Hume’s Central PrinciplesHume’s Central Principles

Peter MillicanPeter Millican

Hertford College, OxfordHertford College, Oxford

2. Overview,2. Overview,Hume’s Theory of Ideas,Hume’s Theory of Ideas,

and his Faculty Psychologyand his Faculty Psychology

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An Integrated VisionAn Integrated Vision

We have seen how Hume’s investigation of the We have seen how Hume’s investigation of the notion of causation brought together his interest in notion of causation brought together his interest in the the Cosmological Argument for God’s existenceCosmological Argument for God’s existence, , free willfree will and the and the Problem of EvilProblem of Evil, his opposition to , his opposition to aprioristic metaphysics (e.g. concerning aprioristic metaphysics (e.g. concerning mind and mind and mattermatter), and his view of ), and his view of human beings as part of the human beings as part of the natural worldnatural world, amenable to empirical investigation., amenable to empirical investigation.

Although there is historical evidence of his early Although there is historical evidence of his early interest in these things, they come together most interest in these things, they come together most clearly not in the clearly not in the TreatiseTreatise itself (January 1739), but itself (January 1739), but in the in the AbstractAbstract (autumn 1739) and the (autumn 1739) and the Enquiry Enquiry concerning Human Understandingconcerning Human Understanding (1748) … (1748) …

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The Topics of the The Topics of the AbstractAbstract

IntroductionIntroduction Associationism Associationism Probability Probability Liberty and Necessity Liberty and Necessity Copy Principle Copy Principle Sceptical R Sceptical Résuméésumé Induction Induction Idea of Necessity Idea of Necessity Belief Belief Probability Probability

Personal Identity PassionsPersonal Identity Passions Geometry Geometry

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Overview (1)Overview (1)

Starts from a theory of mental contents: Starts from a theory of mental contents: impressionsimpressions (sensations or feelings) and (sensations or feelings) and ideasideas (thoughts). (thoughts).

Empiricist: Empiricist: all ideas are derived from all ideas are derived from impressions impressions (and hence from experience) (and hence from experience) – Hume’s Copy Principle.– Hume’s Copy Principle.

Assumes a theory of Assumes a theory of facultiesfaculties (reason, the (reason, the senses, imagination etc.), in terms of which senses, imagination etc.), in terms of which he expresses many of his main results.he expresses many of his main results.

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Overview (2)Overview (2)

Aims to deny that we have Aims to deny that we have rationalrational insightinsight into things (and also – in his moral theory - into things (and also – in his moral theory - that we are governed by that we are governed by reasonreason).).

Relations of ideas / matters of factRelations of ideas / matters of fact– roughly analytic / syntheticroughly analytic / synthetic

(but in the Treatise based on a theory of (but in the Treatise based on a theory of different kinds of relation)different kinds of relation)

Demonstrative / probable reasoningDemonstrative / probable reasoning– roughly deductive / inductiveroughly deductive / inductive

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Overview (3)Overview (3)

Induction presupposes an assumption of Induction presupposes an assumption of uniformity over time, which cannot be uniformity over time, which cannot be founded on any form of rational evidence.founded on any form of rational evidence.

Instead, induction is founded on “custom”, Instead, induction is founded on “custom”, an instinctive extrapolation from observed an instinctive extrapolation from observed to unobserved.to unobserved.

When we find ourselves making customary When we find ourselves making customary inferences, we ascribe necessity (and inferences, we ascribe necessity (and hence causation) to the objects concerned.hence causation) to the objects concerned.

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Overview (4)Overview (4)

Customary inferences provide our only Customary inferences provide our only impression of necessary connexion: there impression of necessary connexion: there is no other possible impression source.is no other possible impression source.

So that is where our idea of necessity is So that is where our idea of necessity is copied from, and we can have no other copied from, and we can have no other understanding of necessity.understanding of necessity.

Customary inference is as applicable to the Customary inference is as applicable to the human as to the physical world. Hence this human as to the physical world. Hence this must involve the same idea of necessity.must involve the same idea of necessity.

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Overview (5)Overview (5)

““a prioria priori, any thing may produce any thing”, any thing may produce any thing”

““all objects, which are found to be all objects, which are found to be constantly conjoined, are upon that account constantly conjoined, are upon that account only to be regarded as causes and effectsonly to be regarded as causes and effects .”.”

