How_conceptually_Guided_are_Kantian_Intuitions_ (1).doc

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How Conceptually Guided are Kantian Intuitions?1

Jessica J. Williams

1. Introduction

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant draws a distinction between intuitions, which

are singular representations that pertain to objects immediately, and concepts, which are

general representations that are used to determine the objects of intuition by serving as the

predicates of judgments. The receptive faculty of sensibility is responsible for intuitions,

insofar as it is affected by objects, while concepts spring from the spontaneous faculty of

understanding. Kant writes, bjects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it

alone affords us intuitions! but they are thought through the understanding, and from it arise

concepts" #$%&'())*+. Kant famously notes in the Introduction that sensibility and

understanding are the two stems of human cognition" #$%'(+&* and in the Transcendental

-ogic he writes that, these two faculties or capacities cannot echange their functions"

#(/'$%* although cognition re0uires their co1operation. The distinction that Kant draws

between the faculties of sensibility and understanding and the representations associated with

them, intuitions and concepts, has been a point of interest to several contemporary

philosophers engaged in the debate over the possibility of nonconceptual mental content.

John 2c3owell has argued forcefully against the possibility of nonconceptual content on

Kantian grounds. While 2c3owell ac4nowledges that, for Kant, eperience is the result of

the co1operation of sensibility and understanding, he claims that intuitions already have

conceptual content, and moreover, that receptivity does not ma4e an even notionally

separable contribution to the co1operation" #%&&5, &*. 6onversely, -ucy $llais and 7obert

8anna have both offered nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant and have turned to his

description of intuition in the Transcendental $esthetic as the model for at least certain forms

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of nonconceptual content as found in the contemporary literature.

In this paper, I will argue that the interpretations offered by 2c3owell, 8anna, and

$llais are problematic insofar as they either overloo4 or misconstrue crucial aspects of

Kant9s account of cognition, including the role of the imagination in the synthesis of

intuitions and its relationship to the understanding, and the distinction between the categories

and empirical concepts. In addition, I will argue that proper attention to these aspects

provides a more nuanced answer to the 0uestion of what we should learn from Kant

regarding the role of concepts in structuring representational content. n the one hand, I

thin4 that best interpretation of Kant is as a conceptualist because, on his account, any

intuition must be synthesi:ed by the imagination in accordance with the categories, and hence

the understanding, in order for the content to become available. This does not, however,

mean that empirical concepts have been or must be applied to the content of intuitions in

order for them to have representational character.

2. Varieties of Nonconceptualism

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of the most compelling motivations comes from the consideration of infant and non1human

animal cognition. 2ost of us will grant that infants and non1human animals, especially higher

mammals, not only have sensations, but actually represent the world. 8owever, unless we are

wor4ing with a minimalist account of concepts, it is difficult to attribute the possession of

concepts to infants and non1human animals. $ second, e0ually compelling, reason comes

from the following feature of perception> perceptual eperience seems to present a

0ualitative fineness of grain that cannot be captured by our concepts?that is, we can

perceptually discriminate aspects of eperience even without corresponding concepts.

2oreover, perceptual eperience can present contradictory and paradoical contents, for

instance in cases of optical illusions, that concepts cannot, given the constraint of rational

consistency.

$t least one commonly accepted view among nonconceptualists is that how one

perceptually represents the world need not be constrained by the set of concepts one

possesses! however, beyond this point, a number of distinctions are drawn. The first

distinction is between the global and local lifting of the conceptualist constraint. )ne can

reject conceptual content itself and argue that all content is nonconceptual #global lifting* 5, or

one can ta4e it that concepts are re0uired to lin4 eperiential inta4e to beliefs and judgments,

but are not re0uired for perceptual eperience to have representational content. In other

words, not all representations are constrained by concepts or conceptual capacities #local

lifting*. We can rule outglobalnonconceptualist readings of Kant from the start. @o matter

how we interpret the representational content of intuitions for Kant, it is undeniable that he

thin4s that intuitions have to be conceptuali:ed at some pointif they are to factor in our

eperience of an objective world. This leaves us with the various branches of

nonconceptualism that involve a local lifting of the conceptual constraint.

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ne branch of the #local* debate is focused on the role of nonconceptual content in

subpersonal states. Within this branch, the concern is usually about the content of the early

stages of perceptual, especially visual, eperience or with the subpersonal processing of

information, where this processing is eplained in terms of physical systems operating under

causal laws. Those interested in the first domain, e.g., the content of early stages of

perceptual eperience, have relied on an interpretation of spatial and temporal orientation that

is nonconceptual. Aor the purposes of this paper, I thin4 we can ta4e the issue of the

conceptual independence of spatial and temporal representation at the early stages of

perceptual eperience to be a subset of the larger 0uestion of such independence in

perception in general. Aurthermore, many of the 0uestions that arise in relation to subpersonal

states are a matter of empirical investigation or of cognitive psychology, and in some sense

fall outside the scope of Kant9s project.

