Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission - MOLLE et al

www.wateralternatives.org Volume2|Issue3Molle,F.;Mollinga,P.P.andWester,P.2009.Hydraulicbureaucraciesandthehydraulicmission:Flowsofwater,flowsofpower.WaterAlternatives2(3):328349

Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power

Franois Molle InstitutdeRecherchepourleDveloppement(IRD),UR199,Montpellier,France;[email protected]

Peter P. Mollinga DepartmentofPoliticalandCulturalChange,ZEF(CenterforDevelopmentResearch),BonnUniversity,Germany;[email protected]

Philippus Wester IrrigationandWaterEngineeringGroup,WageningenUniversity,theNetherlands;[email protected]

ABSTRACT:Anchoredin19thcenturyscientismandanideologyofthedominationofnature,inspiredbycolonialhydraulicfeats,andfuelledbytechnologicalimprovementsinhighdamconstructionsandpowergenerationandtransmission,largescalewaterresourcesdevelopmenthasbeenadefiningfeatureofthe20thcentury.Whetheroutofaneedtoincreasefoodproduction,raiseruralincomes,orstrengthenstatebuildingandthelegitimacyofthestate,governmentsNorthandSouth,EastandWestembracedthe'hydraulicmission'andentrustedittopowerful statewaterbureaucracies (hydrocracies).Engaged in thepursuitof iconicand symbolicprojects, themassivedammingofriversystems,andtheexpansionoflargescalepublicirrigationthesehydrocracieshavelongremainedoutof reach.While theyhaveenormously contributed to actualwelfare, includingenergy and foodgeneration,floodprotectionandwatersupplytourbanareas,infrastructuraldevelopmenthasoftenbecomeanend in itself,ratherthanameanstoanend, fuellingrentseekingandsymbolisingstatepower. Inmanyplacesprojects have been challenged on the basis of their economic, social or environmental impacts. Waterbureaucracieshavebeenchallenged internally (withinthestatebureaucraciesorthroughpoliticalchanges)andexternally (by critiques from civil society and academia, or by reduced funding). They have endeavoured torespond to these challenges by reinventing themselves or deflecting reforms. This paper analyses thesetransformations, from the emergence of the hydraulic mission and associated water bureaucracies to theiradjustmentandresponsestochangingconditions.KEYWORDS:Irrigation,hydraulicmission,waterresourcedevelopment,irontriangle,interestgroups,reform

INTRODUCTION:THEPROPHETSOFIRRIGATION

In the past 150 years,water resources development by the statewas an emergent and, at times,intentional,politicalstrategyforcontrollingspace,waterandpeopleandanimportantpartofeverydayforms of state formation (Worster, 1985; Reisner, 1993; Wehr, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2007; Wester,2008). A cadre of professionals, most frequently civil engineers staffing hydraulic bureaucracies(hydrocracies)ledthisprocess.Whilecrucialfortheeconomicdevelopmentofthemodernera,theroleand power of hydrocracies have hardly been the focus of academic research. This issue of WaterAlternativescontainsaThemedSectionon"HydraulicBureaucracies:FlowsofWater,FlowsofPower",presentingsevenarticlesthataddressseveralcentralfeaturesofhydrocraciesandtheirfunctioning.Wehopethiswill leadtomorestudiesonthehistoryofhydrocracies,theirdynamicsandtheirscopefortransformationtomeetthewaterchallengesofthe21stcentury.

Molleetal.:Hydraulicbureaucraciesandthehydraulicmission Page|328

WaterAlternatives2009 Volume2|Issue3

Manyofthemostpowerfulandgrandempiresofancienttimes,suchastheChinese,Mesopotamian,Egyptian,orMayaempires,are famous for their success in controlling river systemsanddevelopinglargescale irrigatedareasandagriculturalproduction,whichsupportedandsustainedtheirmightandglory.Therelationshipbetweenwatercontrolandtheemergenceofpowerfuldespoticstatesformedthe fulcrumofWittfogels (1957) inquiry intohydraulic societies,basedonhis longtime fascination"withthedevelopmentallessonstobelearnedfromthestudyofagrariansocietiesbasedonlargescaleandgovernmentdirectedwaterworks.Thesesocietiescoveredmoreterritory, lastedformoreyears,andshapedmorelivesthananyotherstratifiedagrariansociety".

Wittfogel argued that the necessity tomuster the labour force necessary for huge floodcontrolworksandirrigationsystemswasconducivetothedevelopmentofacentralisedbureaucraticdespotictypeofstatehecalledorientaldespotism.AccordingtoWorster(1982)thecontrolofwatergavewaytotheemergenceofapowerfulelitethat

included scientistsandengineerswhoachieved sophisticatedability tomanipulate thenaturalriverineenvironment,anexpertisetheywillinglyputtoserviceofevenmorepowerfulauthorities.Therewerepriestswhogavespiritual legitimacy to the regime.And therewasanoverclassofagromanagerial bureaucratswho took charge of directing that knowledge and spirituality, ofdirectingthepeasants,andofdirectingtherivers

Wittfogels thesisbecame the centreofheated scholarlydebates,withmany critiques1 showing thelimitsof,andcounterexamplesto,thetheoryandtheuniversalcorrelationbetweencontroloverwaterandcontroloverman (seeEisenstadt,1958,discussed inEversandBenedikter, this issue).Especiallythe linearitysuggestedbyWittfogelbetween irrigationdevelopment,state formationandcentralisedpower, and whether this necessarily leads to a despotic state, have been debated (Adams, 1974;Steward, 1978; Bray, 1986). However, it is evident that water development by state waterbureaucraciescanplayanimportantroleinstateformationandthecentralisationofpower,bothinthedistantandrecentpast.

With thedemiseof theseearly greatempires, largescale irrigation andhydraulicworks virtuallydisappeared,withtheexceptionofChina.Theyreappearedinthe19thcentury,asachildofcolonialism,withcolonialpowers inaposition tomobilisemassivecorve labourand the technicaland scientificknowledgeofenthusiasticengineers.This led to the transformationof local labour, land,waterandsunlight into agricultural products grown in plantations or collected from local farmers. Historicalfiguresassociatedwiththisformofcolonial'occidentaldespotism'anditsfeatsthediversionofgreatriverstoirrigatelargeandfertilealluvialplainsanddeltasincludeWillcocks(Willcocks,1935),Cotton(Hope,1900) in IndiaandEgypt,deBruyn in Indonesia (RavesteijnandKop,2008),vanderHeide inSiam (ten Brummelhuis, 2007),Godard in Tonkin (Vsin, 1992), and Blime in French Sudan (Mali)(Schreyger,1984).Asmuchasirrigationdevelopmentwasacolonialprojectpursuedwithvigour,itwasa process of trial and error that happened at great social cost (e.g. in North India, where canalconstruction in the19thcenturycausedwidespreadmalaria throughblockingnaturaldrainageways;seeWhitcombe,1972).

Thesecondhalfofthe19thcenturyandthebeginningofthe20thcenturywitnessedageneralcrazefor irrigation development. Inspiration came from both colonialworks and experiences in differentpartsofthewesternworld:theAmericanWest,Californiainparticular(Ertsen,2006),andplacessuch1AsBarkerandMolle(2004)note:"Criticshavebeenprompttopointtosituationswhereimpressivehydraulicworkswerenotnecessarilytheresultofapowerful,centralizedbureaucraticanddespoticstate(Bali:Lansing,1991;SriLanka:Leach,1961),while, on the other hand, there was no shortage of such states associated with modest hydraulic achievements(Wijeyewardene,1971).However,the intensityofthe intellectualdebateonAsiandespotism inthepostwarperiodhassentmanyresearchers inaquestofhydraulicsocieties inAsiawhichhasnotbeenalwayssuccessfulorconvincing. ()EventheparadigmaticcaseoftheKhmerempireand irrigationaroundGrosliers(1979)"hydrauliccity"ofAngkor,whichhasspurredmuchfascinationforancienthydraulicfeats(e.g.Stargardt,1986,1992onBurmaandsouthernThailand),isnowincreasinglyseenasowingmuchtoimagination(Stott,1992;deBernon,1997)".



as Spainor theP valley, in Italy. Irrigation and itspurportedbenefitswerehotlydebated inmanycountries in theworldespeciallyafter thedramaticdroughtswitnessed in the1870sand1880sincluding Mexico, (Northeast) Brazil, South Africa, Morocco or Australia. It had its prophets likeSmythe in theUS, theChaffeybrothersandAlfredDeakin inAustralia, J.deCaldas inBrazil, JoaquinCosta inSpain,or J.C.Brown inSouthAfricawhosaw themselvesasentrustedwith themission topreach,ofteninhyperbolicandlyricalstyle,theadventofanirrigatedEden.

