edge over nature, competi.tors or the enemy, not perfection, Armies, it is said, winwars not because they are perfect, but because they fightother armies, In business, likewise, it is not perfection thatsucceeds, but an edge over the competition. And knowinghow to make fire gave mankind an edge long before thebeginnings of scientific understanding of combustion pro-cesses, 19

THE ART OF KNOWING ENOUGH

The ability to recognize the "right" information,people, and time is part of war's "art," akin toSimpkin's "spotting of opportunity," The lesser com-mander either waits too long and misses the opnor-tunity while gathering unnecessary information ormoves too quickly, failing to wait for the one essen-tial piece of information that makes a difference. It'sa matter of balances, information needs versus theneed for quick action.

Inevitably, the commander who waits forperfect-i.e., "complete, true, and up-tee-date"-Information, perfect organization, perfect communi-cations, perfect training, perfect doctrine, perfectstandard operating procedures, or perfect anything

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is going to be too late; that commander will miss theopportunity. That commander will be beaten bysomeone whose information, organization, commu.nications, and so on were good enough.

The perfect., to paraphrase Voltaire, is the ene-my of the good, In war, business, sports, or any formof competition, the goal is not to be perfect, but tobe good enough to beat the competition. More oftenthan not, what a commander needs to get "right" arebalances rather than ultimates,

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A MATTEROF BALANCES

The Greek concept of the "olden mean" is as old as the prcepts ofSun Tzu and may be of comparable use to commanders. Findingthe mean it Avy to a balanced approach to many questions, practh-cal ones a, well as ethical ones, When we approach C2 issues asquestions of balance, we're leas likely to overlook something, suchas a vital interaction among dtfferant C2 elements,

y ou walk up to your front door, a bag of grocer-ies In your left arm and a ring of keys in your

right hand, Flipping through the keys with yourthumb, you finally get your house key in place be-tween the thumb and index finger, ready to bewielded against the deadbolt that defends your do.main,

You insert the key into the lock but discover youcan't turn it, The friction between the bolt and theoutside edge of the strike plate is too great for you toovercome with one hand. You lean against the doorwith as much weight as you can muster and try again,Still won't budge, though the door has moved. Youdecide you're using too much weight, causing fric-tion between the bolt and the inside edge of thestrike plate. You gradually ease off the pressure onthe door, until the bolt is between the two edges ofthe strike plate and the key turns easily.

"Common sense has Just led you to use an ancienttechnique for solving problems. You've found thegolden mean,

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A PRACTICAL MEAN

The golden mean or media via ("middle way") be-tween extremes can be traced back to the sixth cen.,tury B.C. The temple that housed Apollo's shrine atDelphi bore the motto Midan Agan, "Nothing in Ex-cess," reflecting an emphasis on moderation charac-teristic of most Greek systems of thought,I It wasAristotle, though, who specifically formulated thegolden mean, His treatment of the mean focuses onchoices and offers us a useful way to approachchoices concerning C2,

It may seem a little strange to drag an ancientGreek philosopher into a discussion of contempora-ry C2. Remember, though, that many of the prit.il-ples upon which today's military tactics are based goback to Sun Tzu, who, like the Delphi shrine, was aproduct of the sixth century BC. And Aristotle was,after all, the tutor of Alexander the Great and astudent of physics and politics as well as first prlnci-ples. Even his Ethics Is quite practical in orientation,a down to earth approach to happiness that devotesas much space to practical and intellectual "virtues"as it does to moral ones, In the Ethics, Aristotle evengoes so far as to say a person has to have a reason-able amount of money and goods to be happy.

MATTERS OF CHOICE

We don't usually think of C1 problems as matters"involving choice. If the problem is a lack of data, weask how we can collect more data, Just asking thequestion, though, involves making a choice: we're

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A MATTER OF BALANCES

choosing to focus on the data problem rather thansome other. If our solution to the data problem in-volves money, as is usually the case, and if our moneyresources are limited, also usually the case, we'llsoon find ourselves forced to address anotherchoice: From which area should we take the moneywe'll use to solve our problem?

We said in the last chapter that commandersshould focus on "balances" rather than ultimates,Their C2 must be good enough to beat a real enemy;it doesn't have to be perfect. We begin to realize thatwhen we see every attempt to solve one C2 problemseems to cause-or at least reveal-other problems.Just about the time we think perfect C2 Is on thehorizon, we realize, "Nope. That's not perfection.It's a new day and a new set of problems,"

As we've seen, In solving one problem or set ofproblems, we've consciously or unconsciously madechoices which have an impact on other elements ofC2. Using more resources to gather more data usual-ly involves taking those resources from some otherarea. Even if we somehow manage to gather moredata without reassigning resources, we may discoverthe Increased volume of data overwhelms our analy.sis system,

Thinking about C2 problems in terms of bal.ances-in the sense of temporary equilibriums ortensions between opposing elements or Influences-is an acknowledgement of the complex interrelation.ships among the different components of C2-inter-relationships reflected in General Cushman's use ofthe word web in referring to command and control, 2

* One of the most important benefits of thinking'14.

___ I ___ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


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The CR webSourcei Lt, Gen.,John H, Cushman

about balances is that doing so makes our choicesconscious ones.

HOLISTIC APPROACH

When we attempt to address C2 problems a.- isolatedissues, we act like the medical specialist who attemptsto treat a patient without considering factors In thepatient's background which lie outside the special.

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A MATTER Of BALANCES

ist's purview. If we're not careful, we may solve theimmediate problem but kill the patient. What we

* •need, in the C2 arena as well as the medical world, Isa holistic approach.edIn the wake of the Second World War, the Unit-ed States faced a dearth of data about Soviet capabil-ities. While the Soviets could sit outside almost anyU.S. installation or facility and gather a mass of data

* by simply keeping track of what went in and whatcame out, the United States had no such option. Theclosed society of the USSR forced us to rely on ei-ther spies like Oleg Penkovskiy or overflights byhigh-flying aircraft such as the U-2. The fates ofPenkovskiy and Gary Powers-Penkovskly was ar-rested and apparently executed, Powers and his U-2shot down-show how risky and uncertain both pro-positions were.

As we've seen, the technology of the space agehas changed all that, with satellites and the elaboratesensing equipment they carry giving the UnitedStates much better access to the Soviet Union, Butnow, instead of a dearth, we have an overabundance,literally tons of data--photos, intercepted telemetryand communications, radar emissions, etc.-gath-ered each year. And that mass of material has over.whelmed our analysis system. Much that is gatheredgoes into storage without undergoing anything morethan the most superficial analysis.5 In short, we'vesolved one problem and created another. We'vemade progress, but we're no closer to perfect C2,

,I The most we can hope to do is find efficientbalances, Aristotle sees human happiness the sameway: if you get the balances right, you've done every-thing you can do to win happiness, Just as Sun Tzu

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and Clausewitz refuse to guarantee victory, though,Aristotle refuses to guarantee happiness.

AN APPROACH

Our interest here is in Aristotle's approach to find.ing the right balances, While he's looking for a gold.en mean between such extremes as cowardice andfoolhardiness, we're looking for ways to balancethings like collection and analysis, or speed and de.liberation, or stability and innovation, Two kinds ofbalancing acts-one approach,

Aristotle sees virtue as a pattern of behaviorinvolving choice. 4 The virtuous pattern is one ofchoosing the mean between two extremes, The vir-tue of courage, for example, is a pattern of behaviorbetween the extremes of cowardice and foolhardi-ness. Thrift lies between wastefulness and stinginess,

In mathematics, we find the mean between twonumbers by adding them and dividing the sum bytwo. Thus, five is the mean between four and six;three, the mean between two and four. Unfortunate-ly, the golden mean is not so precisely calculable, Itsdiscovery depends on reason, good sense, and a mod.icum of "luck" and "art," rather than mathematics.

Equating the mean with a target, Aristotle saysit can be missed in a countless variety of ways, Thereis, however, only one direct route to the target, andthat route is hard to find. While there is no easy wayto do it, he suggests the best way is to determine ourpresent disposition and then move in the opposite

1 .... direction: "By moving to a long way from going

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wrong, we shall come to the mean, which is whatpeople do who are straightening timber,"5

So, if we tend to be overcautious, we shouldwork toward developing a devil-may-care attitude,

Timber-bending analogy for finding the media via

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Clausewltz sounds as though he's echoing Aris.totle when he writes about the tendency of com-manders to assume the worst, He argues that onceleaders have made their plans, based on the mostreliable information available, they should stick tothem and not let their first view of the battlefieldpanic them into abandoning their plans, His advicesounds a lot like Aristotle's timber analogy:

Firm in reliance on his own better convictions, the leadermust stand fast like the rock on which the wave breaks. Therole is not an easy one; he who is not by nature of a buoyantdisposition or has not been trained and his judgementstrengthened by experience in war may let it be his rule todo violence to his own inner conviction, and incline fromthe side of fear to the side of hope, Only by that means willhe be able to maintain a true balance,6

A CONSCIOUS SENSE OF BALANCE

Let's think back to our earlier discussion of the prin-ciples of war, We noted that theJapanese might havedone better In the World War II battle at Midway Ifthey had put more emphasis on the principle of secu-rity and less on the principle of cooperation, whiteU,S. planners of the 1983 Grenada invasion proba-bly could have put more emphasis on cooperation,In those two cases (and we could find many similarones in history), cooperation and security were per-ceived to be in opposition. The "right" balance ofthe two would correspond to Aristotle's mean. TheJapanese at Midway and the United States in Grena-da simply happened upon two of the many ways tomiss the target. Perhaps just recognizing the balance

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A MATT~k OF BALANCES

involved-addressing it consciously-would havehelped them cut their losses:

Unconscious extremlits look upon the golden mean as thegreatest vice; they "expel towards each other the man In themiddle position; the brave man Is called rash by the coward,and cowardly by the rash man, and in other cases according-ly": so in modern politics the "liberal" Is called "c'*nserva-tire" and "radical" by the radical and the conservatlvv I I

Recognizing the need for balances helps us avoid theextreme positions we might otherwise slip Into toour disadvantage. A conscious sense of the balancesinvolved will, for example, help us avoid the all.or.nothing thinking that underlies debates between onegroup which sees national security exclusiv.ly interms of technological prowess and another whichequates sophisticated technology with vulnerability,A balanced view of national security will focus atcen-tion on brain and muscles, on people issues andequipment issues, on strategic concerns and tacticalconcerns.

NATURE'S BALANCES

We often see Nature engaged in a comparable bal-ancing act, For example, when the deer populationin a particular area exceeds the food requirements oflocal predators, the herd may begin to grow toorapidly and reach a point where population exceedsfood supply. At that point, the herd will begin to die

,a off, Or perhaps more predators will migrate to thearea. In either case, we can perceive the work ofNature to restore her balances. In the natural world,the right balance is necessary for survival,

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Survival is often a matter of balances in thehuman world, too. Gaining the edge over the opposi-tion-be that opposition an enemy commander or abusiness competitor-involves, as Anthony Oet-tinger puts it, "knowing as much as possible aboutwhere the other guy has struck his balances, andbeing better than the other guy at identifying andadjusting one's own critical balances."s

OVERLAPS

Identifying those balances is itself difficult; adjustingthem is an unending task, The balances we're talkingabout overlap, Every time we adjust one-by shift-ing money from one area to another, by introducingnew technology, or by reorganizing-the change af-fects other balances. Changing the balance betweencollection and analysis, for example, will have animpact on the other pieces of the C2 process. If wedecide to reduce collection, then we must decidewhich kinds of collection to reduce-technical orhuman collection. That choice, in turn, will have aneffect on the degrees and kinds of data correlationwhich will have to take place. And so on down theline, And every time a potential enemy makes anadjustment, our balances are also affected.

Most of what we think of as C2 "issues" can bestated, therefore, in terms of balances, Let's look atsome examples,

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PRESIDENTIAL BALANCING ACTS

The president as commander-in-chief of U,S, mili-tary forces is essentially responsible for all aspects ofC2 , at all levels of our national security system. So,one of the balances the president must strike isamong strategic and tactical priorities. The presi-dent must decide how to apportion attention andresources among them,

Some issues are more likely than others to re-ceive immediate attention, One of the first concernsof a new president, for example, is his or her respon.sibility for U.S. nuclear forces-tactical as well asstrategic. As those forces are critical to our nationalstrategy of' deterrence, the president must ensuretheir adequacy and credibility, Because existing nu-clear weapons have the power to destroy the worldmany times over, the president also must make sureour weapons are safely maintained and controlled,Thus, the balance between the credibility and safetyof our nuclear forces is one of the president's majorconcerns.

The credibility side of the balance involves bothweaponry and C2 capabilities. A reasonable numberof the strategic missiles sitting in silos, the nuclearweapons carried by aircraft, and the nuclear weap-ons carried by submarines and other ships must beperceived to be capable of surviving and respondingto a pre-emptive attack by an enemy. The same istrue of tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe andother "forward" areas-i.e., areas close to potentialpoints of attack.

