How Rebellious Non-State-Actors acquire weapons

By

Eran Zohar

A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Politics)at

the University of Otago

August 2014

ii

Abstract

Recent events in world politics, such as the civil wars in Syria and Iraq and conflicts between

powerful rebel groups and weak governments in Africa, underline the need for a

comprehensive theory to explain how Non States Actors (NSAs) acquire weapons and the

factors that influence these efforts.Rebellious activity has been an integral part of political life

since ancient times and has taken diverse forms.There were always those who revolted and

took up arms against central rule.Weapons were not necessarily the most important factor but

rebels needed weapons to fight and usually revolts erupted after the organizers acquired some

weapons while many revolts lost their momentum, and operations were not carried out or

effective due to shortages in arms and ammunition. Conflicts between governments and

armed NSAs have always outnumbered inter-state wars and are not a new phenomenon as

some scholars claim.In the last decade NSAs have accelerated the acquisition of large

sophisticated weapons systems. Theycould be better armed than states‘ armies because of

their access to advanced technologies in the possession of supporting countries or

international arms markets. Other NSAs, lacking external support, employ Mao‘s principle of

self-reliance. They live on their enemies‘ arms stocks and improvised weaponry.

Available literature on armed NSAs is incomplete because it addresses partial aspects of the

problem.This thesis is an attempt to construct a substantive theory explaining NSAs‘ arming,

offering generic phases and principles that characterize past and present NSAs and probably

the NSAs of the near future.The thesis also checks how globalization has affected the way

rebellious NSAs acquire arms.In spite of dramatic political and technological changes, rebel

groups in different periods have employed similar methods to acquire weapons. Self-

production, looting and stealing, external support and arms trade were always the major

methods for NSAs to acquire armaments, though the importance of each method and the type

of arms changed remarkably over time. Persistent principles have shaped the arming of

NSAs. Initial engagements between rebels and states usually highlighted the superior force of

the latter, but because of states‘ interests and constraints weapons and military technology

have been leaking from states to NSAs by different methods.

A set of factors, political, social, cultural, technological and organizational, both facilitated

and constrained NSAs‘ ability to practise the four methods of arming, making it a dynamic

process.From the nineteenth century, NSAs have employed mainly external sources to

acquire weapons rather than domestic sources because the technology of modern weapons is

iii

more difficult to improvise. Another dramatic development, dating from the second half of

the twentieth century, is the intensive use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)by armed

NSAs, enabling them to reduce the power imbalance against the state. Present NSAs

caneasily acquire and ship weapons systems over long distances using the mechanisms of

globalization. They are customers of the global illicit arms trade that integrates government

and non-government actors, creating complicated structures, often beyond the control of

national states. Still, arms smuggling remains a time-place-based challenge for NSAs, while

governments improve their counter-smuggling skills. In the near future NSAs‘ efforts to

obtain weapons will dominate their conflicts against states.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………………ii

Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………………iv

List of Tables and Figures……………………………… ………………………………..vii

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………1

The Research Question…………………………………………………………1

Theoretical Framework of the Thesis ………………………………………….5

The Methodology of the Thesis …………………………….………………….7

The Outline of the Chapters …..……………………………………………...10

Part 1: The Arming of Non-State-Actors in the Pre-Globalization Era

Chapter One: Globalization as a Facilitator for Non-State-Actors‘(NSAs) Arms

Smuggling…………………………………………………………………...…...15

Introduction ……………………………………………….……………...……. 15

Globalization and Technological Facilitators …………………………………..18

Proliferation of Conventional Weapon Systems ………..………………………27

The Implication of Globalization on Terror and War………………………......32

The Nation-State in Light of Globalization…………….……………….………42

The Creation of Transnational Social Spaces…………….……………………..46

Glocalization and Grobalization…………………………….…………………..48

Globalization and Systems Theories …………………….……….………….… 50

Chapter Two: The Arming of Ancient and Medieval NSAs……………….………………..57

Introduction……………………………………………………...………………57

The Arming of Rebellious NSAs in Antiquity…………………………………..58

Facilitators and Constraints of NSAs‘ Arming in Antiquity…………………….66

NSAs and the Arms Trade in Antiquity…………………………..….………….70

The Arming of Rebellious NSAs in the Middle Ages……………...……………72

NSAs‘ Constraints - Logistic and other Military Skills….…………..………….76

Social-Economic Dimension of Medieval NSAs……………………..…………79

v

Initial Implications of the Firearms Revolution for NSAs…………..………….82

NSAs within Medieval Arms Trade……………………..………………………87

Summary………………………………………………………………………....90

Chapter Three: NSAs‘ Arming from Early-Colonialism through the French

Revolution……………………………………………………………………….92

General Trends in Early-Modern Age‘s NSAs‘ Arming……….………………..92

Early Colonialism and NSAs‘ Arming…………………………………………..97

NSAs‘ Arming in the Wake of the French Revolution and

Napoleonicperiod……………….……………………………………………...100

The Rise of the Nation-State and its Implication on NSAs‘ Arming………......109

Revolutionary NSAs and their Arming………………………………………...117

The rise of Modern Terrorism and the Discovery of Explosives…………........124

Chapter Four:Armament – A Key Factor in NSAs‘ Struggle against Colonialism

from the ineteenth Century until World War Two……………………...…….….127

Historical and Theoretical Introduction………………………………………….127

Major Trends of the Arming of anti-Colonial NSAs……………………………130

State-Sponsor and Diaspora‘s role in the Arming of NSAs……………………..136

NSAs‘ Use of the Global Arms Trade for Resistance against Colonialism……..145

Summary………………………………………………………………………....153

Chapter Five:The Arming of NSAs during the Cold War and the De-colonialism…....155

Historical and Theoretical Background………………………………….………155

The Cold War and the Arming of NSAs in Southeast Asia……………….…….159

The Cold War and the Arming of NSAs in Africa………………………………163

The Cold War and the Arming of NSAs in the Americas……………………….169

Additional Factors that Influenced the Arming of NSAs in the Cold War Era….172

The Arming of International Terrorism………………………………………….176

Summary………………………………………………………………………....177

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Part 2: The Arming of Non-State-Actors in the Era of Globalization

Chapter Six: Contemporary Trends in State Sponsorship of Rebellious NSAs….………180

Foreign Sponsorship of NSAs in the post-Cold War World….…………….……..180

Iran‘s Support of radical Islamic NSAs–Ideological Background and

The Quds Force….…….……..……………………………………………………189

Iran‘s Arming of Cross Border NSAs…………………………………….……….199

Iranian and Syrian Arming of the Hezbollah….…………………………….…….206

Iran‘s Military Buildup of the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)…...223

Arms Smuggling System of the Hamas and the PIJ……...……………………….228

Summary………………………………………………………….........................237

Chapter Seven: Major Trends in the Arming of Contemporary NSAs……………………239

Contemporary NSAs‘ Use of Black Arms Markets and Arms Dealers…………240

NSAs‘ Arms Logistic Mechanisms……………………………………………...262

NSAs Fund their Arms Purchases……………………………………………….269

NSAs‘ Manufacture of Weapons, use of IEDs and Suicide Bombing………......276

Summary………………………………………………………………………....289

Chapter Eight: A Theory of Non-States-Actors Arming…………………………………..291

NSAs have Built up their Military Force along Similar Paths……..……….…….292

Mechanism of Changes and Developments Shaping NSAs‘ Arming Activity.....301

The Arming of Rebellious NSAs in a Globalized World………………………..312

Military Thought in light of NSAs‘ Arming Efforts……………………………..321

Summary………………………………………………………………………....327

Bibliography

Primary Sources…………………………………………………………………..329

Secondary Sources………………………………………………………………..368

vii

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: State-NSA Conflicts with Foreign Sponsorship including Arms Supply……...…181

Figure 1:WeapnsSmuggling Routes Destined for the Gaza Strip and the

Sinai Peninsula……………….…………………………..…………………………………230

Figure 2: Weapons‘ Smuggling Routes in Southeast Asia …………………………...……245

Figure3:General Historical Trends in the Arming Methods of Rebellious NSAs.…..293

1

Introduction

The Research Question

Qualitative research is conducted because existing interpretations of a significant social

problem are demonstrably incomplete.This thesis explains the question of how Non-State-

Actors (NSAs) buildup their forces.Syria‘s civil war, the armed conflicts between the

governments of Nigeria and Mali and Jihadist groups in Africa, the war in Afghanistan

between the central government backed by NATO troops against the Taliban, the United

States‘long conflict with al Qaeda, and the armed conflict between the Indian government

and the Maoist Naxal are just a few contemporary engagements in which NSAshave

sustained lengthy wars through their ability to acquirearms and ammunition.Statistics of illicit

trade of arms are important but they do not tell us whyand how NSAs act as they do, or the

context of their smuggling activity. The following thesis focuses on rebellious NSAs and the

buildup of their forces.1

Rebellious activity has been an integral part of political life since ancient times and

has taken diverse forms.There were always those who revolted and took up arms against

central rule; slaves against their masters, peasants against their landlords, ethnic and religious

minorities against the majority‘s government, national movements fightingEuropean

colonialism, Marxist insurgencies against pro-western governments, terror groups and many

more. This research employs a generic definition of the rebellious NSA– any organized

resistance against central rule. It deals with two types of NSAs or two aspects of NSAs‘

activity: within and across the state frontiers.This research defines smuggling as the illegal

transport of goods, especially across borderlines.2

Conflicts between governments and armed NSAs have always outnumbered inter-

statewars and are not a new phenomenon. Salehyan argues that rebellion is a strategy for

winning concessions from a government. At the extreme, rebels will demand– and sometimes

win – complete removal of the regime in power orthe establishment of an independent state.

Rebels may ask for significant political, economic, or social reforms, power-sharing with the

1John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing among Five Approaches (London:

SEGA, 2007), 39-40. 2 US Legal. ―Smuggling Law and Legal Definition,‖ 3 April 2014, http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/smuggling/(3

April 2014).

2

incumbent regime, orfor some form of regional autonomy.Unlike a state, which,in

principle,already commands coercive power, rebellious NSAs must obtainarmsin order to

issue and carry out threats if their demands are not met. NSAs‘ armament has been vital for

the buildup of their forces that enables both the execution and sustainability of those forces.

In addition to an examination of command and control apparatus, personnel, training,

doctrine and operations, a study of NSAs‘ arming is important for the analysis of their

struggle against states.3

Recent events in world politics underlinethe need for a comprehensive theoryto

explain how NSAs acquire weapons and the factors that influence these efforts. Arms

smuggling might be seen asa tactic but it is associated with significant political, economic

and cultural processes;agreater knowledge of arms smugglingcould helpunderstand state-

NSA conflicts.In particular, researching NSAs‘ efforts to acquire weapons could be a

valuable building-block to better analyzeNSAs and contemporary armed conflicts. 4

Available literature on armed NSAs does not provide a ready explanation of how

NSAs buildup their forces. War theoreticiansdiscuss small wars and focus on operational and

psychological aspects and counterinsurgency techniques but hardly mention theissue of

NSAs‘ buildup of forces and armaments.Somescholars undermine the need to theorizeabout

NSAs, arguing it is useless because conflicts between NSAs and states around the world are

extremely heterogeneous.Older history books on guerrilla warfare and insurgency deal with

NSAs‘ weaponry.Since the publication of these books, more recent important developments

have shaped the arming of NSAs, such as global supply chains of weapons, transnational

NSAs and suicide bombing.Dealing with multiple aspects of rebel groups these books could

not elaborate on political and economic mechanisms that encourage or discourage the arming

of NSAs.5Post-9/11 books on NSAs focus on terrorism and terror groups, but barely cover the

arming of NSAs; weapons are ―easy to obtain,‖ is a common statement.6A number of

scholars offer detailed accounts of contemporary NSAs‘ arming activity, but they are

3 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders. Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2009), 19. 4Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry,39.

5 For example, Robert B. Asprey, The Guerilla in History (New York: Doubleday, Company, 1975), and Walter

Lacquer, Guerilla.A Historical and Critical Study(New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, 1998). 6For example,Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) and James M.

Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, Global Terrorism, 3rd ed.(London: Routledge, 2013), 29.

3

regionally based and because they analyze only one, or a few NSAs, lack comprehensive

analysis.7

The Small Arms Survey (SPIRI) is the major research center monitoring NSAs‘

arming, providing detailed reports on arms smuggling across the world, mainly in war zones

like Côte d‘Ivoire, Congo DR, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan and post war zones such as

Cambodia. They are most interested in weapons designed for personal use while a number of

military NSAs possess heavier weapon systems. SPIRI researchesarms proliferation, gun

violence, arms control and disarmament, therefore theorizing about NSAs‘ armingis not the

focus of its work. For instance, it does not question how NSAs‘ operational approachesare

affected by the acquisition of new weapon systems and how NSAs and their patrons use

global trade to smuggle weapons. The implications of suicide bombing tactics on state-NSA

conflicts are very briefly discussed as well as states whichclandestinely supply weapons to

client NSAs. The International Crisis Group (ICG) and the RAND Corporation publish

manuscripts on security issues including arming of NSAs; mostly they cover specific groups

and countries. Thus, existing publications and research on NSAs arming are incompleteor

inadequate, and do not capture the complexity of the problem.8

The thesis debates the concept of Martin Van Creveld and General Rupert Smith

about the arming of NSAs that is part of their general theory about modern warfare. Both

argue that post-World War Two warfare has particularly features conflicts between powerful

states and weak NSAs. The former have been equipped with modern weapons systems based

on state-of-the-art‘ technology and the less sophisticated NSAs have possed old light

weapons and small arms. The military superiority of states does not guarantee victory over

the much weaker NSAs and they have gone down in defeat.9 Martin Van Creveld has argued

that twentieth century armed forces ―are helpless in front of small groups of often ill trained,

ill funded, ill equipped terrorists.‖10

Similarly, General Rupert Smith argues that

contemporary wars are waged ―amongst the people‖, between multinational coalitions of

states and NSAsthat might be parties to a civil war or an insurgency, whether operatingas

7For example,David Capie, Small arms production and transfers in Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian

National University, 2002);Jennifer M. Hazn, What Rebels Want. Resources and Supply. Networks in

Wartime(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army (Champaign:

University of Illinois Press, 2009). 8 The Small Arms Survey. ―The Small Arms Survey 2013,‖ http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-

type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2013.html(accessed 30 December 2013). 9Martin, Van Creveld, Changing Face of War. Combat from the Mane to Iraq (New York: Ballantine Press,

2008).223-228. 10

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 264.

4

formed armies or guerillas or terrorist groups or the band of some warlord. NSAs are

formless and ill armed. The AK-47 and the machete continue to kill people by the millions as

well as the effective suicide bomber. They are the tools of war amongst the people.11

Still,

thethesis debates that past and contemporary NSAs have not been a homogenous and

monolithic category but extremely diverse especially regarding their weaponry. Today, some

NSAs are well-funded and better-armed than the countries they are fighting or at least they

are able to sustain longstanding conflict because of their advanced weapons. That affects the

profile and outcomes of states-NSAs‘ conflicts that are not linear.

This thesis is an attempt to construct a substantive theory explaining NSAs‘ arming.

The research questions how NSAs have acquired their weaponry through the history of

rebellions, and how has globalization affected the wayrebellious NSAs acquire arms. The

survey examines both the arming of NSA through history and the importance of

globalization. The research examines how, in each period, new military and general

technologies affected NSAs‘ arming and their role in illicit trade. Compared to previous

works on NSAs and arms smuggling, the current thesis is a consistent historical check on

NSAs‘ arming methods, containing case studies from around the world, offering a holistic

approach to NSAs‘ military buildup that integratesthe aspect of security with economic,

political and cultural factors. The theory that emerges out of the data argues that rebellious

NSAs have used similar methods of arming in different periods despite technological and

political changes. This theory aimsto be relevant and connected toevents; one can use it to

explain NSAs‘ behavior, to interpret their arming policy and it can be varied and adjusted. By

reviewing past and present insurrections and revolts from across the world, the thesis aims to

be meaningful in a wide range of areas and understandable to all readers. Moreover, by

examining the arming spectrum, the thesis could providea unique historical account of state-

NSA conflict, and highlight the need of the political science discipline to promotestudies of

political violence, terror and insurgency. The thesis is updated as of early 2014.12

Armed NSAs are fighting governments and that influences all aspects of their activity.

But unlike Van Creveld and Smith the current study is focused on NSAs instead of the

Western armies. The study explores the uniqueness of different NSAsrather thanpresenting

11

Rupert Smith, Utility of the Force. The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 298–

305, 325–327, 364–369. 12

David Silverman, Doing Qualitative research. A Practical Handbook, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE Publication,

2005), 95-107.

5

them as a monolithic entity, believing this is the way to clarify the complicated field of NSAs

and help to fight them.

Theoretical Framework of the Thesis

The thesis integrates two components: rebellious non-state-actors of different types and the

arming activity of these NSAs.The thesis is primarily based onqualitative analysis rsultingin

theoretical-empirical generalities based upon the empirical picture. It is situated in relation to

severalprinciples and concepts:

Military thoughtand theories on insurgency. One component of the war system is NSAs‘

acquisition of weapons;it is part of the buildup of their forces. By acquiring weapons, NSAs

establish their military force so as to conductoperations.NSAsengage in small wars, also

called low-intensity wars, against states. Both strategically and tactically, the small war has

special features which directly influence NSAs‘ arming efforts. At the outset of the conflict,

governments have regular armies while rebel groups need to build a military force. When

they do, the power balance between the two parties is weighted against the NSA because of

its smaller size and types of material resources at its disposal in relation to those available to

the state.13

As early as the eleventh century BC, a classic Chinese military book advised rebel

movements to locate weapons in the immediate environment, arguing that military tools are

to be found in ordinary human activity.NSAs require the ability to operate for a long period

of time to practisethe strategy of winning by not being beaten, to irritate enemy soldiers and

undermine the civilian-political home fronts‘ will to continue the fight.NSAs must sustain

their forces including acquisition of arms and ammunition.In fighting small wars,NSAs focus

on the psychological aspect which influences their arming activity. To illustrate this point,

modern NSAs possess long-range rockets which could irritate and deter their foe.14

In the twentieth century, NSAs became significant actors in world politics, being used

by rival countries – mainly neighbors – against each other. Outside support of NSAs,

especially in providing weapons was crucial for victory, and scholars argue that a rebellious

NSA could defeat a state if supported by a patron state. For NSAs, external support is a

13

Yehoshafat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1990), 193-204 (Hebrew); Jacob

Zigdon, Studies in Force Design Theory (Tel-Aviv: IDF, 2004), 31-43 (Hebrew). 14

Ralph D. Sawyer, trans.,TheSix Secret Teachings on the Way of Strategy. A Manual from Ancient China in the

Tradition of the Art of War(Boston: Shambhala, 1997), 112-113.

6

precondition to move from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of operations, to create a regular

army. Mao Tse Tung emphasized the importance of a base area, often located in a

neighboring country,where rebels organize the volunteers and improve their operational

skills, while intensifying their attacks against the government. Rebels use the hostcountry to

stockpile weapons, maintain them, and smuggle weapons into the target state. In order to

secure support, NSAs might need to adopt their backers‘ agenda into their own.By accepting

outside aid rebel groups lose some of their organizational autonomy. Moreover, rival states

could prefer to attack each other with a proxy NSA.15

The systems theory. The system approach is a valuable tool to analyze the arming of NSAs

which aredynamic entitiesoperating in a chaotic system.They draw information from the

environment, which causes them to evolve and change.Complex operations of arms

smuggling in recent years could be explored by either the Systems of Systems (SOS)

orFederation of Systems (FOS)models.Reflecting the global world, both describe

howdisparate, diverse, autonomous, and synchronized entities work together, without losing

their individual sense of purpose, in order to realize some higher-level otherwise unattainable

purpose.16

Therole of globalization. Discussion on current arms smuggling is embedded in

globalization issues, especially the question of the state system in a global world and time-

space convergence. Using modern technologies, armed NSAs could targetstates‘ interests

across the world. Furthermore, advanced communication and transportation, global

commerce and free trade agreements have dramatically improved NSAs‘ capability of

trafficking weapons over long distances, especially when they are assisted by a patron state‘s

logistic apparatus. Container shipping manifests the global economy and at the same time

strengthens NSAs‘ ability to threaten state security. The internet and mobile phones facilitate

the command and control over NSAs‘ operations including acquisition of weapons and

sharing knowledge of how to build Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The inevitability

of data flowing across borders makes the task of controlling information almost impossible

or, at the least, very costly. Yet modern technologies also improve states‘ counter-smuggling

15

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), 46, 82-85, 96-114;

Salehyan, Rebells,35-43. 16

Mo Jamshidi. ―Introduction to System of Systems,‖ in System of Systems Engineering. Innovations for the

21st Century, ed. Mo Jamshidi (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009), 2; Andrew P. Sage and Christopher D. Cuppan.

―On the Systems Engineering and Management of Systems of Systems and Federations of Systems,‖ Systems

Management 2 (2001), 327.

7

skills, targeting the arms cargoes of rebel groups. Being able to acquire weapons,

transportand smuggle them into the target state, today‘s NSAs, especially transnational

NSAs, can pose significant security threats. The sovereign state remains the center of

international politics, but it operates in a fast-changing global context. Many states fail to

secure their borders against arms smuggling and cannot resolve smuggling problems by

acting alone. Losing authority, these countries cannot secure their weapons arsenals which

become the weapons source of rebel and criminal groups.17

The Methodology of the Thesis

Analyzing NSAs‘ arming throughout the history of revolts and insurgency is too complex to

be done according to dependent, independent and intervening variables. To to illustrate this

point, analyzing the arming of Palestinian militant groups in Gaza researchers should pay

attention to the geography of the Gaza Strip, the political situation in Sudan, Eritrea and

Yemen and the relations between Egypt and Israel. They should explore the culture of

smuggling in the Horn of Africa and the Sinai Penisula as well as the role of underground

tunnels to the economy of Gaza. Thus, smuggling of Iranian weapons to Palestinian groups is

much more than a case of state sponsorship.

The current thesis is influenced by a tradition of qualitative writing, especially grounded

theory – formulating a question for research rather than hypothesis; focusing on the context

and special features of different eras instead of universal explanations.The current thesis

gatheres data from various sources and analyzes that data; focusing on the manner in which

the players interpret their environment; translating the data into insights and identifying the

nexus between them.18

The inductiveapproach leads the current research; themes about NSAs

are built ―bottom-up,‖by organizing the case studies of arms smuggling into increasingly

more abstract units of information. Also, the research looks for clues to the existence, or

thefootprints,of important questions within the data.These questions derive from the

literature,and from common sense, in order to avoid the problems associated with an

inductive approach based solely upon what the analyst sees in the data. For example, how

new military technologies facilitated the arming of NSAs;what are the characteristics of

armsdealers and smugglersin different time periods; and what is the connection between the

17

Jarice Hanson, 24/7. How Cell Phones and the Internet Change the Way we Live Work and Play (Westport,

CT: Prager, 2007), 17. 18

Dan Givton.―Grounded Theory,‖ in Naama Sabar, ed., Genres and Traditions in Qualitative

research (Or-Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Devir- Publishing house, 2006), 196-200 (Hebrew).

8

structure of NSAs and their military buildup. The historical account addresses these

questions.19

The thesis demonstrates an emergent design because phases of the research process

changed or shifted after the researcher entered the field and began to collect data. The

original plan to focus on three contemporary NSAs while conductinga brief historical review

was shifted to a more general analysis of present armed NSAs, supplemented by a much

broader historical analysis. The research commenced with atheory testing approach

(deductive), aiming to collect data on NSAs‘ arming to test theories of globalization and

guerrilla warfare. It was replaced with a theory of generation (inductive), combining the

emerging findings with a number of theories to form the basis for a new theoretical

explanation of the military buildup of NSAs.20

Initially, the researcher read major historical textbooks on guerrilla warfare and

insurgency - Robert B. Asprey, ―The Guerrilla in History‖(1975),Walter Lacquer

―Guerrilla‖(1998) and Martin Van Creveld, ―The Encyclopedia of Revolutions and

Revolutionaries — From Anarchism to Zhou Enlai‖ (1996). These books provided the data

base of armed NSAs from antiquity. The research examines every revolt and uprising,

lastingthree years or more. In the second phase, using primary and mainly secondary sources

each case studywas analyzed through the spectrum of arming of rebel groups.Data on more

recent NSAs has beencollected from general books about insurgency - Stephen Sloan, Sean

K. Anderson, ―The Historical Dictionary of Terrorism‖(2009),Cindy C. Combs and Martin

W. Slamm, ―Encyclopedia of Terrorism,‖ (2009) and the United States State Department‘s

Country Report on Terrorism published annually. Data on the twenty-first century‘s NSAs

has been collected through major online news websites and secondary sources. Claims about

states arming NSAs or NSAs smuggling arms have to be confirmed by at least two different

sources.In total, the thesis reviews about one thousandcases of insurrections and revolts from

approximately 2000 B.C. to 2014.21

The codification process of the data starts at an early stage.The unit of analysis is a

single eventor a number of arms smuggling events by an NSA. Arms acquisition of NSAs

divides into four methods: self-production, stealing and looting, state sponsorship and illicit

19

Russel Bernard and Gery Ryan, Analyzing Qualitative Data Systematic Approaches(Los Angles: SAGE,

2010), 266. 20

Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry, 39. 21

Creswell,Qualitative Inquiry, 41.

9

arms trade that are assembled into two groups – domestic and external sources. For example,

the methodof outside support of an NSA could refer to a superpower, regional power,

previous NSA state or another NSA. A long list of factors that influence arms smuggling

emerges out of the data andiscategorized, such as the geography of the target states, the

political regime under which the rebels operate, and domestic traditions.22

Different concepts

evolve out of the cases, for instance, persistent principles affect NSAs‘ arming,such as that

rebels begin their armed struggle with any weapons they can find in the immediate

environment. The research linksdata of different categories, for example, data aboutmilitary

technology comprises a cause of the method of armingbyrebelsanddetails about the political

system of the target state explain the rebels‘method of arming. Saturation occurs when new

casesof arms smuggling no longer require more testing.23

The outcome is a substantive-level theory, that is, a theory developed for an empirical

area of inquiry which is the military buildup of rebellious NSAs. The theory of NSAs‘ arming

is a combination of concepts (force buildup, force execution, smuggling, insurgency and

terrorism), variables (outside support, political regime, military technology, geographical

conditions, religious beliefs of the rebels and globalization) and propositions (such as

contemporary NSAs that enjoy external military backup have a greater chance of sustaining a

long-standing struggle and even defeating a government). The theory of NSAs‘ arming does

not come ―off the shelf,‖ nor is it pre-definedbut rather is generated from data in the case

studies.This involved a ―logic diagram,‖ where the researcher presents the actual theory in a

visual mode, in this case general historical trends in arming methods of rebellious Non-State-

Actors(Figure 3, p. 293).24

This thesis is perhaps the first attempt to conduct a systematic historical review of the

arming efforts of NSAs. Given the huge timeframe the author believes that any attempt to use

specific hypotheses would be too limiting such as the suggestion that poor NSAs are more

likely to be defeated; the argument that states are better armed than NSAs and NSAs acquire

light weapons because they do not hold territory. Too many historical changes and

intervening factors are involved. Still, the available literature about NSAs and the

22

Dan Givton.―Grounded Theory,‖ in Naama Sabar, ed., Genres and Traditions in Qualitative

research (Or-Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Devir- Publishing house, 2006), 205 (Hebrew). 23

CreswellQualitative Inquiry, 64, 160; Asher Shkedi, Words of meaning. Qualitative research- Theory and

practice (Tel-Aviv: University of Tel-Aviv Publishing house, 2003), 143 (Hebrew). 24

Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry, 67.

10

globalization process suggests a number of propositions about the arming of NSAs that are

examined through the study but without enforcing a narrow theoretical spectrum:

The arming of NSAs in the pre-globalization era depended on sources they could find

in their close environment and region, primarily self-production and looting and

stealing.

The arming of NSAs in the global era features more options due to advanced

transportation and communication, especially acquisition of weapons through state

sponsorship and overseas arms markets.

The arming of NSAs in the pre-globalization era demonstrated relatively simple

systems in terms of the number of role players, division of labor and geographical

deployment.

The arming of NSAs in the global era reflects more complex systemsincluding many

participants, division of labor that is more differentialand larger geographical

dispersion.

The Outline of the Chapters

Following the introduction, chapter one offersconcepts and models of globalization and

system theories, useful for the analysis of NSAs‘ arming. The empirical research is divided

into two parts: the first part focuses on the arming of NSAs in the pre-globalization era. It

includes chapters two, three and fourthat explore rebel groups‘ efforts to arm themselves

from antiquity to the end of the Cold War (around 1990). Each chapter addresses questions of

how the emergence of new military technologies influenced the arming efforts of NSAs and

what role NSAs played inillicit trade. Each chapter discusses propositions about the

complexity of arming activities of NSAs. The historical chapters establish the background for

the secondpart of the thesis –the arming of NSAs in the globalization era – consisting of

chapters six and seven thatdiscusscurrent armed NSAs.These chapters review arming trends

of NSAs in light of Van Creveld and Smith‘s models of modern warfare.The eighth and

finalchapter of the thesis presents a theory of NSAs‘ arming that explains how rebel groups

acquire weapons over the history of warfare and the factors that have shaped this activity.

Chapteronepresents some theories and models potentially useful foranalyzingarming

efforts of past and mainly present NSAs. Under the title ―globalization‖a number of theories

11

and concepts could help answer the questions why NSAs acquire weapons in a certain way

and what stands behind their activity. These problems cannot be adequately studied at the

level of nation states, that is, in terms of national society or inter-national relations. Rather,

they need to be theorized in terms of transnational processes beyond the level of the nation

state. The chapter introduces the concept of transnational social spaces and the model of

glocalization and globalization to analyze global arms smuggling. Another segment discusses

the growing proliferation of conventional weapons as an outcome of global process while the

United Nations has failed tomonitor arming and disarming of NSAs. Globalization creates

technological facilitators assisting NSAs to arm themselves. The chapter emphasizes how

smugglers could easily exploit developments in aerial and maritime transportation, such as

the use of containers and air delivery services. Arms smugglers and terrorists use wireless

communication, mobile phones and the internet extensively, to execute complex

operations.The chapter suggests examining complex operations of smuggling of weapons by

NSAs as a System of Systems (SOS) or Federation of Systems (FOS). The chapter discusses

the military theory of the jihadist strategic thinker, Abu Musab al Suri, who as early as 2000

was pressing a future generation of Jihadist operatives and recruiters toward a new modus

operandi of terrorism based on globalized concepts.

Chapter twobegins the historical review. It raises the question of how ancient

rebels(slaves, vassal states, nomads) acquired their weaponry. Though using limited sources,

the research finds that in ancient times rebels fought mostly with weapons they captured,

produced or inherited and were taught to use from childhood. External support was less

common and involved large forces from an ally or patron-state. Sometimes NSAs, rooted in a

warlike tradition, introduced better weaponry than the state. Ancient NSAs‘ main weakness

was not necessarily shortage of arms but deficient organization and logistic capacity.The

second part of the chapter discusses the engagements between medieval NSAs (peasants,

people under foreign rule) andnoble knights who were the military elite of that time armed

with expensive weapons. A few popular movements whether of townspeople in the Low

Countries, farmers in the Swiss valleys, or religious fanatics in Bohemia, showed that

aristocratic armies of mounted knights could be effectively challenged. Those NSAs,

although without military skills, effectively coordinated weapons and tactics that neutralized

the knights‘ advantages and exposed their weaknesses (being heavily equipped and

vulnerable to missiles). These rebels used weapons they built using agriculture tools, such as

12

pole arms that combine a lance and an axe or mace, and which were efficient multi-purpose

weapons. Skilled peasantarchers used the longbow.

Covering the history of rebellion from the late fifteenth century to the earlytwentieth

century, chapter threeinterprets the role of NSAs‘ armingin light of dramatic events,namely

the discovery of the New World and early colonialism through the French Revolution and up

to the Russian Revolution. It addresses the question of how the armingof rebel groups

integrated with the emergence of various NSAs (native people fighting colonialism, religious

groups, former slaves and laternational and revolutionary groups), new military technologies

(firearms), and the rise of transatlantic trade. From the early Modern World the military

balance between states and NSAs shifted further against the latter, because government

armies and military industry controlled the production of firearms, followed by heavier and

more complicated weapon systems (artillery).In later times this development served rebel

groups because for the first time gunpowder made it possible to impart unfamiliar military

skills to men who were themselves generally unaccustomed by upbringingto warfare.Lacking

modern weaponry rebel groups of the New World were still subordinated to the principle of

self-reliance in their military buildup and could not be a realmatch for the Great European

powers. In a few cases native people sustained long wars against stronger European armies

due to political and economic mechanisms, such asconflict between European rulers who

recruited,armed and trainedenslaved Africans and their descendants in the Americas, using

them against each other. European traders enthusiasticallytraded firearms for lucrative

commodities with native people. The last segment of the chapter discusses how the invention

of high explosives affected the rise of modern terrorism.

Chapter fourreveals dramatic changes in NSAs‘ arming in light of European

colonialism. NSAs faced stronger industrialized armies of European powers from the

nineteenth century.Mass production of ammunition, necessary for lengthy conflicts, posed

new challenges for NSAs with limited resources. For rebellious NSAs, self-production of

weapons became a minor channel of arming themselves while external support became a vital

one. The weakness in weaponry of most native peoples in Asia, Africa and Oceania

facilitated the colonization of their continents. Yet the possession of sophisticated new

firearms did not always guarantee success against indigenous weaponry and tactics. In South

Africa, the Northwest Frontier of India and Southeast Asia, local armies and rebels lost the

war, but not before they first offered ferocious resistance, challenging the prevailing

assumption about the superiority of Western arms in the modern world. Assisted by supplies

13

of traditional weapons, geography, warfare traditions and better tactics, their knowledge of

the terrain and high morale could balance NSAs‘ inferiority in technology, weaponry and

organization.

In the first half of the twentieth century NSAs‘ arming challenges increased with the

introduction of more sophisticated weapon systems - tanks, submarines, aircraft carriers, and

mainly fighter aircraft. NSAs could no longer imitate the state military arsenal by themselves.

According to chapter five, for victory, NSAs had tochange their arming strategies. They

could secure external support, from direct military involvement of a patron to covert supply

of arms and ammunition only. Using examples from Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin

America, chapter five demonstrates how during the Cold War superpower intervention(the

Soviet Union and the United States) dramatically improved NSAs‘ forces, because of their

great logistic capabilities and access to advanced weapon systems.

Chaptersix focuses on the extent to which contemporary states provide weapons to

rebellious NSAs. Using a survey the chapter demonstrates that the end of the Cold War

resulted in a decline in state sponsorship. Cutting military aid, the superpowers and host

countries of NSAs playedan important role in ending state-NSA wars or encouraging rival

sides to initiate peace talks,as in West Africa and Southeast Asia. Indirectly, governments are

still deeply involved in arming NSAs using proxies, arms dealers and criminal groups to

support NSAs. A major example is the weaponsChina and Pakistan supply to ethnic and

religious-based insurgentgroups fighting the government of India.States differ in the level of

military support they offer to friendly NSAs. An extreme example is Iran‘s military support

of radical Islamic NSAs, mainly the Lebanese Hezbollah, rooted in religious motives.

Hezbollah is probably the best armed NSA today. In the last decade both Iran and Syria

supplied the organization with weapon systems characterizing regular armies such as surface-

to-surface missiles, middle range rockets and anti-ship missiles. The research argues that

Hezbollah is an operational extension of the Iranian regimerather than a regular alliance.

Chapter sevenpresents major trends in contemporary NSAs‟ arming activities, many

of which are products or manifestations of globalization.Aside from a major special case like

Hezbollah, black arms marketshave become the major source of weapons for NSAs. The

most important are located in Southeast Asia, Yemen and East Africa, the Balkans, Libya and

the United States. They connect transnational, heterogeneous and complex networks,

integrated with trade in illicit goods, mainly the narcotics trade. Based on detailed research,

14

the chapterdrawssmuggling routes and describes exchange relations between rebellious NSAs

and criminal syndicates. Privatization of transportation services and the rise of global trade

provide more opportunities to camouflage military cargoes. The final section of the chapter

focuses onIEDs and terror tactics that reducethe power imbalance between contemporary

states and NSAs.The new transnational global jihad networks led by al Qaeda have employed

suicide attacks, escalating explosives‘ effects. Using the advantages of globalization, radical

Islamic groups are sharing explosive skills, and collaborating in terror plots all over the

world.But these NSAs are also being targeted by governments, using advanced surveillance

technologies.

Chapter eightpresents the outcome of the research – a comprehensive theory of

NSAs‘ arming. The theory argues that in spite of dramatic social and technological changes,

rebel groups in different eras have employed similar methods of acquiring weapons. Self-

production, looting and stealing, external support and arms trade were always the major

method for NSAs to acquire armaments, though the importance of each methods and the type

of arms changed radically over time. The military buildup of rebellious NSAs has been

influenced by consistent principles. A significant principlestates that throughout history

empires and greatpowers armed NSAs, using them against enemies, and occasionally these

groups turned their weapons against their patrons. The thesis finds four other categories of

factors that have changed the arming of NSAs: the type of NSA and its operational approach,

the emergence of new weapon systems, the political framework, and social and cultural

aspects. These factors shifted the focus of NSAs‘ arming in different periods.The chapter

debates that globalization has significantly improved NSAs‘ opportunities to acquire

weapons, smuggling them over long distances. Some NSAs are better armed than the armies

they are fighting. The growing involvement of NSAs in trading of narcotics has provided in

substantial funds to purchase weapons. But as weapons are physical objects, globalization

cannot erase the subordination of weapons smuggling to time and space. States use

surveillance technologies to intercept arms shipments. The final segment of the chapter

discusses connections between the thesis and contemporary military thought. The thesis

criticizes currentapproaches about a-symmetric wars and global Jihadterror. Rebellious NSAs

are an old phenomenonand a diverse category, only changing their tactics. Many of today‘s

NSAs are well funded and armed, departing from the classical image of the guerrilla group.

Chapter One: Globalization as a Facilitator for NSAs’ Arms Smuggling

15

The goal of this theoretical chapter is to introduce a number of theories and models that could

be useful for understanding recent developments in arms smuggling by rebellious NSAs.

Classical theoreticians of guerrilla warfare, such as Mao, emphasize the limited resources

possessed by rebel movements, which shaped their strategy and tactics. This chapter

describes how globalization might change this theme. Globalization interacts with the arms

smuggling of NSAs in two major ways: as a technical facilitator of the smuggling of arms,

and as a creator of a new kind of NSAs. NSAs are exploiting outcomes and features of

globalization for their arming efforts, while being influenced and shaped by globalization in

their modus operandi, operational skills, structures and organization. After a shortexplanation

of the term globalization, and using themes from transportation geography, the

chapterdiscusses how modern logistics facilitate NSAs’arms smuggling. It emphasizes the

role of container shipping in undermining states‘ sovereignty. It also considers how new

information and communication technologies are empowering NSAs who are playing a more

significant role in world politics.25

The next segment deals with theproliferation of

conventional weapons as a result of globalization. Thechapter also introduces Abu Mus ‗ab al

Suri‘s military theory of individual jihad for the post-9/11 era which is based on globalization

threats. The chapter continues with two debates over the nature of contemporary wars and the

status of the nation-state, in light of outcomes resulting from globalization.The final part of

the chapter offers two models of the system theory that could be used to analyze complex

networks of arms smuggling. 26

Introduction

Ritzer defines globalization as ―the worldwide diffusion of practices, expansion of relations

across continents, organization of social life on a global scale, and growth of a shared global

consciousness.‖27

General notions of global-ness have a long history, but talk of ―globality‖

(the conditions) and ―globalization‖ (the trend) has mainly arisen since 1980.28

The concept

of globalization originally started as a description of the development of financial markets,

25

George Ritzer, The Globalization of Nothing (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2007), 15-25. 26

Jaffe, D. Eugene, Globalization and Development (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2006), 13;

Hanson, 24/7,179. 27

Ritzer, Globalization, 4. 28

Art J. Scholte, Globalization. A Critical Introduction. 2nd.ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),49.

16

and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines

globalization as ―a process by which markets and production in different countries are

becoming increasingly interdependent due to dynamics of trade in goods and services and

then flows of capital and technology.‖ 29

There is considerable disagreement as to the beginning, pace, and significance of

globalization. Some scholars predict a ―borderless world‖ and global homogeneity with a

single global society in the end. They portray an evolutionary process where society has

evolved from tribal to national to regional and now to a global scale. Other theorists doubt

whetherglobalization is ―real,‖ arguing that trade and exchange of goods have taken place

between states for many years, and events in one area have always had consequences for

other areas, but because of poor communication it was not known. They claim that the

globalization thesis is overstated and the processes it describes are not unprecedented.30

All

globalization approaches agree that many important contemporary problems cannot be

adequately studied at the level of nation states, that is, in terms of a national society or inter-

national relations. Rather, they need to be theorized in terms of globalizing (transnational)

processes beyond the level of the nation state. Anthony Giddens notes that globalization is

more than an economic process; it is also political, technological, cultural and economic.

Globalization is a complex set of processes, not a single one, that operate in a contradictory

or oppositional fashion. NSAs‘ force buildup is connected to many of these processes. 31

Scholars make comparisons between globalization and similar terms to highlight the

uniqueness of globalization and this comparison could enhance understanding of the meaning

of globalized arms smuggling. For example, Scholte`s globalization theory challenges the

categorization of arms smuggling as a globalized activity. He argues that the fact that people

29

Brawley, Politics of Globalization, 13. 30

Larry Ray,Globalization and Everyday Life (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 24-26; Jonathan Friedman. ―The

Hybridization of Roots and the Abhorrence of the Bush,‖ in Modernities, Class, and the Contradiction of

Globalization. The Anthropology of Global Systems, eds. Ekholm-Fridman, Kajsa and Jonathan Friedman

(Plymouth, UK: AltaMira Press, 2008), 296-297. There is no consensus about the time when globalization

began. Some scholars argue that globalization began in the sixteenth century, following the first

circumnavigation of the earth in 1519 to 1521. Others believe that globalization began after World War One

with the establishment of the League of Nationsorafter World War Two with the establishment of the United

Nations. Some even argue that there was just as much globalization in the nineteenth century as there is today.

They bring evidence that the world economy was more integrated in the late nineteenth century than it is today.

Also, in the 1890s the emigration rates out of Europe were proportionally higher than today (one million people

a year after 1900); Jaffe D. Eugene,Globalization and Development (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers,

2006), 17-18; Friedman, ―The Hybridization of Roots,‖296-299. 31

Anthony Giddens, Runaway World. How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives (New York: Routledge, 2003),

173-174; Eugene, 13.

17

are smuggling weapons all over the world (universalization) and delivering arms across

borders and between countries (internationalization) does not mean that arms smuggling is a

globalized activity. Arms smuggling is a globalized phenomenon when it is understood in

spatial terms as the spread of transplanetary and supraterritorial connections between people.

That is, people who are located at points anywhere on earth could smuggle arms together, and

the smuggling could transcend territorial geography. In this case, the smugglers are relatively

dissociated from territory and their activity has qualities of transworld simultaneity (the

smugglers could act across the planet at the same time), and transworld instantaneity (the

smugglers could move rapidly anywhere). Yet Scholte emphasizes that territorial domains

remain very important, subsequently influencing NSAs that conduct smuggling activity

through hostile countries. Scholte rejects the idea of a ―borderless world‖ where territory has

become irrelevant. Moreover, the addition of supraterritorial qualities of geography has not

eliminated the territorial aspects; for example the reappearance of regionalization within a

state or as a trans-state. According to Scholte, social space in today`s world is both territorial

and supraterritorial, and the relative simplicity of a territorialist-statist-nationalist world is

fading.32

Likewise, D`Andrea distinguishes between ―transnational‖and ―global‖: the former

refers to processes anchored across the borders of a few nation-states (such as the smuggling

of drugs from Egypt to Israel and from the latter to Lebanon), whereas the latter refers to

decentralized processes that develop away from the space of the national (such as a

multinational network of drug traffickers who operate in many countries). Globalization is an

organization of diversity, an increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, and a

culture without a clear anchorage in any one territory. NSAs operate both as global and

transnational organizations, because some NSAs are transnational, such as the al Qaeda

organization, and NSAs conduct global efforts to smuggle weapons.33

32

Scholte, Globalization, 49-79. 33

Anthony D`Andrea, Global Nomads. Techno and New Age Transnational Countercultures in Ibiza and Goa

(Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 9.

18

Globalization and Technological Facilitators

Globalization could facilitate arms smuggling (as it facilitates smuggling of drugs and illegal

workforces) because it transcends borders between states.Globalization breaks down

traditional barriers between countries thus allowing the movement of goods, capital, people,

and information. This process has sped up dramatically as technological advances make it

easier for people to travel, communicate, and to do business internationally. NSAs are among

the beneficiariesof the globalized era: they can easily transfer money from one side of the

globe to the other to fund arms acquisition plans. They use computers, digital technologies

and the Internet to plan and coordinate specific attacks as well as to mobilize support and

influence perceptions of the conflict. They use mobile phones to coordinate operations in

isolated areas and use the same tool to detonate bombs. They exploit transportation systems

to get almost everywhere they want, and to transfer military equipment for their operations

and buildup of forces. The following section attempts to address the question how modern

technologies of transportation and communication have created better conditions for NSAs to

smuggle weapons.34

Transportation development and globalization

Transportation is concerned with the movement of goods including weapons and people

between different locations and the systems used for this movement. Transport geography is

the study of the spatial aspects of transport. Transport is inherently spatial, as it develops

because people and goods need to move from one location to another. People are rarely

located in the same places as the things they want or need, and transport systems are, at their

most basic, an expression of a need to link supply and demand; they are the manifestation of

people`s desire to access goods, services and each other.35

Globalization is driven primarily

by advances in technology, including transportation. Some scholars argue that without

advanced technologies there would be no globalization. Both states and NSAs use

transportation technologies to access weapons.36

Transportation has a role in facilitating trade and national development in the context

of a globalized economy; in the same manner it has a role in illicit arms trade using new

34

Eugene, 1-4; Hanson, 24/7, 123. 35

LionelStapley, Globalization and Terrorism. Death of a Way of Life (London: Karnac, 2006),22;Jon Shaw

Richard Knowles and Iain Docherty. Introduction to Transport Geographies. Mobilities, Flows and Spaces, eds.

Richard Knowles Jon Shaw and Iain Docherty (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 4. 36

Black, ―Recent Developments in US Transport Geography,‖ 13.

19

technology.37

Transportation is a key element for NSAs‘ survival. The classical art of war

argues that to defeat an enemy an army has to block the enemy`s access to its supply, and to

prevent the enemy from using transportation and supply routes. Military history including

guerrilla wars has clearly shown that the battle over transportation routes is vital for defeating

the enemy, whether it is a conventional army or an insurgency. Harkabi argues that guerrilla

groups capture their foes‘ weapons and do not use long supply routes, but contemporary

NSAs traffic heavy weapons systems from overseas, making them vulnerable to interception.

Therefore, the interaction between transportation and the processes of globalization has a

great impact on NSAs` freedom of action. The increasing efficiency of transportation systems

over time has resulted in increased time-space convergence, and thus greater integration over

time.38

New developments in maritime transportation can serve NSAs’ efforts to acquire

weapons. Globalization is the realm of maritime shipping, with containerized shipping at the

forefront of the process. The container is useful to facilitate transfers between ports where the

most important function in international transportation becomes transshipment. At the same

time, the container can be an instrument of instability.39

Maritime transport is at the core of

global freight distribution in terms of its unparalleled physical capacity and ability to carry

freight over long distances and at low costs. Shipping is less limited by size constraints than

other modes, and a bigger consignment does not necessarily imply a higher tariff. The

maritime industry has changed substantially in recent decades. From an industry that was

always international in its character, maritime transport has become a truly global entity with

routes that span hemispheres, forwarding raw materials, parts and finished goods. In fact, it is

one of the most globalized industries in existence. The illicit trade of goods including

weapons is part of this process. The possibility of delivering weapon systems in kits rather

than as finished systems and platforms facilitates the diffusion in production processes and

37

Black, ―Recent Developments in US Transport Geography,‖1-2. 38

Dictionary of Transport Analysis, s.v. ―Globalization;‖Jacob Zigdon, Studies in Force Design Theory (Tel-

Aviv: IDF, 2004), 138-140; Rodrigue, Jean-Paul, and Michael Browne. ―Introduction Maritime Freight

Movements,‖ in Transport Geographies. Mobilities, Flows and Spaces, eds. Richard Knowles Jon Shaw and

Iain Dochery(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008),156-178 39

Jean-PaulRodrigue, Claude Comtois, and Brian Slack,The Geography of Transport Systems. 2nd ed. (London:

Routledge, 2009), 197-198; Brian Hoyle and Richard Knowels. ―Transport Geography: An Introduction,‖ in

Modern Transport Geography, eds. Brian Hoyle and Richard Knowles (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons,

1998), 1-3; Lance E. Hoovestal, Globalization Contained. The Economic and Strategic Consequences of the

Contained. The Economic and Strategic Consequences of the Container (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2013), 200.