((TT 1.4.5.30-2) 1.4.5.30-2)

This empirical, causal, deterministic science This empirical, causal, deterministic science involves systematic searching for underlying involves systematic searching for underlying correlations, “reducing principles … to a correlations, “reducing principles … to a greater simplicity”. (greater simplicity”. (EE 4.12) 4.12)

2(a)2(a)

The TheoryThe Theoryof Ideasof Ideas

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What is an “Idea”?What is an “Idea”?

John Locke’s John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Essay concerning Human UnderstandingUnderstanding (1690) defines an (1690) defines an ideaidea as as

““whatsoever is the object of the understanding whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks” (I i 8).when a man thinks” (I i 8).

This is supposed to include all types of This is supposed to include all types of “thinking”, including perception and feeling “thinking”, including perception and feeling as well as contemplation. So our as well as contemplation. So our ideasideas include thoughts and sensations, and also include thoughts and sensations, and also “internal” ideas such as feelings.“internal” ideas such as feelings.

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Ideas and ImpressionsIdeas and Impressions

Hume thinks Locke’s usage is too broad, Hume thinks Locke’s usage is too broad, so he adopts different terminology:so he adopts different terminology:– An An impressionimpression is a is a sensationsensation (e.g. from seeing (e.g. from seeing

a blue sky or smelling a flower) or a a blue sky or smelling a flower) or a feelingfeeling (e.g. being angry, or feeling pain);(e.g. being angry, or feeling pain);

– An An ideaidea is a is a thoughtthought (e.g. about the sky, or (e.g. about the sky, or about a pain, or about the existence of God);about a pain, or about the existence of God);

– A A perceptionperception is either an is either an impressionimpression or an or an ideaidea. (So Hume uses the word . (So Hume uses the word perceptionperception to to cover everything that Locke calls an cover everything that Locke calls an ideaidea.).)

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Sensation and ReflectionSensation and Reflection

““Impressions [are of] two kinds, those of Impressions [are of] two kinds, those of sensationsensation, and those of , and those of reflectionreflection.” (T 1.1.2.1).” (T 1.1.2.1)– Some impressions come directly from sensation Some impressions come directly from sensation

(e.g. colours, smells, pains).(e.g. colours, smells, pains).

– Other impressions arise only from things that we Other impressions arise only from things that we thinkthink or or reflectreflect about (e.g. thinking about pain about (e.g. thinking about pain can make us feel fear; thinking about someone can make us feel fear; thinking about someone else’s good luck can make us envious). These else’s good luck can make us envious). These are are impressions of reflectionimpressions of reflection, which at , which at TT 1.1.6.1 1.1.6.1 Hume says are either Hume says are either passionspassions (e.g. the desire (e.g. the desire for something) or for something) or emotions emotions (e.g. happiness). (e.g. happiness).

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Force and VivacityForce and Vivacity

Hume says that impressions have more Hume says that impressions have more forceforce, , vivacityvivacity, or , or livelinessliveliness than ideas: than ideas:

““All the perceptions of the human mind All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call which I shall call IMPRESSIONSIMPRESSIONS and and IDEASIDEAS. . The difference betwixt these consists in the The difference betwixt these consists in the force and liveliness, with which they strike force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the soul, and make their way into our upon the soul, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those … which thought or consciousness. Those … which enter with most force and violence, we may enter with most force and violence, we may name name impressionsimpressions …” ( …” (TT 1.1.1.1). 1.1.1.1).

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An Inconsistency?An Inconsistency?

But Hume hints that sometimes a thought But Hume hints that sometimes a thought can in fact be as lively as a sensation:can in fact be as lively as a sensation:

““in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: [And] it approach to our impressions: [And] it sometimes happens, that our impressions are sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas.” (them from our ideas.” (TT 1.1.1.1) 1.1.1.1)

Compare, for example, dreaming of an Compare, for example, dreaming of an attack of spiders, with watching paint dry!attack of spiders, with watching paint dry!