$nother distinction that has been drawn within the nonconceptualist debate is between

Bstate9 and Bcontent9 nonconceptualismC> Bstate9 nonconceptualists hold that a subject can be

in a certain perceptualstate#including having intentional representations of perceptually

given particulars* without the possession of the concepts re0uired for the correct specification

of the content, while Bcontent9 nonconceptualists hold that the contentof perception itself is

different in nature and structure from the concepts employed in the propositional attitudes

specifying the content. To relate this distinction bac4 to Kant, one might want to maintain the

view that a human or non1human animal can have immediate intuitions of particulars without

the possession or application of concepts. r, one might want to go even further and claim

that the content of intuitions is fundamentally different from the content of beliefs and

judgments./

The last distinction within the nonconceptualist debate that is worth mentioning concerns

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the autonomy of nonconceptual content. The 0uestion here is whether one can have

nonconceptual content without possessing any concepts at all, i.e., autonomously. If one

affirms this possibility, then one has subscribed to the $utonomy Thesis> an animal #human

or non1human* can represent the world without the possession of any concepts or conceptual

capacitiesD. The 0uestion of autonomy in Kant is thus the 0uestion of whether intuitions have

representational character independently of the application of any concepts.

(efore going any further, we first need to understand how Kant defines intuitions.

Kant writes, The capacity #receptivity* to ac0uire representations through the way in which

we are affected by objects is called sensibility. bjects are therefore given to us by means of

sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions" #$%&'())*. Through intuition, we are

immediately presented with objects, and when this presentation depends on sensation, as it

does in perception, then we have empirical intuitions #()5'$+E*. In a trivial sense, intuitions

are nonconceptual, precisely because they are defined in opposition to concepts and are

treated as a distinct element in cognition #$E'(/5*. I say this is trivial" because despite

being defined in opposition to concepts, Kant nevertheless claims, intuitions without

concepts are blind" #(/'$%*. If by blind," Kant means that they lac4 intentional content,

then it will not matter if they are nonconceptual, because they will not be able to do the wor4

that contemporary nonconceptualists want them to do.

3.Mcowell!s Conceptualist "eadin# of Kant

In bothMind and World#%&&5* andHaving the World in View#+EE&*, 2c3owell claims

that the proper interpretation of the relationship between sensibility and understanding in

Kant is one that recogni:es that intuitions already involve conceptual capacities and hence

already have conceptual content. 2c3owell repeatedly emphasi:es that conceptual

capacities are not eercised on nonconceptual deliverances of sensibility," instead, they are


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already operative in the deliverances of sensibility themselves" #%&&5, )&*. In other words,

intuitions are conceptualshapings of sensory consciousness" #+EE&, )5*.

InMind and World, 2c3owell uses his interpretation of Kant to combat both the

coherentist view that our representations are not rationally constrained by an eternal world

#although they might be causally constrained* and the 2yth of the


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impingements on sensibility by the eternal world, where what is given to us from the causal

impact of the world is independent of our conceptual capacities. (ecause what is supposedly

given to us is independent of our conceptual capacities, it can serve as the eternal constraint

of our judgments. The problem with this, as 2c3owell sees it, is that the nonconceptual

content that is given" cannot serve to justify our judgments, because justification ta4es place

within what Wilfrid ;ellars has termed the space of reasons," insofar as justification

depends on rational relations. In other words, in order for judgments to be warranted they

must be supported by reasons, which may come in the form of implication or

probabilification. (ut nonconceptual content is precisely outside the conceptual space of

reasons. =perience can serve as the warrant for our judgments on 2c3owell9s account only

because the content of eperience is already conceptual. $s 2c3owell puts it, a bare

presence cannot be the ground for anything" #%&&5, %&*. Intuitions are precisely not bare

presences! on 2c3owell9s reading they are eperiential states that present things as being

thus1and1so. We can then go on to ma4e judgments about our intuitions, for instance, when

we affirm or deny that things are as they appear to us in intuition, but this is not to add

conceptual content to something that was first nonconceptual. 2c3owell writes, $

judgment of eperience does not introduce a new 4ind of content, but simply endorses the

conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed by the eperience on which it is

grounded" #%&&5, 5D*. Intuitions have the right 4ind of content to justify judgments, vi: .

conceptuali:ed content, but 2c3owell also thin4s that since eperience is passive, we have

the eternal constraint needed to avoid coherentism without falling prey to the 2yth of the


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involves a richness of detail that is not possessed by concepts. 2c3owell is aware of this

objection and cites 3o we really understand the

proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we can

sensibly discriminateF" #=vans, %&D+, ++&! 2c3owell, %&&5, C*. While =vans uses the

eample of colors, the point clearly etends to other features of perceptual eperience.

2c3owell responds to this line of objection by proposing that demonstrative concepts can

capture all of the detail that we are capable of perceptually discriminating. Aor 2c3owell, in

the case of color, if one has the concept of a shade of color, then one can go on to

conceptually discriminate what is perceptually presented by saying or thin4ing, that shade"

#2c3owell, %&&5, /*. 8owever, in order for a demonstrative concept to count as a concept

at all, it must be able to persist longer than the perceptual eperience itself, even if only for a

short time. This is because concepts are used to compare, sort, and contrast and they cannot

serve this function unless they have some degree of persistence. 2c3owell accounts for this

by conceiving of demonstrative concepts as recognitional capacities with conceptual content

that can be made eplicit with the help of a sample, something that is guaranteed to be

available at the time of the eperience with which the capacity sets in" #%&&5, /*. $lthough

the capacity re0uires eperience to be actuali:ed, it is nevertheless an enduring capacity

which re0uires no more than possession of a shade together with the subject9s standing

powers of discrimination" #%&&5, & fn. %C*. (y resorting to these demonstrative concepts,

2c3owell thin4s that he can salvage the richness of perceptual eperience without giving up

on the claim that the content of eperience is conceptual.