During the second half of the 19th century most irrigation development was based on privateenterprise,withtheexceptionof IndiaandEgyptwheretheBritishstate investedheavily in irrigationand created Irrigation Departments. It was only in the beginning of the 20th century that publicinvestments in irrigationbecamecommon, leading to thecreationofstatewaterbureaucracies. It isuseful todwellon themotivations,discourses and rationale thatunderpinned thepopularisationofirrigationworldwide:indeed,thejustificationsbroughtupatthattimeembodymanyoftheingredientsthatwouldlatershapeandstillshapetodaytoalargeextenttheworldviewandtheworkethosofhydrocracies.Theseingredientsincludeanenthusiasmfor"scientificirrigation",theassociatedviewofthedominationofnature,aviewthatmanywouldnowregardashubris,thefascinationconveyedbythe"letthedesertbloom"utopia,themoralidealoffarming,andthebiblical/messianicovertoneofthecallforcreatingnewEdensindesertsoraridplaces.

Theenthusiasmfor"scientificirrigation"mustbeseeninthecontextofthedevelopmentofscienceduringthe19thcentury.ForSmythe(1905),themostnoteworthyeulogistofirrigationintheUS,

Irrigation is the foundation of truly scientific agriculture. Tilling the soil by dependence uponrainfall is,by comparison, likea stagecoach to the railroad, like the tallowdip to theelectriclight This progresswill continue until the agriculture and horticulture practised on the littlefarmsofAridAmericashallmatchthemarvellousresultswonbyresearchandinventivegeniusineveryotherfieldofhumanendeavour.

Undertaking irrigation ispresentedasbeingmodern inabackwardruralworld,asanelitebehaviourexpected from the finest: for the Chaffey brothers in Australia it was obvious that the success ofirrigationwouldbeduetothecalibreofthetypeofpersonthatthisventurewouldattract,"namely,the industrious, temperate, thrifty, intelligent,skilful,cleanly,andgood livingofallclasses", inotherwords irrigation was "an industry suited to the most intelligent and refined people" (HamiltonMcKenzie,2009).ForGustavWex,ahydraulicengineerworkinginSouthAfrica,thegovernmentshouldjoin "themore intelligentportionof thepopulation" in theexecutionofdamand irrigationprojects(Turtonetal.,2004).

Notunrelated to scientismwas apervasive hubristic view of the domination of nature,with theglorificationofmans conquestover "theperversityofnature",his "effortat the subjugationof thewilderness"(Smythe,1905),andhis"workoftamingthewildernesswithincreasingfervor"(HamiltonMcKenzie,2009).Thisviewwaswidespread insemiaridregionssuchasSouthAfrica,wherescientistscalled for rivers to be "tamed and domesticated", so that "deserts [could be] turned into gardens"(Turtonetal.,2004),theBrazilianNortheast,wherethe"soluohidrulica"waspromoted(GuerraandGuerra,1980),andSpainwherenothingwouldbepossibleas longas"wearenotthemastersofthekey to therivers,whichrun loose, likeuntamedbeasts, inawild freedom if inothercountries it issufficient forman tohelpNature,hereweneed todomore:weneed to create it!" (Costa, 1911).Similarly, intheUS,PresidentTheodoreRoosevelt inauguratedtheBoulderdamontheColoradoandproclaimedthat"Pridefully,manacclaimshisconquestofnature"(Stevens,1988).

Proponents of irrigation invariably fell prey to the "let the desert bloom" utopia, the fascinationconveyed by images of lush gardens in the desert, with California or the Middle East as frequentreferences and remindersofHammurabis inscription that claimed to "have transformed thedesertplains intofertilefields,giventheirresidentsfertilityandabundance,andIhavemadethecountryanabodeofdelight" (Costa,1911). In theUS,Smythe (1905)viewed irrigationas"nothing less than the



progenitorofcivilizationinanotherwiseinhospitablelandthekeytomakingthedesertbloom"andenvisioned "scenesof intensely cultivated land, richwith itsbloom and fruitage,with its spires androofs,andwithitscarpetsofgreenandgoldstretchingawaytothemountains".

Anotherstrandofargumentwasthefrequentassociationofirrigatedfarmingwithcivilisationandamoral idealoffarming. InBrazil,analystsenthusiasticallyreportedsuccesswith irrigation inCaliforniaand emphatically predicted that in the dry northeast of the country itwould "transform the seminomadmaninsomeonefixedtoearth",emphasisingthesolidarityand"spiritofsubmission"associatedwitha "civilisationof the canal" (deCaldas,1939).According toSmythe (1905), in theUS, this idealembodiedbotharomanticviewandidealisationoflifeinthecountrysideandaJeffersonianconvictionthatirrigationwouldallowtheestablishmentofa

classofsmalllandedproprietorsrestinguponafoundationofeconomicindependenceAlargefarmunderirrigationisamisfortune;agreatfarm,acalamity.Onlythesmallfarmpays.Butthissmall farm blesses its proprietor with industrial independence and crowns him with socialequality.Thatisdemocracy.

Smythe sawas "ablessingofaridity"notonly the fertilityof the soil revealedby theapplicationofwaterbutalso the cooperativeand stable socialorganizationand the civicandmoralattitudes thatwere instilledbyacommondependenceoncollectiveworksand resources.This idealwassharedbyPowell,theDirectoroftheUSGeologicalSurveyandpromoterofacolonisationoftheWestbasedonitsnaturalresources,whostressedthenecessitytoestablishasmallruralcommonwealththatwouldbeindependentfrombothcapitalistcorporationsandthedistantfederalgovernment(Worster,1985).

InAustraliatoo,theearlypatternof landsettlement(and landgrabbing) inVictoriacontributedtothe attraction of the yeoman ideal. The concept of the civilised nature of irrigated and intensiveagriculturewasreiterated,"usingtheimageofpeoplefromallclassesandagegroupslivingsidebysideingentleharmony"(HamiltonMcKenzie,2009).

Notsurprisinglysuchmoral idealsandgrandvisionsofthe"marchofcivilisation"wereassociatedwith biblical/messianic overtones and the call for creating new Edens in desert places. Similaritiesbetween theHolyLandandUtahorCaliforniawereunderlined,both in termsofclimateandof thedivinemissionallegedlyvested in itspeople:thegloriesoftheGardenofEden itself,accordingtotheBible,were products of irrigation andmaking "the desert bloom as a rose"was seen as a biblicalmission,athemethatwould lateralsobecomecentral intheformationofthestateofIsrael(Lipchin,2003).InSpain,Costa(1911)urged"fruitfulengagementsagainsttheblindforcesofNature,tamingandconstraining/channelling[rivers],andmakingthemsourcesofgoodsandwealth,aspartners inGodsplanofcreation". Itwas frequently remembered thataccording to theBible"A river rose inEden towater the garden" and deduced that "the glories of the Garden of Eden itself, were products ofirrigation" (Smythe, 1905).2 While farmers in the Snake river valley were exhorted to establish a"Garden of the Gods" (Lovin, 2002), nowhere was the mission to follow Gods example betterembodied than in Utah, where Mormon leader Brigham Young, "the American Moses", and hisfollowerswouldfinda"newPalestineandbuildthenewJerusalem!"(Smythe,1905).

THEEMERGENCEANDAPOGEEOFTHE'HYDRAULICMISSION'

Politiciansanddecisionmakersmetthespreadoftheirrigationgospelwithmixedenthusiasm.Debatesincludedargumentsonwhether irrigationwasprofitableornot,whether itbefit regionswith scarcepopulationandlabour(likeinAustralia),andwhetheritshouldbepreferredtoinvestmentsinrailways(discussionsontherespectiveeconomicmeritsofinvestmentsinirrigationandrailwayscouldbefound

2Genesis2:10:"AriverroseinEdentowaterthegarden,andfromthereitdividedandbecamefourrivers",fromwhichanengineerinSouthAfricadeducedthat"Thus,GodsintentionwastoirrigatetheGardenofEden".



notonlyintheUSbutalsoinIndia,3SiamorAustralia).Inmostcases,however,theirrigationprophetswere able to converthighleveldecisionmakers and technocrats.4But themostdisputed issuewaswhether irrigation developmentwas to be supported by the government and public investment orthroughprivateinvestment.

As early as 1843 in France,NadaultdeBuffon a famous engineerwith the Corps des Ponts etChaussesmadethecasethatthestateshouldshoulderthefinancialburdenofconstructingirrigationcanalnetworksbecausesuchsystemswerenotprofitableforprivatecompanies(HagheandBarraqu,2001).InAustralia,theChaffeybrotherswereforcedtofileforbankruptcyby1894andElwoodMead,appointedHeadoftheStateRiversandWaterSupplyCommissionofVictoriain1907,arguedthattheinitial failureof irrigationarose from insufficient interventionby thestateand thenecessity forevengreater engineering expertise (seeCrase et al., this issue). In India, theMadras Irrigation andCanalCompanywasaneffortatirrigationdevelopmentbyaprivatecompany.Itlastedabout10yearsinthe1860speriod, started toconstructonecanal,wentbankruptandwas takenoverby the state (AtchiReddy,1990).InthewesternUS,mostofthe investorswhohadbelievedtheywouldthriveonsellingwater to farmers eventually failed around the 1870s, while the subsequent selffunded irrigationdistrictsandcompaniesalsooftenendedupinbankruptcy(Pisani,1992;Reisner,1993).

