how we misuse and ultimately lose power

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y Avoiding the numerous traps that generate power misuses andultimately power loss.

y Fostering organizational excellence, innovation and creativity, and not

getting mired in bureaucratic politics or dysfunctional power conflicts.

This chapter will not by itself change your view or way of acquiring power andeffectively exercising influence. It does provide an opportunity to thinkdifferently about power, politics and influence, and it can refocus your attention on organizational issues and problems. For strategic leaders in mostorganizations the key to successfully implementing organizational change andimproving long term performance rests with the leader's skill in knowing how

to make power dynamics work for the organization, instead of against it.

POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS

THE CONCEPTS OF POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS JohnGardner, writing about leadership and power in organizations, notes, "Of course leaders are preoccupied with power! The significant questions are:What means do they use to gain it? How much do they exercise it?" To whatends do they exercise it? He further states, "Power is the basic energyneeded to initiate and sustain action or, to put it another way, the capacity totranslate intention into reality and sustain it." In a similar vein, Richard Nixonwrote, "The great leader needs . . . the capacity to achieve. . . . Power is theopportunity to build, to create, to nudge history in a different direction." Dahlwriting about the pervasiveness of the concept of power states, "The conceptof power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast." Hedefined power "as a relation among social actors in which one actor A, can getanother social actor B, to do something that B would not otherwise havedone." Hence, power is recognized as "the ability of those who possess power

to bring about the outcomes they desire" (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977).



The concept of organizational politics can be linked to Harold Lasswell's(1936) definition of politics as who gets what, when and how. If power involvesthe employment of stored influence by which events, actions and behaviorsare affected, then politics involves the exercise of power to get somethingdone, as well as to enhance and protect the vested interests of individuals or

groups. Thus, the use of organizational politics suggests that political activityis used to overcome resistance and implies a conscious effort to organizeactivity to challenge opposition in a priority decision situation. The precedingdiscussion indicates that the concepts of power and organizational politics arerelated. Thus, in this chapter, we define organizational politics as the use of power, with power viewed as a sour ce of potential energy to manage

r elationships.

THE POLITICAL FRAME As discussed earlier, Bolman and Deal describefour "frames" for viewing the world: structural, human resources, political, andsymbolic. The political frame is an excellent tool for examining the concept of organizational politics and makes a number of assumptions aboutorganizations and what motivates both their actions and the actions of their

decision makers.

y Organizations ar e coalitions of individuals and inter est groups,which f orm because the member s need each other s' support.Through a negotiation process, members combine forces to

produce common objectives and agreed upon ways to utilize resourcesthus aggregating their power. Power bases are developed that canaccomplish more than individual forces alone.

y Ther e ar e endur ing differ ences among individuals and groups in values, pr efer ences, beliefs, inf ormation, and per ception of r eality. Such differences change slowly, if at all.



y Most of the important decisions in organizations involve allocation of scar ce r esour ces: they ar e decisions about who gets what. Scarcity exacerbates political behavior. In government at present,the competition is for personnel spaces and funding. Mission is themeans to gain both, because resources tend to follow mission. For this

reason, the Services compete for strategic mission (e.g., theomnipresent roles and missions debate), and thus make the job of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs more challenging. In the government as awhole, agencies compete for significance in the national/internationalpicture, because significance means public approval and that meansresources. (The two dominant political parties also attempt to presentthe American public with different views of what is significant.)

y Because of scar ce r esour ces and endur ing differ ences, conf lict is central to organizational dynamics and power is the mostimportant r esour ce. Conflict is more likely in under-bounded systems(less regulation and control). In an over-bounded system with power concentrated at the top (e.g., pre-Glasnost Russia), politics remains, butunderground. Jefferies makes the point that organizations play thepolitical game within the broader governmental context, but thoseindividuals also play politics within organizations. So both influences areat work. And power is key in both cases, because it confer s the ability both to allocate r esour ces- in itself a way to incr ease power -and to consolidate power by br inging other s with similar goals andobjectives into the inner decision making cor e.