20

components. For example, the Palestinian Hamas smuggled Iranian rockets in kits through

tunnels into Gaza. Thus, Hoovestal argues that the container has reduced obstacles to global

trade but can also be viewed as facilitating the activities of NSAs such as pirates, criminal

syndicates, and international terrorists. These activities reveal the inadequacy of conventional

national security structures that is based on the modern nation-state system.40

The global maritime transport system is composed of a series of major gateways

granting access to major production and consumption regions. Between those gateways are

major hubs acting as points of interconnection and transshipment between systems of

maritime circulation. It is no surprise that maritime transport was the first mode to pursue

containerization since it is the most constrained by loading and unloading operations.

Specifically,by placing goods including weapons in large sea containers of roughly uniform

shape and size, containerization reduces the amount of time spent loading and unloading

ships. Huge cranes specially built to lift, maneuver, and stack containers can empty and then

freshly load a large ship in a remarkably short time. If ships spend less time in port, they can

spend more time in transit, thus shortening the amount of time it takes to transport goods,

allowing the shippers to charge less. That serves arms smugglers who face great security

risks.41

Containerization also affects the links between forms of sea and land transport.

Containers lifted from a ship`s hold can be placed directly onto rail cars or flatbed trucks

achieving dramatic savings in costs and time comparedto previous practices. Container ports,

such as those in the Far East and in the Persian Gulf, have become important nodes within

logistics networks. They have extended the boundaries of their interests to encompass the

regional and/or global scale to such an extent that many of today`s major port operators have

evolved to the level of multinational corporations. Infrastructural development has given

international shipping lines greater choice than they would otherwise possess as to which

ports they call at.Also, the entire transport sequence is now seen as a whole, rather than as a

series of stages. There is a clear trend involving the growing level of integration between

maritime transport and inland freight transport systems.42

40

Rodrigue, Comtois, and Slack, ―Introduction,‖198; Hoovestal,Globalization, 86, 96;―Weapons: Hamas has

avery Secret big Rocket,‖ StrategyWorld, 15 July 2013, http://www.strategypage. com/htmw/

htweap/20130715.aspx (accessed 24 August 2014). 41

Rodrigue and Browne,―Introduction,‖ 163-164. 42

Kevin Cullinane and Dong-Wook Song,eds. Asian Container Ports. Development, Competition and co-

operation (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3-8.

21

Hoovestal explains that international trade is less transparent and being exploited by

NSAsbecause of the huge volume, the increase in the number of traders, the increase in the

diversity of freight forwarders, and the growth in the number of flags of convenience. Links

in the global supply chain have become increasingly open and thus susceptible to exploitation

by NSAs. Goods move with little regard to borders; contraband moves readily together with

legitimate trade, and it has become another set of commodities to be shipped and sold. For

example, Lo notes that the Hong Kong Customs Department has foiled many attempts by

Chinese criminal elements to smuggle firearms to foreign countries and criminal syndicates

via the port of Hong Kong, one of the busiest container-ship ports in the world.

Hoovestalnotes that the Chinese resist American initiatives to tighten the inspection of

container shipping, probably because China is involved in shipping illicit materials like

missiles components for Iran.43

NSAs smuggle weapons by air too. Although in terms of tonnage air transportation

carries an insignificant amount of freight (five percent of total tonnage) compared with

maritime transportation, its importance in terms of the total value of the global trade is much

more significant: about thirty five percent annually as of late 2013. Air cargo is oriented

towards high value or time sensitive products, including sensitive weapons systems. New

aircraft are often more fuel-efficient than their predecessors, require less maintenance, carry

more freight, and travel greater distances. Nowadays, the decreasing cost of transportation,

and the increased speed at which goods can be transported has allowed some African

countries, for instance, to export goods one would have considered impossible only a few

decades ago. People in European cities can buy fresh flowers shipped from southern Africa,

for example. However, the same aircraft could deliver weapons for an NSA or be used as a

killing machine, as in the Al Qaeda attack on the United States in 2001.44

Technology can

also make the goods themselves lighter and smaller, and therefore easier to transport. Airline

freight operations are shared between integrators companies such as FedEx UPS and DHL

which have global networks, and combination carriers which use dedicated freighters as well

43

Hoovestal, Globalization, 96, 205; Michael McNicholas, Maritime Security: An Introduction(Burlington, MA:

Butterworth-Heinemannas, 2011), 355; Lo Shiu Hing, The Politics of Cross-border Crime in Greater China:

Case Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 60, 176-177; Anny

Wong. ―Chines Crime Organization as Transnational Enterprises,‖ in Transnational Threats: Smuggling and

Trafficking inArms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberly L. Thachuck (Wesport, CT: Greenwood, 2007),131-

142 44

―Airfreight volumes will grow 17 percent by 2017,‖ Air Cargo World, 11 December 2013,

http://www.aircargoworld.com/Air-Cargo-News/2013/12/airfreight-volumes-will-grow-17-percent-by-

2017/1116335(accessed 6 January 2014).

22

as considerable belly-hold freight capacity of wide-bodied passenger aircraft. NSAs can use

the commercial cargo companies to smuggle multipurpose equipment that could serve

terrorismsuch as electronics and computers. Armed NSAs use the expansion and privatization

of air transport to expand and conceal delivery of military hardware.45

Smuggling and storing of weapons is a logistic activity. New modes of production of

goods are connected with new modes of distribution, which introduces the realm of logistics,

the science of physical distribution. Logistics concerns all the activities required for goods to

be made available on markets, with purchase, order processing, inventory management and

transport among the most relevant. International transportation is shifting to meet the

increasing needs of organizing and managing its flows through logistics. It involves a wide

set of activities dedicated to the transformation and distribution of goods, from raw material

sourcing to final market distribution as well as related information flows. Logistics represents

the material and organizational support of globalization. It has taken an increasingly

important role in the global economy, supporting a wide array of commodity chains. The

logistic apparatus is one of the centers of gravity of any NSA.46

International transportation of weapons and other goods too takes place at the highest

levels of mobility that involve intercontinental and inter-regional movements. Globalization

processes have extended considerably the need for international transportation, notably

because of economic integration, which grew on par with the fragmentation of production

systems and the expansion of international trade. Both processes are interdependent and

require an understanding of the transactional context in which multinational corporations are

now evolving. The heightened integration and efficiency has been expanded by logistics.

Hoovestal argues that governments find it increasingly difficult to engage in activities that

have traditionally been understood to be within their regulatory portfolio, including

controlling the movement of goods. The implication for rebellious NSAs is the opportunity to

acquire and smuggle large shipments of arms and ammunition.47

Mark Brawley, Politics of Globalization,The Politics of Globalization: Gaining Perspective, Assessing

Consequences(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 25; Lutz and Lutz, 30; Graham and Goetz, ―Global

Air Transport,‖ 150-153;Jeffrey Price and Jeffrey Forrest,Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and

Preventing FutureThreats(Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2012), 372. Yet many major air carriers

remain wholly or partially government-owned while there are still significant constraints on foreign

shareholdings in airlines. This situation imposes silent constraints on the sector`s ability to respond to

globalization. 46

Rodrigue Comtois and Slack, Geography, 205-206; Rodrigue and Browne, ―Introduction,‖ 157. 47

Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, Geography, 194; Hoovestal, Globalization, 86.

23

Information and Communication Revolutions

NSAs benefit from the information and communication revolution which began in the late

twentieth century, because itreduces obstacles to interactions between people and business

that were previously separated in distance or time. According to Giddens, globalization

means transformation of time and space and ―actions at distance.‖ 48

Some scholars see the

introduction of the World Wide Web (www) in the mid-1990s as the main technological

enabler and driver of Globalization. Rebellious NSAs optimize the advantages and

opportunities offered by the new modes of information collection and interaction. Hanson

argues that new information and communication technologies enhance NSAs‘ organizational

and operational capabilities and strengthen their cohesion.49

Hoffman uses the phrase

―revolution in terrorist communication‖, noting that NSAs were quick to exploit the strengths

of the Internet.50

The Internet has proved to be an especially beneficial

communicationmedium for terrorists and insurgents – a key means for both external

(propaganda) and internal (command and control and information) purposes. The following

thesis is interested in the internal aspect.51

Wireless communication

Communication, one of the basic features of any weapon system, is a channel to deliver

information and commands among the operatives, and to coordinate within a single weapon

system and between the latter and other weapon systems. As an NSA becomes larger it uses

more communication channels, and it depends heavily on the functioning of the

communication systems.52

Wireless communication networks are diffusing around the world faster than any

other communication technology to date. Digital technologies have been a major factor in

increasing the speed and extent of social communications, and in many ways they epitomize

48

Giddens, Runaway World, 92-93, 174. 49

Hanson, 24/7, 122. 50

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 197-202, 228. 51

Stapley, 21-22; George J. Robovich. ―Enterprise System of Systems,‖ in System ofSystems Engineering.

Principles and Applications, ed. Mo Jamshidi (New York: CrC Press, 2009), 174;;;Rich Ling and Scott W.

Campbell, The Reconstruction of Space and Time. MobileCommunication Practices. Eds. (New Brunswick,

NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 251. 52

Eado Hact, Basic Terms in Military and in the Art of War(Tel-Aviv: IDF, 2005), 41 (Hebrew).

24

the process of globalization itself. The Interpersonal Communication Technology (ICT)

revolution is sometimes seen as the fifth revolution, increasing the speed and ease of

communication between institutions, governments, firms, citizens, as well as NSAs, with

immense implications for social life. 53

The ICT facilitates the activity and the organization of

global terrorism because it collapses distance while hugely proliferating the social contacts

and networks available. Societies in the past have existed in socially organized space, which

is being changed by methods of communication such as emails, Skype, chat rooms – all of

which mediate between the local and the global in complex ways. The Internet is at the same

time the most globalized and the most private intimate space often accessed in a solitary

setting, and that facilitates the activity of NSAs.54

Giddens argues that the communication revolution alters the ways in which people

experience space and time, with important consequences for coordination, social cohesion,

and the management of daily life activities. The development from printing to electronic mail

and satellite transmission has significantly increased the level of information about other

parts of the world. The association of the communication revolution with computerization

creates a new world, with instantaneous information and an intensifying globalization. Social

relations, which previously took place in a local context, are dissolved and reorganized across

time and space. It is an intensification of worldwide social relations that connect distant

localities in such a way that local relations and occurrences are shaped by events taking place

thousands of kilometers away.55

NSAs as operational entities benefit from the development of interpersonal

communication across distance, mainly when they operate simultaneously across many

countries and employ a decentralized structure. Being borderless, timeless, impersonal and

anonymous, the Internet provides unlimited opportunities for NSAs‘ activities including

keeping in contact with each other, obtaining and sharing information, recruiting personnel,

organizing operations, instructing operatives and promoting their policies. The virtual

communities are fluid and without visual cues about the browsers, which creates new

possibilities for falsifying the self.56

Frequently the Internet is a starting point for offline

relationships; it provides a medium in which people engage in a communicative process of

53

Ray, Globalization, 104;Manuel Castells, et al., Mobile Communication and Society. A Global Perspective

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 1. 54

Manuel Castells, et al., Mobile Communication,106, 136. 55

Giddens, Runaway World, 92-93, 174.Ling and Campbell, Reconstruction of Space,251. 56

Ray,Globalization, 134.

25

building up trust, and of exploring the other in relation to their reflexively constructed needs

and desires. Hanson notes that the global network of communication makes transnational

activities of all kinds easier and cheaper, creating more opportunities for non-territorial based

activities, communication, and identities. Internet communication has become the main

communication system of transnational terror NSAs like al Qaeda, because it is saferand

more anonymous if they take the right precautions. Still, NSAs transfer weapons from one

place to another, implying that even in the Internet era things have to happen in particular

places and objects exist in a spatiotemporal relation to one another. 57

NSAs‘ activities are largely associated with an influential aspect of the

communication revolution - cellular phones. In light of mobile communication people have

changed their perception of coordination and control across time and space. An analysis of al

Qaeda terrorist attacks, for example, reveals the vital role of mobile phones in planning,

coordinating and implementing sophisticated terror operations.58

The use of mobile phones is part of a larger shift in the social order from placed-based

sociability to decentralized, flexible network nodes supported by numerous transportation and

communication technologies. The communication revolution embodies unique qualities that

manifest in particular ways throughout social life, chiefly mobility. Mobility lowers the

threshold for communication by loosening the traditional constraints of space and time.

Mobile communication has meant that people call specific individuals, not general places.

Regardless of where people are and where their intended interlocutor is, they are able to make

contact, and instead of agreeing on a particular time to meet, people can iteratively work out

the most convenient time and place to meet. For arms smugglers who need to be mobile and

are organized as a network these technologies are crucial. 59

Some communication theorists

argue that the technology has become such a personal artifact that the lines distinguishing

object from subject become blurred. Moreover, the personalization of mobile communication

technology alters how people relate not only to the technology, but to space, time, and each

other, often resulting in increased social cohesion. Therefore, the mobile phone does not

57

Hanson,24/7, 3, 123. 58

Ray,Globalization, 6; Athina Karatzogianni, The Politics of Cyberconflict (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 161. 59

Karatzogianni,Politics of Cyberconflict, 2, 255.

26

contribute to autonomy, but rather to group integration. Both traits are preconditions for

complex smuggling operations.60

The freedom of contact provided by the mobile phone allows people to free

themselves from the place-based context of their interaction, shifting their frame of reference

to the communication itself; that is, to a space of communication flows. This is a crucial issue

for arms smugglers who stay on the road most of the time, and travel through insecure lands.

The diffusion of mobile communication does not cancel space, but creates a new space that is

local and global at the same time. Castells and others call it ―space of flows‖. Serving NSAs’

control capabilities, places are individualized and networked along the specific networks of

individual practices, and they become a backdrop of communication, rather than the locality

of communication. 61

Information revolution

The Internet serves NSAs‘ operational requirements as an information space. Arriving in the

early 1990s, the Web is an Internet service that functions as a hypermedia information

management system for the purpose of global information sharing. Computers and

networking fundamentally changed the way information could be stored, reuse and shared,

while the Internet and management systems made the information findable, accessible, and

searchable. Bernnres-Lee, the founder of the Web, argues that ―the Web was not a physical

thing that existed in a certain place. It was a space in which information could exist.‖ Some

of the core requirements for the Web serve NSAs‘ modus operandi, such as network

accessibility, decentralized control, widespread data access and privacy.62

NSAs could easily

find on the Internet information about transportation facilities, power plants, ports, and other

vital centers, and access satellite maps. To illustrate this point, the investigation of the 9/11

terror attacks reveals that the Hamburg cell led by Mohammed Atta was systematically using

the Web to organize the attacks, such as finding flight schools in the United States, casing

potential targets, and booking flights. For security reasons, the terrorists rarely used their

private PCs from home, but more often visited internet cafes and libraries. 63

60

Karatzogianni,Politics of Cyberconflict, 12, 255. 61

Castells et al., Mobile Communication,171-172. 62

J. R. Okin, The Internet Revolution: The Not-for-dummies Guide to the History, Technology, and Use of the

Internet (Winter Harbor, Maine: Ionbond Press, 2005), 22-24, 58-59, 77. 63

Karatzogianni, Politics of Cyberconflict, 161; Hanson, 24/7,123.

27

Communication and information integrate through mobile phones that offer Internet

and camera services (the iPhone). Laptop computers are now equipped with a variety of

wireless options to connect the user with the Web. Hanson calls it ―a trend toward

convergence,‖ by combining personal computing and mobile technologies in a way no device

has done before. NSAs exploit this revolution for planning and conducting operations.64

Information and communication technologies are rapidly evolving and Hoffman assesses that

this evolutionary process will continue, even changing the nature of terrorism itself. Using

sophisticated communication in quality, content, and transmission capacity, terror groups

could improve their operational skills.65

Proliferation of Conventional Weapon Systems

In a global world NSAs have greater opportunities to acquire weapons, owing to intensive

production and export of weapons around the world. Anthony Giddens describes a new

military order as consisting of the industrialization of war, the flow of weaponry and

techniques of military organization from some parts of the world to others, and the alliances

which states build with one another. As a result of the massive destructive power of modern

weaponry, almost all states possess military strength far in excess of that of even the largest

of pre-modern civilizations. Many economically weak underdeveloped countries are

militarily powerful. Giddens argues that regarding weaponry there is no ―Third World,‖ only

a ―First World,‖ since most countries maintain stocks of technologically advanced armaments

and have modernized the military in a thorough way. Even the possession of nuclear weapons

is not confined to the Super Powers.66

Martell articulates the problem from a post-Marxist

view: he blames the rich and industrialized countries (mainly the United States, the top arms

exporter, accounting for thirty percent of world deliveries) that while they are enjoying a

peaceful environment, by selling ever more dangerous and destructive weapons to poorer

countries who are conflict-ridden, they are enabling war in these regions. The arms trade is a

profit-making enterprise in which capitalist corporations develop products for sale on the

64

Hanson, 24/7, 87-88. 65

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 228. 66

Giddens, Runaway World, 250-251.

28

market to be bought by states or other actors. The arms trade is a form of capitalist

globalization.67

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institution (SIPRI) yearbook 2011

highlights the growing challenges to monitoring armaments and disarmament in a globalized

era. The report argues that the world is changing faster than established security-related

institutions and processes, which struggle to cope with the destabilizing results of the current

time, including problems such as cyber-attacks, climate change, unregulated migration,

transnational criminal activity, the proliferation of sensitive technologies, and illicit transfers

of weapons, drugs and money.68

Proliferation is associated with several strategic overlapping

processes at national and international levels, which could explain the diffusion of

conventional weapons to NSAs:

The growth of NSAsand quasi-state actors in influencing and even shaping

the global and regional security scene. These actors have managed to equip

themselves with quality arms that they acquired from friendly states, arms

markets and local depots. Also, to form an insurgency, to enable it to survive,

and to weaken the government small arms and explosives are enough. A good

illustration is the Afghan Taliban, carrying modest weapons, who maintain a

lengthy war against the much stronger American army. 69

The growing intrastate conflicts. The SIPRI reports that of the 29 major

armed conflicts in the world in 2001-2011, only two were fought between

states; the other 27 conflicts in this period were within states and involved a

state actor in conflict with at least one armed NSA over a territory or over

government. Karp had already described in the mid-1990s that since the end of

the Cold War ethnic conflicts have become the most common form of warfare

and it is almost certain to stay that way, for example the civil war in Sudan

and the continuous conflict between government and insurgents in

67

LukeMartell, The Sociology of Globalization(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 289, 299; SPIRI. ―The Top 20

Arms Exporters, 2008–2012,‖ 5 June 2013,http://www.sipri.org/ googlemaps/ 2013_of_ at_

top_20_exp_map.html (accessed 4 January 2014). 68

SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 11. 69

SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 4, 11;Aaron Karp. ―The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms,‖ in

Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s, ed. Roberts Brad (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995),64.

29

Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq.In light of the internal political crisis

dominating the Arab World from 2011, this phenomenon has escalated further.

According to the SIPRI report although the trade in major weapon systems

continues, it has lost most of its military and strategic importance. Instead it is

the trade in small and light weapons that poses the most immediate threat to

human well-being and international stability, as these weapons are the most

suitable for, and by far more deadly in, ethnic wars, rather than more

sophisticated weapons. 70

The rise of transnational threats.Thachuk regards proliferation of weapons

as a transnational security challenge in a global world, similarto human

trafficking, illicit monetary transactions, terrorism and the drugs trade. Arms

smuggling cuts across national borders and therefore is frequently beyond the

control of national governments. Arms smuggling has been amplified by

globalization of economic activity and communications as well as weak

governments in a large number of states, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and

the unstable regions from North Africa, through the Middle East, South Asia,

Central Asia and Southeast Asia. She argues that arms smuggling has been

overlooked as matter of domestic security or as outside the purview of

structures more traditionally devoted to national security.71

The prosperity of the global arms industry in spite of the global economic

recession. This trend is associated with the emergence of global and regional

powers, such as China and India, which have dramatically increased their

military spending and have developed an advanced domestic military industry.

By 2013, China had become the fifth largest arms exporter; India and China

are the top two arms importers. The new actors in the arms trade market have

been looking for external markets and have been willing to export

destabilizing technologies into regions of conflict, such as North Korea, since

the 1980s selling Scud missiles and missiles production technologies to Iran

and Syria, who later suppliedScud missiles to the Hezbollah.72

The SIPRI

70

SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 6-7, 61; Karp, ―Arms Trade,‖57-59, 62. 71

Kimberley L. Thachuk. ―An Introduction to Transnational Threats,‖in Transnational Threats. Smuggling and

Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley L. Thachuk (Westport, CON: Praeger Security

International, 2007), 3-18. 72

Michael Moodie. ―Beyond Proliferation: The Challenge of Technology Diffusion,‖ in Weapons Proliferation

in the 1990s, ed. Roberts Brad (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995),75-77; SIPRI. ―The Top 20 Arms

Exporters, 2008–2012.‖

30

report refers mainly to top American arms-producing companies, and Martell

describes the process that has allowedthe arms trade to become more

commercial and privatized, and where increasingly the contractors are

agencies rather than governments.73

But in recent years almost every state,

even very poor ones such as Sudan, and some NSAs (such as Palestinian

militant groups in Gaza), have developed within their limited resources a

domestic arms industry that produces light weapons, explosives, and rockets.74

Karp argues that an era of ethnic conflict implies the irrelevance of major

powers and highly advanced states, and this is a field in which small countries

with archaic industries can directly affect global welfare. Their goal is to

maintain national security and to secure the military supply, especially if they

are isolated states that are subjected to an arms embargo, such as North Korea

and Eritrea. For countries with regional ambitions, such as Iran and Egypt, an

indigenous arms industry can tip the balance of power in their favor and

engender prestige and nationalist pride.75

New sources of weapons arsenals. The collapse of the USSR and the Eastern

Bloc in the late 1980s resulted in the willingness of the new regimes to sell

virtually anything short of weapons of mass destruction to anyone with the

money to buy.76

This was a good opportunity for the arming efforts of NSAs;

for example in recent years unconfirmed reports claimed that Hezbollah

smuggled an anti-air missiles system from a Ukraine firm to Lebanon through

the Balkans. Springe and others regard the widespread availability of weapons,

mass-produced during the cold war in the Soviet Union, as a contributor to the

emergence of the global jihad in the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast

Asia. Many of the weapons left from previous wars found their way to arms

markets that serve NSAs‘ smugglers, such as weapons left from the civil war

in Yemen and American weapons that were left in Vietnam.77

Tsagourias and

White are skeptical that international arms control will be efficient, ―in the

73

Martell, Sociology, 301. 74

Martell,Sociology, 7-8, 231-234. 75

Karp, “Arms Trade,” 59-60. 76

Karp,―Arms Trade,‖59-60. 77

―Report: Secret arms from Balkan region to Hezbollah,‖ YALIBNAN, 24 June

2010,http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/06/24/report-secret-arms-from-balkan-region-to-hezbollah/(accessed 4

January 2014); Devin R. Springer,James L. Regents and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global

Jihad(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 9.

31

face of a post-Cold War world awash with conventional arms fuelled by a

market-driven arms industry.‖ 78

The increasing incorporation of civilian technology into the military

sphere. Over recent decades the relationship between technology in the

civilian and defense sectors has been reversed. It is not the defense community

that is generating spinoffs for the civilian population, but the commercial

arena that is producing an increasing amount of technology that is being

incorporated into the design of weapons and other military equipment. Inertial

navigation systems, communication systems and electro-optic systems are

only a few examples of dual use equipment which is produced by civilian

industry and therefore an NSA could purchase it more easily.79

Martell notes

that the overseas production being established with more licensing of

production but limited regulation, is another factor for the global diffusion of

arms so that more and more actors are able to obtain them. 80

After years of debate, in April 2013, the General Assembly of the United Nations

adopted the landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), regulating the international trade in

conventional arms. The treaty faces serious problems because major arms suppliers of NSAs,

such as Iran and Syria (who were among the few states voting against thetreaty)have not yet

signed the treaty. According to the treaty, states will not provide weapons to governments

who abuse human rights, or to terror groups. But the reports on weapons deliveries rely on

country-members‘goodwill, lacking an enforcement mechanism.81

Against this background,

SIPRI editors admit that many of the organizations that are tasked with promoting peace and

security find it increasingly difficult to generate the necessary political will and financial

resources needed to meet their mandates. Another explanation is a lack of political will to

establish governance mechanisms. Moodie explains this situation in that Western

governments see the non-proliferation of conventional weapons as falling in the ‗too hard‘

78

Nicholas Tsagourias and Nigel D. White, Collective Security. Theory, Law and Practice (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2013), 180. 79

Moodie, ―Beyond Proliferation,‖ 74-75. 80

Martell, Sociology, 77, 299. 81

Stanislava Gaydazhieva. ―Almost 70 countries sign landmark Arms Trade Treaty,‖ New Europe, 4 June 2013,

http://www.neurope.eu/article/almost-70-countries-sign-landmark-arms-trade-treaty (accessed 4 January 2014);

Shaun Tandon. ―US, Biggest Exporter, Signs Landmark UN Arms Treaty,‖ Defense News, 25 September 2013,

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130925/DEFREG02/309250034/US-Biggest-Exporter-Signs-Landmark-

UN-Arms-Treaty(accessed 4 January 2014); Mohamed Kassim. ―How lack of international treaty fuels arms

smuggling trade,‖ Star, 9 January 2013,http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-102107/how-lack-international-

treaty-fuels-arms-smuggling trade#sthash. CmaYdCpf. dpuf (accessed 9 September 2013).

32

category, whereas developing states consider arms control alien and not a high priority. The

latter see arms control initiatives by the developed countries as an attempt to interfere with

their national security needs. The North-South tension over arms control and nonproliferation

makes it easier for NSAs to maintain their force buildup. Additional constraints are the

argument of the legitimate right of developing states and NSAs to self-defense, and pressures

for defense industries to sell arms in difficult economic times.82

The Implication of Globalization on Terror and War

Globalization facilitates the proliferation of weapons to NSAs and empowers transnational

organizations. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both occurring

in 1979, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in an Islamic revival and a religious

radicalization processwhich was characterized by the spread of radical Islamic social

movements, networks and political parties. The ―Global Jihad movement‖ in general and the

al Qaeda terror organization in particular became significant actors. Both are based on the

―Salafiya-Jihadia‖ ideology that emerged in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Al Qaeda`s attack

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 – the most devastating

terrorist attack in modern history – projected a new kind of terrorism, global and

transnational.83

According to the INSS, since their establishment in the 1980s, al Qaeda and

organizations identified with global Jihad have carried out more than 85 percent of the

suicide bombings around the world (around 3,500 suicide attacks in total), and in 2013, they

perpetrated almost 95 percent of 291 suicide attacks.84

Al Qaeda is the first terrorist group to

have successfully conducted suicide attacks on land, at sea, and in the air. Hoffman explains

that suicide terrorism has become increasingly popular because of its unique tactical

advantages compared to those of more conventional terrorist operations. Suicide tactics are

devastatingly effective, lethally efficient, have a greater likehood of success, and are

relatively inexpensive and generally easier to execute than other modes of attack.85

82

Moodie,―Beyond Proliferation,‖ 9, 72-73, 310. 83

Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism (New York: Chelsea House, 2006), 81-82;M. Kamal and Ahmed I.

Samatar. ―The Resurgence of Islam,” in Globalization Critical Reflections, ed. Mittelman H. James (London:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 188. 84

Yotam Rosner Einav Yogev and Yoram Schweitzer.―A Report on Suicide Bombings in 2013,‖INSS Insight

507, 14 January 2014,http://www.inss.org.il/ index.aspx?id= 4538&articleid=6408 (accessed 16 January 2014),

1-2. 85

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 132.

33

In late 2004, Al Qaeda senior member, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (Abu Mus‗ab al

Suri), a top Jihadist military theoretician, published a comprehensive book called ―The

Global IslamicResistance Call‖ which was widely posted on jihadist sites. In November 2005

he was arrested in Pakistan, extradited to the United States and later handed to the Syrian

regime. Based on his past military experience fighting in Syria and Afghanistan, and reading

classical books on guerrilla warfare, Abu Mus‗ab al Suri developed a military doctrine on

how the international jihad should be strategically and tactically fought against the United

States and its allies. No other Jihadi leader has ever conceptualized a comprehensive doctrine

of terror and guerrilla warfare after 9/11. Abu Mus‗ab al Suri‘s themes are valuable for the

following thesis because he regards globalization as creating a new type of Jihad and

terrorism rather than being only a facilitator of the Jihad and he discusses the armament of the

Moslem militants. 86

Abu Mus‗ab al Suri argues that in light of the end of the Cold War, U.S. military

superiority and the global war on terrorism post 9/11, the ―individual jihad‖ is the best

method of defeating the United States and its allies rather than using regional, hierarchical,

and elite type organizations or waging high-intensity war. Al Qaeda could no longer exist as a

hierarchical organization, but instead has to become adecentralized network. Moslems who

want to wage jihad and be martyrs could act individually or in a small cell, conducting terror

attacks and guerrilla operations against civilian and military targets. Individual jihad could be

conducted anywhere in the Arab and Islamic world, even world-wide, because where it takes

place is not dependent on particular conditions. The goal is to transfer individual jihad into an

organized strategic phenomenon rather than a collection of responses.87

According to Abu

Mus‗ab al Suri:

…the necessity of planting the idea of globalized jihad in all fields… this is one of

the axioms of the doctrine. Our new method for the jihad operations is the Global

Islamic Resistance Call. Likewise, the present military theory is also dependent

upon moving on a global horizon… the horizons for this operational activity open

up regardless of borders and countries… it is a system of action (nizam al amal),

not a centralized secret organization for action (tanzim lil amal).88

86

Lia Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad. The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‟ab al-Suri(New York:

Columbia University Press, 2008); Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad H. Ali.―Abu Mus ‗ab Al Suri: Architect of

the New Al Qaeda,‖Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, 1(2007): 1-3. 87

Brynjar, Architect, 367-368, 393. 88

Brynjar, Architect, 393.

34

Abu Mus‗ab al Suri suggests that jihadi cells will be established spontaneously by

those who wish to act or with the help of a builder from the central leadership of al Qaeda.

The latter will use communication networks, mostly the Internet, to distribute military,

political andeducational programs, providing strategic guidance. The cells will share a

common name, political program, doctrine and common goal; otherwise they are independent

and should prepare themselves on their own. Therefore if one cell is disclosed, it will not

influence the others who operate or intend to operate. The success of the individual jihad will

spread through communication technology and many thousands of Moslems will join the

movement until a whole nation is uprising resulting in the establishment of an Islamic

caliphate.89

Being independent, the Jihadist combatant is responsible for acquiring his own

weaponry, mainly personal weapons, home-made and military explosives. ―It is basic

weapons which move him to do whatever he is capable of, even using civilian weapons, if

there is nothing else available.‖90

In areas where Moslems are compelled to confront their

enemy, such as in Afghanistan, the Jihadists need heavier weapon systems, including mortars,

anti-tank and anti-air missiles. According to Abu Mus‗ab al Suri, the availability of weapons

stockpiles is one of the preconditions of Jihadists wagingguerrilla war, such as in Afghanistan

and Yemen.Similar to classical theoreticians of guerrilla warfare, Abu Mus‗ab al Suri and

other al Qaeda strategists have emphasized the limited weaponry of the Jihadist rebels

compared to their foes who have superior equipment. But al Qaeda‘s main requirement is to

set up a state in what they called ―Muslim lands,‖ and that implies the need for more

conventional and better armed forces.91

In his book, Al Qa„ida‟sDoctrine for Insurgency,Abd al-Aziz al Muqrin, another

Jihadist scholar, emphasizes the importance of arming terror cells. Al Muqrin commanded the

al Qaeda branch in Saudi Arabia until killed by the Saudis in 2004. He assigned the logistic

element of the ―urban guerrilla‖ to collaborate with the ―Mafia‖ or other smugglers ―to

supply everything the other units need in terms of weapons, tools, equipment, documents,

89

Brynjar,Architect, 421-426, 445-446, 476. 90

Brynjar, Architect, 373,375, 470. 91

Michael W.S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda‘s Strategy. The Deep Battle

against America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 136, 232, 256.

35

safe houses, vehicles, etc.‖ He suggested training the logistic personnel of al Qaeda‘s terror

cells ―in ways of buying and delivering weapons and ammunition.‖92

Cruickshanks and Alib claim the ideas of Abu Mus‗ab al Suri have made a very

significant impact, and it is likely that perpetrators of terrorist attacks in the last decade have

been exposed to, and influenced by, his posting on jihadi websites. Moreover, Abu Mus‗ab al

Suri‘s military theory forecasts the structure and modus operandi of contemporary al Qaeda.

Hoffman argues that al Qaeda exists more as an ideology that has become a vast enterprise –

an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a

central ideological or motivational base but advancing according the center‘s goals at once

simultaneously and independently of each other. Hoffman emphasizes that al Qaeda‘s

strength is not in geographical possession or occupation of a defined territory but in its

fluidity and impermanence. None of these factors could exist without globalization.93

Some

scholars argue that al Qaeda‘s central and global jihad affiliated groups have adopted Abu

Mus‗ab al Suri‘s strategy, understanding that use of the home-grown cell is an efficient way

to fight the West rather than one centralized organization. The Boston Bombing of April

2013, conducted by two Chechen brothers, citizens of the United States, and thebeheading of

a British soldier in the heart of London in May 2013 by two British citizens of Nigerian

origin, are just two examples of the growing phenomenon. Still, Ryan argues that lone-wolf

terrorism is possible but not sustainable. The strategy of individual and small-unit terrorism is

politically meaningless, exhausting the remnants of support for al Qaeda.94

That NSAs use suicide terrorism intensively across the world and acquire medium and

long-range rockets and missiles characteristic of regular armies, hasencouraged American

military experts to argue, mainly since the 1990s, that the nature of war has changed and the

classical theory cannot be applied to contemporary conflicts in the world. Accordingly, war

in its classical form, involving set-piece battles between regular armies, has little future. They

called ―fourth-generation warfare,‖ 4GW, irregular warfare dominated by terrorists and

NSAs‘ insurgencies, as the major threat to international security. It is asymmetric warfare,

92

Norman Cigar, trans. Al Qa„ida‟s Doctrine for Insurgency. Abd al Aziz al-Muqrin‟s. A Practical Course for

Guerilla War(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009), 123-124. 93

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 282-283. 94

Cruickshank and Ali, 9; Yoram Schweitzer and Aviv Oreg.―Al Qaeda‘s Odyssey to the Global

Jihad,‖INSS,Memorandum 134 (March 2014), http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadimages/

systemfiles/memo132f.pdf(accessed 18 March2014): 40-43; Ryan, Crime-Terror,254. Yoram Schweitzer and

Shaul Shay,The Globalization of Terror. The Challenge of Al Qaida and the Response of the International

Community. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 55-122.

36

that is, a vast discrepancy exists between the resources, the capabilities, and the doctrine of

the combatants. While old wars were between nation-states and often over national territory

the new wars common in recent years are taking place within failing or weak states, rather

than over territory and state-building, such as the civil wars in Syria, Somalia and Iraq. These

wars cannot end with decisive battles but only with the collapse of political will. The new

wars are also more local or global than national, for example in Afghanistan the Taliban

fights NATO forces and the security situation differsremarkably the provinces.In addition,

war-making is more decentralized and less total; it may be less between symmetrical state

armies than asymmetrical forces, and less focused on full-scale wars than sometimes on-and-

off simmering or intermittent conflicts, as in the Israel-Palestine conflict.95

The apparent change in the nature of war led to the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA), led by the U.S. military command and adopted by other western countries. The RMA

implies the development of a new generation of sensors, long-range guided weapons, and

data processing systems that integrate broadband wireless data communication networks. The

common thread in these new approaches, when taken together, is the diminishing need for

concentrating and maneuvering ground forces for the ―linear‖ destruction of the enemy‘s

forces. Instead, information is collected and the enemy is analyzed as a system (and even as a

system-of-systems) in order to identify vulnerability nodes in the system and to direct

simultaneous standoff fire from the air and from decentralized land formations (which are not

in danger due to their detachment from the enemy and their low signature) towards those

vulnerability nodes. This creates various effects on the enemy system, among them

―blindness,‖ ―isolation,‖ ―paralysis,‖ ―decapitation,‖ and ―a sense of being pursued.‖96

These

effects are designed to bring the enemy that could be an NSA to a state of cognitive-strategic

collapse, thereby pushing it to adopt the expected behavioral change, which will consequently

achieve the strategic objective of the war.At the center of the RMA is the ―standoff

firepower-based operations,‖ (SFO). The SFO approach is more than simple upgrading of the

existing military machine, rather it is a buildup and organization of the fighting force, a

concept of force utilization, and a fundamental change in the approach toward using military

force in war while blurring the lines between the tactical, operative, and strategic levels.97

95

Martell, Sociology, 303; Lawrence Freedman. ―The Transformation of Strategic Affairs,‖ in The evolution of

Strategic Thought. Classic Adelphi Papers (London: Routledge, 2008), 650. 96

Freedman, ―Transformation,‖ 600-603. 97

Ron Tira. ―The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations: On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and

Decision,‖Memorandum 89 (March 2007):11; Martell, Sociology, 12

37

The new military thought argues that warfare against NSAs takes place

simultaneously in and among the physical, the information, and the cognitive domains. Key

elements of the transformation include: Information Superiority, Decision Superiority,

Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and Information Operations.

These factors form a network system; its components operate together effectively as one

complete system to accomplish a mission. In irregular warfare, superiority in the physical

environment is of little value unless it can be translated into an advantage in the information

environment. Information is the key factor in military operations, and a new stage– the

information age–has come, bringing with it fundamental changes in organization of all

human affairs, including the use of military force. The new military thought dictates an

increasingly dispersed battlefield, reducing the importance of centralized logistics and mass

(either men or firepower), and a tendency for victory to come through the implosion of the

enemy rather than its physical destruction. There are blurred boundaries–between war and

peace, between civilian and military, between tactics and strategy, between order and chaos.

Such war against NSAs cannot be contained in either time or space. Fighting NSAs, armies

need to operate in the cultural domain, acknowledge the concept of narratives, which move to

the center-stage of strategy at this time. 98

The RMA generated a revolution in the concept of the use of force and the force

buildup in the US and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).One of the main ideas behind SFO is

force efficiency and a transition from ―linear‖ warfare against NSAs to decentralized warfare.

Simply put, while the classic war involves only one's own advance force and the enemy‘s

advance force, with the main body of the two sides‘ forces waiting in the rear, SFO tries to

generate a situation in which all of one‘s forces fire simultaneously at the enemy‘s entire

deployment throughout the depth of the theater. Herein arguably lies a distinction of the SFO

design from the classic doctrine whereby only about one fifth of the main ground forces are

engaged at any one time, while the other forces secure the flanks and the rear and serve as a

reserve force for unexpected developments. The argument is that the technological revolution

enables one‘s forces not only to fire simultaneously deep into the enemy‘s formations but

allows them to dispel the battle fog as well. According to some SFO designers, this means

there is no longer a need to expend forces on reserves and on securing the flanks and rear. 99

98

Freedman,―Transformation,‖ 605, 608, 611. 99

Tira, ―Limitations,‖38.

38

Thelow intensity conflicts between a state and an NSA that take place simultaneously

in different places, and the modern weapon systems which have long range capabilities, have

blurred the difference between the front and the rear, and that has undermined the importance

of the land. The advocators of SPO use the war in Kosovo (1990s) as a confirmation for their

theory, because NATO forces apparently achieved their political objectives mainly by using

aerial attacks againstSerbiangovernment militarytargets (although the Americans

undoubtedly failed to destroy mobile targets from the air and the war lasted longer than

NATO had planned). The fact that this campaign eventually helped to compel a change in

Belgrade`s policy was later taken as some sort of vindication of air power acting alone.100

Most of the literature on SFO talks about the need for balancing SFO with the classic

use of force and preserving the ability to maneuver deep into enemy territory, launch direct

offensives, and maintain close contact. In practice, budgetary constraints, the focus on low-

intensity conflicts, the increased aversion to sustaining casualties during ground maneuvers,

and an over-enthusiastic adoption of the SFO revolution have led to its implementation at the

expense of classic capabilities, including the land maneuver deep into enemy territory, the

launch of direct offensives and maintaining close contact with the enemy. The SPO employs

only light land components, and normally does not use tanks and armored personnel

carriers.101

For example, in the years leading up to the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006, the

scope of training and the allocation of resources for classic formations in the IDF were

reduced to the extent that at its outbreak, it is doubtful whether the IDF had adequate classic

capabilities.102

The RMA washeavily criticized by military experts on duty and by former

servicemen. They claimed that new technology does not change the basic principles of war

including against NSAs, and that some of the characteristics are actually well known in

military history. The conflicts between states and NSAs, for instance, were also the most

common warfare in earliertimes, and the old AK-47 is still the most lethal weapon system.

The theoretical basis of the new military thought was allegedly totally detached from reality

and consisted of nothing more than mumbo jumbo intended to conceal a total lack of

understanding of the art of war in general, and the battle against terrorism in particular. The

new conceptualizations did not improve the understanding of NSAs, but led to organizational

100

Freedman, ―Transformation,‖48-49. 101

Freedman, ―Transformation,‖ 600-603. 102

Tira, ―Limitations,‖13.

39

failures and damage to the basic principles and ethics of Intelligence work. They dragged the

military and the Intelligence community into areas that fell outside the arena of the military

conflict, such as policy decision making and psychological and cultural analysis of the

enemy, to problems forwhich the military had no solutions, and all this at the expense of

concentrating on core military issues.103

Small wars against rebellious NSAs were always the dominant warfare, but they have

become a more efficient tactic to gain victory. Contemporary NSAs have better chances to

win wars against states owing to globalization – they are more mobile, can target state

interests anywhere, and they have access to modern military technologies. Most importantly,

NSAs can use many media channels to advance their cause, such as justifying the use of

terror against civilians. Still, war is not a calculable mathematical algorithm but a dynamic,

changing, and complex human experience that occurs under conditions of pressure and

exhaustion, and involves coincidence and errors by all parties involved.104

Martin Van Creveld agrees that future war will be waged overwhelmingly by, and

against, organizations that are not states. And since they do not own sovereign territory and

consequently cannot be threatened with nuclear weapons, they will be able to fight each

other, and the state, to their heart‘s content. But Van Creveld argues that war in its elemental

Hobbesian sense is not only alive but will be as deadly as ever. To win a war, militaries still

have to target the NSAs‘ forces and weapons in the field rather than seeking to spook or jam

or saturate the enemy‘s sensors, disrupt his communication and infiltrate his computers.105

The critic against the new militarythought argues that some new aspects of force

buildup and the concept of utilization of forces derive from the United States‘ unique need to

respond within hours to situations anywhere in the world with long-range fire and sometimes

inter-continental fire, or within days with airborne and seaborne expeditionary deployments,

while maintaining joint global control of four separate armed services. Such considerations

are, of course, irrelevant to smaller countries such as Israel. In the same manner, the SFO is a

useful doctrine for a superpower that could easily impose its will on its NSAs‘ enemies, butis

less relevant for a weaker country. Therefore, the Israeli political and military leadership

failed to understand at the outbreak of the war against the Hezbollah in July 2006 that the

103

Ya‘acov Amidror. ―Operational Options or Rationale,‖ Ma‟arachot388 (April 2003): 4– 8 (Hebrew); Ya‘acov

Amidror. ―The Strike as Paradigm of Cognitive Effects,‖ Ma‟arachot 403 (December 2005): 54–57(Hebrew). 104

Tira, ―Limitations,‖47; Hanson, 24/7, 124-132. 105

Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War. War and Military Thought(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000),

214-217.

40

bombing of Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut and the targeting of the organization`s long-

range rocket depots alongside a very limited maneuver in the South of Lebanon could not

deter Hezbollah from maintaining the shelling of Israeli inhabitants.106

Demonstrating the

complexity of NSA, Hezbollah operated as a flat, decentralized structure that incorporated a

network of autonomous cells with high redundancy and a central command. The Israeli

commanders mistakenly thought that the employment of the SFO wouldcreate effects

designed to generate a behavioral change in Hezbollah that would ultimately remove the

rocket threat.107

At no stage of the war were the ground forces used according to an

operational concept of direct and comprehensive handling of the problem of the short-range

surface-to-surface rockets (such as total occupation and clearing all the launch areas). After

thirty three days of fighting, the IDF was still unable to remove the threat of short-range

rockets from the north of Israel. Learning its lesson, the IDF employed larger and more

successful land maneuver in its war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, launched in December

2008.108

Van Creveld strongly criticizes the RMA calling on the IDF and the US army to ―get

rid of the seductive but nonsensical and extremely costly illusion that is called RMA,‖ and to

focus on fighting terrorism and insurgency.109

But it could be argued Van Creveld‘s concept

about NSAs in the global era including their arming is too vague and monolithic. Van

Creveld argues that twentieth and twentieth-first century armed forces ―are helpless in

fighting small groups of often ill trained, ill funded, ill equipped terrorists.‖110

The latter

employ the strategy of long conflict using guerrilla and terror tactics and enjoy domestic and

international support because they are weaker than their opponents and are justified in using

any and every means available. Failed counterinsurgency campaigns result in states‘

withdrawal from foreign land (like the withdrawl of the U.S. Army from Somalia and

Afghanistan and the Soviets‘ withdrawl from Afghanistan) local provinces and even

disintegration (such as in Somalia and Sudan). Van Creveld argues that ―insurgents can

hardly establish the logistical infrastructure for operating heavy weapons‖, and ―quite a few

never succeed inadvancing beyond the first [stage of Mao‘s insurgency model]….They never

106

Tira, ―Limitations,‖15. 107

Tira, ―Limitations,‖15. 108

Tira, ―Limitations,‖22, 43-44. 109

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 277-278.

110Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 223.

41

succeed in conquering territory and hold on to it.‖111

Van Creveld claims that state-NSA

wars hardly ever ended with a physical collapse of the state that fight the NSAs (such as the

United States and Israel). Future war will be waged overwhelmingly by, and against,

organizations that are not states. And since they do not own sovereign territory and

consequently cannot be threatened with nuclear weapons, they will be able to fight each

other, and the state, to their heart‘s content.112

Similarly, General Rupert Smith argues that until the end of World War Two the old

paradigm of ―interstate industrial warfare‖ was dominant. It featured conflict between states,

the maneuver of mass forces, and the total support of the state‘s manpower and industrial

base for the purpose of an absolute victory. In contemporary wars, on the other hand, the aim

is to constantly undermine the stronger army and to demoralize the government and the

people. It is a ―clash of wills rather than the trial of strength.‖113

These wars are waged

―amongst the people,‖ between multinational coalitions of states and NSAs that might be

parties to a civil war or an insurgency, whether operating as formed armies or guerillas or

terrorist groups or the band of some warlord. These conflicts tend to be of indefinite duration,

western armies fight to conserve their fighting forces and the ends for which they fight are

not absolute objectives but more modest ones. NSAs are formless and ill armed. The AK-47

and the machete continue to kill people by the millions as well as the effective suicide

bomber. They are the tools of war amongst the people. Smith warns that NSAs that fight the

West have learned not to present a target that favors the weapons the West possesseses and

the way it uses them. Therefore, the major task of intelligence agencies is to locate people

rather than items. In war amongst the people military equipment is less important.114

McKenzie debates with both Van Creveld and Smith arguing against one dimensional

paradigmatic visions that are narrow and incomplete whereas he views state-NSA conflicts as

constantly evolving and varied. ―The notion that any paradigm can summarize the intentions

of wide ranging adversaries is contestable…. They tend to encourage uniform responses.‖ 115

Both scholars overstate the transformation of war.McKenzie argues that the world is a

heterogeneous place and does not advance in linear fashion. Therefore, whenadequately

111

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 223. 112

Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War. War and Military Thought(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000),

214-217. 113

Smith, Utility of the Force, 180, 175. 114

Smith, Utility of the Force, 16-18, 298–305, 325–327, 364–369. 115

Alexander McKenzie, ―‗New Wars‘ Fought ‗Amongst the People‘: ‗Transformed‘ by Old Realities,‖

Defence Studies 11/4 (December 2011), 586.