InHaving the World in View, 2c3owell maintains his interpretation of Kantian

intuitions as already involving conceptual content. 2oreover, he defends this interpretation

against Wilfred ;ellars9 claim in Science and Metaphsicsthat in addition to intuitions that

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involve the understanding, we should also interpret Kant as positing intuitions that result

from sheer receptivity" and are in no way conceptual, even if Kant did not ma4e this

distinction #+EE&, +*. $ccording to ;ellars, Kant9s account of cognition re0uires that we

posit nonconceptual episodes of sensation as guiding those intuitions that already involve

conceptual capacities. @onconceptual intuitions serve a transcendental" role because while

we need them to ground our conceptuali:ed #or proto1conceptuali:ed* intuitions, they do not

actually factor in our eperience! instead, they merely serve an eplanatory function.

Aurthermore, for ;ellars, we mustposit nonconceptual sensations as guiding our

conceptuali:ations if we are to avoid idealism. 2c3owell agrees with ;ellars9

characteri:ation of those intuitions that already involve the understanding as representations

of individual objects as this1suches, but he rejects the idea that we need to posit

nonconceptual states as grounding them, transcendentally or otherwise.

In his argument against ;ellars, 2c3owell is more eplicit about the role of conceptual

capacities in shaping sensory consciousness than he was inMind and World. Aollowing

;ellars, 2c3owell thin4s that perceptual eperience contains claims! for instance, in an

ostensible seeing of a red cube #which, if it is also a seeing, counts as an intuition*, one has

the visual impression that there is a red cube in front of one. Aor 2c3owell, intuitions

contain claims because they ehibit the same logical togetherness" of content that is found

in judgments. 2c3owell places a great deal of emphasis on Kant9s statement in the

2etaphysical 3eduction that The same function which gives unity to the various

representations in a !udgmentalso gives unity to the mere synthesis of various

representations in an intuition" #6G7, $/&'(%E51! +EE&, )E*. In order to judge that there is a

red cube in front of one, one must conceive of red" and cube" with the right 4ind of

togetherness and in a single act. This is because redness and cubeness must already show up

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as combined in an intuition if that intuition is going to justify the corresponding judgment. In

other words, the content of intuitions is already structured compositionally. In both cases, one

must actuali:e conceptual capacities, i.e. the concepts red" and cube," among others. The

actuali:ation of such conceptual capacities is the function that unifies both intuitions and

judgments, and ensures that they have the same content. Aor ;ellars, an intuition that

represents an object as a this1such involves the understanding, but he does not thin4 this

means that one must already possess or necessarily apply the concept that would correspond

to such," e.g., cube." 2c3owell, on the other hand, implies that this process already

re0uires the actuali:ation of specific concepts in perception itself #+EE&, )E*. The difference

2c3owell draws between the role of concepts in intuition and the role of concepts in

propositional attitudes is the following> in an intuition, conceptual capacities are involuntarily

drawn into operation and necessitated by the presence to sensory consciousness of objects,

whereas in beliefs and judgments, there is a free responsible eercise of the conceptual

capacities" #+EE&, )E*.

2c3owell rejects ;ellars9 idea that we need non1conceptual manifolds of sheer

receptivity because, %* as he argued inMind and World, it is difficult to see how something

outside the conceptual sphere can serve as a justification for anything that goes on inside of it

and +* we simply do not need any etra justification. 2c3owell thin4s that it is enough that

conceptual capacities are operative in receptivity rather than on some etra1conceptual given

to avoid the threat of frictionless spinning in a void."

There are a couple of 4ey reminders before moving on. The first is that 2c3owell is

interested in utili:ing Kant9s account of cognition to combat both coherentism and the 2yth

of the


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Kant9s account of intuition as already involving conceptual capacities clearly rules out

Bcontent9 nonconceptualism! 2c3owell goes to great lengths to argue that the content of

perceptual eperience must be the same 4ind of content that figures in beliefs and judgments.

2oreover, this reconstruction of Kant9s account rules out even non1autonomous cases of

nonconceptual content. Aor 2c3owell, representational content is only available to a subject

whose conceptual capacities are actuali:ed in sensory consciousness.

$. %llais and Hanna& '(e Nonconceptualist Interpretation of Kant

While 2c3owell has argued for a strong conceptualist interpretation of Kant, 7obert

8anna and -ucy $llais have both offered interpretations of Kant in which nonconceptual

content does play a role in Kant9s account of cognition. 8owever, there are notable

differences in the degree of nonconceptualism that $llais and 8anna attribute to Kant. $llais,

for instance, is most interested in arguing that intuition does ma4e at least a notionally

separable contribution to cognition, but her overall interpretation is best described as

autonomous Bstate9 nonconceptualism. ;he argues that, on Kant9s account, an individual can

be in a perceptual state with representational content without the application of concepts or

the possession of conceptual capacities, but she does not thin4 that the content of intuitions is

different in structure from that of concepts. While it is true, on her interpretation, that the

application of concepts can further determine the content of intuitions, the synthetic character

of intuition #that which is responsible for its structure and intentionality on her account* does

not re0uire the application of concepts or conceptual capacities #$llais +EE&> 5E/*. 8anna, on

the other hand, goes beyond Bstate9 nonconceptualism in maintaining the view that, for Kant,

the content of intuitions is cognitively and semantically independent of concepts" #8anna

+EE> +/*. 3espite these differences, 8anna and $llais share the view that, according to

Kant, intuition does not depend on any concepts for the representation of particular objects

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#although both admit that concepts are re0uired for the representation of an object qua

object*. I would li4e to focus on the argument common to both $llais and 8anna that is

central to the interpretation of Kant as a nonconceptualist of either the Bstate9 or Bcontent9

variety.

