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Human Development as a Universal Theory of Social Change:

Cross-Level- and Cross-Cultural Evidence from 63 Societies

Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann

ABSTRACT

In this paper we introduce the concept of ‘Human Development’ as a general theory of social

change. We argue that growth of human choice, or Human Development (HD), is the general

principle that unifies three major trends of social change, namely economic modernization,

expressive value change, and democratization. From the human development perspective these

are three subprocesses within one overarching process of diminishing constraints on human

choice. Modernization (economic HD) reduces physical and cognitive constraints, expressive

value change (ethical HD) reduces motivational or ethical constraints, and democratization

(institutional HD) reduces formal or normative constraints. We show overwhelmingly strong

evidence from 63 societies of the World Values Surveys that (1) these processes originate in the

mechanism of “aspiration adjustment” on the individual level, (2) that social interaction

reinforces dramatically the relation between these processes on the cross-national level, (3) that

these relations operate primarily through a sequence from economic to ethical to institutional HD,

(4) that this sequence shows cross-cultural validity, and (5) that this sequence holds against rival

influences, in particular the transnational diffusion of changes in historically connected societies.

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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary social sciences have assembled an immense body of knowledge on three major

trends of social change, which are described as modernization in the economic sphere, as a shift

towards liberal and self-expressive values in the cultural sphere, and as move from autocratic to

democratic rules in the institutional sphere. However, in terms of a general theory of social

change, there is little clarity on the interrelation between these processes. This lack of theoretical

insight derives from a widespread disinterest in the search of the underlying dimension of these

processes. The proportion of scientists dealing with modernization, value change, or

democratization on a comparative level declines with each higher level of theoretical abstraction.

On the lowest level of abstraction, the empirical description of one of these processes, the number

of scientists is difficult to assess. On the second level of abstraction, the empirical relations

between two of these processes, the body of literature is still very large but becomes calculable.

There are many empirical studies dealing comparatively (1) with the relation between

modernization and democratic institutions (e.g. Lipset 1959, Burkhart/Lewis-Beck 1994,

Przeworski/Limongi 1997, Vanhanen 1997), (2) with modernization and value change (e.g.

Almond/Verba 1963, Inkeles/Smith 1974, Inglehart 1990, Fukuyama 1995), and (3) with value

change and democratic institutions (e.g. North 1981, Putnam 1993, Landes 1998). On the third

level of abstraction, the interrelation between all three of these processes, the number of

comparative studies does not amount to even a dozen (Dahl 1973, Huntington 1991,

Muller/Seligson 1994, Inglehart 1997). Finally, on the highest level of abstraction, there is not a

single empirical study, as far as we know, which deduces the interrelation of these processes from

its underlying dimension.

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Having no clear conception of the underlying dimension from which modernization, value

change and democratization emerge is theoretically and empirically consequential. Without such

a conception one cannot understand these processes as partial functions within the whole process

of social change. Hence, the common origin from which one could deduce the causal relations

between the partial processes remains a black box. This problem accounts for further deficiencies.

First, claims for causal relations between modernization, value change and democratization

remain strictly within the logic of bivariate relations. For instance, reasons are given for why

modernization is associated with value change, and value change with democratization, but not

why all three of these processes are connected with each other. Second, there is extreme

confusion of the existence of dominant causal directions in the relation of these processes. Is

democracy, for example, conducive to value change or value change to democracy? The literature

presents arguments for each logically possible direction in the relation between modernization,

value change and democracy. Third, though these are relations at the aggregate level, reasons why

they exist are often derived from assumptions of the behavior of individuals, but either without

making these assumptions explicit or without making plausible how exactly relations on the

individual level turn over to the aggregate level of whole nations.

In the next section we demonstrate these deficiencies by a closer look at the relevant

literature. After that we introduce the concept of Human Development (HD) as a solution of these

problems. In particular we argue that HD, or the growth of human choice, is the common origin

from which modernization, value change and democratization emerge. Viewing these processes

from their common origin allows us to determine each processe’s partial function. And knowing

their partial functions enables us to deduce straightforward hypotheses on the major causal

direction in the relation between modernization, value change and democratization. In the third

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section we present strong evidence that the (1) the HD-relations have a micrological basis on the

individual level, (2) that social interaction reinforces the HD-relations on the aggregate level, (3)

that the HD-relations hold across cultures and (4) against rival influences, such as those from

transnational diffusion of aggregate levels in HD-elements.

1. THEORY

1.1 The Puzzle of the Interrelations between Modernization, Value Change

and Democratization

Researchers concerned with long-term patterns of change in human societies have identified

modernization, value change and democratization as the three major trends in different spheres of

society. The most fundamental of these processes is modernization in the socio-economic sphere.

Modernization in this sense represents a syndrome of interrelated changes including

industrialization, urbanization, growing prosperity, the expansion of education and

communication, and increasing occupational diversification (Lerner 1958, Rustow 1963; Chirot

1986, Bell 1973, Barro 1997, Landes 1998, Hughes 1999). The second subprocess is located in

the field of culture, consisting of human beliefs and values. The key changes in this field are

described as increasing tolerance, interpersonal trust, subjective well-being, and political

moderation, as well as the rise of more self-determined forms of participation and increasingly

liberal values among mass publics (Almond/Verba 1963, Inkeles/Smith 1974, Inglehart 1977,

1990, 1997, Brint 1984, Dalton 1996, Nevitte 1996). As shown by Inglehart (1997), these

complex attitudinal changes converge in the broader dimension of self-expressive values. We will

refer to it as a shift from self-protective or -restrictive values to self-expressive values, or simply

expressive value change. The third major component of change lies in the field of political

institutions. Here the most notable development during the past two decades has been the rise and

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spread of democratic institutions through the “Third Wave” of democratization, as Huntington

terms it (Huntington 1991, Diamond 1993, Gurr/Jaggers 1995, Vanhanen 1997). The trend

towards more democracy is not only evident among former autocracies but also within

established democracies insofar as they tend to widen citizen’s opportunities to influence public

decisions. This trend goes in the direction toward more direct democracy (Budge 1996, Scarrow

1999).

Certain as these trends might be, their causal relations are extremely controversial. Indeed,

each logical possibility finds support from both theoretical rationales and empirical evidence. One

of the most widely discussed hypotheses in empirical political science is the claim that economic

development causes democracy (Lipset 1959, Coleman 1960, Cutright 1963, Russett 1965,

Bollen/Jackman 1985, Lipset/Seong/Torres 1991, Burkhart/Lewis-Beck 1994, Barro 1997,

Przeworski/Limongi 1997, Gasiorowski/Power 1998). But the opposite claim has also been made:

democratic institutions favor economic development (North 1981, Hirschman, Ersson/Lane 1996,

Leblang 1997, Yi Feng 1997, Tilly 1997, Sen 1997, Frey/Al-Roumi 1999). Moreover, some

observers argue that economic development leads to value changes (Inkeles/Smith 1974, Inglehart

1990, 1997), while others, following the tradition of Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis, emphasize

the role of culture in economic development (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995,

Granato/Inglehart/Leblang 1996, Landes 1998). The two claims are not incompatible, of course:

Inglehart, for example, argues that high levels of prosperity give rise to value changes that

eventually shift a society’s goals away from maximal exploitation of nature, leading to more

“sustainable development.” Finally, while some analysts suggest that democracy causes value

change (Rustow 1970, Barry 1973, Schmitter/Karl 1991, Muller/Seligson 1994, Rohrschneider

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1995; Jackman 1999), others emphasize the opposite flow of causation (Inglehart 1997, Dalton

1996).

Each of these possibilities can be supported by theoretically plausible reasons and empirical

evidence. One can plausibly argue that economic development should favor democracy, because

more widespread economic resources empower mass publics to carry through with their demand

for free and equal participation in the making of public policies (Vanhanen 1997). On the other

hand, the claim that democracy promotes economic development seems also plausible, since the

freedom rights connected with democracy allow citizens to unfold their creative potential,

including commercial engagement, and because democracy urges governments to be responsive

to the people’s demand for rising prosperity (North 1981, Landes 1998). In this context, Sen

(1999) has shown that less developed democracies, such as India, never experienced such

desastrous famines as they regularly occured in less developed autocracies like China. In line with

this finding, other authors demonstrate that democracies tend to be more successful in rising the

physical quality of life of their citizens (Diamond 1992, Lane/Ersson 1996, Frey/Al-Roumi 1999).

