IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Assessments Monica Haage – [email protected] Expert on Safety Culture and Human

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Assessments Monica Haage [email protected] Expert on Safety Culture and Human & Organizational Factors

IAEA The IAEA Safety Culture Framework Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receives the attention warranted by their significance. The 2007 IAEA glossary The internationally agreed IAEA normative framework defines strong safety culture into: -5 characteristics -36 attributes Recognized that safety culture is an essential component of the defence in depth and need to be addressed proactively

IAEA Safety is a clearly recognized value Attributes High priority to safety: shown in documentation, communications and decision- making Safety is a primary consideration in the allocation of resources The strategic business importance of safety is reflected in business plan Individuals are convinced that safety and production go hand in hand A proactive and long-term approach to safety issues is shown in decision-making Safety conscious behavior is socially accepted and supported (both formally and informally) GS-G-3.1

IAEA Accountability for safety is clear Attributes Appropriate relationship with the regulatory body exists, which ensures that the accountability for safety remains with the licensee Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood There is a high level of compliance with regulations and procedures Management delegates responsibilities with appropriate authority to enable accountabilities Ownership for safety is evident at all organizational levels and by all individuals GS-G-3.1

IAEA Safety is learning driven Attributes A questioning attitude prevails at all organizational levels An open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged Internal and external assessments, including self-assessments are used Organizational and operating experience (both internal and external to the facility) is used Learning is enabled through the ability to recognize and diagnose deviations, formulate and implement solutions and monitor the effects of corrective actions Safety performance indicators are tracked, trended, evaluated and acted upon There is a systematic development of staff competencies GS-G-3.1

IAEA Safety is integrated into all activities Attributes Trust permeates the organization Consideration for all types of safety, including industrial and environmental safety and security, is evident Quality of documentation and procedures is good Quality of processes, from planning to implementation and review, is good Individuals have the necessary knowledge and understanding of the work processes Factors affecting work motivation and job satisfaction are considered Good working conditions exist with regards to time pressures, work load and stress Cross-functional and interdisciplinary cooperation and teamwork are present Housekeeping and material condition reflect commitment to excellence GS-G-3.1

IAEA Leadership for safety is clear Attributes Senior management is clearly committed to safety Commitment to safety is evident at all management levels Visible leadership showing involvement of management in safety related activities Leadership skills are systematically developed Management assures that there is sufficient and competent staff Management seeks the active involvement of staff in improving safety Safety implications are considered in the change management process Management shows a continuous effort to strive for openness and good communications throughout the organization Management has the ability to resolve conflicts as necessary Relationships between management and staff are built on trust GS-G-3.1

IAEA IAEA Safety Culture Publications http://www.iaea.org DocumentTitle Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1Fundamental Safety Principles Safety Requirements No. GS-R-3The Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Requirements GS-R-Part 2 (supersedes Safety Requirements No. GS-R-3) The Management System for Facilities and Activities draft DS-456 to be published 2015 Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.5The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4Safety Culture Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-15Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture Safety Report Series No. 11Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Activities Safety Report Series No. 42Safety Culture in the Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants Safety Report Series: No 74 Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases Published Sept 2012 Safety Report Series:Performing Safety Culture Self-Assessments approved and expected to be published 2014/2015 Safety Report Series:How to Continuously Improve Safety Culture draft to be published 2015 TECDOC-1321Self-assessment of safety culture in nuclear installations TECDOC-1329Safety culture in nuclear installations TECDOC-1707Regulatory Oversight Of Safety Culture In Nuclear Installations

IAEA Culture is seen as something we can influence, rather than something we can control Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization not only as a top-down process Edgar Scheins well established iceberg metaphor helps to understand and how to continuously improve safety culture observe visible aspects (artefacts and behaviour, above surface) and; interpret this information to reveal the cultural reasons behind (found in attitudes, values and basic assumptions, below surface) For safety culture improvement, the IAEA emphasises human interactions (shared space) including trust, mindful communication, learning attitude, inquiring attitude, self-accountability, diversity, self-reflection etc. IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Artefacts, Behaviour Values Attitudes Basic Assumptions

IAEA Shared Space Safe performance depends on the ability and willingness of individuals to continuously think, engage, and demonstrate safe behaviours. It is shaped by Personal motivation Knowledge and understanding Shared space A good shared space is characterized by Working relationships that support trust Decrease of power dynamics Mutual respect Openness free flow in sharing of thoughts and ideas Enables individuals to express views related to their inner thoughts and feelings about a particular issue without fear of recrimination or exclusion Shared space goes deeper than sharing facts Dialogue instead of discussion/argumentation Me Shared space External space

IAEA IAEA Safety Standards

IAEA Safety Standard GS-G-3.5: Assessment of Safety Culture Safety Culture Self-Assessement should: Include the entire organization Several different self-assessment tools should be used (e.g. interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, observations and document reviews) A designated team representing all organizational levels and functions at the installation should carry out the self-assessment A specialist in safety culture should be included in the team The self-assessment team should receive training The self-assessment team should summarize the results and identify areas for improvement and may suggest actions to be taken The results should be reported to the management at an appropriate level A follow-up assessment should be performed The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach