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Feeling and ThinkingFeeling and Thinking

Hume’s distinction is most easily under-Hume’s distinction is most easily under-stood as that between stood as that between feelingfeeling and and thinkingthinking::

““I believe it will not be very necessary to I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking.” (thinking.” (TT 1.1.1.1) 1.1.1.1)

So then impressions (and ideas) are not So then impressions (and ideas) are not defineddefined as being our more (and less) as being our more (and less) vivacious perceptions.vivacious perceptions.

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The “Liberty of the Imagination”The “Liberty of the Imagination”

Some of our ideas can be divided up Some of our ideas can be divided up imaginatively into components:imaginatively into components:

An apple has a particular shape, a colour, a taste, An apple has a particular shape, a colour, a taste, a smell … Its shape is also complex …a smell … Its shape is also complex …

We can We can put ideas togetherput ideas together in new ways: in new ways:gold + mountain = golden mountain;gold + mountain = golden mountain;

banapple = shape of banana + taste of apple.banapple = shape of banana + taste of apple.

See See TT 1.1.3.4 on this “second principle”. At 1.1.3.4 on this “second principle”. AtTT 1.1.7.3 it seems to turn into the far stronger 1.1.7.3 it seems to turn into the far stronger (and questionable) Separability Principle.(and questionable) Separability Principle.

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Simple and Complex IdeasSimple and Complex Ideas

At At TreatiseTreatise 1.1.1.2, Hume divides all ideas 1.1.1.2, Hume divides all ideas and impressions into and impressions into simplesimple and and complexcomplex::

““Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts.”these, and may be distinguished into parts.”

In the In the EnquiryEnquiry, Hume only hints at this , Hume only hints at this distinction (at 2.6 and 7.4) – perhaps he is distinction (at 2.6 and 7.4) – perhaps he is doubtful whether every idea is absolutely doubtful whether every idea is absolutely simple or complex?simple or complex?

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The Origin of IdeasThe Origin of Ideas

Book I of John Locke’s Book I of John Locke’s Essay concerning Essay concerning Human UnderstandingHuman Understanding (1690) argues (1690) argues against “innate” ideas and principles.against “innate” ideas and principles.

Book II then aims to explain how all our Book II then aims to explain how all our various ideas can arise from experience.various ideas can arise from experience.

So Locke is an So Locke is an empiricistempiricist about ideas. about ideas.

Descartes and other Descartes and other rationalists rationalists claimed claimed that we have innate ideas (e.g. of God, or that we have innate ideas (e.g. of God, or of extension), yielding a priori knowledge.of extension), yielding a priori knowledge.

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The Copy PrincipleThe Copy Principle

Hume’s version of Locke’s empiricism is Hume’s version of Locke’s empiricism is expressed in what is commonly known as his expressed in what is commonly known as his Copy Principle:Copy Principle:

““that all our simple ideas in their first appearance that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly correspondent to them, and which they exactly representrepresent.” (.” (T T 1.1.1.7)1.1.1.7)

Although Although EnquiryEnquiry 2.9 presents this as a 2.9 presents this as a weapon against weapon against bogusbogus ideas, Hume actually ideas, Hume actually uses it almost exclusively to uses it almost exclusively to clarifyclarify ideas, by ideas, by tracing them to their impression-source.tracing them to their impression-source.

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Problems with the Copy PrincipleProblems with the Copy Principle

Hume’s arguments for the Principle seem Hume’s arguments for the Principle seem rather weak:rather weak:– The first (The first (TT 1.1.1.5) just asserts that there are no 1.1.1.5) just asserts that there are no

counter-examples – but his opponent will deny this!counter-examples – but his opponent will deny this!

– The second (The second (TT 1.1.1.9) claims that people without 1.1.1.9) claims that people without particular senses cannot have corresponding ideas: particular senses cannot have corresponding ideas: plausible, no doubt, but plausible, no doubt, but how can he prove ithow can he prove it??

– The missing shade of blue (The missing shade of blue (T T 1.1.1.10) is at least 1.1.1.10) is at least an awkward complication.an awkward complication.

– Overall, one gets the impression that Hume takes Overall, one gets the impression that Hume takes idea-empiricism somewhat uncritically for granted.idea-empiricism somewhat uncritically for granted.