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ining,negotiating, and jockeying f or position among member s of

differ ent coalitions. Bolman and Deal offer the space shuttle programas an example of a strategic effort backed by a complex coalitionconsisting of NASA, contractors, Congress, the White House, themilitary, the media, and even portions of the public. The difficulty in theChallenger disaster was that different members of the coalition were indisagreement about how to balance technical and political concerns.These became increasingly salient as the enormously expensive shuttleprogram encountered one delay after another for safety-related

technical reasons. At the time of the Challenger shuttle disaster, bothThiokol and NASA were under increasing pressure to produce onschedule at programmed cost. The decision to launch on that fateful daywas made when political forces overcame technical considerations. But,of course, this only illustrates the decision maker's difficulty in weighingone kind of consideration against another-subjective assessment of constituency demands versus rational data that may nonetheless lack



substantiated cause-and-effect relationships with downside outcomes-

under conditions of great time pressure.

The five propositions of the political frame do not attribute organizationalpolitics to negative, dysfunctional or aggrandizing behavior. They assert that

organization diversity, interdependence, resource scarcity, and power dynamics will inevitably generate political forces, regardless of the players.Organizational politics cannot be eliminated or fantasized away. Leaders,however, with a healthy power motive can learn to understand and managepolitical processes.

POWER AS A MOTIVE . Power is attractive because it confers the ability toinfluence decisions, about who gets what resources, what goals are pursued,what philosophy the organization adopts, what actions are taken, whosucceeds and who fails. Power also gives a sense of control over outcomes,

and may in fact convey such enhanced control. Particularly as decision issuesbecome more complex and outcomes become more uncertain, power

becomes more attractive as a tool for reducing uncertainty.

Power and the ability to use it are essential to effective leadership. Strategicleaders who are uncomfortable with either the presence of great power inothers or its use by themselves are probably going to fail their organizations atsome point. The critical issue is why the leader seeks power and how it isused. Some see power as a tool to enhance their ability to facilitate the workof their organizations and groups. Others value power for its own sake, and

exercise power for the personal satisfaction it brings. There can be good andbad in both cases. However, the leader who uses power in the service of his/her organization is using power in the most constructive sense. The leader who seeks power for its own sake and for personal satisfaction is at a level of personal maturity that will compromise his/her ethical position, risk his/her organization's effectiveness, and perhaps even jeopardize the long-term

viability of the organization(Jacobs 1996).

Power competition exists at two levels. Individuals compete for power withinagencies and organizations; agencies and organizations compete for power within the broader governmental context. The mechanics of power competitionare much the same. In both cases, power accrues when an individual or anorganization achieves control of a scarce commodity that others need. And inboth cases, the operations are essentially political. Even when compellingphysical force is the means, the mechanism is political. The scarce commodityis the means of inflicting harm on others. So dictators, by hook or by crook,gain a monopoly on the means for inflicting harm on others. During the course



of the Cold War, the massive build-up of armaments was aimed at maintaininga "balance of forces" so as to prevent intimidation by either side. Even after Glasnost, the level of armaments on both sides was carefully negotiated so asto preclude imbalance that might tempt one side or the other toward risky

moves.

Power competition within an organization or agency is generally for resources-personnel spaces or funding, or both, in governmental agencies. And thebasis for the competition can be constructive as well as destructive. If the top-level leadership is wise and capable, the basis for competition can be definedas meritorious performance of either individual or group. In that case,performance becomes the basis for determining who accumulates power. Theprocess is still political, but it is also constructive because the organization asa whole benefits.

So, the political process can be either destructive or constructive, dependingon the resource to be accumulated, the means by which the competitors seekto accumulate it, and the value that accrues to all competitor s by virtue of the competition. (Of course, competition based on performance, if conductedat such an extreme that human values or key norms governing competitionare violated, may substantially hurt the organization in the long term).

However, internal politics can also be detrimental in ways not readilyapparent. Sub-units within agencies may develop objectives and goals atodds with those of the agency. For example, a given "desk" owes its stature in

its own agency to the constituency needs it serves. An extremely importantconstituency is the nation it represents within its own agency and with which itdeals. The "desk" therefore may find it valuable to promote the needs of thatconstituency over the needs of the agency by "selling" important positions or programs that benefit the constituency-thereby unwittingly becoming co-optedand increasingly vulnerable to manipulation by that constituency.

Organizations also play a political game. Organizations seek influence.Influence increases autonomy (freedom to control ownassets);organizational morale (the ability to maintain cohesion andeffectiveness); essence (sanctity of essential tasks and functions); roles andmissions (exclusion of options that would challenge these);and budgets (increased roles and missions will always favor larger budgets)

(Jefferies).

