Hp and Compaq

8/3/2019 Hp and Compaq

1/46

HP-Compaq Merger - Analysis


2/46

Compaq pre-merger

y Compaq Founded in 1982

y Primary strength - Innovation

y Compaqs primary business divisions

y Access, commercial and consumer PCs

y Enterprise computing: servers and storage products

y Global services

y Market leader in PCs, with more international sales than US

y Market leader in fault tolerant computing and industry standardservers


3/46

Compaq pre-merger

y Compaq had successfully created a direct model in PCs

y #2 in the PC business, stronger on the commercial side

y

Continuously weakening performance made Compaqdirectors impatient

y Dell became strong competitor through cost efficiency

y Compaq missed the online bus and its made-to-order system

through its retail outlets failed to take off due to badinventory management


4/46

Compaq pre-merger

y To bring Compaq to the online market, Capellas (CEO)bought Digital Equipment (AltaVista)

y Acquisition was incohesive resulting in 15000 layoffs and lossin 1998

y New management lacked the cutting edge to maintainstability

y

Bad investmentsy Got caught in a cycle of cost cutting and layoffs

y Firm was too small and poorly run to maintain its wide arrayof products and services


5/46

Hewlett Packard pre-merger

y Started in 1938 by two Stanford graduates William Hewlettand David Packard. HP incorporated in 1947

y HP introduced its first PC in 1980 and the LaserJet(companys most successful product) in 1985

y In 2000, HP had 85,000 employees and revenues of $48.8 bn

y Ranked 13th among Fortune 500


6/46

Growing problems at HP

y HP was not adapting to technological innovation fast enough

y Margins were going down

y

IPG (HPs Imaging and Printing Group) was the leader in itsmarket segment but did not rank anywhere among top 3 inservers, storage or services

y Printing line was facing competition from Lexmark and

Epson which were selling lower-quality inexpensive printersy Needed to build strong complementary business lines


7/46

Fiorina tries to rejuvenate HP

y Carly Fiorina joined in 1999 hoping to excite acomplacent HP

y Cut salaries, laid off employees

y Wanted to make high end computers HPs focus

y According to her, home and business PCs, UNIX

servers were the biggest areas of growth


8/46

Pre-merger statistics for Compaq

and HPCompany Market share in high end

servers

Revenue

Compaq 3% $134 mn

HP 11.4% $512mn

Company Market share in mid-range

UNIX servers

Revenue

Compaq 4% $488 mn

HP 30.3% $3,675 mn

Company Market share in laptops

for quarter 2 (volume

share)

Market share in PCs for

quarter 2 (volume share)

Compaq 12.1% 11.6%

HP 6.9% 4.5%


9/46

HPs position before merger

y By 2001, as the industry stumbled, meetinggrowth targets became difficult for HP and it wasforced to cut jobs and scrap plans

y As a result HP stock price dropped drastically.

y Turning the company around required more than

just strategy from within


10/46

Falling stock prices prior to merger

Back


11/46

Potential impact of Merger

y Merger would create a full-service technology firmcapable of doing everything from selling PCs andprinters to setting up complex networks

y Merger would eliminate redundant product groupsand costs in marketing, advertising, and shipping,while at the same time preserving much of the two

companies revenues.


12/46

Market Benefits

y Merger will creates immediate end to end leadership

y Compaq was a clear #2 in the PC business and stronger on thecommercial side than HP, but HP was stronger on the consumer side.Together they would be #1 in market share in 2001

y The merger would also greatly expand the numbers of the companysservice professionals. As a result, HP would have the largest marketshare in all hardware market segments and become the number threein market share in services.

y

Improves access to the market with Compaqs direct capability andlow cost structure

y The much bigger company would have scale advantages: gainingbargaining power with suppliers; and scope advantage: gaining share ofwallet in major accounts .