Empirically, there is unambiguous evidence of a close correlation between economic

development and levels of democratization, which could be taken to support either or both

interpretations. But both interpretations have to deal with striking deviant cases. On one hand, the

existence of a relatively democratic but poor India seems to contradict the thesis that democracy

generates economic development; while the existence of the rich but autocratic Persian Gulf

states and Singapore seem to contradict the thesis that economic development automatically

generates democracy.1

1 But against the counter-factual indication given by the Gulf-states one can argue that

economic growth that derives from the exploitation of natural resources (instead of

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Another and even more controversial debate concerns the relation between value change

and democratization. One group of authors (Almond/Verba 1963; Eckstein 1966; Putnam 1993;

Inglehart 1997) argues that value change towards pro-democratic attitudes must occur first before

democratic institutions gain stability. Against this claim another camp of scholars postulates that

democratic institutions must be in place first before a pro-democratic political culture can evolve.

These authors argue that pro-democratic attitudes can only emerge through “habituation” or

“instituional learning” from the practical use of democratic institutions (Rustow 1970, Barry

1973, Schmitter/Karl 1991, Muller/Seligson 1994, Rohrschneider 1995, Jackman 1999). Thus,

there is a contradiction between the claim that a pro-democratic culture creates stable democratic

institutions and the opposite claim that long-lasting democratic institutions produce a pro-

democratic culture.

1.2 Revisiting the Debate from the Perspective of Human Development

The debate so far is characterized by an under-specification of the common dimension in which

modernization, value change and democratization converge. All scholars argue within the logic of

bivariate relations, rather than deducing their causal hypotheses from a more general logic of

social change. But we need to understand this overall logic in order to deduce from it the partial

processes’ specific function in social change as a whole.

investments in human capital) is not conducive to democracy (Barro 1997). A historical

example is Spain who, at the time of early colonialism, became the richest European nation

because of the state-managed exploitation of Latin American silver. In contrast to Holland

and England whose colonial prosperity derived from private commerce, Spain and Portugal

did not develop liberal institutions (Landes 1998).

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We propose the growth of human choice in society, or Human Development (HD), as the

general principle which links all three processes. Following Sen HD can be understood as the

development of human beings’ capabilities and opportunities to base their lives on free choice. In

this sense HD can take place on different levels. First, it can take place on the level of the

biological human potential, where HD means the evolution of human beings’ genetical capacities

to make free choice. The major process in biological HD is the evolution of the human brain.

With each step in the long-lasting evolution of the neocortex, human beings’ cognitive capacities

to conceptualize options and to make choices between them grew (Birch/Cobb 1986). Second,

HD occurs on the level of personal actualization of the genetical potential. Different persons have

different achievement motivations and thus make different use of their potential. These

differences may be characterized as personal HD (Inkeles/Diamond 1980). And third HD can

take place on the level of the societal opportunity structure, where HD means large-scale

contextual conditions which determine human beings’ chances to actualize their personal

potential. This is how we define societal HD.

Clearly a social theory of HD can only start from the third level. It is evident that different

human beings have different personal talents and potentials but the ranges of those differences are

similar in each human community (Birch/Cobb 1986, Cavalli-Sforza 1996). Human communities

show neither a difference in biological HD nor on the ranges in which their human beings differ

in personal HD (Diamond 1997). But communities show dramatic differences in the opportunity

structure that they offer human beings to unfold their potentials. This opportunity structure is the

topic of a social theory of HD. From the perspective of societal HD we can reconceptualize

modernization, expressive value change and democratization as partial functions in the growth of

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human choice in society. Each of these processes reduces one specific constraint on human

choice.

Modernization, or economic HD, reduces constraints on the level of objective means by

enlarging peoples’ physical and cognitive resources. Value change, or ethical HD, reduces

constraints on the level of subjective aspirations by intensifying human strive for self-expression.

And democratization, or institutional HD, reduces constraints on the level of formal rules by

granting citizens with ”negative” and ”positive” freedom rights (see Table 1 for a summary of our

concept).

Table 1 (about here)

Economic resources, expressive values, and freedom rights improve the societal

opportunity structure in favor of human choice. This is most obvious in case of freedom rights

because they are defined on the societal, not the individual, level. But the same is true for

economic resources and expressive values. Though different individuals within the same society

dispose of these HD-elements in different degrees, aggregate measures should not be considered

as an accumulation of genuine individual characteristics. Also reversely aggregate levels of

resources and values indicate the opportunity structure with which people are confronted when

they grow into a given society. People who are born into an affluent and expressive society have

better chances to become rich and to develop an expressive orientation themselves than people

who grow up in a poor and protective society.

Economic, ethical, and institutional HD do not only share the theoretical focus of growing

human choice. Empirically, too, they tend to correspond to each other, either on low, middle or

high levels, with societies which are far or less advanced in one of the HD-elements also being far

or less advanced in the other HD-elements. The question, however, is how this correspondence is

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generated. A universal theory of social change must locate the mechanism of correspondence in

the individual. Otherwise this theory would only be a single-level theory lacking an

anthropological or behavioral basis. But a theory that deserves the attribute of a social theory

must also offer an explanation on how the mechanism of correspondence is transferred from the

individual to the societal level.

We argue that the basic mechanism of correspondence on the individual level is aspiration

adjustment, which implies that human beings tend to adjust their subjective aspirations to their

objective means. If opportunities increase on the level of objective means by the process of

resource mobilization, human beings tend to rise their subjective aspirations, giving more

emphasis on individual self-expression. Human motivation is led in general by the strive for self-

expression or growing choice. This evident from the World Values Surveys, since these data

show that individuals‘ life satisfaction depends significantly on their feeling of having free choice

in their lives. The average Pearson correlation between life satisfaction and the feeling of free

choice points to .37 over 118 national surveys (significant at the .0001-level in most surveys),

with a standard error of the mean correlation of only .008 (the lowest correlation being .09 and

.61 the largest). However, human beings tend to adjust the priority on self-expression to the

margin given by their objective means (Maslow 1954, McCarthy/Zonderman/McRae 1996,

Birch/Cobb 1986, Sirgy 1996, Hagerty 1999). Therefore, we will see from the World Values

Surveys that people with higher education and higher incomes (i.e., greater physical and cognitive

resources) put stronger emphasis on self-expression. These people have greater means to unfold

their potential which makes it perfectly rational that they put stronger emphasis on self-

expression. This is the micrological origin of the relation between resource mobilization and

expressive values. In addition, there is a micrological origin of the relation between expressive

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values and democratic institutions. When people gain an increasingly self-expressive orientation

it becomes perfectly rational that they support democracy, since democracy is the regime that

enlarges their formal opportunities for self-expression. Exactly for this reason we will see that

people tend to be the more supportive of democracy the stronger they emphasize expressive

values.

However, as we will show, these relations are much more pronounced on the societal than

on the individual level. The relation between resource mobilization and expressive values shows

a .20 correlation on the individual level but a .80 correlation on the societal level. Similarly, the

correlation between expressive values and democratic institutions points to a .20 correlation on

the individual level but to a .90 correlation on the societal level. These differences indicate that

the HD-relations become dramatically strengthened when transmitted from the individual to the

aggregate level. Logically this must have to do with the aggregation process itself. We explain the

enforcement-effect of aggregation by a mechanism of social interaction. Resource-rich people in

each society have a significant tendency to expressive values, but when a society comprises many

resource-rich people who are interrelated they reinforce each other in their expressive tendency,

thus rising the national expressive tendency on the mass-level. Depending on the proportion of

resource-reich people the enforcement-effect of social interaction is weak or strong. Therefore,

social interaction increases the cross-national variation in mass tendencies. So the few rich people

in poor societies (such as Nigeria) have substantially lower expressive tendencies than the few

poor people in prosperous societies (such as Germany). The difference in expressiveness between

the few rich people in poor societies and the few poor people in rich societies is much larger than

the corresponding difference between rich and poor people within the same society. Similarly, the

difference in democratic support between more and less expressive individuals within the same

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society is much lower than the corresponding difference between the few highly-expressive

people in low-expressive societies (such as Russia) and the few low-expressive people in highly-

expressive societies (such as Sweden). This observation indicates that nations’ central tendency

on the mass-level represent in themselves a contextual impact sui generis, binding individual

variances within the center of gravitiy given by the national mean in expressive values and

support for democracy (note that in each society the mean in expressive values and support for

democracy represents indeed the center of gravity because these attitudes are distributed in

perfectly bell-shaped form around the national mean).

