Humanism in a Biocentric Universe

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Frank Cullen and Ingrid Newkirk

In their book, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors: A Search for Who We Are,

Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan write, "A sharp distinction between human beings and animals is essential if we are to bend them to our will, make them work for us, wear them, eat them—without any disquieting tinges of guilt or regret." They go on to describe, among other examples of the difficulty in drawing such a distinction, an experiment in which rhesus monkeys forced by scien-tists to deliver shocks to their cagemates in order to receive food rations starved themselves for up to two weeks rather than pull the switch.

We humans have explained the order and nature of the universe to ourselves, in our own concepts. We have no alternative. Secular humanism and most of the major religions accept that humankind looks at the world as if our species were the centerpiece, much as a child regards its world. ("The dewdrop knows the sun only through its own tiny orb"—Rabindranath Tagore.) Other religions and philosophies can and are reinterpreting their doctrines to ac-knowledge the interdependent associa-tion of manifest life and to admit the inherent value and rights of each member community.

To us, the question seems not to be whether humanism—or religion—is philosophically unable to adapt to the new paradigm of a biocentric universe, but whether either humanism or religion is willing to scrap the mythic status it has accorded humankind within the universe.

Like a child, our history on this planet has been a challenge to match our appetites with compassion, our actions with responsibility. Theology may

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"lt is base hubris, no matter how it may be packaged, to assume that only humankind has intrinsic value

and thus is entitled to live life appropriate to its best nature while

other forms of life are tools, playthings, or rubbish."

impose a godhead but, when it comes to temporal activity, it agrees with the secular community and legitimizes humankind's leasehold on everything it sees and (therefore) wants.

The second question seems to be which philosophies are capable of ethical extension. Let the moral motivation come from where it may, whether through rational thought or transcen-dental divinings. Moral certainty at its least is a guess limited by the human vessel; at its best it is the common ground of those useful philosophies that have nurtured and endured.

Since humans are sorely challenged to conduct our society's affairs ethically, how can we be expected to respect all forms of life? It would be sorry of us to believe that the greatness of the challenge absolves us from commitment. One's belief is one's deeds. The act of living ethically is an end in itself, with or without an expectation of reward.

Moral certainty forbids and permits. Yet often we may not be able to understand what action will produce good. In those events we can only do our earnest best. All we really know is that we should be wary when we are asked to rationalize harm. In a biocentric universe, ethical extension and right actions mean more than good steward-ship and considerably more than acting

in enlightened self-interest. It is base hubris, no matter how it

may be packaged, to assume that only humankind has intrinsic value and thus is entitled to live life appropriate to its best nature while other forms of life are tools, playthings, or rubbish. Where conflicts are perceived they should be resolved in the interest of both compet-itors, not simply on the basis of chau-vinism or might. And if the Gaia hypothesis is anywhere near appropriate, the sum of creation is only as viable as the well-being of its parts.

Currently, there is more argument about the particulars than about the need to extend our ethics. In general, each phase of history has extended the cut-off point, and temporary setbacks seem built into the cyclical dynamic. Exclu-sions have been made on every possible basis: heredity, ethnicity, nationality, gender, race, class beauty, intelligence, sexual predilection, belief system, skin color, and size. They continue to be made on the basis of species, and the same arguments are vetted and retooled to support anthropocentrism. (Surely?)

On an immediate level, the issue is kinship. How can humans fixate on a few variations in DNA and claim both exclusion and superiority? As ecologists, and people who believe that valuing the individual is the first step in respecting the species, we claim kinship. For those who require a kinship test, we remind you that we share identical breathing, eating, sleeping, and reproductive activ-ity with a host of species.

Darwin demolished the first chau-vinistic defense. One by one other argu-ments have dissolved with inquiry and observation. Many animal species, not just mammals, share abilities we thought

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made humankind singular: language, tool-use and tool-making (although humans may be the only animals to borrow tools and not return them), even love and nurturing of a partner and family. Altruism has been observed in most species, whether exalted or de-spised. In its public service appeal to parents the Spanish Child Welfare Society, in fact, uses video footage of adult lions, hippopotamuses, and birds—all protecting, gushing over, and teaching their offspring—before remon-strating, "For once, we're asking you to behave like animals."