However, important as the weapons are, theirsurvival of an attack would be pointless if the capaci-

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COMMAND AND CONTrROL FOR WAR AND PEACE

ty to orchestrate and control their use were de-stroyed in an attack. As a former member of theNational Security Council staff has noted, the vul-nerability of weapons receives a lot more public at-tention than does that aspect of our C2 capacity:

What I never really understood was why that kind of vulner-ability was so much analyzed when a much easier Largetingproblem was getting almost no public attention. Now, thereare 1,054 missile silos, and people could work up enormousconcern about an attack that would get them all in one bnaplBut I could pick for you a much smaller set of much moreattractive targetc-the President, the Secretary of Defense,the military operations staffs at the Pentagon and the com-mand and control centers in the major unified commands-whose destruction would do much more perilous damage toour ability to conduct a war, or respond sensibly, or niro nirsystem,9

In crisis periods, particulaily those that involvea heightening of tensions between the superpowers,the "football"-the briefcase containing releasecodes and other materials related to the use of nucle-ar weapons-looms large in the minds of the public.The "football" symbolizes the American president'sawesome responsibility for the future of the world,The quiet but constant attendance of the militarystaff person assigned to carry the codes reminds thepresident, and the rest of the world, that a hinglepush on "the buton" could quickly bring everythingto an abrupt end,

Technically, however, the pushing of a singlebutton is not going to launch all our nuclear weap-ons and bring an end to the world. The real "dooms-day" sequence is pretty complicated and involves thecoordinated actions of a number of people. And thepresident won't necessarily be one of them.

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If the president were the only person who couldauthorize the release of nuclear weapons, our nucle-ar capability could be lost to a "decapitating" assassi-nation or a surprise attack on the C2 facilities thatlink the president with our nuclear forces. To thedegree a potential enemy believed it possible to killor isolate the president and thereby preclude a deci-sion to launch a retaliatory force, deterrence wouldbe weakened.

Such concerns have led to plans to protect boththe president and the C2 facilities that support theNational Command Authorities, Because fate or su-perior cunning could thwart the best of plans, a lineof succession to the president has also been estab-lished. That line includes seventeen officials rangingfrom the vice president to the secretary of veteransaffairs,. 0 If the president is killed or otherwise pre-vented from making a decision to use or not usenuclear weapons, a successor assumes the decision-mak:ng authority,

The problem with this approach is that a smalllist of successors may still provide a tempting targetfor an enemy, while a long list raises concerns aboutproliferation of control-i.e,, too many fingers on"the button." In the fog of war, any person on thelist might erroneously believe his or her predeces-sors in control had been killed and it was time to act.Even a lesser "fog," such as that in evidence at thetime of the attempted assassination of President Rea-gan, can lead to confusion about "who's in charge."So, the need to protect the president and the presi-dent's successors must be balanced against concernabout proliferation of control. We've got balancesnested in balancesl

i 1I


"* The safety side of the credibility-safety balancealso contains nested balances. We noted earlier that,to prevent unauthorized or accidental detonation ofnuclear weapons, the United States uses lIectroniclocks called PALs. The positive control of nuclearweapons made possible by the PALs must be bal-anced against an ability to release the weapons foruse If' necessary. In effect, control and flexibilitymust be balanced by decisionmakers, According to aformer DoD official, the only acceptable way tostrike that balance is to give control the edge:"Those two kinds of things are in conflict from atechnical and operational point of view. So, you haveto and would want to resolve that1 in our judgment,by erring on the side of safety ... ,1 11

Some exceptions to that rule exist. There are noPALs on nuclear weapons carried on ships: "Withthe single exception of depth charges stored ashore,the Navy has never inserted use control devices intothe command and control chain of its nuclear weap-ons." 12 Some critics worry about scenarios in whicha ship's captain and crew launch nuclear weaponswithout authorization.Is The Navy argues its ownprocedural checks fill the same function as PALs,which are impractical because of the unreliability ofshore to ship communications. Critics respond thatthis argument has some relevance to submarines,considerably less for surface ships, 14

The balance of credibility and safety leads di-rectly to another: "micromanagement" and inade-quate control. Micromanagement describes a seniormanager's getting involved in something that shouldbe handled by a subordinate. It's probably as much aclichM to accuse President Reagan of being lax on

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control as it is to charge Presidents Johnson andCarter with micromanagement.

In the late 1980s, during the investigations ofthe Iran-Contra affair, some critics said Reagan'shands-off management style tempted members ofthe National Security Council staff to violate the law.They said he had inadequate control of his staff.

On the other hand, President Johnson's report-ed agonizing over bombing targets and other detailsof the Vietnam war was called micromanagement byhis critics; normally, the selection of targets is left tomilitary commanders directly involved in a war,President Carter, who was probably one of the mostintellectually adept presidents In history, tended toget involved in everything-from military affairs tneconomic concerns, Like Johnson, he was frequentlycharged with micromanagement,

Every president must expect to hear suchcharges. If an omniscient being were to appear anddefine the appropriate degree of presidential in.volvement in a particular situation, it's likely thepresident following those directions would be ac-cused of micromanagement by disgruntled militaryleaders or of laxity by congressmen of the oppositionparty. Of course, omniscient beings are too smart toget involved in such contentious situations, so find-ing the virtuous balance between micromanagementand laxity will remain a human art,

An omniscient being would also know specificdecisions about structuring the staff are as potential.ly controversial as styles of leadership. In the wake ofthe Iran-Contra affair, the investigating TowerCommission and others called for reducing the sizeand power of the National Security Council (NSC)

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staff. Within two years, critics were arguing thatPresident Bush's new, leaner NSC staff was too smalland lacking in clout.1 B

It's also up to the president to determine whenadequacy of information becomes overload, Everyday the White House is bombarded with far moredata than is manageable by any one person, So, pres-idents must count on their staffs to sift through themass, fusing (piecing together; correlating) relevantinformation into manageable chunks and filteringout the chaff. Being human, every staffer brings aparticular set of biases to the tasks of fusion andfiltering. In a sense, to the degree a staffer's biasesdiffer from those of the president, that staffer'swork may seem a hindrance or distortion more thana help. On the other hand, a staffer with differentbiases may help broaden the president's own per-spective,

Presidents, at any rate, must ultimately deter-mine the blend of information flow, fusion, and fil-tering that will best satisfy their decisionmakingneeds, The same may be said for business CEOs and"middle" decisionmakers at every level, Those whohabitually find themselves drowning in informationor lacking information can probably benefit fromAristotle's timber straightening strategy in makingthe necessary adjustments to their information sys-tems,

A related aspect of their information systemswhich presidents must consider is the difference be-tween competitive and consensus analysis, Seldomare the conclusions to be drawn from a given set offacts clear-cut, In the late fifties, for example, intelli-gence revealed that Soviet testing of the SS.6 missile

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had dropped off dramatically, According to WilliamBurrows, CIA analysts interpreted the decrease as anindication that the Soviets were having problemswith the missile and its deployment would be slowerthan originally planned. Air Force analysts saw thedecrease in testing as a sign the Soviets were ready tobegin full deployment. (As it turned out, the CIAanalysts were right,)'6

A competitive analysis of the testing slowdownwould present both the CIA and Air Force conclu-sions and the reasoning behind them. A consensusanalysis would, in theory at least, reduce the reportto matters about which there was agreement: in thiscase, to the fact that testing had been reduced.

Should analysts with different views work to.ward hammering out a consensus, or will the presi.dent (or another decisionmaker) benefit more froman analysis which presents competing views? In rely-ing on consensus analysis, a president risks sacrifilc-ing vital pieces of information. On the other hand,some argue that anything other than a consensusanalysis confuses busy decisionmakers. William Bur.rows maintains that arguments among the analystsnot only cause confusion, but also "inhibit quick andappropriate responses, and undermine confidence Inthe collection system itself."17 Once again, it's thedecisionmaker who has to make the call.

One of the factors the decisionmaker shouldconsider when making that call is how often the "ap-propriate" response will be a "quick" one. Some situ-ations, such as attacks on the United States, itsforces, or its allies, will require an immediate re-sponse-to support our deterrent posture as muchas to redeem our national pride. However, in most

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of the situations a president faces, careful delibera-tion is critical. The late Richard Beal, President Rea-gan's Director for Crisis Management Systems andPlanning, felt that, "Short of a nuclear exchange,there is no crisis that this nation ever has to respondto in very compressed time, either real or psycholog-ical,"Is Richard Neuutadt and Ernest May, studyingU.S. national decisionmaking in the twentieth centu-ry, observe a tendency to "think first of what to doand onlz second, if at all, of whether to do any-thing,'I0

If American decisionmakers are predisposed-as Neustadt and May suggest-to "plunge towardaction,"• 0 the Aristotelian remedy would be con-scious restraint, That's a remedy Beal would havehad no difficulty supporting: "Anytime you get in acrisis, the major thing is, let's not go too fast ..Moving too rapidly is probably the single most signif-icant error we make."• Speed and deliberation,therefore, will be two more features in the presi-dent's precarious balancing act,

CONGRESSIONAL BALANCING ACTS

While the president and the rest of the executivebranch are involved with one set of balancing acts,the legislative branch is concerned with another, of-ten overlapping set. Through its control of the fed-eral purse strings, Congress frequently gets involvedin debates about C2 issues: Do existing C2 systemsmeet the requirements of national strategy? Shouldour present acquisition system-a system designedaround weapons, ammunition, and replenishable

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A MATTSR oF BALANCES

supplies-be modified to better fit the technologicalcomplexity, small quantities, and other special as-pects of CJ systems?

A streamlined acquisition system is somethingmost congressmen (and just about everybody else)will agree is needed at a time when complex, mul-tilevel planning and testing requirements cause de-lays of twelve to fifteen years between recognition ofthe need for a new system of any kind-weapon orC2-and fielding of that system. On the other hand,given the problems that have traditionally plaguedmilitary purchasing systems, it's not unreasonable toargue too much streamlining will encourage wasteand fraud, As the president must find the mean be-tween micromanagement and inadequate control ofUS. forces, Congress must balance its watchdog rolewith the need for efficiency,

A member of Congress is also required to servethe interests of both the constituents who electedhim or her and those of the nation as a whole, This isanother balancing act, If C2 system A is built in X'sdistrict, providing thousands of jobs there, can weexpect X to vote for system B, which is built in an-other district, just because it has a very slight advan.tage in weight or speed or cost? Is it fair to say X iscatering to parochial interests if X votes for systemA?

The requirenent to balance needs and costs isone shared by the legislative and executive branches.And this is an area where C2 systems are at a realdisadvantage to weapons systems, Give the presidentor a member of Congress a flight in the latest fighteror a ride in the latest tank and chances are good

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you'll win a sympathetic ear for your argument thatthe plane or tank is needed,

Now, compare the selling of that plane or tankto the selling of a new radio system which is secure,jam-proof, interoperable, reliable, and about as ex.pensive as one of those planes or tanks. There'ssomething inherently dull about a radio-regardlessof its features-when it's compared to a fighter or atank, It's hard to get excited about the "force-multi-plier" effects of a little rectangular box while visionsof the fighter's loops and the tank's firepower arefresh in the mind, Having a coherent defense strate-gy-one that offers a clear basis for determiningpriorities-can help overcome the problem by em-phasizing the importance of balancing "nerve" and"muscle" systems, However, human nature beingwhat it is, even such a strategy is unlikely to makethe problem disappear completely,

As noted earlier, Congress's involvement in is-sues concerning C2 of military forces has been grow-ing. The Constitution, of course, gives Congress notonly the power to declare war, but also the power toraise, organize, direct, and support forces. That em-powerment, combined with what vocal critics haveperceived to be military bungling in places like Bei-rut, Grenada, and especially Vietnam, has led Con-gress to extend its interest beyond acquisition toorganization of the armed forces,

Congress has been involved, somewhat less di-rectly, with organizational questions before-in1947, for example, when it passed the NationalSecurity Act establishing the DoD and in 1958 whenit approved the changes to the DoD initiated by theEisenhower administration, The 1986 passage of the

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Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act,however, marked the first time Congress actuallytook the initiative in reshaping the defense establish-ment, The act, passed over the objections of verysenior officials in DoD and the Reagan administra-tion, had the net effect of shifting some power fromthe military services to the combat commands. Aswe've seen, it attempted to balance responsibilityand authority by giving those charged with responsi.bility for winning battles and wars-the CINCs-more say in determining the shape of their own C2

systems,Over the years, the powers of the military ser-

vices relative to the combat commands has probablyreceived as much political attention as any defenseissue, but it's certainly not the only balancing actgoing on in DoD. Should the power of the civiliansin the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) begreater than the power of the JCS organization? Inother words, when we speak of "civilian control ofthe military" do we mean control of the military bycareer civil service officials? Will such people bemore responsive to the electorate than military peo-ple? Balancing the power of OSD relative to theJCSis another perennial issue,

Should we emphasize military service specializa-tion over "jointness," the capability of the Services toflgl. together in a unified effort? As we've seen,Goldwater-Nichols said "no" and moved to makejoint duty-that is, duty in multi-Service organiza-tions-more attractive to the best Service people,Chances are, though, our ideas about the properbalance of specialization and jointness will continue

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to evolve as our perceptions of the other balanceschange.

