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iV1AIZI{. D. LONE G N- {State Bar No. 143f 22) mdl severson.corn

TI IOM.'15 N.. ABBOTT (State Bar I 1o. 24556 3) tna@severson.com

BRIA S. V4'HITTEMORF (State 3ar No. 241631) bswc, severs n.cozn

SEVER.SON & WERSONfl. Professional Cozporation.

4ne Lmbarcadcro e nter, Sui.te 2E00San Francisco; California 94111Telephone: ( 415) 39$- 3344

Facsimile: (415) 9 6- 0439

Attorneys for DefendantsWELLS FF1RG0 BANK, N.t. dba AMERICA' SSBRVICING COMPANY and U. S. BA

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I'ABLE t F C NTEN'' S

I' a e

I. I.iV' I' R DUCTION ................................................................................................: .......,1.

1I. STATEMENT OI R.F_,L, EV- N'1' FACTS ....................:..::.:..::.....:.:.....::...,:.......:.......:..........:1

III. I, EGAL ARUUVIEN' 1' ....................................................... ............... .......... ,... : 3

A. Grounds for a Demuner.........,....,......,., ...:........:;.......,.....................,,......,.............,..,.3

B. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Challenge the Assignment Based on theClosing Date" of the Securitized Trust ........................................... ............. .....

C, Ylaintif. s First Cause of Action for :Breach of Security Instrument Must fail.::....:..4

D. Ptaintiff' s Second Cause of Action For Wrongful Foreclosure Fails ...................:...:6

1. The CiviI Code ection 2923. 0 Theory Incorporated in,the SecondCOAFails ........................................................................................... .. ..6

2. I'he Civil Code Section 2923. 7 Theory Incarporated in the SecondCOAFails ...................................... ................ ........._...............................8

3. The TeYZder Rule Applies .......,. ....................................................................... 3

F;. Plaintif.f' s Third CauSe of Action for. I raud Must Fail ............................... ,,, . 9

F. ' I'he rourth Cause of Action for Violation o1 Businzss and ProfessionsCode § 17200 ....... •---..... ......... ....... ...... ........ ... ...... • . l t)

G. The Fifth Cause of Action fi r Inteniional Inf.liction of Emotional DistressFails............................................:.............................................................................. l 1

i. Plaintif.f's Sixth Cause of Action to Set Aside Trustee' s Sale Fails ............::::.....:.: 12

I. The Seventh Cause of Action for Slander of Title r'ails .......................................... 13

J. - Plaintif' s Ei hth Cause of Action for Quiet "I itic Fails ............................................14

IV. CONCLUSIC?N.:.........:..... ........:...........:...:.......:..........:....::..::...:......::.::.,..:.:....:..,,:.......,....1

I j CiV 53 902w ---------

IVIEM RANUUM OF POINTS t NI? AUTi-IORI'I' IES ?N SliPPORT

OF D MUR.RER TO PLAINTIPF' S SECONll AVIENDED CO IPLAIN Ì'

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FI,DGRAL CASES

i'ABLE O.l AU'1' 3l:ORI'TII+S

P cr(s)

arbajal v. Wells Fargo 13crnk, N.A.,

C.D. Ca1. April 14, 2015) 2015 WL 245054 .:........................................:........:......,..,...........:...... 8

Castanec a v. Scrxon Alortg. Servs, Inc. 2010) 09- 01124, 2010 Vv L 726903 :.....:...:.:...:.:..........:...................._:........ :.:. .,..:... :: 11

Glenn K Jackson Inc, v. Roe .

9th Cir. 2UU1) 273 F. 3d 1192 .. . . . .. .._. ....... . . .• •• . . , .. 10

Hartzilton v. Bcrnlc of I3lace ValleyD, Cal. 201U) 7 6 F. Supp.2d 1160...,,.. .....................................,.........,.......................,.... . 14

Hatton v. l3ank of'Am., N. l., D. Cal. July 3, 2015.) 201. 5 WI., 4112? 83 .................:.....:.........::.........:...:...;....:.........:........,:..... 8

Landg af'v. USI Film Products . 1994) 511 U. S. 2 4..........., .................;,....,......:,......:.....,:.:....:....:......:...:....:....::..................::..... 6

Nlajot v. WeZl.s .Furgv I3arzk., IV.A.

2014) ? 014 WL 1U3936......., . . .. ......... . ... , ..... . ....... . ... . . 3

Rajamin v. l eirt:scl e Banlc Ncr.' l Trz st Cc.

2d Cir.2014) 7 7 F. 3d 79 .............:......................................,,,...........,..............,,,................. .. . 8, 9

Sch artz v. IndytLlcrc Feu'eral Bank

E.D. Cal. 2U10) 2010 WL 2985480 ..................................................................,...................... ....11

Stokes v. Citim rtgage, Inc.,

G. D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014.) 2014 WL 4359193 ...........:......:......:..:....>....:::..::..:...:...:.,.:... ... 7

U.S. H'ideliry Ca. v. Struthers Y ells Co. 1908) 209 LJ, S. 306 ...................... . . •-- . .. .. ..... • - .... .. 6

Wooclr•ing v. Octi>>efz Loan Servicin LI.,C;

C. D. Cal. July 18, 2 14) 2013 WL 35 871.6 ...................:...................................:......,.,.........,..... 7

DOCKET D CASF..S

Saterbak v. R%ational Defcrr.clt Servicing Cv p. S. D. Ca1. Oct. l, 201 S, t:iv. No. 15—CV- 956--WQH—NLS) 2t) 15 WI., 5794560 .,...,,....,:...,.....:1 Q

i CIV 53 9d2

YIEMORANDUM OF POIIVTS tCND AUTHORITIES 1N SUPPOR.T

OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF' S SECOND Ati(ENDED COMPLAIi 1'

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Abitallah v. Zlnited Sav. 13crnk

1996) 43 Cal. pp.4ih I 101 ..:..: .....:::..:.... . ... . • . ... . 3, 5

Aguilar v. Bocci

1974) 39 Ca1. App.3d 475 ................,...........,,.,,....,.................,,.,;,.............,....,............. .... , .., l:

Albertson v, Raboff - 1956) 46 Ca1. 2d 375 ... . . ..,....,. .,. ..... .. .. ...... ........... ... . ..... .. 14

ngell v. Supe ior Court

1999) 73 Ca1. App.4th 691, 86 Ca1. Rptr.2d 657 .................................................................:..::...: 5

Arnola's Nlcrnc gement Corp. v. ischen, •

1984) 158 Ca1.App.3d.at p. 78 ................................................................................................ 12

Blank v. Kirtivar

1985) 39 Ca1. 3d 31. 1 .. .. . . . ,...,...... . .. ... . . .... ... . ., • . • • . ... . 3

Bundren v, Superzor Coa rt. .

1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 784 ..::..::.::.::...:......:.:...................... ............ .,...............,.. . , . ... 12

Cantu v. Resolutinn Trust Corp. 1992) 4 Ca1. App.4th 857 .. . .................. ........ , ..................... .....,....... . .... 12

Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Cv. 1979) 24 Cal. 3d 579 ...................................... .,. .. ...... • . l2

Chavez v. Indyrnac. Mortgage Services

2013) 219 Ca1. App.4th 10 2 ...... . • .......,. . . . . . ... ............. . ..:. . 13

Cole v. Tnir Uaks Tir e P otection Dzst.