Summing this up, people become increasingly self-expressive if societies mobilize more

resources. And people become increasingly supportive of democracy if the societal shift to self-

expressive values makes democracy the rational choice of regime. It is conceivable that

expressive values contribute reversely to resource mobilization because expressive people show

higher achievement motivation in general and thus also in economic activity. However, people

will not put strong emphasis on self-expression if there is only a narrow margin for self-

expression on the basis of physical and cognitive resources. Similarly, it is conceivable that

people learn to support democracy by practical use of its rules. But in how far people are prepared

to learn the use of democratic rules depends on how far their value orientations let them view

democracy as the preferable regime. Since the behavioral mechanism of aspiration adjustment

works from objective means to subjective aspirations (i.e., from resources to values) rather than

the reverse, the reinforcement of aspiration adjustment through social interaction, too, must

operate in the direction from resource mobilization to expressive values to democratic support.

From the logic of aspiration adjustment on the individual level and from the logic of the

reinforcing transfer of aspiration adjustment to the societal level, it is much more plausible that

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causation—not only but—primarily moves along the sequence from economic to ethical to

institutional HD. In the next section we will present evidence for our hypotheses from 63

societies of the World Values Surveys.

2. ANALYSES

2.1 Micro-Level Evidence

In our theory political culture, or value orientations, play a central role as the ethical element of

HD linking economic and institutional HD. Because of the importance of value orientations we

need cross-national survey data to test our theory. The broadest available data are the World

Values Surveys (WVS), which comprise 124 national representative surveys conducted in 63

societies between 1981 and 1998 representing more than 75 percent of the world’s population.2

Covering a wide range of cultural traits, economic development levels and ranging from

authoritarian states to long-established democracies, this sample can reasonably be viewed as

representing the universe of states.

Our micro-level hypotheses claim that the relation between resource mobilization and

expressive values on one hand, and the relation between expressive values and democratic

institutions on the other hand, are present on the individual level in each society regardless of its

particular cultural background. We measure individual differences in resource mobilization (with

regard to physical resources) by income and (with regard to cognitive resources) by education.

Variable V217 of the WVS provides a 10-category measure of rising levels of formal educational

2 Ronald Inglehart is the coordinator of the World Values Survey study group. World Values

Surveys I and II are available via the International Consortium for Political Research (study-

no.: 6160) at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. World Values Survey III will be

available soon. See the web page of the WVS-study group: “http://wvs.isr.umich.edu.”

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attainment. Similarly, V227 gives a 10-category measure of rising income decils in a country.

Though educational and income levels are hardly comparable across nations, they can be used to

identify individuals’ different resource levels within societies.

The level of individuals’ expressive orientation is measured by a factor scale based on 10

attitudes summarized by a confirmatory factor analyses. We forced to generate two factors using

varimax rotation and administered the factor analyses using the pooled data of all 124 surveys. As

with Inglehart’s (1997) earlier analyses, we obtain a religios/secular value dimension (which is

not of further interest here) and a protective/expressive value dimension (or survival/self-

expression dimension to use Inglehart’s term) with higher factor scores indicating higher

emphasis on self-expression. Attitudes loading on the protective/expressive dimension are (1)

“liberty aspirations” (.733 net loading) measured by a 6-point scale indicating peoples’ priority

for “protecting freedom of speech,” “having a say in important government decisions,” and

“greater say in job and community”; (2) “spontaneous engagement” (.485 net loading) given

when people reported to have already signed a petition (V118); (3) “tolerance” (.468) measured

on a 10-point scale indicating peoples’ tolerance towards homosexuality (V197); (4) “happiness”

(.472 net loading) measured on a 4-point scale indicating rising feelings of personal happiness

(V65); (5) “interpersonal trust” (.158 net loading) indicated when people reported to generally

trust other citizens (V27).

Support for democracy is measured by an index developed by Klingemann (Klingemann

1999; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999). The basic idea of this index is to measure “consistent”

support for democracy. This is done by subtracting support of “having a strong leader” (V154)

and “having the army rule” (V156) from support of “having a democratic system” (V157) and

“democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (V163). Since

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the partial indices are based on 4-point ordinal scales this additive combination produces an index

reaching from –8 (no support for democracy) to +8 (strong consistent support for democracy).

Table 2 (about here)

The evidence given in Table 2 is overwhelmingly in favor of our micro-level hypotheses.

For nearly each society for which the relevant variables could be generated we observe a

significantly positive correlation between the variables mentioned above. Considering the relation

between resource mobilization and expressive values, we observe that in 92 out of 94 surveys the

correlation between individuals’ income level and expressive values is significantly positive at

least on the .01-level but in the large majority of surveys on the .0001-level pointing to an average

Pearson correlation of .23. The few exceptions are China II (but not China III) and South Africa I

(but not South Africa II). Similarly in 52 out of 55 surveys, individuals’ expressive values rise

significantly with growing education levels, mostly at the .0001-level with an average Pearson

correlation of .21. The few exceptions here are the Philippines II and Nigeria II and III. It is

important to notice that the strength and significance of correlations does not substantially vary

between nations of different cultural zones of the globe. This can be seen from comparing the

regional averages (calculated only of the basis of significant correlations) with the global average.

The relation between expressive values and democratic institutions, too, appears to have a

micrological origin. In 39 out of 40 surveys there is a significant positive correlation between

individuals’ support for democracy and expressive values, amounting to a .19 Pearson correlation

on average (note that the questions necessary to generate the support for democracy index have

only been asked in the 3rd WVS, primarily in Eastern European and Latin American countries).

In 31 of these surveys the correlation is significant at the .0001-level. In three surveys it is

significant on the .001-level, and in three others on the .01-level, and in only four surveys

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(Azerbaijan, India, Moldova, Taiwan) the correlation is insignificant with one having the wrong

sign (Azerbaijan).

These findings give undubitable evidence that the HD-relations are generally valid on the

individual level and thus have a micrological origin in practically each society. Though these

correlations are not exceptionally strong, they are at least fairly strong for individual level data.

The most important information to prove that the HD-relations have a micrological origin is not

the magnitude of these correlations but the fact that they are significant and have the expected

sign. Actually we did not expect these correlations to be exceptionally strong on the individual

level because the variance between individuals’ attitudes is bounded in each society within the

national center of gravitiy. Since limited variances in singular attitudes limits the covariance

between them, one should not expect exceptionally strong correlations within nations. But as we

hypothesized, it is another case when looking at the cross-national correlations for the same HD-

relations.

2.2 Macro-Level Evidence

2.2.1 Bivariate Correlations

The measures we use to indicate resource mobilization on the individual level are not comparable

across nations, since nations have different educational systems which makes it difficult to see

similar levels of educational attainment as equivalent for different nations. Moreover, the income

levels in the surveys are given by an individual’s position in income decils of a national sample.

Since nations show extremely different average income levels, the same decil in one nation is not

equivalent with the same decil in another nation. So we should use an objective measure of a

nation’s level of resource mobilization. And we should use a comprehensive measure which

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combines physical and cognitive resources. Given these premises, we decided to use Vanhanen’s

index of economic resource distribution (Vanhanen 1997).

