Garcia vs. Drilon 699 SCRA 352

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must begermane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it mustapply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make forreal differencesjustifying the classification under the law.

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Womens Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with theunequal power relationship between women and menotherwise known as gender-based violence. Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, mens companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of mens expression of controlling women to retain power. The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women doesnotdiscriminate against men. Petitioners contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an anti-male, husband-bashing, and hate-men law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. Justice Puno correctly pointed out that (t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution. Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as thede juregovernment, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rightsrecognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As thede juregovernment, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 446 SCRA 299

It is settled in constitutional law that the equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held inVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,and reiterated in a long line of cases: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

Most, if not all,international human rights instrumentsinclude some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality. The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the broader international context,equality is also enshrined in regional instrumentssuch as the American Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League.The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional first generation rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action.Article 26 of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of equal and effective protection against discrimination while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties to ensure the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] without any discrimination and to secure without discrimination the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. These provisions impose a measure ofpositive obligationon States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination. The two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law.There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.

Ocampo vs. Abando 715 SCRA 673

International humanitarian law (IHL) is the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflicts, whether of an international or non-international character. This body of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict on individuals. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols are the main instruments that govern IHL. Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles contained in the Geneva Conventions are largely regarded in the international sphere as having the character of general or customary international law given the fundamental nature of the rules and because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law. In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9851 was enacted in view of its policy to [renounce] war xxx, [adopt] the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and [adhere] to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. Accordingly, [t]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.

International humanitarian law and international human rights law are two sets of regimes in international law. The two regimes have been compared and contrasted with each other, to wit: The two sets of rules certainly have a different history and often a different field of application, bothratione personaeandratione temporis. Human rights thus apply toallpeople and humanitarian law applies tocertaingroups of persons (for example, to the wounded, to prisoners o[f] war, to civilians) and, furthermore, humanitarian law applies only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, human rights and humanitarian law regulate,ratione materiae, similar rights at least insofar that they all intend to increase the protection of individuals, alleviate pain and suffering and secure the minimum standard of persons in various situations. (Emphasis in the original) Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and peace. The protection accorded by human rights laws does not cease to apply when armed conflict ensues. Still, some human rights are allowed to be derogated in times of emergency which threatens the life of the nation. Nevertheless, provisions on the right to life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and slavery remain free from any derogation whatsoever, having acquired a jus cogens character. Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties of crimes against humanity, serious violations of IHL, genocide, and other crimes against humanity. This law provides for the non-prescription of the prosecution of and execution of sentences imposed with regard to the crimes defined in the Act. It also provides for the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the crimes defined in the Act. These crimes are, therefore, separate from or independent from the crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connected with the armed uprisings. Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity or serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights laws, and Rep. Act No. 9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recognize the different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent. The contemporary view is that these can never be considered as acts in furtherance of armed conflict no matter what the motive. Incidentally, this is the view also apparently shared by the CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of the present governments peace process. View that torture and summary execution in any context are shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply been transformed into desperate cowards. Those who may have suffered or may have died because of these acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.