1

Hubert Zimmermann (Cornell University) How the EU negotiates Trade and Democracy in Asia: The Case of China’s Accession to the WTO - Draft – Do not quote - The paper explores the characteristics of the EU as trade negotiator, using the talks about China’s entry to the WTO (1985-2001) as the main case study. This long negotiating process permits an analysis of the influence of democracy promotion and human rights policies on European trade strategies. Such objectives play an important role in the rhetorical framework of European bilateral trade relationships and in multilateral initiatives, such as ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). Based on an institutionalist theoretical framework, it will be argued that despite the ideological and rhetorical commitment of EU institutions and despite corresponding theoretical predictions by most of the literature, the system of decision-making in EU foreign trade policy allows its member states and the Commission to pursue a trade policy with little regard to these objectives (and also other societal interests). As a consequence, Europe’s trade relationship with Asia is considerably less conflictual than the American. I Introduction

The normative identity of the EU as well as its institutional

structure as multilevel system has sparked similar interpretations

regarding the EU as external actor: that social and democratic

norms play an important role in the formulation, negotiation, and

implementation of European foreign policies. These interpretations

seem particularly true for external trade policy-making because

social and democratic issues play an increasing role on the

international trade agenda and the public debate about trade since

the breakdown of the WTO meeting in Seattle. A more thorough

review of the institutional structure of EU policy-making in

international trade negotiations shows, however, that these

elements are either systematically disregarded or that they are

just used strategically. Geopolitical and mercantilist interests

dominate.

2

I will first briefly sketch the substantial recent research on the

EU as normative power. Then I will take a quick look at the

multilevel structure of EU governance in foreign trade policy

which also appears to suggest a strongly norm-oriented trade

policy. I will then confront the premises of these two theoretical

perspectives with empirical reality, and use the case of China’s

accession to the WTO (and also the current Doha Round) as

examples. Finally, I will analyse the institutional structure of

the EU in the different phases of international negotiations and

show why the EU, at least in foreign trade, acts only in a very

limited way as normative power. This will be contrasted with

American trade policy which permits societal interests much better

chances of representation at international trade negotiations.

II The EU as Norm Leader

The notion of the EU acting as „normative power” in the

international arena has gained wide currency among researchers in

the past decade.1 In his much quoted article about „Normative

Power Europe“, Ian Manners (2002) argues that the EU

systematically transmits the norms that are constitutive for its

own identity via its external policies into the international

system. According to Manners, the key norms are peace, liberty,

democracy, the rule of law, human rights, social solidarity, anti-

discrimination, and good governance. Consequentially, the EU’s

foreign policy is said to be characterized by an emphasis on the

peaceful and multilateral regulation of conflict. The British top

diplomat Robert Cooper calls the EU because of this a “postmodern

actor” (Cooper 2004). The historical lessons of 50 years of ever

closer integration have created, according to authors writing in

this vain, a cooperative and deliberative political style which

1 See also the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, March 2006, on this topic.

3

has shaped the identity and the self-understanding of the actors

formulating European foreign policies (Teló 2006: 224). In his

recent book, Mario Teló describes this identity as a kind of „the

world’s Scandinavia“. He even regards such an identity as

essential for the continuation of the European project:

„’Scandinavian Europe’...cannot survive without both the desire

and the ability to confidently and clearly express its version of

the world in international and regional bodies through a vast

array of policies from trade links and development cooperation to

foreign policy” (Teló 2006: 227). Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 539)

suggest that the EU is predisposed to enact a „norm-driven foreign

policy which first and foremost stems from the values promoted

internally within the Union, such as social pluralism, the role of

law, democracy, market economy, etc.)”. These interpretations also

have a long precedent, in particular the conceptualisation of the

EU as a ‚civilian power’(Duchesne 1972).