Vanhanen generates his index from six indicators which he combines additively to three

subindices for the distribution of physical resources (1), the distribution of cognitive reources (2),

and occupational diversification (3). The subindex of physical resource distribution is generated

from indicators for the share of family farms in the agricultural sector (weighted for the

agricultural sector’s share in GDP) and the deconcentration of non-agricultural resources

(measured by 100 minus the share in GDP generated by the state, foreign enterprises and large

national trusts). The subindex of cognitive resource distribution is measured by the number of

students per 100,000 inhabitants and the literacy rate. And the subindex of occupational

diversification is produced from the proportion of the urban population and the percentage of the

non-agricultural work force (for a description of data sources and scaling procedures, see

Vanhanen 1997:42-63). Assuming that the additive subindices represent three different

dimensions of resource distribution, Vanhanen multiplies these subindices to generate his overall

measure of resource distribution. Theoretically this index can range from 0 to 100. We

experimented also with other indices, such as per capita GDP, the Physical Quality of Life Index

and the Human Development Index. But these indices show substantially lower connections with

our aggregate measures of ethical and institutional HD.

On the aggregate level we are less interested in the relation between expressive values and

support for democracy (though this relation is much stronger there than on the individual level

with a .62 Pearson correlation). Instead we are more interested in the direct relationship between

expressive values and democratic institutions (which cannot be measured on the individual level).

Therefore, we need an indicator for the societies’ objective level of democratic institutions.

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Democratic institutions are relevant for Human Development insofar as they grant citizens

freedom rights. Thus, we need an indicator which measures democracy in its freedom rights

dimension. Given this premise, Vanhanen’s indicator of democracy is not adequate, since this

index measures participation rates and the competitiveness of national elections. The same is true

for the Gurr/Jaggers-index which taps constitutional traits but not freedom rights (Gurr/Jaggers

1995). So from the HD-perspective, the freedom rights measures of Freedom House provide the

most reliable indicators for institutional HD (see Freedom in the World 1996:530-5 for a

description of sampling and scaling procedures). In contrast to many other scholars we do not use

the average of the political and civil rights scores but the product of these scores. This is a crucial

improvement, since a global inspection (Figure 3) of these scores shows that democratization

occured much more in the political rights dimension by introducing free and competitive

elections but substantially less in the civil rights dimension. This implies that many “illiberal” or

merely “electoral” democracies came into being—a fact that we would average out when working

with the mean instead of the product of the two scores.

Figures 1 and 2 show in how far the equivalents of the HD-relations on the individual level

do also exist on the aggregate level of national societies. Figure 1 shows the cross-national

correlation between resource mobilization (RM) measured in 1993 and expressive values (EV)

taken from the third WVS in 1995-98. Figure 2 shows the cross-national correlation between

expressive values and democratic institutions (DI). We used a long term measure of democratic

institutions, since the impact of long-term stable expressive values on democratic institutions

must be most pronounced in the long run. Because the yearly product of the highest possible civil

and political rights scores can generate (7*7=) 49 points at the maximum, the highest possible

level that democratic institutions could have reached over the 27 years from 1972 to 1998

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amounts to (27*49=) 1,323 points. This level has been reached, for instance, by Switzerland,

Sweden and the US.

As one can clearly see, the equivalents of the individual-level HD-relations are much more

pronounced on the macro-level. While the correlation between resource mobilization and

expressive values points to only .23 (in case of education) or .21 (in case of income) on the

individual level, the corresponding correlation points to .80 on the macro-level (significant at the

.000-level). Similarly, the correlation between expressive values and democratic institutions on

the micro-level points to .19 but to .90 on the macro-level (significant at the .000-level). This is

indicative for the enforcement of individual tendencies on the mass-level, thus transferring the

variation between nations into much larger scales than those observed between individuals within

societies. So we can explain 80% of the variance in nations’ expressive values by the cross-

national variance in resource mobilization. And long-term differences in democratic institutions

can be explained with nearly 90% by cross-national variation in expressive values.

Figures 1 and 2 (about here)

As one can see, the HD-relations are steeply but curvilinearly increasing with varying

slopes along the course of progressing HD. On low levels of resource mobilization, let’s say from

Belarus to Latvia, expressive values rise steeply with additional units of resource mobilization;

while on middle levels of resource mobilization (from Latvia to Argentina), increases in

expressive values are less steep with additional units in resource mobilization; and on high levels

of resource mobilization (from Japan to Norway) expressive values again rise very steeply with

additional units in resource mobilization. Considering the relation between expressive values and

democratic institutions, in the broad middle zone of expressive values (from Bosnia-Herzegovina

to Venezuela) democratic institutions improve very steeply with additional units of expressive

20

values; while on low levels of expressive values (from Russia to Nigeria) as well as on high

levels (from Japan to Sweden) there is no significant improvement of democratic institutions with

additional units of expressive values. As it seems, the increase in expressive values must surpass

a critical threshold (approximately the level of Hungary) to have an effect on democratic

institutions. On very high levels of expressive values, by contrast, there is a marginal

improvement on democratic institutions when approaching the possible maximum level.

2.2.2 Cross-Cultural Validity

We have seen in Table 2 that the HD-relations within societies do not substantially differ for the

cultural zones of these societies. Table 3 documents that the same is true for the macro-level. The

cross-national HD-relations remain on fairly strong and significantly positive levels within each

of the cultural zones covered by the WVS. Obviously, the existence of positively significant HD-

relations is nothing that differs between cultural zones. The existence of these relations is

independent from cultural zones. But by contrast, differences between cultural zones are not

independent from differences in levels of HD. Quite the contrary, cultural differences can be

expressed in varying HD-levels, with cultural zones scoring high or low in resource mobilization

also scoring high or low in expressive values and democratic institutions. Since cultural zones

tend to be homogenous on either low, middle or high levels in each of the three HD-elements, the

explainable variance within cultural zones is lower than the variance between them. This explains

why the correlations become lower when disaggregated from the global level to the regional level

of cultural zones.

Table 3 (about here)

Though the HD-relations tend to be a little bit lower in the postcommunist zone, also here

they are on a fairly high level pointing to Pearson correlations between .44 and .52. The lower but

21

still fairly high level of these correlations in the postcommunist zone reflects that communism

was a historical formation that, by political means, disturbed the HD-relations. But communism

did not destroy the HD-relations. Even among these countries expressive values emerged in

proportion to resource mobilization and gave rise to democratic institutions when the

international opportunity occured at the end of the 1980s. Communism failed because it disturbed

but could not destroy the HD-relations. But the question of causal directionality requires more

intense investigation.

2.2.3 Causal Relations

The close correlations between all three of the HD-elements suggest that they indeed tap a

common underlying dimension, that of Human Development. Therefore, it is plausible to assume

that these relations are reciprocal. However, as explained in section 1.2, there are strong

theoretical reasons (from the logic of aspiration adjustment and its enforcing aggregation to the

societal level) that these relations are not perfectly symmetric in each direction, but follow at least

a relatively dominant direction along the sequence from resource mobilization to expressive

values to democratic institutions. Whether this or the opposite sequence is true can be tested

within a recursive system of equations in which each of the three HD-elements appears at one

time as a dependent variable regressed on preceding levels of the other two HD-elements. But

causation requires not only that causes must precede effects but also that other important

influences are controlled for. One such control predictor in each of our equations should be the

interaction effect of the two regressors, since it is possible that HD-relations differ in strength on

different HD-levels, in which case the interaction effect would have a significant impact.

However, controlling for the interaction of two of the HD-elements does not introduce elements

22

from outside of our theory as control predictors. In order to apply a severe test of our theory we

should introduce control predictors tapping strictly contradicting assumptions.

In this context, two traits of HD-theory can be challenged. This is at first true for the

assumption that societies’ levels in one HD-element are endogenously caused by her levels in the

other HD-elements or their interaction, respectively. In order to test the endogeneity-assumption

we operationalize an exogenously driven effect, namely transnational diffusion of HD-levels from

other societies within the same cultural zone. Thus we include in each of the three equations the

diffusion-effect of the dependent variable by assigning each country the average regional level of

the dependent HD-element. A second trait of our theory is its claim of cultural generalizability.