1987) 43 Ca1. 3d. 148 ..............................................................:...................,.....,.............. _ ....... 12

Davaloo v. State Fcrrm Ins. Co.

2005) 135 Ca1. App.4th 409 ..:..................:..................:......:.....:.............:,....:...........,,.....,. .. 3

David.son v. Ciry of Westministey1982) 32 Cal. 3d 197 .................................. .. . •• . . .. .• .. ... .. . . 12

Debrunner v. Deutsche Banli Nat, '1'r•ust C'o.

2012) 204 Cal. pp.4th 433 ............................ ........ .........._............._....._......._........_........ 15

Falahati v. Kvndo -

2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823 . ..:.:.....::........:.......:::......:........:......:_.....:..:...._:.::....::.........,............: 3, 5

f%letcher v. e.ster z 1Vcztio zczl I., fe In.s. Co.

197U) lU C'a1. 1pp.3d 376 .................................................,......................,.....,.,...........,......,,..... l?.

iii C1V 53 902

i19EMORANDUM UF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPQRT

OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF' S SECOND t.?v1Ei IDED CO iPLAINT

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Fonlenvz v. Well.s Fczrgr I3ank, N.A:

2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256 .........:::..........:....:......,...:....:............:....:.....,..,:,..:.,.........,.,.....:.... .... 5

FPCI RE- HAB l)1 v. E cY. G It avestment.s, Ltcl.

19$ 9) 207 Ca1. App.3d 1018 ...................... . . 5. 13

Glcrski v. ' cznk ofAfnerrca, N..A. - 20i.3) 218 Ca1.App.4th 1079 ...........:.:_:.......: . .....,....

IIc=rrer a v. I'ederal Natronal l ioytgage As.rn.

2012) 205 Cal.App. th 1495 .......................,,,......,...,....................................................._.....,...... 10

IIlvmestead Savings v. Dczrtniento,

1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 424, 281 Cal.Rplr. 367 :...................:.....:.,..:........,,::,....,-.........::,.....,..::...... l.i

Iace h B. v. Coutaty ofShaster2007) 40 Cal. 4th 948 .. ................................ . ................ ................................................... 14

lenkins v. JP %Inrgan Ch xse 13ank, 1'V.t1.

2t) 1 j 216 Cal. lpp.4th 497 ... ... . ............ . ........ • . . ...... . ..

KachZan v. 1 Iat-k witz,

2008) 168 Cal. Ap. 4th 316 ... .... ... ...... , ......... .. . ..._... •• . . 14

Kat-l.sen v, Anzcr ican Scrv. c I..,c an 1, ssn.

1971) 15 Cal. lpp.3d 1 l 2 .................................. ................,......................,........ . . ... . ...., .. S

Khozcty v, li Ialy',s vj'C'czlif r fzici, Inc. 1993) 1 Ca1.App. t11612 .......... . .. ...... ...... .::.• .. .. .. . . 1 l

Knapp v. DoheytJ', 200) I23 Cal. App.4th, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ........:.......,.

L v. Iensen

2001) 88 Ca1. App.4th 1093, 106 Ca1. Rptr.2d 443-....

5

5

Lnna v. Citib rnk, N.A. - -

2011) 202 Ca1. App.4th 89 ...........:..:......:::...:::::..::............:......:.:.....:....:::::.:.. o:......,:.,....:..:.:.:,....; 5

l%fix v. S dcl

1981) 126 Cal.App.3c 386 ......., ........:..........,...............................,.:.............:.:.....:.... . . ., . l4

ally >>. Grace Cornnzunr'tv Clazcrch of'the L' c lley 198$} 47 Ca1. 3d 278 ..................................:.......................................................,.........,..,.......... 12

Napise v. Gor—L1ey Yi' e.rt, Inc. - 1985) 175 Cal.App.3d. 608, 22Q Cal.Rptr. 7 9 .....:................................................................... 13

11Teman v. C' ornelius

19? 0) 3 Cal.App.3d 279 .: a ........:....:.....> .,......:.: a.:...:... . . ........... 15

1 V CIV 35402

MEMORiANDUM OF P4INTS AND AL'THORI' fIES IN SLPPOR Ì'

OF DEivILRRER TO PLAINTIFF' S SECOND fiV1ENDED. COVIPLAINT

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IR& B Autn Ctr., lnc. v. Fat rraers Gro7t, Inc. ................... .... ....

2006) 1 0 Ca1.App.4th 327 ........................:...::......:::.;.:.::...:.:.....::....::..: ,, . . 11

I Ros.s v. Creel i'rinting c& 1' a hlishin Co. ...... .... ......... 2002) 1 UO Cal..App.4th 736 ................:..:..........:::........::..:.:.....:.....:.. :.., .....:.:..:. . 12Satef•bak v. JI' Lfor, an Cha,se Bank, N.t4.

2016) 2016 DAR 2565 ................................................,.......................,.............................,.. 4. 10

Sc terhak v. JPMof gan Clzase Bank., Ar'.ft.

Cal. Ct. A p., lY1ax. 16, 2Q16, No. D066636) 2016 WL 1055062..

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California Civil Code ,

3 .................... ..................... . ........,.. . ...............................................,., .. ............ ... ,

47 ................................................. . ....... . ............... , . ....,........... ....... . , .... l , 1 47( b) . ........................................................................................,.....:...................................... 14.

47(c} ...................................... ... ........ . ...... .. . . ....,. . ... , ..... . .. . . 1

7' s.... ..................:................••:.................:....:...............:.,.:...:::.............................::..:..:...::.:..... 1

2920 ........................................... . ..... .. . ......... . . . . •. . . . . .......... . .. 1' 4

2923. 6 ................................. .. • .. • . • • - .. .. . - . . • ... 6; 7

2923. 6( c) ,.. ..... .... . . ,. .... ...... .... . .. ....... ... ..... . .. ., 6, 7

2923. 6)•.. . .. . , • . . .. . . - - 7

2923. 6( h).:... .. ... ..... . ....................... .,........ .. . .........,....,.. . ........... . ..... . . . .....................: 7

2923. 7 .........................:......................................................... ... . •• • • • 8

29 3. 7( a) ....... . ................................................... ...................................................................... 8

2924...... . •. . .. „ .... .... .... . . • . . • . • .. 1: 3; 1:. 4

2924, et. seq .. ....................,...... .. . -. •. ......,. .... • . - .. . . . •• 2924 a) l)-and ( 3) ..............:.....,....,..,...,... ......:.......:......::.....:,......................... 13

2924( d) .................................................. . ..,. .. .....

2924( d)( 1) .....................................................................................,......................................... 13

2924( d)( 2) .....................................:.:........................................:...................,..,;.... . .. 13

2944.5 ...... • . .. . . .. . .... . .,.. . .. . . . • • 14

199 Ca1. Rptr.3d 66, 36 P. 3d. 845:......:..-..::.:...::..:::.:...::....;;.:.;.:...:.:;:...:::....,, ...:..::...........:....:.:.....: 8, l0

vi CiV 35903 I

MEMORr1NDUM OF POINTS AND ALTHORITIES .IN SIJPPORT,

I!,

OF D ivItiRRER TO PLAINTIFF' S SECOND A: IENDED COh1PLAINT'.