$llais and 8anna point to Kant9s discussion of the forms of intuition in the

Transcendental $esthetic to support the argument that intuitions have representational

content apart from the application of concepts. In the Transcendental $esthetic, Kant defines

intuition as the immediate representation of an object #$%&'())* &and he provides only two

conditions for the representational character of intuition, vi", the a priori representations of

space and time, which are the pure forms of sensible intuition"#$++'()C*. If it is the case

#as 8anna and $llais both assert* that the nonconceptual, intuitive representations of space

and time are all that is re0uired to uni0uely locate and represent distinct particulars, then it

follows that one can have intentional representations of perceptually given particulars

without the application of any concepts #$llais +EE&> )&&! 8anna +EE> +)*. 8ence, Kant

provides an account of intuitions as having representational content apart from the

application of concepts.

8owever, to maintain the above argument in light of Kant9s further elaboration of

intuition, found in the 2etaphysical and Transcendental 3eductions, one must account for

the following> %* Kant9s introduction of the synthetic activity of the imagination and its role

in shaping intuition and +* Kant9s apparent argument in the Transcendental 3eduction that

the categories, along with the unity of apperception, are necessary for individuating objects in

perception.

In the 2etaphysical 3eduction, Kant indicates that beyond the forms of space and time,

intuitions re0uire synthesis, the action of putting together and combining manifold

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representations into a comprehensible unity. Kant writes, synthesis alone is that which

properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content"! this

synthetic activity is the effect of the imagination, a blind though indispensable function of

the soul" #$/D*. Kant9s introduction of the imagination as the source of this structuring

activity complicates his neat division of cognition into sensibility and understanding and

gives rise to serious interpretative 0uestions regarding the status of the imagination. If the

synthesis of imagination is re0uired for intuition to have a certain content #which I

understand to mean the intentional representation of a distinct particular*, then any

nonconceptual interpretation of Kant will depend on treating the imagination as either a part

of sensibility, or at least separable from the understanding in terms of its synthetic activity in

certain cases.%E8anna ta4es the former approach, incorporating the imagination into the

faculty of sensibility. 8anna cites Kant9s claim that the imagination belongs to sensibility"

#(%%*%%and 8anna then defines the imagination as an immediate, sense1related, singular,

and nonconceptual cognitive capacity that can represent either eisting or non1eisting

objects" #8anna +EE> +CC*. $llais, on the other hand, assumes that the synthetic activity of

the imagination, though usually governed by the understanding, can ta4e place apart from

conceptual guidance. ;he grants that for cognition of an objective world?grasping the

world as objective and #empirically* mind1independent?to be possible, intuition must be

synthesi:ed in ways that are governed by concepts" #$llais +EE&> 5E/*, but she does not thin4

that the synthesis re0uired for the mere presentation of particulars re0uires conceptual

guidance, precisely because she believes the intuitive representations of space and time are

enough to account for this. In order to be presented with uni0ue particulars, however, the

spatio1temporal manifold will still have to be unified in some way, so $llais9 claim here

seems to be that synthesis can provide unity without the categories or the transcendental unity

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of apperception. $s we shall see, it is difficult to ma4e sense of what 4ind of unity this would

be, and it would potentially re0uire positing two different 4inds of spatio1temporal

eperience in Kant, for which there is no tetual support.

$ more serious threat to the above argument can be found in the later sections of the

Transcendental 3eduction. In H+C, Kant argues that space and time are not only forms of

sensible intuition, but are themselves intuitions that re0uire a synthetic unity insofar as they

contain a manifold. Kant also ma4es it clear that what is a condition for space and time as

intuitions is also a condition for whatever appears as determined in space and time. This

condition is the synthetic unity of space and time in an original consciousness, in agreement

with the categories" #(%C%*. Kant then concludes with the following statement>

6onse0uently, all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomespossible, stands under the categories, and since eperience is cognition

through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibilityof eperience, and are thus also valid a prioriof all objects of eperience.

#(%C%*

If synthesis is re0uired for perception itself, then 0uite a bit hinges on what guides synthetic

activity. If, as Kant writes, synthesis stands under the categories," then it does not seem that

intuition can have representational content apart from the categories. In order to reconcile

their nonconceptual readings of Kant with the later sections of the Transcendental 3eduction,

$llais and 8anna have both used the following two strategies. Airst, they have employed

Kant9s distinction between space and time as forms of intuition and space and time as formal

intuitions to claim that the argument of H+C only applies to space and time as formal

intuitions.%+;econdly, they have both relied on the assumption that what Kant says in the

Transcendental 3eduction concerns the conditions for ma4ing objectively valid judgments,

not the conditions for mere perception #$llais +EE&> 5E+! 8anna +EE> +/*.