Therationaleandcallsforpublicinterventioninirrigationdevelopmentgraduallymetwithpoliticalinterest at the national level. This iswell illustrated in the case of Spainwhere, at the turn of thecentury, the regeneracionismomovementwasactivelypromoting"innercolonisation"asameansofinstillingamoralandeconomicrevivalafterthelossofSpainscolonies(seeSwyngedouw,1999;LopezGunn, this issue). For various reasons,dependingon the country, landdevelopmentand settlementcame tobe seen asmajornationalpriorities towardseconomicprogress. The followingquote (Firstprogress report1885; cited inWard,2000) fromAustralia,datingback to1885,epitomises thenewrationale:

If Victoria is to continue to progress in the settlement of her people upon the lands andmultiplicationofherresourcesbytheconquestofthoseareashithertoregardedasworthless;ifshe istoutiliseherabundantnaturaladvantages,bringherproductivenesstothehighestpointandsecuretotheagriculturalpopulationofherariddistrictsapermanentprosperity,itmustbebymeansof irrigation.Noprice, itmaybesaidistoohigh, indeed, it impliesthesappingofthespiritof independenceand thatof selfreliantenergyandenterprisewhichhaveone (sic)herpresentposition;forbythese,andthesealone,canshemaintainit.

Becauseof the financial failureofprivateenterprisesandvariousnationalobjectives, thestates thussteppedinandendorsedtheroleof(largescale)developerofwaterresources.Imbuedwiththefreshlegitimacy of technicalmarvels (high dams, electricity, etc) and the presumably unlimited power ofscience, inspiredbythemissiontotamenatureandmakethedesertsbloom,hydraulicbureaucracieswere created to takeup the challengesof floodprotection,hydropower generation and largescalepublicirrigation.Thesebureaucracieshadtheirsecularpriesthoods,actinginthenameofthecommongoodandintandemwithpoliticiansandnationalleaders.NotasingledropofwatershouldreachtheseawithoutbeingputtoworkforthebenefitofMan:the 'hydraulicmission'wasborn (Molle,2009;Wester,2009).

The beginning of the 20th century was therefore marked by the creation of many hydraulicbureaucraciesindifferentpartsoftheworld:foremostistheUSBureauofReclamation,establishedin

3Thecanalsenvisaged in Indiawere initiallyalsoconceivedasnavigationcanals.Cottons1860splanto linkall Indianriverswasto improvenavigation,whichwaswherethedebatewiththerailwaysoriginated,withmanycanalsalsobeing irrigationcanals.Thehabitofconstructing irrigationcanals thatwerealsosuitable fornavigation (byconstructing locksandelevatedbridgesforinstance)continuedtillthe1950sinIndiainatleastonecaseaspartofthestandardparadigmofcanalirrigation,wellbeyondtheperiodthatsomeirrigationcanalswereactuallyusedfornavigation.4SuchasPowellorNewellintheUSorMeadandDeakininAustralia.



1902astheReclamationService intheUS,alongwithmanyotherorganisationsthatweretobecomepowerful in the century to come: these include, for example, theNational IrrigationCommission inMexico (1926), theDepartment of Canals in Siam (1902;whichwas to become the Royal IrrigationDepartment),theGeneralDirectorateofPublicWorksinTurkey(1914;nowDSI),andtheInspetoriadeObrasContraasSecasinBrazil(1909;laterDNOCS:DepartamentoNacionaldeObrasContraasSecas).InEuropeancountrieswhereCorpsofEngineershadbeencreatedmuchearlier(in1717 inFrance, in1799inSpain,andin1798intheNetherlands),waterworksacquiredgreatersignificance.

But inadditiontothisquestfor irrigation,thisperiodwasalsomarkedbyaneven largerthirstforelectricitythatwas toradicallychangeconditionsof life incitiesand theeconomy.Controllingwaterwasnotonlyawayofreducingflooddamageorirrigatingfields,butwasalsothesourceofhydropower.Theprogressintechnologyinhighdamconstruction,turbines,andhighvoltagetransmissionlineswassoontofuelprivateandstate investments indams,andattendantStatePowerBoards (Sweden)andotherwaterbureaucracies.

These technological innovations made largescale water resources development possible anddesirable.WiththeadventoftheTennesseeValleyAuthority(TVA)inthe1930s,launchedbyRooseveltin the aftermath of the economic crisis, river basin development was taken to new heights bycombiningtheconceptofunifieddevelopment(thedamningofallthestreamsofagivenriverbasintobringtheriverundertotalcontrol),thebenefitsofmultipurposedams(hydropower,floodprotection,transportation, irrigation andotherusers), and the ideaof regionaldevelopment (associatingwaterdevelopment with other interventions such as reforestation, production of fertilisers, industrialdevelopment,etc).These ideaswere soonexpanded to theColombiabasin in theUSwhichwas tobecomethe'battery'ofthewesterncoast,withthefirstconcreteforthegrandioseGrandCouleedampouredinDecember1935.

Similarappealsfor largescaleprojectsandplanneddevelopmenthadarisen inRussia,where"theSovietfascinationwithtechnologyasapanaceaforsocialandeconomicproblemsmirror[ed]thatintheWest" (Josephson, 1995). Technology, mechanisation, and largescale centralised planning andproductionprocesseswerepart andparcelof a visionof a "supremely rational society". In the late1920s,Stalins"bulldozertechnology"plannedmassivehydropowerplants,domesticationofrivers,andhydraulicworks,includingthedammingoftheVolgariver(thatwastoberealisedafterWorldWarII)andtheinfamousWhiteSeaBalticcanalbuiltinthe1930sbyhundredsofthousandsofslavelabourersundertheslogan"wewillinstructnatureandwewillreceivefreedom"(Josephson,1995).

For the western Indian region called the Bombay Deccan, a historically famineprone region,Attwood(2007)showsthe impactonhumanwelfareofacombinationoftheconstructionofrailways(from the1850s1860s), ruralemployment/foodforworkprogrammes,and the triggeringof farmersinterestincanalirrigation(inthefirstdecadesofthe20thcentury).Theformerledtoastabilisationoffoodprices,thesecondtoimprovedpurchasingpowerofimpoverishedlandlesslabour,andthelatterto increases in local foodandparticularlycashcropproduction, leading toeconomicandpopulationgrowth.Togethertheymaderuralfaminesathingofthepast.Before1921lifeexpectancyatbirthwasusuallylessthan24years;sevenoutoftenchildrendiedbeforematurity.Atpresentlifeexpectancyis63years;childmortalityaquarterofwhat itwasacenturyago.WhileAttwoodstatesthat"technicalimprovements may solve some problem while worsening others" (waterlogging and unequaldistributionofwater and itsbenefits in this case, for instance), and that after Indian independenceirrigationsystems"insteadofbecomingtechnicallyandeconomicallymoreefficient,newcanalsystemshavebeenextremelywasteful",thehistoricalimportanceandimpactofprovidingpublicinfrastructurehave been enormous. It is in this period that the Indian public works/irrigation bureaucracy wasestablishedandexpanded.

Inthepostwarperiodofthe1950sand1960s,markedbytheneedforreconstructionandgrowingfoodforaworldinshambles,grandiosewaterresourcesdevelopmentschemesweresoonfoundtobeinhighdemand.Thiswasfuelledbythesearchfornationalsymbols;thecontextoftheColdWarwiththe SovietUnionand theUS vying for symbolicpreeminence andengaged inproxywars in several



countries;andlastbutnotleastthegradualaccesstoindependenceofmostcountriesinAsiaandAfrica.This ledtothreedistinctbut interrelatedformsofthehydraulicmissionthatcombinedtogivewaytoitsapogee:first,areenactmentofthe'Orientaldespotism'ofancienttimesintheSovietUnionandcommunistChina;secondan (often)stateledmassivecapital investment inhydropowerdams inwesterncountries (togetherwith irrigation incountries likeSpain,Australia,orthewesternUS);and,third,a'postcolonialdespotism'innewlyindependent'thirdworld'countries.

IntheSovietUnion,electricityproduction,andhowitwouldtransformsocietyandtheeconomyavisionlongnurturedbyLenin(Josephson,2002)receivedmuchattention,withStalinlaunchinghisBigVoltaProjectepitomisedbytheKuibyshefdamaswellashis1948"PlanfortheTransformationofNature",a reminderofGorkiscall to"turnmad riverssane" (Josephson,2002). In1953,Khrushchevestablishedhis 'virginland'policyaimedat intensifyingagriculture,which included theexpansionofirrigation inCentralAsia (from4.5millionha in1965 to7millionha in1991; seeWegerich,2008).Floated in the1930sand studiedduring the1960sand1970s, theSiberianRiverReversalagrandprojectthatwastodamnorthernriversandmakethemflowbackward,stepbystep,tothepopulatedagriculturalareasofCentralAsiaepitomiseslargescaleprojectsofthattime.