To increase their own influence, agencies in government and other organizations will provide information, recommend options, and execute



directives in ways that enhance their own self interest. Jefferies illustrates withthe decision to send a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft to overfly the Cubanmissile sites. The decision to send the U-2 was actually made 10 days beforethe flight occurred, but the implementation was delayed by the CIA-USAFstruggle for the mission. The CIA defined the mission as intelligence gathering

and advanced the argument that it had a better U-2 than did the USAF. TheUSAF was concerned that the pilot be in uniform to avoid repetition of theGary Powers crisis if the aircraft was shot down. (The total mission delaycame from five days to make the decision and five days to train an Air Force

pilot to fly CIA U-2s.)

Because key leaders who form the centralized circle at the top of the policymaking apparatus have different viewpoints, particularly with something asuncertain as strategic policy, they are obligated to fight for what they consider right. Thus, decision making is not a unitary process, but also "a process of individuals in politics reacting to their own perceptions of national,organizational, and personal goals" (Jefferies 1992). Because the scope andscale are too great for one person to master, the president must persuade inorder to develop the consensus required for broad support of decisionoutcomes. (Those who wind up executing must be product champions for these decisions, or they are not likely to implement them.) The president isalso open to persuasion, because the various branches or agencies may also

build power bases outsidegovernment or outside the executive branch.

While our focus has been on establishing a legitimate context for understanding organizational politics, a countervailing view to the political

frame is the rational frame of organizational decision making

THE RATIONAL FRAME. By definition, rational processes are different frompolitical processes. Rational decisions rest heavily on analytic process. Ananalytic process can be defined as one in which there are agreed-uponmethods for generating alternative solutions to problems, and for assigningvalues to the benefits and costs expected from each of the alternatives. Andsophisticated computational methods are readily available for calculatingbenefits/costs ratios once these values are assigned. The essence of rationalprocess is the belief that, "All good persons, given the same information, willcome to the same conclusion." Those seeking to employ the rational processto the exclusion of political process thus seek open communication, perhapsthrough more than just formal (vertical) organizational channels.

The rapid expansion of electronic mail systems that permits anyone in anorganization to address anyone else probably rests on a rationality premise-



that transcending organizational channels by allowing all members to addressdirectly even the highest official will give that official more completeinformation and thus enable higher quality decisions. This is very difficult for some people to understand especially those with narcissistic power needsand maturity issues. There is also a trust assumption: that members can be

trusted not to abuse the privilege and that high officials will not misuse theinformation. A political process would view valuable information as a

commodity to be traded for influence (Jacobs).

There is another important difference between rational and political views of appropriate operations both within and between organizations. The politicalframe does not depend on trust between persons. In the preceding example,both trust assumptions would be discounted as unrealistic.Trust in theprobable future actions of coalition members is based on perception of gain tobe expected from not violating agreements on which a coalition is based, for example. The intrinsic morality of being trustworthy is not particularly useful as

a concept.

Trust probably is not particularly a part of therational frame, either, except that a strongrationalist believes in and trusts the logic of theprocess by which information is converted intodecision outcomes. So a strong rationalistwill trust others to be similarly logical. Thisleads to important postulates about rationalcommunication within a system. For a rationalist, systems are information-consuming engines. Particularly at the strategic level, the unimpeded flow of information is crucial to the health of the system as a whole. However, politicsand power dynamics strongly influence communication processes. To theextent organizations and the people in them are motivated by political gain

and power dynamics, rational processes are inevitably shortchanged.

POWER DYNAMICS AND THE RATIONAL FRAME.

The National Security Strategy apparatus exists to support the formulation of policy and implementing strategy and thus presidential decision making.George writes insightfully about both the demands of these processes, andobstacles to their effective operation-particularly those attributable tobureaucratic politics. He comments that political scientists of an earlier generation "were intrigued by the possibility that an overburdened executivemight be able to divide his overall responsibilities into a set of moremanageable subtasks to be assigned to specialized units of the organization.



It was hoped and expected that division of labor and specialization within theorganization, coupled with central direction and coordination, would enablethe modern executive to achieve the ideal of 'rationality' in policy making." Hegoes on to say that this hope has not been realized because: Some

problems of large scale ar e not amenable to f ragmentation.