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The Theory of IdeasThe Theory of Ideas

The central assumption of the Theory of The central assumption of the Theory of Ideas is that thinking consists in having Ideas is that thinking consists in having “ideas” (in Locke’s sense) or “perceptions” “ideas” (in Locke’s sense) or “perceptions” (in Hume’s sense) before the mind, and that (in Hume’s sense) before the mind, and that different sorts of thinking are to be different sorts of thinking are to be distinguished in terms of the different sorts distinguished in terms of the different sorts of perceptions which they involve.of perceptions which they involve.

This approach makes the mind very passive This approach makes the mind very passive – its only activity seems to be to – its only activity seems to be to perceive perceive impressions and ideas …impressions and ideas …

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The Mental StageThe Mental Stage

The mind is seen as like a stage, on which The mind is seen as like a stage, on which “perceptions” are the actors:“perceptions” are the actors:– seeingseeing a tree involves having an a tree involves having an impressionimpression

of a tree “in front of the mind”;of a tree “in front of the mind”;– thinkingthinking of a tree involves having an of a tree involves having an ideaidea of a of a

tree in front of the mind;tree in front of the mind;– feelingfeeling a pain involves having an a pain involves having an impressionimpression

of a pain;of a pain;– thinkingthinking about a pain involves having an about a pain involves having an ideaidea

of a pain. of a pain.

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The Copy Principle and ImagismThe Copy Principle and Imagism

If ideas are copies of impressions, then If ideas are copies of impressions, then Hume must takes our ideas to be something Hume must takes our ideas to be something like mental images (not necessarily visual).like mental images (not necessarily visual).This crude assimilation of thinking to the This crude assimilation of thinking to the having of mental images seriously infects having of mental images seriously infects some of Hume’s philosophy, for example:some of Hume’s philosophy, for example:– His discussions of mental Separability (treating it His discussions of mental Separability (treating it

as rather like manipulating a raster image).as rather like manipulating a raster image).– His impoverished view of the faculty of His impoverished view of the faculty of reflectionreflection, ,

which ought to encompass awareness not only of which ought to encompass awareness not only of feelings and desires, but also of mental activity feelings and desires, but also of mental activity such as such as doubting,doubting, reasoningreasoning, and , and inferringinferring. .

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Hume on the Association of IdeasHume on the Association of Ideas

Despite “the liberty of the imagination”, Despite “the liberty of the imagination”, there is a pattern to our thoughts:there is a pattern to our thoughts:

““all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in what form it pleases … and may be united again in what form it pleases … [yet there is] some bond of union among them, some [yet there is] some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another” (introduces another” (TT 1.1.4.1) 1.1.4.1)

Ideas may be associated in three ways:Ideas may be associated in three ways:““The qualities, from which this association arises The qualities, from which this association arises … are three, … are three, vizviz. . RESEMBLANCERESEMBLANCE, , CONTIGUITYCONTIGUITY in in time or place, and time or place, and CAUSECAUSE and and EFFECTEFFECT.” (.” (TT 1.1.4.2) 1.1.4.2)

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Locke on the Association of IdeasLocke on the Association of Ideas

Hume will appeal to the association of Hume will appeal to the association of ideas with great enthusiasm, but Locke’s ideas with great enthusiasm, but Locke’s attitude to it had been far less positive:attitude to it had been far less positive:

““[3] this sort of Madness … [4] this … Weakness [3] this sort of Madness … [4] this … Weakness to which all Men are … liable, ... a Taint which … to which all Men are … liable, ... a Taint which … universally infects Mankind … [5] … there is [a] universally infects Mankind … [5] … there is [a] Connexion of Connexion of IdeasIdeas wholly owing to Chance or wholly owing to Chance or Custom; Custom; IdeasIdeas that in themselves are not at all of that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds that ’tis very hard to separate them …”that ’tis very hard to separate them …”

( (EssayEssay II II xxxiii 3-5)xxxiii 3-5)

2(b)2(b)

Hume’sHume’sFaculty Faculty

PsychologyPsychology

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Humean FacultiesHumean Faculties

At At TT 1.1.2, Hume distinguishes between 1.1.2, Hume distinguishes between impressions of impressions of sensationsensation and and reflectionreflection..