StalinsTransformationofNaturewasechoedby"MaosWaragainstNature"(Shapiro,2001).Intheearly1950sChina started toplanmajor flood control andhydropowerprojectsunder the adviceofSovietengineers,withforexampletheSanmenxiadamdisplacingover400,000peopleandresultingin siltation, salinisationand financial losses. In1958andduring the "Great LeapForward"armiesofworkerswereunleashed inmajorconservancyprojectsandother iconicprojectssuchastheRedFlagcanal.

Figure1.InaugurationofacanalduringtheGreatLeapForward

Source:www.iisg.nl/landsberger/rfc.html

In theUS, the Bureau of Reclamation and theUSArmy Corps of Engineers engaged in a sweepingdamming of the countrys rivers, in a processwell described by authors likeWorster (1985), Pisani(1992)andReisner(1993).WhileirrigationandhydropowergenerationwerethemainobjectivesintheWest,Zetland (this issue) recallshowurban sprawl inCaliforniawasalsodeeplypartof the story.AgiganticprojecttotransferwaterfromAlaskathroughthearidWestdowntoMexicocanbetakenastheequivalentoftheSovietSiberianriverreversalproject.IndeedthedammingoftheColombiabasinandthecelebrationofAmericasmosticonicdams,suchastheGrandCoulee,werethereplicationsof



the Soviet schemes on the Dnepr and the Volga, with its Kuibyshef dam, with the two countriesforcefullyengaged ina (cold)warof symbolsaimedatproving to theworld the superiorityof theireconomic/political systems (see Josephson, 2002). For the case of Spain, LopezGunn (this issue)describeshowtherelentlessconstructionof800dams(andirrigatedschemes)duringFrancosregimewasawayoflegitimisinghispower,buyingsupportfromruralelites,andproducingiconsofmodernityundertheaegisoftheDireccinGeneraldeObrasHidrulicas(DGOH,establishedin1942).Hydropowerdevelopment soared in countries like Canada (with the establishmentofHydroQuebec in 1944), inNorwayand inSwedenwhereriverswere"industrialised" (Jakobsson,2002),or inFrance,where theRhoneriverwasequippedwithseveralrunoftheriverdams,"replacingthewildanddevastatingriverwithausefulriver"andofferingtheDonzreMondragondamasanationalsymbol(Pritchard,2004).

InwhatwasthenreferredtoastheThirdWorld,elitesandgovernmentsmostnotably innewlyindependentcountrieswerepressedtodeliver'thefruitsofdevelopment'totheirconstituenciesandby the necessity to strengthen nation building and the legitimation of their power. These elitesenthusiasticallyembracedtheiconsofmodernityanddevelopmentepitomisedbylargescaleirrigationschemesanddams,famouslyreferredtobyNehruas"thetemplesofmodernIndia".Inthattheyweresupported by Western countries or the Soviet Union, depending on who they sided with in thecontextof theColdWarwhichhadbotheconomicandgeopolitical interests in fuelling this 'postcolonialhydraulicmission'.Massiveinvestmentsmostpreeminentlyindamsandirrigationsystemsincountrieswithpotentialrural instabilitywerethoughttobethebestdefenceagainstthespreadofCommunism.ThisiswheretheTVA,marketedinparticularbytheprophetictoneofLilienthals(1944)bookTVA:Democracyonthemarch,wastobothbecomean iconofmodernityanddevelopmentandproveamajorassetofUSoverseasdevelopmentanddiplomacy(Ekbladh,2002): inamatterofyearsthe TVA would become the "granddaddy of all regional development projects" (Scott, 1998),embodyingthesocialengineeringdrivethatScott (1998)hastermedhighmodernism,and inspiringamultitudeofTVAlikeprojectsincountriesasdiverseasSriLanka,Afghanistan,Columbia,China,SouthAfrica,andintheJordan,DanubeandMekongriverbasins.

Despitethesalientroleof industrialisedcountriescompanies inbothdesignandconstruction(nottomentionthefinancingprovidedbyinternationaldevelopmentbanks),therealisationofthehydraulicmissionnecessitatedthecreationofnationalwaterbureaucraciesentrustedwiththeplanningand/orconstructionofhydropowerdams,reservoirsandcanalnetworksforirrigation.TheeconomiesofThirdWorldcountrieswerestilllargelyagriculturebasedbutyieldsandincomeswerestagnant,pressureonlandresourcesand indebtedness increasing,and foodsecurityoftenseenasanationalgoal. Inotherwords,theurgencyand inevitabilityofthehydraulicmissionwasobvious,aswell illustratedbySouthAfricawhereP.K.LeRouxdeclared(RSA,1962;citedinTurtonetal.,2004)that

In thehistoryofallyoung civilised countries the timearriveswhenbigand imaginativewaterdevelopmentprojectsmustbe launched topromote thegrowthofareasofdevelopment, theformationof industriesand thegenerationofelectricpower,and tocreateameansofcopingwiththefuturepopulation increase,soastomaintaintherateofprogressforthecountryasawhole.ThatistheprincipalaimoftheOrangeRiverProject.

The fourdecades following the SecondWorldWarwouldwitnessmassive investments in reservoirs(largedams5 increasedglobally from5,000 in1950 to45,000 in2000,anaverageof twonew largedamseachday;WCD,2000)whileduring the sameperiod irrigatedareasdoubled, from140millionhectares(ha)to280millionha(Moldenetal.,2007).Thehydraulicmissionwasinfullswing:inSouthAfrica,theOrangeRiverProjectwastobe"biggerthantheTVAitself"(Turtonetal.,2004); inMexicothe SRHworked "for the glory ofMexico" (seeWester et al., this issue),while in theUS irrigation

5Largedamsaredefinedasdamswithadepthofover15mand/oracapacityover3.5millionm3.



developmentwas"pursuedwithnearfanaticism,untilthemostgiganticdamswerebeingbuiltonthemostminusculefoundationsofeconomicrationalityandneed"(Reisner,1993).

Inotherwords,alltheingredientsof19thcenturyscientism,hubrisandutopiaswerealiveandwell.Beyondtheobjectivesoffood/energyproductionorselfsufficiencythehydraulicmissionat itsheightwas a celebration of technology and domination over nature, a linear view of history based onRostowian stages where mechanisation, intensification, and economies of scale would replacebackward ifnot"barbarous"practicesand theacquisitionof iconsofprestigereinforcingColdWarideologiesorgovernmentslegitimacy.Yet,beyondideologiesandpoliticalobjectives,theeminentroleofhydraulicbureaucracieswashardlyvisibleonthefrontscene.

HYDRAULICBUREAUCRACIESANDPOWER,POLITICSANDMONEY

Hydraulicbureaucraciesare,firstandforemost,thecreationofnationstatesandreflectanumberoftheir concernsandobjectives. If,as stressedbyWittfogel, centraliseddespotic stateshaveemergedfrom the need of largescale investments inwater control, these needs have also been sometimesconcomitantlyusedbystatestostrengthentheirlegitimacy.InthecaseofVietnam,asemphasisedbyEversandBenedikter(thisissue),thepostreunificationVietnameseStaterevivedthewartimerhetoricandpropagandatorallypeoplearoundmassiveworksofcanaldigginganddredgingandembankmentsconstruction.Socialcohesionachievedthroughcollectiveundertakingscontributedtostatebuilding.

Butbureaucracieshave theirown setsof interestsand ideologies.Bureaucraticpower is stronglycorrelatedwiththesizeofthebudgetreceivedfromstatecoffers,thenumberofstaff,andinthecaseof water the heavy equipment needed for infrastructural interventions. This power is thereforedependent upon fuelling and sustaining the cycle that goes from planning to the construction ofinfrastructures. Inmanycountries,andThailand isagoodexample,waterdepartmentskeepontheirshelves master plans with projects pencilled in to dam every single river that lends itself to damconstruction, linked to theattendantdevelopmentof irrigationareas (orwhere it isnot thecase, tofloodcontrolorhydropowerobjectives).

Beyond this institutional incentive, water and bureaucrats are also moved by a professionalbackgroundwhereprofessionalgratification is linkedwith thepossibility tobeassociatedwith iconicprojects where interventions on river systems are seen as the manifestation of the muchneededcontrol of nature by humankind.Many dam projects are presented as obvious, inevitable, urgentlyneeded and enjoying an ideal location allowingwater control and hydropower generation, and canbecomean"engineersdream"anda"once ina lifetimeproject",asstatedbyLyleMabbott, thePaMongproject6manager(Jenkins,1968).Thisprofessionalethos ispervadedbyasenseofhierarchy,afaith in planning, and the belief that the considerable technical expertise needed to addresswaterissuesinsulatedengineersfrompublicandlaypersonsscrutiny(seeWatsonetal.,andMcCulloch,thisissue). Ithasalsobeenassociatedwith the conceptof "conservation",whereby scarceandvaluablewaterresourcesmustbeputtouseatanycostandintheirentiretybeforethey"runwastetothesea".

But,history tellsus, the interestsofnation statesandhydraulicbureaucracies inwater resourcesdevelopmentisalsosharedbyfourothercategoriesofpowerfulactors,namelypoliticians,constructioncompanies, landedelitesanddevelopmentbanks (seeMolle,2008 for furtheranalysisof thiswebofinterests). Water bureaucrats, statelevel and local politicians, water business companies, anddevelopmentbanksareoftentightlyassociatedin'synergeticrelationships'wherebythewaystheflowsofwater are created ormodified bywater infrastructure are intertwinedwith flows of power andinfluence,oftenmanifestedintheformofpoliticalorfinancialbenefits,whetherprivateorcollective.

