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IAEA’s Nuclear Security

Programs and the Relationship

Between Safeguards and Security

Dr. George M. Moore

June 5, 2013

What are we discussing?

IPOL 8552 A Nuclear Trafficking What is “Nuclear Security?”

• AdSec definition—

The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

• Nuclear Security Fundamentals

1.1 Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or

intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material,

associated facilities, or associated activities. Other acts determined by the State to have an adverse impact on nuclear security should be dealt with appropriately.

1.2. Nuclear security and nuclear safety have in common the aim of protecting persons, property,

society and the environment. Security measures and safety measures have to be designed and

implemented in an integrated manner to develop synergy between these two areas and also in a way that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security.

IPOL 8552 A Nuclear Trafficking

• Threats

• A nuclear explosive device – Theft of device

– Theft of material to make a device

• Radiological Dispersal Device – Theft of radioactive material

• Sabotage for dispersal

– A nuclear facility/location

– Transport


• Major Nuclear Security Activities

– Physical Security of nuclear material and other

radioactive material

– Detection and Response to materials out of

regulatory control

– Nuclear Security Capacity Building in Member

States

– Nuclear Security Information and Training

Nuclear Security Series

Published guidance (“Bottom-up approach”)

o In response to urgent needs; 20 Security Guidance documents published, many more in development

Establishing a structured nuclear security framework

• “Nuclear Security Fundamentals

– 12 Essential Elements of Nuclear Security

• Recommendations; concepts and principles “the what”

one or the three is INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.

• Technical guidance; “how to”

• Performance based approach, to allow flexible implementation


Nuclear Security’s Legal Framework

• The legal framework for nuclear security

comprises international instruments and recognized principles that are implemented by national authorities

• There is no single international instrument that addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner. The relevant binding and non-binding instruments may overlap, but also may have coverage gaps.

Binding International Agreements • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear

Material and the 2005 Amendment

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT) • Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and States

Required in Connection with the NPT • Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

International Conventions • International Convention for the Suppression of

Terrorist Bombings (UNGA Resolution 52/164, Annex) (1997)

• International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of

Nuclear Terrorism (UNGA Resolution 59/290) (2005)

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

• 1373 (2001),Threats to international peace and security

caused by terrorist acts • 1540 (2004), Non-proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction

Non-Binding Agreements • INFCIRC 225/ Rev 5

• Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive

Sources • Nuclear Security Fundamentals, Recommendations, and

Implementing Guides • Safety Standards

Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection

of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (IAEA Nuclear

Security Series no. 13) (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)

• Intended to apply to the physical protection of nuclear

material in use, storage and transport, whether domestic

or international and whether peaceful or military (??--

including protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear

material against sabotage)

• Definition of nuclear material: Material listed in Table

1, in Section 4 of this publication, including the material

listed in its footnotes.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1)

• In force since 8 February 1987

• 148 Parties • The CPPNM has a threefold scope of application: the

physical protection of nuclear material during international transport; the criminalisation of offences; and international cooperation and information exchange

• The CPPNM applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport (Article 2.1).

• With the exception of the provisions relating to physical protection (Articles 3, 4 and 5.3), the CPPNM also applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and transport (Article 2.2).

The remaining provisions of the CPPNM apply both to nuclear material used for • peaceful purposes while in international transport and to

nuclear material used for • peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and

transport (Article 2.2).

Those provisions relate to:

• co-operation and assistance in the event of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or of credible threat thereof with a view, among other things, to the recovery of unlawfully taken nuclear material (Article 5.1 and 2);

• protection of the confidentiality of information (Article 6);

• making specified acts involving nuclear material punishable offences under national law and the establishment of jurisdiction over such offences (Articles 7 & 8) (e.g., theft, embezzlement or threat to use nuclear material to cause death/serious injury to any person or substantial property damage); and

• the prosecution or extradition of alleged offenders and the provision of assistance by States Parties in connection with criminal proceedings relating to such offences (including the supply of evidence necessary for the proceedings) (Articles 9-14).

Under the provisions that apply only to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport, States Parties are required:

to ensure that, during international transport, nuclear material is protected at the

levels described in Annex I as applicable to the categories of nuclear material set out in Annex II (Article 3);

not to export or import, or authorize the export or import of, nuclear material unless

assurances have been received that the nuclear material will, during international transport and storage incidental to such transport, be protected at the levels described in Annex I (Article 4); and

to co-operate and consult with a view to obtaining guidance on the design,

maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in international transport (Article 5.3).

The remaining provisions of the CPPNM apply both to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport and to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and transport (Article 2.2). Those provisions relate to: co-operation and assistance in the event of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of

nuclear material or of credible threat thereof with a view, among other things, to the recovery of unlawfully taken nuclear material (Article 5.1 and 2);

protection of the confidentiality of information (Article 6);

making specified acts involving nuclear material punishable offences under national law and the establishment of jurisdiction over such offences (Articles 7 & 8) (e.g., theft, embezzlement or threat to use nuclear material to cause death/serious injury to any person or substantial property damage); and

the prosecution or extradition of alleged offenders and the provision of assistance by States Parties in connection with criminal proceedings relating to such offences (including the supply of evidence necessary for the proceedings) (Articles 9-14).