As an example, the task of central coordination and direction of foreign policymaking has gotten steadily worse as the range, complexity, and scope of foreign policy problems has increased. The distinction between foreign anddomestic policy has also eroded. George illustrates by noting that thedeployment of US troops in Europe has implications for defense posture(DOD), balance of payments (Treasury), and U.S. relations with foreignnations (State). Such problems must be approached from a broader, holisticviewpoint, and there must be interaction among representatives of agencieswith diverse viewpoints. This is prevented, however, by power competitionwithin organizations, and between organizations and agencies within thegovernment. As Jefferies puts it, individuals play politics within organizations,and organizations play the political game within the broader context.

Rationalist guidelines for good policy making would include something like thefollowing (George): get all the information needed for incisive and validdiagnosis of the proble/situation; identify all dimensions of value complexity sothere can be balanced consideration of value priorities; identify a broad rangeof alternatives, considering uncertainties; take into account the policyimplementation factor; and arrange for feedback information. In a politicizedstructure, the dynamics of organizational politics impacts all of these by givinga "win-lose" flavor to information-giving and position advancement. Thus,mixing organizational politics with a rational decision making process will likelylead to the following consequences:

y Each actor acquires information on its own policy issues and not thoseof others, thereby denying full, balanced information flow to thedecision maker.

y Its own parochial interests and goals shape each actor's participation inidentification and evaluation of policy options.

y Oversimplification and rhetorical exaggeration distort policy debate(overstate benefits of own position and risks of opponents' positions).

y Actors use their own bargaining advantage to manipulate the flow of advice to influence the executive's choice of policy.

y Actors may arrange compromises (logrolling deals) among themselvesto avoid presidential decisions that might be damaging to their



perceived interests, thereby keeping policy issues from rising to thepresidential level.

y Actors may seek to avoid an area, in order to avoid responsibility for it.y Actors rely on policy routines and SOP that were previously developed,

but which may not be appropriate for novel problems.y Actors may be prevented from dealing incisively with foreign-policy

issues by the time, energy, and attention

expended on internal politics.

As George points out, while the rational frameto organizational decision making may behighly desirable to most decision makers, it isnot immune to political influences. The fact isthere are politics involved in innovation andchange and suc- cessful strategic leadersmust be effective politicians. The higher one goes in organizations, the moreuse of organizational politics becomes an important social process; politicsare often required to get important decisions implemented in complex systems

(Pfeffer).

NATURE OF STRATEGIC LEADER POWER

A number of authors writing in Strivastva's Executive Power (1992) argue thatpower at the strategic organization level is manifested and executed throughthree fundamental elements: consensus, cooperation, and culture.

"An organization is high in consensus potential when it has the capacity tosynthesize the commitment of multiple constituencies and stakeholders inresponse to specific challenges and aspirations." In this area, strategic leader power is derived from the management of ideas, the management of agreement, and the management of group and team decision making

processes.

"Cooperative potential refers to an organization's capacity to catalyzecooperative interaction among individuals and groups." Power is employed by

a strategic leader in the management of organization structures, task designs,resource allocation, and reward systems that support and encourage thisbehavior.

"Cultural/spiritual potential refers to a sense of timeless destiny about theorganization, its role in its own area of endeavor as well as its larger role in itsservice to society." Strategic leaders use power in this area to manage and



institutionalize organizational symbols, beliefs, myths, ideals and values. Their strategic aim is to create a strong culture that connects the destiny of theorganization to the personal goals and aspirations of its members.

Jacobs' seminal work of general officer job requirements can be linked to the

above conceptual requirements for successfully acquiring and managingstrategic leader power potential. His study of the work environment of generalofficers provides a context for looking at strategic performance requirements.He found three job demands consistently reported by the survey respondents.They were long-term vision, consensus building, and command team building.

Although the road to power is open to those who wish to travel it, not all willdistinguish themselves as master practitioners. What skills and attributesdistinguish those strategic leaders who use power effectively from those who

do not?