Collusionbetweenbusiness,politicsandbureaucratsinthewatersectorisacommonalitysharedbyvirtually all countries (Repetto, 1986) and has been well documented in countries such as Japan

6ThePaMongdamwasplannedtobebuiltontheMekongriverinthe1960sand1970sandwouldhavebeenthebiggestdamintheworldatthattime.



(Feldhoff, 2002) and the US (Reisner, 1993; McCool, 1994). These groups are associated in 'irontriangles'(Woodall,1993),systemsofvestedintereststhatencouragebribery,bidrigging,exchangeoffavours,orsimplyoverestimationofbenefitsandneglectofcosts inordertosecureasteadyflowofprojects. LopezGunn (this issue) refers to the Spanish "steel and concretebrotherhood" andpublicevidence inthe1990sofrevolvingdoorsandclosed,nepotisticrelationshipsbetweentheDGOHandthebigconstructioncompanies,intersectingthe interestsofpoliticians intheelectoralvalueofwaterprojects. In Thailand "irrigation projects are large and visible rewards that politicians can offer inexchangeforsupport.MembersofParliamentareactiveinlobbyingRID[RoyalIrrigationDepartment]forprojects,at the requestof their constituencies.MPsand representatives inprovincialassembliesmaybecontractorsthemselvesorhavelinkstothemandstandtogainfrombuildingprojects"(Bruns,1991).EversandBenedikter(thisissue)describetheseamlessrelationshipbetweendecisionmakersinwater bureaucracies and the construction companies. According to Briscoe (1999) "Rentseekingbehaviourisdeeplyembeddedinthesocialandpoliticalfabricofallmajorirrigatingcountriesandthuschangesonlyslowlyandusuallybecauseofmajorexogenousthreats".

In the US, the socalled 'irontriangle' linking state politicians, federal agencies and privatecompanieshaslongbeenfamousforblurringthefrontierbetweenprivateandpublicbenefits(Gottlieb,1988;Worster, 1985; Zetland, this issue). Projectswere, in particular, fuelled by 'logrolling', or thetradingofvotesbetweenlegislatorspushingfortheirownproject(the"Thoushallnotattackaprojectfromanotherdistrict"principle;seeGottlieb,1988).

In the South interest groups often form 'iron rectangles' (Molle et al., 2009)with the additionalinterestsofdevelopmentbanks.Fordevelopmentbanks, largeprojectshold thepromiseofconcreteand largescalechanges,maximisingaid flowwhileminimisingprojectmanagementcosts (HoweandDixon,1993),butstaffmembersofBanksalsohavevested interests (promotionandendoftheyearbonuses)inmaximisingloansanddisbursingmoney.Thishasgivenwaytowhathasbeentermed"thelendingculture",whichisparticularlyperverseinacontextwherethereishardlyanyfinancialsanctionforthebanks,orindividualofficers,incaseofafailedproject.

Otherapexesoftheseinterestnetworksoftenincludefarmersandlandedeliteswhereirrigationisconcerned.LopezGunn(thisissue)recallstheinfluenceoffarmingelitesinSpaininthedevelopmentofwaterresourcesandthemaintainingoftheshareofirrigationinallocation.Smythe,Powellandothershad foreseen the advent of smallholder irrigation in the US as an activity that would guaranteeindependence, collaboration, equality, and democracy. Yet, as Worster (1982) argued, irrigationeventuallydid"littletopromotedemocracy,that instead itwascapableofcreatingaLeviathan inthedesert".AccordingtoWorsterthepursuitofprofitsbylargescalefarmersstumbledovertheevidencethatthelargescalehydraulicinfrastructuresneededtostoreandmobilisedistantwater,whichledtoacall for state, and later federal, intervention, prompting the emergence of powerful hydraulicbureaucraciesand theestablishmentofadurablemodusvivendiofmutualdependenceand sharedbenefits.7

Manyexamplesofthesesynergicrelationshipscouldbegivenbuttheyarewellencapsulatedbytheexampleof Indiawheremembersofstateparliaments,MLAs (Membersof theLegislativeAssembly),have a strong interest in perpetuating the 'supply orientation' of water bureaucracies, that is, the7TobetterappreciatethishistoricalturnitisinterestingtoquoteatlengththepropheciesofWilliamE.SmytheinhisbookTheConquest of Arid America. Smythe envisioned the establishment of a society based on the labour of industrious andindependentsmallfarmersintensivelycultivatingtheirland:

ThefutureofCaliforniawillbeverydifferentfromitspast.Ithasbeenthelandoflargethingsoflargeestates,oflargeenterprises,oflargefortunes.Underanotherformofgovernmentitwouldhavedevelopedafeudalsystem,withalandedaristocracy restingon abasisof servile labor. Thesewere itsplain tendencies years ago,when somebody coined theepigram,'Californiaistherichmansparadiseandthepoormanshell'.ButlaterdevelopmentshaveshownthatwhateverofparadisetheGoldenStatecanoffertotherich,itwillshare,upontermsofmarvellousequality,withthemiddleclassesofAmericanlife.Overandaboveallothercountries,itisdestinedtobethelandofthecommonpeopleUpontheruinsoftheoldsystemabettercivilizationwillarise.Itwillbethegloryofthecommonpeople,towhoselaborandgeniusitwilloweitsexistence.Itsoutreachingandbeneficentinfluencewillbefeltthroughouttheworld.



lattersfocusonphysicalconstructionofnew infrastructureorrehabilitationofexistingwatercontrolsystems.(Re)buildingofinfrastructureallowsanMLAto'showhis/hermetal'toconstituents,aswellasextractfinancialresourcestofundpoliticalcampaigning,thatis,generatefundstosecurereelection.8

Being elected from a specific constituencyMLAs are centrally involved in the implementationofgovernmentpoliciesandprogrammes intheirconstituencies.Theirrolecanbeunderstoodasthatof'resource brokers'. "[A] successful MLA is a 'fixer' (), someone who can get a man a job, divertdevelopment monies into the constituency, help secure a contract, find a place in a school or ahospital" (Potter, 1986). "[I]n exchange for electoral support [groups] gained access to resources"(Manor,1989).Thephenomenonhasbeen labelledas 'competitivepopulism' (Frankel,1990).OneofthebestthingsanMLAcando isgetan irrigationcanalconstructed,extendedorrepairedto improvewater supply to farmers in his/her constituency (Ramamurthy, 1995). For example, theHemavathyirrigationproject in theCauverybasinwasoriginallydesignedasan intensively irrigatedricescheme,butunder politicalpressure thedesignwas extended to includemany additional (sub)districts andconstituencies,whilekeepingavailablewaterconstant.Theenvisagedcroppingpatternchangedfromrice to 'irrigated dry crops' with the extension of canal length and commanded area, water beingtheoreticallyspreadthinlytoa largernumberof irrigators. IntheTungabhadraLeftBankCanal intheKrishna basin a case was found where the length of a secondary canal was doubled as theimplementationofanelectoralpromise,withoutachangeinwateravailabilityforthecanal.

The populist logic of such extension and spreading of irrigation canal systems is that of "equalbenefitsforall",which,however,isnotrealisedinpractice.ThemainpoliticalsupportbaseforMLAsinmostruralconstituenciesistherichpeasants.Richpeasantsactas'resourcebrokers'inlocalsituationsthemselves,andtherebywieldconsiderablelocalpoliticalinfluence.Richpeasantstendtoappropriatemorethantheirshareofthetheoreticallythinlyspreadirrigationwater.Thisisunlikelytobeopposedvery strongly by MLAs, as this might endanger their reelection, which strongly depends on theirrapportwithlocalleaderscontrolling'votebanks'.Theresultingunequaldistributionofirrigationwaterisusuallyrepresented ingeographicaltermsasthedifferencebetween 'headenders'and 'tailenders'and theblame puton the irrigation bureaucracyspoormanagement.With theirpopulistdiscourseMLAsdepoliticisetheissueofunequalwaterdistribution.Theroleofclassandothersocialrelationsofpowerascauseandconsequenceofunequaldistributionareobscuredbyhomogenisingfarmersintoasinglecategoryanddefiningacommonenemyinapoorlyfunctioningirrigationdepartment.

The leverage of the MLA over government bureaucrats is based on his/her power over thecompulsory transfers of these bureaucrats every 3 years. In the informal 'market for public office'bureaucratshavetopayforgoodpostings,orforavoidingbeingtransferredtounfavourableones.Themoneyforthisisgeneratedlargelythroughconstructioncontracts,whicharethebasisofthesystemofadministrative and political corruption in the water sector. The funds thus generated finance theelectoralprocess(seeWade,1982,1984,1985fordetailedanalysis).Thehydraulicmissionorientationisthusnot justsupportedbywaterresourcesprofessionalsdispositionsandprivateand institutionalinterests,butequally, ifnotmore importantlyso,byelectedpoliticiansas theconstructionactivitiesassociatedwiththat'mission'playastructuralroleinthereproductionofthepoliticalsystem.