For many scholars this might reflect one of the most dubitable assumptions, since many

researchers still believe that expressive values and democratic institutions are inherently Western

phenomenons (Bollen/Jackman 1985). We follow the suggestion of other scholars to indicate the

strength of the Western tradition by Western Christianity measured as the percentage of

Protestants plus Catholics in a population (Muller/Seligson 1994).3 So we introduce Western

Christianity as an additional control predictor. Should our theory be true, then diffusion predictors

and Western Christianity should come out as the least significant and weakest predictors in each

of our models. Thus, we have three equations, one for each of the HD-elements as the dependent

variable regressed on lagged measures of the remaining two HD-elements as well as on their

interaction effect and on diffusion and Western Christianity. We assume, first, that in each

equation one of the HD-elements turns out to be a stronger and more significant predictor than

diffusion and Western Christianity. Second, from our sequence-thesis we assume (a) that resource

3 These figures are taken from the Britannica book of the year 1991 and refer mostly to the

mid 1980s.

23

mobilization wins over democratic institutions in predicting expressive values, and (b) that

expressive values win over resource mobilization in predicting democratic institutions. Predicting

resource mobilization, our sequential thesis does not provide a favorable effect—except that one

of the HD-elements should win over diffusion and Western Christianity.

The next task for correct modelling is to identify the adequate time sequence for measuring

variables. We have measures of democratic institutions for each year since 1972, measures of

expressive values for 1981, 1990-91 and 1995-98 (for partly different subsets of countries) and

measures of resource mobilization for 1988 and 1993. In particular the latter urges us to work

with time lags of not more than five years between independent and dependent variables. But

fortunately the resource mobilization measures lay exactly arround the time window through

which the 3rd Wave of democratization has moved. This is an absolutely crucial information.

Resource mobilization and expressive value change evolve incremental and continuously since

these are quasi-natural processes which cannot be targetedly steered. But with democratic

institutions the case is completely different. Democratic institutions are the product of deliberate

constitutional creation implemented by national elites. Therefore, the shape of regime institutions

can nearly completely change over night through far reaching constituional recreation. Exactly

that happened during the 3rd Wave of democratization when more than 30 countries worldwide

adopted democratic institutions within a very short time, namely the period between 1987/88 and

1992/93. Inspecting that global move empirically using the Freedom House scores (Figure 3) one

can see that nearly all countries were on stable levels of democratic institutions over the five-year

period before the 3rd wave (1983-88) and again on rather stable levels over the five-year term

after that wave (1993-98). But during that wave many countries experienced a major shift

upwards from their levels in 1983-88 to the levels in 1993-98.

24

Figure 3 (about here)

In order to test the sequential thesis correctly, we must measure the variables in the

historically adequate time sequence. So we should measure democratic institutions over mid-term

periods before and after the 3rd Wave, and we should use in our models the 1990-91 measure of

expressive values as the center around which we arrange preceding and subsequent measures of

democratic institutions and resource mobilization. Denoting democratic institutions as DI,

expressive values as EV, resource mobilization as RM, diffusion variables with suffix DIF_,

Western Christianity as WESTCHR, regression coefficients with , the constant with c, and the

error term with , we obtain the following system of recursive sequential equations:

(1) EV1990=c+ 1*RM1988+ 2*DI1983-88+ 3*(RM*DI)+ 4*DIF_EV+ 5*WESTCHR+

(2) DI1993-98=c+ 1*EV1990+ 2*RM1988+ 3*(EV*RM)+ 4*DIF_DI+ 5*WESTCHR+

(3) RM1993=c+ 1*EV1990+ 2*DI1990+ 3*(EV*DI)+ 4*DIF_RM+ 5*WESTCHR+

Using only the 1990 EV-measure would reduce our sample to 42 nations, though 63 nations

took part in all three waves of the WVS. Therefore, we imputed missing values for EV for 21

nations from the existing information on their EV-levels measured either in 1981 or in 1995-95

and from the existing data on RM, DI and WESTCHR. Since the explained variance of EV

regressed on these variables is more than 90%, one can be sure that these imputations produce

reliable data. Using the newest technique for multiple imputation from the AMELIA-program

developed by King et. al. (1999) cannot produce another variance-covariance structure than that

of the existing data. However, in order to exclude that we rely on artifacts produced by

imputation, we calculated the equations also with the existing data only. These figures are given

in parentheses in Tables 4-6. As one can see, they do not differ from the results with imputed

data. So we can rest our conclusions on the models with imputed data. Another problem which

25

we expected to ocuur (because of the close correlations betweeen the HD-elements) is

collinearity. Therefore, we calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to detect problems with

collinearity.4

Tables 4 to 6 (about here)

Considering the results, we obtain a clear effect structure. In none of the analyses does the

introduction of the two control predictors outside the HD-relations increase the explained

variance substantially nor does it change the effect structure within the HD-relations. And in none

of the models, does Western Christianity play a significant role. Thus, our theory is not

invalidated by the assumption that it would not hold in non-Western cultures. Moreover, in all

models at least one the HD-elements is among the most significant and strongest predictors. And

in predicting expressive values, resource mobilization seems to be far more important than

democratic institutions, as suggested by our sequential thesis. However, some results contradict

our hypotheses. Predicting expressive values, the regional diffusion of expressive values seems to

be more important than levels of resource mobilization and democratic institutions within

societies. Moreover, in predicting democratic institutions, resource mobilization seems to be

much more important than expressive values (in contrast to our sequential thesis). However, an

inspection of the Variance Inflation Factors indicates that some coefficients are by far too highly

inflated with collinearity in order to be seen as reliable. This is true for the effect of resource

mobilization on expressive values (VIF=18.289), the effect of the interaction between resource

4 Variance Inflation Factors represent a measure of collinearity among predictors. Following

a common convention, the values should remain below 5.0 or the results can be considered

adulterated by collinearity (Judge et al. 1988: 869). The formula for the variance inflation

factor is: VIF = 1 / (1 – Rj2).

26

mobilization and democratic institutions on expressive values (29.035), the effect of expressive

values on democratic institutions (10.673), the effect of expressive values on resource

mobilization (26.335), and the effect of the interaction between expressive values and democratic

institutions on resource mobilization (18.363).

The most appropriate way to deal with such strong indications of collinearity is to bias the

estimators with a k-factor in Ridge-regression (Kmenta 1997:440-1). With increasing k-factors

that method reduces the determination coefficient but takes variance inflation out of the

coefficients and stabilizes them approaching their true relation to each other. Following the “ridge

trace” of the coefficients (which is produced by displaying the change in effect-relation for

increasing k-factors), one obtains a picture of the true effect relation. The ridge traces of the

effects shown in Tables 4-6 are displayed in Figures 4-6. We do not look at the magnitude of the

coefficients but at the change in their relative size to each other based on their T-Ratios, i.e. the

ratio of the magnitude of the regression coefficient to its standard error.

Figures 4 to 6 (about here)

All changes that occur in the ridge-traces bring the results systematically more in line with

our sequential thesis. Predicting expressive values (Figure 4), the effect of democratic institutions

remains at a minor level compared to resource mobilization, while the relative effect of value-

diffusion becomes smaller and smaller falling substantially below the level of resource

mobilization. Thus, HD-effects play the major role in predicting expressive values with resource

mobilization being the dominant effect, as suggested by our sequential theses. In addition it turns

out that democratic institutions play an important role only in interaction with resource

mobilization, indicating that democratic institutions have an impact on expressive values but only

in connection with rising levels of resource mobilization.

27

Predicting democratic institutions (Figure 5), the effect of expressive values moves steeply

upwards reaching nearly the same level as the effect of resource mobilization, all other effects

being on minor levels. Similar dramatic changes occur in predicting resource mobilization

(Figure 6), where the effect of expressive values rapidly moves to the highest level with

increasing k-factors. Thus, it seems that expressive values are an important predictor of both

democratic institutions and resource mobilization, representing the linkage element between

economic and institutional HD. The strongest indication of recursiveness applies to the relation

between expressive values and resource mobilization, while democratic institutions do neither

have a major impact on resource mobilization nor on expressive values once controlled for the

other HD-elements. Institutional HD seems to be more a consequence than a precondition of

economic and ethical HD.