INDIVIDUAL SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTES AS SOURCES OF POWER

Pfeffer's (1992) research and observations emphasize the followingcharacteristics as being especially important for acquiring and maintainingstrategic power bases:

y H igh energy and physical endurance is the ability and motivation towork long and often times grueling hours. Absent this attribute other skills and characteristics may not be of much value.

y Directing energy is the ability and skill to focus on a clear objective andto subordinate other interests to that objective. Attention to small detailsembedded in the objective is critical for getting things done.

y S uccessfully reading the behavior of others is the ability and skill tounderstand who are the key players, their positions and what strategy tofollow in communicating with and influencing them. Equally essential inusing this skill is correctly assessing their willingness or resistance tofollowing the Strategic Leader's direction.

y Adaptability and flexibility is the ability and skill to modify one's behavior.This skill requires the capacity to re-direct energy, abandon a course of

action that is not working, and manage emotional or ego concerns in thesituation.

y M otivation to engage and confront conflict is the ability and skill to dealwith conflict in order to get done what you want accomplished. Thewillingness to take on the tough issues and challenges and execute asuccessful strategic decision is a source of power in any organization.



y S ubordinating one's ego is the ability and skill to submerge one's egofor the collective good of the team or organization. Possessing thisattribute is related to the characteristics of adaptability and flexibility.Depending on the situation and players, by exercising discipline andrestraint an opportunity may be present to generate greater power and

resources in a future scenario.

The skills and attributes identified in the ICAF Strategic Leader DevelopmentInventory are relevant not only to the work of strategic leaders but maycontribute to the their overall capacity to acquire and use power effectively.These skills and attributes are grouped as conceptual skills and

attr ibutes and positive attr ibutes.

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTES.

y Professional Competence is one of the many ways leaders "addvalue" by grasping the essential nature of work to be done and providingthe organizing guidance so it can be done quickly, efficiently, and well.

y Conceptual Flexibility is the capacity to see problems from multipleperspectives. It includes rapid grasp of complex and difficult situationsas they unfold, and the ability to understand complex and perhapsunstructured problems quickly. It also includes tolerance for uncertaintyand ambiguity.

y Futur e Vision reflects strategic vision, appreciation of long-rangeplanning, and a good sense of the broad span of time over which

strategic cause and effect play out.y Conceptual Competence relates to conceptual flexibility in that both

are essential for strategic vision. It has to do with the scope of aperson's vision and the power of a person's logic in thinking throughcomplex situations.

y Political Sensitivity is being skilled in assessing political issues andinterests beyond narrow organizational interests. It means possessingthe ability to compete in an arena immersed in the political frame toensure that your organization is adequately resourced to support your stated organization interests and those of the nation.

POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES.

y Interper sonal Competence is essential for effectiveness in influencingothers outside your chain of command, or negotiating across agencylines. It suggests high confidence in the worth of other people, which isreflected in openness and trust in others.





determine how much power these units haveto leverage influence either in support or opposition to their effort. For example, if aleader is proposing to introduce a consensusteam decision making process in a joint

interdependent environment, thisimplementation decision could change power

relationships among the players. In this case, the leader needs to know theopposing players and the depth of their power bases. This move will likely

require the mobilization of allies and the neutralization of resisters.

4. Developing multiple power bases is a process connected to those per sonal attr ibutes and skills pr eviously discussed and to structuralsour ces of power . Structural sources of power comes from the leader'screation and control over resources, location in communication andinformation networks, interpersonal connections with influential others,reputation for being powerful, allies or supporters, and the importance of leading the "right" organization.

6. Recognizing the need for multiple power bases and developing them is notenough. The strategic leader must have an ar senal of inf luence strategies and tactics that convert power and inf luence into concr ete and visible r esults. Research on strategies and tactics for employing power effectively suggests the following range of influence tactics: (Allen, 1979,Bennis and Nanus, 1985, Blau, 1964, Kotter, 1985, 1978, Pfeffer, 1992, 1981,Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977)

y Framing /Ref raming tactics establishes the context for analyzing boththe decision and the action taken. By framing the context early in theprocess, the strategic leader is positioned to influence what looksreasonable or inappropriate in terms of language and the overallprocess for generating the decision itself. Framing and reframingdecision making is an important tactic for influencing organizational



behavior. This process sensitizes the leader to the context of organizational decision making by increasing his or her self-awarenessof history-the history of past relationships and past choices. Framingand r ef raming tactics thus give the leader the ability to set acontext within which pr esent and possible f utur e decisions ar e

evaluated, and an important per ceptual lens that provides leverage f or producing innovative ideas f or getting things done.