42

resourced and correctly directed by states, conventional military forces can defeat NSAs such

as when the US military destroyed Al Qaeda‘s infrastructure in western Iraq in 2007. Smith

and Van Creveld refer to all NSAs as national and local-based but as this thesisaims to prove

NSAs have diverse characters. Some Salafi-Jihadist groups, for instance, are transnational

rejecting nationalism because they are subordinated to the idea of the Moslem community of

believers.116

Van Creveld argues that reviewing counter insurgency campaigns reveals ―a long

almost unbroken record of failure… to the present day.‖117

He notes that passing time has not

changed this trend. Still he is very selective choosing his case studies which in retrospect

dramatically changed in the opposite direction illustrating the dynamic of state-NSA

conflicts. Van Creveld views the withdrawal of Indian forces from Sri Lanka in 1991 as a

victory of the Liberation Tigers for Tamil and Eelam (LTTE), but the change in India‘s

policy toward the LTTE was a strategic development helping Sri Lanka‘s armed forces to

defeat the LTTE in 2009. Van Creveld ignores India‘s effective counter insurgency efforts

against rebellious NSAs in the Northeast. He rightly criticizes the poor performance of the

IDF in the 2006 war against the Lebanese Hezbollah but since that war Hezbollah has not

fired rockets over Israel.118

The Nation-Statein light of Globalization

Being the principal actors in the international political system since the seventeenth century,

states have always faced the major challenge of arms smuggling. Formally arms smuggling is

a criminal activity, conducted across borders, while state boundaries are perhaps the most

fundamental institution in the modern state system, and territoriality an integral part of what

it means to be a state. The following sub-chapter debates the status of the nation-state in light

of globalization effects (many discussed in previous sections). When an insurgency regularly

manages to smuggle weapons into a state‘s territory it is clear evidence of a weak

governmentthat does not control its territory. For example, the Taliban are smuggling arms

and ammunition from Pakistan to Afghanistan through the unguarded borders between the

two states. Cross-border smuggling of weapons could be linked to a broader subject. Some

scholars claim that borders serve a diminished function or are no longer important in

116

McKenzie, ―New Wars,‖ 588–589. 117

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 219. 118

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 271; Neil De Votta. ―The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the

Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,‖ Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1021-1051.

43

regulating international affairs, implying adecline of the national state as a result of

globalization.119

Significant debate exists concerning the extent to which globalization has eroded the

system of nation-states, and about the future of sovereignty. The outcome of the debate

implies how serious the problem of smuggling of weapons by NSAs is.120

Some globalization

theorists suggest that nation states are imploding under the dual pulls of devolution of

functions to local or sub-national levels and the transfer of sovereignty upwards to

international institutions and processes. According to this view, if there is a role left for the

territorially based state, it is one of regulation of flows of capital, commodities and risks

across its borders. The global begins to replace the nation state as the decisive framework for

social life. Daniel Bell famously expressed it as, ―too small for the big problems of life and

too big for small problems.‖121

Smugglers belong to the relatively new force that consists of

terrorists, NGOs, economic corporations, drug cartels, and insurgents. They all find a space to

move and operate independently, within the nooks and crannies of the international system.

Power is shifting away from nation-states, up, down, and sideways. In such an atmosphere,

the traditional applications of national power, both economic and military, have become less

effective. 122

Globalization theorists provide many examples for the decline of the nation-states.

States have less authority to make decisions about their own policies.Globalization has been

facilitated by states forming and joining supernational organizations such as the World Trade

Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU).

From the 1990s, globalization has been manifested by a dramatic rise in the numbers and

influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), pursuing public purposes outside the

formal apparatus of the state (such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Doctors

without Borders). All these NGOs are widely dispersed across geographic areas and affect the

everyday lives of large numbers of people almost everywhere.123

Fareed Zakaria calls it ―the

119

Gretchen Peters,Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda(New York:

Macmillan, 2009), 37; Salekyan, 26-28. 120

Salekyan,240;LeslieSklair. ―Globalization,‖ in Sociology. Issues and Debates, ed. Taylor Steve (Hampshire:

Palgrave, 1999), 331; Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers. An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham:

Duke University Press, 2006), 21-22. 121

Ray, Globalization, 76-77. 122

Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New-York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008), 4. 123

Ritzer, Globalization, 4-5.

44

diffusion of power from states to other actors.‖124

States cannot provide solutions to issues of

pollution, terrorism, arms smuggling, the drug trade, currency crises, and global pandemics

such as AIDS. States share power with international organizations and political space is no

longer determined by politically defined territories. 125

According to Price in a global world rulers are unable to keep out unwanted signals

and information. The cultural bonds and localities that once seemed to be within the control

of the state are now less so. Governments operate under international regimes and

international norms such as human rights, preventing a ruler from excluding information even

when it is technically capable of doing so. These new conditions make states‘ effort to

contain rebel groups harder.126

NSAs are a product of new forms of organizing and

networking across national boundaries that have evolved, expanding the arena of political

action beyond the nation-state and thus changing the nature of world politics. For example, al

Qaeda militias in North Syria are integrated with al Qaeda forces in West Iraq, associated

with radical Sunni groups in Lebanon and supported by elements in the Gulf States. These

subnational and transnational identities cannot be contained in the nation-state system. 127

Other scholars argue that the decline of the nation state has been overstated, and that

the territorial state remains a key factor in the global system and a significant form of social

solidarity. The existence of exceptionally inept states and respect for their borders in a

competitive global environment is cited as evidence that sovereignty matters. Although

globalization presents new challenges, the territorial nation is still a fundamental actor in

world politics. These scholars claim that never in history was sovereignty absolute or

indivisible. The capacity of states to act was always conditional on treaties, balance of power,

resource limitations and home and international social movements. Yet many key policy

areas of the national state – taxation, infrastructural planning, immigration, education,

research, development and training, social policy – all remain essentially national even if

conditioned by international bodies and agreements.128

Ray claims that the nation state as an

ethnically homogenous realm is relatively new and has co-existed with other forms of state

organization throughout the modern period. But because populations are now diverse, and

124

Zakaria, Post-American World, 4. 125

Ray,Globalization, 80. 126

Price, Jerusalem, 26. 127

Hanson, 24/7, 212-214. 128

Hanson,24/7, 102.

45

economic, cultural and political lives are complex, it does not follow that the state and

territoriality are no longer significant. On the contrary, the state has arguably become more

significant as an actor in the global area than it was previously.These arguments imply that

rebellious NSAs still face much stronger rival states.129

Some theorists argue that globalization has strengthened rather than weakened the

nation state and that although the global system of financial regulation has been undermined,

national policy differences still affect capital flows.130

States have always been challenged

from within and without, and today they are in many ways better able to respond and adapt to

armed NSAs than in the past. For instance, scholars argue that governments use the new

communication and information technologies much more efficiently than NSAs, and these

channels actually strengthen existing power structures, both domestically and internationally.

Governments can afford to exploit modern technology to its limits, especially advanced

surveillance technologies, allowing them to monitor their citizens more effectively. The

mobile phone system, in particular, enables secret services to target specific suspects. The

best illustration is Edward Snowden‘s exposure of many thousands of classified documents of

the U.S. National Security Agency, revealing a huge amount of surveillance activity at home

and abroad. Governments could use these advanced technologies to improve the war against

the smuggling of illicit arms.131

Art Scholte represents a third approach to the debate on the nation-state. He argues

that on no account does the rise of trans-world and supraterritorial relations spell the end of

national identities; however, sovereign states in contemporary times of globalization differ

from those of earlier generations. The state nation framework has become less dominant as a

specific kind of nation, and globalization has encouraged a diversification of types of nations

to include micro-nations, region-nations and transworld nations; that is, the growth of

alternative frameworks of collective identity, both national and non-territorial. An example is

the micro-nationalist movements among many ethnic groups which are striving for

recognition and autonomy or independence; they have not challenged the principle of

129

Ray,Globalization, 80. 130

Hanson, 24/7, 86. 131

Hanson, 24/7, 182-183.

46

nationhood, but have rather reproduced it in new forms. These NSAs could wage armed

struggle against the state.132

The Creation of Transnational Social Spaces

Transnational spaces could be a fruitful paradigm for the analysis of NSAs‘ arms smuggling

because theytouchon a different aspect of smuggling activity. Transnational spaces are pluri-

local, border crossing sets of ties among persons, networks, communities and organizations.

Their formation was facilitated by technological progress in transport and communication.

Also, the concept of the nation state after World War Two has intensified ethnic-religious

conflicts and the multicultural policies of western countries that actually encouraged

minorities to maintain their cultural differences and ties to their country of origin, including

mobilization of resources. The current study deals with cross-states activity (arms

smuggling), and with actors who maintain connections across various states (for example, Sri

Lankan Tamil immigrants in Europe and North America). Therefore transnational spaces are

a productive analytical tool worthy of elaboration.133

―Space‖ does not only refer to the physical aspect but denotes the cultural, economic

and political practices of individual and collective actors within territories or places.

Transnational spaces can be differentiated along two dimensions: their degree of

formalization and their durability. The degree of formalization concerns both the internal

characteristics of group organization and the extent of common or even shared values and

symbols. The durability dimension represents the potential durability of different kinds of

transnational space.134

The arms smuggling of NSAs is concerned with two types of

transnational space:

Issue networks. These are a set of ties between persons and organizations in

which information and services flow for the achievement of common goals.

Often, there is a shared discourse around a specific issue such as human rights

132

Scholte, Globalization, 226-239. 133

ThomasFaist. ―Beyond National and Post-National Models: Transnational Spaces and Immigrant

Integration,‖ in New Horizons in Sociological Theory and Research. The Frontiers of Sociology at the

Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Tomasi, Luigi (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001),279, 281, 287. 134

Faist,―Beyond National,‖279.

47

or a profession. Transnational criminal and arms smuggling networks operate

in a similar way to the issue networks, because they also have a common goal

and exchange information and services. Criminal transnational networks differ

from Transnational organizations(such as the UN), as the latter are

characterized by formal internal hierarchy and systematically structured

controls of social ties. In this context, historians Osterhammel and Petersson

argue that globalization grows where the contacts and interactions become

networks, and the durability and frequency of relations affects whether

interactions become a stable network.135

Transnational communities. These communities comprise dense and

continuous sets of social and symbolic ties characterized by a high degree of

intimacy, emotional depth, moral obligation and sometimes even social

cohesion. The most basic types are village communities in the emigration and

immigration states, whose relations are marked by an extended solidarity over

long periods of time. Diasporas, such as Cubans and Irish in the United States,

Tamils in Canada and Europe and Palestinians in Arab counties, belong to the

category of transnational communities. During periods of domestic unrest,

they feel committed to help their ethnic group. According to Salehyan they

can play an active role in opposing the governments of their homelands in

multiple ways: mobilizing political support among the host governments,

contributing money and other resources for rebellious NSAs in the homeland.

The transnational communities run much of their activities through the

Internet, using communication and new information technologies.136

Salehyan argues that domestic conflicts in states are greatly influenced by NSAs that

are transnational organizations. Rebels seek resources, including weapons, and mobilization

opportunities outside of the territory of the state, beyond any one state‘s legal, political, and

coercive reach. This gives such actors a strategic advantage over state agents who are less

mobile. Migrant diasporas, terror networks, and criminal organizations, are contributing to

violencedirectly or indirectly. These elements are aided by advances in technology, which

lower transaction costs within the organization as well as raise the destructive capacity of

135

Martell, Sociology, 14. 136

Martell,Sociology,285-287; Salehyan, Rebels, 34-36; Hanson,24/7, 198.

48

small groups. Salehyan claims that state-NSA conflict becomes transnational but he

emphasizes NSA activity from neighboring countries and the importance of location near the

target state, arguing it is quite costly for state forces to cross national boundaries in pursuit of

transnational rebels. Dealing mainly with cross border NSAs, Salehyan‘s theme could be

explained in terms of international relations and proxy war rather than transnationalism and

globalization. Extraterritorial bases do not make NSAs transnational.137

Anthony D`Andrea sees smugglers –like traders, handcrafters, DJs, and alternative

therapists– asan example of neonomads (or global nomads) who are a phenomenon of

cultural globalization. Both traditional-pastoral nomads and neo nomads have deployed

mobility as a tactic of evasion from dominant sedentary apparatuses. Neo nomads exercise

their skills along the way, as do the nomads seasonally moving animals into better pastures to

accommodate larger flocks. Displacement does not define nomadism if economic activities

lie ahead of or behind those on the move (such as labor migrants and business people). All

nomads value the ownership of goods and tools. Insofar as they remain able to move and use

free spaces, they have little interest in owning or remaining attached to land. Their de-

territorialized relation with space is a central feature of nomadic culture and mentality, one

that reinforces their will to move.138

Thus, a positive correlation exists between mobility and

autonomy, and nomadism is the best method of adapting and surviving. For nomads mobility

is more than spatial displacement;it is also a component of their economic strategies, as well

as of their own modes of self-identity and formationof subjectivity. Yet, neo nomads differ

from traditional nomads by projecting in a context of globalization hypermobile formation,

digitalization and reflexivity, new forms of subjectivity and identity.139

Glocalization and Grobalization

Arms smuggling might be an outcome of local traditions integrated with global trends. A

useful concept for the analysis is Glocalization, defined by Ritzer as ―interpenetration of the

global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different geographical areas.‖ 140

Ritzer

argues that globalization is not simply about the ―disembedding‖ of the ―local‖ by the

―global,‖ it is rather about creation of a new global-local nexus, about exploring the new

relations between global and local spaces. It manifests the dialectical nature of globalization

137

Salehyan, Rebels, 19-40. 138

D‘ Andrea, Global Nomads, 17-27. 139

D‘ Andrea, Global Nomads, 17-27. 140

Ritzer, Globalization, 13.

49

which comprises two entirely contradictory processes of homogenization and

differentiation.141

There isa complex interaction between localism and globalism whereby

local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. Local

transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections

across time and space. The outcome of this process is a set of changes acting in a uniform

direction, but consists in mutually opposed tendencies, for instance the apparent contradiction

between globalization as a force of homogenization, and the disintegration of countries in

Africa, and in other parts of the world, and the so-called revival of nationalism.142

Glocalization theory presumes that the world is growing more pluralistic; there are

differences within and between areas of the world. Individuals and local groups have great

power to adapt, innovate, and maneuver within a glocalized world. Therefore Thai boxing by

Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos are all

manifestations of globalization, as is a tribal Bedouin from Egypt who buys a Chinese AK-47

rifle in a weapon market located in Eritrea. These are all examples of hybridization, that is, an

increasing diversity associated with the unique mixture of the global and the local. A cultural

hybrid involves the combination of two or more elements from different cultures and/or parts

of the world. 143

Arms smuggling is associated with another aspect of glocalization – the

commodification of local cultures by external influencesbut through the existence of flexible

specialization that permits the tailoring of many products to the needs of various local

specifications. That is, the interaction of the global market with local markets leads to the

creation of unique glocal markets that integrate the demands of the global market with the

realities of the local market. The black markets of arms in East Africa and in South East Asia

are part of the global trend of proliferation of weapons; yet their activity has been modified

by local factors, such as geographic location and the security situation. 144

Ritzer draws a contrast between glocalization and grobalization; the latter is an

approach that ―focuses on the imperialistic ambitions of nations, corporations, organizations,

141

Scholte,Globalization, 79. Likewise, Scholte argues that it is mistaken to set up opposition between the global

and local, and both terms have enabling and disabling potentials. 142

Sklair, ―Globalization,‖ 330; Ritzer, Globalization, 13;Alex Callinicos, Social Theory. A Historical

Introduction. 2ed ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 338. 143

Ritzer, Globalization, 13-14. 144

Ritzer,Globalization, 19.Friedman, ―Hybridization of Roots,‖289.

50

to impose themselves on various geographic areas.‖145

They seek to see their power, influence

and profits grow. Grobalization involves such phenomena as Americanization and

MacDonaldization, as well as capitalism. Ritzer argues that the two approaches would give a

more balanced view of the globalization that would represent both cultural convergence and

cultural hybridization. While glocalization left the local sphere with some autonomy and sees

the world as growing more pluralistic, the grobalization approach implies that it is

increasingly difficult to find anything in the world untouched by globalization, and the world

is growing increasingly similar. 146

The researcher is advised to look at social process as a continuum ranging from

glocalization at one end to grobalization at the other. Therefore, glocalization cannot be

discussed without considering grobalization. For example, the Olympic Games are a

spectacular event demonstrating unity-in-difference (glocalization) and make a serious

contribution to global homogenization (grobalization). Yet grobalization is well demonstrated

through many elements that surround the games, including western companies that fund

individual athletes, fast food branches that operate in the Olympic village, and the key role

played by Western TV networks that are central to the grobalization of sport. NSAs‘ efforts

to acquire weapons could also involve both glocalization and grobalization because NSAs

could be fighting local governments by carrying weapons they obtain via the global arms

trade, using traditional tactics and smuggling routes. 147

Globalization and SystemsTheories

Possessing complex structure and goals they wish to achieve, NSAs could be analyzed as a

system. Mario Bunge defines system as―conceived of a complex object, concrete or abstract,

composed of interrelated items, and possesses some systemic or emergent properties absent

from its constituents.‖148

This definition emphasizes the nature of emergence while other

definitions of system are goal-oriented. Rather than reduce an entity (for instance, the human

body) to the properties of its parts or elements (organs or cells), systems theory focuses on

145

Ritzer,Globalization, 15. 146

Ritzer, Globalization, 21. 147

Ritzer,Globalization, 142, 146-147,161. 148

Mario Bunge. ―A Systemic Perspective on Crime,‖ in The Explanation of Crime. Context Mechanisms, and

Development, ed. Per-Olof H. Wikstrom and Robert J. Sampson (New York: Cambridge University Press,

2006), 10.

51

the arrangement of the relations among the parts that connect them into a whole. The

connections are non-trivial and non-linear. The particular organization determines a system,

which is independent of the concrete substance of the elements (for example, cells or

people).149

Unlike living sciences, systems theory failed to become an influential force in social

sciences and was neglected for many years. Sociology and political science have not

embraced the concept of systems, probably owing to a more deep-seated post-Parsonian

aversion to the very term ‗systems‘ in those disciplines. Some scholars claim that as a

movement and scientific ideology, systems theory for the time being was finished. The

system approach, however, could provide a closer examination and a fruitful analysis of arms

smuggling, especially for the more complex and geographically spread smuggling network. It

could also help inanalyzing alliances between NSAs and friendly states, such as the

Hezbollah-Iran-Syria alliance.150

This segment discusses a relatively new research discipline – the Systems of systems

(SOS) and the Federation of Systems (FOS). Bothmodels are making disparate, diverse,

autonomous, and synchronized entities worktogether, without losing their individual sense of

purpose, in order to realize some higher-level and otherwise unattainable purpose. Originally,

the SOS and FOS refer to engineering, technical and sociotechnical systems, but might be

useful for the analysis of complex smuggling networks too.151

The SOS exists when ―there is a presence of a majority of the following five

characteristics: operational independence,managerial independence, geographic distribution,

emerging behavior, and evolutionary development… SOS means large-scale integrated

systems that are heterogeneous and independently operable on their own, but are networked

together for a common goal.‖152

The Internet, transportation systems, the Al Qaeda

organization, the United States Armed Forces, a hotel chain, and the North Atlantic Alliance

(NATO) – when it engages in a military campaign as in Bosnia (1990s) and Libya (2011) –

149

Bunge,―Systemic Perspective,‖ 242-43; Mario Bunge,Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Vol. 4 (Dordrecht,

Netherland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), 6; Gerald Midgley, Systemic Intervention. Philosophy, Methodology

and Practice(New York: Klawer Academic\ Plenum Publishers),33-46. 150

AndreasPickel. ―Systems Theory,‖ in The Philosophy of Social Sciences, eds. Ian C. Jarvice and Jesus

Zamora-Bonilla(Los Angles: SAGE, 2011), 242-245. 151

JoanBoardman and Brian Sauser,Systems Thinking. Coping with 21th Century Problems (New York: CRC

Press, 2008), 155. 152

Mo Jamshidi. ―Introduction to System of Systems,‖ in System of Systems Engineering. Innovations for the

21stCentury, ed. Mo Jamshidi (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009), 2.

52

aresome examples of SOS; they are very large and complex systems which consist of many

autonomous units.Thus, one of the major contemporary characteristics of large systems is that

they are often formed from a variety of component systems, potentially offering different

perspectives of situations. 153

According to Sage and Cuppan large systems have five unique characteristics that

seem very relevant for NSAs‘ force buildup:

Operational independence of the individual systems. SOS are composed of

systems that are independent and useful in their own right. If SOS are dissembled into

the component systems, these component systems are capable of independence,

performing useful operations independently of one another. For example, the Al

Qaeda organization headed by Ayman al Zawahiri consists of severalregional

commands including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jabhat Al Nusra (Syria).They pledged allegiance to al

Qaeda leaders but usually operate on their own.154

Managerial independence of the systems. The component systems cannot just

operate independently, but generally do so to achieve an intended purpose. They are

managed in large part for their own purpose rather than the purpose of the whole. The

component systems are generally individually acquired and integrated and they

maintain a continuing operational existence that is independent of the SOS. This is a

coalition of partners that has decentralized power and authority. For instance, the US,

the UK and other Europeancountries have employed troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as

NATO members. But each country has its own interests and policy and that explains

why sometimes their troops differ operationally in the combat zones.155

Geographic distribution. Geographic dispersion of component systems is often

large. These systems can readily exchange only information and knowledge with one

another.Exchanging substantial quantities of physical mass or energy is either

153

Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, 155. 154

Andrew P. Sage and Christopher D. Cuppan. ―On the Systems Engineering and Management of Systems of

Systems of Systems and Federations of Systems,‖ Systems Management 2 (2001): 326; Yoram Schweitzer

and Aviv Oreg. ―Al Qaeda‘s Odyssey to the Global Jihad,‖ INSS, Memorandum 134 (March 2014),

http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/ uploadimages/ systemfiles/ memo132f.pdf (accessed 18 March 2014):

41. 155

Andréa‘s Talk, Kevin M. Adams and Charles B. Keating. ―Toward Intelligence-Based Systems Engineering

and System of System Engineering,‖ in Intelligent-Based Systems Engineering, eds. Andreas Tolk and

Lakhmi C. Jain (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 9.

53

impossible or requires considerable effort. Al Qaeda operatives are deployed mainlyin

central Asia, the Middle East, North and East Africa and that implies tremendous

logistic and coordination efforts.156

Emergent behavior. SOS performs functions and carries out purposes that do not

reside, nor are they possible, in any component system. These are emergent properties

of the entire SOS and not the behavior of any component system, such as NATO

military involvement in Libya (2011), and the American wars in Iraq (1991, 2003).

Likewise, a tunnel, automobiles, and a highway, are sub-systems of an SOS; they

have an emergent behavior or property in slowing down the traffic.157

Evolutionary development. SOS are never fully formed or complete. Development

of these systems is evolutionary and with structure, function and purpose added,

removed and modified as experience with the system grows and evolves over time.

The systems engineering and management of these systems families pose special

challenges.Sage and Cuppan argue that a conventional system could also be very big

and complex, and it is the evolutionary development aspect that makes the difference.

NATO operations across the world have created special task forces that were

dismantled once the missions were terminated, such as Operation Joint Endeavor

(1995-1996)conducted by the NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia

and Herzegovina.158

This operation manifested the complexities and difficulties

associated with the employment of SOS (the operation involved troops from more

than thirty countries). Azani distinguishes between ad-hoc, short-lived, and relatively

speaking simple SOS on the one hand (such as military operations), and long-lasting,

continually evolving, and complex SOS (such as human colonies) at the other end of

the continuum. Al Qaeda is an evolving and complex SOS because during the last

decade new Jihadi groups have joined the organization and some of them have had

disputes with the leadership in Pakistan.159

Connectivity. SOS are based on the ability of a collection of communicating entities

to share specified information and operate on that information according to a shared

operational semantics in order to achieve a specified purpose in a given context.

156

Jamshidi, “Introduction,” 6. 157

Jamshidi, ―Introduction,‖ 6. 158

Jamshidi, ―Introduction,‖ 3-4. 159

Dickerson, “Defense Applications,” 326-327.

54

Connectivity may comprise any means necessary, either directly or indirectly, to

exchange information between constituent systems of an SOS. The internal

machinery of the receiving system makes use of the information for the benefit or

detriment of the SOS as an interdependent system. A distinguishing feature of an SOS

is that the internal connectivity of the SOS is not presciently designed but emerges as

a property of present interactions among the systems.160

For example, the US

intelligence community, which contains sixteen separate agencies, has a traditional

weakness in sharing information due to internal conflicts over prestige and authority.

The September 11 commission called it unacceptable, outmoded, and excessively

secretive. The director of national intelligence (DNI) was formed (2005) to ―integrate

intelligence analysis and collection… to strengthen partnerships to enrich

intelligence.‖161

Although the DNI has made some progress in information sharing, in

some respect it is still seen as an agency in search of a clear mission, and the issue of

intelligence collaboration remains a big challenge for the DNI. Dickerson notes that

information exchange between autonomous systems of SOS is both central and

critical for the SOS. Dickerson exemplifies his theme with a U.S. military command

force in a mission context. A complex smuggling network might operate similarly.162

Cooperation. Cooperation is based on an actor‘s interest incooperating. Jamshidi

presents a similar term, integration, which combines cooperation and connectivity,

and this is probably the key viability of any SOS. Integration of SOS implies that each

system can communicate and interact with the SOS regardless of its characteristics, or

nature. Therefore each needs to have the ability to communicate with SOS or part of

the SOS without compatibility issues such as operating systems, communication, and

so on. Integration also implies the control aspects of the SOS because systems need to

understand each other in order to take commands or signals from SOS systems. 163

However, diversity is not necessarily a problem or a licence for anarchic design but an

opportunity for a system`s development. For example, Israel‘s ability to suppress the

160

Michael J. DiMario, System of Systems Collaborative Formation, Vol. 1 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010),

18; Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, 158. 161

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ―Mission, Vision, and Goals,‖ http:// www. dni.gov/

mission.htm(accessed 14 January 2014). 162

Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, 118; Patrick F. Walash, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis,

(London: Routledge, 2011), 161-162; Charles E. Dickerson. ―Defense Applications of SoS,‖ in System of

Systems Engineering. Principles and Applications, ed. Mo Jamshidi (New York: CrC Press, 2009), 329-332. 163

Mo Jamshidi. ―Introduction to System of Systems,‖ in System of Systems Engineering. Innovations for the

21stCentury, ed. Mo Jamshidi (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009), 5-6.

55

Palestinian terror activity from the West Bank by 2004 and to maintain security in this

region derives, among other things, from close cooperation in counterterrorism

activity between the General Security Service (Shabak), the Military Intelligence in

the General Staff, and the Central Command of the IDF.164

The parts of conventional systems have no choice in belonging since they have no

reason for existence and no dynamics to contribute without belonging (such as parts of a car).

They are integral and the system cannot function without them. In an SOS the parts are

capable of being integrated and they negotiate about belonging with the SOS which has to

accept them. For example, in 2005al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Abu Musab

alZarqawi joined the al Qaeda organization and Zarqawi was appointed as the amir of al

Qaeda in Iraq. Both groups had longstanding debate about the Shi‘ite and attacks policy. On

February 2014, the General Command of al Qaeda led by al-Zawahiri denied any connection

with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) led by Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi due to

organizational disagreements but that did not prevent ISIS from becoming powerful.165

Apparently, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are independent organizations with different

characters. Therefore the themeof Federation of Systems (FOS) which refers to a system less

centralized and more heterogeneous, could be useful to explore this alliance. In FOS, there is

little central power and authority, and the participation of the coalition of partners is based

upon collaboration and coordination to meet the needs of the federation. FOS is generally

characterized by significant autonomy, heterogeneity, and geographic distribution or

dispersion.166

Krygiel argues that FOS faces the same dilemmas identified for SOS but they

differ in three dimensions: autonomy, heterogeneity, and dispersion. The FOSis more

heterogeneous along trans-cultural and trans-national socio-political dimensions, often

managed in an autonomous manner without great central authority and direction such that

they satisfy objectives and purposes of an individual unit in the federation, and there is often

much greater geographic dispersion of organizational units and systems. Heterogeneity is a

strong driver of system complexity. Usually increasing geographic dispersion will lead to

greater autonomy and consequently also increase heterogeneity. The UN, the Arab League,

the African Union, and business cooperation between air-flight companies are examplesof

164

Yaakov Lappin. ―Ya‘alon: IDF, Shin Bet have thwarted a multitude of terrorist plots,‖ The Jerusalem Post, 8

August 2014, http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Yaalon-IDF-Shin-Bet-have-thwarted-a-multitude-of-terrorist-

plots-337435 (access 14 January 2014). 165

Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, 158; Schweitzer and Oreg, ―Al Qaeda‘s Odyssey to the Global

Jihad,‖ 41. 166

Sage and Cuppan, “Systems Engineering,‖327.

56

anFOS, since they are geographically spread, have a heterogeneous character, and a loose

command and control apparatus. 167

The commitment of Hezbollah and Iran to rescue the Assad regime might manifest

one of the principles for SOS and FOS management – the notion of alliances, which are

difficult to manage or lead. Each alliance is unique, to be lived with rather than managed,

better built on mutual respect and shared interests than on administrative or legal documents

and tight controls. Power needs to be shared, autonomy granted, and the cooperation held

together by trust and common goals. These types of considerations for system engineers seem

useful for the analysis of close cooperation between state and NSA and an arms smuggling

system. 168

This chapter demonstrates how armed NSAs could use modern transportation and

communication to improve their operational and logistic skills. Globalization improves

NSAs‘ chances of winning a war against a state because globalization offers NSAs better

access to weapons while multiple media channels serving NSAs play a significant role in

state-NSA conflict. States continue to rule world politics, but globalization poses greater

challenges to states‘ authority. Globalization mechanisms constrain governments‘ capacity to

oppress rebellious NSAs and diffuse power from states to sub-states and transnational

organizations, some of which evolve into large complex systems. The next chapters explore

how past rebel groups acquired weapons without the advantages of globalization.

167

Sage and Cuppan, ―Systems Engineering,‖328; Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, 159; Marcus

Bejekemr, Daniel T. Semere and Bengt Lindberg. ―Definition, Classification, and Methodological Issues of

System of Systems,‖ in System of Systems Engineering. Principles and Applications, ed. Mo Jamshidi,

(New York: CrC Press, 2009), 194. 168

Sage and Cuppan, ―Systems Engineering,‖333, 343.

57

Chapter Two: the Arming of Ancient and Medieval NSAs

Introduction

The purpose of the following chapter is to explore how ancient and medieval NSAs acquired

their weapons, and the factors which facilitated or constrained this activity. The thesis

outlines that in the pre-globalization era NSAs practised arming patterns that continued

through the era of globalization and which should be addressed. The historical background is

vital to understand contemporary NSAs‘ armament acquisition processes, and especially to

examine the role of globalization. The research probes three dimensions: weaponry of

rebellious NSAs; NSAs‘ role in arms trade; and the effects of military technology on NSA

tactics. The current chapter covers a very long period of time therefore it can touch on only a

small number of past NSAs and provide a few examples of NSAs‘ rebellions and insurgency.

The historical review reveals that ancient rebelsacquired weapons in similar ways to rebels of

the present global era.

Conflicts between empires, kingdoms and NSAs have been a permanent part of the

history of warfare. One of the first ever recorded conflicts between state and NSA is the

biblical description of Abraham and his allies, an alliance of tribal NSAs who fought the

combined armies of the four kings – each of them the leader of a state, one of them actually

an emperor. If this presents a true incident then it occurred at approximately 1800 to 1900

BC. Yet, writing onthe armaments of ancient NSAs is a great challenge since evidence is

patchy, and there is a lack of indigenous sources about many NSAs that were illiterate.

Researchers have to rely on western and Chinese records that were biased against their

nomadic foes, and reflected only certain aspects of nomadic life.NSAs challenged and

defeated ancient and medieval empires such as ancient Egypt, the city-states of Greece,

Rome, Byzantium, and powerful dynasties in China and India, but were not represented fully

in the sources. Rulers and the upper classes are over-represented in the historical sources

while the latter dealt with NSAs such as rebels, tribes, ―bandits‖, and ―barbarians‖ from a

narrow perspective. Roman historians felt ashamed when they described insurgency as a war,

and at times would totally ignore revolts as they regarded nomadic tribes as less worthy

opponents. When ancient historians referred tomilitary aspects of NSAs they often focused

58

on operations rather than on force design and logistics.169

Thus, Thompson accused ancient

historians of being class biased and concealing information on insurgents against social

order.170

The employment of the term NSA in the pre-state era is problematic since often

ancient governments had neither the will, nor the legitimacy or the means to disarm their

subjects. Decline and collapse of empires, chiefly in the Middle Ages, blurred differences

between states and NSAs; many states lacked central rule and were fragmented into

independent or semi-independent principalities, kingdoms and city-states. Yet, states did exist

before modernity and ancient and medieval political systems featured armed conflicts

between sovereign and central authority against rebels. Therefore, the following chapter

employs a broad interpretation of NSA to conduct an analysis of contests between rulers and

rebels. In the past NSAs were largely an organized uprising against the rule of the local elite

or an external power that was driven by political, social-economic, religious and national

ambitions.171

The Arming of Rebellious NSAs in Antiquity

Ancient NSAs armed themselves mainly with tools they found in their environment and by

plundering defeated enemy troops and garrisons. An early example is presented in The Six

Secret Teachings (1997) – strategic advice and tactical instructions given in the mid-eleventh

century B.C. by a famous general, T‘ai Kung to KingsWen and Wu, the founders of the Chou

dynasty. Sawyer claims that this is the only ancient Chinese military classic written from the

perspective of revolutionary activity, because it served the Chou kings‘ subversive plans

against the powerful Shang dynasty, to overturn its six hundred years of domination. The

former were compelled to consider employing limited resources and limited forces to attack a

vastly superior foe. T‘ai Kung advised King Wu to acquirehis weapons in the immediate

environment, arguing that the tools for supplying the military are all to be found in ordinary

human activity. Specifically, hoes can be used as spears and spear-tipped halberds, large

169

Thomas Grunewald, Bandit in the Roman Empire. Myth and Reality (London: Routledge, 1999), 1, 37-40;

Istavan Vasary, Cumans and Tatars. Oriented Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185-1365 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1; Jim Bradbury, The Routledge Companion to Medieval Warfare (London:

Routledge, 2004), 104. 170

E.T. Thompson. ―Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and Spain,‖ in Studies in Ancient Society, ed. M.I.

Finley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 304-307; Orosius, Onwud. Seven Books of History

againstthe Pagans. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. 171

John, Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun. A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-Insurgency

Warfare, from the Romans to the Present (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 43.

59

hoes, axes, saws, mortars and pestles are tools for attacking walls; raincoats of straw and

large umbrellas serve as armour and protective shields.172

Similar rebelactivity was recorded in the Roman Empire. In the 180s A.D. Maternus,

a deserter from the Roman army formed a band of ex-soldiers and peasants, which was active

in both Gaul and Spain. Since they were military men they probably carried their weapons

with them. At first they plundered small villages and estates; as more men joined them, they

began to attack large cities and release prisoners. Presumably, the rebels could acquire

additional weaponry with the great wealth and booty they collected. Eventually, the rebels

infiltrated Italy and Rome, and an unverified report claimed that they devised a plot to

assassinate Commodus the emperor, which was thwarted at the last minute. Maternus was

betrayed by some of his companions; he was caught and beheaded in 187 A.D.173

The Jewish rebellion against Rome (66-74 A.D.) started as a mass movement armed

mainly with stones and incendiariesbut some of the rebels had their own weapons. They

seized a vast quantity of Roman military equipment from a Roman garrison they lootedin

Jerusalem and from the defeated Roman army of the governor of Syria, Cestius Gallus,

including spear-throwers, stone-throwers and battering-rams (66 A.D.)174

Josephus argued

that the leadership of the Jewish rebels made an effort to organize a regular army out of the

rival paramilitary groups during the months before the arrival of Vespasian‘s expedition.

Josephus was nominated as the military commander of Galilee and claimed that he fortified

that reigon,armed his soldiers,and trained them to become a disciplined military unit based on

the Roman model, though some scholars doubted his contribution. All over Jerusalem

insurgents were forging their spears and suits of armour. Price argues that Jews might also

have purchased arms from local manufacturers who supplied the Roman army.175

Yet, the

Jewish rebels had limited military skills and could not cope with the far stronger army led by

Vespasian and Titus, particularly in the open fields and against Romans artillery. The former

carried mainly short swords and daggers and specialized in stone-slings. They lacked a

172

Six Secret, 2, 88-89, 112-113. 173

John C. Rolfe, trans., Ammianus. Marcellinus. Vol. 3 (London: William Heinemann LTD, 1956), 415, 495;

Raymond V. Dam, Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul(Berkeley: University of California Press,

1992), 18-20. Hammond, Carolyn, trans. Julius Caesar. Seven Commentaries on the Gallic War (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1996). 174

Jonathan .J Price, Jerusalem under Siege. The Collapse of the Jewish State 66-70 C.E.(Leiden: E.J. Brill,

1992), 68-69; G. H. Williamson, trans. Josephus. The Jewish war (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1981), 178. 175

Uriel Rappaport,‖The Great Revolt – An Overview.‖ In The Great Revolt in the Galilee, ed. Ofra Guri-Rimon

(Haifa: Hecht Museum, University of Haifa, 2008), 11-12(Hebrew); Price, Jerusalem, 69, 232-234; Josephus,

Jewish war, 181, 188; Judi Magness. ―A Reconsideration of Josephus‘ Testimony about Masada,‖ in The Jewish

Revolt againstRome. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Popovic Mladen(Leiden: Brill, 2011), 343-359.

60

significant quantity of heavy artillery (javelins, sling engines) with a longer range; nor did

they have cavalry or skill in archery, or the defense of body armour.176

Yet, Jewish rebels in

Jerusalem deployed the artillery systems taken earlier from the Romans to defend the city

during the long siege (70 A.D.) reusing ballista balls that had fallen in the city. Josephus

stated that they had 300 spear-throwers and 40 stone-throwers, though he possibly

exaggerated. Archeological finds, such as in Gamla, revealed that the besieged Jews used

any heavy tools they could acquire against the Romans.It seems that they were not short of

weapons during the long siege, thus lack of weaponry had no role in the fall of the city.177

Shimeon Bar Kokhba commanded the second Jewish revolt against Rome (132-135

A.D.) during the rule of Emperor Hadrian. Jewish rebels planned the revolt against the

Romans for a long time and stored weapons in underground hideouts. They acquired weapons

from weapon-factories built by the Roman army in Judea to supply its Middle-East troops

and staffed with Jewish workerswho purposely manufactured sub-standard weapons. After a

weapon was disqualified by Roman quality-control inspectors it was transferred to the rebels

rather than being melted into raw material. Sling stones and arrowheads belonging to Bar

Kokhba‘s army were discovered in hidden complexes mainly in Gamla, the Judea Plain and

Desert.178

Stiebel argues that mainly in the last phase of the revolt Bar Kokhba‘s rebels

modified weapons due to a shortage. At a hidden cave in Judea Desert he found a wooden

spear, the head of which was made of a catapult bolt probably taken from the Romans. Rebels

collected and reused arrows and arrowheads. Scholars argue that Bar Kokhba had a pirate

fleet,originally fishing ships given to him by Rebuy Alazar Ben Kharsom, a wealthy Jewish

noble. The rebels used the ships to smuggle weapons and combatants into Palestine. The

Romans killed Ben Kharsom because of his support of Bar Kokhba.179

176

Price, Jerusalem, 53-54, 121, 190, 212; Josephus, Jewish war, 190, 212. 177

Danny Syon, ―Gamla: City of Refuge,‖ in The First Jewish Revolt. Archaeology, History, and Ideology, eds.

Andrea, M. Berlin and Andrew, Overman (London: Routledge, 2002), 141; Price, Jerusalem, 69. 178

Roi Porat Hannan Eshel and Amos Frumkin. ―Refuge Caves of Bar Kokhba Revolt in Nahal Dragot‘s cliffs,‖

in Refuge Caves of the Bar Kokhba Revolt, vol. 2, eds. Hannan Eshel and Roi Porat (2009), 276; Bradford, C.

Welles, trans.Diodorus of Sicily (London: William Heinemann, 1963), 447; Amos Kloner. ―Judean Subterranean

Hideaways from the Time of Bar-Kokhba,‖ Cathedra 26 (1982): 4-23 (Hebrew); Mordechai Gichon. ―Military

Aspects of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt and the Subterranean Hideaways from the Time of Bar Kokhba,‖ Cathedra

26 (Dec. 1982): 30-42 (Hebrew); Mordechai Gichon. ―The Quality of the Jewish Fighting Man according to the

Jewish Wars of Josephus Flavius,‖ in Judah and Samaria Research Studies. Proceedings of the eighth Annual

Meeting, ed. Ya‘acov Eshel (Ariel, IS: The College of Judea and Samaria, 1998), 73-80. 179

Roi Porat, Hanan Eshel and Amos Frumkin. ‖The 'Caves of the Spear': Refuge Caves from the Bar-Kokhba

Revolt North of En-Gedi,‖ Israel Exploration Journal 59, 1 (2009): 21-46; Talmud Bavli: Massechet Yoma, 2:

1, 2 (VilnaVersion), http://www.mechon-mamre.org/b/l/l2501.htm (Hebrew); Dov Zudkevitch, Beitar and the

Bar Kochba War.Within the Hadera Region, from Caesarea to the Ephraim (Tel Aviv: Khidekel, 1988), 132-136

(Hebrew).

61

Decline of empires and the dismantling of their armies created more opportunities for

NSAs‘ looting activity. For example, in 411 the Vandals invaded Spain, then crossed to

North Africa where they captured Carthage and an imperial fleet in 425. They established a

kingdom in the region of Carthage that posed the first serious challenge to Roman domination

of the Mediterranean since the Punic Wars 650 years earlier. The Vandals became pirates,

sackingRome in 455 and a decade later used fire ships at Syracuse to repulse a naval

expedition dispatched from Constantinople.180

Rebellious slaves faced more constraints to arm themselves compared to other NSAs.

They sought their freedomthough usually lacked weapons, food, and other supplies. Yet,

huge slave uprisings, each involving many tens of thousands, broke out first in Sicily and

then in Italy between 140-70 B.C. These were the First and Second Sicilian Slave Wars (135-

132 and 104-100 B.C. respectively) and Spartacus‘s rebellion(73-71 B.C.).Scholars argued

that Rome‘s policy toward the slaves was wrong in many respects including the security

aspect.181

Strauss notesthat farmer slaves of the plains who worked as herders of livestock

were left free and were legally armed to drive their herds from pasture to pasture. Their

knowledge of the backcountry made them experts at hiding from the authorities. Many slaves

knew how to use weapons well, since many were prisoners of war who had been trained in

foreign armies.182

The Greek historian, Diodorus Siculus argued that the rebel army in Sicily

armed themselves with any working tools they could get, such as axes, hatchets, slings,

sickles and even cooking spits as well as slings, and fire-hardened spears. The rebels

slaughtered thousands of the inhabitants of Sicily, sparing those skilled in the manufacture of

weapons, probably swords; they put them in chains and set them to work in workshops. They

were also able to supply themselves with a large quantity of captured weapons and to pursue

their aims with greater confidence.183

The Spartacus Slave War took place south of Rome and the rebels began their revolt

with kitchen knives and cooking spits. Being ex-gladiators Spartacus and seventy-four

warriors were familiar with weaponry and warfare; they armed themselves with wooden

clubs and daggers that they seized from travelers on the roads. They went on to make such

homemade weapons as vine-woven shields and fire-hardened spears. According to the second

180

Tim Newark, The Barbarians. Warriors and Wars of the Dark Ages (London: Blandbord, 1985), 62. 181

Barry Strauss. ―Slave Wars of Greece and Rome,‖ in Makers of Ancient Strategy. From the Persian Wars to

the Fall of Rome, ed. Victor D. Hanson(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 190-191. 182

Strauss, ―Slave Wars,‖ 80-86, 112-113, 189. 183

Strauss, ―Slave Wars,‖ 80-86, 112-113, 189.

62

century Greek historian, Appian, as the rebellion grew stronger Spartacus‘ group became an

army with 70,000 soldiers (120,000 when they marched to Rome), armed with contemporary

weapons including swords and spears that they forged in the slave barracks. They also

purchased iron and copper and had large quantities of basic metals for weapons. Therefore

Spartacus‘ rebels were well supplied and able to stage frequent raids and employ a cavalry

force. In 71 B.C. Spartacus‘revolt was ended by the army of Marcus Crassus.184

Many NSAs produced their own weapons based on available resources (wood, iron)

and the local tradition of craftsmen (such as sword-smiths and bowers).

The Celtiberians who inhabited central and North East Iberia rose up against

the heavy burden of Rome‘s rule in 154-133 B.C. They were the most warlike

and best armed of the peninsular races and conducted efficient guerrilla

warfare against the Romans. Only after many defeats did the Romans finally

conquer the capital, Numantia, in the great siege of 133 B.C. Livermore argues

that the Celtiberian military strength derived from their superior weapons –

especially the short stubby thrusting sword which was based on that of their

Celtic ancestors and the fact that Iberia was rich in mines.185

Arribas argues

that Iberian craftsmen excelled in metalwork and especially in the making of

weapons and the use of pure iron was one of the reasons for the high quality of

their swords. Arribas notes that foreign merchants visited ancient Iberia and

Iberian metal traders travelled to other regions including North Africa and

Italy. Originally from Greece, the famed Iberian weapon of antiquity – the

falcatasword– was probably introduced to the peninsula by Iberian

mercenaries.186

Queen Boudica of the Iceni tribe led the people of East Anglia in a rebellion

against Roman rule in 60 A.D. Celtic blacksmiths and bronze workers were

very skillful and the Iceni produced fine iron swords and light chariots that

enabled them to overrun East and South Anglia. Webster argues that the

natives were weak in weaponry in comparison to the Roman army because

they produced fine individual pieces for the chiefs and their senior warriors

184

Strauss, 195-196; Brent D. Shaw, Spartacus and the Slave Wars. A Brief History with Documents (Boston:

Bedford/St. Martin‘s, 2001), 140-143. 185

Harold Livermore,A History of Spain(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), 10, 81, 38-40. 186

Arribas Antonio. The Iberians (London: Thames and Hudson, 1964), 82, 124-127.

63

only. The idea of mass-production of weapons and armour for the levies never

arose; they were lucky to have a reliable sword. The limited armament (spears

and fire) of the Britions was sufficient for the initial phase of the revolt as they

trapped the Roman colonists and ambushed the Roman Ninth legion. The far

more organized and better-trained Romans defeated and slaughtered the rebels

a few days later in a set-piece battle in the Midlands.187

Goths played an important role in the collapse of Rome and were expert

smiths. Penrose claims that Goths were not dependent on Rome for high-

quality weapons. They made use of extensive, accessible iron deposits

throughout Germania. Penrose notes that archaeologists have found evidence

of sizable workshops probably used by the Goths from the first century A.D.