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VIEI C Y. l' DU ' POr.' I'S ANIi IJ.'g' 13 I2ITI+:.

I. I]\iTRO) L'' I()1 1

Plaintiff I2E(JINA MANANTr' N (" Plaintiff") iiled the instant action in an attempt ta

forestall a lawfully noticeci foreclosurz sa e of the re l property located at 91 I.taddack Streei,

Foster Gity, Cali:(ornia 94444 ( t11e " P operty").

The Second Aniended Complaint (" SAC") vas filed ia advance of defendar.ts demurrer to

the First Amended Complaint. Here abain, the SAC remains vt lnerable to demurrer as i#. contains

in•elevant lacival allegations and legal thearies that are generally contrary to California law, rione

of which even come close to meeting minimum pleadi.ng requirements with respect to Defend lts

WELLS FARGO BAVK, N.A. dba A:VIERICA' S SERVICING COIVIPANY and U. S. BAI K,

N.A. AS TR.USTEF Si.1CCESSOR BY MEP CTER Tn Lt Sf1I.,I.,E BANK, NATIO V,1t.,

ASSC)CI': I.' IUN, AS 'TRC.1S" C' EE FnR NIORGr1N STANLEY MOI' I Gt GF..,1 Or1N 1' RliS"I'

2007- 7AX (hereinziEter " N1.oving lleiendants").

1s discussed be(ow, ' laintiff' s letal theories as to the effect f the securitiratzon; roeess

have been rejected by CaliCoinia CoLU-i of f ppeal. Moreover, Plaintiii' s I- omeowners' Bill 01'

Rights (" HBOR") claims, now embedded within the secUnci cause o1' aclion for v rongful

foreclosLtre itistead of separately pleaded are eacl defective Uecattse ( 1) they 7•eprese.nt and

improper attempt to apply the HBOR retroactively; { 2} they are conclusory such that they do not

state a cognizable claiin against Vloving Defendants; and { 3) they each overloak the facl that

Piai ztiff received a Ioan tnodif.ication in 20U9 and failed to plead facts that she undertivent a

material change in financial eircumstances to justify fi rtlier maditication review. Based on these,

and the additional points and authorities discussed below, Moving Defendants respectfully request

this Court sustain the demun•er

I.. S' T 7' E: li l+P1' I' ( @+ I± fL+1V AIoCT +' A ri' S

Tlie Laara and Refina ace. O January 30, 2007, PlaintitFborrowed $7 0, 000 from

Resicientia] ivlortgage_ Capital (" IZesiden.tial") in a loan r tinance securec by real propertV located

at 911 I Iaddock Street, Foster City, CA 9440. ( RN, Ex. l.) The deed ol'trust designates

Alliance Tiile as tlie trustee; aud IERS as nominee and was recordzd on Fabruary b, 2007. ( Id.) r. l ctv 3s o2

i1 tEMOR NUUM F 1' INTS AND Ai THORITIES IN SUPP4RT

OF DEMUItRER Tt PLAtNTIFF' S SECOND A141ENDCD COi 4PLAINT

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ND x West, L.L.C. (" NDEX"} recorded a Notice of Default on May 11, 2009. ( RJlti, Ex.

2.) IERS, as nominee for Residential Mortgage Capital, then f•ecorded as Assignment of Deed of

I'rust (" r ssr nment") iii favor of LT. 5. Bank National Association, as Trustee, SIlCCesSOr- in-

Interest to I3a.nk of America, National Associatiou as Trustee, Successor by Nlerger to LaSalle

Bank. National Association, as Trustee for Mortgage Stanley Mortgage Loan Trt.st 2U07- 7AX

U. S. Ban1: as Trustee"). ( RJN, Ex. 3.)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as attorney in fact for U. S. Bank as Trustee, recorded a

Substitution of Trustee on July 9, 2009. ( RJ1V, Ex. 4.) Thereafter, NUF...X recorded a Notice of

Rescission ofNotice of Default on'' ovember 12, 2009. ( RJN, Ex. 5.)

Loan Modi cnPion. Wells Fas•go recorded a loan modification a reement, as betti.feen

Plaintiff and Wells Fargo, oii December ] 0; 2009. ( RJN, Ex. G.)

I:ess th a year laler, Quality Loan Servicing Corp (" Qualiiy") recorded a Notice of

Uefault on Novenzbet• 2), 2010. ( RJN, Ex. 7.) Quality recorded a Notice of Default on February

3, 2U11. ( RJN, : x. 8.} ' I'hereafier, Wells I'ar o Basik, N. f1., as servicing agent for U. S. Liank

National Associatian, as "I' rustee, successor- in- interest to Banlc of America, tational Association

as trustee, successor by merge• ia l,asalle Bank National Association, as trustee for i1 lortgage

Stan.Iey Mortgage Loan Trust 2007- 7AX, recorded a Substitution of Trustee, substituting Quality

as the trustee under the Deed of Trust, on June 23, 2011. ( RJN, E;c. 9.) Quality recorded a Notice

I of Trustee' s Sale on 1VIay 18, 2011. ( RJi 1, , c. 10.)

Quality recorded a Rescission of Notice of Default on February 4, 201 l. ( RJN, Ex. 1 l,)

1hen, on June 23, 2011, Quality recorded a Notice of Default. ( RJN, Ex. 12.) Quality

recorded a Notice of "f' rustee' s Sale on September 28, 2011, setting a sale date of October 24,

2 11. ( IZJN, F,x. 13.)

Grant D ed. 4n October 24, 2011, the date of the noticed s Ie, Plaintiff' recorded a Grant

Deed, gran[ ing the property to Regina B. Manantan, a m ied woman as her sole and sepasate

praperty, Giaruie Patrice M. Vizconde and Trisha Ainne M. Vizcode, unrnarried women; as joint

tenants. ( RJN, Ex. 14.)

Quality recorded a Notice of Trustee' s Sale on December 28, 2012, setting a sale date for2 • CIV 5359Q2 :

MEMOR 1\ DUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SLPPORI' OF DEVIURRER TO PLAIN"t' IPF' S SECOND AiViENDED COlY1PLAINT

l/ : l

Tanuary 30, 2Q13. ( RJN, Ex. 15.) Quality recorded a Notice af Trustee' s Sale on Augusi 8, 201..

R: 1, Ex. 16.} Quality recorded a Notice of' Tr,is ee' s Sale n September 9, 2015. ( RJN, Ex, i 7,}

Grcajat Deerl. On September 25, 2015, Pl iintiff recorded a Ci-rant Deed in favor of Regina

B. : Tanantan and Pai.rick Virconde, }lusbarld and wife, lVlaria Victaria Manuel, tulinarried wome,n

and Har.ry Ivtanuel, unrnac ried man, as joint tena7its. ( RJN, EY. 18.)

Trustee' s .` ale. Th trustee' s deed upon sale, recorded Uctober 15, 2015, indicates that

Quaiity, in iis capacity as trustee, sold the Property to I tOAB Investment Group LLC on October

2, 201. ( RN, Ex. 19.) The property sold for $ 1, 080. 00.00. ( Ic )

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Lis I'er dens. Plaintiff recorded a Lis Penciens on October 27, 201 . ( RJN, EY. 20.)