y Interper sonal inf luence tactics recognizes that power and influencetactics are fundamental to living and operating in a world whereorganizations are characterized as interdependent social systems thatrequire getting things done with the help of other people. A leader employing interpersonal influence tactics typically demonstratebehaviors that include: under standing the needs and concer ns of the other per son, managing constructive r elationships with super ior s,peer s and subordinates, using active listening skills, askingprobing questions to under stand a countervailing power position,anticipating how individuals may r espond to ideas or inf ormation,thinking about the most effective means to inf luence the individualand craf ting appropr iate tactics to the needs and concer ns of the other per son, and maintaining a broad network of individualcontacts.

y Timing tactics involve determining not only what to do but when tomove out. These types of action include: initiating action fir st to catchyour adver sary unpr epar ed, ther eby establishing possible

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toerode the confidence of proponents or opponents as it r elates tosetting pr ior ities, allocating r esour ces and establishing deadlines,controlling the agenda and order of agenda items to affect how decisions ar e made. The sequencing of agenda items is very criticalwhere decisions are interdependent.

y Empowerment tactics create conditions where subordinates can feelpowerful, especially those who have a high need for power. Leadersempower their followers and subordinates through a process thatprovides direction, intellectual stimulation, emotional energy,

developmental opportunities and appropriate rewards. Typical behaviorsof a leader using these tactics include: high involvement andparticipation in the decision making process, modif ying andadapting one's ideas to include suggestions f rom other s, involvingother s in the strategy f ormulation and implementation process,looking f or cr eative and innovative solutions that will benefit the



total organization, and instilling confidence in those who willimplement the solutions.

y Structural tactics can be employed to divide and dominate the opposition. They can be used to consolidate power by putting aleader or his or her subordinates and allies in a position to

exer cise mor e control over r esour ces, inf ormation, and f ormalauthor ity. Re-aligning organizational structur e can also be used toco-op other s to support a leader 's ideas, initiatives and decisions.Effective employment of structural tactics is accomplished when leadersaggressively use their formal power to consolidate, expand and controlthe organizational landscape.

y Logical per suasion tactics requires using logical reasons, facts, anddata to influence others. Employment of a leader's expert power basecan be used to support logical persuasion. Effective use of these tacticsinclude the following behaviors: per suading other s by emphasizingthe str engths and advantages of their ideas, developing mor e than one r eason to support one's position, using systems thinking todemonstrate the advantages of their approach, and pr epar ingarguments to support their case.

y Bargaining tactics involve leader behavior s that attempt to gain inf luence by offer ing to exchange f avor s or r esour ces, by makingconcessions, or by negotiating a decision that mutually advances the inter ests of all participants. These influence tactics are typicallyeffective in a political environment involving opposing or resisting forces;

when a leader is in a position to do something for another individual or group; or when the collective interests of all can be served.y Organizational mapping tactics focus the leader's sight on possible

power-dependent and interdependent relationships. The critical task isto identify and secure the support of important people who can influenceothers in the organization. Leaders using these tactics will employbehaviors that include: determining which actor s ar e likely toinf luence a decision, getting things done by identif ying existingcoalitions and working through them, gar ner ing support bybr inging together individuals f rom differ ent ar eas of the

organization, isolating key individuals to build support f or adecision, linking the r eputations of important player s to the decision context and working outside f ormal organization channels to get the support of key decision maker s.

y Impact leader ship tactics include thinking carefully about the mostprofound, interesting or dramatic means to structure a decision situationto gain the support of others. Behaviors include: pr esenting ideas that



cr eate an emotional bond with other s, using innovative andcr eative ways to pr esent inf ormation or ideas, finding andpr esenting examples that ar e embedded in the political andcultural f rames such as language, cer emonies and propitious events, and lastly, consistently demonstrating high energy and

physical stamina in getting the job done. y Visioning tactics demonstrate how a leader's ideas and values support

the organization's strategic goals, beliefs and values. Leader behaviorsin executing these tactics include: articulating ideas that connect the organization's member ship to an inspir ing vision of what the organization can become, appealing to organization cor e values or pr inciples, linking the work of the organization to the leader 's vision and broader goals, cr eating and using cultural symbols todevelop both individual pr ide and team identity.