In the years following the transatlantic conflict about the war in

Iraq, the image of the EU as normative actor, characterized by the

use of soft power resources in foreign policy, has been

popularized beyond the narrow confines of EU research, for example

through bestsellers such as Robert Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power

(2003) or Joseph Nye’s The Paradox of American Power (2002).

Despite their completely different assessments of European

international power, they both see the international activity of

the EU as shaped by norms rather than by a realist pursuit of

national interests, - contrary to the USA.2

There is substantial empirical evidence for these interpretations.

After all, the EU itself uses this image in its public self-

2 The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has used the topos of the EU as normative power in his widely discussed interventions on occasion of the Iraq war.

4

representation. In Art. III-292 of its proposed constitutional

treaty, the European Convention formulated the norms shaping EU

external policies as follows: “The Union’s action on the

international scene shall be guided by the principles which

inspired its own creation….and which it seeks to advance in the

wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and

indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect

for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and

respect for the principles of the UN charter and international

law”.

Since 1995, the EU insists furthermore that a so-called democratic

clause has to be included in all its international agreements. It

reads, in abbreviated form: “Respect for democratic principles and

human rights established by [the Helsinki Final Act and the

Charter of Paris for a New Europe] [as well as the principles of

market economy]….inspires the domestic and external policies of

the Community and of [third country] and constitute an essential

element of this agreement” (COM (95) 216final, 23.5.1995)”.

According to this clause, the EU can suspend agreements with third

countries which violate human rights or democratic principles.

Many target countries regard this as insulting or as an imposition

of EU standards onto unrelated areas.

In particular in the field of international trade, the EU is often

considered – and sees itself – as the main force promoting social

and democratic standards, sustainable development, and ecological

issues(Young 2004: 208). A reading of the public statements of EU

trade commissioners shows that they emphasize these points

especially frequently. The rationale behind this rhetoric stems

from an appreciation of the new agenda of international trade by

EU trade representatives. The failure of the WTO meeting in

5

Seattle 1999 has led to a politicization of trade issues. New

themes, such as social justice, sustainable development and

democratic standards are widely discussed, transcending the narrow

confines of bureaucrats, industry representative and academics

that used to dominate the field until then (Flake 2005: 343). The

Commission has reacted to the new quality of the public debate on

trade by systematically including representatives of Civil Society

in the Brussels discourse about trade policy. This has to be seen

also in the framework of its efforts to counter increasing doubts

about the legitimacy of its decisions and to shield itself against

domestic criticism.

To sum up: both the international identity of the EU and its

reaction to the new trade agenda suggest a norm-oriented foreign

trade policy. This argument which forms the core of constructivist

analyses of EU foreign policy is reenforced by an interpretation

deriving the preferences of the EU from its basic institutional

structure and the way this structure shapes internal decision-

making.

III EU Multilevel Governance: The Example of Foreign Trade Policy

Foreign trade is among the most integrated policy fields of the

EU. The supranational level is responsible for negotiations with

third countries – this is inherent in the logic of a common

market. The size of its market makes the EU one of the central

players in the international trade arena. Despite that, EU foreign

trade policy has only recently been the subject of substantial

research. This research has shown the extraordinary reach of

European trade policy and the complexity of the political process

in which it is formulated (Aggarwal/Fogarty 2004; Meunier 2005;

Young 2002). The focus of this research, however, was particularly

the efficiency of the EU representation of its preferences on the

6

international level, less the process of formulating these

preferences.

EU preferences in international trade emerge from a “multi-level

process engaging national, European and international levels of

governance" (Young 2000: 94). The policy field is characterized by

vertical and horizontal political arenas and negotiating games,

and thus shows the typical features of a multilevel system. In the

centre of vertical integration is a two-fold delegation of

competences: from the member states to the Council, and from the

Council to the Commission. According to Art. 133 of the Nice

Treaty, the Commission has the right of initiative for

international negotiations on foreign trade. It also conducts the

talks. Its negotiating brief, however, is based on a more or less

narrow mandate from the Council (Woodcock 2000). The Commission is

also closely controlled by a special committee of the Council, the

so-called Art.133 Committee. The Council of Ministers also decides

about the ratification of the results of negotiations.