CHALLENGESTOHYDRAULICBUREAUCRACIES

Therisetopowerandthepreeminenceofhydrocraciesduringthehydraulicmissionerahavemetwithincreasingchallengesduringthepast40years.Internationally,theenvironmentaldestructionwroughtbythehydraulicmissionledtoincreasingprotests,startinginthe1960sand1970s,withtheriseoftheenvironmentalmovementandopposition tonewdams (Allan,2002).Thiswas strongly the casenotonlyinthewesternUSA(BerkmanandViscusi,1973;Gottlieb,1988;Feldman,1991;Reisner,1993)andintheNetherlands(Disco,2002;WieringandArts,2006),butalso inmanyothercountrieswherethe

8ThisdiscussionisbasedonMollinga,2003.



powerofhydrocraciesstartedtobechallenged.Thishasledtoincreasingcallsforan"ecologicalturn"inwatermanagement(Disco,2002;Allan,2006),withmoreemphasisbeingplacedon"puttingwaterback into the environment" (Allan, 2002). Besides the environmental challenge, hydrocracies havefacedchallengesfromotherbureaucracieswithinthestate,thedropinfundingforwaterinfrastructure,growingprotestsfromcivilsociety,anddecentralisationprocesses.

The first challenge has been internal, with rivalries between hydrocracies and other statebureaucracies. The rentseeking opportunities and the power of the discourse justifying largescalepublicwaterinvestmentsmakeithardlysurprisingthatdominantbureaucracieshavefrequentlyfacedcompetitionfromotherdepartmentsorministries.InThailandforexample,thesupremacyoftheRoyalIrrigationDepartment came tobechallenged in the1970sby the riseof theDepartment forEnergyDevelopmentandPromotion (DEDP).DEDPwas firstestablished asan instrument to fosterprojectsthatcouldmakeuseofthe(temporary)surplushydropowermadeavailablebynewlargedams.WhileDEDPstartedwiththeplanningandimplementationofcollectivepumpingstationsdesignedtoirrigateafewhundredhectareseach(thesestationsendedupdottingThailandswaterwaysbythethousands),it soon found itself planning megaprojects such as the KhongChiMun diversion project, whichenvisionedbringingthewateroftheMekongtoirrigateseveralmillionhectaresinNortheastThailand(Molle and Floch, 2008). A similar competition was observed recently between the ministry ofagriculture and theministry of natural resources and environment, both struggling to impose theirversionofamultibilliondollarprojectdubbedthe"Thaiwatergrid".

The most classic example is provided by the intense rivalry in the US between the Bureau ofReclamation and theUSArmyCorpsofEngineers,who strongly competedwith eachother tobuilddams in thewesternUS (Reisner,1993).Anotherexample is the competitionbetween the IrrigationDepartments inPakistanandtheWaterandPowerDevelopmentAuthority(WAPDA),created in1958at the federal level toallocateandmanagewaterat thenational leveland to construct largewaterworks(vanHalsema,2002).

The most common type of competition has been between the water bureaucracy and theagricultural bureaucracy, like the longstanding struggles between theministry of housing and localgovernmentandtheministryoflandandnaturalresourcesintheUK(McCulloch,thisissue).InMexico,thestrugglebetweenthehydrocracyandtheministryofagriculturetookonepicproportions,withthehydrocracy using the argument that the state should develop andmanagewater through a centralwater authority to safeguard and regain its autonomy (Wester et al., this issue). The competitionbetweenwaterandagriculturalministriessometimesresultsinadivisionofroles,withtheministryofwater responsible for largescale infrastructure and theministry of agriculture in charge of smallerinfrastructure.TheNetherlandsisaclearexampleofthis,withRijkswaterstaattakingonthelargewaterworks,andtheministryofagricultureinchargeoflandconsolidationprogrammes.Inothercountries,usuallywhereagriculture isamajoractivity,as inVietnam (withtheministryofagricultureandruraldevelopment),bothresponsibilitiesmaybeconflatedunderonesinglepowerfuladministration.

Lastly,a special caseof rivalriesbetweenhydrocracies isbetweenagencies specifically setup forhydropowerdevelopmentandmoregeneralisthydrocracies,suchastheFederalElectricityCommissionin Mexico and the National Water Commission and its predecessors. This includes river basindevelopment agencies not directly falling under the control of a national hydrocracy, such as theTennesseeValleyAuthority(TVA)andtheOrganizationfortheDevelopmentoftheSenegalRiverValley(OMVS).

Aseriousthreattothepowerofwaterbureaucracieshasbeenthefinancialsqueezethathasbesetmany countries since the 1980s. With state budgets under pressure, expenditures curtailed understructuraladjustmentprogrammesorotherwise,thelargeinflowofmoneythatfuelledtheuncheckedcycle of water resources development came to be threatened. Most often, under the pressure ofdevelopmentbanks,manywateradministrationshavebeendownsizedorreformed.Theparadigmaticexample is that of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in the Philippines, which became a"financially autonomous agency" in the early 1980s, meaning it no longer received government



subsidiesfor irrigationmanagement,operationandmaintenance(O&M),buthadtorelyon irrigationservicefeescollectedfromwateruserstofinanceitsbudget(Oorthuizen,2003).Afteraperiodofrapidgrowthinthe1970s,witha20foldincreaseinthebudgetbetween1971and1979,anditsnumberofstaffrising from3000 in1965 toapeakof43,000 in1977,NIAexperiencedadramaticdecline in itsbudget in the early 1980s and was made responsible for repaying foreign loans for irrigationinvestmentsfrom itsownbudget (Oorthuizen,2003). InMorocco,theOfficesdeMiseenValeurhaveseenthenumberofstaffcurtailedandanumberofserviceshavebeenprivatisedoroutsourced.

Financialdearth,togetherwithaneoliberalcritiqueofstatemanagement,hasalsobeenakeyfactorbehind the adoption of participatory irrigation management programmes worldwide. While therationaleofsuchprogrammesappealedtothenecessityofputtingdecisionmakingclosertotheusersandtheirproblemsitalsoincludedanattempttoshiftpartoftheO&Mcostsofwaterinfrastructurestothe users themselves. This move was also associated with growing frustration among donors andbankers concerning the escalating costsof the construction and frequent rehabilitationof irrigationschemes. Insomecountries,however,thepressuretoreformwaterbureaucracieswaspartlyduckedandthesehydrocracies liketheRoyalIrrigationDepartment inThailand,theDSI inTurkey,orIndianhydrocraciesretainedmostoftheirstatus. Inothercases,budgetreductionsmerelytranslated intodelayedanddeferredmaintenanceandfurtherdegradationofinfrastructures.

A third challenge to hydraulic bureaucracies has come from environmental movements. Theemergence of environmental values worldwide in the 1970s resulted in the passing of manyenvironmentalacts/lawsandtheestablishmentofministriesdealingwiththeenvironmentand(often)natural resources.One of the striking examples of howwater bureaucracies have had to adapt toshifting societal values isprovidedbyEspelands (1998)account9of theeffectsof the1970NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(NEPA)ontheBureauofReclamationandtheOrmedamitwantedtobuildaspartoftheCentralArizonaProject.Theneedforenvironmental impactstatements(EIS)andthenewtypeof staff (sociologistsandbiologists) that joined theBureauasa resultofNEPA, combinedwithpublicopposition,finallyledtothedecisionnottobuildtheOrmedam.However,thedeepereffectsoftheOrmedamcontroversywasthatitchangedtheBureau,withEISandpublicinvolvementindecisionmakingnow institutionalised (Espeland,1998).A similarprocessoccurred in theNetherlands,wheredebatesinthe1970sontheOosterscheldestormsurgebarrier,spearheadedbyenvironmentalistsanda small groupof activists from Yerseke (de Schipper, 2008), led to drastic designmodifications anddeeper changes in theDutchhydrocracy (Bijker,2002;Disco,2002;WieringandArts,2006).Yet,onbalanceandlookingattheworldlevel,environmentalconcernshavebeenonlymoderatelyandoften,marginallyincorporatedintheworldviewandpracticeofhydrocracies.

More generally, water bureaucrats have been challenged by civil society. One paradigmaticillustration is thatof themany socialmovementsagainstdams in the1990swhich contributed toaslumpintheconstructionoflargedamsandthecancellingofanumberofprojects.ThisculminatedinthesettingupoftheWorldCommissiononDamsin1998,whichtriedtoestablishstandardstoensurefairandbalanceddecisionmaking.

PopularmobilisationhasalsobeeninstrumentalinderailingtheSpanishNationalHydrologicPlan,asexplainedbyLopezGunn(thisissue);oneofthemostcontentiouspointsofthePlanwasthetransferofwaterfromtheEbrotothesoutheastofSpainwhileotherinterbasintransfershavealsorunintopublicoppositionandbeenshelved.