In regards to the first strategy, $llais has focused on the form'formal distinction of

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space. ;he writes that as a form of intuition, space enables us to be presented with empirical

particulars as uni0uely located in an oriented and egocentrically1centered, three1dimensional

framewor4"%)while space as a formal intuition is the representation of a unified objective

space as the study of geometry" #$llais +EE&> 5E5*. It is only the latter that re0uires that

space be unified in accordance with the categories and under the transcendental unity of

apperception. -i4ewise, 8anna thin4s that space and time quaformal intuitions re0uire the

objective unity of consciousness #categories plus apperception*, whereas space and time qua

forms of intuition only re0uire a subjective unity of consciousness #8anna +EE> +//*. Gart of

the motivation behind maintaining this division is that it upholds the initial distinction Kant

draws between sensibility and understanding and fits with Kant9s argument in the#esthetic

for the nonconceptual status of the forms of intuition.

In regards to the second strategy, 8anna and $llais have narrowly focused on an

early passage in the Transcendental 3eduction to support their reading of the 3eduction as

concerning objectively valid judgments and not mere perception. In fact, the following

passage, to which both refer at various stages in their respective arguments, can be seen as

providing the strongest support to a nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant>

bjects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to

functions of the understanding . . . .appearances can certainly be given in

intuition without functions of the understanding.Aor appearances couldafter all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in

accord with the conditions of its unity. $ppearances would neverthelessoffer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means re0uires the functions

of thin4ing. #$D&'(%++1$&E'(%+)*

Aor $llais, the role of intuitions is to provide us with particular and immediate

representations of objects in perception. 6oncepts, as essentially general, cannot provide us

with particular objects. The content of intuitions, while different from the content of concepts

insofar as it is always singular and immediate, nevertheless shares with concepts a similar

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structure. The process of synthesis that is responsible for the structure of content is re0uired

for both intuitional content and conceptual content, and the similarity of structure between

intuitions and concepts allows for the former to serve as reasons for belief. While $llais

holds that cognition re0uires conceptually guided synthesis, intuitions, in providing us with

immediate representations in sensory consciousness #to borrow 2c3owell9s phrase*, re0uires

only synthesisper se#$llais +EE&> )&/*. 8anna goes further than $llais in claiming that, an

intuition refers to its object even if no other cognitive faculty apart from sensibility is

involved" #8anna +EE> +D*. If one wants to ma4e an objectively valid judgment, then

intuitions must be combined with concepts #8anna +EE> +/*. @evertheless, both human and

non1human animals can have intuitions of objects apart from any concepts or conceptual

capacities so long as they have the capacities for spatial and temporal representation" which

8anna ta4es to be non1conceptual cognitive capacities #8anna +EE> +/E*. 8anna9s

insistence that intuitions have content that is referentially meaningful apart from the

involvement any other cognitive faculties seems to fly in the face of Kant9s argument in the

Transcendental 3eduction that the unity of intuition which provides the representation of an

object re0uires the categories #(%55'(%55fn*. $s mentioned above, 8anna supports such a

position by maintaining that the argument of the 3eduction only applies to objectively valid

judgments. In the net section, I will show why this interpretation is misguided.

). %n Intermediary "eadin# of Kant

The conflicting interpretations of 2c3owell on the one hand and $llais and 8anna

on the other show that Kant9s account of cognition can be used to support both conceptualist

and nonconceptualist positions. Gart of the reason for these conflicting interpretations is that

Kant is not always precise with his own terminology and what he claims in one section of the

first Critiquemay be further elaborated, perhaps even contradicted, by what he claims in later

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sections or in other wor4s%5. In terms of the specific debate over whether Kant allows for

nonconceptual content, a central 0uestion concerns how one should reconcile the

Transcendental $esthetic with Kant9s further claims in the Transcendental 3eduction

regarding the forms of space and time and the role of synthesis in intuition. The

nonconceptualist interpretations offered by 8anna and $llais clearly rely on treating the

$esthetic as a self1standing section, and more importantly, on assuming that sensibility can

provide intuitions without aid from the determining capacities of the understanding.

While I thin4 that Kant9s account of cognition can supply the inspirationfor both

conceptualist and nonconceptualist positions, I will argue that despite the interpretative

challenges, the best way to read Kant is as a conceptualist. In order for objects to appear to us

in intuition, the content of intuition must already be structured by the imagination in

accordance with the categories. This is not, however, to claim that we can fully specify the

content of intuitions in terms of empirical concepts, as 2c3owell9s position implies. What

Kant offers is a minimal conceptualism> intuitions must be structured in basic ways in order

to display the unity re0uisite for representational content.

(efore moving on, I would li4e to point out that one interpretative challenge has to

do with Kant9s usage of the term object." $lthough Kant claims in the $esthetic that

sensibility gives us objects," if the understanding, or more precisely the imagination, has not

determined what is given, then we only have a manifold of appearance. Intuitions that are

related to objects through sensation are empirical, and Kant writes, the undetermined object

of an empirical intuition is called appearance" #()5'$+E*. Kant fre0uently uses appearance"

in contrast to things1in1themselves," but here the relevant contrast is between appearance, as

an undetermined manifold, and Kant9s definition of an object in the 3eduction, as that in the

concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" #(%)/*. I thin4 we should also

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distinguish between object" as the representation of a unified particular, and an object" of

eperience, that is, an object that is empirically real and is recogni:ed as displaying at least

some features that must be ac4nowledged by all judging subjects%.