The skills of Germanic smiths and other craftsmen were as good as or better

than those from the Roman Empire. The magnificent gold and garnet-

decorated equipment and pattern-welded blades are clear evidence of their

ability and surpass the mass-produced weapons of the late Roman arms

factories. Once they crossed the Danube Goths plundered superior Roman

equipment and defeated the Romans in the battle of Adrianople (378 A.D.).188

To a lesser extent foreign forces supported friendly NSAs in wars against their foes.

Judas Maccabee who commanded the Jewish revolt against the Seleucid Empire (167-160

B.C.) mobilized Jewish soldiers from the Diaspora. At the outset the Jewish rebels were weak

in weaponry, their first weapons privately purchased or manufactured or improvised from

farming tools. Lack of siege weapons forced the Jewish rebels to conduct longer sieges over

Seleucid forts. However, the two Books of Maccabees describe the Jewish rebels acquiring

modern weapons as loot after surprising and defeating Seleucid forces by employing guerrilla

tactics.189

Yet these books, the main sources on the revolt, do not classify the Jewish troops.

Researcher Bezalel Bar-Kochva has argued, based on analysis of the course of a few battles

(at least one of them frontal) and examination of Josephus‘ version of the Maccabee‘s revolt,

that having armed themselves with their enemy's weapons, long pikes and shields, the Jews

187

Guy Bedoyere, Roman Britain. A New History (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2006), 28, 47, 31-39, 89-

101;Graham Webster, Boudica. The British Revolt against Rome AD 60 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1978). 188

Ammianus Marcellinus, 421; Jane Penrose, Rome and Her Enemies. An Empire Created and Destroyed by

War (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 274. 189

2 Maccabee, 8:33, 8: 39; Michael Avi Yona. ―The Hasmoneans State,‖ in The Hasmoneans during the

Hellenistic Period, eds. Uriel Rappaport and Israel Ronen (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 1993), 193-

196(Hebrew).

64

adopted their enemy's tactics employing infantry as well as cavalry in some of the major

battles after the purification of the temple (162 B.C.). Judea was not a horse-breeding

country, and the Jews in Palestine had no tradition of cavalry and phalanx warfare. Bar-

Kochva assumes that at least some of the phalangites and cavalrymen were Jews from

abroad, mainly soldiers in the Egyptian Ptolemaic army – a major rival of the Seleucid

Empire that might encourage such revolt and maintained close contact with theirreligious

center in Jerusalem. Cavalry arrived also from a former Ptolemaic kingdom in trans-Jordan

that allied with the rebels.190

Moreover, Judas and Jonathan, his brother, were politically

astute and signed a treaty of friendly alliance with Rome (161 B.C.) – at that time a newly

emerging great power and already a rival of the Hellenistic kingdoms (the Romans had

fought and defeated the Seleucids a few decades before). There is, however, no evidence that

Rome provided military support for the Jews.191

Securing military support including direct intervention from a third party could be

significant for the outcome of an NSA revolt. This was probably a major reason for the

failure of the Mytilenean revolt against the Athenian Empire (428-427 B.C.), as told by

Thucydides: Mytilene was an oligarchy on the island of Lesbos that aligned with Athens

during the first phase of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.). They were under Athenian rule

but could keep their own army, mainly their fleet. The Mytileneans‘ leadership secretly

collaborated with most of the Lesbian communities to secede from the alliance with Athens

and declare a unified independent state, relying on the buildup of their army (they recruited

archers and collected supplies from the Black Sea region) and hoping to gain the support of

Sparta. After the plan was discovered Athens rapidly set a naval blockade against the

Mytileneans who pleaded for Sparta‘s intervention. The Peloponnesian League decided to

rescue Mytilene by attacking Athens from land and sea. Yet they were slow and

unenthusiastic in executing their plans while Athens tightened the siege against

theMytileneans and sent a large fleet as a show of strength along the coast of

Peloponnesus.192

Lintott argues that a Spartan military advisor did arrive at Mytilene and

gave arms to the local people hoping they would fight Athens, but the former rose up against

their own rulersbecause food supplies in the city were running out. Thus, Spartan ships

arrived at Lesbos too late to help the government of Mytilene,which had already surrendered

190

1 Maccabee, 8; 2 Maccabee, 12:24. 191

Bezalel Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army. Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaign (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1976), 194-198. 192

J. P. Rhodes, trans.,Thucydides.History, Vol. 3 (Warminster, U.K.: Aris and Phillips, 1994), 1-32; Lawrence

A. Tritle. A New History of the Peloponnesian War (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 67-71.

65

to Athens(427 B.C.). The Spartan and Peloponnesian ships quickly backed away, pressured

by the Athenians. 193

Similarly, Persian expansion in Asia Minor in the second half of the sixth century put

local Greek communities under Persian control. As subjects of the Persian Empire, Persian

satraps had to pay tribute to the king and provide troops and rowers to the Persian armed

forces. They were not disarmed and could keep their fleet. Miletus, a major Greek city in

Ionia, on the western coast of Anatolia ruled by Aristagoras the tyrant, and other Greek cities

defected and revolted against the Persians (499 B.C.). Aristagoras took command of the

Ionian fleet sailing to Sparta in an unsuccessful search forallies; he had more success in

Athens and in Eretria on the island of Euboea. The Athenians voted to send twenty ships to

assist the Ionians who commenced their revolt and then raided Sardis, the seat of the Persian

satrap, but failed to capture the well-fortified city, and were defeated by Persian

reinforcements. At this stage the Athenians sailed back home and kept out of the conflict,

leaving the Greek cities to standalone against the Persian Empire. The much stronger Persian

army recaptured Miletus after defeating the Ionian navy near the island of Lade in 494

B.C.194

Conversely, Agesilaus the First, ruler of Sparta, traveled to Egypt(361 B.C.) with a

large expedition of mercenaries and Spartan military advisors to liberate the Egyptians from

the Persians. Greek sources claimed that his military expertise played a significant role in

securing the Egyptian victory over the Persians. Athens also sent great expedition (354 B.C.)

to Egypt to help the locals in another revolt against Persian rule. 195

Neighboring countries could assist in the buildup of NSAs’ military force. For

example, Quintus Sertorius, a Roman commander and governor, led a Celtiberian rebellion

against Rome (80-73 B.C.) and inflicted remarkable defeats against Roman generals by

conducting land and marine guerrilla warfare. At the start of his revolt he used the Canary

Islands and Mauritania as sanctuaries where he could reorganize his troops, build a fleet of

light ships, and ally with the Berbers who sent an expeditionary force. Back in Spain he used

the mountains of South Spain as a base, breaking Roman supply lines by means of ambushes,

193

Andrew Lintott. Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City (London: Croom Helm, 1982),

105. 194

Joseph Roisman, Ancient Greece from Homer to Alexander. The Evidence (Chichester, U.K.: Willey-

Blackwell, 2011), 193-200. 195

Plutarch, The Age of Alexander. Nine Greek Lives by Plutarch (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 63-68;

Thucydides, 1.104.

66

flanking movements and surprise forced marches, and cut off provisioning by blockading the

coast with pirate vessels. Roman historians claimed that he remained undefeated but fell

victim to an assassination plot of conspirators among his deputies.196

Facilitators and Constraints of NSAs’Arming in Antiquity

Lawrence Keeley describes warfare between pre-state societies, mainly tribes, based on

ethnographic and historical records and compares it to modern war. His work exceeds the

scope of this thesis and it is only addressed because Keeley highlights the significance of the

arming of NSAs. He states that war between non-civilized entities was characterized by

limited logistic capabilities in comparison to civilized armies, and that affected tribes‘ ability

to sustain combat and continuous maneuvering (after a few days their ammunition and food

were exhausted) but not necessarily their capacity to conduct war. Keeley attributes that

deficiency to the lack of strong centralized leadership, a lower level of surplus production, the

smaller population of non-state societies and limited transportation capacities. Yet, these

deficiencies were determined by the social organization, economic efficiency and cultural

values of tribal life, rather than being disorganized, unprofessional, weakly led and so on.197

Rebels in the ancient world coped with tremendous obstacles and challenges. In

addition to powerful and ruthless regimes they were poor in resources and logistics. Their

weaponry served their needs as long as they were on the move in search of fresh supplies,

with short term goals being robbery and pillage; otherwisethey were incapable of supporting

armies for a long period. When food and plunder were not available their military strength

diminished. This fact and chronic lack ofdiscipline meant that rebels could rarely conduct

campaigns with long-term objectives. Usually, ancient NSAs could crush state armies only by

surprise and in set-piece battles the latter‘s technical superiority ensured their eventual

triumph.198

For example, among the Germanic tribes facing the early Roman Empire only

chiefs and richer warriors could afford horses, swords, shields, body armour and helmets.

Tribesmen dedicated many swords to the gods of war and deposited them in bogs, usually

after they had been smashed or bent. Most Germanic warriors fought on foot with spear or

long lance; they were naked, without body protection except when they were fortunate

enough to take it from a fallen foe. The throwing axe (called Franciska among the Franks)

196

Grunewald, Bandit in the Roman Empire, 47; Nic Fields, Pompey, Leadership, Strategy, Conflict

(Cambridge: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 34-36. 197

Lawrence, H. Keely, War Before Civilization. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42-48. 198

Ellis, Barrel, 38-39.

67

was widespread in Germany and elsewhere because it delivered a powerful amour-piercing

blow and yet was still economical in its use of iron – an important factor in metal-poor

societies of the fifth and sixth centuries A.D.199

Yet, political and technological factors facilitated NSAs‘ operational plans and the

buildup of their forces. In the pre-state era people faced fewer constraints on acquiring

weapons and could carry them openly. In many tribal communities all men were expected to

carry a weapon; in Athens and in Rome the right to bear arms was the mark of a freeman.200

Ancient NSAs could fight with weapons they produced based on raw materials they found in

their immediate environment. That is, the simplicity of the old labor division facilitated the

acquisition of arms, and rebels did not need a complex logistical operation to get weapons. In

this context, most ancient weapons served single warriors (swords were sometimes named by

their owners); they were relatively simple to produce and easy to use. To some extent, that

probably balanced power differences between NSAs and powerful imperial armies.201

In

Neolithic China, for example, weapons were crafted from stone, bone, and perhaps bronze.

Arrows and spears comprised the missile weapons; combat axes, knives, and staffs, the shock

weapons.202

According to Khol in late Bronze Age Eurasian steppe settlements nearly

everyone seemingly could – at some level – fashion or rework their metal tools and weapons;

functional bronze tools and weapons were increasingly available in central Asia.203

Xenophon, the Greek historian of the fourth century B.C. recounted how a plotter against the

regime of Sparta visited an iron-market in the city and showed his colleague many knives,

swords, skewers, axes, hatchets, and pruning-knives. The plotter argued that all the tools with

which men work earth, wood or stone, wereall weapons.204

Finally, according to Bedoyere,in

Roman Britain and among the Goths, urban, military and village settlements produced

evidence of metalworking, including weapons; it was an everyday craft or skill that virtually

every settlement would have had someone reasonably competent in.205

199

Todd Malcolm, Everyday Life of the Barbarians. Goths, Franks and Vandals (London: B.T. Basford, 1972),

96-98, 101-103, 109, 115, 121; Roy Ross. ―From the Barbarian Kingdoms to the Carolingian Empire 500-850,‖

in The Medieval World at War, ed. Bennett, Matthew (London: Thames and Hudson, 2009), 47. 200

Michael A. Summers, Individual Rights and Civic Responsibility. The Right to Bear Arms (New York: The

Rosen Publishing Group, 2001), 11. 201

Bradbury, Routledge, 249. 202

Ralph D. Sawyer, trans. One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies. Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 275. 203

Philip L. Kohl,The Making of Bronze Age Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 248-256. 204

E.C. Marchant, trans.Xenophon. Hellenica (Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1984), 221. 205

Bedoyere, Roman Britain, 165-166; Peter Heather, The Goths (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

68

Ancient political systems and systems of subordination are among the most

fundamental factors that shaped the armament of NSAs. Old empires usually employed

controls that facilitated the planning and commencement of revolts. Wees argues that in the

classical age, when a conquering state annexed a territory along with its inhabitants, the latter

were not necessarily reduced to subordinate status but given equal rights. In other cases the

defeated communities had to pay tribute and send troops on demand, and were not called

enemies but subordinate allies. That is, potential rebels were not expected to disarm

themselves. To illustrate this:

Mieroop argues that Assyria of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. did not

want to exert direct control over regions beyond its traditional borders. The

intention was to exact tribute and enforce political obedience, and local rulers

were left in power as long as they complied with Assyrian demands.

Member-states of the Peloponnesian League (formed in the sixth century B.C.)

led by Sparta and the Delian League (477-404 B.C.) led by Athens were under

the latter‘s hegemony but could keep their armies and fleets, being committed

to send troops in times of war. Therefore, when they defected from the

alliance and rose up against Sparta or Athens they possessed ready military

forces. But if the revolt failed – as it usually did – Athens and Sparta, like

other old empires –would severely punish and disarm the rebels.206

Robinson argues that Rome considered conquered land and peoples only as

praeda imperii, designed to enrich the conqueror, while disregarding the

necessity of establishing a modus vivendi acceptable to the conquered. Roman

unwillingness to undertake systematic military and administrative obligations

provided a fertile breeding ground for resistance movements.207

Ancient empires established powerful armies that conquered many countries and

secured the superiority of their dominancefor centuries. Theseempires employed NSAs as an

206

Hans V. Wees. ―War and Society,‖ in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare,vol. 1: Greece,

the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, eds. Philip Sabin Hans, V. Wees and Michael Whitby (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2007), 112-115, 252-256, 284. 207

Robinson Z. Wolfgang. ―Macedonian Resistance to Roman Occupation in the Second Half of the Second

Century B.C,‖ in Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity, eds. Toru Yuge and Masaohi Doi (Leiden:

E.J. Brill, 1988), 147; Arthur M. Eckstein.―Macedonia and Rome, 221-146 BC,‖ in A Companion to Ancient

Macedonia, eds. Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington (Chichester, U.K.: Blackwell Publishing, 2010); David J.

Lonsdale, Alexander Killer of Men. Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Art of War (London: Constable,

2004).

69

important asset in the buildup of their force, but consequently facilitated proliferation of

weapons and military tactics among potential foes. Yallichev states that the Sumerians,

Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Israelites, Persians, Greeks, Macedonians andthe Romans all

resorted for diverse reasons to the hiring of mercenaries at various stagesin their histories.

Mercenary soldiering was an extremely ancient pastime, perhaps almost as ancient as

organized warfare itself. Egyptian infantry included Nubian tribesmen used in the early New

Kingdom (1565-1085 B.C.) as skirmishers; followed (from around 1200 B.C.) by the Sea

Peoples, originally Indo-European tribal peoples, mainly Philistines. Rameses the Second

looked for the latter‘s specialty in metal-sword fighting. King David – himself a mercenary in

the service of Achisk, a Philistine king before becoming a king himself – recruited a whole

corps of mercenaries, mainly Philistines, Canaanites, Hittites and Carties. They captured the

much-coveted Jerusalem in 1000 B.C. and served as the king‘s bodyguard, willing to fight

even their fellow countrymen. Yalichev argues that David could not have created his empire

without the loyal assistance of his mercenary troops.208

Jewish cavalry archers accompanied

Alexander to Egypt as the East has been archer country since an early period. Later, Jewish

rebels employed archers, mounted and on foot, against Alexander‘s heirs, the Seleucids. 209

Germanic and Turkish tribesmen were recruited to the Roman army as mercenaries or

auxiliary units under their leaders. They played an important role in securing the empire‘s

borders and prolonging its existence; many of the tribal chiefs and senior warriors were re-

socialized to Roman culture and became part of the Roman aristocracy (Romanization). Yet

many others kept their cultural identity and led their people in invasions of the empire‘s

territory, using knowledge and weapons acquired during their service. The more Rome relied

on tribal soldiers and secured more autonomy and resources for the tribal communities, the

easier they could arm themselves and challenge Roman authority. For instance, in 377 a

Gothic unit of the Roman army rebelled before the battle of Adrianople and went over to the

Visigoths‘ army.210

208

Serge Yallichev, Mercenaries of the Ancient World (London: Constable, 1997), 1, 65-69; Anglim, Fighting

Techniques, 11; Sekunda, 83-84. 209

Mordechai Gichon and Michaela Vitale. ―Arrow-Heads from Horvat Eqed,‖Israel Exploration Journal 41, 4

(1991): 252-253; Aryeh Kasher, The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: The Struggle for Equal

Rights(Tubingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 1985), 188. 210

Herbert Schutz, Tools, Weapons and Ornaments: Germanic Material Culture in Pre-Carolingian Central

Europe, 400-750(Leiden: Brill, 2001), 42-45, 56-57, 82; Herwig Wolfram,History of the Goths (Berkeley:

University of California Publishing, 1988), 129-130.

70

Nomadic NSAs enjoyed an additional significant advantage – they had built up the core

of their military force far away from imperial supervision, before arriving in Europe, China or

other civilized cultures, thus managing to surprise their stronger foes with new weapons and

tactics. The Sarmatians, for example, were steppe nomads from central Asia in the fourth

century B.C. They invaded and defeated the Scythian kingdom (in Persia). One contributing

factor may have been the Sarmatian nobles‘ horses that enabled them to field heavy cavalry

with both man and horse in armour. Supported by their own mounted archers, they must have

enjoyed a real advantage over the lighter Scythian cavalry.211

Huns invaded East Europe from

the Asian steppesin the fourth century A.D. Terrain (wide spaces) and climate (dry and cold)

conditions in their homeland had a great influence on their military weaponry: cavalry

composed of large even-tempered horses that could find grazing on their own, and the

powerful composite bows shooting arrows tipped with bone that was the most powerful

personal weapon in the early Middle Ages.212

NSAs and the Arms Trade in Antiquity

The arms tradehas been an integral part of commerce since antiquity. Phoenicians, masters of

trade of the ancient world, exported bronze weapons to communities along the

Mediterranean, such as to southern Spain and France during the seventh century B.C.

Artifacts from classical Greece found in graves of local rulers and nobles in Southern Russia,

indicate that weapons produced in Athens (swords, shields) were imported. Chinese imported

the chariot and the composite bow from west Asia forming one weapon system as early as

1500 B.C. NSAs could find it very difficult to engage in arms trade since empires (such as

Athens, Rome, Persia, and Chinese dynasties) supervised and secured trade and trade routes,

imposing taxes, collecting tariffs on goods and regulatingthe flow of commodities.213

Yet,

some information implied that NSAs who were involved in insurgency engaged in arms

trade. Against this background it seems that constraints over ancient foreign trade were

limited. Mieroop, for example, argues that in the Near East of the early second millennium

private entrepreneurs, without direct involvement with any regime, undertook trade activity,

and often commercial concerns kept states from blocking traders even in times of war.

211

Simon Anglim et al. Fighting Techniques of the Ancient World 3000 BC-AD 500. Equipment, Combat Skills

and Tactics (London: Amber Books, 2002), 96, 118-119, 125; Richard Brezinski and Mariusz Mielczarek, The

Sarmatians. 600 BC-AD 450 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002). 212

Mieroop, History,235; Bradbury, Routledge, 248. 213

Karl Moore and David Lewis, The Origins of Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2009), 96.

71

Political boundaries did not seem to affect the work of sixth-century B.C. merchants in the

Near East.214

Ancient commercial activity was characterized by international trade that resulted in

collaboration between states and NSAs. Cunliffe argues that in the Hallstatt period (750-450

B.C.) the Celtic communities of the west (in the West Hallstatt region of the Rhine-Danube

zone and the Mestea of Iberia) developed increasingly close contacts with the Mediterranean

zone (Greek and Etruscan). Commodities such as metals flowed eastwards, while luxury

goods like horses and weapons would have been used for reciprocal exchanges.215

Ellis

claimsthat the Romans adopted the Celts‘ better weapons (swords, lances, and pikes),

military equipment (body armour, longer shields and iron helmets) and tactics (the use of

javelins, war chariots and cavalry).

From late first century A.D. extensive trade relationships evolved between the Roman

Empire and the Germanic tribes across the Rhine frontier. Heather assesses that Roman

merchants imported vast quantities of ironfrom Germanic Europe, probably to produce arms.

German tribes in return imported Roman goods, including weapons, which came to be

associated with high social status. Deposits of antiquities including Roman weapons and

armour, dated from the first four centuries, were discovered in Denmark and variousparts of

Germany.216

Todd argues that as early as the first century B.C. Goths imported Roman

weapons, especially swords, some in illegal trade.217

From another aspect, tradesmen were attracted to Roman military camps because

these formed an important market, and contained a craft industry, chiefly a workshop

(fabrica) that manufactured bricks and weapons as required. Merchants purchased metal

products from Roman soldiers and sold them beyond the camps into the heart of the

uncivilized countries. This is an early example of leaking of weapons from the state‘s army to

214

Maria E. Semmler. ―Phoenician Trade in the West. Balance and Perspectives,‖ in The Phoenicians in Spain.

An Archaeological Review of the Eighth-Sixth Centuries B.C.E. eds. Marilyn R. Bierling and Seymour Gitin

(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 108;John R.Hopper,Trade and Industry in Classical Greece (London:

Thames and Hudson, 1979), 98, 128; Henry Hodges, Technology in the Ancient World(New York: Barnes &

Noble Publishing, 1970), 262, 273; Marcc V. Mieroop,A History of the Ancient Near East CA. 3000-323 BC

(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 91, 93, 263; Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, Power and

Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2009). 215

Barry Cunliffe,The Ancient Celts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 71-85, 271; Peter B. Ellis, The

Ancient World of the Celts. London: Constable, 1998. 216

Peter Heather, Empires and Barbarians. The Fall of Rome and the British of Europe (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2010), 74-78; E. A. Thompson,The Huns (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 191. 217

Todd, Everyday Life,103.

72

NSAs. Sometimes themerchants acted almost as scouts before a conquest, going ahead of the

soldiers; sometimes they followed on afterwards. Another example is the importation of

bronze and iron weapons from China during the Han dynasty (second century A.D.) by

different communities in Korea and Japan who were under China‘ssphere of influence.218

Asian NSAs, mainly nomads, facilitated international trade including arms via the

Silk Road. Since the first century B.C. nomad groups and confederacies, such as the Xiongnu

and Yuezhi in the Central Asian steppe, and to the west – the Wusuns and the Caravants – all

engaged in trade relationships with the Empire of Han (China), Parthia (Persia), and Kushan

(India). The nomads in Asia linked Europe and China and were part of a system of

commercial routes on both land and sea.219

Liu argues that when empires declined (second

and third centuries B.C.) and no great power controlled and protected the Central Asia Silk

Road, large quantities of silk continued to pass through this region, thanks to autonomous

trading networks sustained by NSAs including religious institutions, merchants‘

organizations, and local communities. The Silk Road was an early manifestation of a system

of systems since various independent social organizations collaborated in operating the route

driven by different interests.220

The Arming of Rebellious NSAs in the Middle Ages

Implications of decentralization of political power over NSAs’ arming

NSAs plundered and produced weapons during the Middle Ages more intensively than

before. Harke argues that looting of weapons in Anglo-Saxon Britain had a social role; it

brought in goods needed to attract and maintain social order. Looting supported the ideology

of a heroic society221

. Rebellious NSAs were supported by external forces but as a minor

source of armament that usually included weapons and troops as one system. Against this

background significant political and social changes that occurred in medieval Europe and

Asia impacted upon NSAs‘ armament efforts. The pre-nation-states era often featured a lack

of strong centralized government, frequent internal conflicts within ruling elites, and the

218

Yann Le Bohec,The Imperial Roman Army (London: B.T. Batsford, 1994), 219, 225; Gina Barnes. ―Warfare

in Early Korea and Japan,‖ in The Ancient World at War, ed. Philip, Souza (London: Thames and Hudson,

2008), 263. 219

Peter C. Perdue.‖Coercion and Commerce on Two Chinese Frontiers,‖ in Military Culture in Imperial China,

ed., Cosmo D. Nicola (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009). 220

Liu Xinru, The Silk Road in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 10, 62, 87, 109. 221

Heinrich Harke. ―The Circulation of Weapons in Anglo-Saxon SocietyIn Ritual of Power from late Antiquity

to the Early Middle Ages, ― in Ritual of Power from late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, eds., Theuws

Franks and Janet L. Nelson (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 391.

73

emergence of local forces. Failures of governments to provide basic living conditions and

security for the people encouraged rural and urban social groups to establish private armies.

In some countries rulers encouraged local militias and defence forces as a precaution against

banditry. Nobilities and warlords were first to take advantage of the growing political vacuum

and they established autonomous military power (knights and mercenaries). NSAs that were

not part of ruling elites such as nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, peasants, small merchants,

and deprived peoples dominated by empires, also exploited the diffusion of political power to

arm themselves. For example:

After the decline of Rome in 486 and probably before, there was no longer central

control over the iron mines in the Rhineland, and that probably facilitated rebel tribes

to acquire metals for their weaponry. Newark noted that rebel tribes took over

famous sword and armour workshops in Italy and elsewhere that used to be operated

by the Romans.222

Since the second half of the eleventh century as Byzantine rule had weakened and its

indigenous army dismantled, tribal NSAs were free as never before to collect booty,

including weapons, across the Eastern Empire. A band of rebellious Norman

mercenaries began to conquer Byzantine Italy for themselves; Turkish tribes that

were asked to stabilize the Balkans, soon started roaming and raiding Byzantine

territory, and when the government asked the Turks to suppress mercenary rebels, the

former occupied the larger part of Asia Minor. 223

The decline of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) facilitated many revolts in China from

the eighth century. Most prominent were the An Lushan rebellion (755-763) and the

Huang Chao rebellion (875-884) that resulted in the killing of millions of people and

led to the downfall of the Tang Dynasty in 907. In the eighth century Tang‘s central

government no longer had the means to provide security or famine relief; droughts

and famine in the Central Plains during the 860s and early 870s contributed to the

misery and poverty that fed the ranks of bandits. Huang Chao, a salt merchant,

toppled the Tang emperor and established a new dynasty. He began as a leader of

222

Ellis H. Davidson, The Sword in Anglo-Saxon England. Its Archaeology and Literature (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1962), 43; Pone Peter. ―The Development of Anglo-Saxon Swords from the Fifth to the

Eleventh Century,‖ in Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England, ed. Hawkes, C. Sonia (Oxford: Oxford

University Committee for Archaeology, 1989),63-70; Newark,Barbarians, 61. 223

John Haldon, The Byzantium Wars (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2008), 166-168; Warren Treadgold,

AConcise History of Byzantium (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 39-42.

74

local militia of a few thousandof peasants and merchants and soon became a

commander of more than 150,000 soldiers. His army besieged cities, defeated the

demoralized government forces, conquered vast territories, and finally captured the

capital city Chang‘an in 881. Huang Chao declared himself the emperor of the new

state of Da Qi that lasted for three years. His operations probably relied on acquiring

large stocks of arms.224

Nizami states that the region of Ghur in Afghanistan possessed two of the most

important requisites of war in the Middle Ages – horses and iron. The Ghurids who

were subjects of regional empires exported armour, weapons and war equipment to

neighboring areas, and paid it as tribute to the Ghaznavid and Seljuk empires. Sultan

Masud al Ghayna employed Ghurid officers as specialists in siege warfare in his

army. The Ghurids took full advantage of their resources when they rose up against

their weakened masters, and from subjects of Muslim empires they became a Muslim

sultanate that seized vast territory in central Asia from the mid-twelfth century. 225

Bradbury claims that West Romans and ―barbarians‖ borrowed from each other and

there was no clear distinction between the arms of one and the other on the eve of the

disintegration of the Western Empire.226

Byzantium and its tribal foes fought with similar

weapons for the simple reason that the Byzantine army gradually relied on non-Greek

soldiers and tribal mercenaries (mainly German, Turkish and Slavic tribes)as part of a

strategy of handling the imminent danger of nomadic attacks and incursions. They served as

auxiliaries, supplied to the empire as complete units under their own chiefs by different

tribes, and later they could be units serving under contract (mercenaries). Byzantium had

neither the capability nor the interest in disarming its new subjects.227

Against this

background, NSAs facilitated diffusion of military technologies. Luttwak notes that the

Byzantine military manual, known as the Strategikon of Emperor Maurikios, describes

various military items of Byzantium equipment as of ―Avar type.‖ Luttwak assumes that the

Avars (the first of the Turkic mounted archers to reach the west) acquired the designs of their

224

Herald M. Tanner,China: A History (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2009), 198. 225

Ahmad K. Nizami. ―The Ghurids,‖ in History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. 4 (Paris: UNESCO

Publishing, 1998), 177-190. 226

Bradbury, Routledge, 239. 227

Treadgold, Concise History,8-42, 169-173; Haldon, Byzantium Wars, 146, 164-166; Neil Christie, The

Lombards. The Ancient Longboards (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 91-101; Joseph D. Frendo, trans.,Agathias. The

Histories(Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1975), 1.1-1.38, 5.24-25; Vasary, Cumans and Tatars, 48, 56, 119;

Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

2009), 278-279.

75

weapons from China, from where they originated, and Iran whose culture they encountered

on their way westward as soon as they reached the trading cities of central Asia. Ganshof

claims that the Avars deployed sophisticated siege equipment for the conquest of Byzantine

fortress cities during the latesixth century, and they shared this technology with their Slav

allies. By the early 770s at the latest,the Saxons, who had even less direct contact with later

Roman and early Byzantine military forces than the Avars and Slavs, employed stone-

throwing catapults (petrariace) which could be used for knocking breaches in the walls of

fortifications.228

In the middle ages NSAs produced their own weapons as before but as their state-

foes weakened these weapons served them more effectively.Haldon argues that the victories

of the Asian steppe tribes over Byzantium stemmed among other things from the fact that

they held the self-manufactured powerful composite reflex bow that was not native to the

empire. Therefore, in the ninth and early tenth century Byzantium recruited mounted archers

from among the Chazars, Magyars and others.229

Vikings skillful in production of metal

weapons helped the Vikings to gain an operational advantage over Byzantium, Gaul and

other kingdoms. The iron ore found in bogs and lakes in Scandinavia was often of rather poor

quality, but was a valuable source of raw material. Viking weapon-smiths produced most of

their arms including swords (single and double-edged) and battle axes of many types,

spearheads made of iron, bows and iron arrow-heads. They developed a warship with a

shallow draught which could navigate small rivers and land on most beaches. It was small

enough to be rowed rapidly yet sufficiently sturdy to withstand the surging ocean and with

enough deck room to bear more troops and weapons than most opposing European warships.

They also imported some of the finest swords and spearheads from the Frankish empire. The

Vikings used their sailing skills and ocean-going vessels to dominate the long-distance trade

routes of northern Europe in the eighth and the ninth centuries.230

Sindak claims that Viking

trade operated as a network. Long-distance exchange took place in bulk along routes between

228

Benard S. Bachrach, Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West (Aldershot, U.K.: Variorum, 1993),

113-114; Luttwak, Grand Strategy,58-59, 275; Florin Curta, ―Introduction.‖ In The Other Europe in the Middle

Ages: Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans, eds. Flurin Curta and Roman Kovalev (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 1-12;

Mark Whittow,The Making of Byzantinum, 600-1025 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 229

Haldon, Byzantium Wars, 86. 230

Anne Pedersen. ―Viking Weaponry,‖ in The Viking World, eds., Brink Stefan and Neil Price (London:

Routledge, 2008),204-208; Paul F. Gavaghan,The Cutting Edge. Military History of Antiquity and Early Feudal

Times (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 373; Ian Peirce. ―Swords of the Viking Age,‖ in Introduction to the

Viking Sword, ed., Ewart Oakeshoot (Woodbridge, U.K.: The Boydell Press, 2002).

76

specific localities, where large cargoes were loaded or unloaded.231

It is assumed that once

nomad NSAs became settlers they could improve their production capabilities and trade

opportunities increased. For example, Hoffmeyer claims that Toledo,well known for its fine

blades,was prominentin the sword industry in Spain. The Jewish merchants of Toledo traded

with swords and exported weapons to the entire Mediterranean world in the thirteenth

century.232

NSAs’ constraints - logistic and other military skills

The Byzantine, Chinese dynasties and other medieval empires succeeded in preserving their

rule for centuries despite constant security challenges against a variety of NSAs. One reason

for that was a difference in logistic skills. NSAs‘ limited armaments served the utilization of

their forces as long as they engaged in guerrilla warfare (small-scale raids, piracy) but their

limited logistical infrastructures were a major constraint once they initiated national invasions

and engaged in conventional warfare. Nor could they engage in siege warfare and capture

well-fortified cities.233

Sedlar explains that an enemy force might invade Byzantine territory

with relative ease, but without the benefit of an adequate supply system it could survive only

by foraging. Byzantine military thinkers wrote detailed manuals on resisting sieges that

prescribed long lists of weaponry which required raw materials. Contemporary NSAs were

not capable of planning or producing on that level. Therefore, in the seventh and eighth

centuries NSAs such as Avars and Saracen (Arab) forces blockaded Constantinople, but to no

avail. In the power balance between NSAs and states of the early Middle Ages as in

Antiquity superior state organization including logistical skills were key factors.234

In this context, the disintegration of the Huns after Attila‘s death (453) highlighted the

implications of the logistical constraints of NSAs over utilization of their forces. Thompson

argues that the armament of the Huns was critical to the rise and collapse of their power.

Being steppe nomads, horsemen, often on the move, they did not have the resources or the

infrastructure to manufacture their weapons on a large scale. They acquired their weapons

(powerful dreaded bows, long cavalry sabres, and lassos) by plunder and mainly by trade

231

Sindak, 154; James Graham-Campbell, ed. Cultural Atlas of the Viking World(Abingdon: Andromeda

Oxford, 1994), 52-55, 78-79, 91; Terance Wise, Saxon, Viking and Norman(London: Osprey Publishing, 1979). 232

Ada Bruhn de Hoffmeyer,Arms and Armour in Spain: A Short Survey (Madrid: CSIC, 1982), 36. 233

Todd, Everyday Life,120-121; Gavaghan, Cutting Edge, 372. 234

Jean W. Sedlar,East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000-1500 (Seattle: University of Washington

Press, 1994), 199; Susan Mattern. ―Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome,‖ in Makers of Ancient

Strategy.From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, ed., Victor D. Hanson (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 2010); Luttwak, Grand Strategy,317-318.

77

with other countries since they could carry with them onlya limited supply of raw materials –

whether metal, wood, or textiles. Their bows were short and made of horn and bone because

they came from a treeless region and to improve their mobility.235

As soon as the Huns began to wage war on a large scale their slender productive

resources failed them and they were forced to rely on the Romans for their weapons. In return

for their imports the Huns gave horses, meat, furs, and slaves. The establishment of the Hun

Empire in Europe was associated with an exclusive trade, including in arms, between the

Huns and East Romans. Thus, Attila made sure that Romans would guarantee the open access

to their markets vital for his people. He and his successors collaborated with a group of

European traders who strived to benefit from the Hun Empire‘s prosperity. Once the Hun

Empire started to destabilize after Attila‘s death due to internal division and wars,the East

Romans cut off the supply of goods, mainly weapons, to the Huns. In 455/6 the Emperor

Marcian decreed a law that forbade the export of all weapons to the ―barbarians‖ and of all

materials for making weapons, specifically mentioning bows, arrows, and spears.The East

Roman government closed the market towns and cut off the Huns‘ supply of weapons.

Thompson claims that the Huns weakened mainly because they had no productive resources

of their own, and they depended entirely on their subjects and on the Eastern Romans.236

Often NSAs were less capable or inclined to absorb new weapons in contrast to

their state-foes. For example, the Byzantine army adapted the Huns‘ composite bow as their

weapon while the Goths failed to do this though they lived and fought together with their Hun

overlords for decades. Luttwak claims that the Hun bow was very hard to manufacture while

Germanic tribes presumably lacked expert bowyers; the former demanded endless training to

acquire and preserve proficiency. Also, Germanic warfare culture did not view archery as an

appropriate method of fighting in contrast to the more honorable hand to hand engagement.

Luttwak argues that Byzantines were superior to most of the NSAs they faced because unlike

the latter they were able to fight with many types of weapons.237

The Scots who rose up

against the English (thirteenth century) were mainly spearmen. Taylor argues that all attempts

to supersede the spear by the bow completely failed although the superiority of the latter, in

235

Thompson,Huns, 7, 57. 236

Thompson, Huns, 59-61, 189-195,189-200. 237

Luttwak, Grand Strategy,11, 24, 295; Hall, 17.

78

the hands of the English, was manifested in many bloody fields. The few archers to be found

in the ranks of the Scottish army used low quality bows and were not skillful archers.238

Furthermore, a vital test for a NSA – once it conquered a land – was whether it was

capable of securing its borders and establishing an independent state. The design of the NSA

force including procurement of new weapons was a precondition. Franks – originally NSA –

were able to conquer and unite most of western Christendomduring the eighth and the ninth

centuries. The transformation of the Franks from tribes engaged in raiding and plundering to

the Carolingian dynasty that conquered vast territories and successfully defended its borders

dictated a change in military tactics and weaponry, namely transformation from infantry to

heavy cavalry. Gavaghan explains that Frankish armies came to include strong detachments

of heavy attack cavalry, armed with lance and long sword which helped them take control of

the huge province of Gaul and secure it for centuries. The Franks inherited much Roman

technology and used it to defeat rival neighbors and invaders, such as the Visigoths, Almanni,

Avar, Burgundians, Lombard, and Muslims.239

As semi-nomadic tribesmen Franks fought on

foot or mounted with mainly javelin and axe; and as conquerors they developed an integrated

force well trained and disciplined to scale walls under daunting conditions in which a key

role was played by acquired artillery (heavy stone-throwing machines, battering rams,

compound bows), engineers and logistic support. As an auxiliary arm they employed cavalry

equipped with well-made swords, horses and a naval fleet for transport. The ability of the

Franks to sustain lengthy sieges with an arsenal of weapons against fortress cities such as

Barcelona and Tartosa was decisive.240

Conversely, the Vandals, originally a nomadic NSA, established a kingdom in North

Africa in the fifth century but failed to defend it due to, among other things, lack of military

skills. They stayed committed to their mounted tactic armed mainly with spears and swords.

They did notacknowledge the need to fortify their towns and acquire new weapons to defend

their kingdom, thus making it much easier for the Byzantines to recapture Carthage in 533.241

238

James Taylor, The Pictorial History of Scotland: from the Romans Invasion to the Close of the Jacobite

Rebellion, Vol. 1 (London: James S. Virtue, 1859), 282. 239

Gavaghan, Cutting Edge, 342-343; Bachrach, Armies,2, 108, 115. 240

Todd, Everyday Life,112-113; Ross, 59; Bachrach, Armies and Politics,75; Bernard S. Bachrach, Early

Carolingian Warfare. Prelude to Empire. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 130-131. 241

Bradbury, Routledge, 104-106; Guido Donini and Gordon B. Ford, Isidore of Seville‟s. History of the Goths,

Vandalas and Suevi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), IV, 21.10-17.

79

Social-economic dimension of medieval NSAs’ arming

The issue of western European States versus NSAs is rather more complicated than states

versus NSAs in the ancient world and in later periods – in effect the feudal states themselves

were very similar to NSAs in organization, especially when ruled by weak kings. The kings

usually had a small standing army of noble knights and sergeants living in their court, directly

under their command and serving as their private bodyguard. However, the majority of the

feudal state's military strength was composed of a mobilization of the feudal vassals. By law

each feudal vassal was required to respond when called by the king, however, in fact, each of

the feudal lords was actually an NSA in his own right – and had under him a military force

structured as a miniature of the king's, sometimes even larger than the king's private army. So

if a feudal lord chose to rebel against the king's authority, though his army was ostensibly an

NSA military force, it was identical in composition, weaponry, doctrine and training as the

king's. In other words, there was no clear difference between the armies of a state and the

armies of an NSA.242

Rebellious NSAs (such as peasants, nomadic tribes, peoples of vassal states) could not

acquire the expensive weaponry of the knights and usually their revolts had limited effect,

and failed to topple oppressive rulers, landlords and foreign invaders. For example, the

English Peasants‘ Revolt of 1138 erupted because of growing dissatisfaction over economic

and political conditions.243

Lindsay and Grove argue that the rebels armed themselves with

pole arms (billhooks, scythes, sickles) and with weapons they could carry according to the

English law (swords, longbows). The authors explained that by training and arming the

civilian population (some of them fought at the French Wars) King Edward III gave them

weapons and later the mass turned their weapons against the upper class. He encouraged his

subjects to use the bow. Intensive iron trade in Kent and communities of smugglers in Essex

probably facilitated the arming of the rebels. They formed a large army (60,000 men), took

control over substantial territories in East England and marched towards London. King

Richard II manipulated the rebels when he granted their wishes and convinced them to return

home; thereafter he did not keep his promises and hanged the rebel leaders. The rebels‘

242

Jeremy Black, War. A Short History (London: Continuum, 2009), 43, 47; Michael Mallett and William

Caferro Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Barnsley:Pen and Sword Military,

2009). 243

Kelly DeVries and Robert D. Smith,Medieval Weapons: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa-

Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 168.

80

weaponry produced short-term gains, but they were not professional soldiers and could not

defend themselves successfully against the large military forces of the king and were finally

crushed.244

A few popular movements, whether of townspeople in the Low Countries, or farmers in

the Swiss valleys, or religious fanatics in Bohemia, showed that aristocratic armies could be

effectively challenged. Those NSAs effectively coordinated weapons and tactics that

neutralized the knights‘ advantages (their capacity to break formation) and exposed their

weaknesses (vulnerable to missiles).245

Medieval Welsh developed the longbow (1.8m in length with a 150-400m

range – longer than virtually any other bow), a deadly instrument of war that

could pierce a knight‘s armour, and which provided the Welsh guerrillas with

exceptional firepower. Gam argues that the Welsh were among the most

outstanding practitioners of the art of partisan warfare. Because of the rough

mountainous forest ground in North Wales, lack of roads, wet weather and

limited resources for invaders, the Welsh longbow produced unusual

advantages for the local inhabitants who rebelled against the much stronger

Anglo-Norman rule during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Welsh

longbow was relatively easy and quick to produce as it was made from a

single piece of yew wood. It was light, easily carried, and made no noise

when shooting at a rate of ten arrows or more per minute (although that

demanded long practice from childhood) in contrast to the heavily equipped

Norman cavalry who moved slowly forward thus being easy prey for the

Welsh ambuscades.246

For decades Welsh terrorized their border with

England, looted and burned settlements and castles, while royal punitive

expeditions into Wales failed time after time. Finally the Welsh fell to the

English invaders, because among other things, they lacked logistic backup that

would enable them to sustain troops in the field over long periods. King

Edward the First who was impressed by the excellence of the Welsh archers

244

Kelly DeVries and Robert D. Smith,Medieval Weapons: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa-

Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 168. 245

Lewis H. Gam, Guerrillas in History (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 9; Michael Prestwich,

Edward I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988),187, 202. 246

Gam, Guerrillas, 2-3; John Beeler, Warfare in England 1066-1189 (New-York: Cornel University Press,

1966), 193-198, 214;Robert Hardly, Longbow. A Social and Military History(Thrupp, U.K.: Sutton Publishing,

2006), 39-42, 56; Hall, 19-20.

81

recruited them to his army and established an efficient bow-armed English

infantry which shocked the French in the One Hundred Years War (1337-

1453).247

Hardy‘s detailed description of Welsh and English bowmen revealed

that their armament was well integrated into their social status.―Norman

Knights in mail armour on their costly, prancing destriers, their war horses

were…..valiant and emulous and hot-headed but not often capable of

imaginative cohesion or of the organization that could exploit advantages, or

work together to counter reverses.‖248

Conversely, often bowmen were drawn

from villages and fields, poor, sometimes outlaws; men of no great estimation

in the world but men of country skills and strength, accustomed to things of

wood and finding a pleasing familiarity in the wooden bow. In this context,

Robin Hood, English legendary folk hero of the fourteenth century, led a band

of outlaws who robbed the rich to provide help for the poor. Their main

weapon was the longbow.249

Swiss fought to establish independence from the House of Habsburg in the

fourteenth century. On several occasions in the first half of the fourteenth

century, an army of rural and urban rebels defeated several times the Austrian

army that consisted largely of heavily armed knights. Much of the Swiss

success depended on clever exploitation of the rugged Swiss Alpine terrain,

and employment of self-manufactured weapons. In 1315 several thousand

Swiss militia ambushed an Austrian expedition numbering between 2,000 and

3,000 soldiers, under the command of Duke Leopold of Austria. The invaders

thought they would not face serious difficulty, but when they marched through

the narrow pass between Morganton Mountain and Lake Aegeri, the Swiss

moved out of hiding spots high on the steep slope of the pass, and sent rocks

and logs down on the surprised Austrian knights. Smaller stones and arrows

were also showered onto the cavalry column. Before the Austrians could

regain order the Swiss infantry charged down the hill into the confused

column. Using their famed halberd – with its cutting blade and vicious spike –

the Swiss easily cut down most of the knights from their horses, killing them

247

John E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 15-16, 32-33; Hardly,

Longbow, 41; Gam,Guerrillas, 4. 15-16,Beeler, Warfare, 197-201, 232-233. 248

Hardy, Longbow, 42, 56. 249

Nikolas Jaspert, The Crusades (New-York: Routledge, 2006), 91-92; Hall, 23.

82

as they lay helpless on the ground. Deaths were numerous, with Duke Leopold

himself barely able to flee. Halberds – a combination of an axe and a spear –

were developed in Switzerland and became the most popular late medieval

infantry staff-weapon, followed by the pike. The Swiss became the favoured

late medieval mercenaries.250

Initial Implications of the Firearms Revolution for NSAs

McNeill argues that any major change in weapons and military organization affects politics

and society by helping some people attain ends more easily than before, while putting new,

perhaps insuperable, obstacles in the way of others. The advent of guns was such a change.

Gunpowder for military use appeared in China in the ninth or tenth century and arrived in the

Islamic World and then in Europe during the thirteenth century.251

Guns first appeared in

China during the twelfth century, and they too 'travelled' through the Moslem domains to

Europe, arriving there in the late thirteenth century. The emergence of firepower triggered

significant worldwide political and economic processes that overshadowed NSAs‘ activity.

Hand-held firearms were generally less effective than longbows and crossbows – but the

users could be trained to use them in a fraction of the time required to train longbowmen.

Once models had been developed powerful enough to shatter castle walls towards the end of

the fourteenth century, cannon were much more important in effecting tactical, strategic and

political changes. The initial effects of the powerful firearms were negative regarding NSAs‘

operational capabilities and the power balance between rulers and rebels. Yet the changes

were gradual and the fifteenth century was the experimental stage before standardization of

firearms‘ production.252

Firearms were a crucial factor in the rise of highly centralized monarchical states in Europe

and Asia. This was because the introduction of heavy cannon weakened the effectiveness of

castles – whereas previously a rebellious vassal not strong enough to resist the king in the

open could usually outlast the king's army by withdrawing into his castles. Now kings could

quickly punish rebellious vassals. Furthermore, the expense of manufacturing and

250

Kelly Devries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology, Vol.

2 (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1996), 188-189; Kelly Devries, Medieval Military

Technology(Peterborough, Canada: Broadview Press, 1992), 30; Bradbury, Routledge, 246; Prestwich, Edward

I, 187; Hall, 36-38. 251

Hall, 41. According to Hall and other scholars non gunpowder ―fire‖ was widely employed in China few

centuries earlier. 252

William H. McNeill, The Age of Gunpowder Empires 1450-1800 (Washington, DC: American Historical

Association, 1989); Hall, 103.