13/46

Operational benefits of Merger

y HP and Compaq have highly complimentary R&Dcapabilities

y

HP was strong in mid and high-end UNIX servers, a weaknessfor Compaq; while Compaq was strong in low-end industrystandard (Intel) servers, a weakness for HP

y Top management has experience with complexorganizational changes

y Merger would result in work force reduction by around15,000 employees saving around $1.5 billion per year


14/46

Financial Benefits

y Merger will result in substantial increase in profitmargin and liquidity

y 2.5 billion is the estimated value of annualsynergies

y Provides the combined entity with better ability

to reinvest


15/46

Considerations for Merger

y HPs strategy is to move to higher margin less commodity likebusiness, hence merging with Compaq is a strategic misfit.

y Larger PC position resulting from the merger is likely to increase

risk and dilute shareholders interest in imaging and printingy Lower growth prospects on invested capital

y Market position in key attractive segments remain same

y Services remain highly weighed to lower margin segment

y

No precedent for success in big technology transactionsy Market reaction for the merger is negative

y Revenue risk might offset synergies

y HP and Compaq have different cultures

yIncreased equity risk and hence cost of capital


16/46

Summary of Deal

A

nnouncement Date September 4, 2001Name of the merged entity Hewlett Packard

Chairman and CEO Carly Fiorina

President Michael Capellas

Ticker symbol change From HWP to HPQ

Form of payment Stock

Exchange Ratio 0.6325 HPQ shares to each CompaqShareholder

Ownership in merged company 64% - former HWP shareholders

36% - former CPQ shareholdersOwnership of Hewlett and PackardFamilies

18.6% before merger8.4% after merger

Accounting Method Purchase

Merger method ReverseTriangular Merger


17/46

Reverse Triangular merger

y A subsidiary Heloise Merger Corporation was created solely tofacilitate the merger

y Result : A tax free reorganization in which HP would control all ofCompaqs assets through a wholly owned subsidiary

Hewlett Packard

Heliose MergerCorp

CompaqShareholders

Compaq

Stock (Cash for fractional shares)

Stock


18/46

TRADING PERFORMANCE IN THE WAKE

OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT

Date HWP Closing

Price (in $)

HWP

Percentage

Change

CPQ Closing

Price (in $)

CPQ

Percentage

Change

8/28/2001 24.61 -1.6% 13.32 0.4%

8/29/2001 23.95 -2.7% 13.13 -1.4%

8/30/2001 23.40 -2.3% 12.69 -3.4%

8/31/2001 23.21 -0.8% 12.35 -2.7%

9/4/2001 18.87 -18.7% 11.08 -10.3%9/5/2001 18.21 -3.5% 10.41 -6.0%

9/6/2001 17.70 -2.8% 10.35 -0.6%

9/7/2001 18.08 2.1% 10.59 2.3%


19/46

Deal Valuation

The final Exchange Ratio 0.6325 HPQ shares per Compaqshare

Exchange ratio implied by themarket as on 31 Aug, 2001

0.5356 HPQ shares per Compaqshare

Exchange ratio implied by the 12month market performance of HPand Compaq stocks

0.596 HPQ shares per Compaqshare

Compaqs Valuation by the market

pre-merger announcement

$20.995 billion

Compaqs Valuation by HP asimplied by the final exchange ratio

$24.995 billion


20/46

Deal Valuation (Contd..)

Acquisition Premiumy Acquisition Premium is the difference between the worth of a Compaq

share as valued by HP and the market valuation of a Compaq share

y The Premium will depend on the length of the period considered whiledetermining the market valuation of Compaq

Period ending Aug 31 2001 Average Exchange ratio ImpliedAcquisition

Premium paid by HP (in

%)

Aug 31, 2001 0.535 18.9

10 day average 0.544 16.3

30 day average 0.573 10.3

3 month average 0.557 13.7




21/46

Valuing the Merger was a challenge

because.y Recession :The largely negative outlook for the economy

overall and the tech sector in particular circa 2001

y Volatile trading activity : NASDAQ suffered a 30% drop inthe 12 months preceding the merger announcement

y Valuation multiples for comparable companies and recentcomparable transactions were broadly distributed.