We can't, for example, forget the communica-tions environments and needs of the people flyingairplanes will differ from those of people command.Ing tanks, and the needs of the pilots and tank com-manders will both differ from those of ships'captains. Where possible, we'll want our pilots andground commanders and ships' captains to be able totalk to each other; however, some circumstances willforce us to sacrifice such interoperability in the in-terest of the most efficient communications amongairmen, among sailors, among marines and amongsoldiers,

In such circumstances we might take the F-I 11,a plane designed to meet the needs of both the AirForce and the Navy, as an object lesson, Accordingto some critics, that multipurpose aircraft "turnedout to be too heavy for use on carriers, too un-maneuverable for use as an air superiority fighter,and too short-range for use as a strategic bomberwithout a good deal of air-to-air refueling." 92 In oth-er words, such critics see the F-I I I as a case where,instead of balancing interoperability and specializedneeds, we put most of our emphasis on interoper-ability (and saving money) and lost sight of the spe-cialized needs that had originally led to the call for anew aircraft.

The F-4, on the other hand, met the require-ments of both the Navy and the Air Force, eventhough it was originally designed only for the Navy,So, the specialization versusjointness issue is anotherfor which easy, formulaic answers are not always use-ful,

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A MATTER OF BALANCFS

One of the criticisms frequently heard in discus-sions of the Desert One and Grenada operations isthat planners were more concerned with protectingmilitary service turfs than they were with effective-ness, Richard Gabriel, for example, maintains thatthe Marine pilots chosen to fly helicopters to DesertOne were involved because the Pentagon had to givethe Marines a piece of the action and not becausethey were the pilots best qualified for the job, Infact, Gabriel argues that their lack of experienceflying long distances over land was a central factor inthe failure of the mission,9

According to Samuel Huntington, concern withturf protection resulted from the bitter inter-Servicerivalries of the late 1940s, as the Servicesmaneuvered to grab continuing roles in the post-warworld, After the initial bloodletting, the competitionbecame "collusion," says Huntington, an effort "toshare the market, to keep others out, to maintaineach other's position without running afoul of eachother,"24 Under the collusion system, the Air Forcevotes for the Army's new tank, the Navy's new carri-er, and the Marines' new amphibious vehicle in or-der to guarantee the other military services' votesfor its own new fighter. By the same token, each ofthe Services counts on having a role In any impor-tant operation, even if it isn't particularly well suitedfor the role,

To some degree, turf protection involves thesincere belief by the leaders of each military servicethat their own outfit is the most critical element ofnational security, Thus, by protecting their Service'sturf, they are acting in the best interests of the na-tion.

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At any rate, the issue is not the simple one wesometimes assume. It's not just a case of power hun.gry generals and admirals sacrificing the nation's in-terests for their own, Oettinger sums up thecomplexity this way:

If one were Infinitely wise and the world were infinitelyarrangeable, then maybe you could define totally non-over-lopping subresponsibilitles, But In the real world that strikesme as impossible, and, therefore, even If angels were In theorganizatiun they would end up fighting over ill-definedturf, It seems that folks tend to overlook that fact and be-lieve that it requires either malice or stupidity or both forpeople to fight, and (they don't realize] that it's InherentlyImpossible to define non-overlapping responsibilities. 2

The 1986 Defense Reorganization Act at-tempted to minimize inter-Service collusion by con-centrating the power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inthe Chairman, It's important to remember, though,that collusion, turf battles and other symptoms ofoverlapping responsibilities are not always the ene-mies of effectiveness, Many would argue the net ef-fects of tempests stirred up by the Billy Mitchells ofhistory have been healthy; or that the strategic tri-ad-of bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-basedmissiles-besides being the product of military collu-sion, is a fairly effective basis for a deterrence strate-gy.

Some other critical balances in DoD have al.ready been touched on, They include questionsabout the relative weights of changing personalitiescompared to changing organizational charts; of mov-ing information upstairs to someone with the bigpicture relative to moving it downstairs to the soldierfacing the guns; of emphasizing security comparedto emphasizing thorough planning,

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One whole subset of balances pertains to howDoD buys what it needs-particularly new C2 sys-tems, Command and control systems usually involvesophisticated technologies and, in most cases, smallquantities. The complexity of such systems forcesDoD to weigh its Institutional aversion to buying"off-the-shelf"--i e., buying systems or componentsalready In commercial production-against the ex-treme difficulty of articulating its needs in the formof technical specifications. Very few people on activemilitary duty have the opportunity to keep up w~th"state-of-the-art" developments in fields where .henotion of what is or is not possible changes everyday. As a result, military people-even those trainedas engineers-have difficulty assessing what can orneed be done,26

When the system needed is unique enough tojustify going through the lengthy acquisition pro-cess, the producer's risks must be taken into consid-eration in determining the size of a reasonableprofit, Developing a truly unique system for whichno commercial applications exist will have few at-tractions if a contract doesn't cover developmentcosts as well as some profit,

When a product that meets government specifi-cations has been or can be marketed commercially,it's reasonable to allow market forces to determineprofit levels. The same airframe, for example, mightbe used for both a civilian airliner and a militarycargo plane, In a case like this, it might be unreason-able for the developer to try to recoup all develop-ment costs and a high profit from the governmentsales, with the commercial sales being just so muchgravy.

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However, a piece of 'ommunications gear builtto withstand the conditions of the nuclear battlefieldmay not have much commercial application. In acase like f:iis, the government must expect to coverboth development costs and reasonab)e profits.2 7

Otherwise, the government will be forced to createand run its own defense industries, and the exper-iences of countries that have tried that-notably theSoviet bloc-suggests it's a costlier and less efficientsystem than even the one with which we're stuck. It'sjust not a good idea.

Another acquisition balance involves planningand flexibility. While it becomes inordinately expen-sive to change requirements after a Ljntract hasbeen signed-any buyer of a new home will knowhow that works-it doesn'L make any sense to refuse-o change requirements if' sticking to the originalplan means a system will be obsolete by the time it'sfielded. Of course, if the requirements are beingchanged constantly, the system may never be fielded.

Sometimes it's possible to develop a basic systemin a relatively short period of time and then modifyit after it reaches the field. Such an "evolutionary"approach to acquisition can save both time and mon-ey. The problem you run into with evolutionary de-velopment is akin to the old big picture-little picturedichotomy. A sys.em that works fine in one littlecorner of' the world-say, a radio used by one battal-ion-may cause problems when it has to function interms uf the bigger picture-when, for example,one battalion's evolutionary radio system has to com-m'micate with another batt. ion's evolutionary radiosystem. In other words, we have to be ca-eful evolu-tionary developments don't lead t) the kinds of in-

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compatibilities the concept of systems managementwas supposed to overcome. We have to balance sys-tems and evolutionary thinking.

BALANCING ACTS IN 'FHF, INTELLIGENCF. COMMUNITY

Those in the intelligence community have to dealwith similar balances. First, there is the question ofacquisition versus analysis which we've alreadytouched on. Technical and human intelligencesources provide tremendous quantities of data-farmore than analysts can convert to useful informationfor decisionmakers. If intelligence resources wereunlimited, we could simply devote more money toanalysis. Unfortunately they're not, so we must makedifficult decisions about the efficiency of reducingcollection and using the money saved to increaseanalysis, compared with leaving the acquisition-anal.ysis balance as it is.

Debates can also rage over the relative utilitiesof TECHINT (intelligence gathered by technicalmeans) and HUMINT (intelligence gathered byhuman sources). Some argue that TECHINT revealsnothing about enemy intentions, which are as impor-tant to identify as capabilities. Others point to exam-pies such as the Cuban Missile Crisis to support theirview that we can indeed determine intent fromTECHINT. In that crisis, analysts compared missilesite configurations discovered in Cuba with thosepreviously identified in the Soviet Union, The simi-larities alerted the United States to the Soviets' in-tention to build an offensive missile capability inCuba.

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COMMAND AND CONIROL FOR WAR AND PEACE

Another hot topic within the intelligence com-munity is the line between policy and objectivity. Anadministration's policy will be a factor in determin-ing what intelligence data will be useful to the presi-dent and other decisionmakers. However,intelligence professionals risk compromising theirobjectivity-or at least the appearance of objectivi-ty-by establishing close ties with those deci-sionmakers, Does the need for objectivity necessitatethat the intelligence collectors or analysts ignore theinterests of the decisionmaker?

That leads us directly to another issue. If theintelligence provider is not known and trusted by thepolicy maker, will the latter find the informationprovided credible? Will the policy maker accept theinformation without knowing its source? Frequently,revealing a source is the quickest way to lose it, but ifthe provider isn't known and trusted by the deci-sionmaker, the credibility of the information maydepend on the decisionmaker's confidence in thesource,

Another question involves balancing rights withsecurity needs. Which takes precedence: the public'sright or need to know something or national secu-rity? Extremists on both sides of this issue will havelittle doubt about the rightness of their own answerand will be shocked by the audacity of their oppositenumbers, whom they will see as undermining theconstitution or lacking in patriotic fervor. The otherside of the same coin is the question of when, if ever,an individual's constitutionally given right to privacyoutweighs the needs of national security,

Intelligence analysts (and their bosses) must alsobalance the benefits of stability against the need for

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A MArrFR oF BALANCES

an unbiased perspective. If an analyst has devotedtwenty to thirty years to studying nothing but theSoviet submarine base at Polyarnyy, new data per-taining to that base will probably reveal more to hiseyes than they will to the eyes of any analysts wholack comparable familiarity with the base, However,there's also a chance that the Polyarnyy expert willmiss something that clashes with the expectationshe's been building up over the years he's been study.ing the base,

SHARED INTERESTS

Cushman's concept of the C2 "web" ties together allthe balances (or choices) we've been looking at, Eachof the balances is important for everyone concernedabout national security, even if the balance in ques-tion is the special responsibility of a particular na-tional security element. For example, how theintelligence community balances the benefits of sta-bility against the need for an unbiased perspectivewill have an impact on more than just the analystsinvolved; recognized or not, the decisions madeabout that balance will affect the analyses, everyonewho uses them, and even the citizenry who will ulti.mately benefit or suffer from their use, In a sense,then, regardless of the balance involved, there's like-ly to be some overlap of interests.

Some balances, however, might be described asmore generic than others. They involve choices thatmust be made by or for decisionmakers at mostlevels of our national security system, from the highlevel bureaucrat in the Department of Commerce to

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the squad leader intent on getting his troops back tofriendly lines,

For example, whether the asset concerned isfirepower, intelligence collection, communicationssystems, or what have you, decisionmakers will oftenhave to make decisions between control and capabili-ty-between having great capabilities over whichthey have little control and minimal capabilities overwhich they can exercise complete control, Thesquad leader, for example, might be able to drawclose air support from a flight of A-10s, but if hecan't risk having that firepower drawn off at the lastminute by a higher priority target, he better not becounting on more than his own and his soldiers'guns.

Another choice which can come into play at justabout any level: who will run the show? At the bri-gade level, the question might be focused on thebattalion commander and the company commander.The battalion commander hovering 300 feet abovethe battleground in the command helicopter has abroad view of what's happening on the field as awhole; the battalion commander may, for example,spot enemy reinforcements long before their arrivalon the battlefield. However, the company command-er on the ground has a more focused, detailed view,The company commander may be aware, as the bat-talion commander in the sky cannot be, that thetroops are close to panic.

It will be up to the brigade commander to bal-ance the focused view of the company commander-the person on the ground-against the broad viewof the battalion commander-the person in the heli-copter, The decision about who should run the show

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may be affected by the terrain on one occasion-theguy in the sky will have an advantage if the groundcommander's view is blocked by rocks, trees, gullies,etc.-and relative experience levels on another.

At the national level, the president might face acomparable balancing act in deciding whether deli-cate negotiations with a particular country should berun by the ambassador to that country or the secre-tary of state, Again, the choice would probably bedriven by the question, "Which is more important inthe present context: focused view or broad view?"

The somewhat cliched phrase "centralized con-trol, decentralized execution" is said to characterizeAmerican military operations and to be vastly superi-or to the heavy-handed central control that guidesSoviet operations. One question that needs to beasked is whether the phrase means anything or is justa rhetorical ploy for having our cake and eating ittoo. In the most extreme case imaginable, with thepresident on a radio giving the order to "fire" and asoldier 5,000 miles away pulling the trigger, wecould say we're using "centralized control, decentral-ized execution." Would that instance be any differ-ent than a Soviet pilot with a target aircraft in hissights waiting an hour or more to get permissionfrom Moscow to fire? Might we be using the phrase"centralized control, decentralized execution" toavoid deciding how to find the appropriate meanbetween centralized and decentralized Cl?

Given the kind of linkage technology makesavailable, avoiding a decision will probably have thesame effect as opting for highly centralized C'?,When that occurs, it's only fair to remember it

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wasn't the technology that brought centralized con-trol, but our failure to make a decision.

DECISION OR DEFAULT

Balances require decisions. That's really the point ofthis whole discussion. Shifts in contexts call for ad-justments to existing balances-more decisions. Ournational security depends upon our willingness andability to be constantly making decisions about whatadjustments are needed. Many of the decisions wedon't make will be decided by default,

We're accustomed to thinking about nationalsecurity in terms of isolated issues-in bits andpieces rather than holistically. But the elements ofnational security are as tightly bound together as thevarious organs, muscles, cells, and other elements ofthe human body: we can't change one without hav-ing an impact on them all.