y Inf ormation and analysis tactics suggest that leaders in control of thefacts and analysis can exercise substantial influence. Leaders willuse unobtrusive behavior s to disguise their true intention, which is toeffectively employ influence tactics that seemingly appear rational andanalytical. Facts and data ar e manipulated and pr esented to appear rational and help to make the use of power and inf luence less obvious. Another ploy used by leaders is to mobilize power bybr inging in cr edible outside experts who can be r elied on tosupport a given strategy and provide the answer s they ar e expected to give. Lastly, under conditions of VUCA which

characterizes strategic decision making, lead

er s wi

llse

lec

tivelyadvocate decision cr iter ia that support their own interests and

organizations. In these cases, leaders typically do what works best andmake decisions based on criteria that are most familiar to them.

y Coer cive tactics are the least effective in influencing strategicdecisions. These tactics involve employing threats, punishment, or pressure to get others to do what a leader wants done. Typical leader behaviors include: using position power to demand obedientcompliance or blind loyalty, making per fectly clear the costs andconsequences of not "playing the game", publicly abusing and

r epr imanding people f or not per f orming, and punishing individuals who do not implement the leader 's r equests, order s or

instructions.

This chapter has addressed what strategies and tactics are required for leading with power at the highest organizational level. In a micro context, it isabout managing power, which translates as being personally effective in



knowing how to get things done and having the political will to do so. At amacro level, it means coping effectively with the strategic environment anddealing with innovation and organizational change.

HOW POWER IS LOST

In a general sense power is lost because organizations change and leadersdon't. Organizational dynamics create complex conditions and differentdecision situations that require innovative and creative approaches, new skillsets and new dependent and interdependent relationships. Leaders who havelearned to do things a specific way become committed to predictable choicesand decision actions. They remain bonded and loyal to highly developedsocial networks and friendships, failing to recognize the need for change, letalone allocating the political will to accomplish it. Ultimately, power may belost because of negative personal attributes that diminish a leader's capacity

to lead with power effectively. The SLDI identifies a number of negativeattributes that when linked to certain organizational dynamics will generate

potential loss of power:

y Technically Incompetent describes leaders who lack the conceptualskills needed to develop vision and be proactive in managingorganizational change.

y Self-Serving /Unethical leaders abuse power and use it for their ownself aggrandizement, take special privileges, and exploit peers andsubordinates by taking credit for contributions done by others. Self-

serving leaders contaminate the ethical climate by modeling power-oriented behavior that influence others to replicate their behavior. Over the long run, these leaders engender divisiveness and are not trusted.

y Micromangement of subordinates destroys individual and teammotivation. Leaders who over-supervise their subordinates have strongcontrol needs, are generally risk averse and lack conceptualunderstanding of power sharing and subordinate development.

y Arrogant leaders are impressed with their own self-importance, and talkdown to both peers and subordinates thereby alienating them. If empowering others is about releasing purposeful and creative energy,arrogance produces a negative leadership climate that supresses thepower needs of others. Arrogant leaders makes it almost impossible for subordinates to acquire power as a means to improve their ownperformance as well as to seek new ways to learn and grow.

y Explosive and Abusive leaders are likely to be "hot reactors" who useprofanity excessively, have inadequate control of temper, and abusesubordinates. They may also lack the self-control required to probe for



in-depth understanding of complex problems and so may consistentlysolve them at a superficial level. Explosive and abusive leaders mayself-destruct repeatedly in coalition building and negotiating situations.

y Inaccessible leaders are out of touch with their subordinatesparticularly when they need access for assistance. Peers typically "write

the individual off." Leaders are generally inaccessible because theydon't place great value on building interpersonal relationships, they may

have weak interpersonal skills or they may be self-centered.

CONCLUSIONS

What are the key learning points in this chapter and what are the practicalimplications for strategic leaders and decision makers. Pfeffer has describedlearning about power most succinctly: "it is one thing to understand power--how to diagnose it, what are its sources, what are the strategies and tactics

for its use, and how it is lost. It is quite another thing to use that knowledge inthe world at large...In corporations, public agencies, universities, andgovernment, the problem is how to get things done, how to move forward,how to solve the many problems facing organizations of all sizes and types.Developing and exercising power require having both will and skill. It is the

will that of ten seems to be missing."

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how we misuse and ultimately lose power