On a horizontal level, a multitude of actors participate in the

formulation of EU foreign trade policy and they come in at

different points in the process of vertical delegation. For the

purposes of the paper, the European Parliament (EP) is

particularly important. It has set up committees which require the

foreign trade Commissioner to appear in front of them regularly.

The EP has become increasingly active in trade policy and is the

main promoter of the new trade agenda, emphasizing particularly

non-commercial aspects. The image of the EU as norm-driven actor

is anchored intensely in the EP (Erikson/Rossbach 2004).

Further groups influencing European foreign trade policy are, of

course, industrial lobbies (at the national level as well as in

7

the form of European-wide associations in Brussels), the already

mentioned NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty

International), the press and national parliaments.

The most important interest groups are consulted in an

institutionalised setting by the Commission. The central forum is

the so-called Civil Society Dialogue which encompasses a wide

array of groups.

Members of the Contact Group of DG Trade in the Civil Society Dialogue (6/2006)

Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE) – http://www.wide-network.orgAssociation of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry www.eurochambres.beBureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs – BEUC http://www.beuc.orgComité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles de l'UE &Comité Général de la Coopération Agricole de l'Union Européenne COPA-COGECA - COPA-COGECA www.copa-cogeca.beCoopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité – CIDSE http://www.cidse.orgEurocommerce http://www.eurocommerce.beEurogroup for Animal Welfare – http://www.eurogroupanimalwelfare.orgEuropean Economic and Social Committee – EESC http://www.esc.eu.intEuropean Trade Union Confederation – ETUC http://www.etuc.orgForeign Trade Association – FTA http://www.fta-eu.orgSOLIDAR http://www.solidar.orgThe European Services Forum – ESF http://www.esf.beUnion of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe – UNICE http://www.wto.unice.orgWorld Wildlife Fand – WWF http://www.panda.org/epo Source: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civilsoc/contactgroup.cfm

European Foreign Trade policy therefore appears at first sight as

a heavily integrated negotiating system with several differently

defined and interconnected policy arenas.3 The mode of policy-

making in such systems has been analysed by a substantial part of

the recent EU literature as network governance, relying on

consultation, dialogue, expert knowledge, and bargaining & arguing

3 According to Benz the EU displays the characteristics of a concordant democracy, which reaches decisions not via Bargaining, but rather in a consensual process which is negotiated between the executive and relevant societal groups.

8

among different institutions and actors (Eising/Kohler-Koch 1999).

Reference is frequently made to “comitology” in the EU, locating

the place where these negotiations happen in the myriad of

committees and sub-committees in the EU (which also characterize

trade policy in the EU). The rules, norms and procedures of such a

system over time transform, according to this literature, the

expectations and therefore also the behavior of the actors

(Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 2003: 16). Decision-making in policy

arenas characterized by network governance usually corresponds to

a deliberative policy model (Neyer 2003): most decisions are taken

unanimously. This is also true for foreign trade policy, despite

the possibility of qualified majority voting in the case of

conflicts, as stipulated in the EU treaties. It is one example for

the frequent prevalence of informal over formal rules in this

field: even in the allocation of competencies there are

substantial grey areas regarding the question whether the

Commission or the Council is responsible. The ubiquity of informal

rules requires incessant renegotiations among the core actors. EU

trade policy therefore appears an ideal instance of a policy field

creating decisions by negotiations among different levels which

closely interact. The final decisions are not hierarchical but

they depend on consent by various levels (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-

Koch, in Wiener/Diez 2004).