83

maintaining large cannon-parks was prohibitive and usually only the royal treasury, based on

taxation of an entire state, had the required funds. For instance, in central Asia the

establishment of a group of ―gunpowder empires‖ including the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid

Empire, the Uzbek Khanate, and the Mughal Empire in India, controlled the major part of the

continent during the sixteenth century. Eastwards, rulers of Burma, central Vietnam and

Indonesia mobilized the new weapons to create centralized new states. In Japan the

introduction of firearms in the 1500s hastened the unification of the country under a single

ruler.253

Military warfare became more collective and less hand-to-hand in nature. In turn, the

new weapons and the strengthening of the central authority also usually strengthened rulers‘

power relative to that of rebellious NSAs who were almost incapable of acquiring the new

technology. 254

Reid explains that acquisition and deployment of guns required more resources and

better administration than local potentates could achieve. Governments had to buy copper and

tin, control the manufacture of arms and raise infantry units trained to use hand-guns. The

proper authority of the monarch meant, among other things, that if arms were to be sold they

were sold to the ruler, and if any private trading arrangements were made, they involved the

ruler. The purchase and manufacture of arms for defence against internal and external threats

became a major concern of rulers worldwide.255

Increasing centralization of the political

authority went hand in hand with increasing centralization, standardization and organization

of standing armies.Hess claims that the increasing use of firearms from the mid-fifteenth

century onwards allowed contemporary empires to expand using their new professional

armies; it facilitated the emergence of European colonialism as most of the less developed

nations (mainly in the New World and Africa) did not use firearms or refused to employ

them. However, the firearms themselves, apart from the cannon, did not actually provide a

great techno-tactical advantage over non-gunpowder weapons until the nineteenth century

253

Iqtidar A. Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms. Warfare in Medieval India (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2004),7; Anthony Reid. ―Introduction: A Time and a Place,‖ in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era. Trade,

Power, and Belief, ed., Anthony Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 13-14; Kenneth W. Chase,

Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 179. 254

Chase, Firearms, 9, 23-24; Frances Gies and Joseph Gies, Cathedral, Forge, and Waterwheel. Technology

and Invention in the Middle Ages (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), 204-208;Arnold Pacey,

Technology in World Civilization. A Thousand-Year History (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 44-49. 255

Leonard Y. Andaya. ―Cultural State Formation in Eastern Indonesia,‖ in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern

Era. Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Reid, Anthony (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 35; Jeyamalar

Kathirithamby-Wells. ―Restraints on the Development of Merchant Capitalism in Southeast Asia before c.

1800,‖ in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era. Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Reid, Anthony (Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 1993), 125; Anthony Reid. ―Introduction: A Time and a Place,‖ in Southeast Asia in

the Early Modern Era. Trade, Power, and Belief, ed., Anthony Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1993).

84

when improvements in firearms technology first increased the range, rate of fire and accuracy

of these weapons to betterthan those of powerful bows. The true source of European

superiority was organizational and logistical and, when faced by enemies who tried to fight

from behind fortifications, cannon.256

Governments acknowledged the potential risk in the diffusion of firearms, and attempted

to tackle this. The Ottoman governments imposed a state monopoly on the manufacture of

gunpowder and firearms. Commoners (Muslim or non-Muslim) were not allowed to bear

weapons of any kind, including firearms. All weapons were to be stored in arsenals and only

released for use by order of the sultan. Periodicsearches were conducted to confiscate

weapons in the hands of the population. By the end of the sixteenth century, Japanese rulers

prohibited arms trade with foreigners and disarmed the peasantry to avoid social

destabilization.257

Yet, the initial stages of firearms provided a few hints that states could not gain full

control on firearms proliferation, such as the declining prices for both gunpowder and guns in

the late-fifteenth century along with the fact that saltpeter could be manufactured by anyone

who had little more than a dry masonry cellar and animal manure and a certain tolerance for

the odor.258

Thus, a few rebellious NSAs accessed firearms and used them to defeat stronger

military forces. For instance, firearms were introduced in Vietnam in the late fourteenth

century by Chinese traders and deserters. The Ming Empire conquered Vietnam in 1407,

using its technological superiority over the Vietnamese by effectively employed firearms.

This gap was rapidly lost and the battlefield humiliation ofChinese troopscaused them to

withdraw from Vietnam in 1427 mainly because the Vietnamese resistance movement under

Le Loi captured more and more Ming weapons and other military supplies in major battles

from 1418 using guerrilla tactics. Ming captives and defectors provided the Vietnamese with

techniques for attacking city walls, models for protective shelters, primitive tanks, and

Muslim catapults. Le Loi ordered the manufacture of weapons and equipment based on these

models and distributed them to different places.259

Laichen argues that the Vietnamese troops

256

Hess C. Andrew,The Forgotten Frontier. A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibro-African Frontier (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 117-118. 257

Chase, Firearms 88-89;Khan, Gunpowder, 7-8; Pacey, Technology, 90. 258

Hall, 58-59. 259

Keith W. Taylor. ―Nguyen Hoang and the Beginning of Vietnam‘s Southward Expansion,‖ in Southeast Asia

in the Early Modern Era. Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Reid, Anthony (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1993), 42-65.

85

upgraded their operational approach and engaged in siege and open battle warfare as well as

guerrilla warfare since they captured a large number of firearms (cannon, fire lance, rocket

arrows and ships); otherwise their victories over the Ming would have been extremely

difficult if not impossible. Summarizing the war Le Loi pointed out the important role played

by Ming deserters and captured weapons.260

China witnessed a rebellion against Mongol rule (the Yuan dynasty) in 1356. One of

the rebel groups acquired cannon and used it against the regime. Pacey claims that while the

Mongol regime had neglected firearms technology various unofficial groups had continued to

innovate them. The Mongol emperor of China was expel

led in 1368.261

In India from the sixteenth century onward local chiefs recruited

skilled musketeers (mainly Sikhs, Baluchis and Bhattis) and revolted against the Mughal‘s

rule. At a later stage, peasant communities in different areas and Muslims from the vicinity of

Delhi started arming themselves with muskets due to the low price of ordinary muskets, and

rose up against Mughal authority. Wood notes that in Siam in the fourteenth century the city

of P‘ayao revolted against Siamese rule. While the Siamese erected a tower from which to

shoot into the city, the people of P‘ayao melted down the brass tiles on one of their temples

and made a five-inch cannon, wherewith they destroyed the Siamese fort and forced the

Siamese to withdraw from the city.262

The Hussites were a Czech Christian revolutionary movement with social and national

motives who fought against the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic clergy (Hussite Wars,

1420-1434). According to Seldar the Hussites illustrated how a rebellious NSA with limited

weaponry could deploy high operational skills against better armed professional troops. They

lacked heavy cavalry, and developed wholly distinctive and highly successful battle tactics.

Hussite general Zizka specialized in creating ways to neutralize the armoured mounted

knight‘s advantages – a key requirementfor NSA‘s military victory. Hall argues that like

modern guerrilla leaders Zizka‘s main task was simply to survive with a credible fighting

force to defend successfully rather than risk defeat with bold attacks. The resources with

which the Hussite army began their struggle looked hopeless compared to their foes,

260

Sun Laichen. ―Chinese Gunpowder Technology and Dai Viet, ca. 1390-1497,‖ in Vietnam Borderless

Histories, eds., Nhung T. Tran and Anthony S. Reid (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 77-91. 261

Pacey, Technology 54; Khan,Gunpowder, 164-165, 173-182; R. W. Wood, A History of Siam (London: T.

Fisher Unwin, 1926),78;. 262

Simon Digby. ―The Problem of the Military Ascendancy of the Dehli Sultanate,‖ in Warfare and Weaponry

in SouthAsia 1000-1800, eds., J.L. Gommans and Dirk H.A. Kolff (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001),

311-320.

86

multinational mercenary cavalries. TheHussites were chiefly peasants and townsmen who

were, initially at least, untrained in the art of war.263

The peasants were armed with

agricultural implements while townsmen carried pikes, lances, and sometimes crossbows.

Zizka trained them to be skillful guerrilla warriors in a training camp he established on the

steep hill of Tabor, southeast of Prague. This enabled them to attack neighbouring Catholic

monasteries to capture weapons. The only possible sources of armour were battlefield booty

or looted castle armours.264

The few resources at his disposal obliged Zizka to employ any means at hand, which meant

the use of pole weapons, such as the grain flail, hooked or spiked bill, shafted clubs with

spiked wooden heads, and mainly, the modification of farm wagons to carry small guns.

According to Turnbull farm carts were already used in warfare as supply carts and Zizka`s

innovation was to drive wagons as a mobile defensive fortification that could be erected

rapidly. Zizka trained his peasant troops to move forward in a formation which allowed the

wagons to form a closed circle at short notice, linked by chains. The horses were unhitched

and kept within the enclosure.265

Zizka developed two types of carts, both drawn by four

horses: an essentially defensive fighting vehicle against cavalry attack with builtup sides to

provide protection for up to twenty men and operated as a firing platform for crossbowmen,

handguns and the rest with polearms and light bombards. A second type of war wagon

mounted light cannon known as ―snakes,‖ though Kinard argues that the cannon was not

deployed as true field artillery in the modern sense. A few military scholars regard Zizka‘s

cart as the predecessor of the twentieth century tanks because it married firearms and some

sort of armoured vehicle.266

Also, Zizka obtained access to a local arms manufacturer who

supplied him with small handguns and primitive artillery pieces. Stibetr claims that Zizka was

the first European commander to maneuver on the field with cannon of medium caliber,

which he mounted on carts in the spaces between wagons. Therefore the Hussites defeated

the armies of Emperor Sigismund five times; they repulsed them from Bohemia and from

1427 carried campaigns into Germany, Austria, and even arrived at the coast of the Baltic Sea

(1433). Only internal division deteriorating intobloody internecineconflict weakened

263

Sedlar, East Central Europe,231. 264

Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics(Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 108; Prestwich, Edward I, 188; Stephen Turnbull, The Hussite Wars

1419-1436 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 4-15; Prestwich, Edward I, 188. 265

Spencer Tucker, Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa-Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 2-3. 266

Turnbull, Hussite Wars,23-34.

87

theHussite movement and in 1436 they signed a peace agreement with Emperor

Sigismund.267

NSAs within Medieval Arms Trade

In western Europe theMiddle Ages witnessed growing efforts by rulers to block supplies of

arms to external and internal foes, many of which were NSAs. The Frank’s decree of 805

prohibited traders who traveled in the territories of the Slavs and the Avars to take weapons

with them to sell, and, according to Steuer, merchants were checked and had to show their

goods to the king‘s officials at the border posts.268

In 562 Avaremissaries who purchased

weapons in Constantinople while on a diplomatic mission later had their purchase

confiscated.269

Escalatingclashes between Muslims and Christians intensified the efforts to

supervise the arms trade. In the late twelfth century popes placed embargoes on trade of war

material with the Muslim World, including horses, weapons and the wood necessary to build

ships, though the embargoes were only partially respected.270

NSAs were involved in medieval arms trade as partners and facilitators including high-

sea trade over long distances, coastal trade with nearby port cities and land trade. The more

complex a trade network, the harder it was to control its activity. For example, the Scots

exploited their traditional commercial connections with Flemish towns to import armour and

weapons (spear, swords, and bows) that were essential to their First War of Independence

against the English (1296-1328). Barrow argues that they associated with German merchants

and English smugglers to acquire weapons. They also negotiated with Genoese firms for the

supply of weapons and ships while England failed to place an effective embargo on Scottish

ports. Barrow claims that Scottish ability to secure a continuous flow of weapons and armour

(though limited in scope) helped them to secure their independence.271

Until the late Middle Ages weapons were a small part of extensive international trade

networks that specialized in trade of luxury goods, mainly fur and silk. These networks were

267

Sedlar,East Central Europe, 231-235; Turnbull, Hussite Wars,35-41; Jeff Kinard, Artillery: An Illustrated

History of Its Impact Weapons andWarfare (Santa-Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007). 268

Morris, 33; Newark, Barbarians, 125; Heiko Steuer. ―The Beginning of Urban Economies among the

Saxons,‖ in The Continental Saxons. From the Migration Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic

Perspective, eds., Green, H. Dennis and Frank Siegmund (San Marino: The Boydell Press, 2003), 171. 269

John Haldon, Warfare State and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 258. 270

Jaspert, Crusades, 91-92. 271

Michel Brown, The Wars of Scotland 1214-1371 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 283;

Geoffrey W. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

University Press, 2005), 261.

88

supervised by rulers and clergy and served their economic and political interests. But they

contained independent players, such as nomad tribes and merchants, and it is assumed that

rebellious NSAs could connect the trade networks through middlemen, particularly during the

decline of empires.272

Martin argues that Volga Bulgaria, for example, was an international market and

distribution center for northern luxury fur in the ninth and tenth centuries. Weapons were one

of the luxury goods that local merchants traded for fur with hunting-tribes from the North and

gradually with the Russ. They also obtained fur from local Bulgars, and tributaries. Khazar

and Muslim merchants, paying in silver coin and a variety of Oriental luxury goods,

purchased fur along with slaves, weapons, honey, and other goods. It seems that the Bulgar

marketplace also contained weapons and other commodities. Khazar and southern Muslim

merchants transported their purchases (including arms) by land or boat southward along the

Volga River to Itil, capital of the Khazar Empire. There they sold their fur or carried it further

by land and sea to other points in Byzantium and the Muslim world, as far as Spain and North

Africa through the Black Sea ports. Itil was also connected to East Asia through commercial

middlemen. Bulgar merchants conducted land caravans to Khwarezm, where fur was

repurchased, again mainly for silver coin, by southern Muslim merchants who transported it

further to the towns of the Semanid Empire and other Muslim centers. During the thirteenth

century the fur network continued to operate under the Mongol Empire‘s control. 273

The Radanites, a group of adventurous multilingual Jewish merchants who operated

in the late eighth and early ninth centuries,demonstrated NSAs‘ role in facilitating an arms

trade. They operated through the Muslim world between western Europe and China by land

and sea. Among other things, they exported iron weapons (mainly swords) from Gaul to

China and to the Muslim Mediterranean that was short in iron. Jewish merchants benefitted

from the fact that Muslims were not interested in foreign languages and were unwelcome in

Christian Europe while the former could claim a degree of neutrality in the Muslim-Christian

struggles. Curtin calls the Radanites a single trade diaspora with a shared culture carrying

trade over such a long distance. 274

272

Janet Martin, Treasure of the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2004), 8, 43; Jaspert, Crusades, 91-92. 273

Janet Martin, Medieval Russia, 980-1584 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 5-27, 65, 68. 274

David Abulafia, The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2011); Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1984), 105-107.

89

The emergence of firepower boosted arms trade, and developments in international maritime

commerce facilitated the proliferation of military technology. Governments invited foreign

craftsmen, supplied weapons to friendly states, and exchanged military technology. Initially,

NSAs were minor players in this activity; for example,Chase argues that Japanese and

Chinese pirates were part of a network of trade including arms trade that connected the

southeastern coast of China to Japan and Southeast Asia and in turn to the global network of

trade through the Spanish in Manila and the Portuguese in Melaka. 275

Mostly, NSAs procured firearms and its technology fromother states. According to

Nicolle and McBride the Turks spent more effort in acquiring firearms from the first half of

the fifteenth century for their better-organized army than their European rivals. Uyar and

Erickson argue that the Ottoman leadership came to understand the potential and importance

of firearms in a remarkably short time. Turks‘ sources for firearms were fugitive Jews from

Spain who landed in Turkey with expertise in gun manufacture, and illegal arms trade from

Italy and Hungary. The arming of the Turks with firearms was important for their

transformation from nomadic tribes with limited operational skills into a professional regular

army that conquered vast territories in the Balkans and in Asia and established a worldwide

empire.276

Firearms experts served as mercenaries in foreign armies. In the 1530s, while fighting each

other, both Burma and Siam hired Portuguese military advisors including for musketry. Inthe

early sixteenth century Portuguese deserters were hired by the Mughal rulers of India to

establish infrastructure for the manufacture of light cannon; they produced various different

types of guns, and trained local artisans in the art of making European guns. TheMughals also

used Iranian and Ottoman bronze gun-makers.277

275

Pacey, Technology, 80-81; Dai Yingcong. ―Military Finance of the High Qing Period: An Overview,‖ in

Military Culture in Imperial China, ed., Nicola D. Cosmo (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University

Press, 2009). 276

Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk (Santa

Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 42;David Nicolle and Angus McBride, Armies of The Ottoman Turks 1300-

1774(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1983). 277

Khan,Gunpowder, 61-62, 69, 78; Wood, Siam, 102-103

90

Summary

While Smith and Van Creveld highlight interstate wars in the pre-global world, the historical

review reveals that NSAs were a persistent phenomenon in the ancient and medieval world.

There were always those who revolted and took up arms against central rule, and many of

these combats were fought amongst the people. Sometimes they shaped dramatic events in

political and military history though often being neglected and were the object of biased

reports by past historians and chronicles. It can be assumed that lack of evidence mainly

about ancient NSAs undermined understanding of their actual historical role. This chapter

outlines a number of persistent principles that have shaped the arming of NSAs as the

following chapters demonstrate too. Ancient NSAs managed to acquire weapons mainly by

assaulting their foes, collecting dual-use artifacts, and manufacturing efficient war tools.

They could also obtain foreign military aid at some risk. The weaker state authority had

become, the more easily rebellious NSAs could acquire weapons.

Medieval NSAs‘armament is a more complicated issue since the official state was often

actually very much like the NSA, and the non-state feudal barony was often like a little state.

In this context, state-armies and NSAs‘ armies used similar weapons and even acquired them

in similar ways, though they differed in quality and quantity.Smith and Van Creveld

emphasize present NSAs‘ weakness in weaponry because they have limited resources

compared to states‘ armies. This chapter demonstrates that past NSAs too had poor weapons

and some failed to use specific weapons but not so much because they were expensive or

hard to acquire but because they demanded long practice and contradicted their military

culture. The major weaknesses and challenges of past NSAs were – as Luttwak implies –

organizational, structural and political, that is, lack of discipline, training, intelligence,

logistics (of food and water), rather than armaments. Only a few NSAs overcame the

obstacles and managed to defeat the stronger state armies. The key for the former‘s victory

was coordination between excellent leadership, exploitation of the terrain, use of guerrilla

tactics and employment of effective weapons.

At least at first firearms manufacture was limited in scope and very expensive – it was

an art known to a select few (almost a guild) so it was easier for rulers to control the sources.

Over time, the knowledge was passed on so that more and more people could manufacture

the weapons, gunpowder and bullets (soldiers carried the equipment to manufacture

gunpowder and bullets on their own, and so could any civilian – manufacturing the weapons

91

required more skill and knowledge, but not beyond those of a good blacksmith) and so central

authority gradually lost control of the manufacture and proliferation of small firearms, but

retained the ability to control the manufacture and proliferation of cannon.

The growing international trade in the Middle Ages demonstrated a few characteristcs of

modern complex systems like the Federation of Systems (FOS) and Systems of Systems

(SOS), though this trade activity cannot be called FOS or SOS. Operational independence of

the individual systems hardly existed because rulers controlled the trade activity. Some of the

arms trade systems were very small and simple. The components of the trade had limited

communication links and the geographic distribution of the trade partners was small. Still,

medieval trade reflected some diversity because it consisted of different entities including

NSAs and the players cooperated in trade exchanges and some of them enjoyed managerial

independence.The next chapter explores how the rise of European colonialism created new

armed NSAs that had more opportunities to acquire firearms.

92

Chapter Three: NSAs’ Arming from early Colonialism to the French

Revolution

The following chapter covers more than four hundred years of wars and rebellions

witnessingdramatic geo-strategic and political changes. Like their predecessors, NSAs that

operated in the early modern world were subordinated to the principle of self-reliance in their

military buildup. The chapter emphasizes the dialectical outcomes of early colonialism.

Native peoples and enforced African immigrants to the new world were abused by European

powers because they lacked modern weaponry, but occasionally they were able to revolt and

defeat their ―masters.‖ Early colonialism stimulated international arms trade that initially

served mostly colonial armies and local rulers; only in later stages did it contribute to the

buildup of native-NSAs‘ forces. The chapter describes how the French Revolution created

national NSAs and revolutionary NSAs in Europe and in the Americas, both of which

required weaponry for their struggle against European rule. The rise of the nation state

encouraged new types of rebellious NSAs and arming methods including cross-border

smuggling, growing use of state sponsorship and international arms trade to support domestic

insurgencies, involvement of volunteers, ethnic diaspora, mobilization of the masses by

political parties and international smuggling networks that collaborated with government and

private entities.The last segment of the chapter discusses the invention of high explosives that

increasingly empowered NSAs‘ strategies and tactics. All these factors became stronger in

the globalization period.

General Trends in Early-Modern Age’s NSA Arming

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeanarms trade evolved into an industry;

production centers rose in northern Italy, the Germanic Empire, the Low Countries, London

and Birmingham, serving mainly the ruling elites. The centralization of power in the hands of

kingly or princely rulers favored the creation of court armories where craftsmen were

appointed to work principally, if not always exclusively, for their sovereign masters. There

was no mass-production of arms beyond the special requests of European rulers and

noblemen, foreign governments, and charter companies. The creation of state arsenals and the

distinction that was made between the producer of weapon systems and the people, who used

them, strengthened the position of rulers. However, attempts at centralization and state

93

control did not significantly affect the flowering of free enterprise in the arms business. Some

armorers were independent, and the weapons business was dominated by city merchants who

were both producers and traders. Mainly in the Netherlands and Belgium of the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, the establishment of the arms industry involved aristocratic family

companies that exported large quantities of weapons to European countries, the Ottoman

Empire, North Africa and America, and attempted to monopolize the import of raw materials

for the arms industry (iron, copper). Some of these companies conducted large scale business,

using logistic assets that included outlets and offices across the world. They served ruling

elites but occasionally they were willing to sell weapons to rebels, demonstrating a

phenomenon that would escalate in the modern world.278

In 1582 a leader of a Portuguese

rebellion against Spain received a substantial shipment of gunpowder against prompt

payment from the weapon markets of the Dutch Republic that was at war with Spain. In

1640, the Portuguese and Catalans began an armed rebellion against the central government

in Madrid, and England was divided by a long civil war, which ended only in 1649. Those

rebels made intensive use of the Amsterdam arms market.279

Vogel argues that while strict

export controls on arms and military equipment were imposed by the States-General,

smuggling was comparatively easy, since all one had to do was to give a fake destination.280

Until the sixteenth century warfare was dominated by men who learned their

military skills in childhood and adolescence as a part of their cultural environment. For the

first time gunpowder made it possible to impart unfamiliar military skills to men who were

themselves generally unaccustomed to warfare by upbringing. State armies benefitted from

this change, but so did growing numbers of rebels who were not professional soldiers. In this

context, states‘ efforts to restrict the spread of weapons were often ineffective mainly in

militarized regions or when territory was vast and the central regime was weak. In the

Ottoman Empire ordinary Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were not allowed to bear

weapons of any kind. The Ottomans frequently searched for firearms and if found the owner

was mutilated and executed. The manufacture of firearms was a state monopoly and those

278

Matthias Pfaffenbichler, Medieval Craftsmen (London: British Museum Press, 1992), 34; Emrys Chew,

Arming the Periphery. The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire (Basingstoke,

U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 51-55. 279

Elgood, Firearms, 59-61; Hanno Brand,Trade, diplomacy and cultural exchange: continuity and change in

the North Sea and the Baltic c. 1350-1750 (Amersfoort: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2005), 66-69; Caroline Brooke,

Moscow: A Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 204. 280

Hans Vogel. ―Arms Production and Exports in the Dutch Republic, 1600-1650,‖ in Exercise of ArmsWarfare

in the Netherlands(1568-1648), ed. Hoeven V. Marco (Leiden: Brill, 1997),197-210.

94

who traded in them ran severe risks. Only the sultan could authorize the distribution and

export of arms. Yetgrowing unrest in some parts of the empire encouraged the smuggling of

firearms from Western Europe, Ragusa (Sicily) and from Algeria, and also encouraged the

spread of illicit firearms within Turkey.281

For example, according to Elgood, Ottoman

merchants of the late sixteenth century traded arms (handguns, daggers and bows) illegally

across the Black Sea with the people of the north-west Caucasus, and Ottoman authorities‘

attempts to stop arms smuggling was ineffectual. The production of fine weapons has a long

tradition in the Caucasus which made it easier for local rebels to rise up.282

Rebels who lacked financial support or access to arms markets, such as lower class

groups, were compelled to use captured weapons. They were always short of weapons, had

maintenance problems and therefore had little chance to conduct lengthy warfare. The

German Peasants‘ War (1524-1525), the greatest revolutionary movement in German history,

erupted against the oppression of the peasants by the ruling classes of the Holy Roman

Empire. Rebels from southern Germany and Austria carried polearms as local militia

members; some had military experience serving as laborers and carpenters in many

campaigns in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. The rebels were organized as territorial

bands of 4,000-12,000 men each, and acquired firearms either from plundered castles or from

arsenals of those towns that agreed to assist in their struggle. They secured artillery but less

than the feudal armies. Shortage ofartillery and powder supply for the peasants resulted in

unsuccessful sieges and defeats in field battles against the German princes‘armies. By the

summer of 1525 the princes had crushed the German peasants‘ revolt.283

On the other hand,

the Dutch rose against the Habsburgs‘ rule (Eighty Years‘ War, 1568-1648) and were able to

sustain a lengthy struggle and build a very powerful fleet in a very short time. They defeated

the Spanish navy, and paved the way for an independent Netherland that soon became a

trading and colonial empire. The Dutch revolt succeeded, among other reasons, because the

rebels enjoyed financial strength and possessed a military industry.284

281

Dina R.Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire Mosul, 1540-1834(Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1997), 44-74. 282

Elgood, Firearms, 42-43, 101-102; Dina R.Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire

Mosul, 1540-1834(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 283

DouglasMiller,Armies of the German Peasants‟ War 1524-1526(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003) ???? 284

Ivo V. Loo. ―For Freedom and Fortune. The Rise of Dutch Privateering in the First Half of the Dutch Revolt,

1568-1609,‖ in Exercise of Arms Warfare in the Netherlands (1568-1648), ed. Marco V. Hoeven (Leiden: Brill,

1997), 174-177; Hans Vogel. ―Arms Production and Exports in the Dutch Republic, 1600-1650,‖ in Exercise of

ArmsWarfare in the Netherlands(1568-1648), ed. Hoeven V. Marco (Leiden: Brill, 1997),197-210.

95

In the early modern world, European rulers viewed armstransfersfor the first timeas a

potentially significant instrument in continental power politics. Rebel groups benefitted from

the rulers‘ will to influence alliances and the outcome of battles by sending weapons and

troops, within and outside Europe.285

For example, during the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries the powerful Ottomans failed to impose their rule over the Druzes in Lebanon who

maintained self-autonomy (Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut). Abdul Rahim Abu Husayn explains that

Druzes acquired large quantities of firearms (thousands of muskets and gunpowder) from

European city-states in return for grain and other local products (the Ottomans blamed a

Damascene merchant for facilitating this trade). Therefore, at times their weapons were

superior to those used by the Ottomans.Venetians, who were frequently at war with the

Ottomans, and major arms producers, smuggled firearms from their base in Cyprus to the

Druzes and other Syrian rebels. The Druzes defeated a few Ottoman expeditions and the

central government in Istanbul failed to bring the Druze Mountain under strict administrative

and fiscal control. Abu Husayn argues that after the Turks conquered Cyprus in 1570 and

blocked the naval smuggling route to Lebanon, they could temporarily restore order and the

Druzes surrendered most of their weapons. During the seventeenth century, Tuscany

sponsored Druzes and other ethnic groups in Syria against the Ottomans by sendingweapons

shipments. The papacy gave specific permission for Christian governments to supply arms to

regions such as Syria to encourage rebels to rise against the Ottomans, and Christian

Maronites of Lebanon facilitated these connections.286

Irish revolts against British rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

demonstrated a major argument of the thesis that geography has always modified the arming

of NSAs including access to foreign aid.As Ireland was an island with few recources, Irish

rebelswere compelled to search repeatedly for foreign military support.Previously the Irish

fought with close-combat weapons together with bows and javelins while the English were

equipped with firearms.Scholars stressed the role of English sea power that could easily

reinforce their troops on Irish soil from nearby England and block Ireland from receiving

external support. The Irish attempted to neutralize their weaknesses with partial

285

David Held et al. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University

Press, 1999), 107. 286

Abu HusaynAbdul Rahim. ―Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria During the 16th and 17th

Centuries: The Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut,‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies 24, 4 (1992):

666-672; Abu Husayn Abdul Rahim,The View from Istanbul. Ottoman Lebanon and the Druze Emirate (Oxford:

Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2004), 14-23; Richard V. Leeuwen, Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon. The

Khazin Sheikhs and Maronite Church (1736-1840) (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 46.

96

success.287

Hugh O‘Neill, earl of Tyrone, the leader of the first revolt (known as The Nine

Years‘ War, 1594-1603), hired English and Spanish captains in the 1580s specifically to train

his ten thousand native troops in the use of muskets and claviers. He purchased firearms and

ammunition on a large scale in England and Scotland, as well as from fugitive soldiers and

corrupt officials in Ireland. O‘Neill‘s soldiers became a formidable force inflicting the worst

defeat suffered by an English army in Ireland (Battle of the Yellow Ford, 1598) and

controlling much of the country. Overconfident, the Irish met the English in open battle and

were crushed in 1601. Spain sent an expeditionary force of 3,500 men to Kinsale port, but the

Royal Navy prevented further Spanish reinforcements from reaching Tyrone or the Spanish

army in Kinsale, forcing the Spanish commander to surrender in early 1602 and return home.

O‘Neill surrendered in 1603 and the English established rule over the whole of Ireland for

more than three hundred years.288

During the Jacobite War (1689-1691) France sent eight major convoys to Ireland to

support James II‘s ambitious plan to recover his throne in Britain and Ireland. The French

navy shipped arms (rifles, swords, and gunpowder), soldiers, and money to their Jacobite

allies, improving the quality of the Irish army significantly. Britain failed to stop these

convoys and Catholic Ireland seemingly possessed the best chance of using foreign aid to

help achieve autonomy and religious freedom. Yet French support was inadequate; effective

firepower was limited to less than half the Irish infantry, and the French made no attempt to

harass the provision of supplies to the English forces from Britain, thus enabling the latter to

send an expedition across the Irish Sea that forced James and the French to depart for France

in 1691. Irish rebels were never able to convince their continental contacts to mount a really

committed attempt to alter the dynamics of English control over Ireland.289

287

Gam, Guerrillas, 8-9. 288

James, S. Wheeler. ―The Logistics of Conquest,‖ in Conquest and Resistance. War in the SeventeenthCentury

Ireland, ed. Lenihan Padraig (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 177-183; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Military

Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 33; Cyril E.

Black and Louis Dupree, Elizabeth Endicott-West, and Eden Naby. The Modernization of Inner Asia (New

York: East Gate Back, 1991), 55; Christopher Duffy,Siege Warfare. The Fortress in the Early Modern World

1494-1660 (London: Routledge, 1979), 144-145; Donal O‘Carroll. ―Change and Continuity in Weapons and

Tactics 1594-1691,‖ in Conquest and Resistance. War in the Seventeenth Century Ireland, ed. Lenihan Padraig

(Leiden: Brill, 2001). 289

Tadhg O' Hannrachain. ―The Strategic Involvement of Continental Powers in Ireland 1596-1691,‖ in Ireland

Conquest and Resistance. War in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Lenihan Padraig (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 44-49;

Wheeler, 199-207.

97

Early Colonialism and NSAs’ Armament

International trade is a prominent factor that explains the arming of NSAs in different time

periods. The decades between 1500 and 1750 witnessed a tremendous expansion of

commercial and cultural exchanges around the world. New long-distance sea routes linked

Europe with sub-Saharan Africa and the existing maritime networks of the Indian Ocean and

East Asia. Spanish and Portuguese voyages ended the isolation of the Americas and created

new webs of exchange in the Atlantic and Pacific. Overland expansion of Muslim, Russian,

and Chinese empires also increased global interaction. Such expansion implied new power

relations between European powers and native peoples. The people of the Old World were

coming to dominate the people of the New.290

Increasing use of firearms from the middle of

the fifteenth century facilitated the rise of European colonialism as most of the natives did not

possess firearms or refused to employ them. The Europeans saw the new military technology

as an opportunity for expansion and enjoyed remarkable military superiority over the

conquered peoples. The Spanish and Portuguese established vast territorial empires in South

and Central America, followed by the Dutch who struck first at the Portuguese overseas

empire, and British and French colonization of North America. Almost immediately, the

conquerors created new types of NSAs: Amerindians resisted tribute payment, revolted

against forced labor obligations, and objected to loss of land rightsand religious conversion.

Blacks brought from Africa resisted slavery. Initially they carried bows, spears and clubs

made of hard wood in the jungle, but colonial authorities were always able to reestablish

control.291

In a few cases NSAs were able to defend themselves, beating much stronger European

troops by using guerrilla tactics, but eventually they were defeated. Native NSAs‘ victories

were confined to the backwoods and could not endanger European empires‘ rule over the

New World as a whole.These events demonstrated, though on a very limited scale, how

rebellious NSAs could use the environment and other factors to neutralize their technological

inferiority. They hinted at the dialectic character of colonialism: colonialism also facilitated

290

RichardW. Bulliet et al., The Earth and its Peoples. A Global History. 3th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 2005), 445. 291

Elgood, Firearms,188-189; Gam, Guerrillas,11;Hess, Forgotten Frontier,117-118; Michael F. Brown and

Eduardo Fernandez, War of Shadows. The Struggle for Utopia in the Peruvian Amazon (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1991), 38, 40.

98

proliferation of firearms among natives‘ NSAs by different mechanisms.292

The remarkable

worldwide expansion of the global economy that began in the wake of the voyages of

discovery facilitated the distribution of weapons. The trade boom of the early-Modern World

derived from the soaring demand for Southeast Asian spices; and the arms trade was part of

this commerce. Arms trade with native peoples was part of mercantile economic doctrine. In

their vigorous contest for control of the lucrative furtrade on the Pacific coast of North

America, European powers supplied plenty of weapons to their Amerindian allies from the

first half of seventeenth century. European traders, who ignoreda stateorder not to sell

weapons to the natives, purchased rifles from factories such as those in Amsterdam and

Liege, shipped them to North America and moved inland with canoes laden with guns to the

rich fur fields that yielded their bounty. French, English, Spanish and Dutch distributed

weapons to Indians with little regard for the day when these weapons would be turned upon

the independentUnited States, though they could not check the influx of settlers who drove

them westward (Russell estimated that the French armed Amerindians with 200,000 muskets

over more than a hundred years). Arms trade with the Indians was an integral part of

European expansion and mercantile economy. Therefore, when New France ceased to exist

(1760), the flow of French guns to the Indians of America came to an end.293

European expansion in the New World relied on native forces. Thousands of blacks

participated in the English conquest of the settlements ofAmerica, consequently being

exposed to modern weapons. European countries established production facilities for arms in

the colonies (Spain, for example, built ships and produced cannons in the Philippines) or

exported vast quantities of weapons to the colonies that could be captured by rebels. In some

colonies local craftsmen had become very skillful in the production of firearms.294

Maroons were enslaved Africans and their descendants in the Americas who fled from

bondage and fought a long series of wars to maintain their freedom in the very earliest days

of European settlement and slavery. The maroons established hundreds of runaway

communities throughout the New World. Although small in number (they ranged from a few

people to more than a thousand) and in their operations, Maroon communities were among

292

Carl P. Russell, Guns on the early Frontiers. A History of Firearms from Colonial Times through the Years of

the Western Fur Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 11-23, 42-49. 293

Jiu-Hwa L. Upshur et al. World History. Since 1500: The Age of Global Integration. Vol. 2 (Boston:

Wadsworth, 2005), 612, 627, 628. 294

Elgood,Firearms, 188-189; Hess, Forgotten Frontier, 117-118; Brown, Wars, 38,40; John F. Guilmartin,

Gunpowder and galleys: changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the 16th century (London:

Cassel, 2002), 135-134; Bulliet et al., Earth, 445, 447, 489, 493.

99

the first Americans to renew resistance to colonial domination after the initial conquest of the

Americas, striving for independence and defining the experience of freedom. Maroonage was

a common phenomenon in all parts of the western hemisphere where slavery was practised

wherever large expanses of inaccessible and uninhabited terrain permitted, as in the rough

and rugged mountains of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, or the equatorial forest and

marshlands of Suriname, or the marshlands of Oklahoma, Virginia, or Texas in the North

America colonies. Colonialist governments barred slaves from using or carrying weapons

(though it was unenforceable) while acquisition of arms was vital for the Maroons‘

struggle.295

Actually, armed slaves were the rule rather than the exception because masters

readily armed their trusted slaves to protect their interests whereas colonial government could

not control the diffusion of weapons among slaves (and the civilian population in general).

Jamaica‘s Maroons acquired iron weapons and guns by theft and raiding white settlements.

Goucher and Agorsah‘s archeological research of Maroon and Maroon-related sites across

the island of Jamaica revealed that Maroons even refashioned and repaired the guns obtained.

Maroon communities had a rich iron-smithing tradition and maroon blacksmiths

manufactured cutlasses and lead shot. Also every man, woman, and child reportedly carried

an iron hoe. The authors state that despite the fact that enslaved Africans arrived in shackles,

the historical archaeology of Maroons has demonstrated that iron technology was at the heart

of their resistance, empowerment and survival.296

Therefore, Genovese claims that Jamaica‘s

maroons illustrated a powerful community, powerful enough to force European powers such

as the British in Jamaica in 1738 into formal peace treaties designed to pacify the interior

while recognizing the freedom and autonomy of the rebels.297

The Palmares of Pernambuco were black slaves who escaped the sugar plantations

along the fertile coast of northeast Brazil and established an African kingdom in the interior,

the largest of its kind, numbering 6,000-10,000 people. They maintained their independence

throughout most of the seventeenth century defeating Dutch and then Portuguese mounted

expeditions using guerrilla tactics, partly because of their armament. They traded gold and

295

Goucher Candice and Kofi Agorsah. ―Excavating the Roots of Resistance: The Significance of Maroons in

Jamaican Archaeology,‖ in Out of Many, One People. The Historical Archaeology of Colonial Jamaica, eds.,

James A. Delle, Hauser W. Mark and Douglas V. Armstrong (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama

Press, 2011), 145-147. 296

HendrikKraay. ―Arming Slaves in Brazil from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth Century,‖ in

Arming Slaves from Classical Times to the Modern Age, eds.,Christopher L. Brown and Philip, D. Morgan (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 152-154; Stuart B.Schwartz, ed. Early Brazil. A Documentary Collection

to 1800 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 265. 297

Eugene D. Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution. Afro-American Revolts in the Making of the Modern

World. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 51-53, 65-66.

100

silver for firearms with the urban European colonialists (moradores), and manufactured

weapons (gunpowder) since they had the technology and their environment was rich in

metals and nitrate. Genovese argues that sometimes these trade relations prevailed even

during wartime between whites and Maroon colonies. Later, coffee-plantation slaves plotting

a revolt in the interior of Rio de Janeiro managed to acquire a great quantity of gunpowder in

barrels with the aid of peddlers who made the purchases.298

In 1609 the Spanish recruited black, mulatto and Indian archers to fight against

Yanga‘s maroons in Mexico, while the Portuguese army that defeated the Palmares in 1695

contained many Indians. Colonial empires militarized Indian tribes, Maroons and African

slaves, mainly in times of crisis and employed them as freed militia-men or volunteers in

auxiliary units of national armies that bravely defended colonies against internal and external

threats. That was another mechanism for arms diffusion in the colonies. Spanish authorities in

Florida armed slaves who escaped the newly settled English colony of Carolina and in 1728

sent the ―new Christians‖ back northward on guerrilla raids against the fledgling plantations

of the English. African slaves in Havana formed an artillery company that served in the royal

army. Against this background were the economic interests and limited personal resources of

the European colonialists. European officials demonstrated a racial pragmatism in the face of

necessity, but their ad-hoc partners could soon turn their weapons against them,

demonstrating a persistent principle in the history of conflicts between states and NSAs.299

NSAs’ Arming in the Wake of the French Revolution and Napoleonic

Period

The French Revolution and Napoleon‘s conquests introduced in Europe and the Americas a

new type of NSA, national-NSA. Romantic nationalism had spread everywhere; peoples who

lived in relatively contiguous states encompassing relatively homogeneous ethnic groups

developed a national identity; they had become members of a nation, they felt a sense of

belonging. The rise of national ideas intensified militant national-NSAs who were committed

to liberating their fatherland from foreign rule, often associated with demands for political,

298

Kraay, Arming Slaves,153; R. K. Kent, ―Palmares: An African State in Brazil,‖ Journal of African History 6,

2 (1965): 161-175; Genovese, Rebellion, 51-53, 65-66. 299

Genovese, Rebellion, 60-81; Jane Landers, ―Transforming Bondsmen into Vassals: Arming Slaves in

Colonial Spanish America,‖ in Arming Slaves from Classical Times to the Modern Age, eds. Christopher, L.

Brown and Philip, D. Morgan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 125-137.

101

economic and social reforms. Colonial populations throughout the Americas became more

aware of separate national identities and were more aggressive in asserting local interests

against the will of distant monarchs. By the 1790s, the wealthiest and most influential sectors

of Spain‘s colonial society had come to view the Spanish Empire as an impediment to

prosperity and growth, while American settlers resented the English Crown‘s ambitious

campaign to establish greater control over the colonies, increasing tax burdens and forced

military mobilization for imperial wars. The growing wealth and contacts with the rest of the

world made colonial societies the center of smuggling, including arms.300

The New World‘s

rebels had more opportunities to obtain weapons from long distant allies due to developments

in maritime transportation. Outcomes of national-NSAs struggles against repressive

monarchical regimes both in the Old and New World, were influenced largely by the ability

of rebels to mobilize Great Powers‘ military support, otherwise they were easily defeated.

National-NSA arming efforts featured growing involvement of ethnic diasporas that sent

money and arms to rebel groups. Early eighteenth century NSAs enjoyed a new type of

external support. Along with mercenaries, NSAs‘ force buildup was facilitated by volunteers

who joined the rebels. Thus, the great powers could support rebel groups indirectly by

approving trade with the latter and sending volunteers.301

Half a centurybefore theNapoleonic Wars, books began to appear on the subject of

―small wars‖ or guerrilla operations, such as Denis Davidov, ―On Guerrilla Warfare‖ and

George Valentini, ―What Kind of Training.‖Ellis notes that it is remarkable that during the

years when the theory of tactics and of grand operations was pushed toextremes, irregular

warfare for the first time became a common concern of military thinkers. Following the anti-

Napoleonic struggle from 1796 to 1814 in Italy, Spain, Germany, and Russia military

thinkers in Europe addressed the subject of guerrilla warfare and small wars as a means of

national liberation from foreign occupation.302

They regarded NSA military activity as an

inherent minor part of a conventional war, consisting of light, mobile and semi-independent

troops (often cavalry) who fought in advanced posts. The guerrillas were subordinated to the

regular armies, tasked with commando and intelligence types of missions such as attacks on

on the enemy‘s rear, night raids on enemy posts, interception of the enemy supply lines,

recruitment of spies, and kidnapping enemy personnel. They were always operating on the

300

Bulliet, Earth, 495-497. 301

Dennis P.Hupchick, The Balkans from Constantinople to Communism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 189-

201;Bulliet, Earth, 495-497

302 Ellis, Barrel, 57.

102

flank of the grand armies, assisting the latter by distressing the enemy; their object was not

any great operation to crush the forces of the enemy in the field. 303

Military theoreticians of the early nineteenth century associated guerrilla warfare and

small wars with the theme of people‘s war. Henri Jomini, for instance, regarded the latter as a

spontaneous uprising of a nation against a foreign occupant.304

They addressed the right of

the people to rise up against an enemy to sustain their independence, but they were very

suspicious of the spontaneous and uncontrolled actions that were involved. Also, they mainly

analyzed the operational aspects of people‘s wars, strategic goals of the guerrilla, relations

between partisans and the local population, and partisans‘ required traits. In this discourse

neither the logistic needs of the guerrillas nor their armament played a significant

role.305

Jomini addressed a significant element in maritime arms smuggling which is still

relevant today: ―the control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a national

invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and are masters of the sea or in alliance

with a power which controls it, their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of

the facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all the points he may

occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will be thrown in the way of his procuring

supplies by sea.‖ NSAs that enjoy access to the sea could run a steady flow of military

supply, necessary for maintaining a longstanding struggle against a stronger invader.306

The Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz – probably one of the greatest military

thinkers in the last two hundred years – wrote the most influential and valuable On War. He

discussed in a short chapter the idea of people‟s war which is a means of fighting against an

enemy by arming the people. Like his contemporaries, he regarded partisans as part of regular

forces, helping them to defend the country against an invader. The arming of the people by

the state-army is a legitimate part of war and all forces should be coordinated by a single

strategy. Accordingly, people‘s war is useful for limited purposes and under specific

conditions – as a last resort after a defeat or as a natural auxiliary before a decisive battle. Nor

should it involve conventional operations otherwise the enemy will crush it and the defeat

303

Laqueur, Guerrilla, 65, 81, 117; Miller T. Maguire, Guerilla or Partisan Warfare (London: Hugh Rees,

1904), 15; Denis Davidov. ―On Guerrilla Warfare,‖ in The Guerrillah Reader. A Historical Anthology, ed.

Walter Laqueur (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 53-58; Denis Davidov, In the service of the tsar

against Napoleon: the memoirs of Denis Davidov, 1806-1814 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 84-85, 92-96. 304

Henri A. Jomini. ―National Wars,‖ in The Guerrillah Reader. A Historical Anthology, ed. Walter Laqueur

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 41. 305

Natali A. David. ―Carlo Bianco and the Radical Origin of the Resorgimento.‖ PhD diss, University of

Columbia, 1972;Laqueur, Guerrilla, 65, 81,117. 306

Henri A. Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 30.

103

could cause severe moral consequences.307

Clausewitz explained that opponents of people‘s

war see it as a ―revolutionary means, a state of anarchy… which is as dangerous as a foreign

enemy.‖ 308

Thus, military historians and scholars hardly wrote on NSAs and their military

skills until the eighteenth century. They were very interested in force execution and readiness

while hardly discussing the design of the force.

On the ground, the arming of rebellious NSAs featuredinstability. Serbs revolted in

1804 in reaction to the arbitrary and anarchistic rule of the local Ottoman governor of

Belgrade and his Janissary garrison. Their military commander, Petrovic Karaddjordje, was

deeply connected to Habsburg border Serbs. Serbian rebels, largely dependent upon captured

weapons and unreliable foreign help were able to maintain control of the Serbian countryside

and in 1806 they seized Belgrade employing forty cannons that they plundered from the

Turks and procured in Austria through a local merchant. Although the Habsburg government

did not support Serbian actions, Habsburg territory was a safe haven for the rebels who

smuggled volunteers and weapons across the Danube.309

In 1810 Russia waged war against

Turkey and provided weapons, ammunition and military advice to Serbian rebels. With

Russian assistance victory seemed at hand for the Serbs, but events in Europe dashed Serbian

hopes. Faced with the imminence of a French invasion in 1812, Czar Alexander Inow wished

to sign a definitive peace treaty with the Ottomans to free his troops to meet the new attack.

Russian forces withdrew from Serbia and the Serbians were left to fend for themselves. In

1813 the uprising was stifled temporarily when the Turks re-entered Belgrade and

Karaddjordje fled the empire for safety among the Habsburg border Serb community.310

Greek revolt against the Ottomans erupted in 1821 and gained strong support from

European public opinion. From an early stage the revolt was characterized by dramatic

international involvement and support by the Greek diaspora (mainly merchants). Private

volunteers –some of them with militarycapabilities– came from all parts of Europe, lightly

armed, and the Great Powers, mainly Russia, claimed to be the protector of the Orthodox

population of the empire. Jelavich argues that outside intervention was to be more influential

in determining the final outcome than were the actions of the Greek leaders themselves. By

307

Carl V. Clausewitz, On War(London: David Campbell, 2000), 578-583. 308

Carl V. Clausewitz. ―People‘s War,‖ in The Guerrillah Reader. A Historical Anthology, ed. Walter

Laqueur(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 31. 309

David Norris, Belgrade: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 30. 310

Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 1977), 27-37;MichaelBroers, Napoleon‟s Other War. Bandits, Rebels and their

Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions (Witney, UK: Peter Lang, 2010), 179.

104

1822 the rebels controlled many islands that became logistic centers.311

Commercial Greeks

secured a steady trickle of supplies; supportive Greek communites in West and Central

Europe sent volunteers, guns, cannons, gunpowder, uniforms, food and money by ship from

Marseilles. The poet Lord Byron departed Genoa in 1823 for Greece, aboard a ship heavily

equipped with weapons and other goods, and American aid organizations also sent weapons.