The synthetic activity of the imagination is responsible for the transition from

appearance #as above construed* to unified particular #which we can further connect to other

representations via judgments made possible by the categories*. Kant claims that even prior

to eplicit conceptuali:ation, all intuition re0uires synthesis, which is an effect of the

imagination" #$/D*. 8e describes synthesis as the action of putting different representations

together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition"

#$//'(%E)* and goes on to write, synthesis alone is that which properly collects the

elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content" #$/D*. If I am right, then by

content" we should understand the representation of a distinct particular, located spatio1

temporally, to which both attention and thought can be directed. In an important way, the

entire debate over whether Kantian intuitions are conceptual or nonconceptual hinges on how

we understand the synthetic activity of the imagination. If synthesis is guided by the

understanding, then it counts as a conceptual capacity, and 2c3owell is correct in claiming

that the deliverances of sensibility already depend on the eercise of conceptual capacities in

sensory consciousness. If, on the other hand, synthesis does not depend on the understanding

#or at least not always*, as $llais and 8anna have claimed, then intuitions would seem to be

able to present us with concrete particulars to which we can be directed apart from any

conceptual activity.

In the Transcendental 3eduction, Kant connects the imagination with both sensibility

and understanding. 8e writes>

@ow since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the

subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding

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intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs tosensibility! but insofar as its synthesis is still an eercise of

spontaneity the imagination is to this etent a faculty for determining thesensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the

categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the

imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibilit

#(%+, italics added*.

While it is true that Kant initially subsumes imagination under sensibility, his point here is

that the imagination depends on the material that is given to sensibility and thus has a

receptive component. @evertheless, because the imagination determines what is given to it, it

is more a4in to the active faculty of understanding. 2oreover, the way in which the

imagination determines the manifold transcendentally fundamentally depends on the unity of

apperception and the categories. Insofar as it is both active and dependent on the

understanding, the imagination is a conceptual capacity. ne could object, as $llais does,

that although Kant here lin4s the imagination to the understanding, this is not to say that

synthesis per se must be guided by the categories or the unity of apperception. Let, there is

strong tetual evidence against this objection.

To begin, Kant9s account appears to rule out the possibility that synthesis per se could

provide an intuition of a concrete particular apart from conceptual guidance. In the

Transcendental $esthetic, Kant establishes space and time as the forms of intuition, with

space as the form of outer sense and time as the form of inner sense, but in the 3eduction, he

argues that these forms are not enough to provide the intuition of distinct particulars. In

regards to space as the form of outer sense, Kant writes that in order to cogni:e something in

space I must synthetically bring about a determinate combination of the given manifold, so

that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousnessand thereby is an

object #a determinate space* first cogni:ed" #(%)D*. Kant ma4es the same point in regards to

inner sense. 8e writes, inner sensecontains the mere form of intuition, but without

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combination of the manifold in it, and thus does not yet contain any determinate intuition at

all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold

through the transcendental action of the imagination" which Kant parenthetically eplains as

the synthetic influence of the understandingon inner sense" #(%5, italics added*. In order

to support their nonconceptualist interpretations, both $llais and 8anna relied on the

distinction Kant draws between space and time as forms of intuition and as formal intuitions.

Let, Kant states that as mere forms of intuition, space and time contain a manifold, but

cannot provide any determinate intuitions.

The point here is essential for the success of the Transcendental 3eduction. ne of

the major goals of the 3eduction is to show how the categories, which are not derived from

eperience, nevertheless apply to eperience in a way that grounds the objective validity of

our judgments. Gart of the eplanation #and justification* of this application of the categories

is that they ma4e eperience itself possible. Arom the Transcendental $esthetic, we 4now

that anything that we can sensibly eperience is subject to the forms of space and time. What

we learn in the 3eduction is that the forms of space and time, as intuitions, must themselves

be synthesi:ed by the figurative imagination #(%C%*. 2oreover, this synthesis must be in

accordance with the categories #(%5)* because only the categories can prescribe the unity

necessary for an intuition to be determinate. In H +C, Kant writes, 6onse0uently all

synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the

categories, and since eperience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories

are conditions of the possibility of eperience" #(%C%*. This passage indicates that we need

the categories not only for ma4ing objectively valid judgments about the world #as 8anna

and $llais claim*, but for perception itself, which Kant e0uates with the synthetic unity of

apprehension" #(%C+*. We should, however, clarify what it means for this synthesis to

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stand under the categories." What synthesis provides is unity! in order to have a

representation of a spatiotemporal particular #which clearly involves seeing it assomething

and as distinct from other things, even if I do not yet 4now whatit is*, one must combine and

order the material of sensation into an image of which one is conscious. $t the very least, this

process re0uires the imagination to combine preceding perceptions with succeeding ones

#which re0uires the unity of apperception*, otherwise we could not be presented with an

object, but would have mere heaps of unconnected sensations. Kant writes that this

reproduction of perceptions must thus have a rule in accordance with which a representation

enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any

others" #$%+%*. Aor Kant, this is the merely empirical and subjective association of

representations. 8owever, he thin4s that this 4ind of association is only possible given the

transcendental function of the imagination in ordering intuitions according to the categories.

