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Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts Yiliu Lu & Qi Zhang GSICCS June 26 th , 2013

Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

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Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts. Yiliu Lu & Qi Zhang GSICCS June 26 th , 2013. Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian C onflicts. 1. Introduction. 2. R2P. 3. Conflicts in Libyan & Syrian. 4. Chinese Views. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

Yiliu Lu & Qi ZhangGSICCS

June 26th, 2013

Page 2: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

1. Introduction

2. R2P

3. Conflicts in Libyan & Syrian

4. Chinese Views

5. Conclusion

Page 3: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

Introduction

R2P / Pillar Three

Responsibility to Protect

A United Nations initiative established in 2005

Sovereignty is not a right, but a responsibility

4 crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (Mass Atrocity Crimes)

Page 4: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

The R2P has three "pillars"

a. A state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities;

b. The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary responsibility;

c. If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last resort.

Introduction

Page 5: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

Introduction

Through global governance mechanisms and international accountability instruments, the emerging powers will determine whether:• a)

• b)

• c) violators of both are made to answer for their transgressions.

brutish rulers domestically

vulnerable groups

protect

regional or global major powers

weak countries

protect

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3 Preliminary Things.

1. External interventions were frequent in the past, and are not guaranteed in the future.

The choice therefore is not if intervention,but whether an intervention will be: ad hoc or rules-based unilateral or multilateral divisive or consensual

Introduction

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Introduction

2. The debate over R2P is not, and should not become, a North-South issue. But it can turn into one.non-Western societies: a historical tradition of reciprocal rights and obligations which bind sovereigns and subjects.

3. The only likely sites and targets of intervention in the foreseeable future will be developing countries.

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Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian conflicts

Page 9: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

R2P before 2001

R2P

The Rwanda Genocide (1994)

NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo (1999)

Kofi Annan’s Appeal (1999.9, 2000.9) ICISS (2001.9)

R2P (since 2001)

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R2P before 2001

R2P

NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo (1999)

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(FRY) Kosovo Liberation Army

NATO

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R2P before 2001

In an address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected upon “the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century”.

He recalled the failures of the Security Council to act in Rwanda and Kosovo, and challenged the member states of the UN to “find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defense of our common humanity.”

R2P

Kofi Annan’s Appeal (1999.9, 2000.9)

Page 13: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

R2P before 2001 At the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, Kofi Annan again posed the central question starkly and directly:

R2P

Kofi Annan’s Appeal (1999.9, 2000.9)

… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed,

an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,

how should we respond to a Rwanda, to

gross and systematic violations of human

rights that affect every precept of our

common humanity? …

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R2P before 2001 In September 2000, the Government of Canada responded to the Secretary-General’s challenge by announcing the establishment of this independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

Objectives: • to build a broader understanding of the problem of

reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty

• to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations

R2P

ICISS (2001.9)

Page 15: Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian Conflicts

R2P

R2P since 2001 The R2P report was published in December

2001 and endorsed by the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 2004, as well as by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005:

• war crimes• Genocide• ethnic cleansing• crimes against humanity 

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R2P

But in principle, the 2005 formulation on R2P: not cover humanitarian disasters not cover situations of interstate armed conflict

“it is not appropriate to expand, willfully to interpret or even abuse this concept”

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Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian conflicts

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Libya 2011Gaddafi has vowed to fight on and die a "martyr", calling on his supporters to take back the streets from protesters in a furious speech on state TV :

“ I am a fighter, a revolutionary from tents ... I will die as a martyr at the end… ”

“… Peaceful protests is one thing, but armed rebellion is another… I have not yet ordered the use of force, not yet ordered one bullet to be fired. When I do, everything will burn…”

“ You men and women who love Gaddafi ...get out of your homes and fill the streets," he said. "Leave your homes and attack them in their lairs ... Starting tomorrow the cordons will be lifted, go out and fight them! ”Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122216458913596.html

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Faced with Gaddafi’s imminent intention to massacre the city’s population, it was clear that tough international action in response to the Libyan government’s failure of protecting its civilians was needed to halt the terrible mass violence.

Rather than stand by and risk failing to act while more civilians had been subject to mass violence, R2P quickly took action to prevent a bloodbath.

Outcome: a triumph for R2P“It took just one month to mobilize a broad coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce no-kill zones, stop Gaddafi’s advancing army, and prevent a massacre of the innocents in Benghazi. By year’s end, Gaddafi had been ousted and killed” (Ramesh T., 2013).