Code of Conduct

• Material covered could be an important source for use in RDDs and sabotage of facilities containing covered material could lead to harmful releases of radioactive materials and/or radiation

• However, Code coverage is limited to radioactive sources, defined as follows:

“radioactive source” means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded, in a solid form and which is not exempt from regulatory control. It also means any radioactive material released if the radioactive source is leaking or broken, but does not mean material encapsulated for disposal, or nuclear material within the nuclear fuel cycles of research and power reactors.


• Thus coverage is arguably limited to sealed sources of solid form material (and their leakage)—leaving many potential RDD materials not covered by the Code

• Code does not provide physical security guidance in the manner of INFCIRC/225. Such guidance is being provided by the Nuclear Security series of documents

• Another coverage issue with the Code is its limitation to Category 1, 2, and 3 sources

IAEA Categorization Table

Category Practice Activity Ratio A/D

1 RTG’s; Irradiators;

Teletherapy; Gamma Knife

A/D>1000

2 Gamma radiography

Brachytherapy (HDR/MDR)

1000>A/D>10

3 Fixed industrial gauges (e.g.: level, dredger, conveyor gauges)

Well logging

10>A/D>1

4 Brachytherapy (LDR except eye

plaques & perm implants)

Portable gauges; Static

eliminators; Bone densitometers

1>A/D>0.01

5 Brachytherapy (eye pl. & perm

implants); XRF; ECD

0.01>A/D>Exempt/D

A = source activity; D = radionuclide-specific “dangerous” activity



Illicit Trafficking

Database (ITDB) System

The New Name—the same initials--Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB): Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control

ITDB Quick

Review

ITDB System- What It Is

• Established in 1995

• Unique network of points of

contact connecting over 122

states and several

international organizations

• Information collected from

official sources

supplemented by open-

source reports

ITDB membership Members and Non-members

ITDB membership Members and Non-members

ITDB work flow

National

Competent

Authorities

ITDB Point

of Contact INF ITDB

Confirmed

State POCs

International

organizations

IAEA

ITDB

Pending Open sources

INF’s, Reports, WebITDB

Verification

request

NUSEC - ITDB

Restricted Area

http://www.interpol.int/default.asp

Current Trends

Incidents Reported Where Incident Occurred in the

Year of Report

Looking at the Data with a Simple “Scientific”

Method

Reporting Issues- What It Isn’t

The analysis is wrong for at least two reasons

• Delayed reporting

• Inconsistent reporting criteria

• Failure to report?

Looking at the Data with a Simple “Scientific”

Method

Incidents Reported Where Incident Occurred in the

Year of Report




A Check from Open Source Reporting

• What happens when IAEA data is compared

with open source reporting?

Failure to Report?

• Do these results indicate a failure to report?

• Are there predictors that would indicate an

expected number of reports per year for a

state?

Conclusions- What It Isn’t

• Given the delayed reporting effect, end of year

summaries are not too useful

• We can account for inconsistent reporting

criteria in analysis if we understand them

What Can Be Learned?

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Group III

Group II Adjusted

Group I

Conclusions- What Can Be

Learned?

• Quantitative trend reporting may not nearly

as important as Qualitative reporting of

trends

– Example- “Hostage Taking,” or Theft for

Ransom

– Example- Border return reports

– Example-worth of conventional

police/security work

Conclusions- What Can Be

Learned?

• What we are really interested in is the

“Actual” rate of Illicit Trafficking Incidents

– Detection

– Reporting

– We know few of the relevant factors

• Therefore, what is the relation between “Actual” and

Reported

HEU and Plutonium

Incidents

Uranium enrichment terms

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0

100

Natural Uranium (.7%)

Reactor Grade, Fuel (2-5%) Low Enriched

Uranium (LEU)

Highly

Enriched

Uranium

(HEU)

Weapon Grade Uranium (~90%)

Various types of reactors, such as some

research reactors and naval propulsion

reactors

use enrichments from natural to

approximately 90%

Higher enrichment less needed for a

given yield, possible to design

in smaller size, less HE needed

Depleted Uranium (~.4%) D-38 or DU

U235 % Enrichment Graphics on this slide are courtesy of

DHS/Nuclear Assessment Program

(NAP)

20%

HEU Incidents

Plutonium Incidents

So, How Does Nuclear

Security Relate to

Safeguards??

The Three “S”s

• Security

• Safety

• Safeguards

Safety and Security of Radioactive Material

SAFETY SECURITY

Failure of legal control

· Lack of regulatory

infrastructure

· Lack of proper inventory

· Inadequate physical

protection

Intentional

Damage

· Sabotage

Acquisition

· Theft

· Illegal purchase

· Legal purchase

Malicious motive

· Terrorism

· Individual’s intent to

harm other(s)

Financial Motive

· Illegal sale for profit

· Avoidance of cost of

ownership

· Extortion

Failure of legal control

· Lack of regulatory

infrastructure

· Lack of proper inventory

· Inadequate physical

protection

Inadvertent loss or damage

· Misplaced

· Forgotten

· Accidents

Nuclear Security Perspective

Safeguards

Safety Security

Safeguards

Safety Security

• Nuclear Safeguards – Non-proliferation

• Nuclear Security – Counter Terrorism

• Nuclear Safety – Technical Accident Prevention

Synergistic approach


• The only overlap is with “nuclear material”

Documents

IAEA’s Nuclear Security - WordPress.com · IAEA’s Nuclear Security ... 3 Fixed industrial gauges (e.g.: level, dredger, conveyor gauges) Well logging 10>A/D>1 4 Brachytherapy