‘I Know’ as an Explicit Performative

‘I Know’ as an Explicit Performative

by

STEVEN DAVIS (University of Illinois)

1 want to argue in this paper, contrary to Austin, that “I know” is not an explicit performative. Admittedly Austin has doubts about “I know” in How To Do Things With Words. However, these doubts are never stated, but only indicated by a question mark before the entry of ’know’ in the list of expositives.’ The question mark need not mean that Austin is unsure whether “I know” is an explicit performative or not, but might mean only that he is doubtful that it should be classified as an expositive, rather than, say, an exercitive. But in “Other Minds” there is evidence that he regards i t as an explicit performative. In this earlier paper he draws a parallel between “I promise” which is an explicit performative and “I know.”

. . .When I say ‘I promise,’ . . . I have not mereIy announced my intention, but, by using this formula (performing this ritual), I have bound myself to others, and staked my reputation in a new way. Similarly, saying ‘I know’ . . . i s not saying ‘I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite sure’: for there is nothing in that scale superior t o being quite sure. . . . When I say ‘I know,’ 1 give others my word: I give others my iiuthority for saying that ‘S is P.’

The parallel between “I promise” and “I know,” if there is one, by no means establishes “I know” as an explicit performative utterance. What are needed are tests which are necessary and

J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. by J. 0. Urmson [Har-

J. L. Austin, “Other Minds” in Philosophical Papers, ed. by J. 0. Urmson vsrd, 19623, p. 161.

and G. J. Warnock (Oxford, 196l), p. 69.

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sufficient to classify any utterance as to its membership in the set of explicit performative utterances. For this purpose Austin proposes four non-problematic’ tests which are listed below. The last two are those to which he calls special attention.

I. If an utterance is an explicit perfomative, then i t does not make sense to ask about that utterance “Do you really-?” where the blank is filled in by the verb of the utterance.*

11. If an utterance is an explicit performative, then the action referred to by the verb of the utterance can be done deliberately or someone can be willing to do it.”

111. If the supposed explicit performative renders true the form, “to say. . . is to . . . ,” where the first blank is filled by the utterance to be tested in quotes and the second by the verb of that utterance, then that utterance is an explicit performative.“

IV. If there is a certain asymmetry between the use of the utterance in the first person singular present indicative and other persons and tenses, then that utterance is an explicit performative.‘

One and two are necessary and three and four are sufficient for establishing any utterance as an explicit performative. One and two can be termed tests by the ear and three and four are grammatical tests.

In adidtion to these four tests which apply generally to utterances, there are two justifications for including “I know” within the class of explicit performatives.

V. There is a certain parallel between “I promise” and “I know” and since “I promise” is obviously an explicit performative utterance, so too is “I know.” ’

VI. If I say, “I know,” then I give others my authority for saying that ’S is P.’ Since “I give X my authority for saying that

‘ There are two other tests for which Austin finds exceptions. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 84.

lbid., p. 84. a Ibid., p. 84. ‘ Ibid., p. 149.

lbid., p. 149. ’ Austin, Philosophical Papers, pp. 66-69.

‘I KNOW’ AS AN EXPLICIT PERFORMATIVE 159

‘S is P’” (where X ranges over persons other than the speaker) is a performative utterance, so too must “I know” be.O

I will show in the following that the four tests do not apply to “I know,” that “I know” and “I promise” are not parallel in one important respect and that the explicit function of “I know” is not to give others our authority for saying that ’S is P.’ I will discuss the above six points in the order presented.

I. If Smith says, “I swear in witnesses down at the courthouse,” it makes sense to ask him “Do you really?” when we think that it’s Jones’ job. But if a witness says “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, etc.” in the appropriate circumstances and he correctely completes the oath, then it makes no sense to ask him “Did you really swear?” He said “I swear etc.” appropriately, completely, and correctly and so he has sworn. Even if he intends not to tell the truth and subsequently does not tell the truth, he has perjured himself. Saying “I swear etc.” in this case is really swearing.

There are situations, however, where we can ask “Do you really?” upon the utterance of such oaths. For example, the witness mumbles the oath under his breath; or his hand is placed upon a book other than the Bible; or the judge is out of the courtroom at that moment. It is open in each case whether the witness really takes the oath or not. What we suspect has gone wrong is thatthe oath was performed incorrectly, or to use Austin’s phrase, infelicitously. The same sort of infelicities can also infect cases like “I swear in witnesses a t the Chicago Supreme Court,” when there

is no such court. Because of the possibilty of infelicities, the first test must be amended by adding “barring any infelicities” after the first occurence of “utterance.” If we have no reason to think, however, that cases such as oath taking are infelicitously performed, we cannot continue to ask “Do you really?” In t k e example of the bailiff, even though we do not think that what he says is said incorrectly we can doubt that what he says is correct.

Before considering whether “Do you really?” applies to “I know,” there is an additional important point. The strength of

~~

’ Austin, Philosophical Pupers, p. 67.