IAEA Member States requests to IAEA to provide practical guidance IAEA Safety Standards Behaviour and social science Past experiences Basis of the safety culture assessment methodology

IAEA Overall characteristics of the IAEA safety culture methodology Multiple-methods approach Explorative, open approach Raw material for interpretation Data in itself say little about culture (tip of the iceberg)

IAEA Using several assessment methods The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology Document Review Interviews Surveys Focus Groups Observations

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Interviews

IAEA Interview technique Structured Semi-structured Non-structured Open-ended questions Striving towards a non-structured interview technique Explorative more like a conversation

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Focus Groups

IAEA Focus Groups The purpose of focus groups is to develop a broad and deep understanding rather than a quantitative summary 7 10 participants (2 Facilitators) Various cross-section of the organisation Job, Grade, Age, Department, etc. A highly effective method for listening to others views and gain insight into group dynamics Used to draw out attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way that is not feasible using other methods

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Questionnaires/Surveys

IAEA Why surveys? To capture attitudes and impressions of a large population To make sure that everyone in a organization has had an opportunity to make his/her voice heard To establish a baseline and be able to track changes over time

IAEA Disadvantages of surveys Surveys identify symptoms rather than causes The information collected is about what employees think they think this is not the same as how they really act! Surveys are subject to response bias, e.g. respondents may feel that they should respond in certain ways Questionnaires say more about what the person asking questions thinks is important than what the respondent feels is important! Safety culture only make sense in a qualitative perspective and caution should be made when using quantitative methods

IAEA IAEAs Safety Culture Perception Questionnaire

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Observations

IAEA Why observations? Visible manifestations of culture What you see is factual whether it should have happened or not! Should involve observations in different areas and with different people across the organization to ensure the validity of the findings

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Document Review

IAEA Why document review? Documents communicate the organizations values and expectations Reveal approaches/beliefs related to ensuring compliance, e.g. how positional power authority is distributed, degree of formality, approaches to corrective actions, etc. May reveal actual work practices, e.g. event reports. Can show how the organization thinks, e.g. in documents with analytical content. A document says a lot about how the organization presents itself to itself.

IAEA Separation of descriptive and normative The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology Descriptive is Based on data and a theory of culture Normative should Based on data, a theory of culture and a norm

IAEA The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology Performed in silos each assessment method treated separate Survey Interviews Focus groups Observations

IAEA The IAEA Safety Culture Analysis Process e. g. self-assessment Final Issues; Normative, evaluative analysis Overarching themes: Image(s) of culture Interview data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Survey data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Focus group data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Document data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Observation data Cultural expressions Cultural themes

IAEA Example of the Descriptive Analysis Process Focus group data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Observation data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Theme Relaxed attitude towards radiological risks Cultural expressions Several incident of body contamination and one internal People express they did not go to RP re- training for last five years People say that RP- techs are sitting mostly in their office Managers have identified problems and taken decisions but nothing have changed Theme Contamination risk is not considered Cultural expressions Skipping contamination area borders Not properly marked boarders Chewing gum in RCA Not wearing gloves when working in the RCA where its required Overarching theme; Risk awareness related to actions for preventing contamination spread

IAEA Normative Analysis Overarching theme; Risk awareness related to actions for preventing contamination spread Final Issues; Normative, evaluative analysis

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAEAs Approach to ISCA Independent Safety Culture Assessment within Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)

IAEA Safety Culture Independent Assessment should: The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach as self-assessment The independence and qualification of the members of the assessment team should be considered crucial for the success of the assessment The team should be staffed with sufficient diversity of experience and should include specialists in behavioural science, with knowledge of statistical methods of analysis The independent assessment team should aim at identifying strengths and areas for improvement Safety Standard GS-G-3.5: Assessment of Safety Culture

IAEA The ISCA Teams Area of Expertise Psychology Cognitive science Sociology Social Psychology Organizational theory Cultural theory Leadership and management theory Human Factor / Human Factor Engineering Organizational Factors Resilience Engineering ITO (interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organizations) Basic knowledge; Nuclear technology, nuclear organizations, regulatory framework

IAEA OSART Findings and Safety Culture

IAEA Sources of information: The IAEA ISCA Assessment Methods Document Review Interviews Surveys Focus Groups Observations Team Findings

IAEA Core of IAEA Safety Culture Analysis Process e. g. independent assessment within OSART Interview data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Survey data Survey data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Focus group data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Document data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Observation data Cultural expressions Cultural themes Overarching themes: Image(s) of culture Final Issues; Normative, evaluative analysis Team findings data Cultural expressions Cultural themes

IAEA Example of amount of safety culture facts Team findings: Circa 220 facts 25 interviews: Circa 150 facts 7 observations: Circa 30 facts 7 focus groups: Circa 80 facts Survey 389 participated 97 questions In total about 480 fact excluding the survey material

IAEA Reporting of the results Recommendations for areas in need of attention Three senior managment workshops to reach a shared understanding Exit meeting Report

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