Centralisedwaterbureaucraciesarealsothreatenedbydecentralisationofpowertotheregionalorlocallevels.Thisprocessimpliesthatdecisionmakingisincreasinglyshiftedtothelevelofthepersonsconcernedbytheprojects,theirbenefitsandalsotheirexternalities.InthecaseoftheMekongdeltainVietnam(seeEversandBenedikter,thisissue),thishasledtothegrowthofhydraulicbureaucraciesatthe provincial level but the influence of the central government remains high (with also a high

9Espelandsaccount, togetherwithGottliebs (1988)bookonwater inCalifornia, isoneof thevery few longtermanalysesavailableontheinnerworkingandtransformationsofwaterbureaucracieswrittenbyinsiders.



representation of people from northern Vietnam in local hydraulic companies) both through stateownedormilitaryownedconstructioncompanies(whichimplementthebiggestprojects)anditscrucialcontrolover,orinfluencein,thebiddingprocessesofinfrastructuralprojects.

InSpain,thepower, longconcentrated intheDireccinGeneraldeObrasHidrulicas(DGOH),waspartly fragmented in the process of regionalisation which saw Spains regions acquiring increasingpoliticaland financialautonomy. LopezGunn (this issue) showshow thehydraulicmissionhasbeenreplicatedattheprovinciallevelaftertheweakeningoftheconceptofnationalsolidarityonwhichthecentral government previously based its hydraulic plans of 'general interest'. Construction interestshavemovedtotheprovincial levelwherewaterresourcesdevelopment isagainusedtostrengthenand legitimise regional powers and are thriving on capitalintensive projects that now includedesalinationandtreatmentplants.Thisfuelsarevivalofneocorporatismandthesuspicionthatrentseekinghasalsobeendecentralised.

The tension between the central and provincial governments is particularly acute in federalcountries such as the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, India or Nigeria, whererelationshipsbetween federaland stateprerogativesaboutwaterhavealwaysbeenakeyaspectofwater management. In most of these settings regional states tend to pursue their own hydraulicmission,withafocusontheirinterestsratherthanonwiderriverbasinmanagementorenvironmentalhealth:thisisclearlyvisibleinIndia,wherestatestendto'rushforwater'irrespectiveofwhathappensinotherriparianstatesorofpastagreements;andalsoinmoreregulatedcontextssuchastheMurrayDarlingbasin inAustraliawhere the federal government eventuallyhad to step in to regulate statewateruse(seeCraseetal.,thisissue),orintheColoradobasin(Kenney,2009).

Alastthreatisthatoftheemergenceofsupranationallayersofgovernance.ThisiswellillustratedbytheelaborationandcurrentapplicationoftheEUWaterFrameworkDirective(WFD),whichaimsatachievinga"goodecologicalstatus"forEUwaterbodiesby2015.TheDirectivecomeswithanumberofeconomic concepts the userpay, polluterpay, and full costrecovery principles as well asmandatoryparticipatoryorientations that theoreticallyoverridenational strategies (or lack thereof).Whethertheorganisationofwatermanagementatthebasin level,thepolluterpayprincipleandfullcostrecovery are going to be fully applied is doubtful (they seem to frequently gloss over socioeconomicandpoliticalrealities)buttheydopromptadjustmentsinwaterbureaucracies.Watsonetal.(thisissue)argue,however,thatinEnglandparticipationhasbeenminimalandtheWFD'absorbed'bythe Agency but the interbasin transfers of Spains National Hydrologic Plan were partly derailedbecause of their nonadherence to its economic or environmental principles (see LopezGunn, thisissue).

REPRODUCTIONSTRATEGIESINACHANGINGWORLD

Facedwith thishostof challengeswaterbureaucracies, like allbureaucracies,have adopted severalstrategies to secure their interests or reinvent themselves in a changing world. The resistance ofhydrocracies to change and their resourcefulness in maintaining their commandandcontrol andconstruction orientation under the guise of apparently drastic institutional reforms has beenhighlightedbyMollingaandBolding (2004),basedon indepth studiesof irrigation reforms in sevencountries.Gottlieb(1988)andMcCool(1994)makeaconvincingargumentthatthisisalsothecaseinthe western USA, while Mollinga (2008) paints a similar picture for India. This raises the questionwhether there is something special about hydrocracies that makes them resilient to change, assuggestedbyLachetal.(2005)fortheUS.

Oneofthestrategieshydrocracieshavefollowedhasbeentoshiftcoststousers.Insomecases,asin thePhilippines casementionedearlier,externalpressureadded toapoliticalwill to reduce costshavemeant thatwaterbureaucracieshavehad toacceptasharpreductionof theirbudget. Inothercases,theyhave (ingeneralreluctantly)acceptedtoadoptcostrecoverypolicies,withhikes inwatercharges(orestablishmentofsuchchargesincountrieswheretherewerenone).Inmanyinstances,asin



SriLanka,ThailandorPakistanthesepoliciescreatedattritionandpopularoppositionandweresoonaborted.

InTurkey, the transferof the financialburdenofO&M to farmerswas themainobjectiveof theirrigation management turnover programme (nver and Gupta, 2003). In Mexico, the "Big Bang"approachtoirrigationreformswaspioneeredintheearly1990s,withaveryrapidtransferofirrigationmanagement and the associated costs to water user associations (Rap et al., 2004). However, thetransferprogrammealsostrengthenedthehydrocracyscontrolovertheirrigationdistricts,anditwaspartofabroaderpolicypackage thatmade itpossible for thehydrocracy to regainbureaucraticandfinancialautonomy(Rapetal.,2004).

A second strategyhasbeen to capitaliseon the rhetoriconprivatisationand itsallegedbenefits,mostofthetimepropelledbydevelopmentbanks.Itisincreasinglyapparentthatthepressureexertedby theneoliberaldiscourseabout"rollingback the state"hasbeenaptlycapitaliseduponbyprivateeconomic interestswhichhave succeeded inpromoting the transformationofpublic services (oftenmonopolies) intoforprofitprivatebusinesses(alsooften implicitmonopolies)(seeGalbraith,2008).10Insomecountries,likeMoroccoorVietnam(seeEversandBenedikter,thisissue),officialsinchargeofmaintenance in irrigationdistrictswereable tobuy thepublicmachineryof theiragency tosetupaprivate companywhichwould be hired to deliver the same service. In Iran,management of someirrigation schemeshasbeen takenoverby semiprivate companiesmostly staffedby the very samepersons previously in charge of operations. Rap (2004) provides striking instances of how irrigationmanagementtransferinMexicoprovidedbenefitstopreviousemployeesofthehydrocracyandforthepresidentsofthenewwateruserassociations. InThailand,EastWateraprivatecompanysetuptoservethetouristandindustrialhubontheSouthEastofBangkokbuyswaterfromtheRoyalIrrigationDepartment at very low cost and sells its back to userswith a handy profit: the companys boardmembershipincludesseveralfiguresoftheThaiwaterestablishment.

Inmanycountries,projectplanninganddesigncapacityhavebeenshiftedtoprivatecompaniesorconsultantsbelongingtoacademia.InSouthAfrica,forexample,thegovernmenthasoutsourcedmostof itstechnicalcapacityandexpertisetothepointthat it isvirtuallyunabletotakedecisionswithoutresortingtocostlyconsultancies.Theseapparentlossesofprerogativesbyhydraulicbureaucracieshavebeencompensatedbythefactthatmanyoftheseconsultantsareformercivilservantswhocapitalisedonthenewpolicybyopeningtheirownbusinesses;theynowcarryoutstudiessimilarto thosetheywereformerlydoingintheadministrationbutwithmuchhigherpayoffs.Itisdoubtfulthatthischangeisbeneficialtothegovernmentandthecountrybutitsdesirabilityispredicateduponthe(dubiousandpurported) claim for efficiency trumpeted by market fundamentalists. In other cases, there is aseamless interaction between water bureaucrats and consulting firms which frequently share thebenefitsassociatedwiththefundsreleasedforparticularstudies.

A counterstrategy to pressures towards decentralisation and subsidiarity has consisted in takingadvantageoftheobserveddifficultyinharmonisingcompetingclaimsfromprovincesorsubbasinsandcoordinating their needs and actions to recentralise decisionmaking. For example, the relativeineffectiveness of the efforts of Australian states in reducing water overallocation led to a reconcentrationofdecisionmakingpoweratthecentrallevel(Turraletal.,2009;Craseetal.,thisissue).McCulloch(thisissue)describeshowintheUKandWaleswatercontrolwasgraduallyconcentratedinthe Water Resources Board during the 19641973 period but also how the board was graduallyundermined by its lack of remit over quality and environment issues and by privatisation trends.Challengedbytheministriesfortheenvironment,whichclaimaregulationroleovernaturalresources,waterbureaucracies intheministriesofagricultureascanbeseen inSoutheastAsia,forexamplefrequentlylobbyfortheestablishmentofawaterministrywithextendedpoweroverwaterresourcesplanning andmanagement. Likewise,despite the growingpowerof Spains regional governments in

10ThiscanbeseeninthehealthoreducationsectorsandprobablymostclearlyinthetelecommunicationssectorwithvirtualmonopoliesinmobilephoneoperatorsthatcanbeobservedincountriesasdiverseasMexico,ThailandorFrance.



waterissues,thefailuretoharmonisecompetingclaimsmightwellleadtoarecentralizationofpowerasforeshadowedbythemergingoftheenvironmentandagriculturalministriesin2008,seenbysomeas the return to power of the old 'hydraulic' guard after a number of yearswhen theNewWaterCulturemovementwasvery influentialwiththeearlierministryofenvironment(seeLopezGunn,thisissue).