III. LEGAL -1I2GUiVI I' I'

Grounc s for a c; m as- e e¢

A dernurrer tests the le; al suificiency of a pleaciing as o whether thc plaintiffs have

adequately pled the alleged causes of .ction. Pursu tlt to Calit>rnia Code aCCivil 1' rocedure

CCP") 430. 30, a demur-rer is prc per when any groimd for an objection t the pleading " appears

an tlie face thereof, or from any matter of whicl Cile court is required to or may tal e judicial

notice." Conclusary averments aYld canclusions of law do n t: constitute a sta ement of facC upc n

which reliePmay be granted. ( Davaloo v. Stale Farrn Ins. Ca. ( 20Q} 13 Cal;App.4th 409, 415;

Srnith v, Busniewski ( 1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 124.)

The Court in Blcztak v. Kirwcxn, ( 193) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, held that "[ tiv] e treat the

demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deduc;tions or

conclusions of fact or law. [ Citation. We also consicicr m tters which may be judicially noticed."

ci ing, Ser•rczno v. Priea•t ( 1971) Cal.3d 584, 591). Additionally, a complaint that refers

benerally to " defendants" does not state a claim. ( Falc.zhati v. Knrac r ( 2(}4} 127 Cal., pp,=th 23,

829.) " lhe instant complaint fails to lead facts to state a single cause of actian a ainst :Vioving

I e% ndants. In adciition, Ylaintiff lacks stuzdin to brir g her equitable claims, such as to set aside

forecIosure and quiet title,, as shc has nat alleged cornpiiance with the tender r le. ( See, Ahdallalz

v. C%nitec S'czv. Bcrnk { 1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1109 [( borro rcrs) required to allege tender of

the amount of [lender' s] secured indebtedness iil order to maintain any cause of action for3 CIV 535902

SE IORANDliN1 F POINTS AND AL'•THORITiES 1N SUPPORT

OI' DEMliRRCR TO PLAtNTIPF' S S CdNU Ai1 fENDEU COi IPLAli t' ;

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irregulasi y in the sale procedure].)

The 5AC alleges eight causes of action as foliows: ( 1) Breach of Security Instrument; (2)

Wronb:ful Foreclosure —Violat.ion of Civil C; odes § 2924, el. seq., ( 3) Fraud; ( 4) Violation of

Business and Professions Code 1720U; ( 5) Intentional Infliction of rmotional Distress; ( 6}

Setting Aside Ì'rustee' s Sale; ( 7) Slander o.f Title; and ( 8) Quiet Title. As discussed more fully

below, Plaintiff failed to plead facts suffcient to state a cause of action against Ioving

Deiendants.

B: Plaintiff I,acks Standing ta Challenge the Assignmen$ Based on the " Closing Date" ofhe Securitizee Trust

Plaintiff fi rther challenges the foreclosure process based upon the assignment of deed from

iVIERS ta tJS Bank on .T uie 12, 2009. ( S C j 6Q.) This theary is likewise contrary to California

la.w, which holds Chat a borrower lacks standin tc challenge an assignnlent. " I-IOWCb'er, even il

t} e asserted improper securitization ( or any other invalid assignments or transfers of the

pr.oinissory note subscquent to her exec; ution o:P the nate on Niar. 23, 2()07) occurred, the i-cicvant

parties to such a transaction were the holdc;rs ( transferors) of the promissory note and the ihird

party aequirers ( iransferees) of the note.. " Because a promissory note is a negotiai le instruinent, a

borrower must anticipate it can and might be transferred to anatl.er cz•editor. As to plaintift; an

assignment merely substituted one creditor for another, without cha.nging her obligations under the

note." ( Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ( 2013) 216 Ca1. App.4th 497, 514- 15.)

In the most recent appellate court case dealing with this issue, the Saterhak Court held tllat

Glaski v. Barzlc ofArfierica, N.A. ( 2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079 is wrong: a post-closing-date

transfer of a loan into a New York securitized trust is voidable, not void, so the borrower has no

standing to challenbe ii. ( S'aterBak v. , P 1vlvrgafa Chase 13ank, N.A. ( 2016) 2016 D11R 2565.}

Thus; Plaintiff' s attempt to sct aside the Poreclosure by challenging the securitization

process must fail.

C. ' laintiffs+' i st C'aense of Aclaon fa r 3 reach of Secc uurity Instrumen Mus faal

Plaintiff' s first cause of actian alle es a bre ch of the Dced of Trusi and fails for at least

two reasons: ( 1) the cantract claim cloes not plead the essential terms of the conh•act' and ( 2) the

l. t 4 CIV 535902

MEIv10RANDUM OF POtNTS A 1D AU7'HORITIES IN SUPPORT

OF DEVIURRER TO PLAINTIT'P' S SEC ND AMENDED COVIPLAINT .

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cause of acti il fails to plead damages.

Plaintiff alle es that Movina Defendants recorded a Notice of Default without performing

Ia condition precedent contained in Section 22 of thc Deed o:f "Crusi. sne. J 6.

In actual fact, Plaintiff pleads an r'Nregularity in the fo eclosirre prvicess and therefore must

II Plead facts to show prejudice. Tellingly, Plaintiff does not plead thal she was; in fact, cun ent on

II her loan obligation so prejudice has not been pled in this case. " We also note a plaintiff in a suit

for wrongful foreclosure lias generally been required to demonstrate the alleged imperfection in

the foreclosure process vas prcjudicial to the plaintiffs interests. ( Nlelendrez v. D ce: Ilnvesttnent,

Inc., supra, 127 Ca1. 1pp.4th at p. 125$, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 413; Knapp v. I oher•ty, ( 2004) 123

Ca1. App.4th at p. 86, fn. 4, 20 Ca1. Rptr.3d 1[" A nonjudicial foreclosure sale is presumed to havc

been conducicd regularly and fairly; one attacking the sale must overcome this common law

resumption `by pleading and provin* an improper procedure crnd tl•ce resatlt.ing s• ejuc rce '"],

italics added; Lo v. Jensen ( 2001) 88 Ca1. App.4th 1093, 1097-- 1098, lU6 Ca1. Rpt•.2d 443

collusion resulted in iriadcquate sale pz•ice]; ! lrtgell v. S'uperiot• Cou° t ( 1999} 73 Ca1.11pp. 4th 691,

700, 86 Ca1.Rptr.2d 657 [ faillu•e to comply with proeedural requirements must cause prej udice to

plaintiffJ.) Prejudice is not presumed froin "meY•e irregularities" in tlie process. ( I'orrtenot v, d3 ells

f' argo Bas k, N.A. ( 2011) 198 Ca1. App.4th 256, 272.) In addition, as the sale was completed,

Plaintiff must also plead tender in order to have standing to set aside the sale. She does not.

As a general rule, a debtor cannot set aside the foreclosure based on irregatlaritie,s in ihe

sale without also alleging tender of the amount of the secured debt. ( mphasis added.)( Ka1•lsen v.