We're also used to thinking in terms of fixesrather than adjustments. If our data collection is de-ficient, we focus our efforts on "fixing" that prob.lem, on finding ways to collect all the data we canlocate.

The more dramatic the fix, the more cata-strophic the impact can be, especially when it occurssomewhere we're not expecting it. When we domake a dramatic change, we must be prepared to letthe dust settle a little before rushing into the nextchange. The key, though, is constantly fine-tuningthe whole, making an adjustment here and an adjust-ment there to minimize the requirement for whole.

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sale changes, while recognizing that occasionallywholesale change is the way to go.

One mission is less successful than we'd like be-cause concern for security interfered with thoroughplanning, The next time, we deemphasize security,practice until we're sure we've got it right, and thencome close to blowing the mission because the badguys heard we were coming. Is it time to revamp ournational security organization and jump from one setof strategies and tactics to another? Probably not.It's just time to do a little fine-tuning, to acdjust theplanning-security balance a little.

THE POWER OF RECOGNITION

By recognizing the balances Involved in nationalsecurity and the web-like interdependence of thewhole structure, we enable ourselves to start think-ing in terms of adjustments that improve things,rather than changes or fixes that will make thingsperfect, By recognizing our national security struc-ture will never be perfect, we can avoid the now-we-fixed-it-and-can-worry-about-something-else syn-drome, the complacency that somewhere down theline will make dramatic changes unavoidable.

A complete list of the balances would doubtlessbe useful, but, given the size and complexity of ournational security system, compiling such a list wouldbe a very difficult, if not Impossible, task, More im.portant is Aristotle's "pattern of behavior involvingchoice,.

Science, with its "dust-free" environments and"laboratory conditions," has given us a pattern for

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approaching the natural world of things: we stabilizethe environment, bring together a number of ele-ments, and observe the results. We call those results"facts." "Facts" are very comfortable things to dealwith because they're so stable, What was a fact yes-terday will be a fact tomorrow, so long as the envi-ronment stays the same.

Unfortunately, that kind of fact-oriented ap-proach doesn't work very well when we're dealingwith people and people issues. Human dynamics aresimply too complex.

We can stabilize a human subject's environmentby locking the person in a windowless, dust-free,clinically tested room, but that's not the same asisolating a chemical element in a test tube. 'Thehuman will think about being in that locked room;he or she will respond to that experience Intellectu-ally and emotionally. Even though the person mayhave volunteered to be locked in the room, the expe-rience will change the person. Furthermore, how theperson changes will be the culmination of everythingthat has happened in his or her personal history.The experience of being locked in the room willprobably have very different effects on a MohandasGandhi and an Allen Ginsberg, What reliable con.clusions about humanity as a whole could a scientistdraw from observing those two human beings? Yetthe scientist's observations about the chemical ele-ment in the test tube would apply to any comparablesample of the same chemical element observedunder the same conditions; the experiments and ob-servations could be repeated and confirmed by otherresearchers,

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In short, empirically determined conclusionsand principles are not very helpful when it comes topeople questions. If we factor competition into ahuman scenario, the already impossible complexityincreases geometrically, Two atoms placed in opposi-tion in a controlled experiment will not attempt tooutwit or deceive each other the way opposing com-manders on a battlefield will. To a large extent, theconflict of the atoms is straightforward; the results,statistically predictable. Human conflicts-on battle-fields, playing fields, or in boardrooms-are any-thing but. Colonel John R, Boyd, US. Air Force(Ret.), puts it this way:

When things went wrong at the Pentagon, really wrong,you'd always hear some bright guy in a business suit com-plaining that a country able to land a man on the moonshould be able to carry out any operations on earth: raidHanoi, drop into Tehran, whatever. I always pointed out tothese smart alecks that as I recalled, the moon didn't hide.move around under its own steam, or shoot back, 8

Thinking in terms of the media via-in terms ofbalances--is a practical "pattern of behavior" formaking choices about the complex C2 "web," Theresults aren't guaranteed; they never are whenhuman beings are involved, But, by addressing ourbalances consciously, we stand to gain an advantageover an enemy-particularly if many of the enemy's,"choices" are default ones-and over our present,position as well.

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FIGHTING SMART

Improving all aspect$ of C2 is the key to jghting smarter, Havingbelatedly come to rdeognise this fact, we can't afford to ignore itjust because defense budgets shrink, Improved CO will continue tobe the basis for doing more with less,

In the wake of the Cold War, the Importance ofcapable C2 remains critical, United States defense

planners confront dramatic decreases in the defensebudgets at the same time the task of providing forthe national security grows more complex, A worlddominated for nearly a half century by the super-power rivalry finds Itself menaced in the post-ColdWay period by tribal and ethnic warfare from SouthAfrica to the Soviet Union, by factionalism andrevolution in places like Natal and Liberia, and bythe nationalistic aggressions of leaders like SaddamHussein, At home, our military forces have beendrawn into the "war" on drugs as the potential for asuperpower confrontation has diminished, Andmonitoring the treaties engendered by the newworld situation further stresses our C2 capacity.

Command and control is the basis for efficientoperation at all times; in armed conflict, it is thebasis for fighting smart. Capable C2 is the key to theflexibility our leaders and forces need in the compli-cated international environment. While a particulartechnology-such as Stealth-may be rendered oh.solete by a new development-such as a sophisticat-ed sensor-or a new development negated by newtactics, C2 will always be relevant to national secu-

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rity, The most efficient way to "do more with less"-now, as in the past-is to improve C2 , giving com-manders better knowledge of what they're upagainst, what resources are available and how theymight be best used, as well as better means for con-trolling their use,

As we've seen, who we are and where we fit inthe defense hierarchy affects our view of C2, Essen-tially, C2 is the process by which commanders com-municate with superiors and subordinates; receivetheir missions; learn everything they can about theenemy, the environment or battleground, and theirown forces; make their battle plans; assign tasks tosubordinates; monitor the battle; compare what'shappening in the battle with their battle plans; de-cide what adjustments are necesmary; make them;and, finally, evaluate the outcome of the battle. It'salso the "arrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and procedures" they useto do all these things. Command and control, in oth-er words, is both a process and a system.

One danger in thinking about C2 as a system isthe widespread tendency to identify it with technolo-gy. Besides equipment and communications, theDoD definition of C2 includes personnel, facilities,and procedures. Slighting any one of these elementscould prove a costly mistake: the best equipmentwould be useless if an army didn't have people whoknew how to use it.

A danger in thinking about CR as a process is themistake of identifying the abstract formulations,which make such thinking possible, with reality. Ourformulations can be helpful in highlighting the activ-ities that constitute C2 , but they can also be mislead-

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FIGHTING SMART

ing. They're too neat, We construct them byabstracting some of reality's messiness.

We can get a more accurate idea of C2 by takingthe verbs used in describing the process, jumblingthem up, running them together, and repeatingthem countless times. Real C2 won't have distinctphases, such as the communicating phase, or theplanning phase, or the decisionmaking phase, etc. Inreal life, commanders find themselves looking atmaps and photos and talking on the radio at thesame time they're making plans and decisions; orreceiving new information or orders just at the mo.ment they've made a decision based on old informa-tion and orders-or two minutes after they've"disseminated" the now outdated order to their sub.ordinates. To put it another way, the communicat.ing, receiving, learning, planning, tasking,comparing, deciding and evaluating occur in a loop-Ing, indeterminate pattern, rather than a structuredsequence. The process is dynamic, Iterative, andmessy. A formulation will never quite do it justice.

Our military history predisposes us to seek tech-nical solutions to our defense problems. In the1980s, increased concern about C0 at both the stra-tegic and tactical levels led to vast expenditures ontechnical "solutions" to shortcomings in C2 , Unfor.tunately, the melding of advanced technology andC2 was not always an unmitigated blessing, Technol-ogy allows us to do things unimaginable in the past,but it also brings with it a whole set of problems,ranging from overconfidence to complexity and de-pendence. Some of these problems are so subtle theyescape detection until a moment of crisis-at whichpoint their effect can be disastrous.

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Furthermore, our fascination with technologycan relegate human issues of command to secondarystatus, We sometimes focus on thep oblems forwhich there are technological fixes, rather thani onmore important, difficult, or subtle issues. The factis that most of our past failures in C2 have resultedfrom poor organization or poor decisions, not tech-nological shortcomings, When we err in policy orjudgment, modern technology can actually magnifythe consequences of our mistakes, enabling us to acton the poor decision or to put the flawed plan intoaction more quickly than would have been possible ifthe technology had not been available,

The human side of C2 is probably more com-plex and less understood than the technology side,For example, all sorts of physical, mental, and emo-tional "noise" impact on the human decisionmaker,rhe judgment of human beings may also be cloudedby preconceptions, Institutional biases and norms,and convention, Organizational structures, whichdetermine how the human components of C2 are puttogether further complicate the "people" aspects ofthe process.

Ultimately, none of the devices or constructs ofimperfect man-radios, computers, software, orga-nizations, procedures, or doctrine-can be moreperfect than their maker, It is, therefore, dangerousand misleading to promise (or even seem to promise)commanders perfect C2 systems. Such systems can'tbe defined, let alone delivered, They exist only asabstractions or idealizations-just like our theoreti-cal pictures and diagrams of the C2 process itself.

Being able to distinguish between the ideal andthe possible is a critical element of the "art" of war.

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FIGHTING SMART

Commanders lacking in art will miss their opportuni-ties. They'll act too late, or too soon-waiting toolong for better Information, organization, communi-cations, training, etc., or moving before they havethe one essential piece of information or the onecommunications link that makes a difference, Ifthey've taken too literally the words of those whopromise things like information that is "complete,true, and up-to-date," they'll find themselves beatenby someone whose information was good enough.

Ability to recognize the "good enough" is a signof the artful commander, Artful commanders havemuch in common with the most creative writers,scintists, painters, and poets: they work intuitivelyas well as rationally. They balance an analytical tend-ency to divide, abstract, and isolate with an intuitivesense of the whole.

The complexity and dynamics of C2 frustraterationalistic attempts to fix or Improve pieces of theprocess. One isolated fix-a highly capable new ra-dio, for example-spawns another problem-in thecase of the new radio, another "interface" problem.

A more creative approach to a C2 problem com-bines a rational focus on the immediate issue with anintuitive sense of the whole web-like process. It con-siders not only proposed solutions to the problem,but also the impact a proposed "fix" will have onother parts of the process. It combines analysis withsynthesis.

Aristotle's concept of the media via-of findinga good balance-offers a pragmatic way to makechoices regarding C2. By addressing C2 in terms ofbalances, we frequently force to the surface choicesthat might otherwise go unrecognized. When we

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COMMoND AND CONTROL FOR WAR AND PEACE

choose to buy a new system, for example, we areimplicitly making other choices, consciously or oth-erwise. Buying the new system requires us to comeup with money from somewhere else, so severalchoices are involved: the choice to buy a new system,the choice of which system to buy, the choice ofwhich expenditures to cut or reduce in order to fi-nance the new system, the choice of buying or devis-ing new interfaces to link the new system with oldsystems, etc.

Thinking in terms of balances forces us to con-sider at least one counterweight to the proposed fix.It cuts down on the number of default choices wemake by not considering the impact a change willhave on the rest of the process. It points us in thedirection of' more holistic thinking.

Protecting the national security of the UnitedStates involves more than preventing a nuclear at-tack. Our most vocal critics say the material comfortof Americans is based upon economic imperialismbacked by military forces, A friendlier view is thatour national interests require access to world mar-kets and sources of raw materials, and that our mili-tary forces must be strong enough to deter potentialenemies from interfering with such access,

Regardless of the political context from which itis viewed, the linkage of military and economicstrength is clear, and it's not going to go away justbecause we've declared an end to the Cold War,This means the maintenance of our military capabili-ty is going to continue to be important for largenumbers of Americans.

That defense budgets will always be the targetsof choice when it becomes necessary to cut federal

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spending is a simple fact of the American way ofseeing life and the world, However, the care withwhich we orchestrate defense cuts can be the differ-ence between "peace dividends" that can be sus-tained over the long term and those that quickly giveway to hefty war taxes.

In the 1980s, defense planners with full pocketscame to acknowledge that C2 was the linchpin ofdefense, more critical than even the most glamorousweapons systems. They realized that neither theStrategic Defense Initiative nor the more traditionalnuclear strategies would be worth having unless theywere built upon capable C2. They also recognizedthe central importance of tactical C2, something pre-viously either assumed (on questionable grounds) orcompletely overlooked.

Such important lessons bear frequent repetition.We've seen that C2 involves more than technology,but it would be naive to believe our long overdueawakening to the importance of the nervous systemof defense was not due in some part to the involve-ment of defense contractors, who recognized anenormous potential market for information technol.oly. Money does talk, and the money available forC in the Reagan military budgets caught a lot ofattention. In periods when the money is lacking, it'slikely the attention will be lacking.

It's up to all of us-as taxpayers, and the elect-ed, appointed, or military representatives of taxpay.erE-to keep C2 a national priority, Duringrelatively peaceful periods, we can afford to cutdown on weapons acquisitions, so long as we main-tain a strong research and development effort, Wecan probably even reduce the money we spend to

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buy the latest in computers and communicationsequipment. What we can't afford to do is to settle forinadequate C2.