At At TT 1.1.3, he distinguishes between ideas 1.1.3, he distinguishes between ideas of the of the memorymemory and and imaginationimagination..

Talk of mental faculties (Talk of mental faculties (reasonreason, , sensessenses, , imagination imagination etc.) will continue to play a etc.) will continue to play a major role in the Treatise. Indeed some of major role in the Treatise. Indeed some of Hume’s most important and famous results Hume’s most important and famous results are expressed in these terms …are expressed in these terms …

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Faculties, Induction, and BodyFaculties, Induction, and Body

“… “… the next question is, whether experience the next question is, whether experience produces the idea by means of the produces the idea by means of the understandingunderstanding or or imaginationimagination; whether we are ; whether we are determined by determined by reasonreason to make the transition, or to make the transition, or by … association … of perceptions.” (by … association … of perceptions.” (TT 1.3.6.4) 1.3.6.4)

““The subject, then, of our present enquiry, is The subject, then, of our present enquiry, is concerning the concerning the causescauses which induce us to which induce us to believe in the existence of body: … we … shall believe in the existence of body: … we … shall consider, whether it be consider, whether it be the the sensessenses, , reasonreason, or , or the the imaginationimagination, that produces the opinion of a , that produces the opinion of a continu’dcontinu’d or of a or of a distinctdistinct existence.” ( existence.” (TT 1.4.2.2) 1.4.2.2)

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Faculties and MoralityFaculties and Morality

“… “… we need only consider, whether it be we need only consider, whether it be possible, from possible, from reasonreason alone, to distinguish alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some other principles to enable must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction.” (us to make that distinction.” (TT 3.1.1.3‑4) 3.1.1.3‑4)

““There has been a controversy started of late There has been a controversy started of late … concerning the general foundation of … concerning the general foundation of MORALSMORALS; whether they be derived from ; whether they be derived from reasonreason, or from , or from SENTIMENTSENTIMENT …” ( …” (MM 1.3) 1.3)

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Faculties in the Faculties in the TreatiseTreatise (1) (1)

The (external) SensesThe (external) SensesPresent impressions to the mind (thus Present impressions to the mind (thus creating ideas which copy them).creating ideas which copy them).

ReflectionReflectionAn An internal sense, internal sense, by which we inwardly by which we inwardly sense our own mental state.sense our own mental state.

MemoryMemoryReplays ideas vivaciously, reflecting their Replays ideas vivaciously, reflecting their original order.original order.

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Faculties in the Faculties in the TreatiseTreatise (2) (2)

Imagination Imagination (or (or the Fancythe Fancy)) Replays ideas less vivaciously, with Replays ideas less vivaciously, with freedom to transpose and mix them.freedom to transpose and mix them.

ReasonReason (or (or the Understandingthe Understanding))The overall The overall cognitivecognitive faculty: discovers faculty: discovers and judges truth and falsehood.and judges truth and falsehood.

WillWillThe The conativeconative faculty: forms intentions in faculty: forms intentions in response to desires and passions.response to desires and passions.

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Hutcheson on the FacultiesHutcheson on the Faculties

““Writers on these Subjects should remember the Writers on these Subjects should remember the common Division of the Faculties of the Soul. That common Division of the Faculties of the Soul. That there is 1. there is 1. ReasonReason presenting the natures and presenting the natures and relations of things, antecedently to any Act of Will or relations of things, antecedently to any Act of Will or Desire: 2. Desire: 2. The WillThe Will, or , or Appetitus RationalisAppetitus Rationalis, or the , or the disposition of Soul to pursue what is presented as disposition of Soul to pursue what is presented as good, and to shun Evil. … Below these [the Antients] good, and to shun Evil. … Below these [the Antients] place two other powers dependent on the Body, the place two other powers dependent on the Body, the SensusSensus, and the , and the Appetitus SensitivusAppetitus Sensitivus, in which they , in which they place the particular place the particular PassionsPassions: the former answers to : the former answers to the the UnderstandingUnderstanding, and the latter to , and the latter to the Willthe Will.”.”