If we turn to Kant9s eample of the empirical intuition of a house, we can better

understand the relation of empirical association to transcendental synthesis. In the empirical

intuition of a house, in order to see the house as a unified object, even if I do not 4now what

it is, I must have associated the various representations of its parts in such a way that I see

them as comprising a single object, which is the intentional content of my representation. In

order to do this, though, I must have ordered the spatial relations of those parts. I am able to

locate the house in space as a unified object because I have utili:ed the category of 0uantity,

the category of the homogenous in an intuition in general" #(%C+*. $lthough many of the

associations I ma4e among representations will be empirical #and contingent*, the point is

that I can only do that if there are some necessary rules for putting representations together

into unified particulars in the first place. This also eplains the 0uote from the 2etaphysical

3eduction that plays a central role in 2c3owell9s interpretation> The same function that

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gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere

synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which epressed generally, is called the

pure concept of the understanding" #(%E*. It should be noted, however, that when Kant

claims that the categories ma4e perception itself possible, what he means is empirical

intuition, which involves not only appearance, but also the empirical consciousness of

appearance as such #(%CE*. $ppearance itself does not re0uire the categories, or any

functions of thin4ing for that matter, precisely because we are receptive to the sensible

influence of the eternal world. (ut this receptivity is not enough to account for the

synthesi:ed content of our representations and consciousness of them! for that we need the

categories.

While I am in agreement with 2c3owell that for Kant, intuition does re0uire the

actuali:ation of conceptual capacities to provide intentional representations, 2c3owell

overloo4s the distinction between the categories and empirical concepts. Kant provides no

indication that the representational content of intuitions re0uires the application of empirical

concepts. In the Transcendental 3eduction, Kant aims to show how the categories ma4e

eperience in general possible, or, in other words, Kant ehibits the possibility of the

categories, as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general" #(%&, italics added*.

=mpirical concepts, as rules for combining singular intuitions together under a common

mar4, are derived from eperience. The Transcendental 3eduction relies on the impossibility

of intuitions not being structured by the categories, at least as far as their form is concerned!

it does not, however, rely on the impossibility of the content of intuitions out1stripping the set

of empirical concepts possessed by the subject. Kant9s account rules out the $utonomy

Thesis, but allows for a nonconceptualist position that maintains that the representational

content of intuitions does not depend on the application of empirical concepts. In the $%sche

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&ogic, Kant offers an eample where someone has an intuition without possessing the

corresponding concept. 8e writes,

If a savage sees a house from a distance, for eample, with whose use he

is not ac0uainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation

the very same object as someone else who is ac0uainted with itdeterminately as a dwelling established for men. (ut as to form, this

cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With theone it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at

the same time #$&, H*.

$lthough Kant describes the savage" as having a mere intuition," I thin4 the best

interpretation of this passage in light of Kant9s argument in the Transcendental 3eduction is

that the intuition has been shaped by categorically1guided synthesis, providing the object

content, but this content has not been further determined by the empirical concept of a house.

It should be noted that even apart from the application of an empirical concept, the unity of

the content of the intuition is the same. (ecause the categories function as rules for the

synthesis of intuition, they guarantee a certain basic unity of the content of intuition. The

application of additional concepts does not change the content of the representation from

being nonconceptual to conceptual content, even if the content itself is further refined by the

application of additional concepts. It should also be noted that when 2c3owell describes the

role of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness using the eample of the red cube, he

implies that one already has the concepts of red" and cube." #+EE&, )E*. While this may be

the case, Kant9s account gives no indication that one mustpossess the empirical concepts

needed to specify the content of an intuition in order for that content to already contain what

would be described by someone else in terms of specific concepts, such as red" and cube."

In fact, 2c3owell9s own discussion of demonstrative concepts is li4ely a more accurate

depiction of how perceptual eperience can have conceptual content even if a subject lac4s

specific concepts. ne could even argue that what gets demonstrative concepts off the ground

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is that all intuitions are already synthesi:ed in accordance with the categories. In other words,

we can point to something as a this" or that" because we already have a sense that it is a

unified whole with features that can be recogni:able in other situations and belong to other

objects.

*. Conclusion

If we turn to Kant9s account of cognition to understand the role of conceptual

capacities in shaping representational content, what we learn is that, for Kant at least, any

intuition must be synthesi:ed by the imagination in accordance with the categories in order

for it to have content that is directed at or is about objects, even if we do not yet 4now what

those objects are. In other words, the formation of representational images re0uires rule1

governed synthesis. Kant9s account supports conceptualism, but only up to a point.

@onconceptualists can still turn to Kant to support at least the basic position that the content

of representations, while not autonomous from conceptual capacities, can still outstrip the

empirical concepts that a subject possesses. This does not, however, support the

nonconceptualist positions of either $llais or 8anna that rely on separating the forms of

space and time from the formal intuitions of space and time. Kant argues that space and time,

as mere forms of intuition, contain only an indeterminate manifold. n the other hand, the

mere denial of the claim that content cannot be independent of the categories, while

admitting that it can still be independent of empirical concepts, is probably not enough

conceptualism for 2c3owell. That is to say, it will not secure the 4ind of content which will

be able to function in the space of reasons" in the way that motivated 2c3owell9s

conceptualism in the first place.

ne advantage to adopting this 4ind of intermediary position is that it may be helpful

for clarifying 0uestions concerning the formation of empirical concepts. While I cannot

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eplore this idea in detail, it seems that one way of approaching the 0uestion of how we

generate empirical concepts in response to perceptual eperience is by understanding how we

synthesi:e empirically given material in a rule1governed way. If our intentional

representations of the material given to us through perceptual eperience were not already

structured in a way that was amenable to further conceptuali:ation, it is difficult to see how

empirical concepts could get off the ground. 8owever, this also points to a remaining

challenge that Kant9s account poses for the contemporary debate. There is a deep problem

with Kant9s reliance on the imagination as the intermediary between sensibility and

understanding. n the one hand, we need the imagination to be tied to sensibility, so that we

do not lose contact with the eternal world. n the other hand, the imagination is lin4ed to

the understanding, and Kant refers to it as an effect of the understanding" #(%+*. If the

imagination is treated as a conceptual capacity, then we run up against the threat of idealism.