This briefly sketched, widely accepted theory of the EU as multi-

level system and a policy area characterized by network governance

has focused its interests mainly on the tracing of political

processes and here above all on a descriptive analysis of the

input-dimension.4 Less attention has been paid to the political

output. Most of the time, the output has been analysed with regard

4 This research first concentrated on the analysis of EU structural policies (Benz/Eberlein 1999).

9

to the efficiency of the decision making process and the

democratic legitimacy of the results.5

However, most of the works dealing with the EU in this way contain

more or less explicit predictions regarding the formation of

preferences in the EU. They usually claim, that the EU reflects

its internal decision making processes also in its external

behavior. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch write in their much-quoted

introductory chapter of „Europäische Integration“: „The structure

of the political system of the EU is responsible for the

characteristics of the political processes and the substance of

political results“(2003: 18). Thus, a political system which

solves its internal conflicts by deliberation, consensus and

negotiations, will behave in such a way also towards the outside.6

Furthermore, it will try to achieve a far-reaching representation

of all societal actors which participate in the deliberative

process.

In a recent special edition of European Foreign Affairs Review

dealing with the EU as international actor, Mary Farrell

summarizes this in a similar vain: “to understand EU actorness …

we have to both understand the internal governance structure and

to identify how this is used in the international arena … [The EU]

model of governance can be defined as a norms producing process

which in turn structures the EU as a normative power” (458)

3) Theoretical Predictions

Therefore, both the top-down approach of the normative power

school as well as the bottom-up approach of the multilevel game

5 Grande 2000: “the institutional structure of the European system of multi-level governance has a decisive influence on the problem solving capacity of EU policies (12). 6 This echoes democratic peace theory.

10

literature generate similar predictions regarding the preferences

of the EU in international trade talks. Or, phrased differently,

the mode of policy formulation and the self identity of the EU

predispose it to integrate democratic and social viewpoints into

its positions during such talks. Do these predictions hold when

confronted with empirical evidence?

4) Empirical Evidence

Despite the wide distribution of these theoretical predictions

they correspond only very little to empirical reality. The trade

policy of the EU is widely criticized for destabilizing the socio-

economic structures of many poor countries and thus undermining

any chances for political liberalisation in these societies

(Youngs 2001: 39). One indicator is that the trade deficits of

developing countries with the EU have grown since the mid-1990s.

Empirical research, furthermore, has shown that the use of

positive or negative conditionality by the EU in foreign trade

policy is very inconsistent and limited to less important and

uncontroversial cases and measures (Smith 2001: 197)

Normative and economic components thus seems to be still separated

in EU foreign policy as Söderbaum/Hettne, have recently concluded

in a review of the interregional strategies of the EU: “whereas

much of the EU’s interregional relations are officially conducted

ander the pretext of civilian norms and a liberal institutionalist

agenda, the actual implementation of this agenda seems to be (at

least partly) a function of the relative power positions of the EU

vis-à-vis its counterparts“.(2005: 550)7

7 See also Lightfoot/Burchell (2005).

11

These rather anecdotical first impressions, however, need to be

backed up by more detailed research. This papers first looks

briefly at the EU negotiating posture during the current Doha

Round of multilateral negotiations on trade liberalization, and,

second, on EU negotiations with China during the process of the

latter’s application for WTO accession between 1985 and 2001.

Doha-Round

The Doha Round, which started in November 2001, owes its existence

mainly to an initiative by the EU. When the Round began, the areas

of services (investment, IPR, transparency) and agriculture turned

out to be of particular importance. Thus, the EU represented

defensive as well as offensive interests. In its public

pronouncements, the EU promoted an explicitly postmodern agenda,

in particular with regard to the sustainability of trade and the

promotion of social standards (not surprisingly, the multilateral

negotiations were sold as Doha Development Round). A link between

trade and labor standards, however, was soon abandoned by the EU.

Ecological topics also disappeared quickly from the agenda. Ahnlid

(2005: 133) argues in a recent volume on „EU Negotiations“, that

these topics were above all bargaining chips to avoid far-reaching

concessions in agriculture.