Later, American and French shipyards constructed a few armed ships for the revolutionary

Greek government that raised big loans in London to finance the purchase. External support

was critical since the Greeks‘ moderate trade in arms and production of gunpowder

wassufficient for traditional local guerrilla warfare rather than for establishing a regular army

that could defeat the Ottomans. Siege artillery was almost entirely lacking. The pieces

brought to Greece by certain foreigners were far too few and of insufficient caliber for

breaching massive Turkish fortresses. Moreover, the Greek revolution lacked a strong leader,

was disunited and socially divided. The revolt was threatened with collapse by the much

stronger Egyptian-Turkish armies until the intervention of the Great Powers (Russia, Britain

and France) that won the naval Battle of Navarino in 1827. Greece gained independence in

1832.312

Wars of Independence in North and South America featured NSAs with a new profile.

Britain and Spain failed to suppress more sophisticated well-funded NSAs than they were

used to contest elsewhere. These NSAs employed complicated smuggling networks, well

connected in Europe and exploited the growing trans-Atlantic trade for gun-running. They

were not poor native bands carrying spears and some rifles but professional military

organizations that previously served in colonial armies. It was much harder for the European

powers to block the Atlantic coasts. American NSAs closely analyzed the geo-strategy of

America and exploited the disadvantages of their powerful foes.313

The thesis focuses on the arming of American rebels because the American

Revolution was a pioneer in using new arming methods that later became dominant

worldwide. The American Revolutionary movement was built top-down including its arming

apparatus. Congress, its committees and formal officials led the smuggling activity even

311

Jelavich, 38-52; William St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free. The Philhellenes in the War of

Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 287, 291. 312

Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833 (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1973), 70-72, 166-172; Keith Pomakoy, Helping Humanity: American Policy and Genocide Rescue (Plymouth:

Lexington Books, 2011), 27. 313

Charles Rappleye, Robert Morris. Financier of the American Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster,

2010), 36, 47, 68.

105

before the war against the British erupted, featuring semi-institutionalized patterns such as

labor division among the activists who were involved in arming activity, working under

regulations, and accountability of the activists who were involved in the arms smuggling.

Congress issued a specific requisition for the rebels‘ army, namely gunpowder, weapons, and

general military equipment. The Committee of Safety followed by the Secret Committee for

Trade (members shared a mercantile background), acted on the orders of the Congress to

build American force by obtaining weapons and ammunition. The American Revolution

demonstrated how rebel organizations and formal institutions associated with entrepreneurs

to facilitate smuggling of large numbers of weapons. American privateers played a vital role

in gun-running for the patriots, emphasizing more than ever before, the strong connection

between armament of rebels and economic activity. Their role affirmed Karras‘ image of

smugglers as ―free traders‖, people who were committed to exchange without any restrictions

whatsoever.314

The Patriots lacked the resources to manufacture the materials necessary to wage war,

especially gunpowder. In 1774 the British banned the export of gunpowder, arms or

ammunition from Britain to the colonies. The Patriots seized gunpowder in daring raids on

British garrisons but their stocks were exhausted within the first nine months of the conflict.

With no navy and no formal foreign alliance, weapons were obtained through the enterprise

of private merchants. Robert Morris, one of the founding fathers of the United States, was the

principal actor in supplying powder to the American war effort (1775-1778). Morris‘ firm

secretly purchased weapons abroad through an international network of trade-partners,

captains, and through other merchants under contract to the Secret Committee. American

ships were often loaded with tobacco, flour and other goods to trade for the weapons. This

was risky business, a combination of espionage and arms smuggling under the nose of British

consuls in foreign ports and warships cruising the high seas. Personal contacts were the

primary and often the sole consideration.315

Morris and his partners employed any form of

subterfuge they could devise to ensure a cargo would get through: false papers for ships, false

sailing orders, false cargo registers, and transfer of cargo between two ships on the open sea.

American merchants roamed Europe and the West Indies to find entrepreneurs willing and

able to assemble return cargoes of contraband gunpowder and arms.Many ships were

314

Rappleye, Robert Morris, 36, 47, 68. 315

Rappleye, Robert Morris, 36-49.

106

captured (some crewmen were British spies), but many more got through as the British could

not completely block the American coast.316

The Secret Committee employed sophisticated techniques to acquire weapons, such as

using a network of agents empowered to handle funds and cargoes, and to manage contacts

with foreign suppliers. Some of these agents were based in America; others were sent to

foreign ports. All reported to Morris. An Italian citizen, for instance, handled transshipment

of munitions from Europe through neutral ports in the Caribbean, and mixed private and

public cargoes on the same vessel as a mask. Rappleye stresses that Morris‘ relationships

with his partners and agents were dual, public-private, thus had potential for conflict of

interest. Morris and his trade partners worked simultaneously forthe American nation and for

their own interest. Therefore, after the war ended Morris prevailed in a series of

interrogations by Congress, and a final one in 1790 stated that ―there will be no accusation

against Morris, but no exoneration either.‖ 317

The rebels‘ arms smuggling followed many years of illicit trade between merchants in

American colonies and the French Caribbean. O‘Shaughnessy claimed that money knew no

patriotism in the smuggling business of this region since British naval officers had sold

weapons at St. Eustatia, which were sometimes resold to the patriots in North America; some

British customs officials ignored trade laws or accepted bribes, and British merchants in

Jamaica were also involved in smuggling gunpowder to North America for profit (Congress

encouraged merchants to estimate a generous price for gunpowder and arms).The Secret

Committee also enlisted American, Irish and French privateers who seized weapons from

British supply ships on the high seas. American agents in Paris employed these bands while

the British accused the vessels‘captains of taking bribes from the Americans to surrender

their ships.318

The Patriots also used the Dutch free port of St.Eustatia, located in the West Indies

near the islands of other European powers. It was a grand market for both civilian and

military goods. The trade included the sale of guns, powder, rifles and ammunition, often

purchased by Dutch firms from France and Belgium. After France‘s entry into the war St.

316

Rappleye, Morris, , 52-58,82, 104-105; John W. Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots. Boston Merchants and the

Adventof the American Revolution (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 237-239; Andrew J.

O‘Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided. The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 213. 317

Rappleye, Morris, 55-56, 81, 173-197, 480-481, 521. 318

O‘Shaughnessy, Empire Divided, 62-64, 216-219,227.

107

Eustatia became a major source of supplies for the North Americans and the French. The

British believed that the French and Americans were only able to sustain the war because of

the supplies they had received from St. Eustatia. Therefore, the British forces occupied the

island in 1781 and confiscated plenty of weapons though it was only a tactical victory. In

addition, a business partner of Morris enjoyed close ties with the French authorities in

Martinique, and made the port the premier venue for selling off captured ships and

cargoes.America‘s procurement network proved to be flexible, refundable and sustainable.319

The Patriots gained military support from France that was critical to balance the

British military superiority, and without French support the War of Independence might

never have been won. In February 1778, France signed two treaties with the United States – a

commercial agreement, and a military alliance pledged to American independence.From 1776

France provided arms (muskets, cannons) and ammunition to the Patriots through a joint

intelligence operation. French and American agents established a commercial trading firm as

a cover for the secret French aid. They used French merchants to procure ships; they

mobilized commission privateers, recruited French seamen, and purchased French weapons

that were declared ―surplus‖ for that purpose. The French navy convoyed vessels engaged in

Franco-American commerce. France sent naval reinforcements and an army to America.

Benjamin Franklin, one of the founding fathers of the American Revolution and a colleague

of Morris in the Secret Committee, was a commissioner to the court of France (1776-1785).

Well connected to local nobility, Franklin played a significant role in bringing France to

support the new republic of the United States.320

Spain supplied arms and gunpowder to the rebels in Virginia throughits colony in

New Orleans and the Spanish ports of Havana. A New Orleans American agent under the

cover of local businessmen liaised between the Spanish and the Patriots. The consignments

were shipped into the Mississippi under the Spanish flag, and thwarted British plans to

capture Fort Pitt. Spanish military support helped the George Rogers Clark expedition to

capture Kaskaskia and Vincennes.321

The arming activity of the rebels in South America demonstrated a different type of

external support. The rebels were assisted by foreigners whose governments turned a blind

319

Rappleye, Morris, 76, 102-103; O‘Shaughnessy, Empire Divided, 183-200, 214-217. 320

Gordon S. Wood, The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 183-

200; Rappleye, Morris, 83-84, 101. 321

Rappleye, Morris, 83-84, 101.

108

eye; it was a semi-governmental support that can be found today too. General Simon Bolivar,

the Liberator, conducted a successful war against Spanish rule in South America from 1811

to 1826 because he secured a flow of weapons from overseas. The republican army

(consisting of American-born Spaniards, Indians and slaves) seized Spanish weapons, as in

1816 when they captured fourteen Spanish war vessels with 73 cannons, 3,300 muskets and

other military equipment. Yet, Bolivar could conduct a lengthy war and established a

professional army modeled on military institutions in Europe, mainly because he managed to

gain military support from friendly states. In 1815 he went into exile in Jamaica and Haiti

after being defeated in New Granada. He associated with President Petion of independent

Haiti who provided him with weapons (6,000 rifles) and ammunition, naval transport and a

sizeable sum of money. Bolivar argued that Petion‘s support gave him the means to continue

the fight. In late 1816 he returned to Venezuela and re-organized his army. 322

Bolivar acquired plenty of armaments to campaign again into Venezuela,overcoming

the powerful Spanish expedition. He sought the support of the British government and used

British public opinion and his own contacts for the acquisition of weapons.Bolivar knew

Europe as he had traveled widely during the Napoleonic Wars. In 1817 he appointed an agent

in London who interacted with the Foreign Office. The British government policy regarding

the war in South America was one of neutrality, but actually British authorities supported

Bolivar: British loans financed Bolivar‘s war which in turn allowed him to employ available

British troops and officers returning home from Waterloo, and to purchase ships and

weapons. In less than two and a half years some 5,500 volunteers would leave Britain and

Ireland for South America, along with quantities of war-surplus arms, clothing, and other

supplies which Britain was only too happy to sell off. In 1819 a second British Legion

arrived, containing 2,172 veterans, an artillery brigade equipped with howitzers, and large

supplies of spare weapons. Lynch argues that between 1817 and 1822 the rebels shipped from

Britain 50,000 rifles and muskets, hundreds of tons of lead and powder, artillery, lances,

cutlasses, swords, sabres and pistols. Bolivar claimed that the British expedition upgraded the

operational capabilities of his troops, and he was rarely without a British or Irish advisor.323

British merchants in Guyana traded hardware, arms and munitions in exchange for cattle and

other products from the rebels. Bolivar‘s right-hand man was a rich Dutch merchant and

322

Richard W. Slatta , Simon Bolivar‟s Quest for Glory (Austin: Texas University Press, 2003), 158; John

Lynch, Simon Bolivar. A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 97; Terry Hooker and Ron

Poulter,The Armies of Bolivar and San Martin (London: Osprey, 1991), 20. 323

Hooker and Poulter, Armies, 7-9; Lynch, Simon Bolivar, 98,103, 124-126.

109

admiral who was employed outfitting ships at the logistic and operational service of the

patriots. The flow of weapons enabled the rebels to move operations to the offensive in the

heartland of Venezuela in mid-1817. Spain could not block the long coasts of South America,

nor could it force the British government to maintain its policy of neutrality. Spain failed to

intercept both the force buildup and force maintenance of Bolivar‘s army: Hooker and

Poulter quote a contemporary foreign observer who was astonished how Bolivar got so much

money and everything necessary to equip a large army from this ―depleted country‖.

Alongside San Martin who liberated Argentina, Chile and Peru, Bolivar achieved the

destruction of the Spanish American empire by 1826. For a few years he was the dictator of

the newly established Gran Colombia that contained Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia),

Ecuador, and Panama.324

The Rise of the Nation-State and its Implication for NSAs’ Arming

Sectarian NSAs and their weaponry

The rise of the nation-state since the late-eighteenth century and the territorial expansions of

contemporary countries created sectarian-NSAs, chiefly ethnic and religious groups who

belonged to sovereign states but sustained autonomous identities. The concept of people who

share the same territory, culture, language, and are ruled by the same government, enabled

different social categories to share a national identity. But in some countries, mainly those

established as multi-nationals,nation-building failed to create a collective identity resulting in

considerable tension between citizenship and nationalism. The majority group discriminated

against the minorities; sectarian identities and cleavages destabilized the nation-states

creating constant sources of political conflict and violence. Political division and civil wars

within new nation-states sometimes provided an opportunity for long-pacified native peoples

to rebel. For example, after independence, new national governments in the Western

Hemisphere were generally weaker than the colonial governments they replaced. In debates

over tariffs, tax and monetary policies, and in many nations, slavery and the slave trade, as

well as the role of the Catholic Church, some social groups were willing to lead secessionist

324

Lynch, Simon Bolivar, 98,103, 124-126; Hooker and Poulter, Armies, 7-9; Judith Ewell.―Bolivar Atlantic

World Diplomacy,‖ in Simon Bolivar. Essays on the Life and Legacy of the Liberator, eds. David Bushnell and

Lester D. Langley (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 38, 45, 53.

110

movements or to provoke civil war rather than accept laws that threatened their interests.

Often, new states used overwhelming military force to crush sectarian resistance. 325

Against the background of the modern state, not only did sectarian NSAs confront

larger national armies armed with modern weapons; they faced significant obstacles to

acquire weapons. Modern states enforced a monopoly over military force; they imposed

border controls, secured maritime sovereignty, and regulated arms trade. Governments

initiated new laws to disarm minority groups. Thus, sectarian NSAs often possessed lesser

resources and logistic capabilities, which compelled them tobe self-reliant and engage in

cross-border arms trade. Border areas played an important role in sectarian-NSAs‘ smuggling

activity. These groups resided in remote and boundary regions where government authority

was weaker, sometimes non-existent. International borders, sometimes artificially created

rather than representing the demographic picture, could be easily crossed, and rebels could

contact and intrigue with arms traders and fellow ethnic groups.326

In 1893, in the town of Canudos in the northeastern interior state of Bahia in Brazil,

local people, armed with mainly machetes, axes and lances, revolted against the

discriminating policies of the republic‘s government. They captured firearms including

cannons from the defeated state‘s expeditions (gunpowder they had bought in the

neighborhood or manufactured themselves). They employed guerrilla tactics against an

enemy with superior weapons and technology. Yet, in 1899 the rebels were defeated and

massacred by a powerful federal expedition. 327

In 1840 the Ladino people of the Yucatan Peninsula in southeast Mexico (creoles and

mestizos) began fighting the central government for their independence. To succeed, they

armed the Mayans, who formed the bottom layerof Mexican society, and organized them into

militias. Prior to this time the Indians were forbidden to use firearms. In 1847 the Mayans

rose up against the social-economic abuse imposed on them by the Spanish-Mexicans. Often

they proved no match for the well-armed government army in open battle, but they waged

effective guerrilla war (ambushes and raids) using the vast virgin forest as a main element of

defence. They continued to fight for many years mainly because they secured supplies of

325

Bulliet et al., Earth, 639-649, 747; Shmuel Sandler, The Nation-State. Introduction to International Relations

(Tel Aviv: The Open University Press, 1999), 21-29; Borough Kimmerling, State and Society: The Sociology of

Politics, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Open University Press, 1995), 150-154 (Hebrew), 326

Laqueur, Guerrilla, 61. 327

; Colin M. McLachlan, A History of Modern Brazil. The Past against the Future (Washington, DE: Scholarly

Resources Inc., 2003), 50-53.

111

weapons and ammunition across the border in Belize (British Honduras). Reed noted that the

first move of the Mayans was to send one of their commanders south with all the money they

could raise, to buy arms from the English in Belize.328

Mostly, they traded goods they

harvested (tobacco, cattle, wood, animal skins sugar cane, and honey) or stole for lead,

gunpowder and rifles with merchants in Belize, Englishmen, Blacks, and refugee Ladino of

Yucatan. Mayan rebels decreased their operations during the planting season unless they

could pay in cash, and increased their activity when gunpowder became more plentiful.

Rugeley provides accounts about traders from Belize, visiting the Mayan capital bringing

gunpowder which they sold to the chiefs. The Yucatan government requested that British ban

the sale of war supplies to the Mayans who smuggled the goods via rivers in the jungle. The

British regarded the Indians as legitimate trade partners arguing that Britain was neutral.329

The Yucatan army attempted to deprive the Mayans of access to Belize by building

outposts and garrisons deep in the jungle, employing patrol canoes upstream, clearing trees,

and constructing barricades, with limited success. To reach their suppliers, the rebels used

different routes, some of them dotted with islands and swampy inlets that gave concealment,

though it was a risky business. In 1893 Mexico signed a peace treaty with Britain that dealt

with the ―pacification‖ of the Maya along the border with Belize. Britain agreed to prohibit

the supply of arms and ammunition to the Maya and to prevent the Maya in Belize from

raiding Mexican territory. The treaty facilitated the counterinsurgency campaign of Yucatan‘s

army against the Maya. The rebels had been gradually encircled by sea, isolated from English

supplies, and put under pressure from the west. By 1901 the revolt was largely suppressed,

demonstrating a major argument of the thesis that securing international borders is a

precondition of counter smuggling.330

When the power difference between the stronger state and the sectarian NSA was

great, arming efforts by the NSA could make no difference, merely postponing the final

outcome of the conflict. For instance, Indian uprisings against their resettlement by the U.S.

government greatly depended on securing military support of foreign countries, directly or

through arms trade. During the American Revolution and until the mid-nineteenth century the

British and to a lesser extent, the Spanish encouraged Indian tribes to fight the Americans to

328

Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 55, 68, 72-73, 125-131. 329

Robert L. Scheina, Latin America‟s Wars. The Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.:

Brassey‘s, Inc., 2003), 369-373; Terry Rugeley,Maya Wars: Ethnographic Accounts from Nineteenth-

centuryYucatán(Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 2001). 330

Nigel O.Bolland, Colonialism and Resistance in Belize: Essays in Historical Sociology(Belize: Cubola

Productions, 2003), 110; Reed, 124, 131, 240-242.

112

keep their lands. They encouraged the Indians to form military confederations, and supplied

arms and ammunition through trade posts, for example to the Cherokees who lived in

Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Miami tribe from Ohio. At the outbreak of the Revolution,

British agents and traders, operating among the Indians, encountered little or no difficulty in

delivering guns to Indian towns. They also used Canada as a supply base of arms to

encourage Indian resistance. With the end of the Anglo-American War (1812-1815), the

British abandoned their interest in an Indian state in accordance with the treaty they had

signed with the United States, and in few years ceased supplyingarms to the Indians.331

In this

context, the Creek War (1813-1814) commenced after a group of Alabama militiaman

attacked an Indian convoy that returned from a secret trip to Florida where they acquired

weapons from a British trading firm and the Spanish governor. A British fleet off the coast

sent arms and ammunition to Pensacola and other Spanish ports in Florida. When the British

and Spanish left Florida the Creeks had neither weapons nor allies. That implied an end for

the Indians in the southern trans-Appalachian frontier.Eventually, Amerindians were forced

to lay down their weapons, leave their lands and relocate to reservations in the West.

Following the end of the conflicts,the American government prohibited trade connections

between Indians and any other foreign power.332

Yet, the U.S. policy was to arm the Indians

(for hunting and self-defence) through private contractors and manufacturers. The

distribution of weapons among the Indians since the seventeenth century demonstrated how

arming of NSAs had diverse meanings as a result of different historical contexts, starting with

the fur trade, then enlisting Natives‘ support during the European wars, and eventually U.S.

strategy regarding the Indians. 333

In China, the people of the border province of Yunnan, mostly Hui (Muslim) were

traditionally discriminated against and faced poverty and harassment by the Qingcourt that

increasingly distrusted them. In 1856 Qing officials promoted a full-scale massacre

conducted by Han militia armed with government weapons, aiming to cleanse Yunnan of the

Hui. More than 10,000 people were slaughtered (the Kunming Massacre). Muslim

Yunnanese frustration atthe state authority‘s reluctance to defend them against Han violence

resulted in the eruption of a fully-fledged rebellion against Qing rule (the Panthay Rebellion

331

Nancy Ward, Cherokee Chieftain Dragging Canoe. Chickamauga War Chief (Johnson City, TN: The

Overmountain Press, 1978), 59-62, 82; Jacob Burnet, Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western

Territory (North Stratfor: Ayer Publishing, 1975), 164-165. 332

Jane E. Dysart. ―Indians in Colonial Pensacola,‖ in Archaeology of Colonial Pensacola, ed. Judith A. Bense

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 78-80. 333

Henry S. Halbert and Timothy A. Ball, The Creek War of 1813 and 1815 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama

Press, 1995), 126-139; Russell, Guns, 50-61, 132-135.

113

of August 1856). The rebels acquired arms and ammunition from Burma, a nation that was

under increasing British control (since 1824) through Burmese Muslim traders. Trade

networks, often illicit, bound Yunnan to Burma, exploiting the ill-defined border.334

Atwill

argues that England sold arms to the Burmese who in turn sold them to the rebels. Indian

traders who followed the British conquest of Burma might have been involved in this arms

trade. The leader of the revolt, Du Wenxiu, realized that Britain and France might be

powerful allies against the Qing, and sent his adopted son to Queen Victoria to obtain aid

from England but he was turned down. The Chinese forces, set free by the ending of the

Taiping rebellion and armed with modern French weapons, subdued the revolt with great

ferocity in 1873.335

Collapse of central government in China enabled sectarian NSAs to acquire weapons

as they do today in failed countries. For example, through the last decades of the eighteenth

century and the first decades of the nineteenth, scarcely a year passed without violent protest

or armed rebellion. The imperial government gradually lost control of large areas that were in

the hands of rebel groups. Against this background, rebels in China could easily take up arms

and Gray observes that the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) was the greatest of many

outbreaks. Taiping was a Chinese religious-based domestic uprising with ethnic – Han versus

Manchu – overtones. The Taiping Rebellion demonstrated how rebels exploited internal

weakness to gain weapons. External forces influenced the outcomes of this conflict between

the state and NSA, including the arming of both sides.336

The majority of the Taiping were

armed with no more than short and long spears and a knife or sometimes a sword – all locally

produced. Some substituted a polearm, and a few had bows. Firearms were at first uncommon

among the rebels, and plundering of the imperial army was a significant source of armament.

The Taiping seized thousands of boats of different sizes and used them for transportation

along rivers and for storing goods includingammunition. Experienced miners who joined the

334

Michael Dillon, China‟s Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sect (Richmond: Curzon Press,

1999), 58-59; Greville S. Freeman-Grenville and Stuart, C. Munro-Hay, Islam: An Illustrated History (New

York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 233. 335

David G. Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate. Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China,

1856-1873 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 84-138, 149-151, 165-169, 178-179. 336

Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (London: Routledge, 2001), 35-56; Jack

Gray,Rebellious and Revolutions. China from the 1800s to 2000. 2ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),

52-75;Thomas H. Reilly, The Tipping Heavenly Kingdom. Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire (Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 2004), 13-14.

114

Taiping used gunpowder to explode tunnels and bring down walls of well-fortified cities,

such as Nanjing in 1853.337

The Taiping established trade connections with Shanghai that included a black market

supply of goods such as weapons and ammunition (swords, muskets, rifles, revolvers,

carbines, artillery pieces, and gunpowder). Heath argues that the arms were generally of poor

quality, either old and worn or badly made, though scholars attributed Taiping successes to

their acquisition of sizeable quantities of foreign arms. Spence describes large scale activity

of European and American gun-runners and arms dealers in Shanghai who smuggled armsby

boat into Taiping territory.338

Tayliacozzo notes that many guns found their way from

Singapore to Taiping-ravaged China. British and French naval forces stationed in Shanghai

intercepted some of these merchant boats in the latter phase of the war, finding gunpowder

marked as salted butter, percussion caps marked as screws or even as religious tracts, and

rifles as umbrellas. The Taiping revolt was suppressed in 1864 by modernized imperial

armies that exploited the strategic operational errors of the Taiping leadership (stretching its

forces too far, internal divisions, and a leadership which took no part in current affairs). The

Manchus were also able to defeat the Taiping by mobilizing western powers that until then

had employed a policy of neutrality.339

Border control has been a key challenge in the efforts of sectarian NSAs to acquire

weapons. The ability of a state to consolidate its borders, to monitor trafficking of goods and

travelers into its territory could be critical for the outcomes of NSAs‘ revolt as of the present

time. Karras explains that in the modern world states expanded their territories and

consolidated their control over their people who lived in those territories. Geographic

separation between several parts of a single state made physical inspection and verification

difficult, serving the interests of rebel movements.340

Detecting smuggling was notoriously

difficult since there were never enough police or customs officials to check all activities and

every transaction at all times. Most illegal exchanges, therefore, went unchecked and

337

Gray, 35; Elleman, 38-42; Jonathan D. Spence, God‟s Chinese Son. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of

HongXiuquan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 127,154-158, 165; Reilly, 121; Ian Heath, The Taiping

Rebellion 1851-1866 (Oxford: Osprey, 1994), 18-19. 338

Spence, God‟s Chinese Son, 311-312; J.K. Fairbank. ―The Provisional System of Shanghai in 1853-1854,‖

Chinese Social Political Science Review 19, 1 (April, 1935): 94-97; Heath, 19, 23, 42. 339

Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous. Borders Smuggling and States Aceh a Southeast Asia Frontier,

1865-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 262. 340

Alan L. Karras, Smuggling. Contraband and Corruption in World History (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield

Publishers, 2010), 1-3, 88-90, 104.

115

unobserved, which is precisely the way smugglers liked it.341

For example,the people of Rio

Grande Du Sol, the southernmost province in Brazil, revolted against the newly formed

―empire‖ of Brazil in 1835. Initially they sought greater autonomy but evolved into a

separatist movement proclaiming the independence of the Piratini Republic. For ten years the

rebels (farrapos) controlled the countryside of the province. Their military force was cavalry

dominated (armed with lances). They had access to remounts from neighboring provinces in

Uruguay and Rio de la Plata (Argentina) that were in an almost perpetual state of political

chaos. The acquisition of arms was relatively easy because the ruler of Uruguay supported

the rebels, therefore when the former was badly defeated the rebels lost an important source

of resources. The rebels had only the few cannons which they had captured from the imperial

army and while possessing mainly cavalry they preferred to fight on the open plain. Further,

the imperial army and navy were able to control most of the coastal region whereas the rebels

were unable to secure contact with the world through a seaport, a fatal implication for the

maintenance of their forces. Their small naval force operated only in the rivers and lakes of

the province. In early 1845 the rebels laid down their arms after being defeated by the royalist

army, now also containing cavalry. 342

Often, maritime borders were harder to secure. Despite years of sailing relentlessly

back and forth between Cuba and Florida, the U.S. navy failed to intercept any ship carrying

weapons from Cuba to the Seminole, a powerful Indian tribe that rose up in 1819 against the

U.S. government‘s effort to seize their lands in the former Spanish colony of Florida. The

Second Seminole War (1835-1842) was the longest and the most expensive war of all the

conflicts with Native Americans, because the Seminoles acquired ammunition and powder

for their muskets from Cuban fishermen along the lower west coast of Florida. The U.S.

government was compelled to compromise with the Seminoles who remain America‘s only

unconquered native people.343

Cross-border smuggling has been associated with the smuggling town; that is, a

border settlement that attracted traders, smugglers, rebels and adventurers, all of whom were

involved in arms trade that fuelled the nearby conflict zone. Harris and Sadler provide a

detailed account of El Paso, the largest and most important American city in Texas on the

341

Karras, Smuggling. Contraband and Corruption in World History, 104. 342

Scheina, Latin America, 151-155. 343

James Kaserman and Sarah Kaserman, Florida Pirates. From the Southern Gulf Coast to the Keys and

Beyond (Charleston: The History Press, 2011), 82; Stan Zimmerman, A History of Smuggling in

Florida(Charleston: The History Press, 2006), 35-36.

116

Mexican border that became an arms smuggling center for rebel groups in Mexico at the time

of revolution (1906-1920).344

Smuggling was a time-honored occupation along the border,

and many of the locals did not consider smuggling a criminal activity. With the outbreak of

the Mexican Revolution people ceased smuggling Chinese laborers into the United States and

began smuggling guns into Mexico because of the large profit. Mexican rebels employed a

wide logistical network across the United States, consisting of Mexican and American agents,

brokers, and commercial representatives in New York, and El Paso was the hub. When the

United States imposed an arms embargo on Mexico, FBI officers desperately fought against

arms smuggling using intelligence methods, occasionally being assisted by Mexican

authorities. They managed to intercept many shipments but many more made their way into

Mexico, and convicted gun-runners usually got a light penalty. Mexican rebels purchased

rifles, ammunition, machine guns and cannons from American firms (for example, a New

York-based company that purchased government surplus, mainly U.S. Army supplies), and

arms factories; they liaised between the company officials and Texas smugglers who

collected the goods and smuggled them into Mexico using any available transportation

(automobiles, wagons and even railway trains).345

In El Paso, proprietors of hardware stores, pawn shops and secondhand stores

acquired weapons from across the country, and traded them with Mexican rebels. Proving

flexible and creative, the rebels and their associates used different techniques to smuggle the

weapons, exploiting partial inspection by American customs authorities and the military.

They shipped by train large iron pipes filled with ammunition; declared ammunition as

medicine, and hid weapons under shipments of flour.346

They bribed train crews who secreted

ammunition under seats in the train and once in Mexico returned the goods to the smugglers.

Using false names, Mexican operatives in the United States sent to themselves ammunition

packages via the postal service that were declared as lime and nails. Women crossed the

border daily, taking with them rounds of ammunition, and exploiting the shortage of female

inspectors on the Mexican border. The rate of smuggling increased on the eve of rebels‘

campaigns. Some of the smugglers worked solely with one of the Mexican rebel factions,

344

Charles H. Harris and Louis R. Sadler, The Secret War in El Paso. Mexican Revolutionary Intrigue, 1906-

1920 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 31-33, 45-46. 345

Harris and Sadler, The Secret War in El Paso, 31-33, 45-46. 346

Harris and Sadler, The Secret War in El Paso, 45-46.

117

while others worked simultaneously with rival factions. The submission of the Mexican-

American border to smuggling activity has persisted to this day.347

Revolutionary NSAs and their arming

Following the French Revolution, popular support for national self-determination and

democratic reforms grew throughout Europe and America. A revolution is a ―major change in

the political and socioeconomic structure of an individual state, brought about the

spontaneous efforts of its citizens, though efforts may be aided from outside and may in turn

act to bring about similar change in other countries.‖ The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries‘

theory of revolutionargued that revolutions occur when the use of force results in a significant

political change while ―coup‖ means seizure of state power or the forcible overthrow of a

ruler without far-reaching social or economic transformation of the country concerned.348

Against this background emerged a new type of writing about guerrilla warfare as a military

tool to overthrow current regimes rather than fight against a foreign invader. The shift in the

essence of guerrilla warfare had dramatic consequences on the arming of the insurgents. No

longer could the latter count on the state-army – now its rival – as its arms supplier but had to

look for alternative sources. The first revolutionary writers conceived insurgency as a

popular movement rather than a militia, therefore they hardly wrote about arming.349

Radical Italian scholars were the first in Europe to discuss guerrilla warfare as a

political tool to achieve national independence and social justice. Carlo Bianco (1795-1843)

was among the first to articulate a process of force buildup of a revolutionary movement that

fights against foreign or domestic oppressors. In his Handbook for Revolutionary Bands

(1833) he argued that at the beginning of events smaller groups of volunteers will carry only

light weapons because of their limited resources, but that will enable their mobility. At a later

stage when the guerrilla groups become a mass-movement, and all the people enlist the

national army to expel the foreign invaders, they will need more weapons and ammunition,

most of which they will capture from the enemy. Bianco acknowledged that insurgents‘

347

Harris and Sadler, The Secret War in El Paso. 89-92, 162-164, 241, 288. 348

Peter Calvert, Terrorism, Civil War, and Revolution. Revolution and International Politics (New York:

Continuum, 2010), 11-12; Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution. The Oxford Companion to Politics and the World. 2th

ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Paul Hart. ―Beyond Borders: Causes and Consequences of the

Mexican Revolution,‖ in War along the Border: The Mexican Revolution and Tejano Communities, ed. Arnoldo

De Leon (Huston: University of Houston – Center for Mexican American Studies, 2012), 8-30. 349

Laqueur, Guerrilla, 151-152.

118

weaponry will be poor and that some of them will fight with axes, spears, pikes and rocks.350

August Blanqui (1805-1881) another Italian revolutionary theoretician argued that because

the revolution will start in an urban environment the rebels will hold rifles while cannons will

be useless. He distinguished between the early stage of the revolution when people will

acquire their light weapons, chiefly by looting local or from a foreign enemy, and a later

stage in which former military men will form a people‘s army which had need of larger

armaments.351

Frederik Engels and Karl Marx– the great political philosophers, and founders of

scientific socialism – advocated for the working class‘ popular uprising. They rejected

militarism in general and did not supported guerrilla warfare as a means to conduct a socialist

revolution, therefore they created a gap between insurgency and military studies. Engels

mainly dealt with the impact of technology on military affairs, and discussed the armament of

an insurgency. He stated that ―insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other, and

subject to certain rules of proceeding, which when neglected will produce the ruin of the

party neglecting them. … Insurrection is a calculus with very indefinite magnitudes the value

of which may change every day.‖352

For Marx and Engels the tactics of the barricade, very popular in the urban areas of

1848, had lost its effectiveness partly due to the new weapon systems employed by modern

armies (more accurate rifles and cannons). They also noted the weaknesses in the weaponry

of the rebels, and argued that popular war could not succeed in Europe due to the advantages

of state-armies that became bigger, stronger, mobilized, and reluctance of the masses to

engage in revolutionary activity after the events of 1848. Popular war and guerrilla warfare

were more suitable for peripheral and underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia, while the

European working class should seize power by the inner contradictions of capitalism,

mobilization of the security apparatuses for the revolution and employment of free and

confidential elections. 353

350

David A. Natali, ―Carlo Bianco and the Radical Origin of the Resorgimento‖ (PhD diss., University of

Columbia, 1972), 25, 32, 34. 351

Augusta Blanqui. ―A Blueprint for Insurrection,‖ in The Guerrilla Reader. A Historical Anthology, ed. Walter

Laqueur (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 153-158. 352

Friedrich Engels, The German Revolutions. The Peasant War in Germany and Germany: Revolution and

Counter-Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 227. 353

Freidrich Engels.‖The Tactics of the Barricade,‖ In Marxism and the Science of War, ed. Bemard Semmel,

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 202-206; Bemard Semmel, ed. Marxism and the Science of War

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 197.

119

In reality the seizure of political power almost inevitably involves direct physical

control of the capital area as such, or at least of the members of the government. Therefore,

revolutionaries neededweapons as part of their contingency planning, but often lacked the

resources to acquire weapons.For instance, students in Odessa collected donations for guns

and ammunition on the eve of the 1905 armed uprising in the city. Further, revolutionary

movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that seized power faced the problem of

its consolidation, the eradication of serious opposition, both internal and external.354

For

example, the advance of the Germans eastward (late-1917) and the emergent threat of civil

war (which erupted in May 1918), convinced the newly established Communist regime in

Russia that if it was to survive it had to form a powerful national standingarmy that would

mobilize former tsarist officers rather than relying on a civilian militia, in spite of strong

objections from the Left Wing Communists in the party.355

Revolutionary NSAs could not challenge states with national armies equipped with

modern weapons, unless being supportedby external intervention.Despite their heroism on the

barricades of Paris, Vienna, Rome, and Berlin, the revolutionaries of 1848 failed to gain

either their nationalist or their republican objectives because the monarchs retained the

support of professional military forces that had little sympathy for the urban worker. Students

and workers in the Austrian Empire took to the streets to force political reforms but were

oppressed by loyal Austrian troops and Russian military assistance that reestablished the

central authority.356

Internal destabilization of regimes and demoralization of the army could

compensate for the rebels‘ weakness in weaponry. For instance, the Second French

Revolution of July 1830 was carried out by disorganized crowds. A small crowd gathered in

some districts of Paris to protest against King Charles X‘sdecision to suspend the Chambers

and the constitution. The uprisingdeveloped entirely spontaneously into numerous violent

demonstrations. Partial and scattered riots turned into armed confrontations between the

government and especially workers and artisans of Paris who built barricades on nearly every

street. Once the gendarmerie shot indiscriminately at demonstrators, the crowds became

threatening, replying with stones and muskets they ransacked at night from gun shops. Some

354

Calvert, Terrorism,11-33; Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket Books,

2008), 97-98, 112-123, 184-190; Laqueur, Guerrilla, 151-152; Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky Speaks (New York:

Pathfinder Press, 1972), 63-64. 355

Earl F. Ziemke, The Red Army 1918-1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to US Ally (London: Frank

Cass, 2004), 14; Robert Weinberg, The Revolution of 1995 in Odessa. Blood on the Steps (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1993), 156-162. 356

Bulliet, Earth, 604-605.

120

historians claim that the owners voluntarily distributed weapons to the rebels.357

In this

context, Brogun argues that there were many arsenals and gun shops in Paris, and there was

no need to loot as rebels did in 1789. Women of Paris sat on their doorsteps molding bullets

for the rebels; bands of men moved from door to door borrowing weapons. Rebels armed

themselves with rusty sabres, swords, spits, pikes and pitchforks. Their foes, the Royal

Guards and the Army, were more powerful but demoralized, which led to a steady flow of

defections. Units of the normally reliable Royal Guards refused to fight the populace, and

troops from the provinces refused to supply the troops or enter the capital. The Three

Glorious Days resulted in the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy and the establishment of

the Orleanist regime rather than a republic.358

Neutralityof the national army and mobilization of some military units in favor of

revolution secured its success:this is a persistent feature of the history of rebellion. The first

phase of the Mexican war of independence (1810-1821) ended in 1816 when the royal army

of the colonial empire suppressed a massedarmy of one hundred thousand rebels, consisting

of oppressed peasants and Indians, barely controllable without military experience. They

were armed only with the peasant‘s machete, the miner‘s pick, and bow and arrow, and

occasionally guns they captured from their enemies.359

The power balance between the rebels

and royalists had changed when the Creole elites switched sides. Finding Spain of 1821 too

liberal they opted now for independence to preserve their privileged position in Mexican

society. Large sections of the royal army deserted, arming themselves with the best weapons

available, and joined the rebels who were commanded by Colonel Agustin Iturbide, a royal

army officer. In September 1821 Spain had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Cordoba that

recognized Mexico‘s independence.360

State-military assets were a favorable source of weapons for NSAs who rose against

the collapsing regime. An example that became a historical symbol is the seizure of the

Parisian Bastille on July 14, 1789. When the people of Paris heard that the King Louis XVI

was massing troops in Versailles to arrest the National Assembly‘s members, crowds of

357

Murray Bookchin, The Third Revolution. Popular Movements in the Revolutionary Era, vol.2 (London:

Cassel, 1998), 52-62; William Hone,Full annals of the revolution in France, 1830(London: Thomas Tegg,

1830), 99;Robert Gildea, Children of the Revolution: The French, 1799-1914 (UK: Penguin Groups, 2008), 50. 358

Hugh Brogan, Alexis de Tocqueville: Prophet of Democracy in the Age of Revolution (London: Profile Books,

2010), 123. 359

Lyunn V.Foster, A Brief History of Mexico (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), 110-115. 360

Teresa A. Meade, A History of Modern Latin America 1800 to the Present (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell,

2010), 60-70; Christon I. Archer, The Wars of Independence in Spanish America (Wilmington: Rowman and

Littlefield, 2000), 157.

121

common people began to seize arms and mobilize. A crowd searching for military supplies

attacked the Bastille, a medieval fortress used as a prison. The futile defence of the Bastille

cost 98 lives before its garrison surrendered. 361

The Russian Revolution demonstrated important aspects of the arming of a

revolutionary movement, that is, the mobilization skills of a political party and the

employment of international networks to smuggle weapons into Russia. The turn of the

nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of modern political organizations. According to

Max Weber a ―party is an organization oriented toward the planned acquisition of social

power.‖ Parties are organized to represent people of certain class and status and with certain

interests. The means to obtain power can include violence, votes, bribery, and donation.

According to Lipest and Rokhan every political party seeks to mobilize the populace against

other forces. Thus, revolutionary political parties were involved in subversion against central

governments, including acquisition of arms. They could use their organization, mobilization

skills and international character to facilitate the smuggling of weapons against repressive

regimes.362

From the early twentieth century, networks of socialist activists from different parts of

the Russian Empire,from the Caucasus through to the Baltic States, and abroad, were engaged

in smuggling weapons into Russia. They purchased small arms from factories and arms

dealers in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, France, England and the United States. To make

the purchase they might use intermediaries from other parties. The activists came mainly

from the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRP), the Social-Democrat Party (Bolshevik), the

Finnish Action Resistance Party, and the Polish Socialist Party. Initially Japan, waging war

against Russia from 1904 to 1905, organized and finalized the network through its brilliant

military attaché in Stockholm who traveled across Europe to coordinate the operation. He

stored purchased arms and ammunition in the cellar of a London bookstore. With Japanese

money revolutionaries bought three small ships in England, registering one of them in the

name of a wealthy American widow, and crewed the ships with young revolutionaries from

the Baltic. Radical British activists helped to load the ships with the weapons, and on July

1905 the vessels sailed to the Baltic Sea. This operation failed because the major steamship

361

Bulliet, et al., Earth, 594-595; Nolan, J. Cathal,Wars of the Age of Louis XVI. An Encyclopedia of Global

Warfareand Civilization(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008). 362

Seymour M. Lipest and Stein Rohkan.―Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An

Introduction,‖ in Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives, eds. Seymour M. Lipest

and Stein Rohkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 4-5; John Wallace-Ferrante, Sociology. A Global

Perspective (Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, 2006), 222.

122

ran aground and was scuttled by its crew off the coast of Finland. Most of the cargo was lost,

but activists transported a small part of it to Moscow and used the rifles during the December

uprising there. The other two ships did not arrive in Russia.363

On November 1905, another

steamship delivered 8,500 rifles to the Caucasus. Scholars argued that between the spring of

1904 and the end of 1905, the revolutionaries smuggled more than 15,000 rifles,

approximately 24,000 revolvers, three tons of explosives, and 2.5 million rounds of

ammunition into Russia. 364

While still in Switzerland Lenin – based on lessons from the uprising in Moscow

(1905) – called for the creation of a proletariat guerrilla force that would acquire modern

weapons (automatic rifles and hand grandes), and its members would learn to make bombs.

He urged the rebels to obtain supplies of explosives, fuses and rifles. He explained that to

achieve socialism there ought to be a violent revolution engaged by armed workers and

peasants.365

Thus, the Bolshevik Party became more involved in arms smuggling under the

supervision of Lenin from his sanctuary in Switzerland using the party‘s organizational skills

and large cadre of activists. Rappaport describes the intensive activity of Maxim Litvinov, a

Jewish Bolshevik who became a successful gun-runner, managing to fool the Russian secret

police (Okhrana) for some time. From his base in Paris he posed as a respectable army officer

from Ecuador. Under this cover he traveled through European countries, inspecting and

buying up arms. Records of contemporary radical Scottish leftists revealed that steamers

came to British ports from Antwerp or Hamburg with boxes of Mausers and Brownings and

ammunition. The activists repacked the cargo and sent it to Russia mainly through Finland.

On a smaller scale, the Bolsheviks used land routes across Finnish and Latvianborders into

Russia. The Okhrana invested a lot of effort in capturing Litvinov but he found shelter in

England (he served later as Stalin‘s foreign minister from 1933 to 1939). Yet, due to good

intelligence and cooperation with local security services, the Okhrana managed to intercept

much of the contraband of the Bolsheviks.366

Lenin was ready to cooperate with common

criminals, who had less interest in socialist ideals, but who could nevertheless be very useful

363

Manfred Hidermeier, The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War (New York: St.

Martin‘s Press, 2000), 133-134; Iurii Fel‘shtinskii, Lenin and his Comrades: The Bolsheviks Take Over

Russia,1917-1927 (New York: Enigma Books, 2010), 29-31. 364

Dennis and Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russ-Japanese War, 1904-1905 (New York:

Charterhouse, 1974), 451-458, 523-524. 365

Vladimir I. Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, vol. 11. June 1906-January 1907 (London: Lawrence and Wishart,

1962), 171-178, 213. 366

Helen Rappaport, Conspirator: Lenin in Exile (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 146-148.

123

partners in operations involving weapons smuggling and arms sales. In these temporary

alliances there were ample grounds for conflict and mutual grievances.367

In 1917, the Bolsheviks planned to mobilize Russian soldiers into their ranks with

their assets including their weapons. Later, summarizing the revolution, Trotsky stated that

―the first task of every insurrection is to bring the troops over to its side.‖368

The communists

exploited demoralization and disintegration among the Russian army‘s units to capture

thousands of rifles, machineguns and some cannons. The Bolsheviks employed the Red

Guard – a worker militia with no real fighting capability – as their military arm and Trotsky

was involved in the militia‘s arming. But he was counting on pro-Soviet soldiers, mainly

sailors, to support his insurgent plans. Zeimke claims that the seizure of the Russian

government building (The Winter Palace, 25th

October) was a military coup planned by

Trotsky and conducted by mainly regular forces rather than a revolutionary political act.369

The Russian revolution illustrates a revolutionary NSA that abandoned part of its

ideology to cope with the urgent challenges of reality. Originally the Bolsheviks rejected

militarism and promised a government that would bring immediate peace. Lenin stated

(September 1917) that disarmament is the ideal of socialism, wars are social evil and the

proletarian‘s revolution would wipe the standing army off the face of the earth and replace it

with a workers‘ militia.370

However, the Bolsheviks confronted a general European war

(World War One, 1914-1918) which their theory had held to be impossible and Lenin made a

radical revision of Marxist thought on war and advocated for a civil war. Ziemke argues that

Lenin did not anticipate that the Bolsheviks would have to create an armed force while

actively engaged against domestic insurgents and still nominally at war with foreign enemies.

The militarization of the Bolshevik regime was an indispensable element for the survival of

the Soviet state. The employment of a regular army with professional officers that acquired

its weapons mainly from local factories helped the new Bolshevik regime to win the Russian

civil war (1924). This episode illustrates what happens when an NSA becomes a state.371

367

Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1993), 192; Fel‘shtinskii, Lenin, 192. 368

LeonTrotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, vol.3 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,

1964), 170, 181-182 369

Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky Speaks(New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), 63-64;Leon Trotsky, The Military

Writing and Speeches of Leon Trotsky. How the Revolution Armed, vol. 5 (London: New Park Publications,

1981), 112-123, 184-190, 297-298; Ziemke, Red Army,14. 370

Lenin, Collected Works, 23, 95. 371

Ziemke,Red Army, 30-37; Jacob W.Kipp. ―Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1915-

1921,‖ in Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991, eds. Frank C. Willard and Philip, S.

124

The Rise of Modern Terrorism and the Discovery of Explosives

The appearance of specific weapon systems and military technologies could have

revolutionary effects on NSAs‘ operational ability and arming methods. In 1863 Alfred

Nobel discovered dynamite, a far more destructive explosive than all previous explosives

(like gun powder) and in 1875 he invented the more powerful gelignite explosive. At the

same time, anarchist and revolutionary groups in Europe, comprising mainly students and

intellectuals, advocated the use of violence to achieve democracy, national liberation and

social equality. Nobel‘s dynamite wasa key tool of their campaign which Laqueur calls

―systematic terrorism.‖ The first terror groups ever to use dynamite were the Russian

anarchists, Narodnaya Volya (People‘s Will), and the Irish Fenians. The former fought the

Russian tsar‘s autocratic rule from 1878 to 1881. They planned to provoke the government

and shock the masses into action, using explosive bombs in addition to pistols and rifles.