Illustrations upon the Moral SenseIllustrations upon the Moral Sense (1742), SB (1742), SB §§450450

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Hume on Reason and UnderstandingHume on Reason and Understanding

Hume, like Hutcheson, implicitly identifies Hume, like Hutcheson, implicitly identifies Reason with “the understanding”, e.g.:Reason with “the understanding”, e.g.:

““When the mind [makes an inductive inference] it When the mind [makes an inductive inference] it is not determin’d by is not determin’d by reasonreason, but by certain , but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in these objects, and unite them in the imaginationthe imagination. . Had ideas no more union in Had ideas no more union in the fancythe fancy than than objects seem to have to objects seem to have to the understandingthe understanding, …”, …” ( (T 1.3.6.12T 1.3.6.12))

– See also See also TT 1.3.6.4, 1.4.1.1, 1.4.2.46, 1.4.2.57, 1.3.6.4, 1.4.1.1, 1.4.2.46, 1.4.2.57, 1.4.7.7, and compare 2.2.7.6 n. with 1.3.9.19 n.1.4.7.7, and compare 2.2.7.6 n. with 1.3.9.19 n.

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Hume on Reason as CognitionHume on Reason as Cognition

““Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood.” Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood.” ((TT 3.1.1.9) 3.1.1.9)

““That Faculty, by which we discern Truth and That Faculty, by which we discern Truth and Falshood … the Understanding”Falshood … the Understanding”(E(E 1.14, note in 1748/1750 editions 1.14, note in 1748/1750 editions))

“… “… reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood …” (judgment of truth and falsehood …” (DOPDOP 5.1) 5.1)

See also See also TT 2.3.3.3, 2.3.3.5‑6, 2.3.3.8, 2.3.10.6,  2.3.3.3, 2.3.3.5‑6, 2.3.3.8, 2.3.10.6, 3.1.1.4, 3.1.1.19 n. 69, 3.1.1.25‑27, 3.2.2.20, 3.1.1.4, 3.1.1.19 n. 69, 3.1.1.25‑27, 3.2.2.20, MM 1.7,  1.7, M AppM App 1.6, 1.21. 1.6, 1.21.

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Distinguishing Between FacultiesDistinguishing Between Faculties

imagination/reason (imagination/reason (TT 1.4.2.2); imagination/  1.4.2.2); imagination/ memory (memory (TT 1.3.5); imagination/the senses  1.3.5); imagination/the senses ((TT 1.4.2.2); imagination/passions ( 1.4.2.2); imagination/passions (TT 2.2.2.16). 2.2.2.16).

reason/memory (reason/memory (TT 3.3.4.13); reason/the senses  3.3.4.13); reason/the senses ((TT 1.4.2.2); reason/the will ( 1.4.2.2); reason/the will (TT 2.3.3.4). 2.3.3.4).

memory/the senses (memory/the senses (TT 1.1.2.1) 1.1.2.1)..

Hume Hume nevernever distinguishes between “reason” and distinguishes between “reason” and “the understanding”, or between either of these “the understanding”, or between either of these and “the judgment”. And he insists that our and “the judgment”. And he insists that our “intellectual faculty” is undivided “intellectual faculty” is undivided (T(T 1.3.7.5 n.20 1.3.7.5 n.20).).

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Locke’s Scepticism about FacultiesLocke’s Scepticism about Faculties

Locke ridicules the language of faculties as a source of Locke ridicules the language of faculties as a source of philosophical error, and declares himself inclined to philosophical error, and declares himself inclined to forego it completely were it not that faculty words are forego it completely were it not that faculty words are so much in fashion that “It looks like too much so much in fashion that “It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by” (affectation wholly to lay them by” (EssayEssay II xxi 17‑20). II xxi 17‑20).

When we refer to man’s “understanding”, all we can When we refer to man’s “understanding”, all we can properly mean is that man has a power to understand.properly mean is that man has a power to understand.

It is a serious mistake to speak of our faculties “as so It is a serious mistake to speak of our faculties “as so many distinct Agents”.many distinct Agents”.

Hume makes similar dismissive remarks about “occult” Hume makes similar dismissive remarks about “occult” faculty language (faculty language (T T 1.4.3.101.4.3.10, D, D 4.12). 4.12).