One is tempted to twit the chauvinists with the fact that animals such as gorillas, chimpanzees, and grey parrots can understand, and in some cases use, human language. And experiment after experiment has been devised to challenge

the ability of individuals within these species to employ human language—and hence human concepts and abstract thought—yet has failed to dismiss the evidence, whether "signed," as in the case of chimpanzees and gorillas, or spoken, as by grey parrots. (While we have recently "discovered" that rats and elephants communicate subsonically, in the case of dolphins, at least, Dr. John Lilly advises us that they "speak" at speeds and frequencies far too fast and high for us to fathom except, perhaps, by computer.)

We offer a counter challenge: Is there any similarly scrupulously tested evi-dence that any human has been able, in turn, to understand and communicate in the language and concepts of another species?

Who knows what the full reality is.

Once the sky was a canopy for gods fashioned in the image of humankind and the Earth was a turtle's back. Later and elsewhere, it was a Eurocentric, four-cornered thing awash in seas that spilt over the edges into an eternal abyss. Maybe the Gaia concept isn't quite right. Maybe biocentric is not an adequate concept. Maybe it isn't enough to accord all sentient beings rights. But, as a chart for humanity, biocentrism, the Gaia theory, and the rejection of speciesism take us a step or two beyond the flat-worlders.

Frank Cullen, writer and educator, is the originator of the lecture series "New Ethics for a New Era." Ingrid Newkirk is the founder and national director of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.

Is humanism a form of speciesism? The questioned posed by FREE INQUIRY'S

editors is not as simple as it appears at first blush. For one thing, it suggests that there are many forms of speciesism, while plainly there are not. For another, it suggests that the concepts of human-ism and speciesism have similar episte-mological status, which plainly they do not.

Humanism is the view that human beings are capable of achieving happi-ness, knowledge, prosperity, and fulfill-ment without recourse to the super-natural, and ought to pursue these goals. Speciesism is an expletive, used by radical environmentalists to express moral opprobrium at the values of those who believe people ought to act on behalf of themselves and their fellow beings, as opposed to other living beings or to the entire system of living beings.' It is not a moral worldview, but rather a way of denigrating a moral worldview. Species-ism is to ethics what nigger is to race: an ugly expression of hatred, an attempt to prevent discussion by intimidating and insulting those with whom one disagrees.

I am not convinced that such deliberate invective has a role to play in intelligent controversy.

One can try, of course, to reconstruct its meaning without the overtones of moral opprobrium. Speciesism, we might say, is the view that one particular species ought to be at the center of one's values. But this is clearly nugatory, for who proposes any ethical system cen-tered on the prosperity of any species other than humanity?

Are the radical environmentalists, who use the term speciesism to denounce those with whom they disagree, correct in their worldview? Ought human beings act indifferently to the health, happiness, prosperity, and fulfillment of themselves and other human beings? Or should we hold human values as our goal and moral compass? These are interesting questions which merit serious discussion. But devising insults to intimidate those with whom one disagrees does not stimulate that discussion.

My own view, as you might imagine, is that the humanist view is superior to the radical environmentalist view. I

believe that we humans can pursue and achieve, at least partially, happiness, knowledge, prosperity, and fulfillment on this Earth. I further believe that it is desirable and morally appropriate for us to work toward these goals. As human beings, we live within a social environ-ment as well as a natural environment. Both occur without human design and are evolutionary in character, and we are only beginning to understand the com-plicated dynamics of each. Environmen-tal integrity is a high priority for all of us, and a healthy natural environment is critical to achievement of the hu-manistic goals I pursue. But the notion that we ought to measure the rightness or wrongness of our own actions against the standard of the health and well-being of all living things in general, or against the standard of the "health" of the planet in general, is just plain silly.

Note 1. Speciesism was coined by Peter Singer, a vegetarian, as a term of opprobrium for people who do not grant equal moral status to animals. Singer coined the term as an analog to racism and sexism. Speciesism has since been approp-riated by radical ecologists, who use it to refer to any belief or behavior pattern that fails to grant equal status to any living species, or to the ecosystem, or to "Mother Earth" herself.

R. W. Bradford is editor of Liberty magazine.

Humanism and Speciesism

R. W. Bradford

Spring 1993 19