I 1n•ierican Sav. & Loan Assn. ( 1971) 1S Ca1.App.3d 112; 117 [" A. valid and viable tender of

payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a-deed

af' tr•ust"]; see bdallah v. United Savin Js Banlr ( 1996) 43 Ca1. App.4th 1101, 1109: sustaining

demurrer for lack of tender of amounts due and owing under the loan].) "' 1' he rationale behind the

rule is that if [ the borrower] could nal have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been

proper, any irregularities in the sale did not resull in damages to the [ borrowerJ." ( FPCI RE—Hf1B

O1 v. E& G Investments, Ltd, (1989) 207 Ca.1. App.3d 1018, 1022; Lona v. Citibank, N.A. ( 2011)

202 Ca1.App.4th 89, I 12; Shuster v. BAC Hnrne Loans Sef vicing, LP {2012) 211 Ca1. App. th 05; I 5 CIV 5359G2

NtEMORANDIIM OI' POINTS AND AUTNORITIES IN SliPPORT

OF DEMiJRR.ER TO PLAT! TIFF' S S COND AMENDED CONiPLAI: 1T

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512.) H re, Plaintiff fails to plead tender and the demurrer is properly sustained.

Based on the foregoing, Moving Defendants' demur.rer to the fi•st cause of action is

pro erly sustai7 ed.

II Pl intiffs Second Causc of Aetion For Wrongful Foe-eclasure ' ails

Plaintift' s Second Cause of , ction for Wrongful Foreclosure is impermissibly conclusory

Ias to 1 Ioving Defendants b it generally prernised on the application of California' s Homeowners' Bill of Rights (" HBOR"). The Conlplaint alleges that the Notice of Uefault was statutorily

deticient under HBOR. However, the Notice of Default in connection with the foreclosure was

recorded on June 23, 2011, well before HBOR was enacted in January 2013, ( RJN, Ex. 12.) The

statute is not retroactive.

I his is fatal to the clairn, the subscquent 11 UR claims and a11 claims that are predicated

on violation of the H 30R, because of thc strotlg pr.esumption against retroactivity in the absence

of such e: cpress language. ( See, e. g., Civ. Code, 3; Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 3.) " Generally, `( i]he

presumption is very strong tl at a statute; was nc t meant to act ret•ospectively, [ whereinJ [ iJt aught

not receive such a construction unless the words uscd are so clear, st7•ong and iinperative that no

other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislaiure cannot be

olherwise satisfied.' "(. oshi ka >>. Satper•ioj Cvurt ( 1997) 58 Ca1.App.4th 972, 980, quoting U.S.

Tidelity C'v.' v. Stra ther•s Wells Co. ( 1908) 209 U.S. 306, 314.)

Tndced, tlze presumption against retroactive application is especially strong u hen

retroactive applicatian would " increase a party' s Iiability far past conduct, or impose new duties

with respect to transactions already completed." { LandgYaf v, USI Filrr PN Je ucts ( 1994) 511 U.S.

244, 280.) Plaintiff' s allegations related to the Notice of Default must fail as it was recorded

before the HBOR vas enacted.

1. ' The Civil Codc Sectioin 2923. 6 Theury Incorpor tesi in the Second C A Fails

In her second cause of action, Plaii tiff alle es, in conclusory f.ashion, that she submitted a

complete loa.n modi_tication to Wells Fargo loilg before the recardation c f' the NOTS. ( SAC j 82.)

1'his conclusory statement is insufficient to state a claim withaut factual support. Section

2923. 6( c} provides that if a borrower submits a compleCe loan modification application, the

6 CIV 535902W_____...............__..____.___...._.__...___.... ___.__ __....._ ..............__._...___

YIENIORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORII'IF.S IN SUPPORT

OF DEIv1URRER TO PLAINTIPF' S S COND A; IENDED COi 1PLAINT

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servicer is obligatcd to postpone the sale until the servicer mai{es a written decision and the

borrower' s timc to•appeal has expired. Here, Plaintiff cannot state a Section 2923. 6 claim because

she does not plcacl sufficient facts that the, application was ever conaplete. " Nevertheless, whether

a loan modification is " complete" is a legal determination that znust be made by considering the

ma idates af section 2923. 6( h). Plaintiff' s bald allegation that she submitted a" con plete" loan

modi .fication.— vithout any supporting factual allegations -- is a conclusory statement, and the

Court does not rely on such assertions iu evaluating the suificiency of Plaintiff' s Complaint."

I oodf•ing v. Oc efz Loan Servicing, LLC', 2013 WL 35 8716 ( C. D. Cal. July 18, 201); Stokes v.

Citi azor•tgage, Inc., 2014 WL 4359193 ( C. D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014.) Here, PlaintifFinalces no specific

allegation with regard to the cempleteness of their purported loan modiiication application.

Because Plaintifi' never alle; e suffcient supporting facts that the loan modification was complete,

she cannot state a" dual tracking" claim based on the allegation that Wells F• go lias not provided

a ritten deterniination. Wells Faroo is not obli ated to pr•ovide a written determination on a loan

modircatian application unless the application is " complele". ( Civ. Cocie 2923. 6( c).)

Coilspicuously absent from the facts presented in the SAC is the judicially noticeable loan

modi:fication signed be:twecn Wells Fargo and Plainiif:f' in December 2009. { RJN, Ex. 6.} Here,

Plaintiff' s borrower' s prior loan modification triggers Civil Code Section 2923. 6( g), which states

as follows:

g) In order to miilimize tlie rislc of borrowers subinitting multiple applications fortirst lien loan modifications for the purpose of delay, the mortgage servicer shallnot be obligated to evaluaie applications fi•om borrowers who have already beenevaluated or afforded a fair opporttznity to be evaluated for a first lien loanmodification prior to Janlrary 1, 2413, or who have been evaluated or afforded afair opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the requirements of ihis section; unless there has been a material change in the borrorver's financial circurnstancessince the date of the borrower's previous application and that change is doeumenled

by the borrower and submitied to tlie mortgage servicer.

However; Plaintiff docs not disclose that she received a ioan modiFication in December

2009 and was afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated for a tirst lien modification. In addition,

she fails to plead that lhere was a inaterial change in her fnancial circumstances, and ihat ihe

material cha.nge w s d cumented and submitted to Vl' ells argo; such tllat Wclls rargo was tulder

obligation to consider her second request for a modification. Based on the loregoing; Movingi. t ' 7 CIV 5359U2

MEivIORANDUM OF FUINTS AND AUTHORI"I' IES IN StiPPORT

OP UEYtli.RRER ' 1' O PL,AINTIFF' S SECOND AMENDED COiY1PLAINT

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Defendants' demurrer to the second cause of action is properly sustaiiled.

2. ' The Civifl Code Section 2923. 7 heory Incorporaieci in tlac Second C. DA Fails

Sectian 2923. 7 abligates he servicer to provide a SPOC " upon request." ( Civ. Code §

2923. 7( a).) Iiere, Plaintiff malces no allegation that she ever rcquested a SPOC, vhich is iatal fio

the claim. Indeed, courCs have re d 2923. 7 to " require a bo rower to requcst a SPC} C before the

servicer is required to establish one." ( Carbajal v. Yi ells Fargo Bank, N, 1., 201 WL 24505, at

7 ( C.D. Cal. April 10, 2015); Hatton v, Bank ofAm., N.A., 2015 WL 41122$ 3, at * 6. ( E.D, Cal.