However, the statistical evidence for causation is limited and does not justify a definite

decision. It is still a matter of theoretical interpretation. But what is at least overwhelmingly

evident is that the interrelations between the HD-elements are exceptionally strong and hold

against rival influences. Moreover, even if these effects should be strongly recursive, such

recursivity necessarily implies that causation does also flow along the sequence from resource

mobilization to expressive values to democratic institutions. So let us concentrate on exactly that

sequence and whether it holds for rival influences.

2.2.4 The Economic-Ethical-Institutional HD-Sequence

In order to test the existence of the economic-ethical-institutional sequence directly, we apply a

two-stage-least squares regression model in which we predict democratic institutitons measured

after the 3rd Wave (DI1993-98) with expressive values measured within the 3rd Wave (EV1990)

using resource mobilization measured before the 3rd Wave (RM1988) as an instrument to obtain

28

more reliable estimates of expressive values. Again we test this sequence against the two major

opposing explanations of democratic institutions: regional diffusion of democratic institutions

(DIF_DI) and Western culture (WESTCHR). The results are shown in Table 7.

Table 7 (about here)

According to Table 7 expressive values clearly outmatch the effects of regional diffusion

and Western culture in predicting democratic institutions. The impact of expressive values is

significant at the .000-level, while none of the two rival effects comes near any acceptable

significance-level. This result is strictly in line with our theory. Yet, similar levels of democratic

institutions can result from either high regime stability or from far reaching regime change during

the 3rd Wave. Therefore, the question arises whether the sequence also holds in explaining ranges

of change in democratic institutions. In order to give an answer to this question we test the effect

of expressive values directly against that of resource mobilization, since from the analyses above

resource mobilization seemed to have a slightly more important impact on democratic institutions

than expressive values.

Figure 7 (about here)

For this purpose, we must differentiate countries into different start groups, since different

levels of democracy before the 3rd Wave allow for different ranges of change in direction to

democracy. Hence, we categorized countries according to the level of democracy with which they

entered the 3rd Wave into four groups: minimum start level, low start level, medium start level

and high start level. Figure 7 demonstrates that in all four groups ranges of change rise

significantly in proportion to levels of expressive values, with increasing slopes along with

decreasing start levels of democratic institutions. This reflects the simple fact that greater ranges

of democratic change could be reached from lower start levels of democracy.

29

Table 8 (about here)

In Table 8 we controlled the effect of expressive values on democratic institutions for levels

of resource mobilization. We did that in a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) for

the different start levels of democracy. Using SUR has the advantage that we calculate the

regressions from a common error structure which makes coefficients more comparable (Kmenta

1997:635-48). What we see from Table 9 is that within each start-level group the effect of

expressive values outmatches that of resource mobilization, being significant at least on the .0-

level, while resource mobilization does not show any significant effect once controlled for

expressive values. The level of expressive values present in 1990 actually had a major impact on

democratic change that occured during the 3rd Wave.

SUMMARY AND SPECULATION

In this paper we introduced the concept of ‘Human Development’ as a general theory of social

change. We argued that the growth of human choice, or Human Development (HD), is the general

principle that unifies the three major trends in social change, namely economic modernization,

expressive value change, and democratization. From the human development perspective these

are three subprocesses within one overarching process of diminishing constraints on human

choice. Modernization (economic HD) reduces physical and cognitive constraints, expressive

value change (ethical HD) reduces motivational or aspirational constraints, and democratization

(institutional HD) reduces formal or normative constraints.

We have shown strong evidence from 63 societies of the World Values Surveys that (1)

these processes originate in the mechanism of aspiration adjustment on the individual level, (2)

that social interaction reinforces dramatically the relation between these processes on the cross-

national level, (3) that these relations operate—may be not only but also—along a sequence from

30

economic to ethical to institutional HD, (4) that this sequence shows cross-cultural validity, and

(5) that this sequence holds against rival influences, in particular the transnational diffusion of

changes in historically connected societies.

HD-theory has several advantages. It identifies the micrological or behavioral-

anthropological basis of cross-national relations in the mechanism of aspiration adjustment. It

offers an explanation how the micrological relations are transferred to the societal level through

social interaction. And it identifies the common focus of three major processes of change making

the claim that this focus is culturally universal. The human strive for greater choice is a universal

but one that comes into work on the ethical level only if the needed resource basis is present. But

when the economic and ethical basis of human choice exceed a certain level, then there is mass

pressure on elites to preserve or deepen democracy—the regime that opens the widest margin for

human choice.

HD guided the whole human history when societies rose from one civilizational level to

another, for instance from hunting-gathering-societies to agricultural societies or from agricultural

to mercantile societies. Each civilizational step widened human choice, but only for privileged

groups such as casts, estates or classes. HD had an extremely exclusionary character over the

largest part of human history. Against this background, the entrance into the inclusive phase of

HD was an evolutionary leap. It occured at first in Northwestern Europe, beginning with the

Mercantile and the Industrial Revolution. But inclusve HD diffused all over Europe, North

America, Australasia, Japan, Southeast Asia and some parts of Southern America. Inclusive HD

even occurs in some Islamic societes, such as Malaysia and Indonesia which are the most recent

democratizing countries. In the past, the entrance into into increasingly progressive and inclusive

HD was caused by ecological advantages. Already in the pre-industrial era HD had a more

31

inclusive character in the Western Europe and Northern America, since steady rainfall did not

allow for a despotic agricultural regime as it occured in the great river valley civilizations

(Nolan/Lenski 1984, Midlarski 1999). Similarly, the Southeast Asian economies’ take off had

much to do with the fact that these societies did not dispose over large natural resources and

therefore were forced to invest in human capital (Barro 1997, Landes 1998). However, in the era

of global communication societes can much more lear from each other, thus being less dependent

on ecological advantages in the future. This offers improved opportunities for societies in Sub-

Saharan Africa and Central Asia to catch up in HD.

HD theory offers immense possibilities for further research and discussion. For instance,

one can investigate HD for sequences, for different profiles in different regions, for the degrees of

freedom that elites have to influence HD. One can investigate HD on the individual level and the

societal level. One can ask for the relation between biological and societal HD. One can discuss

societal HD in human history. HD can be easily linked to the moral or philosophical discussion

on the universality of human rights. HD is linked with questions of “sustainable development,”

since ethical HD (expressive values) brings with it more ecological consciousness. And finally,

HD is linked with the development of civil society and social capital, because expressive values

increase a society’s creative potential. In summary, HD may really have the potential for an

integrating theory of social change.

32

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39

Table 1. The Concept of (Societal) Human Development

The three components of Human Development (HD)

Characteristics of the

components

I. Economic

component

II. Ethical

component

III. Institutional

component

Meaning of the HD-

components

Human resources

(“hardware”)

Liberal values

(“software”)

Guarantees for freedom

(“user-rights“)

Spheres in which the HD-

components emerge

Economic structure

Political culture

Regime institutions

Processes generating the

HD-components

Socio-economic

modernization

Expressive value change

Liberalization,

Democratization

Components’ contribution

to HD

Reducing material and

cognitive constraints on

human choice

Reducing motivational and

ethical constraints on

human choice

Reducing institutional and

formal constraints on

human choice

Focal point in which the

components converge

The growth of human choice in society

(Human Development)

40

Table 2. Micro-Level Evidence for the HD-Relations

Income and Expressive

Values

Education and Expressive

Values

Expressive Values and

Support for Democracy

Survey sample

Pearson’ R

N

Pearson’s R

N

Pearson’s R

N

Anglo-Saxon world:

Australia 3 .24*** 1,716 .18*** 1,883 .22*** 1,843

Canada 1 .16*** 928

Canada 2 .22*** 1,317

Iceland 1 .09** 764

Ireland 1 .15** 415

Ireland 2 .30*** 835

New Zealand 3 .26*** 598

Northern Ireland 1 .24*** 222

USA 2 .22*** 1,530

USA 3 .29*** 1,224 .25*** 1,332 .14*** 1,273

UK 1 .18*** 639

UK 2 .24*** 1,006

Mean (SE mean) .21 (.02) .23 (.02) .18 (.04)

Protestant Europe:

Denmark 1 .18*** 852 .20*** 588

Denmark 2 .31*** 801

Finland 2 .09* 457 .20*** 457

Finland 3 .20*** 822 .17*** 873 .32*** 800

Germany (West) 1 .12*** 846

Germany (West) 2 .23*** 1,302

Germany (West) 3 .23*** 767 .27*** 924 .32*** 912

Netherlands 1 .12** 509

Netherlands 2 .26*** 723

Norway 1 .18*** 931

Norway 2 .23*** 912 .31*** 1,070

Norway 3 .28*** 1,008 .34*** 1,079 .23*** 1,057

Sweden 1 .13*** 648

Sweden 2 .21*** 776 .25*** 857

Sweden 3 .24*** 791 .25*** 868 .27*** 842

Switzerland 2 .24*** 591 .12** 667

Switzerland 3 .23*** 803 .15*** 994 .16*** 875

Mean (SE mean) .20 (.01) .23 (.02) .26 (.03)

Catholic Europe:

Austria 2 .22*** 1,155 .35*** 1,190

Belgium 1 .25*** 617

Belgium 2 .25*** 1,381

France 1 .24*** 783

France 2 .35*** 721

Italy 1 .19*** 883

Italy 2 .21*** 1,263

Portugal 2 .20*** 984

Spain 1 .23*** 1,549

41

Spain 2 .25*** 2,786

Spain 3 .26*** 774 .28*** 1,040 .22*** 907

Mean (SE mean) .24 (.01) .32 (.04) .22

Continuation of Table 2

Income and Expressive

Values

Education and Expressive

Values

Expressive Values and

Support for Democracy

Survey sample

Pearson’ R

N

Pearson’s R

N

Pearson’s R

N

Postcommunist

Central Europe:

Czech Republic 2 .16*** 921 .18*** 775

Germany (East) 2 .16*** 997

Germany (East) 3 .29*** 825 .33*** 932 .22*** 897

Hungary 2 .24*** 879

Hungary 3 .22*** 531

Poland 2 .26*** 786 .14*** 785

Poland 3 .38*** 979 .28*** 1,016 .15*** 1,016

Slovakia 3 .32*** 751 .25*** 772

Slovenia 2 .36*** 758

Slovenia 3 .38*** 928 .27*** 814

Mean (SE mean) .26 (.03) .29 (.04) .22 (.02)

Postcommunist

Balkans:

Albania .14*** 583

Bulgaria 2 .31*** 774

Bulgaria .21*** 495

Croatia 3 .35*** 1,000 .22*** 965

Macedonia 3 .08* 668

Montenegro 3 .36*** 172 .25** 184 .26*** 143

Romania 2 .32*** 1,022

Romania 3 .10*** 810

Serbia 3 .24*** 1,021 .22*** 1,075 .21*** 906

Mean (SE mean) .31 (.02) .27 (.04) .17 (.03)

Postsoviet Europe:

Armenia 3 .24*** 1,602 .09*** 1,688 .17*** 1,688

Belarus 2 .10** 872

Belarus 3 .23*** 1,535 .22*** 1,600 .20*** 1,316

Estonia 2 .08** 846 .08* 847

Estonia 3 .37*** 864 .22*** 853 .23*** 774

Georgia 3 .26*** 2,141 .10*** 2,213 .13*** 2,082

Latvia 2 .09** 612 .11** 621

Latvia 3 .31*** 988 .22*** 1,018 .23*** 836

Lithuania 2 .18*** 813 .11** 820

Lithuania 3 .29*** 730 .27*** 567 .13** 567

Moldova 3 .28*** 846 .24*** 863 .02 781

Russia 2 .13*** 1,297

42

Russia 3 .31*** 1,577 .19*** 1,662 .25*** 1,281

Ukraine 3 .26*** 1,658 .20*** 1,949 .13*** 1,330

Mean (SE mean) .22 (.02) .17 (.02) .18 (.02)

Table 2 to be continued

43

Continuation of Table 2

Income and Expressive

Values

Education and Expressive

Values

Expressive Values and

Support for Democracy

Survey sample

Pearson’ R

N

Pearson’s R

N

Pearson’s R

N

Latin America:

Argentina 2 .24*** 661

Argentina 3 .23*** 768 .23*** 918 .27*** 825

Brazil 2 .11*** 1,609 .07** 1,703

Brazil 3 .13*** 1,068 .07** 1,113 .16*** 1,058

Chile 2 .22*** 1,344

Chile 3 .29*** 932 .17*** 921 .18*** 865

Dominican Rep. 3 .22*** 295 .16** 350 .14* 277

Mexico 1 .11*** 1,319

Mexico 2 .12*** 1,117

Mexico 3 .23*** 1,123 .17*** 1,266 .06* 1,041

Peru 3 .15*** 921 .23*** 1,078 .10** 870

Uruguay 3 .27*** 831 .22*** 879 .23*** 717

Venezuela 3 .18*** 1,059 .13*** 1,101

Mean (SE mean) .19 (.02) .16 (.02) .16 (.03)

Far East:

China 2 –.02 902

China 3 .31*** 1,291 .14*** 1,290

India 2 .14*** 2,068 .10*** 2,128

India 3 .23*** 1,257 .25*** 1,537 .04* 1,554

Japan 1 .13*** 671

Japan 2 .23*** 596

Japan 3 .24*** 670 .17*** 518

Philippines 3 .02 1,176 .08** 1,176

South Korea 2 .18*** 1,086 .27*** 1,131

Taiwan 3 .25*** 1,170 .20*** 1,020 .02 1,176

Mean (SE) .21 (.02) .19 (.03) .10 (.03)

Sub-Saharan Africa:

Ghana 3 .56** 27 .36* 48

Nigeria 2 .20*** 808 –.04 896

Nigeria 3 .20*** 1,960 .08 2,462

South Africa 1 .18*** 950

South Africa 2 .37*** 2,095 .32*** 2,306

South Africa 3 .31*** 2,219

Mean (SE mean) .30 (.06) .34 (.02)

Islamic countries:

Azerbaijan 3 .22*** 1,513 .07*** 1,507 –.02 1,507

Bosnia-Herzeg. 3 .19*** 947 .12*** 952

Turkey 2 .20*** 908 .14*** 860

Pakistan 3 .36*** 923 .26*** 923

Mean (SE mean) .26 (.05) .17 (.04) .12

44

Overall mean (SE) .23 (.01) .21 (.01) .19 (.01)

45

Table 3. Cross-Cultural Validity of HD-Relations on the Macro-Level

Bivariate Correlation (Pearson’s R)

Cultural Zones

Resource

Mobilization with

Expressive Values

Expressive Values

with Democratic

Institutions

Protestant-Anglosaxon World

.663***

(36)

.720***

(36)

Catholic-Latin World

.771***

(27)

.556**

(27)

Postcommunist World

.435**

(23)

.522**

(23)

Far East

.685*

(11)

.947***

(11)

Islamic World

.751*

(10)

.586*

(10)

Source: Pooled Aggregate Data of WVS I-III.

46

Table 4. Regressing Expressive Values on Prior Levels of Resource Mobilization

and Democratic Institutions (non-imputed data in parentheses)

Dependent Variable: EV1990

Model 1.1.1

(Model 1.1.2)

Model 1.2.1

(Model 1.2.2)

Predictors

VIF

B

T-Ratio

Beta

B

T-Ratio

Beta

Constant

–1.201

(–1.139)

–9.373***

(–6.512***)

–.738

(–.656)

–4.839***

(–3.383**)

RM1988

18.289

(23.653)

.03715

(.04524)

2.906**

(2.752**)

.588

(.755)

.02524

(.02947)

2.098**

(1.825*)

.400

(.492)

DI1983-88

7.710

(8.178)

.00178

(.00166)

1.667

(1.139)

.204

(.200)

.00022

(.00079)

.209

(.598)

.026

(.095)

RM*DI

29.035

(35.313)

.00003

(00004)

.603

(–.058)

.150

(–.020)

.00002738

(.00001313)

.585

(.022)

.140

(.007)

DIF_EV

2.098

(3.304)

——

——

——

.450

(.430)

4.548***

(4.090***)

.403

(.412)

WESTCHR

3.963

(1.916)

——

——

——

.0008369

(.0004060)

.475

(–.185)

.031

(–.014)