Narodnaya Volya established dynamite workshops in the late seventies, and in 1879 they

conducted the first terror attack with a bomb, attempting to assassinate Alexander II. They

preferred to kill him with a bomb rather than shooting, to make a greater impression. In 1881,

after numerous attempts, Narodnaya Volya operatives succeeded in killing Tsar Alexander II

by throwing two bombs at his carriage in St. Petersburg. Killing the tsar also killed the group

because the authorities cracked down on the terrorists. Yet, other revolutionary groups in

Russia engaged in explosive bombs including that of Lenin‘s older brother in the late eighties

as well as more organized groups like the ―technical bureau‖ of Lenin‘s own Bolshevik party

at the turn of the century.372

Only two years after Nobel‘s invention, Clan ma Gael, a U.S. based Irish liberation

movement began to experiment with the new explosive. They also smuggled dynamite bombs

from the United States to Liverpool. In 1867 the movement began the ―dynamite war‖ against

England. Between 1867 and 1887 Clan ma Gael planted at least sixty bombs in England‘s

major cities, killing at least one hundred people. In 1885 they shocked Britain when they

bombed the Houses of Parliament and the Tower of London. The Irish terror campaign

encouraged Britain‘s liberal Prime Minister, William Gladstone, to introduce home rule bills

Gillette (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 68-76; Leon Trotsky, The Military Writing and Speeches of

Leon Trotsky. How the Revolution Armed, vol. 5 (London: New Park Publications, 1981), 316-317, 405-429. 372

A.R. Oppenheimer, IRA.The Bombs and the Bullets. A History of Deadly Ingenuity (Dublin: Irish Academic

Press, 2009), 177-178; Herman,Social Movements, 70-74; James H. Belington, Fire in the Minds of Men:

Origins of the Revolutionary Faith (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 380; Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism

Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2009), 123-124; Laqueur,Guerrilla, 92-94.

125

for Ireland. 373

London in the second half of the nineteenth century attracted anarchist groups

from all over Europe, and they were full of praise for dynamite as a transformative

revolutionary tool. They regarded dynamite as firepower to match the armies of the state and

to counter governments‘ repressions. In America after 1870, radical worker groups, mainly

mine workers, frequently used dynamite to attack employers‘ property.374

The employment of dynamite bombs followed by other explosives provided many

advantages for terrorists and guerrillas. It was a new stage for insurgency because the

explosives were smokeless and therefore secured low signature activity. The stabilizing of

nitroglycerin and the invention of gelignite meant that it was possible to build bombs which

could be manufactured, transported, and placed with relative ease and securityto cause

massive explosions. Already in 1875, the British government issued a law to monitor the

selling of explosives but that could not stop the proliferation of commercial explosives. 375

If the new explosives were highly effective, they were also extremely dangerous, and

many revolutionaries were killed while producing or transporting dynamite. Insurgents

needed substantial quantity of explosives to produce powerful bombs which could result in a

security risk. Miniaturization of bombs was another challenge for the first bomb makers, and

from the late nineteenth century they produced hand-grenades, Molotov cocktails and letter

bombs. The next chapter will reveal the increasing expertise of NSAs in manufacturing and

acquiring explosives and explosive devices during the twentieth century.376

This chapter underlines a number of developments about rebellious NSAs and their

arming from early modernity up to the early twentieth century. Colonialism, the rise of the

nation state and social-economic conflicts encouraged the appearance of new forms of NSAs,

national, sectarian, revolutionary and social class oriented. Many of the rebel groups used

traditional arms and were dependent on successful raids on governments‘ assets. The new

NSAs faced the stronger militaries of states armed with firearms. At the same time, modern

rebel groups could use the spread of intentional commerce and patronage of foreign states to

acquire weapons and challenge powerful governments. The nineteenth century witnessed the

roots of modern terror using explosives.

373

Oppenheimer,IRA, 177-182. 374

Gaye Beverly, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2009), 44-45. 375

Oppenheimer, IRA, 177-178; Beverly, Wall Street,45. 376

Laqueur,Guerrilla, 92-94.

126

Thus, due to the emergence of gunpowder and cannons, mostly under state control,

early modern world NSAs clearly demonstrated the arguments Smith and Van Creveld made

about weak NSAs, possessing simple arms, and fighting much stronger armies. A number of

complicated arming systems of NSAs that operated from the late eighteenth century,

especially the arming of the American Patriots, reflected early SOS. They were Trans-

Atlantic, relatively heterogeneous, containing both states and NSAs, more independent than

past smuggling networks and more cooperative. But they were rare and due to limited

communication means their level of integration was low. The next chapter focuses on

rebellious NSAsin Africa and Asia that challenged colonial powers during the nineteenth

century and until World War Two.

Chapter Four: Armament – A Key Factor in NSAs’ Struggle against

Colonialism from theNineteenth Century until World War Two

127

Historical and Theoretical Introduction

The following chapter reviews NSAs‘ efforts to acquire weaponry from the nineteenth

century to the mid twentieth century. The chapter analyses major historical events that had

significant influence on the buildup of rebel groups‘ force in the colonization of Africa and

Asia. The chapter demonstrates how European powers used military and technological

superiority to control native people in colonies which were mostly weak in weaponry. Some

armed NSAs, well organized and skilled warriors, seriously challenged colonial forces. They

used the growing international arms trade in their struggle against colonialism.

During the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century European powers seized

territories in Africa and Central Asia, and both Europe and the United States, motivated by

political, economic and cultural reasons, took territories in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Additionally, Russia conquered the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, and Japan started to

expand its empire in East Asia. Approximately twenty sixmillion square kilometers and 150

million people fell under the rule of Europe and the United States in this period.377

The

Industrial Revolution gave Western nations great military advantages over the rest of the

world. The development of new and much deadlier firearms in the 1860s and 1870s shifted

the balance of power on land between Westerners and other peoples. The use of the

breechloader rather than the musket, the smokeless powder followed by TNT explosives,

repeating rifles, and the new ultra-rapid fire machine gun, improved the firepower of Western

armies, making colonial conquests and control easier than ever before. From the 1830s,

Europe and America built up powerful armies whose troops numbered in the hundreds of

thousands instead of tens of thousands. They were better armed and supplied due to the mass

production of arms and ammunition (that is, standardization of products with interchangeable

components), with better forms of organization and mobilization. The war machine and its

accelerated manufacture of weapons enabled the Europeans to project their power and secure

resources along with markets on other continent, to enforce their colonial authority.378

The

spread of railroads and electric telegraph throughout the world accelerated Western forces‘

mobility and deployment, facilitating the control of colonies including those in remote

locations. Steamships enabled Western powers to ship military cargoes over very long

distances, and the telegraph and telephone enabled better control over military forces. Fighter

377

Bulliet et al., Earth, 750; Joseph, P. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate. Historical and Sociological

Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 108-109. 378

Bulliet et al. Earth, 750; Chew, Arming the Periphery, 94.

128

jets appeared in the First World War and were used in ground-support missions against

insurgents.379

Native peoples were usually armed only with old rifles, spears, bows and arrows. For

example, firearms did not become generally available in inland Africa until the last decade of

the nineteenth century. Van Creveld argues that time after time the advanced weapons

wielded by small groups of white men enabled them to blast much larger bands of native

African and Asian people to pieces. Repeatedly, too, it was shown that the only way to stop

the Europeans was by adopting their weapons and, along with those, numerous other aspects

of their industry and culture. 380

Yet, Chew argues that the power balance between colonial

powers and native people was more complicated than some historians stated. The possession

of sophisticated new firearms did not always guarantee success against indigenous weaponry

and tactics. In South Africa, the Northwest Frontier of India and Southeast Asia, local armies

and rebels lost the war, but not before they first offered ferocious resistance, challenging the

prevailing assumption about the superiority of Western arms in the modern world. Assisted

by supplies of traditional weapons, geography, warfare tradition and better tactics, their

knowledge of the terrain, and high morale could balance NSAs inferiority in technology,

weaponry and organization.381

European powers fought formal rulers and NSAs in societies that colonialism had

already militarized from the seventeenth century by providing large quantities of arms and

military training to indigenous rulers, their trade-partners (small arms could be presented as

gifts); also, by encouraging a global trade of old and modern arms with the colonies. To

illustrate this point, British customs records from the turn of the nineteenth century revealed

the export of substantial quantities of firearms to markets in Africa. European charter firms

(chiefly, the East India Company) established weapon factories in the colonies. From the

1870s the British government sold obsolete or surplus munitions at colonial outposts and in

municipal centers in Britain. These weapons were used for arming native tribes and could be

employed against British troops. Great power rivalry was another mechanism of arms

diffusion in the colonies. The late nineteenth century featured intensive competition that

accelerated arms transfers from the Western hemisphere‘s centers to the colonies, arming

379

Martin V. Creveld, Technology and War. From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1991),

226; Chew, Arming the Periphery, 48-49. 380

Bulliet et al., Earth, 629-630, 726, 746, 753, 771, 773; Van Creveld, Art of War, 160-161, 171, 196. 381

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 37. For example, the war between Britain and the Zulus (1879); the three wars

between Britain and the Sultanate of Mysore and the Maratha Confederation (1750-1818), and the Sikhs (1800-

1849). All native armies were able to mount a formidable challenge to the British.

129

indigenous peoples with the most modern, rather than the most obsolete, of weapons. These

arms transfers destabilized regions in Africa and Asia, fueling inter-tribal and cross-cultural

conflicts. Eventually colonialism contributed to the buildup of NSAs‘ forces that rose against

colonial authority.382

Against this background, British military experts who analyzed guerrilla

conflict emphasized the principles of mobility, dispersion of forces, surprise, prolonging the

war, mobilization of the people and exploitation of the topography while arming had a minor

role in this project. For example, Major Dening discussed the connection between armament

of guerrillas and their operational capabilities. He argued that the new trend of the urban

guerrilla (as the British witnessed in Ireland) was associated with the invention of bombs,

automatic pistols and high explosive mines, effective weapons which were hard to dismantle

and relatively easy to acquire. Dening like other contemporary military thinkers argued that

guerrillas might hasten to conduct conventional war against a state after procurement of new

weapon systems, and consequently lose the war.383

Colonel Charles Callwell‘s treatise Small Wars was adopted by the British army as an

official handbook in 1896. Callwell analyzed the special character of small wars; he

explained the principles and practice of small wars in regard to strategy and tactics, and used

many examples from the British army and other colonialist armies. He argued that the

conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art in itself, diverging widely from the

conditions of regular warfare. Many of the author‘s ideas and thoughts are useful for the

study of contemporary NSAs. Callwell discussed the significance of arming among NSAs

arguing that while regular armies are better equipped, ―it must be remembered that the arms

of the enemy (NSA) have also improved.‖384

Callwell explained that ―savages‖ who used to

fight with bows and arrows were now using rifles, and he discussed this dramatic change to

smuggling activity: ―the constant smuggling of arms into their territories, which the various

powers concerned seem wholly unable to suppress.‖ Accordingly, some NSAs, such as the

Boers in 1899, the Indian Mutiny in 1854-1855 and the Egyptian army in 1882, had the form

and organization of regular troops. They had been organized into battalions, squadrons and

batteries and their weapons were fairly efficient.385

Callwell encouraged British intelligence

staff to study the organization of their NSAs opponents and highlighted the fact that many

382

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 21-37, 94, 211-221. 383

Laqueur, Guerrilla, 99-100, 139-141, 146- 147; B.C. Dening. ―Modern Problems of Guerilla Warfare,‖ The

Army Quarterly 13, 2 (January 1927), 350. 384

Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice. 3rd ed. (London: Book Club Edition, 1976),

22-23. 385

Callwell,Small Wars, 29.

130

failures of regular troops stemmed from underestimating the strength and fighting qualities of

NSAs. Callwell predicted the growing importance of wars between states and NSAs arguing

that ―small wars of the future may involve very difficult operations.‖386

Miller Maguire (1849-1920), another British officer, was one of the first military

thinkers to highlight the connection between diffusion of technological developments and the

arming of NSAs. He argued that ―civilized powers‖ were losing their historical advantage

over ―savage‖ people in military technology because of the growth of trade routes and

facility of communication. ―The possession of the very newest and most perfect weapons is

simply a matter of money, and the firms which turn them out will sell as freely to a savage as

to the most enlightened of the world`s rulers.‖ He drew a connection between the ―savages‖

and their better operational capabilities, warning that because of the proliferation of modern

weapons all over the globe future British expeditions to the colonies would cope with highly

skilled rivals armed with modern weapons rather than swords and spears.387

Major Trends in the Arming of Anti-Colonial NSAs

The following section demonstrates how geography and cultural aspects can facilitate NSAs‘

struggle against colonialism. The efficient combination of geographic conditions and self-

production of arms stimulated the Afghans‘ struggle against the superior British army during

the First (1838-1843) and Second (1878-1880) Anglo-Afghan Wars. Britain wanted

Afghanistan to be a buffer zone between India and Russia, but in both wars Britain easily

seized Afghanistan only to set the stage for a later retreat in ruins. The Pashtun tribes of

Afghanistan – although deeply divided – inflicted defeats on the powerful imperial army,

because they were well-armed and did not face logistic constraints as contemporary NSAs

usually did. The Afghanistan economy of the nineteenth century was based on bazaar trade.

Bazaars with guild-like structures maintained a vigorous trading system, with commercial

families having contacts as far afield as London, Moscow and Hong Kong. Bazaars in Kabul,

Kandahar and Herat contained artisans who lived in particular sections and produced goods,

including hand-made weapons evaluated as works of art. They made jezail, a heavy caliber

musket, often mounted on horses, with greater range and better aim than the old British

―brown bess.‖ If Afghan snipers were allowed to maintain distant firing positions unmolested

they could inflict devastating casualties on a tightly formed infantry formation. They fired

386

Callwell,Small Wars,24, 43-47. 387

Maguire, T. Miller. ―Differences between Guerrilla and Regular Warfare,‖ in The Guerrilla Reader. A

Historical Anthology, ed. Walter Laqueur (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 118-121.

131

into British troops marching through valleys and narrow mountain passes from invisible

positions atop cliffs.388

In 1842 defeated British troops retreating from Kabul to Jalalabad

(―Death March‖) were forced to hand over most of their guns; other British columns

abandoned their weapons during battles. Mainly in the First Anglo-Afghan War, the British

left a small force in Afghanistan with limited ammunition, and the Indian soldiers did not

adapt to cold Afghan weather. 389

Until the late-nineteenth century, Afghanistan‘s borders were not internationally

accepted, and that enabled nomads to move easily from area to area and establish trading

partnerships with bazaar merchants. Smuggling and corruption run together were an accepted

and legitimate part of the economic system, just as they are today. In 1879, Afghan troops

defeated the British column near Qandahar employing new cannons made in Iran. For close

combat tribal warriors used the Persian sword, much superior to the European one. Iron

cannons and other weapons were produced at Dara Adam Khel, an artisan gun-manufacturing

village in the tribal area of Pakistan near Afghanistan.390

Girardet explains that the British

considered it better for the Pathans to make their own weapons. Not only did this dissuade

them from stealing from the British frontier troops, but the quality of weaponry produced

would be inferior. Yet, local craftsmen in basic workshops have been producing perfectly

crafted replicas of weapons since the nineteenth century. The plentiful supply of cheap

firearms from Darra has long helped the tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan to maintain their

reputation as a wild frontier.391

Further, Pashtun frontier tribes that raided Indian and British

troops acquired modern rifles that had been exported from Europe to Muscat, and re-exported

to Bushier and Bandar Abbess. Afghan smugglers collected the goods and transported them

up to the North West Frontier. The British could not block arms trafficking into Afghanistan

because the Persian government was incapable of putting a stop to the smuggling of arms into

its territory, and the Royal Navy did not have the resources to seal the whole Gulf, trying to

388

Robert Elgood,Firearms of the Islamic World in the Tareq Rajib Museum, Kuwait (London: I.B. Tawris,

1995), 12; Chew, Arming the Periphery, 215-216. 389

Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan. A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban

(Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 168-171, 176, 200-201. 390

Christopher M. Wyatt, Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy during the Great

Game (London: I.B. Tawris, 2011), 87-90; Tanner, Afghanistan, 215-217. 391

Edward Girardet, Killing the Cranes: A Reporter's Journey through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan

(White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2011), 43.

132

stop small smuggling boats, some of which would make illegal coastline drops, rather than

calling at ports.392

Aside from Asia, Africa was colonized too, and from the late nineteenth century

Africans responded to their colonization and exploitation with military resistance and armed

insurrection (for example, the rebellion of the Soninke people of Upper Senegal against the

French in 1885-1887; the rebellion of the Asante against the British in Ghana in 1900;

Nandi‘s rebellion against the British in Kenya in 1890s, and the Mazi Mazi uprising in

German East Africa, 1905-1907); all resulted in defeat.393

Apart from disunity, unwillingness

to rethink strategies and tactics that had proved ineffective against European methods of

warfare, and the ability of the Europeans to recruit large armies of African troops, weakness

in weaponry was a major factor.394

In 1890, the European imperialists, through the Brussels

Convention, reached an agreement that no further modern arms should be sold to Africans;

some governments attempted to collect arms and to disarm the colonial population.

Therefore, African rebels had only outmoded weapons such as the muzzle-loader Danish

guns, spears, bows and arrows in the face of European cannon and the Maxim gun.395

Some colonies had a long tradition of arms trade and possession of arms, facilitating

the buildup of the force of the rebel groups. For example, in Anglo and Dutch South East

Asia, men went about their daily business heavily armed, usually with three or more arms on

their person at all times, and more if they were travelling abroad. Women too were often

skilled in the use of firearms. The huge profits to be made from the sale of firearms in the

region enabled these commodities to diffuse into local societies on a large commercial scale

and to the widest possible geography by the mid-nineteenth century. When colonial

governments were trying to maintain a much stricter stance on such items, firearms were to

392

Elgood, Firearms, 121,126;; Paddy Docherty, The Khyber Pass: A History of Empires and Invasion (New

York: Sterling Publishing Company, 2007), 219; Black et al., Modernization, 101-102. 393

Mbaye Gueye and Adu A. Boahen, ―African Initiatives and Resistance in West Africa, 1880-1914,‖ in

General History of Africa, vol. 7. Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, ed. Adu A. Boahen (London:

Heinemann, 1985), 147-148. 394

Assa Okoth, History of Africa,vol. 1. African Societies and the Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1800-1915

(Nairobi: East African Publishers, 2006), 221; Henry A. Mwanzi ,‖African Initiatives and Resistance in East

Africa 1880-1914,‖ in General History of Africa,vol. 7. Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, ed. Adu

A. Boahen (London: Heinemann, 1985), 158. 395

Smaldone, Warfare, 107; Bruce Vandervort,Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914 (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1998), 29 ; A. Isaacman and J. Vansina. ―African Initiatives and Resistance in Central

Africa, 1880-1914,‖ in General History of Africa,vol 7. Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, ed.

Boahen A. Adu (London: Heinemann, 1985).

133

be found hidden away nearly everywhere.396

Where weapons were harder to find, native

NSAs were compelled to capture colonial armies‘ weapons in battle and by robbery. Mao

stated that guerrillas should fight initially with any available weapon, producing fabricated

arms, and gradually capturing from the enemy better weapons and a new supply of

ammunition in the battlefield.397

Maori, the native people of New Zealand, were a race of

warriors, who traditionally waged war with war clubs and spears based on hand-to-hand

combat. In the early nineteenth century European missionaries and traders introduced them to

the musket, thereafter Maori rapidly became very discerning in the weapons trade, acquired

an expert knowledge of firearms, and subsequently updated their tactics. Maori werea well-

armed NSA at the outset of a war against the state.398

The Druze started their revolt against French administration in Jabal Druze (the Great

Syrian Revolt, 1925-1927) armed with German and old Ottoman rifles left over from the First

World War, and some of the fighters carried nothing but swords. At the battle of Maazraa

(August 1925) a mounted rebel force ambushed and defeated the French 3,000-man column

that was marching across the open plain toward Suwayda. The Druze captured 2,000 rifles

with ammunition, several machine guns and cannons; the latter were operated by former

artillery men from the army of the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans.The additional

weapons facilitated the expansion of the uprising into a national revolt throughout Syria.399

Palestinian rebels initiated their Arab Revolt (1936-1939) against British rule and the Jewish

Yishuv, armed with mainly clubs, knives, swords, and daggers; some possessed rifles and

pistols left over from the Ottoman withdrawal. The rebels also captured rifles from British

arsenals and acquired rifles from corrupt British military men. One of the motives of battle in

the front ranks of the guerrillas was to capture the best weapons, uniforms, footwear or

equipment. For NSAs with chronic ammunition problems, the outcomes of battles had a great

effect on their supplies, and could encourage or depress their activity and force buildup.400

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, geographic factors could facilitate or

constrain NSAs‘ ability to secure third-party help and arms trade. Daniels makes the

396

Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades; Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World that Trade Created:

Society,Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006),33. 397

Tal Tovy, Guerrilla and the War against It. The Military Heritage of Mao (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2010), 87-88

(Hebrew). 398

Mitchell, History of Maori,234-236. 399

Kramer, Decline in Soviet Arms,275; Michael Provence,The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab

Nationalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 59, 91. 400

Barnett Singer and John Langdon.Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire

(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 228.

134

distinction between places in South America where the Spaniards succeeded in isolating the

Indians from weapons and allies, defeated them, and forced them to surrender (such as in

California and the Llanos of present day Colombia). In places where Indians could turn to

foreigners for support, the Spanish made substantial concessions, paid tribute and recognized

the Indians‘ autonomy (as in southeastern North America and the Miskito coast in present

day Nicaragua).401

The New Zealand Wars (1843-1872) were a series of campaigns between

new European settlers and the British army against Maori people, the first settlers of New

Zealand. Maori conducted a lengthy struggle, inflicting heavy casualties on the imperial army

not only because they were a race of warriors but also because the New Zealand government

failed to block the islands from the flow of firearms. American and other nations‘ whaling

and trading vessels were the major arms suppliersto Maori. Initially coming to New Zealand

to load oil and other whale products, whalers and other merchants traded axes, muskets,

plentiful supplies of gunpowder, guns, tobacco and other civilian goods for seal skins, pigs,

potatoes, fish and other Maori products. Women were often pressed into service as ―ship-

girls‖ as a means of obtaining muskets and ammunition.402

From the 1840s the New Zealand

government conducted a legal campaign against the arms trade of the Maori, and faced great

difficulties in suppressing naval smuggling of the Maori. The government imposed a penalty

on people who either sold or gave arms or ammunition to Maori, made vessels liable to

seizure, and imposed a maritime blockade on the East Coast with limited effect.403

Australia became one of the main arsenals from which Maori obtained guns and

gunpowder from the late 1820s. Australian firms and merchants engaged with Maori in

intensive and reciprocal arms trade across the Tasman Sea trading gunpowder and muskets

for flax and preserved Maori heads. In the 1860s, Australian colonies gradually prohibited the

export of warlike commodities to New Zealand with moderate results. For example, they

charged a Melbourne firm with exporting five tons of blasting gunpowder to a fake railway

contractor in Canterbury, New Zealand. The Australian firm answered that these materials

were only intended for the mining industry.404

Maori acquisition of firearms was vital for the

401

Hilary Mitchell and John Mitchell, A History of Maori of Nelson and Marlborough. The People and the Land.

Vol. 1 (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2004), 234-236. 402

Jeff E. Hopkins-Weise, Blood Brothers: The ANZAC Genesis. (Kent Town: Wakefield Press, 2009), 116;

Bronwyn Elsmore, Like Them that Dream: The Māori and the Old Testament (Auckland: Oratia Media, 2011),

44. 403

Craig Innes. ―Maori with Guns: Armed Maori and the Early Settler Parliament,‖ in Terror in our Midst.

Searching for Terror in Aotearoa Nez Zealand, ed. Danny Keenan (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2008), 74;Ian

C. McGibbon, ed. The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History(Auckland: Oxford University Press,

2000). 404

Weise, Blood Brothers, 20-22, 117-118.

135

readiness of their forces against the British, but their supplies were constrained. Initially,

Maori weapons were a match for the British weapons, but the technology gap in small arms

and in artillery increased greatly in the years between the first and last campaigns in New

Zealand against the Maori. In 1872, hostilities came to an end. 405

NSAs could repair weapons or cast spare parts for them, but only a few could

manufacture the weapons themselves. Manufacturing required a base area, possession of raw

materials and technological knowledge acquired from external sources. The Barue people

who revolted against Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1917 developed munitions plants

which produced powder, rifles and even components for their artillery. The Barue posed a

serious challenge to Portuguese control of Mozambique from the 1880s onwards because

they could repair and copy European weapons.406

Earlier, Avar Imam Shamil from Daghestan

led the major anti-Russian revolt in the Caucasus (1834-1859), aiming to expel the Russians

through the unification of all the Muslims in the Caucasus. He commanded an army of twenty

thousand warriors at most, consisting of tribes from the north-eastern Caucasus and managed

to wage a longstanding war against the much stronger Russian army using effective guerrilla

warfare and the mountainous environment. The Caucasus topography introduced logistical

problems for transporting supplies and the Ottomans turned Shamil down several times when

he asked for military support against Russia.407

Gammer argues that the mountaineers of

Daghestan traditionally produced gunpowder. Shamil established three factories for the

production of gunpowder, one of them using water power. The rebels managed to produce

some gun-shells and bombs, but these were of very poor quality, mainly due to lack of lead in

the mountains. Most of the shells used were those captured from the Russians. In 1842

Shamil started to build his artillery, at first using captured Russian pieces. Later he started to

cast his own cannon which were, however, of poor quality. The rebels had a few dozen

405

Nigel Prickett, Landscapes of Conflict. A Field Guide to the New Zealand Wars (Auckland: Random House,

2002), 30-34. 406

Gueye, Mbaye and Adu A. Boahen. ―African Initiatives and Resistance in West Africa, 1880-1914,‖ in

General History of Africa, vol. 7. Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, ed. Adu A. Boahen (London:

Heinemann, 1985), 93;Li Xiaobing, A History of the Modern Chinese Army(Lexington: University Press of

Kentucky, 2007), 56. 407

Moshe Gammer,Muslim Resistance to the Tsar. Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Dagestan

(London: Frank Cass, 1994), 257-259; Laqueur, Guerrilla, 62-63; Vandervort, Wars of Imperial,132-133,

146.When the sultan was at peace with the tsar he did not want to do anything which might irritate the Russians

and even in wartime Shamil failed to gain Turkish military support due to problems of coordination and mutual

mistrust.

136

cannons whichwere effective in capturing the Russian fortress and repulsing Russian attempts

to capture the heights.Theyproduced and used rockets as well. 408

The buildup and maintenance of the Caucasus army was assisted by a team of local

engineers who visited Egypt possibly for technological instruction. These engineers

organized and commanded the rebels‘ artillery; they established and managed Shamil‘s

gunpowder mills, built and managed the gun foundry and supervised the fortification works.

Gammer claims that these engineers made an enormous contribution to the rebels‘war effort,

to their ability to continue the struggle for a long time and to the consolidation of Shamil‘s

power and authority. Deserters from the Russian army also played a major role in the

maintenance and operation of Shamil‘s artillery. Caucasus rebels were finally crushed by a

powerful Russian army of 250,000 soldiers, by exhaustion, and because of inter-tribal

rivalries (some of the tribes allied with the Russians). Shamil surrendered in 1859 and was

exiled to Central Russia. 409

State-Sponsor and Diaspora’s Role in the Arming of NSAs

External support became an important source of NSAs‘ weapons during the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries. Still, only a few NSAs acquired direct and large scale assistance

that empowered their campaigns against a colonial power like France‘s vital role in the

American Revolution. The scale of external support was influenced by different intervening

factors such as geographic location, diaspora political pressure on the benefactor state and the

counter-reaction of the other colonial power.Mostly, third parties supported NSAs‘ struggle

against a colonial power indirectly by providing sanctuary and turning a blind eye to

smuggling activity, for example, U.S. support for Cuba‘s War of Independence (1895-1902)

against Spain.410

With none of the raw materials necessary to manufacture rifles, cartridges,

and other supplies, the Cuban rebels had to rely on what they could capture from the Spanish,

and more fundamentally, on what expeditionary forces brought into Cuba from abroad. Jose

Marti, the leader of Cuba‘s war of independence, was an exiled Cuban nationalist who found

refuge in New York in 1880 where an active Cuban colony operated. From America Marti

pursued a war that would bring about an independent, sovereign Cuba that would also feature

408

Gammer, Muslim Resistance,229;W.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the

Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 51. 409

Gammer, Muslim Resistance,229, 261-262; Laqueur, Guerrilla, 63. 410

Roger E. Hernandez, The Spanish-American War (New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2010), 30-

35; Frank R. Villafana, Expansionism. Its Effects on Cuba‟s Independence (New Brunswick:Transaction

Publishers, 2011), 115-128.

137

social justice. In 1892 he founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party (CRP); he traveled to

American cities to address workers and raise money to buy weapons for the war of

independence. With the help of Cuban immigrants, many of whom worked in the cigar

factories of Key West and Tampa, Florida, he organized the Second War of Independence

(many workers agreed to contribute one-tenth of their earnings to the cause of Cuban freedom

from Spain).411

Between 1895 and 1898 Cuban immigrants, especially those based in the United

States, sent dozens of vessels (from ships to yachts), loaded with volunteers, arms, and

ammunition, from ports from Florida to Virginia. Officially, the American government

opposed the Cuban revolution; in fact it did little to intercept supplies coming from the

United States. The Cubans smuggled largely from the south of the United States where the

power of the U.S. federal government was partial.412

The Spanish blocked the Cuban coast,

capturing some of the rebels‘ ships and intercepted hidden cargoes along the coast. Many

rebel shipssucceeded in breaking through the blockade since guarding Cuba‘s two thousand

miles of coastline was a huge challenge, to the dysfunctional Spanish navy. The Spanish also

avoided firing at American ships, even those smuggling arms for the rebels and disguised

under the flags of other nations. The rebels transshipped at an appointed location in the Gulf

of Cuba to ships that came from Cuba or they unloaded the cargo at a secure point along the

beach. Local rebels patrolled the smuggling location and secured the area. At nightfall the

expedition group delivered the cargo to local insurgents who put the cargo on pack mules and

headed inland. In 1896 the New York Times reported on one of the largest shipments that

brought 750,000 cartridges, 1,200 rifles, 100 machetes, and 400 revolvers. In the same year

another ship unloaded 500 shells and 2,600 rifles.413

These arms shipments helped the Army

of the Liberation to sustain what Tone callsa ―brilliant guerrilla campaign.‖414

Some NSAs were totally dependent on getting foreign aid while others were self-

reliant as a result of strategic and operational conditions. The Chinese Red Army wars against

411

John L. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,

2006), 82; Quesada D. Gonpalo and Henry D. Northrop,The War in Cuba: the GreatStruggle for

Freedom(Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004). 412

Tone, War and Genocide,82-83; IrvingH. King, The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915 (New Roles, New

Frontiers. Naval Institute Press, 1996), 109-110, Hernandez, Spanish-American,30-35; John Offner. ―United

States and the 1898 War over Cuba,‖ in The Crisis of 1898: Colonial Redistribution and Nationalist

Mobilization, eds. Angel Smith and Emma Davila-Cox (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999), 18-44 ; David F.

Trask, The War with Spain in 1898(New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1981). 413

King, Coast Guard,109-110; Hernandez, Spanish-American,30-35; Tone,War and Genocide, 82. 414

Tone, War and Genocide, 82-87, 181-182.

138

the Japanese (The Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945) and the Nationalists (China‘s Civil War,

1927-1949) demonstrated NSAs with almost complete self-reliance in weaponry. In the eight

years of the War of Resistance against Japan, the Chinese communists‘ army, a mere 40,000

in 1934, grew to over a million men by 1945. The population of Communist-controlled areas

increased from 1.5 million to over 100 million, and the original territory of 92,000 square

kilometers expanded to 950,000 square kilometers in nineteen resistance bases.415

Against

this background, the Eight Route Army (ERA, the name of the Red Army since 1937) often

lacked arms and ammunition; Chiang Kai-shek‘s forces provided hardly any military supplies

when the Communists and Nationalists cooperated under the United Front, and from 1939

they sent nothing. Nor did much Russian aid reach any Chinese armies other than Chiang‘s

own (Stalin sent Chiang large Soviet supply convoys worth 250 million dollars in 1937 U.S.

dollars).The ERA lived off the enemy and by its wits. From 1931 to 1932, for example, the

Communists seized thousands of guns and other light arms from Nationalist forces, and by

1934 they had more than 60 small-sized military supply factories that produced military

provisions and that grew to 121 enterprises by 1937. Yet, lack of weaponry was a major

reason why the ERA refrained after 1940 from the waging regular warfare against the much

stronger Japanese army and employed guerrilla warfare instead. Some commentators argued

that between late-1941and late-1944 Mao spent most of his energy in political and

organizational activity in north China; the ERA engaged in limited guerrilla operations, and

its contribution to the war against Japan was minor.416

In 1945 Moscow transferred captured

equipment from the surrendered Japanese army in Manchuria to the Chinese communists,

including airplanes, tanks, and field artillery. Stalin also provided the ERA with Soviet and

Czechoslovak-made weapons. Soviet economic advisors helped restore the railroad system

and heavy industry, creating a solid base for the future Chinese Red Army‘s advance to the

south, and helping the Communist party to expand its military forces in the civil war against

the Kuomintang.417

415

Calvert,Terrorism, 13. 416

Tovy, Guerrilla, 40, 42, 54-55; Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming World War

II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 190; Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 2000), 176; Tai M. Cheung, China's Entrepreneurial Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2001), 17-18. 417

Ming Y. Tsai, Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Greenwood

Publishing Group, 2003), 24; Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China

and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,

2003), 115.

139

The Arab Revolt against the Turks (1916-1918) was an example of an NSA heavily

dependent on foreign aid. Traditionally, smuggling of arms took place along the Red Sea

coast to supply Arab tribes of Central Arabia and the Hejaz. Encouraged by the British

command in Egypt who had sent some weapons across the Red Sea, the Grand Sherif

Hussein, Emir of Mecca, called on all Arabs in Hejaz to rise up against the Turks in June

1916. The rebels enjoyed some success at first, overwhelming small Turkish garrisons, but

they were untrained and under-equipped, without cannon or machine guns, and with only ten

thousand rifles, many of them antiques, for a potential force of fifty thousand. There was no

unified command or central strategy, even for such mundane matters as feeding or paying the

troops. It was a case of every tribe for itself. After three months, the revolt was falling

apart.418

British army involvement, especially by T.E. Lawrence, made a great difference: the

British planned the rebels‘ new operational approach; they provided plenty of weapons

(British service rifles, light machine guns, explosives) and military advisors to the Arab

tribesmen. The Royal Navy backed the rebels‘ advance along the Red Sea coast with supplies

and artillery fire, and armored cars manned by Englishmen were used in the desert. Lawrence

and his Arab irregulars gave valuable help to General Allenby campaign in Palestine by

capturing Aqaba in 1917. The Arabs formed the right flank of Allenby‘s army as the British

moved north toward Damascus. They participated in the capture of the city in September

1918 that ended the war in the Middle East. But the rebels were dependent on British arms

and finances. 419

Failure of NSAs to mobilize external support or to secure long-term aid from a third

party could terminate revolt against colonial powers. For example, the Arab Revolt (1936-

1939) which was a serious challenge to British rule in Palestine. The Higher Arab

Committee, the Palestinian rebels‘ leadership body, demanded the suspension of Jewish

immigration, the prohibition of land sales to Jews and the appointment of a fully independent

national state. The British managed to suppress the uprising partly because rebel leaders and

their supporters in the Arab World failed to secure the flow of arms and ammunition to

Palestine. From his exile in Lebanon, after being dismissed by the British in 1937, Hajj Amin

418

Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows. The Guerrilla in History, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday and

Company, 1975), 258-271. 419

James Barr, Setting the Desert on Fire (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007), 32-33.

Jure Fiorillo, Great Bastards of History: True and Riveting Accounts of the Most Famous Illegitimate Children

Who Went on to Achieve Greatness (Minneapolis:Fair Winds, 2010), 204-211; Cam Emrence, Remapping the

Ottoman Middle East: Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State (London: I.B.T. Tauris and

Company, 2011), 87; David,Murphy, The Arab Revolt 1916-18: Lawrence sets Arabia ablaze (Oxford: Osprey

Publishing, 2008), 21-22.

140

al-Hussaini, the president of the Supreme Muslim Council and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem

unsuccessfully attempted to acquire weapons for the rebels through different channels.

Several times Arab leaders, including Hussaini, asked Nazi Germany for arms, ammunition

and money. Germany refrained from granting the rebels assistance in any form as this would

have a negative impact on Anglo-German relations, and did not go further than expressing

sympathy for Arab self-determination in Palestine. It was committed to a policy of non-

involvement in the Palestinian conflict. Fascist Italy wanted to increase Italy‘s influence and

prestige at the expense of Britain‘s in the Middle East, in line with the Fascist Regime‘s

imperial aspirations. Italy supported the rebels financially.420

In 1937 the British security

service foiled an Italian plot to procure weapons in Europe apparently for Saudi Arabia, and

then smuggling the weapons to Palestine. By the end of 1938 Hajj Amin al-Hussaini asked

Mussolini for one million rifle cartridges, the transportation of which would be handled by

Mufti people who would load the munitions on a ship in one of the Italian islands in the

Aegean. But the Fascist regime decided to suspend all aid of any kind to the Palestinians

which would enable them to complete military preparations that would have ensured

Palestine‘s success in the future general war. Also, Arab dealers smuggled weapons from

Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq whose governments turn a blind eye, using

traditional smuggling routes and clan connections but this was not sufficient. The rebels

lacked artillery and did not have machine guns. Apart from the lack of a single overarching

politico-military authority, factionalism, equipment shortages were major weakness of the

rebel bands.421

In contrast, some NSAs overcame lack of sponsor-states by using theirorganizational

skills and mobilizing diaspora communities. From the early twentieth century, NSAs in

relatively developed societies that resisted colonialism and foreign occupation featured

formal structures, labor division and roles. They had special operatives dealing with arming

and logistics. A consistent argument of the thesis is that well-organized NSAs with skillful

leadership, a centralized command and control system could function better despite a

shortage of ammunition and could initiate complicated logistic operations to acquire

420

Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985),

101-102; Massimiliano Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922-1940 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010),

98-105. 421

Reeva S. Simor, Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origin of Tyranny (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2004), 65-66; Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians. The Making of a People

(Jerusalem: Ketter, 1999), 99-112; Ninian Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol (London:

Routledge, 2002), 7 ; Gudrun Kramar,A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding

ofthe State of Israel(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

141

weapons, using modern communication and transportation. Technology has facilitated

smuggling of arms by NSAs. The telegraph facilitated smuggling activity overseas,

connecting command with overseas cells. The submarine telegraph cables enabled control

over ships. The growing activity of NSAs away from their country was associated with

another important twentieth century development – the diaspora had become more involved

in the military buildup of NSAs and was recruited to facilitate arms smuggling.422

The IRA

under the command of Michael Collins as Director of Intelligence was probably a pioneer in

that sphere. The struggle for Irish independence (1919-1921), though incomplete, was a

leading legacy for other national liberation movements who faced a shortage of weaponry.423

During the Irish War of Independence and even before, the primary problem of the

Irish Volunteers and later the IRA was to obtain arms. Their efforts at armament were

crippled by the fact that Ireland is an island located close to Britain, isolated without a local

industry in a society which monitored weapons closely. On the other hand, the island had

numerous isolated points of access, small harbors, empty beaches, port cities, and outside of

Britain were the Crown‘s enemies who were often willing suppliers to the restive. In 1914 the

Volunteer movement established a committee to organize the acquisition of arms. It was

privately formed in London, and succeeded in buying 1,500 Mauser rifles and 45,000 rounds

of ammunition in Germany and in landing them in Howth, Ireland. Germany‘s strategy was

that uprising in Ireland would impair Britain‘s offensive power on the Continent.424

The

Easter Rising (April 1916) became part of a wider German offensive against Britain in the

First World War. German officials made clear to Republican representatives the message –

―no revolution no rifles‖. In April 1916 Germany sent 20,000 old rifles, 10 machine guns,

and 40,000,000 rounds of ammunition to the republicans in Ireland on a ship pretending to be

a Norwegian fishing boat. The British navy captured the ship and the British police arrested

Roger Casement, a Republican senior activist who initiated cooperation with Germany, and

was set ashore in south-west Ireland, from a German submarine. After the Easter Rising, the

Germans were willing to increase military support to the Irish nationalists (60,000 rifles,

12,000,000 rounds of ammunition), but the Irish canceled the operation since the Germans

422

Joseph, McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921 (Jefferson, NC:

McFarland and Company Publishers, 2011), 271. 423

McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare , 271. 424

Bell, J. Bowyer, The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916-1986 (New Brunswick, NJ:

Transaction Publishers, 1987), 30-31.

142

refused to send soldiers as well. German diplomats in the United States assisted Irish rebels in

smuggling weapons to Ireland.425

During the 1920s Irish nationalists extendedtheir arms smuggling to Germany using

German sympathy for the Irish cause, the political instability of the Weimar Republic and the

large amount of military material left over from the First World War. Michael Collins

dispatched a number of secret emissaries to Germany in 1920 and 1921 to secure military

supplies. They cooperated with diverse German movements, and were assisted by Indian

nationalists who lived in Germany. At first they smuggled arms to Ireland in small batches

taken by individual couriers traveling in regular shipping. By the summer of 1921, because of

the severe shortage of munitions in Ireland the IRA team in Germany was instructed to

organize large-scale shipments. For example, in November 1921 they procured a ship in

Hamburg, crewed it with members of a German right-wing anti-Semitic paramilitary group,

and loaded it with 200 rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. Also, a British intelligence

report claimed that the Irish were working with the German Communist Party to arrange for

fishing boats to transport arms to Ireland. In 1922 IRA procurement operatives in Germany

set up a commercial shipping line and purchased a vessel to operate between Hamburg and

Ireland. It carried general goods but also arms and ammunition. British intelligence closely

monitored IRA activity in Germany, and intercepted some of the arms shipments to

Ireland.426

The IRA employed a section covering docks in Liverpool and other English ports that

was responsible for smuggling weapons and explosives directly to Ireland and transferring

munitions from ships arriving from the United States and the continent onto boats crossing

the Irish Sea. Irish dockers working for the IRA in Liverpool and other English ports received

and re-shipped the cargo. The IRA recruited sympathetic crew members on the ships or

passengers willing to carry the weapons in their luggage. The IRA used the British post

service to send packets with military equipment such as ingredients of explosives labeled as

bicycle parts, to fake recipients in Ireland.427

425

Jerome A. de Wiel, ―Europe and the Irish Crisis, 1900-1917,‖ in 1916: The Long Revolution, eds. Gabriel

Doherty and Dermot Keogh (Dublin: Mercier Press, 2007), 32-43; Ben Novick. ―The Arming of Ireland:

gunrunning and the Great War, 1914-1916,‖ in Ireland and the Great War. A War to Unite Us All ? ed. Adrian

Gregory and Senia Paseta (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 73-93; Seamas O‘Siochain, Roger

Casement. Imperialist, Rebel, Revolutionary (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2008), 376, 432-440. 426

Paul McMahon, British Spies and Irish Rebels: British Intelligence and Ireland, 1917-1945 (Woodbridge:

Boydell Press, 2008), 115, 125-133. 427

Tom Mahon and James J. Gillogly, Decoding the IRA (Crok: Mercier Press, 2008), 170-172, 188-189, 197.

143

The Irish diaspora to America was vital for the Irish national struggle against Britain.

Many of the nineteenth century attempts at freeing Ireland from British rule were U.S.-

inspired and U.S.-aided from those Irish people who had emigrated, in their millions, from

their famine and poverty ridden homeland. The United States was a safe haven for IRA

operatives who exploited the uncertainty in the U.S. government after World War One over

whether Irish revolutionary activists broke American law, and over popular support for Irish

independence. Irish republicans had arms agents in the United States who acquired weapons

under the cover of a political envoy. While having authority to sign an arms deal, IRA

operatives in the United States were often instructed by IRA headquarters in Dublin by

telegraph. They were assisted by Irish-American organizations smuggling funds, arms,

ammunition and operatives to Ireland. For example, on June 1922 a Royal Navy destroyer,

based on intelligence from the British Consul in New York,stopped an American steamer off

the coast of Kerry,and discovered 240,000 rounds of ammunition packed in forty barrels

marked ―Natural Laid.‖ A group of Irish-Americans and a republican senior member who

operated in New York, facilitated the introduction of the new powerful Thompson sub-

machine gun among IRA operatives in Ireland. In late-1920, an Irish-American IRA

supporter known as an arms dealer mediated in the purchase of sub-machine guns from the

Auto-Ordnance Corporation for the IRA. He was assisted by a senior Irish official in the

company, and another Irish-American multi-millionaire funded the deal. Under U.S. law

American citizens could procure such a weapon. Two former U.S. Army officers instructed

IRA operatives in Ireland in the use of the Thompson, a perfect weapon for the urban

guerrilla.428

In June 1921 the group planned to smuggle an additional 495 sub-machine guns

from New York to Ireland on a ship that carried coal to Dublin. An Irish humanitarian

organization chartered the ship, and an Irish-American support organization funded the deal.

The guns were sewn into sacks, labeled as legs of lamb. A few days before departure U.S.

customs officers searched the vessel and discovered the cargo, possibly with British help. In

the 1920s, IRA agents in New York also attempted to acquire chemical weapons for use in

Ireland against the British. Overall, in the face of successful British campaign to intercept

IRA smuggling activity, the major recourse open to the Irish rebels to obtain arms was to

seize them from the British by raiding British army barracks up and down the country. To

428

Mahon and Gillogly, Decoding, 217-229; Bowyer, Gun, 36-40.

144

illustrate, the main IRA weapon during the Irish Civil War was the Lee-Enfield rifle, which

was stolen or even bought from the British army or police. 429

Highly organized NSAs executed combined operations from overseas that included

smuggling of arms and operatives. From the 1930s, Jewish resistance groups smuggled

weapons from Europe to Palestine, directly or through Egypt, with the help of the Jewish

diaspora in many countries. The National Military Organization (IZL, the Irgun) planned to

establish clandestine cells in Europe in 1938. The plan was to train a cadre of Jewish fighters

who would immigrate to Eretz Israel illegally bringing arms with them, to become a kind of

commando corps. The Irgun reached an agreement with the Polish government that provided

weapons and ammunition to its representatives, hoping that the establishment of a new

Jewish state would lead to mass emigration of Jews, thus solving the Jewish problem in

Poland. Some of the weapons were concealed in the false bottoms of crates in which the

furniture of prospective emigrants was transported, or in the drums of electrical machines.430

With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 most of the arms that had

been kept in special ammunition depots in Poland were returned to the Polish army. After the

end of the war the Irgun renewed its smuggling efforts from Europe, mainly from France

where it established headquarters in 1946. Irgun‘s activists allocated weapons left by the

German and other armies, such as rifles, machine gunsand TNT. Explosives left by the

Germans in Nancy were removed and brought to southern France; powder was removed from

war-surplus shells. Over the history of revolts former warzones have been a valuable source

of weapons for rebels. 431

NSAs that neither mobilized third-party military intervention, nor acquired weapons

through trade or indigenous industry, were defeated by powerful empires. In 1896 Pilipino

revolted against Spanish rule, led by the Katipunan secret society that was dedicated to

independence for the Philippines. In June 1898 Emilio Aguinaldo, the main Filipino

nationalist leader declared Philippines‘ independence and proclaimed himself president of the

new Republic. But the United States that bought the Philippines from Spainrefused to

429

McMahon,British Spies,112-119, 131-132; Bernadette Whelan, United States Foreign Policy and Ireland.

From Empire to Independence, 1913-1929 (Dublin: Four Court Press, 2006), 98, 248, 341-344; David

Fitzpatrick, Harry Boland‟s Irish Revolution (Cork: Cork University Press, 2003), 147-148, 212-215, 246;

McKenna, Guerrilla, 42, 57-59; Oppenhaimer, IRA, 145-147; Martin Pegler,The Thompson SubmachineGun:

From Prohibition Chicago to World War II. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011). 430

Jerry A. Grunor, Let My People Go: The Trials and Tribulations of the People of Israel, and the Heroes who

Helped in their Independence from British Colonization (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2005), 195-196. 431

Bell J. Bowyer, Terror out of Zion: The Fight for Israel Independence (New Brunswick: Transaction

Publishers, 1996), 306; Zev Golan, Stern: The Man and His Gang (Tel Aviv: Yair Publishing, 2011), 24.