July 8, 2015.) As with the 2923. 6 theory, Plaintiff's allegations of wrongfiil foreclosure based on

violation of Civil Code Sectian 2923. 7 must Fail as ii is iinpermissibly conclusory. The caus of

action simply alleges the requirements of the code section, but then alleges no facts to suggest

who, how, or when Movin ;.De:fendants purporteeily violateci the rec uirements of CiviI Code

Sectioi12923. 7. Plaintiff ".must allege 4 lhen the request was made, who made the re.quest, who

received the request, and in what manner the alleged request was inade. Without tliis additional

infor.mation there is no way to dete.rmine rvhekher Wells Fargo actually violated thc statute, or

whether. [Plaintiffs are sirnply pleading a naked, formulaic claim." ( lt lajor v. YY'ells Fargv 13crnk,

A. ( 201) 2014 WI 410393C, at ` 5.) TIZe AlcrjvF Court' s reasoning is equally ap licable to this

cause of action. Here, the conclusory claim cannot reasonably be interpreted as an e; cplicit request

for a SPOC and ihere are no facts pleaded to suggest that Moving Defendants violated the sta#ute.

Accordingly, the demurrer is properly sustained.

3. ' i'he Tender I2ule ppiees

California la v rejects Plaintifis allegation that the foreclosure sale was void under the

facts pleaded. ( Sf1C 99.) Yvanoua expressly offers no opinion as to whether, under New York

la«, an untirnely assignment to a securitized trust made after the trust's c(osing date is vaid or

nlerely voidable. ( Ic at pp. 94U- 941, 1 9 Ca1. Rptr.3d 66, 3b5 P. 3d 45.) d3je concl cd sueh rcn

assigntnent is nzerely vaadabl.c. (Emphasis added.) ( See Rajanzin v. Detrtsche I3ank 1Vat'17t arst Co.

2d Cir.2Ul.4}. 757 F. 3d 79, 88- 89 [" the weight of :1ew York authar ty is conirary to plainliffs'

contention that any failure to comply idz the terms of the PSAs rendered de% ndants' acquisition

of plaintifis' loans and mortgages void as a matter of trust law"; " an unauthorized act by theCIV 535902

N1E:L1(? RANDiJM OF POINTS AND AUTNORITIES IN SliPPORTOF DE: IIJRR.ER TO PLAINTIFF' S SECOND AYtENllED CONIPLAINT

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txustee is not void but merely voiciable by the beneficiaz•y"].}5

Consec uently, Saterbak laeks

standing to challenge allebed defects in the MERS assignment of the DOT ta the 2007— R7 trust.

See; Saterbak v. ,IP Llorgan Ch.cise Bcznk, !' A, ( Cal. Ct. App., iV1ar. 16, 2016, No. D066636) 2016

WL 10 5062, at * 4.) Accordingly, Plaintill' s contention that the tender rule is not applicable

because the foreclosure sale is " void" is simply con.trary to California l w. Based on the

foregoing, the demurrer is properly sustained.

E: Plaintiffs' i'hird Cause of Action for Fraud Must Fail

Plaintiff' s third cause of action once again challeizges the foreclosure based on ( 1)

fi•audulent inducement at origination a.iid (2) on false mortgage assignment.

Plaintiff appears to allege thai defendant Residential committed fraud be securitizing the

loan — therc is no allegation that Movin; DeI'endants were involved in the sale o f tlie loan, so this

cause of action fails as to Nloving Defendanis. Fven if Moving Detendants had been involved in

origination, Pl iintiff' s claim must nevertheless fail because she lacks standing to brin; a frauci

claim premised upon the purported assignment of the loan inta a securitized trust.

Yvanova reeognizes borrower si uidind only wl ere the defect in the assignnzentrenders the assignment void, rather than vviclable. ( Yvanova v. IVew Century M rtg, Cor•p. (2016} 62 Cal. 4th 919, 942- 943.) " Lnlike a voidable transaction, a void onecannot be ratified or validated by ihe parties to it cven if they so desire." ( Id. at p. 936.) Yvanova expressly offers no opinion as to whether, under New York lativ, anuntimely assignment to a securitized trust made after the trust's closino date is voidor merely voidable, (Id. at pp. 940- 941.) We conclude such an assignmeilt ismerely voidable. ( See Rajatnin v. Deutsche Bank iVat' l Trzrst Co. ( 2d Cir.2014) 757

F.3d 79, 88- 89 [" thc weight of New York authority is contrary to plaintiffs' contention that any failure to coniply with tile terms of the PSAs rendereddefendanis' acquisii;ion of plaintiffs' loans and mortgages vaid as a matter of trustlaw"; " an unauthorized act by the trustee is not void but merely voidai le by thebenefciary".)

5

Consequently, Saterbalc lacks standing to challenge alleged defectsin the MERS assignment of the DOT to the 2U07—AR7 trust.

4Sate hak v. , II' ii!lnYgan Cha,se f3crnk, N.A. ( Cal. Ct. App., Mar.. l i, 2Q16, No. D4 6b36)

j 2016 WL 10 5062, at ` 4.)

In addition, Plaintiff agreed that tL1e loa i could be sold when she executed the deed of

trust. ( PJN; Ex. 1.) " The autliarity to exercise atl of lhe rights and interests oftile lender

necessarily includes the authority to assign tlie deed of trust." ( Siliga v. lLlortgage Electr nic

Registf° ztion Systenzs, Inc, (2013) 219 Ca1.App.4th 75, 84, disapproved on other grounds inl CIV 53 902.

MENiORANDUM Or POTNTS AND AC.'THORITIES IN SUPPORTOF DEMLRRER `f0 PLAIN1' IFF' S SECOND A; IE'vDED COiviI' LA1NT

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Yvc nova, su ru, 62 Ca1. 4th at p. 939, fn. 13, 1. 99 Ca1. Rptr.3d 66; see Hef t•era v. F'ederal National

IYInY gage ssr. ( 2U 12) 205 Cal.App. th 1495, 1504 [ interpretin language identical to Saierbak"s

DUT to ive MLR5 " the riaht tU assign tlie DO I''], disapproved on other grotiilds in Yvc nova, at

p. 939, fn. 13, 199 Ca1. R:ptr.3d 66.) The federal cc urt adjudicating Saterbak' s parallel case against

h r loan servicer cited the above-quoted language in the DOT to reject the same securitization

f I theory proffered here. ( Saterbcrk v. Natinnal Default SeYViciyzg C'or. ( S. D.Cal. Oct. 1, 2015, CiV.

No. 15—CV- 956—WQH—NLS) ZO15 WL 5794560, at ' 7.} sS'rtt r?rrlG v: JPii lf»' lLl1'1 C( XS'2 4a77IC..

1. ( Cal. Ci. App., Mar. 16, 2016, No. D066b36) 2016 WL ] 055062, at 4.) Basecl on the

foregoing, Plaintiff' s fraud claim premised on the sale or assignment of the loan is sin ply contrary

to California law and without legal rnerii. -

Zven if it werc not, ii is subject to applicable st. tute of limitatiuns. The assignment in this

case was recorded on June 26, 2009. ( TZJN, EY. 3.) Accordingly, any purported fraud related to

the assignment is barred by the applicable tlaree yerar statute of liinitations. Code of Ci, ril

I? rocedure section 338, subdivision (d) three- year] IimitaCions period," governing frauci..]