22/46

Valuation ofSynergies

y $2.5 billion pre-tax cost savings in year 2004

y NPV of Cost savings estimated at $5 to $9/share of the combinedentity

The result is based on the following estimations :

y P/E multiples ranged from 15x to 25x

y Weighted cost of equity of HP-Compaq 15%

y Effective tax rate of the combined entity 26%

y Pre-tax profit decline of close to $500 million in 2004 resulting fromoverall revenue loss of approximately $4.1 billion for the combinedentity

y Weighted average contribution margin of 12%


23/46

Deal Multiples vs. Market Multiples

Deal Multiples Market Multiples

EV/EBITDA 82.72 69.07

P/E NA NA

EV/Sales 0.72 0.60

Value ofSynergies > Price ofSynergies

HPs Valuation of a Compaq share at the time of dealannouncement : $14.68

Compaqs share price at the time of announcement : $12.35

Price paid for Synergies as per market valuation : $ 2.33

Synergies valued at $5-$9 per share !!


24/46

Compaq capital structure

y Compaq capital structurey The authorized capital stock of Compaq consisted of:

y 3,000,000,000 shares of Compaq Common Stock, par value $0.01per share

y 10,000,000 shares of preferred stock, par value $0.01 per share

y At the close of business on June 30, 2001:

y 1,753,000,000 shares of Compaq Common Stock were issued andoutstanding

y 59,000,000 shares of Compaq Common Stock were issued and heldby Compaq in its treasury

Stock Options : As of the close of business on August 14,2001y ESOP :279,538,000 shares of Compaq Common Stock are subject to

issuance pursuant to outstanding options to purchase Compaq CommonStock


25/46

Merger Team Structure


26/46

Post Merger integration

Merger IntegrationTeam Size: 1200

Big Bang concept: Communicate merger to Channel partners,

customers

Both companies are in similar businesses: CombineProduct road maps

Deliver on the short-term synergies in six to 12months They don't need two Unix or NT development

teams

15,000 Jobs Eliminated HP:6000 Compaq: 8500

Problems with sackings: Even talent packs theirbags

Achieving the integration will be tied to peoples

compensation packages

Human resourceintegration

INTRANET

Operationsmanagementintegration

Sales forceIntegration


27/46

Operational Efficiencies Achieved merger-related cost savings of more than $1.3B annually

Restructured direct material procurement to save $450M annually Redesigned products & re-qualifying components to save $300M

Consolidated multiple mfg sites achieving $120M in annualized savings

Achieved manufacturing savings of $200M annually

Reduced supply chain headcount by 2,700

Realized logistics savings of $100M+ annually

Indirect Procurement negotiated annual savings of $220M


28/46

Post Merger integration


29/46

Strategic Integration

y Out-compete Dell:The new HP needed a highly competitive directsales model

- 50% of retail shelf space was occupied by HP & Compaq

- Direct sales model benefited from Compaq direct sales model

y Out-compete IBM

- Manage the high level relationships with global enterprise

customers-With help of Compaq consultants managed 40 big deals in

competition with IBM


30/46

Shareholder value

y Myth:y A strategically poor integration will be reflected by the stock

markets pushing the combined company's stock price down , anillustration of how mergers can destroy value

y Fact :y In mid-July 2007, five years after the merger announcement, HP's

total shareholder returns were up 46 percent. Over the sameperiod, the Standard & Poor's IT index had sunk 9 percent, rivalIBM was down 23 percent, and even Dell was up only 2 percent.