Instead, the EU formulated a link between the removal of

agricultural subsidies in the EU with the so-called Singapur

Issues (Investment, Competition Policy, Trade Issues, transparency

in public offerings). This link was partly responsible for the

breakdown of the WTO-negotiations in Cancun (Woolcock 2003). When

the Commission formulated the EU-position prior to the Cancun-

Negotiations even the member states had difficulties to influence

the agenda, given information deficits and time constraints. Of

course, the EP or NGOs fared even worse.

12

Likewise, in the meanwhile stalled talks after Cancun, commercial

interests were completely dominating the positions of the EU. Even

this cursory look therefore suggests a strategic use of democratic

and social norms in international trade talks. This is visible also

in cases which seem to be counter examples. In the 2000 Mexiko-EU

Cooperation agreement, the EU insisted on having the democracy

clause in the agreement. It tied its own hands by granting the EP

an exceptional right to ratify the agreement (Szymanski/Smith

2005). However, as (Youngs 2001: 29) remarked subsequently the

clause turned out to have no practical meaning.

WTO/China Talks

A similar picture emerges when analysing the negotiations about

the accession of China to the WTO. The core forums of this process

were bilateral talks of the People’s Republic with the most

important trading powers. The talks had hardly started when the

Tienanmen Square incident in June 1989 interrupted the talks and

caused intense public criticism in the engagement policy of the EU

member states towards China. The EU reacted with some sanctions;

however, despite ongoing human rights violations in China, there

was a very quick normalisation of mutual relations. Much faster

than the US, the EU returned to a concentration on trade relations

and a policy of positioning itself geopolitically in East

Asia(Friedrich 1998). The promoters of an active human rights

policy, in particular the very active EP and the Brussels-based

NGOs, did not succeed in placing their issues in any meaningful on

the agenda of Sino-European talks. They also failed during the

rest of the negotiations, as demonstrated by an analysis of the

available evidence and interviews with decision-makers (for

details, see: Zimmermann 2005).

13

The ratification of the results of the negotiations was a de-

politicised process. The Council accepted the text presented by

the Commission without long debate (European Council 2001a;

2001b), despite criticism from the EP.8 In the ratification

process as in the whole negotiations, the role of the EP turned

out to be negligible. In contrast to the American negotiations

with China, human rights issues played no role.

How can these results be explained which so obviously contradict

the theoretical premises of much of the literature on the EU as

external actor?

5) An Institutional Explanation

My hypothesis is the following:

The formation of preferences during international negotiations in

the EU-system of multi-level governance is decisively shaped by a

path-dependent process. This process opens or closes possibilities

of access and veto points for the different actors shaping EU

trade policy in the different phases of trade negotiations.

The hypothesis can be illustrated by looking at the access points

of societal interests in a typical negotiating process of the EU.

The following scheme is based on interviews with EU officials and

a comprehensive evaluation of the literature on EU foreign trade

policymaking. It shows the three phases of a negotiating process:

agenda setting, negotiations and ratification. Of particular

importance, is the veto potential of actors, especially with

regard to the final ratification of an eventual agreement.9

8 Despite its concern with the human rights situation in China, the EP has consistently supported China’s WTO accession (ER 2233, 19.6.1997, 3); however, it promoted social and democratic conditionality. 9 This article uses Tsebelis’ Vetoplayer theory. See: Tsebelis 2002.

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EU Decision-making in international trade negotiations

(volume of arrows indicates importance)

A

G

E

N

D

A

S

E

T

T

I

N

COUNCIL approves mandate

COMMISSION negotiates

EP

ART. 133-COMMITTEE

Industrial Lobby Groups

in-form

reports to informs

NGOs Member States

in-struct

controls

R A T I F I C A T I O N

COMMISSION concludes

informsPresents results

Council ratifies (QMV/ unanimity)

EP takes notice

N E G O T I A T I O N S

COMMISSION: Writes mandate

Industrial Lobby Groups

Member States

EP

COREPER

Art.133-Subcommittees

ART. 133-COMMITTEE

NGOs

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Lets first look at the agenda setting phase, that is, the

question which societal interests the Commission has to consider

when it draws up a negotiating mandate. At first, it is obvious

that the European Parliament plays a very minor role.10 The draft

mandate the Commission presents to the Council is defined by DG

Trade in cooperation with those economic interest groups that have

a stake in the future negotiations. In this process, the

Commission systematically anticipates eventual veto positions of

member states the consent of which it needs for the approval of

the draft mandate.