Saying we won't buy fancy new systems isn't thesame as saying we'll settle for inadequacy. Our C2

systems don't have to be fancy. They don't evenhave to be new. Theyjust have to work.

Realistic exercises-leading to evolutionaryfine-tuning, clarification of operating procedures,and better training-are key to low cost improve-ment of C2 .Joint exercises, emulating the way we'llfight, can also generate doctrinal revisions that willreduce interoperability problems and unnecessaryduplication.

In fact, the net effect of budget reductions canbe quite positive: a "leaner," "meaner," more effi-cient military establishment. Americans are more In.clined. to support a force that fights "smart" thanthey are to support a force that counts on over-whelming an enemy with brute strength, The wide-spread public support for the way allied forcesfought the Gulf War of 1991 offers a case in point.And command and control processes-involvingstrategies, doctrines, procedures, and training, aswell as technology-are essential to fighting"tsmart."

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NOTES

Chapter 1. THE BROAD VIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

1, Alan D. Campen, "Information Systems," SIGNAL, Janu.ary 1990, 79.

2. Kenneth L, Moll, "Understanding Command and Con-trol" (Part I), Defense and Foreign Affalris,June 1978,41,

3, Greg Todd, "CI Catharsis," Army, February 1986, 14.4, Emmett Paige, Jr,, "Adequate CSl," SIGNAL, May 1984,

reprinted in Tacical COf for the Ground Forces, ed. James M,Rockwell (Washington, DC: AFCEA International Press, 1988),25.

5, Sun Tzu Wu, The Art of War; The Oldest Military Treatise inthe World, trans, Lionel Giles (Harrisburg, PA: Military ServicePublishing Co,, 1944), 51.

6, Eberhardt Rechtin, "The Technology of Command," Na.val War College Rtview, March-April 1984, 12.

7. Ibid., 2'.8, U,S, Senator Tim Wirth, "What now for peace dividend?"

The Northern Light (Colorado Springs, CO), 15 June 1990, 4,9. John E, Rothrock, "Theater War in the 'Information

Age': The Rapid Application of Airpower (RAAP) Concept," inControl of Joint Forces, New Perspectives (Fairfax, VA: AFCEAInternational Prebs, 1989), 67,

Chapter 2, c9 : PROCESS AND SYSTEM

1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of DIfense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 June1987), 77,

2, See, for example, Mike Caputzo, "War, Football ShareLongtime Alliance," (Knight-Ridder Newspapers) Colorado

'-I

NoTEs

Springs Gazette Telegraph, 20january 1991, AS, General DouglasMacArthur was especially fascinated by the parallels betweenfootball and war. See William Manchester, American Caesar:Douglas Mact 'hur, 1880.1964 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co,1978), 480-81.

S. The National Football League has a rule requiring a teamto stop using its telephones and radios If the opposition's com-munications fall for any reason, Unfortunately, rules to ensure"fairness" don't usually apply in war.

4. Brigadier General William A, Mitchell, Outlines of theWorld's Military History (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Pub-lishing Co,, 1931), para. 740.14,

5, Being unaware of the U,S. success In breaking theircodes, the Japanese undoubtedly thought their emphasis onsecurity was adequate.

6, "Operation Desert Shield" and "Operation Desert Storm"were the names given to the allied military build-up and offen.sive operations respectively; E.J Dianne, Jr., "On War: IdeasWith a Familiar Face: Gary Hart Makes lst Hill Visit Since '88 toTestify on Defense Reform," Washington Post, May 1, 1991(LEGI-SLATE Article No, 180874),

7. Peter Townsend, Dusl of Eagles (197 1; New York: PocketBooks, 1972), 275.

8. Len Deighton, Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain(New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1978), 88-89,

9, Cajus Bekker, Angriffshohe 4000 (1964); republished asThe Ltuf•wffe War Diaries, trans, Frank Ziegler (New York: Bal-lantine Books, 1966), 199,

10, Peter Townsend, Duel of Eaglej, 275.11, Winston Churchill: "Never in the field of human con.

flict was so much owed by so many to so few," Quoted in PeterTownsend, Duel of Eagles, 369.

12. Len Deighton, Fighter, 224-26, Ironically, Dowding'sperserverence cost him hisjob shortly after the Battle of Britain,

1S. George E. Orr, Combat Operations CJ!: Fundamenials andInteractions (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 19,Boyd refers to his own four-step model of C2, the "O-O-D-ALoop" (observing, orienting, deciding, acting), and speaks ofgetting inside an adversary's O-O-D-A loop,"

186

Noiras

14. U.S, Marine Corps, WarjIghting (FMFM 1) (Washingtor,DC: Dept of the Navy, March 6, 1989), 69.

15, For example, Brigadier General Richard Neal, U.S.Marine Corps, U.S, Central Command Briefing, Cable NewsNetwork, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 15 February 1991,

16. Lieutenant General Raymond B, Furlong, "Strate.gymaking for the 1980s," Parameters, Journal of the US Army WarCollege 9 (March 1979): 10. Quoted In George Orr, Combat Oper.allons C1t, 20.

17. President Truman writes of giving General MacArthur"complete command and control after victory in Japan" in hisMemoirs. Year of Decision (1955); quoted in William Manchester,American Caesar, 459,

18. There are arguments for at least two variations on thisview, One simply reverses the command/control relationship:control is strategic and command is tactical or operational, Theother suggests command is a composite of leadership and con.trol: a General Eisenhower controls, subordinate commanderslead; their joint accomplishment is command. Appealing as thisview is in some respects-its neatness, for example-it addsfurther confusion to the question "Why command and control?"

19, According to Dr, Ruth Davis, former deputy under sec-retary of defense for research and advanced technology, "thephrase 'command and control' or 'Cl',., was 'invented' at aconference [in the 1960s] at which we were trying to describedecision making by military commanders, It did not seem to be avery significant decision at the time, but the phrase has beenlong lastitng and has become a part of both military and ti chno.logical terminology." See Ruth Davis, "Putting C51 L ,.velop.ment in a Strategic and Operational Context," in Seminar onComm-nd, Control, Communications, and Intelligence: GuestPresentations, Spring 1988 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityProgram on Information Resources Policy, 1989), 162.

20. See Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control ofNuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links (Lan-ham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 72-73,

21. See, for example, Rear Admiral Daniel V, Gallery, ThePueblo Incident (New York: Doubleday & Co,, 1970), 42.

187

.. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .

Nonas

22, Robert F, Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of tihe CubanMissile Crisis with introductions by Robert S. McNarnara andHarold Macmillan (New York: WW, Norton, 1969), 59-60.

23, Donald Latham, "A View from Inside OSD," in ,C1:Issues of Command and Control, ed, Thomas P, Coakliey (Washing-ton, D.C.: National Defense University Press, W991), 210.11.Perhaps the most useful way to look at the money spent on C9 isin comparison with the rest of the defense budget, BetWeen1975 and 1988, the defense budget as a whoIe grew by roughly330 percent: from 87,6 billion dollars in 1975 to 291.4 billion in1988. During the same period, the unclassified expenditures for"Intelligence and Communications" grew from 6.3 billion dol.lars to 28 billion or 440 percent, The percentage of the DoDresearch and development allotted to the category of "Intelli-gence and Communications" also increased: total DoD research.and development grew 270 percent between 1980 and 1988,while the "Intelligence and Communication" portion grew 408percent (US Statistical Abstracts, 1989).

24, Craig Wilson, presentation to the John F, KennedySchool of Government Seminar: "Command, Control, Commu.nications, and Intelligence," Harvard University, Cambridge, 16February 1989 (based on notes I took on this talk).

25, Harry G, Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War inContext (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institue, 1981), 116,Published in 1982 as On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the VietnamWar by Pre:,dio Press (Novato, CA),

26, Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (New York: Henry Holt andCo,, 1957), 220,

27. U.$,, Congress, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on theInveMtigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Vol. 39 (Washington, DC:GPO, 1946),21.

28. RayImond Tate, "Worldwide C51 and Telecommunica-tions," in C'!: Issues of Command and Control, 9,

29, Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the Ameri-can Military Doesn't Win (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 115.In Americans At War, 1975-1986, Ar, Era of Violent Peace (Novato,CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 99-168, Daniel P. Bolger examinesthe rescue plan in detail and concludes President Carter's hopefor a "surgical solution" wasn't realistic,

S0, Daniel Bolger, Americana at War, 254,

188

NOTES

8 1, General John W. Vessey, Jr., Foreword to Tactical Clforthe Ground Forces, ix.

Chapter ), C2 TECHNOLOGY

1, Former US. Senator Gary Hart, for example, writesabout C2 only in terms of "command and control equipment,"which he defines as "radios and other devices soldiers use to talkto each other in combat," Working from that shaky ground, heconcludes, "we don't want command and control in combat,"Gary Hart (with William S Lind), America C•n Win: The CayeforMiltary Reform (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986), 5 1.

2, Robert T. Herres, "A CINC'a View of Defense Organiza-dton," in Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intel-ligence: Guests Presentations-Spring 1985 (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy,1980), 138,

S. William Odom, "C31 and Telecommunications at the Pol-icy Level," in C-1. Issues of Command and Control, 109.,

4. See, for example, U,S, Marine Corps, Warflihtng (FMFM1) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989), 32, 84n (20),

5. William J, Crowe, Jr., "A Ptrspective on the Commandand Control Agenda," in Principles of Command and Control, ed.John L, Boyes and Stephen J. Andriole (Washington, DCQAFCEA International Press), 27.

6, Ashton B, Carter, "The Command and Control of Nucle.ar War," Scientiflc American January 1985, BO; Donald Latham,"A View from Inside OSD," 146.

7. Ashton B, Carter, "The Command and Control of Nucle-ar War," 55; Donald Latham, "A View from Inside OSD," 148.

8, Latham, Ibid,9, Ibid., 146.10, Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Ibid., 147; Hillman Dickinson, "Planning for Defense.

Wide Command and Control," in Seminar on Command, Control,Communications and Intelligence: Guest Presentations-Spring 1982(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Program on InformationResources Policy, 1982), 42.

1891i."

'Il

ii!

NOTFS

IS. Donald Latham, "A View from Inside OSD," 147.14. James W. Rawles, "MILSTAR Soars Beyond Budget and

Schedule Goals," Defense Electroncs, February 1989, 69.15, Donald Latham, "A View from Inside OSD," 147,16, EMP is a controversial subject. A nuclear test in the late

1950s generated a surge of electromagnetic energy thatknocked out power hundr, ls of miles from the blast, Someexperts contend that a sizable above-ground blast over the Unit-ed States would cause nationwide power failures and dirruptcommunications, Others argue that the effects of EMP havebeen exaggerated; still others say they're just impossible to pre-dict, On the hardening of the NEACP, see Richard H, Ellis,"Strategic Connectivity," in Seminar on Command, Control, Com.Inunicationi and Intelligence: Guest Presentations-Spring 1982(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Program on InformationResources Policy, 1982), 7.

17, Steven Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," USNews df World Report, 7 August 1989, 98,

18, Richard S, Beal, "Decision Making, Crisis Management,Information and Technology," in C3I Issues of Command andControl, 23-50,

19, James W. Rawles, "MSE: The Army Goes Cellular,"Defense Electronics, February 1989, 38 (sidebar],

20. Richard C. Gross, "CS: Fewer Mixed Signals," MilitaryLostics Forum,June 1987, 25.

21, James M. Rockwell, Editor's Introduction to Part II inTactical Cs For The Ground Forces, 75.,

22. James W, Rawles, "MSE: The Army Goes Cellular," 36,2B, James M. Blackwell, "The Status of Follow-On Forces

Attack Technologies," Military Technology, October 1988, 115,24. Norman E, Wells, "The View from the Joint Program

Office- Joint Tpctical Information Distribution SystemJTlDS)," Signal, March 1982; reprinted in Tactical C2 For The

Ground Forces, 226-28,25. Ibid., 229,26, John H, Cushman, Command and Control of Theater

Forces,: Adequacy (Washington, DC: AFCEA International Press,1985), x0.

27. Jerry 0, Tuttle, "Tailoring CSI Systems to MilitaryUsers," in Seminar on Command, Control, Communications, and

190

I a.

No-i 1

Intelligence: Guest Prenlaions--pring, 1988 (Cambridge MA:Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy,1989), 100.

28, I've pieced together this description of events from avatiety of public sources, including Ed Magnuson, "High-TechPayoff," Time, January 28, 1991, 30-31; Sue McMillin, "SpaceCommands Forge Vital War Links," Colorado Springs Gazttet Tel-egraph, February 4, 1991, Al, A4; and Philip Elmer-DeWitt,"Inside the High-Tech Arsenal," Tme, February 4, 1991,46.47,

29, Edward C, Taylor, "Artificial Intelligence in Commandand Control-WhaL and When?" in Defense Applications of Arto-cial Intelilgence: Progress and Prospects, ed, Stephen J. Andrioleand Gerald W, Hopple (Lexington, MA: D,C. Heath and Co,,1988), 139,

80. Paul E. Lehner, Artorial Intellgence and National De-fense: Opportunity and Challenge (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TABBooks, 1989), 4,

3 1, Adapted from Lehner, 6.89, Edward CTaylor, "Artificial Intelligence in Command

and Control," 140.41.$3. Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores, Understanding

Computers and Cognition (Norwood, NJ: ABLEX Publishing,1986); cited in Edward C. Taylor, "Artificial Intelligence inCommand and Control," 142.45.