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this test rests upon the fact that “DO you really?” having the same sense cannot be asked of both a report and an explicit performative utterance. But, there are a t least three senses of “Do you really?” which make the same sense to ask of both a descrip- tion and explicit performative. However, two of these can be clearly distinguished by their intonation contours. The third has the same intonation as the important sense of “Do you really?” Special care must be taken to separate these latter two. We discuss them under three below.

1) The first utterance is,

2Do you1.1*really3*

“Do you really?” with these macrosegments has the same sense as “So what.” With these intonations it makes sense to ask i t about both reports and explicit performatives.

2) The second utterance is,

DO YOU^+ really4

An example of a context in which the above intonation contour is used is, “I promise to marry you.” “Do you really?” With this intonation it also makes sense to ask it about a report and an explicit performative.

3) Lastly, there is the case where “Do you really?” has the intonation contour of a normal question.

Do you3 really3

This utterance has two distinct senses. a) In the first sense it is similar to questions such as “Are you

joking?” “Are you sincere?” and “Are you pretending?” “Do you really?” in this sense is being used to discover whether the contextual implications of the questioned utterance hold. The query

“’ The numbers indicate pitch level where /I/ is the lowest relative pitch and /4/ the highest. / * / and I & / are terminal contours of macrosegments where / . f / marks a rise in pitch higher and /.1/ a fall in pitch lower than the last pitch indicator. This system of intonation marks can be found in C. F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics [The Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 33-46,


is directed towards a suspected abuse, Austin’s word, of the function of the utterance. The utterer might not intend to carry out his promise, might not feel that we deserve his congratulations, or might be lying. In this sense “Do you really?” can be asked in- telligently of both reports and explicit performatives.

b) What is being questioned in the important sense of “Do you really?” with this intonation contour when asked of a report, such as “I swear in witnesses etc.” is whether it is the case that that person swears in witnesses. It has the same sense as “Couldn’t you be mistaken?” But if someone says “I promise” and it is said felicitously, then there can be no question whether he promised or not. His saying “I promise,” felicitously, is his promise. It, then, makes no sense to ask “Do you really?” of someone who has said “I promise.” Whereas it does make sense to ask it of s o m e x e who has said “I swear in witnesses.”

Can “Do you really?” with the above sense be asked intel- ligently of ‘‘I know t h a t . . .”? W e can ask “Do you really?” of someone who has said “I know that X” i f we have some doubt as to the truth of X. Someone can really know X, only if X is true. If we do not think that it is true, then we can wonder if the person really knows X. This does not mean that the person has no right to say “I know that X.” He has the right in so far as he has no doubts as t o the truth of X. Thus, “Do you really?” can be asked about a felicitous utterance of “I know that X.” “I know,” then, fails the first test for explicit performatives.

11. Someone can deliberately rule, “Jones deliberately ruled that Smith be stricken from the list,” willingly appoint, “He willingly appointed him to the post,” willingly promise, “I willingly promised him a job.” But no one can either willingly or deliberately know anything. W e would not say, “I willingly know that Jones wasn’t there.” Nor would we say, ”I deliberately knew that he was in his office.” Thus, “I know that X” does not pass the second test.

111. In “To say ‘I deny’ is to deny,” “I deny” is an explicit performative because the function of the utterance is to deny. More- over, ‘denying’ is the name of what is performed by saying “I deny.” “I run” is not an explicit performative for in saying “I 1 2

162 STEVEN DAVIS

run” I do not run. And running is not what is done when I say “I run.” “To say ’I deny’ is to deny” is true, but, “To say ‘I run’ is to run,” is false.

“I know” is not in the same class as “I deny.” To say “I know” is not to know and what is performed by saying “I know” is not knowing. Thus “I know” renders the form “To say . . . is to . . . ,” false. However, if we grant that the function of “I know” is to give others our authority to say. . . , then “I know” fits the form. What is performed is giving others our authority for saying that X. But this greatly changes the structure of the test. In the case of “I deny” and “I run” the second blank of the form is filled purely by grammatical means. With “I know” semantical in- formation provides the name of the performance. However, as will be shown, the explicit function of “I know” is not to give others our authority to say that X.

IV. The last general test is that there is an asymmetry between the use of an explicit performative in the first person singular indicative active and any other tense or person. For example, “I promise tha t . . .” functions differently from “He promises tha t . . .” or from “I promised tha t . . .” To say “I promise tha t . . .” is to promise, but to say ”He promises tha t . . .” is not to promise, but t o report someone else’s promise. He must do his own pro- mising, as I must do my own.’‘

This asymmetry does not hold for “I know.” Preserving the suggested relation of VI above, “I have known X ’ gives others our authority as much as does “I know.” For example, A : “They’re trying to find out whether all the cranes have died out in the district.” B: “They should ask me. I have known for years that they’ve died out.” A has, then, B’s authority for saying that the cranes have died out in the district.