National parliaments, like the EP, do not play a role in

agenda setting. Thus, this phase is removed from the democratic

process. In fact, the extent to which the positions of parliaments

are honored is at the mercy of the Commission and the Council.

This is explained by a look at the constellation in the other two

negotiating phases: European parliaments, contrary to the US

Congress, are in none of the typical phases of negotiations

effective veto players. This also is true for the so-called ‚civil

society’. The Commission accepts its advice, as long as it does

not contradict its general negotiating strategy; much of this

acceptance, however, remains rhetorical, as the China case shows.

In contrast, the member states dominate the overall agenda of

European foreign trade policy. Although nominally the Commission

has the sole right of initiative in foreign trade matters, there

are of course many ways for the member states to make their

specific requests known to the Commission, either via the Art.133-

Committee or in direct contact with DG Trade (Johnson 1998).

10 Just one example: Prior to the WTO talks in Seattle the European Parliament tried without success to shape the agenda of the EU (Elsig 2002: 148).

16

The preferences of the Commission n international trade

negotiations are the strengthening of the geopolitical and geo-

economic position of the EU, safeguarding its own role in the EU

system, the representation of commercial interests and the

promotion of European ideals. However, some of these interests are

more likely to ‘survive’ the trajectory of decision-making than

others. Because of its limited knowledge, especially on

complicated questions of market access, the Commission uses

systematically private actors when drawing up a negotiating

mandate (Lahusen/Jauss 2001: 41). It does need the cooperation of

business lobbies not only for gathering expert information, but

also with regard to its own bargaining game with the member

states. Despite of that, industrial lobbies have to surmount high

barriers in case they want to create a potential veto coalition

against mandates they don’t like. The Commission is financially

independent and it also does not need to bother about reelection.

Interest groups therefore have to convince a member state to

assume a veto position. Member states, however, use their veto

only in very important matters; otherwise, European foreign trade

policy would be quickly paralysed. Geopolitical and geo-economic

interests therefore dominate the Commission’s agenda-setting.

How does the negotiating phase look like? Industrial lobbies

are systematically consulted also during the actual negotiations.

However, again high institutional barriers prevent them from

torpedoing the general strategic line of the Commission. Only

member states can do this but because of the consensual mode of

decision-making in the Council, the information advantage of the

Commission and a substantial overlap of Commission and Council

preferences, this happens much less frequently than suggested by

rationalist analyses of EU trade policy. Despite the ritual

mentioning of the EP in official statements its role in the

17

negotiating phase is very peripheral, although Members of

Parliament were observers in the EU-delegations in Seattle and

Doha. The Commission has no obligation to consult the European

Parliament; however, the EP is getting informed about the

proceedings and content of the talks.11 Thus there is, at least, an

informal participation during the negotiations, yet, without the

right to vote and participation in the talks themselves.

Accordingly, the Parliament has lamented repeatedly a lack of

transparency in EU negotiations and the exclusion of parliaments.

Despite verbal support by the Commission it had no success.12

Its distance from the national arena and national parliaments, the

lack of reelection concerns, and, linked to that, its financial

independence from lobbying groups makes the EU system of

multilevel governance in the area of foreign trade relatively

resistant against pressure by concentrated interests. This is

particularly welcome for the member states themselves which have

achieved, through the Europeanization of foreign trade policy,

considerable maneuvering space against industrial lobbies, but

also against trade unions and NGOs. Because they have the last

word on ratification, the member states created a principal-agent

relationship in which the Commission anticipates their positions

systematically to ensure ratification.