Tlzomson v. Canyvtz ( 2011) 19$ Ca3, App.4th 59, 60.}

1' Iainti FPs additional allegztions, related to alleged fraudulent conduct of A oving

Defendants, involve allegations that i1 Ioving Defendants pracessed Plaintiff s loan modiiication

even thou h they l:new that the Trustee was prohibited from accepting assets into the Trust 2007-

7AX after its cl sing date of April 30, 200. ( SAC' 115.} However, as discussed above, [" the

weight of Ne v York autJzority is contrary to pl intitis' contention that any failure to comply , ith

the terms of the YSAs rendered defendants' acquisition of plaintiffs' loans anci morts ages vaid as a

matter of trust law"; `=an unauthorized act by the trustee is noi void but merely voidable by the

benef ciary"].) 5 Consec uently, Sater.bak lacks standing ta challenge alleged defecls in the IYII;RS

assigninent of the DQT to the 2Q07--AR7 trust." ( Saterbalc, supra, * 4.) Iiased on tl e foregoing,

the thirc cause of action must f:ail as to : loving Defendants.

I'he Fou- th Ca s f Action f r Viol.ataon c f Ba sines anc I"rafessions Code § 17200

Plaintiffs UCL clairn is based whally on her ather failed fheories. Since tllose theories are

simply wron under California lati, Plaintiff s liCL claim should be dismissed as well. ( Glenn K it 1 { CIV 5359Q2

i1 tEivIORANDUM OF P INTS AND AliTH02ITIES IiV SUPPORT

OF DE:vIURRER TO PLtIINTIFF' S SECOND AME' DED COMPLAI, T

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Iackson Inc. v. Rve ( 9th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 1192, 1203 [ where a plaii tiff s L'CL claims are

predicated on the viability of another claim— as they are here— if the underlying claims fail, so

does the UCL elaim]; (:' crst.crneda v. Scrxvn . lortg, Ser•vs, Ine. ( 2010) 09- 01124, 2010 WL 726903,

at * 7 [ dismissind UCL claim " cntirely derivative of the previously claim in the complaint"].)

Pla:inliff fails to state a predicate claim to animaie the UCL. Here, as discussed above, each of the

causes of action upon whicli the UCL claiin inight rely, are contrary to California law or

deficiently pleaded. Accordingly, Plainliff has not pleaded a predicate claim upon which her UCL

ilieory nlight rely.

Second, i:he facts constituting an alleged violation of section 17200 must be ".state[ d] with

reasonable par-ticularity." ( Khouyy v. l laly' s of Calif'of"121tI, Inc. ( 1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619;

see alsv Sch a tz v. IndyNlac Fec eral 13ank (. D. Cal. 2010} 2010 WL 2985480 at * 4.) Here,

Plaintiff lacks ihe requisiCe predicate violation, stated in the r.c.q. iired level o:C.specificity, for such a

cause of action to survive.

I' hird, Plaintiff lacks standinb to bring such this claim. A private par-ty may bring an

aclion under seclion 17204 et seq. anly if they l ave suffered injury in fact and have lost money or

property as a result oF uniair competition. ( Cal. l3us. & Pro.f. t:ode 172U4; K c. . B . iuto Ctr•,, Inc.

v. Fcrrmer.s Groa p, Inc. (2006) 140 Ca1. App.4th 327, 360.) Plaintiffs' allegations undcr seciion

17200 fail to eslablish the necessary standing. towhere in Plaintiffs' FAC do tlley assert any

harm that they suffered throu; h any specific action or inaction on the part of Nioving Defendants.

Finally, Plaintiff fails to aIlege any fact showing the lcey factor of dollar loss to herselfan

idea which defies probability, because in order to be dama; ed Plaintiff must have somehow repaid

defendants the $760,000 which she borrowed. Tl is is an assertion which Plaintiff could easily

malce if it were true, but which Plaintiff does not malce. But .it any case there is na a(legation of

the lcey inaterial facts— and that is what is requir.ed. Based on the foregoing authorities, the

demurrer is properly sustained. _ .

G. ' The Fift9 Cause of Actic a for Inte tioaial Infliction of Eianotional I9istress Fails

The eleinents of an IIED claim are: { 1) defendant' s outrageous conduct; ( 2) defendant' s

intentian to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, ernotional distress; ( 3) 11 ctV 53590?

VI I IORANDUM O.F PONTS AND AUTHORITILS IN SUPPORT

OF DE\%iLRRE.R TO PLAINTTPF' S S COND A: tENDED COMPI.AIN'I'

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plaintiffs suffering severe or extretne emotional distress; and (-) an actual and proximate causal

link between the tortious (outrageous) conduct and the emotional dis ress. ( ltiTally v. Gt ace

Cornmunity Chu ch ofthe Valley ( 1988) 47 Ca1. 3d 278, 3Q0; C' le .v. FaiN (?crks I'ire Pf•vtection

Dist. (19$ 7) 43 Ca1. 3d 148, 155, n. 7.) The "[ c] onduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to

exceed a11 bounds of thai usually tolerated in a civilized community." ( Davidson v. City of

Westminister ( 1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209)( guoting Cer•vantez v. J.C. Penney Co. ( 1979) 24 Cal.3d

579, 593.} " In the context of debt collection, courl;s have recognized that the attempted collection

of a debt by its very nature often causes the debtor to suffer emotional distress," ( Ros,s v. Cf,eel

Printing cPc Puhlishing Co. ( 2002) 100 Ca1. App.4th 736, 745)( citing Bzcndren v. Superior Cnut•t,

1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 78, 789.) " Frequently, the creditor intentionally s elcs to create concern

and worry in the miud of the debtor in urder to iriduce payment." ( Bundr en, I45 Cal.App.3d at

789.) Such conduct is only outrageaus if ii gaes beyond " all reasonable bounds of decency."

13undren, 14 Ca1. App.3d at 789.} 3ased on these authorities, the demurrer is properly sustainedi

without leave to amend.

The assertion of an economic interest in good faith is privileged, even if it causes

emotional distress." { Ross, 100 Ca1. App.4th at 745, n. 4.; citin; Fletcher v. Westef' i2 1VQl1UtZRZ IIfe

In.s. Co., ( 1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 395; Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. ( 1992) 4 Ca1.App.4th

857, 888.) The SAC fails to allege Ioving Defendants' ouirageous conduct io support an IIED

claim. Further, the SAC points to no conduct of Moving Defendants, other than the rejected,

generalized and conclusory theories discussed hereiiz. Plaintif s theory that defendants had no

right, title or inieresi in the property is pi•emised upor tl e flawed assignment theory and is

properly rejected. In addition, the SAC identifies no severe emoti nal distress which Plaintiff

allegedly suf.fered that was proximately caused by : ilovin Defenclants. The demurrer is properly

sustained as a result.

H. I' laintif' s Sixth Cause of Actic n to Set Asic' I' rustee' s Sale ± aals

As a gerleral rule, a debtor cannot set aside the foreclosure based on irregularities in tlie

sale without also alleging tender of the amount of the seciu•ed debt. [ Citations.]" ( Shuster v. BAC

Hotne Loans Se viczng, LP (2012) 211 Ca.1. App.4th SUS, 512; accord, Arnolds 1Llanagenzen Corp. 12 CIV 5359U2

MEVIORA IDUiV1 OF POINTS AND AliTHORITIES-IN SUPPORTQF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIF'' S SECOND AiytENDED COMPLAINT

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v, i.rchen, ( 19g4) 158 Ca1.App.3d at p. 578 [" aiz action to set aside a t•ustee' s sale for

irregularities in sale notice or procedure should be acco npanied by an offer to pay the full amount

of Che debt f.'or which tlle ptoperty was security"]; Chcrvez v. .Indymac A lnrtgczge Services (2013)

219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1. 063 [ if the sale is facially valid but there is soine proced tral irregularit

in notice procedures, it is voidable requirin tender].)