We want our representations to be constrained not just by our concepts, but also by the

eternal world. 8ow do we 4now that the imagination, in synthesi:ing intuitions, is actually

faithful to the world, i.e., that it is not arbitrarily synthesi:ingF 2c3owell, in appropriating

Kant, brushes off the threat of idealism! he thin4s that it is enough that conceptual capacities

are operative insensibility, rather than onsensibility. I agree that pointing to some bare etra1

conceptual given will not answer the 0uestion of how our representations are eternally

guided, but a change in preposition is not enough to banish idealism. %CIn applying Kant to

the contemporary debate, we need to carefully address the problems that his account may

leave us with, especially the threat of idealism. This tas4 I leave to another paper.

Jessica J. Williams

;tanford Mniversity

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%I am grateful to 7ebecca Ku4la, 7ichard 2anning, Jeffrey Tluma4, =ric Winsberg, and those present atthe 2arch +E%% meeting of the ;outhern 3ivision of the @orth $merican Kant ;ociety in @ew rleans forcritical comments on earlier versions of this paper.+7eferences to the Critique of Pure Reasonare given parenthetically in the tet, following the standard

practice of B$9 and B(9 referring to the first and second editions of the tet.)(ermNde:, #+EE)a*.5;talna4er is a notable proponent of a global lifting of the conceptual constraint. While 2c3owell has

argued that conceptual content goes all the way down, ;talna4er #%&&D* argues that nonconceptual content

goes all the way up" and should be thought of in terms of information1bearing states.(ermNde:, #+EE)b*.C. 7. +D%*, as 0uoted by -. $llais #+EE&> )D&fn*.%E;ee 8annah )D5fn*.%5Aor eample, Kant9s distinction between judgments of eperience and judgments of perception in the

Prolegomena#+&D1+&&* is of obvious relevance to this debate. Kant here claims that judgments of

perception, re0uire no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perception

in a thin4ing subject." This would seem to lend support to a nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant,however, there are interpretations of this passage that are in line with a conceptualist reading of Kant.

;ee (Oatrice -onguenesse9s discussion of this distinction in(ant and the Capacit to $udge#%&&D>%C* for an eample of the latter.%-eaving aside the transcendental object, I thin4 we can distinguish between three senses of object">bject%refers to the manifold which is given" in an empirical intuition prior to determination. f course, it

is my contention that we have no consciousness of what is given prior to conceptual determination, rather, it

is a way of tal4ing about the content of empirical intuitions apart from conceptual activities. bject +refersto the representation of a unified particular! in other words, it is the product of figurative synthesis. bject)

refers to the object of eperience that is both objectively valid and objectively real. I ta4e it that objective


27/28

validity indicates that a given representation refers to an object, where objective reality indicates that agiven representation refers to an object for which there is also an empirical intuition.%CThere are good reasons for 0uestioning whether 2c3owell9s position can overcome the threat ofidealism. ;ee, e.g., 7ichard 2anning #+EEC*.

"eferences

$llais, -. #+EE&*, Kant, @on1conceptual 6ontent and the 7epresentation of ;pace," )uropean $ournal ofPhilosoph, 5/> )DD15%).

(ermNde:, J. #+EE)a*, @onconceptual mental content". In =. Palta #=d.*, ;tanford =ncyclopedia ofGhilosophy. M7-Qhttp>''www.plato.stanford.edu'archives'

spr+EE)'entries'content1nonconceptual(ermNde:, J. #+EE)b*, @onconceptual 6ontent> Arom Gerceptual =perience to

;ubpersonal 6omputational ;tates". In L. 2IT Gress.

=vans, 6larendon'ford Mniversity Gress. 5D)1+).

Kant, I. #%&&/*, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. G. 6ambridge Mniversity Gress.

Kant, I. #%&&+*, JRsche -ogic," in+mmanuel (ant, &ectures on &ogic, trans. J.2. Loung.6ambridge> 6ambridge Mniversity Gress, %&1C5E.

Kant, I. #+EE5*,Prolegomena to #n 'uture Metaphsics, ed. and trans. 6ambridge Mniversity Gress.

-onguenesse, (. #%&&D*(ant and the Capacit to $udge, trans. 6harles T. Wolfe. Grinceton> Grinceton

Mniversity Gress.2anning, 7. #+EEC*, The @ecessity of 7eceptivity> =ploring a Mnified $ccount of Kantian ;ensibilityand Mnderstanding," in 7. Ku4la #=d.*#esthetics and Cognition in (ant-s Critical Philosoph#pp. C%1

D5*, 6ambridge> 6ambridge Mniversity Gress.

2c3owell, J. #%&&5*, 2ind and World. 6ambridge> 8arvard Mniversity Gress.

2c3owell, J. #+EE&*,Having the World in View, )ssas on (ant Hegel and Sellars. 6ambridge>8arvard Mniversity Gress.

Geacoc4e, 6. #%&&+*,# Stud of Concepts. 6ambridge> 2IT Gress.;talna4er, 7. #%&&D*, What 2ight @onconceptual 6ontent (eF" In =. Sillanueva #=d.*,

6oncepts #pp.))&1)+*, $stascadero, 6$> 7idgeview Gress.


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