31/46

HP vs. S&P 500 : last 5 years

Link


32/46

HP vs. IBM : last 5 years


33/46

HP vs. Dell : last 5 years


34/46

HP vs. Sun : last 5 years


35/46

HP vs. Canon : last 5 years


36/46

PC business

y Myth:y HP, even after combining with Compaq, cannot fight Dells direct-

sales model with their retail (indirect) plus direct model

y Fact :

y HPs PC business has steadily improved and is bringing competitionto Dell that Dell has not seen for the past 5 or 10 years

y Dell's PC shipments worldwide share fell to 15.2 % from 18.2 %last year, a particularly sharp decline given that the overall market

grew 10.9 percenty Hewlett-Packard holds 19.1 percent of the world PC market

y Even in the US, HP and Dell have 24.2 and 26.8 % of the PCmarket in 2007


37/46

Printer business

y Myth:

y HP is pursuing only market share in printers instead of ROI

y Fact :y

In HPs printer business, good share consists of devices thatdeliver color, photos, lots of output, and perform multiplefunctions.Those characteristics lead to more pages printed, andmore profitability. HP has extended that business, leaving low-end, single-function printers to competitors.

y The company also refused to respond to Dell price-cuttingintended to weaken HP's market share in printers


38/46

Server business

y Myth:y Pursuing more market share in PCs will divert resources and

distract attention from its strengths in printers and servers

y Fact :

Vendor 2007

Revenue

(Mn US $)

2007

Share

(%)

2007

Revenue

(Mn US $)

2007

Share

(%)

Growth

(%)

IBM 4069 31 3824 30.9 6.4

HP 3707 28.2 3424 27.8 8.0

Sun 1711 13 1620 13.1 5.6

Dell 1526 11.6 1270 10.3 20.2

Fujitsu/Siemens 542 4.1 554 4.5 -2.3


39/46

Market shares and operating margins


40/46

Revenues and earnings from operations

-2000

-1000

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

100000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Revenue Earnings from operations


41/46

Achieved benefits for customers

y HP now offers a one-stop shopping experience for globalcorporate customers

y The company has the ability to procure everything from PDAs

to commercial printers and servers from the same sourcey The economies of scale have helped HP focus on its legacy of

manufacturing innovation

y It can build and deliver precisely the product that customers

need and want to buy.


42/46

Achieved benefits for customers

y Ease of doing businessy The supply chain strategy allows a single point of collaboration

with HP, simplifying suppliers interaction with HP, increasingbusiness collaboration, and lowering costs for both parties.

yEnhanced supply and demand visibilityy This visibility improves participants ability to predict demand.

It also enables suppliers to build purchasing, manufacturing, andlogistical efficiencies into their own supply chains. Further, itenables suppliers to pass associated discounts onto customers

such as HPy Elimination of non-value-added steps, such as administration,

and costs


43/46

The Rationalized Product Portfolio

y HP branded: Notebooks

Desktops, workstations

Servers (complete range from high-end to low-end), blade

servers, storage Printers & printing consumables

Scanners

IT Solutions

y

Compaq Desktops

Notebooks


44/46

References

y Buchanan, Anna D.,The Merger of HP and Compaq, Case (A) and (B),Darden Business Publishing, 2004

y Hoopes, Charlotte L.,The Hewlett-Packard and Compaq Merger: ACase Study in Business Communication, Marriott School of

Managementy Supply Chain Management for the adaptive enterprise, HPs Internal

Document

y www.nasdaq.com

y Strategic Analysis:The Integration of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq,

Tiffany Adams and Renee Poutousy Compaq and Hewlett-Packard, Mergent Online, www.mergent.com

y Burgelman, Robert A. and Webb McKinney, Managing the StrategicDynamics of Acquisition Integration: Lessons from HP and Compaq,

Aug 2005


45/46

Contributions

y Simeen Mirza Premerger Scenario

y Pingali Bharadwaja V R - Rationale

y Shrikanth K Deal financials

y

Surya Prashant S N Rao - Integrationy Nilangsu Mahanty Evaluation of merger

But finally, everybody worked on everything..


46/46

Thank You

Documents

Hp and Compaq