34, Paul E, Lehner, Artfldal Intelligence and National De-fense, 25-27.

85. Ibid., 97.36. Ibid., 119.37, Stephen 1, Andriole, "Tools, Techniques, and National

Defense Applications of Artificial Intelligence," in Defense Appli-cations ofArtjflc1al ihttullignce, 24,

38. Paul E. Lehner, Artt/lcial Intelligenct and National De-fense, 122-25,

39, Ibid., 124.40, Ibid,, 152,41. Ibid., 168-70,42, For examples, see the essays in Defense Applications of

Articial Intelligence which could have been subtitled "Variationson 'Someday.",

191

*'-.,...._.. -........

NOTES

43, Stephen J, Andriole, "Artificial Intelligence, NationalDefense, and Some Practical Opportunities and Challenges," inDefense Applications ofArtifidal Intelligence, 362,

44, Ibid,, 362.45. Ibid., 365.66.46. Paul E, Lthner, Artificitl Intelligence and National Do-

fens#, 188,47. Ibid., 160.48. Stephen J. Andriole, "Opportunities and Challenges,"

362.49, Raymond Tate, former deputy director of the National

Security Agency, maintains some of the people involved In theMayaguez incident didn't follow security procedures- accordingto retired Vice Admiral Jon Boyes, inadequate procedures fortying together Navy and Marine radios caused the tragedy.Daniel P, Bolger argues flaws in the difficult operation wereminimal and due to the normal friction of war, See RaymondTate, "Worldwide C31 and Telecommunications," 9-11; RichardC. Gross, "CS: Fewer Mixed Signals," 20; and Daniel P. Bolger,Americans at War, 19-98.

50, John Grimes, "Information lochnology and Multina-tional Corporations," in C31: Issues of Command and Control, 82,

51. CEP refers to the length of the radius from the target tothe circumference of a circle within which 50 percent of thedelivered bombs or missiles would be likely to hit, "Zero CEP"would, in effect, be a bull's eye.

52, Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, 432.53, Ibid.54. Ernest Volkman and Blaine Baggett, Secret Intelligence

(New York: Doubleday, 1989), 188ff.55, Ibid., 190,56, Hillman Dickinson, "Planning for Defense-Wide Com-

mand and Control," 133.57, Quoted in Eberhardt Rechtin, "The Technology of

Command," 9,58, Richard S. Beal, "Decision Making, Crisli Management,

Information and Technology," 28,59, C.E. McKnight, Jr., "Solving the Interoperability Prob-

lem," Principles of Command and Control, 388,

192

No'trc

60. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R, May, Thinking inTime: The Uses of Historyfor Decision.Makirs (New York: Macmil.lan, 1986), 1-6,

61. Defending General MacArthur's division of forces inKorea, military analysts noted General Lee frequently dividedhis forces during the Civil War, according to William Manches-ter, American Caesar, 613.

62. Anthony G. Bohannan, "C51 in Support of the LandCommander," Speech presented at the Fifth AFCEA EuropeanSymposium 2nd Exposition at Brussels, Belgium, October 24.26,1984; reprinted in Principles of Command and Control, 192,

63. Ibid., 181,64. U,S. Navy, Warfightlng, 69.65, Severo M, Ornstein, "Computers in Battle: A Human

Overview," in Computers in Battle-Will They WorhP, ed, DavidBellin and Gary Chapman (New York: Harcourt Brace Jova.novich, 1987), 9.

66. Eric Roberts and Steve Berlin, "Computers and the Stra-tegic Defense Initiative," in Computers in Battle, 159-60,

67. Alan Borning, "Computer System Reliability and Nucle.ar War," in Computers in Battle, 104-6.

68. Fred R. Demech, Jr,, "Making Intelligence Better," InC31: Issues of Command and Control, 102.

69. John Keegan, The Mash of Command (New York: Viking,1987), 327.

70. Ibid.71. Alan D. Campen, Foreword to Science of Command and

Control: Coping With Uncertainty, ed. Dr, Stuart E, Johnson andDr. Alexander H. Levis (Washington, DC: AFCEA InternationalPress, 1988), vi,

72. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed, and trans. MichaelHoward and Peter Paret, 1984 ed. (Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1984), 117.

73. Dr, Stuart E. Johnson and Dr, Alexander H, Levis,"Introduction," to Science of Command and Control, vii,

74, Alan Borning, "Computer System Reliability and Nucle-ar War," 107.

75. Hillman Dickinson, "Planning for Defense-Wide Co.m-mand and Control," 13.

193

7) ...........

NOTES

Chapter 4, THE HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF C2

1, John H. Cushman, "C31 and the Commander: Responsi-*, bility and Accountability," Semlnar on Command, Control, Commu-

nications and Intell4fnc: Guest Prisentations-Spring 1981(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Program on InformationResources Policy, 1981), 97,

2, Chester 1. Barnard, The Function. of the Rxecutlve (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), 215.

S. Norman Dixon, On the Psycholoo of Military Incompetence(New York: Basic Books, Inc,, 1976), 27-28,

4. Robert T, Herres, "Equipment, Personnel and Proce-dures-Foundations for Future C' Architecture," In Principles of"Command and Control, 414.15.

5. William Manchester, American Caesar, 575.8. Norman Dixon, On the Prycholio of Military Incompetence,

371-74.7. Ibid., 28.8. Ibid., 50.9. Ibid.10, Richard E, Simpkin, Race to the Swk: Thoughts on Twoniy.

First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers,1985), 222.

11, Norman Dixon, On the Psycholo•V of Military Incompetence,391.

12. Richard E. Simpkin, Rac# to the Swi$f, 222.23,.13. Ibid., 223.14. Norman Dixon, On the PsycholoV of Military Incompetence,

380.81,388,15. David Marlowe, "The Human Dimension of Battle and

Combat Breakdown," in Military Psychiatry.: A Comparative Per.spectiv, ed. Richard A, Gabriel (New York: Greenwood Press,1986), 10-11. All of the material in this paragraph is based onMarlowe's study and earlier studies cited by Marlowe,

16. William Manchester, American Caesar, 206.17. Ibid.IS. Ibid.19. Roger Beaumont, "Nelson's Telescope: The Problem of

Tension in C2 Systems," Sgal, November 1989, 43,

ii 194

,

____......._ _____.._

NOTES

20. Hirsh Goodman and Zeev Schiff, "The Attack on the' Liberty," The Atlantic Monthly, September 1084, 78-84. The mate-, • rial In the next two paragraphs Is based on Goodman and

Schiff's account,21, Samuel P, Huntington, "Centralization of Authority In

Defense Organizations," in C1I: Issues of Command and Control,253-42: Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, 191-260,

22, Donald Latham, "A View from Inside OSD," 149-52;Daniel P, Bolger, Americans at War, 261-358,

25, Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1985), 96.

24, Ibid.25. Ibid., 95,26. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 204-05,27. Ibid., 204.28. Ibid., 206,29, Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, 101,30. Ibid., 95-6.81, Richard E. Simpkin, Ratt to the Swf, 235.52. U.S. Marine Corps, Warfightng, 45,35, Ibid.34, Richard E, Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 206.55, Larry Thacker, "A Defense of Literature in the Educa-

tion of Defense Leaders," in Literature in the Education of theMilitary Professional, ed, Donald Ahern and Robert Shenk (Colo.rado Springs, CO: USAF Academy, 1982), 65-6. As superinten.dent at West Point, General MacArthur fought hard to bringthe cadets "broader offerings In 'he humanities," especially En.glish courses, according to William Manchester, American Cae-sar, 125-26).

36, John Keats, "To J,A. Hessey," October 8, 1818, letter110 in Keats: Poems and Selected Letters, ed. Carlos Baker (NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), 441,4

37, Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swif, 217,•$88, Ibid., 218,89, Gareth Morgan and Wayne Tebb, "Under New Man.

agement," PC Computing, October 1989, 110,40. John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater

Forces.: Adequacy, xii,41, Ibid,

195

1{.i

_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _,,...

NOTES

42. Robert Herres, "A CINC's View of Defense Organiza.tion," 255.

48. Archie Barrett, "Politics and the Military: The Climatefor Reform," in C31: Issues of Command and Control, 249,

ChapterS. AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM. INFORMATION THAT ISCOMPLETE, TRUE AND UP.TO.DATE

1, James George Frazer, Sir, The Golden Bough: A Study inMagic and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1942), 56,

2. [bid., 5D.3, Severo M, Ornstein, "Computers in Battle: A Human

Overview," 1.4, Ibid., 2.5. Ibid., 45.6. Alan Borning, "Computer System Reliability and Nuclear

War," 104,7, Ibid,, 104.8. 1987 Defense Science Board Task Force on Command

and Control Systems Management, quoted in Frank M. Snyder,Command and Control: Readings and Commentary (P-89.1) (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Program on Information Re-sources Policy, 1980), 11,

9, BerJamfi M, Compaine and John F, McLaughlin, Man-agement !nformation: Bach to Basics (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Program on Information Resources Policy, 19,06), 4,

10, Alan Borning, "Computer System Reliability and Nucle.ar War," 109,

11. Ibid., 105,12, Paul Bracken, The Command and Control ofNuclear Forces

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 65-66,18. Richard Elili, "Strategic Connectivity," in C31: Issues of

Command and Control, 18,14. Ibid.15, David McManis, "Warning as a Peacekeeping Mecha-

nism," in COIb Issues of Command and Control, 517,d 16, If this particular fantasy sounds far-fetched, consider

the results of a study done in the mid.1970s to determine theNational Command Authorities' wish list for capabilities in the

196

| S

'/,w.

NOTES

Worldwide Military Command and Control System. As RobertL. Edge points out, the officials responding were clearly Influ-enced by the facilities of modern television. They asked for"zoom" shots, "color commentaries" by experts, "historicalmonographs," "face-to-face" interviews with major players, etc.See Robert L. Edge, "CR in the Year 2000 (Remembering theFuture)," Principles of Command and Control, 458.

17, Anthony G. Oeittnger, Tha Information Evolution: Build-ing Blocks and Bursting Bundles (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-versity Program on Information Resources Policy, 1989), 55.

18 Ibid.19, Ibid., 57,

Chapter 6, A MATTER OF BALANCES

1, Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy. The Lives and Opinionsof the Great Philosophers of the Western World (New York: Simonand Schuster, 1926), 61,

2. John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces.,Adequacy, 24.

S. BR. Inman, "Issues In Intelligence," in CIL: Issues of Com.mand and Control, 8 11-12.

4. Aristotle, "Ethics" in The Philosophy of Aristotle: A NewSelection, trans. A.E. Wardman and J.L. Creed (New York: NewAmerican Library, 1968), 809.

5. Ibid., , 19,6. Clausewitz, 51.7. Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 61.8. Anthony G, Oettinger, Whence and Whither Intolligence,

Command and Control . The Certainty of Uncertainty (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Program on Information ResourcesPolicy, 1989), 6.

9. William Odom, "C31 and Telecommunications at the Pol-icy Level," 110-11,

10. Steven Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," USNews & World Report, 7 August 1989: 27.

11, Donald Latham, "A View from Inside OSD," 144.45,12. Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear

Weapons, 70.

197"V,1* ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

II

NOTES

15. "Water Bombs," The New Republic, 8 October 1988, 20.21,

14, Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear'1 Weapont, 77.

15, Gerald F. Seib, "White House Wonders If DownsizingHas Hurt National Security Council," Wall Street Journal, 23October 1989, A-I I.

18. William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage andNational Security (New York: Random House, 1986), 98.

17, Ibid.18. Richard SBeal, "Decision Making, Crisis Management,

Information and Technology," 55,19, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R, May, Thinking in

Time, xvii,20, Ibid., ,2.21, Richard S, Beal, "Decision Making, Crisis Management,

Information and Technology," 36,22, William E, Burrows, Deep Black, 158.23, Gabriel, Military Incompetence, 110-11, Daniel P. Bolger

disagrees, saying it was the extraordinarily complicated natureof the Desert One plan that doomed it to failure (Americans atWar, I1S, 156.).

24, Samuel P, Huntington, "Centralisation of Authority inDefense Organizations," Sminar on Command, Control, Communi.cations and Intelligence. Guest Presontations-Spring 1985 (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Program on InformationResources Policy, 1988), 6.

25, Archie Barrett, "Politics and the Military," Seminar onCommand, Control, Communications and Intelligence: Guest Preisn-tation-Spring 1985, 69, Professor Oettinger's remarks weremade during Dr, Barrett's presentation,

26, James M. Osborne, "Meeting Military Needs For Intelli-gence Systems," In CJI: Issues of Command and Control, 176,

27, Of course, in the case of something like the $600,000nuclear-hardened fax machine mentioned among the horrorIturies of 1990, somebody ought to spend some time deciding

4 whether such extreme capability-at such extreme cost-is real-ly necessary. To whom would one situated on a battlefield awashwith radiation wish to fax something?

198

SJ. .. . .. ..

No,rts

28, Colonel John R, Boyd, US, Air Force (Ret,), "Remarksto USMA Department of Hlitory/Department of Military In-struction Art of War Symposium," 29 April 1987; quoted inDaniel P. Bolger, AmMrMOatU at War, 445.