Adj. R2

.832

(.823)

.877

(.874)

N

63

(42)

63

(42)

47

Table 5. Regressing Democratic Institutions on Prior Levels of Expressive Values

and Resource Mobilization (non-imputed data in parentheses)

Dependent Variable: DI1993-98

Model 2.1.1

(Model 2.1.2)

Model 2.2.1

(Model 2.2.2)

Predictors

VIF

B

T-Ratio

Beta

B

T-Ratio

Beta

Constant

139.606

(151.287)

5.970***

(5.433***)

98.493

(96.016)

2.078*

(1.800*)

EV1990

10.673

(11.619)

30.983

(19.128)

1.508

(.716)

.367

(.247)

11.936

(3.898)

.531

(.139)

.141

(.050)

RM1988

6.002

(7.936)

3.211

(3.548)

3.015**

(2.863**)

.602

(.764)

2.871

(3.475)

2.699**

(2.500*)

.538

(.749)

EV*RM

8.846

(8.606)

–.596

(–.805)

–.999

(–1.128)

–.200

(–.311)

–.174

(–.119)

–.242

(–.623)

–.059

(–.194)

DIF_DI

2.336

(4.718)

——

——

——

.077

(.182)

1.555

(.622)

.193

(.144)

WESTCHR

5.136

(4.359)

——

——

——

.446

(.554)

.285

(1.560)

.053

(.250)

Adj. R2

.577

(.502)

.589

(.537)

N

63

(42)

63

(42)

48

Table 6. Regressing Resource Mobilization on Prior Levels of Expressive Values

and Democratic Institutions (non-imputed data in parentheses)

Dependent Variable: RM1993

Model 3.1.1

(Model 3.1.2)

Model 3.2.1

(Model 3.2.2)

Predictors

VIF

B

T-Ratio

Beta

B

T-Ratio

Beta

Constant

8.240

(7.689)

1.988*

(1.328)

7.449

(7.796)

1.510

(1.144)

EV1990

26.335

(34.130)

4.650

(7.372)

1.228

(1.246)

.275

(.422)

4.433

(7.807)

1.028

(1.179)

.262

(.447)

DI1990

4.138

(3.614)

.246

(.260)

4.532***

(3.573**)

.435

(.417)

.241

(.262)

4.219***

(3.402)

.427

(.420)

EV*DI

18.368

(24.125)

.066

(.0325)

1.542

(.499)

.278

(.144)

.062

(.0234)

1.221

(.325)

.260

(.103)

DIF_RM

2.539

(5.096)

——

——

——

.056

(.0384)

–.087

(.224)

–.007

(.033)

WESTCHR

5.613

(2.120)

——

——

——

–.003

(–.0154)

.393

(–.327)

.046

(–.031)

Adj. R2

.849

(.836)

.844

(.827)

N

63

(42)

63

(42)

49

Table 7. Controlling the Resources–Values–Institutions Sequence for Western Culture

and Diffusion in Two-Stage-Least Squares Regression

Dependent Variable: DI1993-98

Predictors

B

T-Ratio

Beta

Constant

240.198

3.728***

EV1990

79.524

3.902***

.941

DIF_DI

–.345

–1.040

–.235

WESTCHR

.427

1.599

.185

Adj. R2

.554

N

63

Note: SPSS-syntax advising the two-stage least squares regression “2SLS di9398 WITH ev1990

/INSTRUMENTS= rm1988.”

50

Table 8. Predicting Ranges of Change in Democratic Institutions from a

System of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions

Dependent Variable: DICHG

Predictors

VIF

B

T-Ratio

Beta

Minimum Start Level of Democracy

Constant

181.783

5.175***

EV1990

1.642

54.342

2.453*

.513

RM1988

1.642

2.838

1.235

.258

Adj. R2 (N)

.442 (22)

Low Start Level of Democracy

Constant

150.115

2.597*

EV1990

1.225

164.339

2.561*

.665

RM1988

1.225

1.477

.845

.219

Adj. R2 (N)

.505 (10)

Medium Start Level of Democracy

Constant

22.775

.685

EV1990

5.103

137.252

3.284**

1.211

RM1988

5.103

–1.966

–1.133

–.418

Adj. R2 (N)

.680 (13)

High Start Level of Democracy

Constant

–54.136

–2.059*

EV1990

1.164

21.017

2.706*

.578

RM1988

1.164

.436

.647

.138

Adj. R2 (N)

.335 (18)

51

Figure 1. Resource Mobilization and Expressive Values

EV1996=–1.655+.12339*RM1993–.00331*(RM1993)2+.00004*(RM1993)

3

Adj. R2: .78

RM_1993

55,050,045,040,035,030,025,020,015,010,05,00,0

EV

_1996

2,5

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

-,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0

MAC

COL

ALB

BAN

DOR

AZEGEO

GHA

URUVEN

PER

RUS

LAT

LIT

TUR

TAI

PAK

ROM

IND

BEL

CHI

NIG

BRA

SWI

POLSKO

FIN

ARG

SWE

NOR

HUN

SAF

JAP

USA

SPA

WGR

UK

52

Figure 2. Expressive Values and Democratic Institutions

DI1972-98=579.144+467.963*EV1996+67.381*(EV1996)2–54.326*(EV1996)

3

Adj. R2: .87

EV_96

2,52,01,51,0,50,0-,5-1,0-1,5-2,0

DI_

72-9

8

1400

1300

1200

1100

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

BOH

SLO

CRO

COL

ALB

BAN

DOR

AZE

GEO

VEN

RUS

LATLIT

TUR

TAI

CHN

BUL

EGR

IND

BEL

CHI

NIG

BRA

SWI

SKO

FIN

ARG

SWE

HUN

SAF

MEX

JAP

USA

SPA

WGR

UK

53

Figure 3. Net Number of Countries per Year with Changes in Freedom Rights

of at least 2 Points

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

19

72

-73

19

73

-74

19

74

-75

19

75

-76

19

76

-77

19

77

-78

19

78

-79

19

79

-80

19

80

-81

19

81

-82

19

82

-83

19

83

-84

19

84

-85

19

85

-86

19

86

-87

19

87

-88

19

88

-89

19

89

-90

19

90

-91

19

91

-92

19

92

-93

19

93

-94

19

94

-95

19

95

-96

19

96

-97

19

97

-98

Number of net changes in civil rights Number of net changes in political rights

54

Figure 4. Ridge Trace of T-Ratios of Effects on Expressive Values (Table 4)

Note: Explained variance decreasing from 83% (no k-factor) to 82% (k=1).

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0,01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

RM

DI

RM*DI

WESCHR

DIF_EV

55

Figure 5. Ridge Trace of T-Ratios of Effects on Democratic Institutions (Table 5)

Note: Explained variance decreasing from 58% (no k-factor) to 53% (k=1).

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0,01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

EV

RM

EV*RM

WESCHR

DIF_DI

56

Figure 6. Ridge Trace of T-Ratios of Effects on Resource Mobilization (Table 6)

Note: Explained variance decreasing from 85% (no k-factor) to 79% (k=1).

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0.001 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

DI

EV

DI*EV

WESCHR

DIF_RM

57

Figure 7. Expressive Values and Ranges of Change in Democratic Institutions

R2: .56 (points), .58 (squares), .70 (triangles peak up), .40 (triangles peak down)

EV_1990

2,82,52,32,01,81,51,31,0,8,5,30,0-,3-,5-,8-1,0-1,3-1,5-1,8-2,0-2,3-2,5

DIc

h

275

250

225

200

175

150

125

100

75

50

25

0

-25

-50

-75

-100

-125

-150

Jap.

Aust.

Belg.

Italy

Switz. Swed.Canad. NL

GBTurk.

IndiaNig.

Columb.

Urug.

Venez.

Peru

Arg.

Spain

Finld.

Azer.Phil.

Ghana

Taiw.

China

S.Kor.

Bosnia

Croat.

Port.

Georg.

S.Afr.

Armen.

Rus.Ukr.

Lith.

Belar.

Slovak.

Maced.Alb.

Roman.

Sloven.

Czech

Pold.Hung.

Chile

Ger. (E)