Libya 2011

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Syria 2012

By the end of 2011, the peaceful Arab Spring →   a bloody armed uprising →   civil war

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Syrian Civil War (2012)

is an ongoing armed conflict in Syria between forces loyal to the Syrian Ba'ath Party government and those seeking to oust it

part of the Arab Spring. Protesters demanded the resignation of

President Bashar al-Assad International organizations have accused both

government and opposition forces of severe human rights violations.

Syria 2012

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Possible courses of action in Syria cannot be contemplated relations with Iran, Russia, and China another Western invasion of another Muslim

country

Oct.4,2011, Feb.4, 2012, Jul.19,2012• China and Russia: vetoed • Brazil, India, South Africa: abstention → support

Syria 2012

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China and Russia: opposed to any resolution in Syria put Syria on the path to civil war the Security Council should not dictate internal politics and

succession opposition groups must also receive condemnation for

perpetrating violence and must be exhorted to engage constructively with the government

the draft resolutions would have inflamed, not calmed the situation

the only solution to the Syrian crisis is through an inclusive, Syrian-led process to address the legitimate aspirations of the people in an environment free of violence and human rights abuses

Syria 2012

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India and South Africa: resolve internal differences through peaceful means

Brazil: played a more constructive role by tabling a possible compromise paper

Syria 2012

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Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian conflicts

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China’s Authoritative Stance

Authoritatively, China supports a just, peaceful, and appropriate resolution of the crisis using political means, but not military means.

• urged the international community, through the UN, to call on all sides to “discard violence” and “address problems through dialogue”

• opposed all attempts to employ international bodies to single out and direct critical or coercive words or actions against the Syrian regime

Chinese views

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China’s Authoritative Stance

In general, China has taken the position that the application of the R2P norm:

• should not contravene the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs that are contained in the UN Charter

• must be considered in the broader context of maintaining international peace and security

Chinese views

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China’s Authoritative Stance

China has repeatedly uttered the following statement or variants since the beginning of the Syrian unrest:

Chinese views

Our fundamental point of departure is to safeguard the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as well as the basic norms governing international relations, including the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in others' internal affairs, to safeguard the interests of the Syrian people and the Arab states, and to safeguard the interests of all countries, small and medium-sized in particular. This is China's consistent stance in all international affairs. It is not targeted at a particular issue or time.

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China’s Authoritative Stance

Chinese officials and authoritative spokespersons strongly criticized the military actions undertaken by U.S. and NATO forces in Libya, declaring China‘s opposition to not only the use of force in international relations but also the abuse of force that can cause more civilian casualties and a bigger humanitarian crisis, and called for ―an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful settlement of the issue.

Chinese views

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Chinese views

Non-Authoritative Chinese Views

explicit and full-throated criticism of Western—and especially U.S.

• The resolution would lead to the West bombarding another Arab state, and fears regarding the potentially disastrous consequences for Syria and the region of Western military involvement

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Chinese views

• Beijing‘s stance on the Syria crisis is influenced by the absence of the kind of economic and direct humanitarian interests that were present in the Libyan case, as well as the position taken by Russia.

• Efforts to remove Assad through force would prove futile and lead only to a chaotic, prolonged conflict and a highly unstable post-civil war political situation

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Chinese views

• Some observers blame the West for assisting in the militarization of the dispute by encouraging and assisting armed resistance to the Syrian government.

• Syrian conflict provided a clear demonstration of crisis and mass killing, while Libyan conflict involved a civil war and military gridlock.

• Any settlement of the Syrian conflict must leave the Syrian government with a chance for survival, since not doing so will force it to ―fight to the end.

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Humanitarian Intervention and the Libyan/ Syrian conflicts

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China’s stance on such issues seems primarily motivated by

• Preventing the establishment of legal or procedural precedents for military interventions by the international community against sovereign states.

• Preventing Western powers, and especially the United States.

Conclusions

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China’s stance on such issues seems primarily motivated by

• A strong desire to prevent democratic states from establishing a principled basis for outside intervention in the internal affairs of non-democratic states, including China.

• In the Syrian case, Beijing’s resistance to even targeted criticism of the Assad regime is motivated to a great degree by the Libya experience.

Conclusions

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More could be done to avoid mass violence;

Somebody somewhere has the responsibility to make judgment and take action;

PREVENTION rather than just REACTION.

Conclusions

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