9

.tI.

.................. 4.

INDEX

Accountability, and control, Mobile SubscriberS$9 Equipment, 65

Afghanistan, Soviet invasion tactical communications

of, 27 system, 6s

Air Defense Command, 90 Art of war, 107, 110, 180-81

Air Force (U.S.) Artificial intelligence

control as an application of Advanced Feature

command, 37 Extraction System, 68,Air superiority, 272Aircra t Automated Exploitation of

detecAircraft Large Area SurveillanceIdetection systems, 6 1. Sensor. 8S, 72

55-64 expert systems, 66-68E-8A, 18-64 importance of, 72-7-, 92F-4, 162I knowledge engineeringF- 111, 162 capabilities, 71,72F- I I IA Stealth fighters, Language Access to

65 Distributed Data with

Pilot Associate Program, Error Recovery, 68-69,

70,72 79

United Flight 242 crash. Naval Onboard Message092 Analyzer and

Alexander the Great, 25, 34, Disambiguator, 88-89,82,95,142 72

Andriole, Stephen J., 71, 72 neural networks, 72

Arab-Israeli War of 196?, object recognition, 68104-05 Pilot Associate Program,

Aristotle, 142, 145-46, 147, 70

148, 156,178,181 programs, 68-71,72• Army (U.S.) shortcomings, 71l

control as an Tactical Planner system,

organizational issue, 87 70, 72, 80-81

201

----------

INDEXAuerstadt, 108 C2 systems, $to also

Equipment; Technologybalanced against need for

Ballistic Missile Early weapons systems,Warning Systenm, 60, 88 159-60

Bernard, Chester, 96 catastrophic failure of, 8-4CINC&' voice In design of,SBarrett, Archie D., 122 48, 64Beal, Richard S,, 62, 78, 84, definition, 17, 53157 hardening of, 58-s9, 61,Beaumont, Roger, 104 82, 153, 165

Bergson, Henri, I I I Ideal, 121-28, 180Bohannan, Anthony G., 82 Importance of, 178Bolger, Daniel, 75-76 integration of, 64-65Boyd, John, 88, 58-59, 175 interoperablilty, 10, 184Bracken, Paul, 120 precision of, 128Britain, Battle of, 29-82 redundancy In, 10, 58, 91Budlet issues, 5 Semi-Automated GroundC funding, 7, 48, 59-62, Environment, 90-9 1,177, 182-84 125Burrows, William, 156-57 training needs, 9 1 -9sBush, George, 155 vulnerability of facilities,58

CarterJimmy, 7, 47, 58, 59,60,68, 154, 155CR process Chance. See Luck/chancedefinition, 17, 58 Claulwitz, Karl von, 24,

In Gulf War of 1991, 86-87, 145, 14765-66 CombaL effectiveness,Importance of, 178-79 combat duration and,models, 32-84 102-08organizational Issues Combatant commandsaffecting, 114 power shift to, 160-61relationship to technology, responsibilities of, 11422, 56-64 Commandrole of military directive control

commander In, 42-45, approach, 10895-97 evolution Into C2 , 84-38tactics, 22 structure, 108

202

.. ...... .

V ,.I. .. .. ........ .... ... ..... ,. • .,. / +

INDEX

Command and control. Se# nuclear, 7

alse C2 process; C9 numerical inferiority and,

systems; Command; 6Control post-Cold War role, 177

balancing acts In, 59-54, priorities, 10142-66, 181-82 procedures, 22-94

broad view of, 21-16 sports analogy. 18-22, 42,

community. expansion of,57-8 technological aspects, 5.

cycle, 96 10, 178, 179; se alsodefinition, 9-11, 17, Technology

44-45,53,178 vulnerability, 6, 7dichotomy in, 38-59 web 145-44,169-71,elements of, 10, 143-44, 175, 181

178 Command postenemy facilities, attacks hang of,8

on,28 hardening of. 82

evolution of, 34-58 state.ofthe-rt, 69failures, 50-53, 55, 73-74ý Commanders. See Military

I 0; so- seLo Military commandersfailures and mistakes Communications systems

force multiplier effect of, and accountability, 59

29•1, 160 and control, 57-7S, 39"general's luck" and, Defense Satellite

108-09 Communicationsholistic approach. 12, system. 61, 5 65

144-45 extremely high frequencyimportance, 8-7,1 5, channels, 61

177-78, 183 failules, 104-06

information-lntensiveness Fleet Satelliteof, 12-14 Communications

interactions needed on, System. 8149-50 Ground Wave Emergency

interrelationships amongrcomponents of, 143-44 Network, 61

models, 32-34.48. 53,82• interfaces between

nature and scope of, 5-6, service1 , 48 83,2115-17,18-19 181-8c

nervous system analogy, jamming and interception"41-45 protection. 83

203

WAWO

INDEX

Joint Tactical false alerts on missile

Communications launches, 9S..84, 126,

Program, 65 129-50

Joint Tactical Information Joint TacticalDistribution System. 64 CommunicationslDastarabteon Sesses. 81 Program, 63

low data rate messages, 61 joint Tactical Information• low frequency towers, 61 Distribution System. 64,Military, Tactical, and reliability of, ISO

Relay Satellite reliance on, 124-26Communication System, and size of military61 organization, I IS

Naval Onboard Message strengths of, 80- 1Analyzer and support of C2 process, 56

Disambiguator, 68-69 vulnerability of, 76,

Single.Channel Grnund 87-89, 196and Airborne Radio CongressSystem, 65 balancing of CO issues,

specialization in, 114-16 158-66

super high frequency interest In C2, 4

channels, 61 Contractors, See Defensesupport of C' process, contractors

support 5Control44-45. 56 accountability and, 39-40

tactical, 63 definition of, 56, 37-58

ultra high frequency nuclear weapons, 37, 39S~channels, 61chnnerblsy, 6Crowe, WilliamJ,, Jr., 59

vulnerability of, 87-88, Cuban Missile Crigis, 88, 81,

154 167World War II, s0- 1 Cushman, John H., 64,

Computer Professionals for 95-96,114-15,143-44,Social Responsibility, 169125, 127,128

Computers and computerprograms, 56-57. See Damage assessment, 60

also Artificial Data. See also Information

Intelligence links, hlih-capaclty, 64

credibility attrlbuted to Database, common, for

Informations from, 87 military users, 64-65

data links, 64 David and Goliath, 25, 26

204

INDFX

Decislonnmaking Defense Satellitebalancing required In, Communications

27-29, 1,141-75 System, 61, 65C2 and, 142-43' Defense Science Board Taskcontrol.capabillty choices. Force on Command and

170 Control Systems"<fact.oriented approach, Management, 127

!73-74 Defense Support System, 60Sfixes vs. adjustments, 17, Department of Defensef, 1v2 acquisition of C2 systems,

154-eb-, a## alsogetting inside enemy's 16-curement,,decision cycle, 33.-34, Procurement

d9, 107, 149-50 balancing acts in, 164-659 4 -40 budget for C2, 59

golden menn in, 141-42, C policy coordinators in,146,148 47

human limitations and,103-08definition of CE, 17, 178

in0a0o ovorganization, 114-18,Information overload and, 121-22, 160,164

Desert One operation,information quality and,22and itiDeterrence strategy, 164

and intuition, 8 1-o2 Dixon, Norman, 96, 99-100prao modes, Dowding, Hugh, 29-52process, 53 .

and logic, 82models of, 98-1UI Eisenhower administration,organizational 160

considerations in, 114 Electromagnetic pulseand preconceptions, protection against, 62

99-100 senshri, 60psyche of commander and, threat to advanced

97-98,114 technology, 76speed of, 10, 35, 157-58 Ellis, Richard H., 130

Defense contractors Engineers, perspective onimportance of, 183 C9, 46, 50perspectives on C2, 48, 60 Equipment

Defense industries, acquisition of, 49, 114,

government-run, 116-17,159165-66 catastrophic losses of, 91

I' I: 20

.

INDEX

commercial applications Gulf War of 199 1, 4, 27-28,of, 165, 185 33, 65, 72,91,156,184

funding for, 43interfacingi 10, 48, 80,

I11-17, 181 Haig, Douglas, 98,101-02omaintenance of8, 80 Herres, Robert, 57Sobsolescence, S0, 3 Hitler, Adolph, 84-85precision of, 128 Human factors, 8, So# alsotactical, development and Decisionmaking-

fielding of, 62-63 Military cnmmanderstechnology vs. quantities, in C9 , 10, 178

engineers' perspectives ontraining of users, 80, CR.46

91-92European Command, mistakes in human

org~nizational problems, judgment, 73-74,117-18 92-95, 180

Exercies, training, 109, 184 research and developmentneeds, 43

technology design and, 8,Ford, Gerald, 7 10

threat assessment forForce multipliers, 29-31 msieau a lerts,French and Indian War, 27 missile launch alerts,Furlong, Raymond B,, 84 126-27, 130-31Hungarian Revolution, 129

Huntington, Samuel, 185Gabriel, Richard, 162-63Genghis Khan, e5Global Positioning System, Information, See also

60, 62-83 Computermz Data;Goldwater.Nichols Defense Technology

Reorganization Act of art of knowing enough,1986, 4, 44, 64, 113, 138-39120-21, 160, 161,184 analysis, 31, 52, 78-79, 85,

Goliath, 25, 26 130-31,145, 146,150,Goodman, Hirsh, 104,105 156-57, 167, 168-69Grenada, U,S, invasion of, collection, 52, 79, 85, 146,

27, 105-06, 148, 160, 150,167162 conceptual problems,

Grimes, John, 75 132-36

206

.. ........ . ....

INDEX

"complete, true, and up to stability vs. unbiaseddate," 127-28, 131-82, perspective In181 information analysis,

credibility of sources, 168 168-89

and declsionmaking, 22, TECHINT vs. HUMINT,77-79 167flows, 17-714, 9 1,4 Iran-Contra affair, 154

needs of commanders, I S Iranian hostage rescue

overload, 74, 77-79, mission, 51

I02-08, 145,155-56processing, 5, 14, 51, 156reliability of, 151-B2, 181 Jackson, Stonewall, 105sharing across command Jena, 106-07,108

levels, 108-09, 114 Johnson, Lyndon, 7,154,

sources, 5 l--2, 114 155

substance, 186-58 Johnson, Stuart E., 87

technically gathered vs Joint Chiefs of Staff

human gathered, 167 advice from services to,

technology, 14-16 119

timeliness and accuracy of, chairman, 119, 120, 164

84-87 power of, 161, 164

uncertainties in, 86-87 Joint Tactical

Infrared sensors, short-wave, Communications60 Program, 65Intelligence Joint Tactical InformationIntellgenceDistribution System, 64

credibility of sources, 168data collection-analysis

balancing, 167as element of C2, 44-45 Keats, John, 111

friendly, B8 Keegan,JJohn, 84-85

organization and KennedyJohn F., 7, 88

accessibility of, 116 Kimmel, Husband E., 50

perspectives on C2, 49 Khrushchev, Nikita, 88

policy-objectivitybalancing, 167-68

reliability of data, 150, 188 Lawson model of C9 process

Rhyolite program, 76--77 art function, 88, 58, 70

security interests vs. compare function, 32-83,public's rights, 168 56,68,70

fI.:?20

LJ

INDEXdecide function, 33, 56, Military commanders, 5, See62, 68-69, 70 also Decisionmaking;process function, 32, 56, Leadership68-69, 70 accountability, 39-40sense function, 32, 56, 68, CINCs of unified70 commands, 47-48, 50,and technological support 64, 114-16,120-21,

of C2 process, 55-56 161Leaders, alternative shelters communications withand command posts for, forces during combat,

62 115-16,161-62Leadership conformity In, 111-12

flexibility In, 108, 109 control of forces duringimportance of, 27-28 combat, 170style of, 114, 154-55 creativity In, 109-12, 181Lehner, Paul, 72 decisiveness in, 100-0 1,Levis, Alexander H., 87 147-48

Libya, U.S. bombing of, 76 flexibility in, 108, 109,Light sensors, 60 110,154luck/chance, 22, 102, football coach analogy,

107-09,146 20-21Luftwaffe, 29, 30 "general's luck," 107-09

ideal, 101-02information needs, 13,

132-36, 138-39MacArthur, Douglas, 95, information overload,103-04 103-04

Manchester, William, 10, knowledge of own forces,Marine Corps 38

tactical communications leadership style, 31-32system, 63 limitations of, 95-96, 99,terrorist bombing of 103-06

Beirut barracks, 51, 105, perspectives on C2, 47-48117, 160 psyche andWarf2,i0ng manual, 33, decisionmaking, 97-9882, 109 role in C2, 42-43, 95-97,May, Ernest, 158 114McKnight, Clarence E., 80 trust between subordinatesMidway, Battle of, 27. 148 and, 109

208

.4

i I

- .' . -...