The formal and informal institutional set-up of the negotiating

process thus causes a situation in which so-called postmodern

demands, represented by the EP and the NGOs, are systematically

11 Article III-217 Paragraph 3 draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe “ . .The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the EP on the progress of negotiations”. Comissioner Lamy: “Le Parlement européen n'est pas encore constitutionnellement associé à cette politique mais je lui rends déjà compte régulièrement. L'association à part entière du Parlement aux discussions sur les politiques commerciales internationales devrait d'ailleurs être . .l'un des acquis du futur Traité constitutionnel (Statement, Institut de France, Paris, 29 Mar 2004). 12 See the debate in the EP on 12.03.2001 and the remarks of Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy; European Report 2579, 24.3.2001, 18-21.

18

discarded, whenever this seems opportune. If, however, the EP

became a veto player in one of the phases of negotiation, the

chances of access for all kinds of societal actors would improve

dramatically.

6) The US Example

This last claim can be demonstrated by a brief look at the

institutional structure of US decision-making in foreign trade

negotiations. This structure leads to an often tenacious pursuit

of norms and particular societal interests. In the WTO meeting in

Seattle, the Clinton administration stuck to the issue of labor

standards although many developing countries threatened to walk

out and eventually did so because of this issue. The NAFTA

agreement also contains social clauses, some of which were

introduced only at the ratification stage. The clearest example,

however, is the China/WTO negotiating process. Despite the huge

interest of the US industry and the geopolitical goals of the

administration, social and democratic norms kept appearing at the

agenda during the 15 years of negotiations, particularly during

the quasi-ratification of US-China trade relations during the

yearly debates about a continuation of China’s MFN status. Recent

FTAs with Chile, Singapur, and Jordan contain democratic and

social clauses. Thus, although the US is only rarely seen as

postmodern actor and societal support for this kind of issues

seems to be lower than in Europe, norms play a bigger role in the

formation of US preferences during international trade

negotiations. This is, however, also true for comparatively small

protectionist groups with strategic veto-power, like cotton and

citrus farmers as well as the sugar industry, all of which are

located in so-called swing states. The core explanation for this

is the institutional shape of decision-making in international

trade talks.

19

Institutional Mechanisms in US Foreign Trade Negotiations

Issue leaders

PRESIDENT consults ITC consults Ministries

A G E N D A S E T T I N G

USTR creates mandate

lobbies Industry

represented through Private Sector Advisory Groups

Hearings

RATIFICATION

PRESIDENT

notifies

Congress discusses Committees (Finance/Ways & Means)

ADVISORY COMMITTEES Reports

President signs agreement

asks for briefings

Consultation

Congressional Oversight Group

ITC

Departments

Consultation (2.Vetopoint) Congress

Consultation

USTR Negotiates and concludes

NE GO TI AT IO NS

Industry NGOs

Congress

Congress agrees or disagrees (3.Vetopoint) legislates with majority in both houses

discuss implementing legislation

(1.veto position) CONGRESS

Industry initiates

20

The crucial issue in this diagram is the location of the veto

points: in all three phases Congress can stop the negotiations.

Given that trade liberalisation since many years has only very

small majorities in Congress (the latest example being CAFTA which

was approved by a one vote majority), US negotiators cannot afford

to keep issues which are pushed by strategic groups of Congressmen

from the table. This includes social and democratic norms. The EU,

however, is capable of disregarding these factors, although

ideologically it might be more predisposed to include them.

6) Resummee

The constructivist school, which defines the EU as new normative

power, as well as the multilevel governance approaches, which sees

the modes of policy-making in the EU as determining its external

behavior, disregard the path-dependent institutional determinants

characterising different policy fields in a specific way. Norms

are certainly important in EU external policies but they are

filtered through the institutional system. In the field of trade

policy this means that the much-hyped notion of the EU as

normative actor is far from the reality.

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