The rationale behind the rule is that if [the borrower] coutd not have redeerned the

property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not resulC in

dama es to the [ borrower]." ( FPCI Re—Hab Ol v. E& G Investmenls, Ltd. (1989) 2Q7 Ca1. App.3d

1018, 1022, 255 Cal.Rptr. 1 7.) As noted above, section 2924 provides that, where the trustee

delivers a deed to the buyer at the foreclosure sale, and the deed recites that all procedural

requirements for the default notice and sale notic;e have been salisfied, there is a statutory

rebuttable pr.esurnption thai such notice requir.ements have been htlfilled, as to a BFP, this

presumption is conclusive. ( 2924; Hornesteatl Savings v. Darmiefatv, { 1991) 230 Gal.App.3d

424, 432, 281 Ca1.Rptr. 3b7; Napue v. CTor- 1i ley We,sc, Inc. ( 1985) 175 Ca1.App.3d C08, 620- 621,

220 CaI. R tr. 799.) Here, there are no facts presented to suggest that the purchases, iv10 1B, is not

a bona ide purchaser. "

Moreover, as discussed above in Part D- III, California lav rejects Plaintif. s contention

that the sale is void, as alleged. ( St1C ¶ 147.) The court should properly disregard this contention,

which is central to the allegations running tl rough the entire S C. Based on t1 e foregoing, the

demurrer is properly sustained.

I. The Seventh Cause of Ac#eon for Slander of Title Fa ls

1' he seventh cause of action for slander of title must iail as reeordation of a notice of

default and a notice of saic are absolutely privileged acts on which no tart claim of any sort, other

than malicious prosecution, may be baseci. California Civil Code section 2924(d)( 1) provides that

t] he mailin.g, publication,•and delivery of not.ices ts required. by this section" " constit,rte

privile;ged communications pursuant ta Section 7." Notice flf sale and d.efault are required by

seetion 2924( a)( 1) u d ( 3); hence, giving those notices is privileged conduct under Civil Code

section 47. Reinforcing. that conr.lusion, Civil Code section 2924( d)( 2) provides thatr. 13 CIV 535902

i tEUIORANDUM OP POINTS 1ND AUTHORITIES IN SUP.P R1'

UP DEMURI2LR TO PLAINTIFF' S SECOND AM.ENDED C I IPLAINT

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p] erforinance of the procedures set forth in this article"t

also " constitute pritiileged

communicatians pursuant to Section 47."

Civil Godc sectiori 47' s privilege " bars all tort causes oi' action except malicious

I prosecution." ( Jcrcoh B. v. Count} of'Shasta { 2(}07) 4U Cal.4th 948, 96U.) In particular, tlze

priti ilege bars a slander oi title claim based on the recordation f the privileged documenl.

Albertso,z v. Rczboff (1956) 4b Cal.2d 375, 378- 81.) Under Civil Code section 2924(d}, the act on

j which tlze Plaintiff bases her slander of title claim is privileged under section 47. Here; Plaintiff

alleges no facts raising any inference af malice.2

In fact, the cause of action agaiia appears based

Plaintiff' s erroneous theory that the foreclosure process w s flawed because of the assi nment and

that the subsequeilt sale of the property was void as a result. These al egations are simply contrary

to California law as explained above in Part D- III, and throu hout the demuner..

As Plaintiff has no standing to challenge ilie assibnment, the slander of title tlieory must

also f il. Accc rdingly, the slander of title cause of action states no claim on which relief may be

granted and the demurrer is properly sustained.

J. Plain#iifs ighth C use i' Ac4iora f r C uiet Title ' ails

It is settled in California that a mortgagar i:annot quiet his title against the mortga ee

without paying the ciebt securec." ( Slzimpone.r v. .Stickney, ( 1934} 19 Cal. 637, 649; see t ix v.

Sodd, ( 1931) 126 Ca1.App.3d 386, 390 (" a mort agor in possession may not maintain an action to

quiet title, even though the debt is ur.enforceable"); r guilar v. Bocci, ( 1974) 39 Cal.App,3d 475;

477, ( trustor is unable to quiet title " wifhout discharging his debt"); see also, Hamilton v. Bank of

Blue Valley; (E.D. Cal. 2010) 746 F. Supp.2d 116d). Thus, an action to Quiet Title is simiiarly

barred b the tender rule.

Plaintiff' s eighth cause of action is generally barred by the tender rule and iiso because

Section 2924. is p irt of Title 14, Chapter 2, rticle 1 ofthe. California Civil Cade, whicll beginswitli section 2920 nd ends tivith section 2944. 5. 2

kachlon v. .Maf•ko itz, l 68 Cal.App. th 316 ( 2008) h lds that recordation of the nc tices of default and sale are fall within only the ci.ii diCional privilege of Civil Code 47{ c), not the absolutepri filege af §47( b}. A f7cCurzl.ly supporied averment of ma( ice is suffcient to avoid dismissal based onprivilege.

14 CIE> >35942

I tENfO.RtI:VDUM t}P POINTS ND AUTHOR.ITIES .N StJPPORTOF .DE lUR.RER TO PLt INTIFF' S SECOND AIYtENDEll C01rIPLA1NT

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Plaintiff failed to state facts supporting a claiin against Moving Defendants. The pui pose of a

quiet title action is to determine " all conflicting claims to tl e property in controversy and to decree

to each such interests or estate therein as he may be;entitled to." ( Venzan v. Cof• aelius ( 1970) 3

Cal.App.3d 279, 284). A quiet title action must include: ( 1) a description of the property in

question; ( 2) the basis for plaintiffs title; azld ( 3) the adverse claims to plaintiff' s title. Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 761: 020.

Plaintiff has not alleged that she is the rightful ownar of the property, i.e. that she has

satisfied her obligations under the Deed of Trust. Nor that she pled any facts to establish any of

the myriad and duplicative claims alteged abave. In disrnissing a Quiet Title claim based on a

purported flawed assigninent theory, the Debrztnner Court stated, "[ t] o the e; ctent that his position

depends on the invalidity.of the assignment, it falls with the cause of action for declaratory relief,

as he did not show title free and cleax of the first deed of trust." ( Debrunne v. Dezttsche Bank

Nat, Tru.st Cv. ( 2012) 204 Ca1. App.4th 433, 444.) The same rationale applies to this case and the

demurrer is properly sustained.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintift' s SAC fails to state a cause of action as against Moving Defendants for all of the

reasons discussed above. Moreover, each claim is independently deticient and subject to a

demurrer. For the foregoing reasons, iVloving Defendants' demurrer should be sustained and

judgment entered in favor of Moving Defendants.

DATED; May 27, 2016 SEV RSON & WERSONA Professional Coiporation

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BY: , Brian S. Whittemore

Aitorneys for Defendants

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. dba AMERICf1' S -

SERVICING COMPANY and U.S. BAtiK, N.A. AS

TRUS' I' EE

15 CIV 535902

MENfORf1NDUM OF POIN7' S AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

OF DEi IURRER TO Pr,A1NTIFF' S SECOND AMENDED COA IPLAINT