INDEX

Military failures and mistakes rivalry among, 114, 119,cause of, 55, 103-06, 117, 163

180 specialization vs. jolntness,and congressional interest 11, 120-21, 161, 162

in C2, 160 Military, Tactical, and Relayin Grenada invasion, Satellite Communication

105-06,148,160 System, 61Iranian hostage rescue Missiles

mission, 51 cruise, 61,865Jena, Napoleon's victory detection systems, 60-61,

at, 106-07 83-84Marine barracks bombing false alerts, 83-84, 126,

in Beirut, 51, 105, 117, 129160 ground-based, 60

Mayaguez incident, 73 ICBMs, 60Pearl Harbor, 50-5 1, 73, "launch on warning,"

103-04 policies, 128-30, 131USS Libero, 104-05 Patriot, 66, 72USS Pueblo, 51 Scud, 66, 72U$$ Stark, 5 1, 73 SLBMs, 60USS Vincennes, 51, 73-74 smart bombs, 65Waterloo, 10S Soviet tests of, 78-77,

Military operations, control 156-57of, 170-71 SS-6,1156-7

"Military Reform" Tomahawk, 65movement, 33 Moll, Kenneth, 9

Military Services, SU 41$0 Montcalm, Louis Joseph, 27,speofi c ser vices 8 2Rcollusion among, 164interest in C2 technologies,

47interfacing equipment, 63 Nagano, Admiral, 104joint exercises, 184 Napoleon, 103, 106-07, 108doctrines, 23-24; sof also National Command

Principles of war Authorities, 158perspectives on C2, 45, 50 National Emergency"power shift to combat Airborne Command

commands, 160-61 Post, 62procurement of National security

equipment, 116-17 decisionmaking, 172

209

..... .

INDEX

interdependence of detection of explosions, 60elements of, 175 vulnerability of, 151-52

nonmilitary components,182

planning balanced with,':: 172 -78O ettlnger, A nthony,172-73 185,4-0

public's rights balanced 136-68,149-50,against, 168 163-64

National Security Act, 160 Office of Secretary ofNational Security Council, Defense, 161

size of, 155 Operation Desert Storm,National Warning Staff, 131 27-28, 31"Naval battle group, IS Operational commandsNaval Onboard Message voice in design of C2

Analyzer and systems, 48Disambiguator, 68-69, Opportunity72 creation of, 107-08

Navy (U,S,) exploitation of, 109control as a constraint, 37 spotting of, 109-10, 138Fleet Satellite Organization (military/

Communications defenie)System, 61, 55 CR and, 5, 10-11, 115-19Neustadt, Richard, 158 computers and size of, I 13

Night vision devices, 65 congressional InvolvementNixon, Richard, 7 in, 160NORAD, 66 decisionmaker's style and,North American Aerospace 114,154-55

Defense Command, effect of Goldwater83-84 Nichols Act on, 11,

Nuclear Detection System, 120-21,16060, 68 and equipment acquisition,

Nuclear forces, credibility. 114safety balances, 151 , 153 of European Command,

Nuclear war, computer error 117-18and, 126-27 and failure of military

Nuclear weapons, $ee also operations, 117Missiles Importance in Battle of

balancing between C2 Britain, S0capabilities and, Ib1-52 Information sources and

controls, 57, 39, 152-54 assets and, 114ij -.. - . . .

INDEX

and micromanagement, cooperation, 25, 27, 80,114,154 148

specialization vs. jointness, economy of effort, 25, 30, :. 11, 114-18,119,121 deceit, 24, 35

Ornstein, Severo M., 124-25 formulators of, 24

maneuver, 24V• PasedaeeMarine Corps WarNAh~ng

Passchendgele, British losses manual, 53, 82, 109at, 98, 101-02: at,98, I1-02mass, 24-25, 26, 27, 30

Pearl Harbor, 50-5 1, 783, I2-52,7104 Hmisapplication of history,•. 81-82

Penkovskiy, Oleg, 145 8 2:, ~movement, 25, 30Permissive Action Links, n t9Perry, William, I I never-f26 ht-uphill rule,2Piaget,Jean, I l l"Politicians, See also Congress objective, 24, ,1

perspectives on C3 , 48-49, offensive, 24, 30-3150 security, 25, 27, 80, 148

Powers, Gary, 145 simplicity, 25, 30Presidents, See also specific source of, 142

mon and success In war, 25-26alternative shelters and surprise, 25, 26, 27, 30-51 A.

command posts for, 62 and training, 109balancing required in US, War Department

decislonmaking, (1921), 24-25,26,271 5 0 - 5 8 , 1 7 1 ( 1 9 21r o2 4 -2 5,pr o c e s

C2 concerns of, 7 Procurement process

information overload, acquisition of C2

155-56 equipment, 49, 184-65line of succsslon, 153 evolutionary approach to,

management style, 154-55 16nuclear weapons control, "off-the.shelf' vs, technical

39 specifications, 164-65protection of, 153 organization of DoD and,

Principles of war 1 16-17balancing rules, 27-29, 3 1, planning-flexibility

148 balance, 166consistency in following, problems with, 88-89,

26-27 158-59

N211

... .-... ...

IA ~~~~~ .__ _ _ _ _ .. _ __._._ _..._ __....._

INDEX

Radar Military, Tactical, andattack warning and Relay Satellite

assessment, 59 Communication System,Ballistic Missile Early 81

Warning System, 60, 85 weather, 65-66ground systems, (0 Schiff, Zeev, 104, 105Joint Surveillance Target Schwarzkopf, Norman, 8

Attack Radar System, 03 Semi-Automated GroundOver-the.horizon Environment, 90-91,

backscatter, 61 125"Pave Paws," 60 Services, See Militaryphased array, 60 Services; and specijicsupport of C1 process, 56synthetic aperture system, Short, Walter C,, 50

63 Simpkin, Richard, 101, 107,World War II, 29-50,46 109-10,158

Reagan, Ronald, 7, 48, 47, Simulators, training on,59,60,61,62,68,72, 91-92114, 153,154 Somme, Battle of the, 102

Rechtin, Eberhardt, I5 Specialization, I1, 12Reconnaissance, 27 Spies and spying Sit almoResearch needs, 43, 183-84 IntelligenceRhyolite program, 76-77 damage from, 76-77Rothrock,John E., 15 Walker family, 77

Standard operatingprocedures, 108

Strategic Defense Initiative,Satellites, 51, 50, 59, 145 43, 72, 183

Defense Satellite Strategies, 6Communications Suez Crisis, 129System, 61, 65 Summers, Harry G,, 45-46

communications, 61Defense Support System,

60 Tactical Air Command, 90Fleet Satellite Tactical Planner system, 70,

Communications 72, 80-82System, 61 , 65 Tactics, 22

Global Positioning System, feints, 28i 60, 62-63, 65 mass is, 26KII-I 1, 77 Taylor, Maxwell, 58

80. 8.-8. 8

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - --....... ..-. ....-. ",.--... .~ .

Technology, 5 Tokyo bombing, 104dependence on, 89-9 1, Tower Commission, 1553

178 Townsend, Peter, 29-80funding for, 59-60 Tuttle,Jerry 0,, 64human factors Tzu, Sun, 12-1S, 24, 26,

considerations, 6 142, 145importance to C2, 55-56,

• 72-75, 178

Sinformation, 14-16, U-2 incident, 145* 56-57 US Publo, 51

and information overload, UmS Star*, 5177-79 USS Vinconn"s, 51

limitations andvulnerabillties, 65,78-74, 76, 92-93, Van Creveld, Martin, 106179-80 VesseyJohn W,,Jr,, 52

overconfidence In, 75-77 Vietnam War, 25, 26, 27, 90,perceptions of accuracy 155, 160

and reliability, 76, 180relationship tn CR process,

56-64, 178 Walker family, 77"Second Best Tomorrow," Warfare, success in, 25-26

29-30,46 Washington, George, 103strengths of, 75 Watson-Watt, Robert, 46success of, 65 Weapons systems,superior, and victory, importance to defense

27-28 planners, 7, 159-80support requirements, Wolfe, James, 27, 82

79-80 World War 11and "teeth-to-tail" ratios, awtomation of some

79 functions during, 36training of users, 80, Battle of Britain, 29

91-9 8 Battle of M idway, !? . 1

Terminology, 9-11, 17,44-45, 55, 178

Theorists, perspectives on X.ray sensors, 60, C2, 46-47,50

rhreat AssessmentConference, 126, 128 Yamamoto, Isoroku, 104

*213

HARVARD UNIVERSITYCENTER FOR INFORMATION

POLICY RESEARCHAFFILIATES

ABRH Consulting COMSATAction for Children's Cox Enterprises, Inc.

Television Department ofAdvertising Mail Marketing Communications (Canada)

Association Dialog Information Services,American Newspaper Inc.

Publishers Association Digital Equipment Corp.American Telephone & DRI/McGraw Hill

Telegraph Co. European ParliamentAmeritech Corporation (Luxembourg)Apple Computer, Inc. France TelecomArthur D. Little, Inc, Gartner Group, Inc.Auerbach Publishers, Inc, GTE CorporationBell Atlantic Hitachi Research InstituteBell Canada (Japan)BellSouth Corporation Honeywell, Inc.Bolce Dunham Group, Inc. IBM Corp,Bull, S,A, (France) IQ, Inc,Centel Corporation Information Gatekeepers,CMC Limited (India) Inc,Commission of the European Information Industry

Communities AssociationCommunications Workers of International Data Corp,

America International MonetaryComputer & Fund

Communications Industry International ResourceAssoc, Development, Inc,

215

S4 - ... ...... . . .

AFFILIATES

Iriternational Monetary Research Institute of

Fund Telecommunications and

International Resource Economics (Japan)

Development. Inc. RESEAU (Italy)

Invoco AB Ounnar Bergvall Revista Nocional de(Sweden) Telematica (Brazil)

L,T, Direction Ltd. (UK) Salomon BrothersJapan Telecom Company Scalfe Family Charitable

Kapor Family Foundation Trusts

Knowledge Industry SeAT S opoataoyPublications, Inc, Siemens Corporation

Korean Teleco.munications Southern New EnglandAuthority TeTelecommunicationsAuthority Corp.

Lee Enterprises, Inc, State of California PublicJohn and Mary R. Markle Utilities Commission

Foundation TEKNIBANK S.P.A. (Italy)

Martin Marietta The College Board

McCaw Cellular Times Mirror Co.Communications, Inc. Tribune Company

Mead Data Central United States Government:MITRE Corp. Department of CommerceNational Telephone National

Cooperative Assoc. TelecommunicationsThe New York Times Co, and Information

NEC Corp. (Japan) AdministrationNippon Telegraph & Department of Defense

Telephone Corp. (Japan) National Defense

Northeast Consulting UniversityResources, Inc. Department of Health and

Northern Telecom Human Services

Nova Systems, Inc. National Library of

NYNEX MedicineIng. C, Olivetti & Co., S.p.A. Department of State

(Italy) Office of

OTC Limited (Australia) Communications

Pacific Telesis Group Federal Communications

Public Agenda Foundation Commission

Puerto Rico Telephone General Services

Company Administration

216

S. . .... .... .. ...... . . .. .... .....

AFFILIATES

National Aeronautics and United Telecommunications,Space Administration Inc,

National Security Agency US WestU.S. General Accounting Williams

Office TelecommunicationsUnited States Postal Rate Wolters Kluwer

Commission

217

P_,

THE AUTHOR

Thomas P. Coakley was a Senior Research Fellow atthe National Defense University in 1988-89, A lieu-tenant colonel in the U.S, Air Force, he has servedin a variety of positions ranging from executive offi-cer and squadron commander to Professor of En-glish at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He graduatedfrom Villanova University in 1969; he received hismaster's degree from the University of Texas at SanAntonio and his doctorate from Penn State Univer-sity. Colonel Coakley and his wife Katherine havefour children,

Colonel Coakley is the editor of CO Issues of Com-mand and Control, published by NDU Press in 199 1.

" • "* U.S. GOVIRNMENT PRINTING OPPICE: 191 "211-0W4=05

I'

COMMAND AND CONTROL"FOR WAR AND PEACE

Composed in I I on 13 BaskervilleCover art prepared by Laszlo Bodrogi

Figure illustrations prepared byLois Herrmann and Lasslo Bodrogi

Advisory Readers

Colonel James R. Graham, U.S. Air ForceCaptain Barry N, Jeffers, US4 Navy

Dr. Thomas A. JulianNational Defense University

Dr. Anthony 0. O0ttingerHarvard University

NDU Press Editor

Janis Bren Hietala

I'"

W ith Command and Control for War and Peace,Thomas Coakley has done great service to

those who aspire-or dare-to peer into this myste-rious world and get at its basics. His delineation ofthe basic principles of command and control is asthorough and comprehensive as I have seen on thesubject. While he orients his treatment of the subjecttoward the operational practitioner, I would recom-mend it as fundamental reading for any of the spe-cialists in the wide variety of fields that pervade thecommand and control world, from the technical ar-chitect to the operational manager and the ultimateuser. It adds measurably to the body of knowledgethat must eventually emerge from scholarly treat-ment of the business and take an enduring form forfuture and aspiring practitioners to study. Seniorcommanders as well as novices on the threshold of anew career will benefit from the time they sperndreading this material and reflecting upon how it allmust play together.

-General Robert T. Herres, U.S. Air Force(Ret.)former Commander-in-Chief U.S. Space Commandand North American Aerospace Defense Command and

former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL DEFENSE 'UNIVERSITY PRESSFort Lesley]. McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319..6000

iI