Afourthstrategyhasconsistedofhydrocraciesdiverting,neutralisingandreconfiguringinstitutionalreformeffortstheyhavebeenconfrontedwith.Suchreformprogrammeshavebeen implementedaspart of development loan packages as provided by international agencies, with the substantiveelementsof such reformsoften strongly shapedbymultilateral funding agencies,withmoreor lesssupportofsectionsofnationalgovernmentsdependingonthecase. Inthe irrigationsectorthere isalonghistoryofsuchreforms(MollingaandBolding,2004).

ThereformoftheNIAinthePhilippinesisanearly(1980s)andfamouscaseinirrigationstudies.Aclose lookat thatreformhistoryshows that the introductionof 'financialautonomy'of the irrigationagency, which would assumedly enhance its management orientation and performance and wouldmake it more accountable to water users, has not exactly accomplished that. Through clevermanagementof its (mostly foreignfunded)projectbudgetsandothermechanisms, theorganisationhas managed to maintain its construction orientation, while irrigator influence in governance andmanagementhasremainedaslimitedasitwas(Oorthuizen,2004;Panella,2004).Thecaseofirrigationreforminthe1980sand1990sinIndonesiaundertheSuhartoregimeisequallyinteresting.TheWorldBankandAsianDevelopmentBankpushedreformpackagestodecentralisemanagementtowateruserassociations,toachievegreateraccountabilityofthe irrigationadministrationtofarmers,andtoshifttheorientationofthehydrocracyfromconstructiontomanagement,thatwereeffectively 'rerouted'bytheIndonesianirrigationbureaucracy(Suhardiman,2008).Theagencysuccessfullyinsistedondoingphysical rehabilitation of systems before turnover of management, and by defining basically allirrigationsystemsas'governmentschemes'inneedofphysicalimprovement,evenwhenmanysystemswerefarmermanaged(Bruns,2004).

AsimilarstorycanbetoldabouttheAndhraPradesh, India irrigationreformeffortthatstarted in1996.Thisisastoryofanattemptatradicalreformthroughlegislatingareorientationoftheirrigationagencytowardsa 'serviceoriented'bureaucracy,and legallyprescribedelectedbodiesof irrigatorsatdifferent levels of the system (water user association orWUA, distributary committee, and projectcommittee) as the structureof farmermanagement and governance. The first two, lower, levelsofcommitteeswere created through elections forWUAs in 1997; theproject committees in the statewereonlyconstituted in2009.The firstwaveof reform,which lasted into theearly2000swas, toalargeextent,capturedatfieldlevelbyaclassofricherpeasantscumlocalcontractorscumpartycadre,undermining the representationandaccountability component (Mollingaetal.,2004).The irrigationdepartmentmanagedtoregainmuchofitslostgroundthroughamendmentstotheActthatisthebasisofthereform(Nikku,2006).11Thepoliticalmomentumofthereformdeclinedasreformprogrammesmultipliedacrosssectors,aswellasthroughaseriesofdroughtyears intheearly2000sthatmeantastrongreductionofirrigatedareas,aswellasbeinginstrumentalintheelectoraldefeatin2004ofthechiefministerofthestatethatstartedthereform.Donorinterestinthereformwanedintheprocess.

Stoppinghereandconcludingthateverythingisasitwasbefore,would,however,beamistake.TheAndhraPradesh reformprocess,nomatterhow imperfect itwasasagainst itsstatedobjectives,hascreated a constituency of farmerirrigators pursuing change, and a group of senior bureaucrats hascontinued tomake attempts to further the reform,orbring it backon track. This isundoubtedly aslowerprocessandonelesspronetomediaattentionthanthe'bigbang'approachof199697withallitsnationalandinternationalpoliticalfanfare,butitmaybethelonguedureofirrigationreform.Theestablishment of the project committees in 2009, which are potentially powerful farmergoverning

11Cf. Suhardiman (2008) on the Indonesian publicworks bureaucracy successfully reshaping theWater Law to neutralisereformthatwouldhavereducedthepoweroftheagency.



bodies, as well as the creation of multidisciplinary teams in the irrigation agency for projectmanagement, suggest that the reform process is continuing. Research attention has often beenfocussed,atleastintheirrigationsector,onthemorespectacularepisodesofreformprocesses,andonthose programmes formulated and/or implemented in the context of international developmentfunding, probably not in the least because research funding also tends to be associatedwith suchprogrammes. Thismay,we suggest, have created a bias in theway reform is looked at,with littleattentiontoandunderstandingproducedof'internal'reformdynamicsascomparedtothosedrivenbyglobalreformparadigmsandinternationaldevelopmentfunding.

CONCLUSIONS

Weconcludebysuggestingsomepertinentareasforfurtherresearchonwaterbureaucracies.First,theroleofwaterresourcesdevelopmentinnationbuildinginourviewmeritsfurtherresearch,

particularlyfromacomparativeperspective.Inthiscontext,researchcouldlookatthewaysirrigation,flood control and hydropower have played different roles in state formation, and at the impact ofglobalisationonthenationalcharacterofwaterresourcesdevelopment.

Second, the internaldynamicsofhydrocracies remainsheavilyunderresearched,despiteaslowlygrowingnumberof studieson the topic.The reasons for the lackoforganisationalethnographiesofhydrocracies,studiesofwaterresourcesengineersasaprofession,sociologiesofwateragencies,andsocialstudiesofgovernmentwaterscience,forinstance,arenottotallyclear.Thedifficultytobebothaninsiderandanobserveratthesametime,thetechnicalorientationofthesebureaucraciesandtheleveloftechnicalexpertiserequiredfrom(socialscience)researcherstoenterthefieldmightbesomeof the reasons;buthydrology,hydraulics and civilengineering arenotquantummechanics.Amorelikelyexplanationseemstousthat'critical'perspectivesinwaterstudieshavetendedto'takethewaterusersside',andconcentrateonthestudyof localisedwatermanagementpracticesandresistancetotheprojectsofstatebureaucracies(cf.Baviskar,2007).

Third,the 'hydraulicmission'notion,thoughveryevocative,needsfurtherunpacking.Thestrengthof the construction, supply enhancement, harnessing water for full control etc. disposition ofhydrocraciesisveryclear,butthereasonsforthisstrengthandpersistenceareonlypartlyunderstood.Insteadofevolutionary schemesofparadigm succession, a framework that looks at the reasons fordominanceamongcompetingparadigmsseemstobeclosertocontemporaryreality(Swatuk,2008).

Fourth, it is reasonable to suggest that the transformations in the dispositions of waterbureaucracies in recent decades have been mainly triggered or forced by environmental critique.Arguably, this will also be the case in the decades to come. Understanding causes and process of'ecologicalturns'inwaterbureaucraciesthereforeseemsimportant,andmoregenerally,whichpoliticalalliancesinbroadersocietyfacilitatebureaucratictransformationinthewatersector.

Fifth,researchoncorruption inthewatersector,anotherunderresearchedarea inwaterstudies,strongly suggests that in the context of developing countries international assistance (notably,developmentbankfundingforinfrastructuralprojects)hasbeenveryinstrumentalinthereproductionof water bureaucracies technical orientations, notwithstanding stated objectives of reform in therecentperiod.Thisraisesthequestionoftheinternationaldevelopmentfunding/waterbureaucraciesalliance,for instance,aspresentlyprofiling inthecontextofdebatesontheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsandclimatechange.Anotheralliance thatmeritsmoreattention is thatbetweenhydrocraciesandprivateconstructionbusinessesandconsultants.

Sixth,anevenlesscommonareaoffocusisthatofthegenderedcharacterofhydrocracies,whetherit is the gender compositionof its staff, themasculinityof its organisational culture,or the genderdimensionsofthetechnologiesbuiltandmanaged(cf.Zwarteveen,2008).

Seventh,thoughtherewasatimewhenseniorwaterprofessionalswrote'memoirsoftheirworkinglives', the voice ofwater professionals ismuch less heard in thismanner in current public debate.Biographies ofwater bureaucrats reflectively reporting on their careers and the projects they have



been involved in would be a significant contribution to the understanding of the evolution anddynamicsofwaterbureaucracies.

All this andmore there iswork to bedoneonwaterbureaucracies.We continue towelcomearticlesonthelifeandtimesofhydrocraciesinthepagesofWaterAlternatives.

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Introduction: The prophets of irrigationThe emergence and apogee of the 'hydraulic mission'Hydraulic bureaucracies and power, politics and moneyChallenges to hydraulic bureaucraciesReproduction strategies in a changing worldConclusionsReferences

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Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission - MOLLE et al