V. When we say “I know” and we turn out to be wrong the charge brought against us is “You’re wrong, so you didn’t know.” In the case of “I promise,” if we do not produce, the charge is “YOU didn’t do it, but you did promise to do it.” Austin argues that this is only an apparent difference.

Austin, Pliilosophical Papers, p. 67


The sense in which you ‘did promise’ is that you did say you promised (did say ‘I promise’): and you did say you knew. That is the gravamen of the charge against your word. But it may well transpire that you never fully intended to do it, or that you had concrete reason to suppose that you wouldn’t be able to do it (it might even be manifestly impossible) and in another ‘sense’ of promise you can’t have then promised to do it, so that you didn’t promise.”

But this ”sense” of promise involves an infelicity. For example, we cannot promise when what we promise is obviously not in our power or when we say “I promise” and no one is there to hear the utterance. But surely if we promise correctly and the hearer takes it as a promise we are entitled to be called to order for breaking our promise. No ordinary future contingencies, unless we want to include the utterance of “I take back my promise,” can cancel our promise once we unambiguously have given it.

Even if there is no infelicity connected with our saying “I know,” we are in a position to know, we have no doubts about the matter etc., and we turn out to be mistaken, the charge brought against us is that we did not know, when we said we knew. Ordinary future contingencies can show that we were wrong. If “I know” were an explicit performative, then once having said “I know,” no ordinary future contingency should be able to annul our performance. For, the saying of the performative barring any infelicity should be sufficient for its performance.

It could be argued that being mistaken about X in “I know X ’ is an infelicity of type A. 2 (This sort of infelicity is connected whit the misapplication of the utterance with respect to either inappropriate persons or circumstances). It is parallel to an infelicity affecting “I promise.” If we say “I promise that I will do X” and the listener knows that it is not possible to perform X or not in our power to perform X, he can call our promise in question. “You can’t promise that, for you couldn’t (possibly) do it.” In this case, saying “I promise” is not a promise. Similarly, if we say “I know X ’ and the speaker knows that X is false, he could

‘’ Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 69. I ’ Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 15.

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say “You can’t know X, because it isn’t so.” In both cases the charge brought against us is, “You didn’t know or promise, because you couldn’t know or promise.”

There is a weakness in this defense of the parallel between “I know” and “I promise.” The above infelicity is not that what is promised by the speaker is not in his power or that he is mistaken about knowing X, but that the listener knows that it is not within the speaker’s power or that X is false. If the listener does not know or believe either of these, then a promise is a promise, but “I know” is not knowing. A mistake in this case is no more an infelicity than is a failure to perform. But a mistake leads to a charge that the speaker did not know, even though he said he knew, while the failure t o perform does not cancel the promise given by “I promise.”

VI. This breakdown in the parallel between “I promise” and “I know” also affects the claim that the explicit function of “I know” is to give others our authority for saying that ‘S is P.’ If we give others our authority for saying that ‘S is P’ even though ‘S is P’ turns out to be false, the charge against us is not that we did not give others our authority. Once we say that we give our authority, if it is ours to give, we have given it. But if we say that we know, even if we correctly say it, it can turn out that we did not know. Our saying i t does not make it so. Moreover, “When we say ‘I know,’ we give others our authority for saying ‘S is P,”’ is often false. In an oral examination a student’s reply of “I know X ’ to a question is not an authorization for any listener to say X. Rather, it is often a prelude to a proof of X. In still other con- texts, such as those relating to personal affairs, the speaker never intends to give and the listener never assumes to have the right to say that ‘S is P.’ “I know that I’m going bankrupt” is not usually intended by the speaker to be repeatable and if it is repeated it is looked upon as a breach of etiquette. Such a breach might be classified as an abuse of the contextual implications of the report and fall under I. 2 l4 of Austin’s list of infelicities. (This type of infelicity is connected with certain conventional proce-

Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 69.


dures which require participants of these procedures to conduct themselves in a prescribed manner subsequent to the performance of these procedures). The appearance of such an infelicity and the different ramifications of “I know” and “I give others my authority for saying that ‘S is P,”’ leads us to suspect that when we say “I know” we do not give others our authority for saying that ‘S is P’ anymore than we do when we say ‘S is P.’

I have shown that I. It makes sense to ask “Do you really?” of 3 b above, about

11. It sounds odd to say “I willingly know” or “I deliberately

111. “To say ‘I know’ is to know” is false. IV. If “I know X ’ authorizes others to say that X, then “I

have known X” does, also. Thus, “I know” does not have an asymmetry of function from other tenses.

V. The parallelism between “I promise” and “I know” breaks down a t an important point.

IV. The explicit function of “I know” is not to give others our authority for saying that ‘S is P.’

“I know.”

knew. ”

Because of the above, I conclude that “I know” is not an explicit performative utterance.

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‘I Know’ as an Explicit Performative