145

recognize Philippine independence or withdraw. Consequently, the Philippine-American War

(1899-1902) broke out, as Aguinaldo was not willing to replace one colonial rule with

another. Since late 1899, the army of Liberation waged a war of attrition using guerrilla

tactics, and at times was able to inflict serious damage. Yet, the Americans conducted a

successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Army of Liberation that focused on

blocking the Pilipino from weapons. This encompassedAmerican naval intelligence, the

enforcement of a naval blockade, and Aguinaldo‘s inability to generate international aid. The

American fleet effectively prevented the trade and movement of most contraband between the

islands and with the world at large. Japan and Germany sympathized with the Philipino

struggle but did not send military supplies.432

The insurgents were forced to rely heavily on

the weapons and ammunition they captured from the Spanish army in 1898, and whatever

Philipino deserters from the Spanish army brought with them, including the modern German-

made Mauser rifles that challenged American technology. America exchanged captured

guerrillas for weapons, and paid insurgents to turn in their weapons. As a result, throughout

the war the republic was desperately short of basic military equipment, including rifles and

ammunition. Lacking the facilities to manufacture smokeless powder or high-quality

cartridges, their arsenals could only produce, with great time and labor, homemade black

powder and casings, which were consequently inferior in accuracy and rate of fire. Often,

rebels used simple weapons such as bolos, spears, and poison-dipped arrows and poison-

filled squirt bottles. Lack of weapons and the defective ammunition of the Philipino

insurgents were major reasonsfor their defeat.433

NSAs’ Use of the Global Arms Trade for Resistance against Colonialism

The following section demonstrates how rebellious NSAs used the rapid expansion of the

arms trade in their struggle against colonialism. Many features of the global arms trade of the

twentieth first century emerged in the nineteenth century; by then the arms trade had become

global and therefore a major channel for NSAs to build up their forces. Rebel organizations

had long been involved in the arms trade and acquired arms from other continents. The trade

in arms was transformed in terms of its intensity, velocity, impact, institutionalization, and

432

Brisan M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 35,

282; John Gentry, How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerabilities and Military Power (Santa-Barbara: ABC-

CLIO, 2012), 24, 28-30, 35. 433

Domon L. Woods, The Philippines: A Global Studies Handbook (Santa-Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 37-39,

49-50; Andrew R. Wilson, Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant Elites in Colonial Manila, 1880-1916

(Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, 2004), 158;David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire. ThePhilippine-

American War, 1899-1902 (New-York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 84, 115, 185-191.

146

patterns of stratification, modes of transfer and the kinds of weapons traded. This

transformation was driven by the industrial revolution and the transportation revolution.

Steam ships and the railroad had a profound impact upon the geography of world trade in the

nineteenth century.Railroads could, for the first time, move heavy loads cheaply over long

distances, and steamships could go upstream almost as easily as downstream, and could sail

the ocean at any time of year. The use of the express service and telegraph facilitated

trade.New technologies in metallurgy and steam power were applied to weapons and warfare,

with devastating consequences. From the 1850s the progressive commercialization of war

and military service, along with arms manufacture and supply, resulted in the construction of

military-industrial complexes (such as in Birmingham, London and Liege), capable of

producing anything from small arms and ammunition to heavy armaments, explosives,

pontoon-bridges, and warships.434

The internationalization of arms transfers served Western governments, imperial

expansion, and colonial armies but gradually anti-colonial rebels too. It was easier for NSAs

to acquire weapons through global trade because of the huge areas of activity, complicated

structure of trade systems, limited political interference, and the drive of large European

private corporations to export large quantities of weapons to accessible markets in South

America, Africa, the Near East and Asia. The development in global communication and

transportation facilitated acquisition of arms by NSAs with moderate logistical skills. Chew

argues that the global arms trade meant that the arming of NSAs could radically change in

both qualitative and quantitative terms. The global arms trade was an instrument to secure

colonial rule, but eventually it provided native NSAs with better weapons to resist

colonialism, though resistance and its outcomes evolved mainly in the twentieth century.435

NSAs were involved in regional arms trade as before, for instance, in the late-

nineteenth century, Greek sponge fishers smuggled weapons from the east Mediterranean to

points on the long coastline of North Africa. The smuggled munitions were transshipped at

sea to smaller boats that then put in along the unprotected coast. The smuggled goods were

transported to the hinterland and sold to the rebel tribes of North Africa. Yet, from the early

nineteenth century, global trade featured complicated large scale networks of the arms trade,

mainly in small arms, being inter-continental, transatlantic, employing maritime trade of port-

434

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 21-25, Held, Global, 108-109. 435

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 21-25; Pomeranz and Topik, 48-49; R.W. Beachey. ―The Arms Trade in East

Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century,‖ The Journal of African History 3, 3(1962):454-455, 458, 460;

Smaldone, Warfare, 96.

147

cities with traditional trade caravans that operated further inland. These networks featured

heterogeneous structures and roles: European governments, arms factories, trade houses,

native armies, indigenous rulers, rebel groups, foreign and local merchants, smugglers, trade

agents and bankers. All were engaged in arms trade with the colonies via modern technology,

based on political and economic interests. For example, Chew and other scholars have

analyzed trade networks that connected Europe, North America, East Africa, South Asia, and

South East Asia, supplying weapons to NSAs that resisted colonialism in Dutch and Britain‘s

East Asia, and South Asia. That the development and use of new types of firearms in Europe

rapidly threw on the markets in Africa and Asia a great quantity of obsolete weapons, chiefly

black powder and breechloader rifles from the arsenals of Europe, demonstrated the inter-

connected profile of modern arms trade, which facilitated NSAs‘ arming efforts.436

Haitian rebels of the early nineteenth century traded tropical crops (coffee, sugar)

with American and English merchants in exchange for guns, gunpowder, and military sea

vessels. In the 1890s, Somali rebels traded camels for rifles, and Congo Arab warlords sold

forest ivory in exchange for guns. Often caravan merchants and maritime traders transported

arms with other goods. Smuggling to gain profit, they might cease gunrunning and trade with

other more profitable commodities. These exchange patterns were not novel, but modern

trade systems were much bigger and global. They evolved into big business with wider

informal labor division and roles set. Senior arms traders had large arsenals of weapons

stored in depots, and also had financial backing. That is, logistical and financial aspects

became major issues in modern arms trade.437

For example, the western and eastern Indian

Ocean economy was based on triangular trade in guns, slaves, ivory or drugs; the last two

were sent to European and American markets. Native NSAs were an important component of

this system because rebels acquired guns that were needed to secure trade in local goods, in

addition to raiding forslaves who supported the regional economy. In the Indian Ocean arena,

Indian and European senior merchants used profits from the opium trade to reinvest in the

business of gunrunning and slaves. Thus, from its outset the global arms trade was connected

to illicit trade and criminal activity.438

Global arms trade networks consisted of hubs such as Singapore in South East Asia

from the mid-nineteenth century. British governmental and private weapons companies

436

Harman, Bwana Storkesi,159, 179; Chew, Arming the Periphery, 168-172. 437

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 40, 198-209. 438

Laurent Dubois,Avengers of the New World. The Story of the Haitian Revolution. (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 2004), 108, 110, 126, 157, 283.

148

exported secondhand and new rifles, ammunition, and machine-made powder to Singapore.

Local and foreign merchants re-exported the cargo directly to rebel groups in the Philippines,

Sumatra, Java and China, or through North Borneo, Siam, Portuguese Timor, New Guinea

and French Indochina. From Bengal Singapore received supplies of Indian opium, very

popular in the region, that facilitated the arms trade. Rebel smugglers visited Singapore and

North Borneo to acquire weapons. Chew notes that Singapore was the leading arms

transshipment center of the eastern Indian Ocean. Singapore, as well as Mombasa, Zanzibar,

Muscat and Djibouti demonstrated entrepots, free trade facilities that established gateways for

small arms traffic.439

Since its establishment in 1896, Djibouti port, for example, was the

most active center of the arms trade between the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. Arab and

European traders shipped arms and ammunition that were coming from Europe to the

Arabian coast; from Aden they transported the goods to North Somali ports. After off-loading

the cargo, smugglers would proceed to Djibouti, where the trade in arms was practically

unchecked. Local dealers sold part of the arms and ammunition to rebel groups in Somaliland

or the vessels carried the weapons further south, and merchants sold it in South East Africa.

Some of the weapons were French made, and Arab dhows sailed under the French flag and

could not be searched at sea. They carried clearance papers made out to Yemen when it was

definitely known that their destination was the Somali and East African coast. In spite of the

vigilance of the British and Italian patrol ships, only a small fraction of the dhows were

captured.440

Similarly, Abd el Krim was a national Moroccan leader who drove the Spanish army

out of Morocco, and came close to doing that to the French. El Krim turned bands of clans

and tribes into a well-organized army equipped with modern weapons which were vital for

his military success. Riffian-Berbers exploited the international free zone of Tangier to

smuggle arms (machine guns, rifles, cannons) and ammunition they purchased from

European business men through the city. Tangier remained open during the war, and the

Spanish were never able to seal off the city and the coast entirely. Rif‘s women smuggled

weapons from Tangier to safe houses because nobody could touch women.441

439

Beachey, ―Arms Trade,‖ 465-466. 440

Beachey, ―Arms Trade,‖ 465-466. 441

Laqueur,Guerrilla,185-186; Jean D. Lepage,The French Foreign Legion: An Illustrated History (Jefferson,

NC: McFarland, 2008), 125-126; Helmuth, C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen,Merchants of Death. Study of

the International Armament Industry (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934), 192-193; Alison

Backer,Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women (Albany: State University of New York Press,

1998) 154; Stanley G. Payne,Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

149

Modern trade facilitated the previous involvement of trading diasporas in supplying

weapons to rebel groups. Abd el Kader al Din was the leader of the first Algerian war of

independence against the French(1832-1847). His father Sheikh Muhi al Din, a nobleman

(marabout) of the Beni Hachem tribe that occupied the Plain of Ghriss (southeast of Oran),

appointed him to lead the Jihad against the French invaders in 1832 and he was declared

sultan. The arming of the Algerian tribes was a significant segment of Abd el Qader‘s plan to

establish a regular army for the new Islamic nation out of his irregular force.442

Against this

background, Jewish traders from Oran acquired for Abd el Qader rifles, cannons and

gunpowder. Jewish traders established a commercial network that encompassed major

Mediterranean ports (such as Gibraltar, Livorno, Tunis, Alexandria and Marseilles), the tribal

interior in Algeria (they exported the meat and grain of local Arab farmers), the British

consulate in Gibraltar and even British officials in the foreign ministry in London. This

network dated back to the sixteenth century when the Spanish expelled the non-Christian

population and the Jews settled in the Ottoman Empire and in Italy. The Jewish traders served

as middlemen between the Arabs and the French colonialists‘ administration and exploited

both sides‘ dependence on them to secure their commercial and religious interests.443

Kiser

argues that Jewish merchants served as diplomats and intelligence agents on behalf of Abd el

Kader because they knew the French well,with whom they conducted business; they visited

Europe often, spoke foreign languages and thus were more cosmopolitan than the Arabs. One

of them, Mordecai Amar, was a close advisor to the Algerian leader; he traded the tribes‘

wheat for European weapons through commercial connections in Britain and Spain. Another

Jewish merchant, Judas Ben Duran, purchasedraw materials (iron, steel, sulphur) in Europe to

develop the indigenous Algerians‘ military industry. European technological experts (some of

them military deserters, others professionals under contract from France) assisted the rebels

in establishing modest production facilities such asa cannon shells factory in Tagdempt and a

rifle factory in Tlemsem. He saw this activity as laying the foundations for an Algerian state.

With these resources Abd el Kader posed a real challenge to the French colonial plan in

1967),163; Tagliacozzo,Secret Trades, 275; Beachey, ―Arms Trade,‖ 462; Harman, Bwana Storkesi,190-207;

Chew, Arming the Periphery 39. 442

John W. Kiser, Commander of the Faithful. The Life and Times of Emir Abd el-Kader (Rhinebeck, N.Y.:

Monkfish Book Publishing, 2008), 61-62, 72-74. 443

Joshua Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria (Piscataway, NJ:

Rutgers University Press, 2010), 14-15, 25-33; H. D‘ Ivedville, Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud. From his Private

Correspondence and Original Documents 1784-1849, vol. 1 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1884), 273-276.

150

Algeria, forcing the French to acknowledge his authority over much of Algeria and managing

to postpone the total occupation of Algeria. 444

Thus, as in the Middle Age, NSAs of the modern world played an important role as

arms traders. The Straits Chinese were a group of merchants and smugglers who dominated

the arms trade of the South China Sea in the second half of the nineteenth century. They lived

in separate communities through South East Asia and mediated between European merchants

and indigenous peoples. They purchased European weapons in Singapore and North Borneo

and sold them to Muslim rebels in southern Philippines (Sulu islands and Mindanao) who

revolted against Spanish rule, in exchange for slaves, gutta-percha, and wax. Once the

Spanish began the calculated destruction of rebel shipping, Chinese merchants freighted their

goods from Singapore on European-owned vessels through family and business associates.

They also used transshipping trade in the outer islands of the Philippines Archipelago. The

Spanish attempted to constrain the Strait Chinese by harsh measures (registration, restrictions

over migration and expulsion) but could not compete with Chinese mobility, community

solidarity, and their business cooperation with the British government in Malaya.445

The global character and larger size of the modern arms trade explains the diverse

figures and institutions that engaged in the nineteenth century arms trade. Formal

representatives of European charter companies, agency houses and shipping firms linked

arms transfers from manufacturing centers in Europe to markets in the East. European and

American adventurers and entrepreneurs visited colonies, mainly in wartime, to gain a good

deal of their stock (for example, in the Caribbean, Netherland East India and China), and also

local merchants, and bankers who financed the growing scale of the arms trade. In the

colonies, the distinction between legal and illicit trade was not clear, and people engaged in

formal and informal occupations simultaneously. For example, European trade companies

employed European merchants who emigrated to the colonies and facilitated illegal trade in

arms and other commodities that could be classified as contraband with native NSAs (some

of them established private firms, many lived in ports). Thus, Chew argues that around the

trade system of the India Ocean arena, there was little difference between the chartered

444

Kiser, 136 100, 112; John Ruedy, Modern Algeria. The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1992), 62-63; Henry Churchill, The Life of Abdel Kader. The Sultan of the Arabs

ofAlgeria (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867), 62, 125-130; Laqueur, Guerrilla, 69-72. 445

James F. Wamen, The Sulu Zone: 1768-1898. The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the

Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 127-134.

151

company and colonial regime and drug cartels and pirates. 446

Arms dealers and merchants

used creative and sophisticated techniques to smuggle weapons; many of them were

connected to maritime trade. They avoided reporting the content of a vessel‘s cargo or

provided false declarations. They concealed and camouflaged weapons among civilian goods,

and sailed under a comfortable flag in conflict areas (for example, American shippers used a

Spanish brig to smuggle arms to rebels in the Philippines under the Spanish flag). Ethnic

groups‘ connections at ports helped in unloading illicit cargos. 447

Colonial powers acknowledged the potential security threat imposed by the global

arms trade. They conducted different measures to limit the risks, but mostly with limited

success. Arms smugglers operated in European centers, for example in 1854 British

authorities seized a large quantity of gunpowder that was about to be shipped to Greece for

use by the Greek insurgents. A batch of Birmingham guns was smuggled into South Africa

for use in a raid in 1895 that precipitated the Boer War. Some of the guns left Birmingham

secreted in packing cases designed to resemble grand pianos.448

European governments

initiated legislation limiting the sale and use of firearms but it was harder to supervise the

flow of weapons once they were transported to the colonies. Private weapons companies were

apparently less committed to export regulations, and a strong free trade lobby undermined

these legislations. Colonial powers attempted to monitor the flow of weapons into their

territories by marking borders, patrolling the coasts, increasing police supervision at ports,

forbidding import of modern weapons, regulating the possession of arms in the colonies, and

confiscating weapons arsenals. The maritime profile of the global arms trade made it harder

to intercept arms shipments, especially within archipelagos (Netherland East India,

Philippines, and the Caribbean Islands),unless colonial powers conducted brutal measures

(demolition of towns, expulsion of people).449

In Southeast Asia, the borders between British and Dutch rule existed more in the

minds of European diplomats than anyone living in the depths of the forest. Tagliacozzo

argues that legislation and technologies of enforcement might have changed over the second

half of the nineteenth century, but neither the British rule in Southeast Asia nor the Dutch

were ever able to completely stop the trade in arms spilling across the border. What did

446

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 195, 202-209. 447

Chew, Arming the Periphery ,204-208. 448

Joan Zuckerman and Geoffrey Ele, The Birmingham Heritage(London: Taylor & Francis, 1979), 97;

Chew,Arming the Periphery, 79, 95. 449

Smaldone, Warfare, 100, 107; Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, 44-47, 271-280

152

happen was that this trade was pushed further and further underground, as the state strove to

cut off tendrils of supply that constantly adapted and changed. Arms smuggling was a big

business in Southeast Asia. The geographical profile of the archipelago, composed of

thousands of islands, helped, and colonial officials turned a blind eye or lacked manpower on

the ground to check smuggling activity. Cross-sections of ethnic and national actors in

Southeast Asia dealt with arms; locals and foreigners were all heavily involved in these

transactions as traders, smugglers and shippers (for example, arms ships under British colors

with Chinese skippers and Acehnese or Malay crews). Even many Dutchmen themselves

were active in these trades, proving that profit was a stronger incentive than nationalism, at

least for some. Consequently, Aceh rebels in northern Sumatra maintained a lengthy

resistance against the Dutch.450

European states played a double game regarding the illicit arms trade. They supported

smugglers and shippers when they benefitted politically and financially from the trade.

France encouraged the arms trade through the port of Muscat because the arms were

smuggled to the North West Frontier of India to be used against the British.451

In 1890,

Germans used an Irish arms trader, well connected in East Africa, to supply old gunpowder

produced in Hamburg, for a local leader from the Lake Victoriaregion who revolted against

the British. The dealer stored his supplies in German territory in Tanganyika. Harman notes

that European troops in the colonies sold army surplus to local arms dealers who traded with

African chiefs. European merchants operated in Africa, using anti-slavery societies and

missions as a cover for arms trade with local peoples.452

The rise of the global arms trade encouraged great powers to cooperate in their

struggle against gunrunning. Initially, arms control efforts targeted the disarmament of NSAs.

For example, the United States and Russia agreed in 1824 not to sell weapons to the native

people of the northwest coast of America in order to ensure that they would be relatively safe

from destructive attack by the Amerindians. In 1897, Spain, Britain and Germany signed a

protocol to suppress gunrunning and slave raiding around the Philippine Archipelago. The

technological development of weaponry that led to the vast destruction of the 1914-1918 war,

created for the first time a global framework for arms control by an international

organization. The League of Nations conducted conventions for the control of trade in arms

450

Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, 44-47, 271-280. 451

Chew, Arming the Periphery, 126. 452

Nicholas Harman, Bwana Storkesi and his African Conquests (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), 123-125, 190-

207.

153

and ammunition. The states involved were motivated in part by the desire to prevent the

escalation of limited wars, in part by the hope that such an action might facilitate the more

comfortable control of colonies. In this framework, the convention of 1919 prohibited the

export of firearms and ammunition to most parts of Africa and the Middle East. Croft argues

that the success of such rare efforts was very limited. Thus, Held states that well before the

Great War the arms merchants, encouraged by their respective governments, had created a

global arms trade system which operated largely on a commercial logic and was effectively

beyond the control of governments. Rebellious NSAs used this change to acquire weapons.453

Summary

The chapter explored how the European powers exploited their military and technological

superiority to annex Asia, Africa and Oceania, easily suppressing local resistance. During the

nineteenth century, self-production of weapons became an ineffective method for rebellious

NSAs to build up their force, and the imbalance of power between states and NSAs reached a

peak confirming the views of Smith and Van Creveldof NSAs weak in weaponry. The

historical review reveals that even in the era that Smith calls ―interstate industrial war‖

colonial powers were busy fighting many rebellious NSAs in the colonies. In a number of

cases native people with skillful commanders, a warfare tradition, access to arms trade

networks and tactical use of geographical environment, inflicted heavy losses over much

stronger colonial armies. Rebellious NSAs began to exploit modern communication and

transportation to facilitate smuggling of weapons over long distances.

In that pre-global world, NSAs used guerrilla and terror tactics to fight mighty

colonial armies, occasionally gaining victories. Still, as articulated by Smith and Van

Creveld, they did not enjoy the advantages of today‘s armed groups, primarily the great

impact of the media on conflicts and states‘ fear ofcausalties instead of using their forces at

any cost to achieve their aims. Colonial armies brutally suppressed indigenous revolts, but at

that time it was not viewed as ―crimes in an unjust cause.‖454

The next chapter discusses how

post World War Two‘s developments of the international system improved the military

strength of rebellious NSAs.

453

Stuart Croft,Strategies of Arms Control: A History and Typology(Manchester:Manchester University Press,

1996),29-33, 51-52; Chew,Arming the Periphery, 51; Held, Global, 109. 454

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 226; Smith, Utility of the Force, 17.

154

The rise of the global arms trade encouraged the emergence of more complex smuggling

systems of NSAs. With modern communication and transportation evolving, the second half

of the nineteenth century witnessed important features of SOS. Geographic dispersion of

componentsof smuggling systems become larger and NSAs could better communicate with

each other. A bigger role set and more differential division of labor amongst smugglers and

arms merchants made the arms trade more heterogeneous and components of this trade more

independent and less controlled by governments.

155

Chapter Five: The Arming of NSAs during the Cold War and

De-colonialism (1945-1990)

The chapter analyses how the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union that

encompassed part of the Third World, influenced the arming of NSAs that fought for

independence or regime change. Providing examples from Southeast Asia, Africa and

America, the chapter demonstrates how different NSAs were armed and employed by the

Soviet Union and the United States to fight their foes, namely proxy wars. At the same time,

NSAs (like independent regimes) made the most of the East-West contest, including gaining

advanced weapon systems from their sponsors. In the evolving new world system, rival

neighboring countries employed NSAs against each other, providing the insurgents with large

quantities of weapons. The chapter explores how classical guerrilla scholars addressed the

arming of rebel groups.

Historical and Theoretical Background

NSAs‘ efforts to gain weapons in the postwar era should be viewed through the lens of the

de-colonialism process. It was usually a two-way story: the rebel group turned to the super-

power for support in its private struggle promising to help the super-power against a regime

supported by the rival super-power and the super-power exploited the rebel group because it

could weaken the rival super-power's hold on a particular region. Each side exploited the

other for its own gain even if, in some cases, they were ideologically incompatible (for

example supporting religious extremists or military juntas irrespective of their ideological

affiliation) with the supporting super-power.

The United States and Soviet Russia emerged as the two superpowers at the end of

World War Two, and from viewing each other as an ally against Germany they shifted to

seeing each other as a global enemy. Yergin explains that these two countries stood opposed

to each other as nation-states, as ideologies, and as economic, and political systems. After

1945 the two superpowers were able to approximate a state of general mobilization without

general war being the consequence. Alongside the creation of the Iron Curtain, the arms race,

and the space race, to do their fighting, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation competed in 'collecting'

rival third party allies,states as well as NSAs,providing them with weapons and other

essential logistic support. Europe was the major battleground for the superpowers, but the

Americans and the Soviets supported rebel groups across the world, directly or through

156

proxy.455

Western leaders regarded the Soviet Union as the nerve center of world-class

revolution. A new doctrine of ―national security‖ led the Americans to believe that the Soviet

Union presented an immediate military threat to the United States everywhere in the world.

From the point of view of the Soviet strategies, it was better to confront the imperialist

powers, led by the United States, by backing national or incipient socialist movements in

Africa and Asia, than by direct confrontation, which carried the awful risk of nuclear war.

Some of the proxies served as operational and logistic centers, arming insurgents across the

world. Cuba especially played a remarkable role in that respect. Cuban leaders advocated a

global ―internationalist‖ mission in supporting revolutionary movements (including weapons

supply); they regarded their military intervention overseas as an effective means of

combating the United States and its allies.456

In 1975, experiencing a shortage of American

weapons, the Soviet Union askedCommunist Vietnam to provide captured American

weapons for ‗foreign Communist parties and representatives of national liberation

movements.‖ A few years later, during the Reagan administration, the United States used

Saudi Arabia, Morocco, South Africa, Israel and other allies to send money, to train and

supply weapons to insurgent groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Sudan and

Somalia.457

The Cold War overlapped with the struggle of movements for independence in Africa,

Asia and revolutionary movements in Americas, following World War Two. By1975, most of

the colonies of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, and finally

Portugal, were transformed into independent states (seventy new members in the United

Nations). Exhausted by World War Two, European imperialist powers granted independence

to their colonies with relatively little violence. In colonies with significant white settler

minorities, Africans mainly had to resort to armed struggle to gain independence, since the

settler population strongly resisted majority black rule and struggled to retain their privileged

position. Some independent countries did not meet the challenge of ruling new nations and

establishing a viable economy. They faced great demographic and economic problems and

witnessed ineffective and corrupted regimes, and internal disunity due to ethnic and religious

divisions. Thus, both superpowers could punish nations that rejected their overtures by

455

Upshur et al., World History, 888-899, 912-934. 456

Bulliet et al., Earth, 861-885; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, The Origins of the Cold War and the National

Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 5-13, 406. 457

George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation. United States‟ Policy toward Angola since 1945 (London: Pluto

Press, 1997), 110; Yevgenia Albats, KGB. State within a State. The Secret Police and its Hold on Russia‟s Past,

Present and Future (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 225-226.

157

supporting their enemies. Cold War antagonists provided arms and political support for the

nationalist forces even when the nationalist goals were different from those of the

superpowers. The Soviet bloc supplied arms and training, and much rhetorical support, to

anti-imperialist guerrilla movements from the 1960s. The United States supported

conservative, pro-Western regimes, and provided covert assistance to conservative opponents

seeking to overthrow socialist or communist governments, mainly in its backyard, Latin

America.458

Anti-colonial NSAs that failed to mobilize external support were usually

repressed. The British army suppressed the Mau Mau insurgency of the Kikuyu tribe in

Kenya (1952-1956) and the Malayan Communist Party‘s guerrilla war in Malaya (1948-

1960) mainly because both NSAs lacked support from an external benefactor. They had no

foreign supporters to send them weapons, money or military advisors.459

The superpowers were involved in the buildup of NSAs‘ force. Often the aid was

comprehensive including arms shipments, training in the use of weapons, guerrilla warfare

and other military subjects, military advisors and technicians. The foreign aid covered a range

of arms from small arms to major weapons and serviced all three branches of the armed

forces; often it was free. Superpowers supplied NSAs with their own produced weapons and

sometimes provided captured weapons of their foes which characterized a global arms trade

(China and Cuba supplied American weapons to their allies while the United States and its

proxies re-exported Soviet weapons).460

The superpowers also set limits on how far such

fighting could go in order to keep conflicts from triggering a devastating nuclear world war.

They confined themselves to sending weapons and occasionally sending combat units to war-

zones (American forces were sent to Vietnam and Latin America, Soviet forces intervened in

Afghanistan and Egypt and covertly in North Vietnam). The following sectiondemonstrates

that often regional factors like historical inter-state alienations affected and even

overshadowed the connection between the Cold War and arming of NSAs. In this context, the

superpowers‘ military support for NSAs often involved other players, including friendly

states, smugglers and merchants. It was not a pure superpower-NSA combination.461

458

Dominguez, Make a World,114;Anne Gilksand Gerald Segal,China and the Arms Trade(Beckenham, U.K.:

Goom Helm, 1985), 33; Odd, A. Westad. The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of

Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 459

Robert B. Edgerton, Mau Mau. An African Crucible (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 59, 81-83, 128-131;

Mumford, 45-46, 61-69. 460

Dominguez, Make a World, 114. 461

Gilks and Segal, China, 33; Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 25.

158

The Cold War encompassed several theatres of war that influenced each other

regarding the superpowers‘ability to support NSAs. That is, the United States and China

could increase their military support for rebel groups in Africa and Latin America once the

war in Vietnam ended. The superpowers‘ remarkable logistic capabilities provided greater

opportunities for NSAs to improve their armament and to conduct longstanding struggles.

Big transport aircraft and huge ships redefined external support for rebel groups. Older

transport aircraft could be refueled in long distance flights and often for security and political

reasons, the superpowers could not send military aid directly to the theatre of war. NSAs and

their patrons relied on third countries that provided shelter to national liberation movements,

and logistic and operational services. These countries hosted political leadership and military

commands of rebel groups and guerrilla training camps run by foreign advisors. They also

served as transit stations for arms shipments. Training has often preceded the supply of

weapons. In some cases the guerrillas returned with arms, in others arms arrived later. More

sophisticated weapon systems compelled rebels to deal with maintenance problems,

otherwise their modern weapons were useless. Some insurgencies were unable to absorb

more than a small quantity of basic arms.462

Many of the national liberation movements that fought western colonialism after War

World Two were inspired by Mao Tse-Tung‘s theory on guerrilla warfare. While Marxism-

Leninism regarded arming of revolutionaries as critical, Mao argued that people are more

important than weapons. Therefore arming of an insurgency has a minor role in planning a

revolution in comparison to ―subjective‖ aspects, chiefly morale. Mao provided historical

evidence for the argument that countries with weak armies could defeat empires with

powerful armies because people in the former had a stronger morale and were committed to

the policy of their party. This theme had direct implications for the role of armament in

Mao`s military theory.463

Mao focused on the principle of a long-term war to defeat the

enemy and to gain time to organize the volunteers into a new regular army. The mobilization

and indoctrination of the people to support the revolution and join the war also required a

long campaign. Apparently, these goals, like the need to operate in vast space and time,

implied a requirement for a steady flow of large military supplies, but that was unrealistic for

the Communists in China. In his book, On Guerrilla Warfare (1937) Mao stated that China

was aweak country of vast size with poor technology and communication. Therefore local

462

Gilks and Segal, China, 39. 463

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), 87.

159

guerrilla groups should be self-reliant in acquiring their arms which could be old and

improvised.464

Following Mao, revolutionary commanders across the world advocated for prolonged

war and the employment of guerrilla warfare tactics such as ambushes and harassment as

compensation for their weakness in arms. They believed that by annihilating small bodies of

the enemy troops, thus demoralizing the others, they would force the enemy to withdraw

from the occupied land or to give up power. This was their method to turn “weaknesses” into

“strengths.‖465

For example, Troung Chinh, former Secretary-General of the Vietnamese

Communist Party and the senior theoretician of the Vietnamese revolution stated: ―because

we are short of arms, guerrilla warfare will in general be the most widespread method of

fighting employed by our people in the long-term resistance. With the gradual development

of the war, our army will gain more experience and we shall have more modern arms, so that

mobile warfare will be applied more extensively.‖466

Chinh asked the people not to

overestimate modern arms claiming that: ―material conditions are quite necessary to victory –

even a temporary victory – in any military action, whether in war, or in an armed uprising,‖

but ―all the strong points of Vietnam are fundamental; and those of the French are

auxiliary.‖467

Ernesto (Che) Guevara, the most important theoretician of the Cuban revolution,

emphasized the purchase of explosives as vital for guerrilla operations. He argued that in a

future war with the United States army the Cubans would need to equip themselves with anti-

aircraft and anti-tank weapon systems and that was a manifestation of an asymmetric military

doctrine. Guevara acknowledged that the Cuban people – being unskilled in military affairs -

would have to engage in a people‘s war against an American invasion.468

The Cold War and the Arming of NSAs in Southeast Asia

The Vietminh war of independence against the French (1946-1954) was an early example of

the Cold War‘s impact upon NSAs‘ weaponry. It demonstrated an arming procedure of rebel

groups similar to past and more modern NSAs. Initially, the communist rebels seized

464

Mao, Guerilla, 44-46, 71-72, 97; Tovy, Guerrilla, 56, 88-89. 465

Trung Chinh, Primer for Revolt. The Communist Takeover in Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger

Publishers, 1963), 166; Tovy, Guerrilla, 56, 88-89. 466

Gareth Porter, ed. Vietnam. A History in Documents (New York: Earl M. Coleman, 1979), 112, 116. 467

Porter, 66, 72. 468

Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), 10, 18, 82-85.

160

weapons that the surrendered Japanese army left behind (May 1945), mainly rifles and

machine-guns, and a few mortars; Giap claimed that they also bought armaments from

General Chiang Kai-shek‘s army that was deployed in North Vietnam in 1945-1946. They

seized French weapons by ambushing French supply convoys, but generally they lacked

weapons to the extent that they were searching for Japanese and French weapons sunk in

rivers, and they fought with spears. Therefore, in 1947 the Vietminh failed to conquer Hanoi,

and returned to guerrilla warfare.469

The victory of the Communist Party in China (1949)

opened a new phase for the Vietminh struggle. The encirclement of the Vietminh had been

broken on the northern border and the former started to receive material aid from their

neighbors. China was a significant sanctuary for the Vietminh as they conducted training,

operational planning and logistics work in Yunnan and Guanxi in southern China. The

capture of Hainan Island in April-May 1950 facilitated the supply of weapons. Their volume

increased, and the French reported a significant improvement in the Vietminh‘s weaponry.

The arms and military advice that the Chinese had started to supply to the Vietminh – heavy

mortars and cannons – contributed to the buildup of their force from a militia that conducted

guerrilla warfare into a regular army which was capable of occupying territory and launching

a positional war. By June 1951 China‘s aid had enabled the Vietminh to arm three divisions.

Chinese aid did not enable the Vietminh arsenal to equal the French, but it did radically alter

the military situation. For the first time the Vietminh began to inflict heavy losses on French

troops.470

In November 1951 a new rail link was opened, which facilitated supply. Daily

supplies arrived by train across the border from Nanning, carrying heavy mortars, 105mm

field guns, 75mm and 57mm recoilless guns. The Vietminh transferred through China

weapons they received from the Soviet Union such as 37mm anti-aircraft guns. Gilk and

Segal argue that the Chinese supplied heavier weapons, even though they were desperately

trying to modernize their own forces. The Vietminh had received sufficient light and heavy

weapons to outfit heavy artillery units for what was to be a war-ending offensive. The former

also set up an indigenous military production infrastructure which produced small arms,

bazookas, recoilless guns and light repaired weapon systems. The head of the department was

a Vietnamese scientist residing in France who probably used his connections to acquire

469

Vu N. Giap, People‟s War People‟s Army. The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped

Countries. (New York: Frederich A. Plaeger Publishers, 1962), 135 ; Vu N. Giap, Unforgettable Days (Hanoi:

Foreign Language‘s Publishing House, 1975),86, 399; Vu N. Giap, Dien Bien Phu, 2nd ed. (Foreign

Language‘s Publishing House: Hanoi, 1962), 22, 39, 65, 169, 189. 470

Gilks and Segal,Revolutionary Guard, 33-34.

161

military technologies for the new army. Therefore, the Vietminh were able to initiate

(January 1954) a large scale operation to besiege the French fortified entrenched camp in the

valley of Dien Bien Phu (northwest of Vietnam). They surprised the French by shelling the

camp with heavy artillery from the surrounding mountains, and after fifty five days of

extensive fighting the besieged French surrendered. Giap argued that ―our light artillery

played a great part in the Dien Bien Phu battle. A few months before the battle the Chinese

built a special road linking Mengtze in Yunnan with Dien Bien Phu, and after the victory

Giap said that 1,000 Soviet lorries had carried supplies over from China. The French defeat in

Dien Bien Phu paved the way for French withdrawal from Indochina and in 1954 the

Republic of North Vietnam was established.471

As an independent state, North Vietnam supported communist insurgent groups in

neighboring countries, such as Cambodia. The Cambodian Communists, the Khmer Rouge

were weak in weaponry and depended on the captured arms of government units. From the

1960s until the end of 1972 Pol Pot's troops were armed, trained, and often led by the

Vietnamese who carried out most of the fighting against the Cambodian Republican army.

The Khmer Rouge lacked the weapons and ammunition to sustain an offensive on Phnom

Penh. Following the Paris Agreement and the end of American involvement in Vietnam

(1973), China stepped up support to the Khmer Rouge that flowed down the Ho Chi Minh

Trail from China. The North Vietnamese provided logistical support to move the Chinese

material and supplemented it with some of its own equipment. China sent the Khmer Rouge

floating mines; the Communists planted them in the Mekong and the Cambodian government

were compelled to close the river to traffic after several supply ships were sunk. By the end

of 1974, Phnom Penh was completely isolated because all roads to the capital were cut too.

China supplied the Khmer Rouge artillery that enabled them to fire heavy bombardments on

the capital. Also, they captured several cannons from the collapsing Republican army.

American cargo planes could no longer airlift rice and ammunition to the Phnom Penh

airfield which came under artillery attack. Heavily armed Cambodian Communist troops

entered Phnom Penh on April 1975.472

After the end of the Second Indochina War (1975), the Cold War in Asia had become

a rivalry between two communist powers, China and the Soviet Union, with the United States

471

Giap, Dien Bien Phu, 217-222, 287, 303. 217-222; Gilks and Segal, China, 34-35. 472

David P. Chandler, Brother Number One. A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999),

48, 80-94, 102-103; Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields. The Cambodian War of 1970-1975 (Texas

University Press, 1997), 79, 165, 211.

162

firmly joining China‘s side. China‘s military support of the Khmer Rouge in spite of the

latter‘s massacre of its own people (1975-1979), rescued the organization after Vietnam

invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Communist Cambodian regime in 1979 but now the

Chinese were assisted by other states that were also afraid of Vietnam‘s expansion in

Indochina. Pro-American Thailand played an important role as a military sanctuary for the

forces opposing the Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh, providing territory in which

the Khmer Rouge and other factions could find shelter, construct bases, and facilitate the flow

of finance and arms to the guerrilla groups.473

The Thai-Cambodian border was the scene of

arms smuggling and black market trade for many years, but now China used Thai territory for

Khmer Rouge resupply in exchange for decreasing support for communist insurgents

operating in Thailand. Thai officials saw China as a crucial factor in a strategy to contain the

influence of Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. As if they were still fighting

the Vietnam War, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United

States sent some weapons to the non-communist Cambodian resistance who allied with the

Khmer Rouge and refused to consider arresting Pol Pot or any other Khmer Rouge on

charges of genocide all in the name of fighting against Vietnamese occupation, even though

the Vietnamese had withdrawn from Cambodia by 1989. Weapon shipments for the rebels

were unloaded in Sattahip Port. The Thais constructed weapon storehouses on both sides of

the Cambodian border for the weapons the Khmer Rouge and other resistance groups

received. Thai military provided logistical support for the transfer of arms supplies for the

guerrillas, and took a portion of the arms delivered. Usually China paid for the Thais‘

logistical services.474

In 1993 local media reported that a large clandestine storage area had been found in a

farm in southeast Thailand and contained around 1,500 tons of arms and ammunition, mostly

Chinese-made. The farm was guarded by Khmer Rouge members who lived there with their

families and was connected to the Thai army. The Khmer Rouge and the Thai army became

trading counterparts in the 1980s. The rebels traded in timber and gems from border areas

they seized, gaining enormous sources of revenue to wage war. Whether from China alone or

with additional funds and supplies from the United States, the Khmer Rouge were

473

Terry Fiona, Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University

Press, 2002), 117-125; Susan E. Cook, Genocide in Cambodia And Rwanda: New Perspectives (New

Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 83, 96-104. 474

Dinah PoKempner, ed. Cambodia at War (Human Rights Watch, 1995), 12, 111-112, 122; Gerd Junne and

Willemijn Verkoren, Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 2005), 290-291.

163

rehabilitated as a strong fighting force (forty thousand troops in strength) that challenged the

Cambodian government, a few years after their defeat by the Vietnamese army. Later, against

the background of massive international efforts to pacify Cambodia and gain national

reconciliation, a weakened Khmer Rouge had no interest in the stabilization of Cambodia and

resisted disarmament and demobilization because of their economic interests in arms trade

and exploitation of Cambodian mines in the north. Isolated and without external support they

sustained guerrilla warfare until the late 1990s.475

The Cold War and the Arming of NSAs in Africa

Most African countries‘ wars of independence occurred when rivalry between the East and

the West was at its most intense, and that created new opportunities for acquisition of

weapons. The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) that resisted French control in

Algeria (1954-1962) exploited local resources of arms and funds to the maximum. The FLN

located some caches the United States left behind in North Africa after World War Two. It

set up underground factories to make bombs out of odds and ends, but mostly it relied on

material from the French army obtained by theft, robbery or the battlefield, and from

deserters from the French forces.476

Later, a few shipments arrived from Egypt, paid for by

the Arab League as an act of solidarity with an Arab people struggling for independence. The

External Delegation, operating from Cairo, took the lead in developing sources of supply

among countries friendly to the FLN in the Arab World and the Eastern Block. By 1955, the

former had erected a workable system of bases and routes for providing the FLN forces in

Algeria with arms, ammunition, and other supplies. In 1958, responsibility for most logistical

support for the FLN was passed to the new Minister of Armament and General Supply of the

ALN government-in-exile. The equipment and supplies obtained were shipped to ports in

Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco and subsequently moved forward to FLN depots in Tunisia and

Morocco under the supervision of FLNs‘ representatives. The Tunisian army carried arms

and supplies to the western part of the country where they were handed over to the FLN.477

475

Elizabeth Becker, When the War was Over. Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution (New York: Public

Affairs, 1998), 460, 485-486, 493, 499; Aurel Croissant. ―International Interim Governments Democratization

and Post-conflict Peace Building. Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor,‖ in Interim Governments:

Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy, eds. Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo (Washington DC: US

Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 231-232. 476

Edgar O‘Balance, The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 49-50. 477

Charles R. Schrader, The First Helicopter War: Logistics Mobility in Algeria 1954-1962 (Westport, CT:

Greenwood, 1999), 164-166; O‘Balance, The Algerian Insurrection, 49-50.

164

Communist countries played an important role in arming the FLN. In 1959, China

supplied the FLN with captured U.S. weapons from Korea (mortars, heavy machine guns,

anti-aircraft guns), and granted the FLN ten million dollars to purchase weapons. In

December 1961, a Cuban ship left Havana with 1,500 rifles, more than thirty machines guns,

four U.S.-made mortars, and a large quantity of mortar rounds, also of U.S. manufacture. The

weapons were unloaded at Casablanca and transported in January 1962 to the FLN camp near

the Algerian border. Communist Czechoslovakia and East Germany supplied weapons to the

FLN on behalf of the Eastern Bloc (fearing that France would ask for U.S. involvement in

Algeria, the Soviet Union deliberately remained in the background). The former provided

mainly the Mauser guns taken from the retreating German army, followed by imitation

Mausers the Czechs manufactured themselves.478

The FLN used Arab states as an end-user

for purchase of weapons and other military supplies in western countries. Some weapons

reached Algeria directly, but usually gunrunners loaded arms on East German or Yugoslav

ships, and then sent them via independent Morocco or Tunisia. The FLN employed Algerian

immigrants in France to run cash in suitcases to Swiss banks which then paid the gunrunners.

Some of the latter were career smugglers involved in illicit trade of cigarettes and gold

through the Mediterranean or ex-SS officers who acquired rifles in West Germany.479

The FLN acquired significant quantities of arms and ammunition but faced great

difficulties in smuggling the shipments into Algeria. The French almost completely isolated

the insurgents from outsider aid, and also cut them off from much of the civilian population

by resettling nearly two million people. Learning from their defeat in Indochina, the French

waged effective counter-insurgency warfare inside Algeria and abroad to eliminate the flow

of weapons into Algeria. By constructing effective barriers along the borders with Tunisia

and Algeria (the Maurice Line) and resettling the inhabitants of the border region, the French

managed to block the bulk of arms supplies and prevented large-scale infiltration. While FLN

insurgents inside (15,000 guerrillas) were starved of arms and ammunition a well-armed

inactive force (around 25,000 insurgents) sat just across the frontier. Based on good

intelligence the French navy stopped and searched ships of any nation suspected of running

munitions to the FLN as far as the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel. For example, in

April 1959 the French seized a Czech vessel in the Mediterranean bound for Morocco, loaded

478

R. T. Naylor, Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busting, and Their Human Cost (York, PN:

Northeastern University Press, 2001), 153-154; Schrader, Helicopter, 170, 200, 221-222, 229, 233. 479

Gilks and Segal, 37; Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution. Cuba‟s Foreign Policy

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 31; Gilks and Segal, 37-38; O‘ Balance, Algerian, 85, 88,

204.

165

with 581 tons of arms including 12,000 rifles and 2,000 machineguns. French intelligence

services waged an effective assassination campaign against arms dealers who served the

FLN, and French government threats encouraged some states to cease sending weapons to the

guerrillas.480

By late 1959 the FLN were short of weapons, losing up to five hundred men per

day. The defeat of FLN guerrilla warfare in the hinterland encouraged the FLN to initiate

urban terror tactics that needed limited weaponry (they operated a bomb factory in Algiers

that the French discovered in February 1959) but this too was largely contained by the

French. Still, the insurgents were determined to continue the struggle at all costs and by any

means, while the European community and the French army were involved in intrigues

against the French leader, General Charles de Gaulle who was anxious to bring the war to an

end, viewing the Algerian situation as too expensive financially and politically. Algeria

received its independence in July 1964. At the end of the war, only one-third of the FLN

active operatives inside Algeria had weapons. Thus, the FLN victory was not on the

battlefield but on the political field.481

More than the FLN case, Communist countries were deeply involved in liberation

movements‘ struggle against colonialism in southern Africa. During the 1970s and 1980s

southern Africa faced wars which clearly demonstrated the link between the Cold War, inter-

state relationships, and arming of NSAs. Two phases of rebellious NSAs were involved: in

the 1960s and 1970s the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries supported

liberation movements that resisted colonialism. Becoming a center of African liberation

movements, Tanzania was vital for the delivery of these arms shipments. From the late 1970s

the United States and mainly South Africa supported insurgent groups battling the new pro-

Soviet regimes.482

Cuba supported many anticolonial movements but its commitment to

support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from the Portuguese

was spectacular. From the early 1960s the Soviets and Cubans sent weapons (including

mortars) to the MPLA and trained the rebels in the Marxist Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania.

Cuban military men and the MPLA smuggled the first shipments from Brazzaville crossing

hostile Zaire with false documents and with help from underground Angolans, into Angola.

480

Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel

inLebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 85-86; Schrader,

Helicopter,200, 221-222, 229, 233. 481

Anthony J. Joes, Urban Guerrilla Warfare (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 55-56. 482

Naylor, Economic Warfare, 153-154; Bernard Estival, ―The French Navy and the Algerian War,‖ in France

and the Algerian War, 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy, eds. Martin S. Alexander and John F. V.

Keiger (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 84; O‘ Balance, Algerian, 138-140, 204-220.

166

Competing with the Soviets in Africa, the Chinese armed and trained a rival group, the Frente

Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and extended some assistance to the pro-

American UNITA. By 1974 and mainly after Angola was granted its independence a year

later, the MPLA and UNITA were fighting each other. Angola became a battlefield for the

rival superpowers with dramatic implications over local NSAs‘ arming. Angolan central

government (the former MPLA) brought in Cuban troops, while the American and South

Africans supported the rebel UNITA army. South Africa supported the UNITA as part of its

total Onslaught Strategy; that is saving apartheid by escalating its incursions into neighboring

states. 483

Unlike UNITA and FNLA, the MPLA could receive weapons only by sea or air.

Therefore, Congo-Brazzaville was logistically vital for the Eastern Bloc‘s flow of weapons.

In April 1975 a Yugoslav ship loaded with arms arrived in Luanda. Under Portuguese

direction, the ship had to leave and proceeded to Congo-Brazzaville‘s coast where it unloaded

armored cars, recoilless guns and machine guns. The cargo was reshipped on smaller ships

that infiltrated into a minor port south of Luanda. In late-1975, the Soviet Union used long-

distance transport aircraft that transferred Cuban troops and large quantities of Soviet

weapons to the MPLA government via Brazzaville, after Cuba had started to face difficulties

finding a refueling stop due to American intervention.484

In October 1975, with U.S. blessing,

South Africa invaded Angola and provided weapons to UNITA, as part of a CIA covert

operation to overthrow the Marxist MPLA government. Pretoria sought to destabilize Angola

because the latter supported the African National Congress (ANC) and Namibian Marxist

guerrillas, the South West African People's (SWAPO). Fearing a new Vietnam, in early 1976

Congress refused to fund American involvement in Angola while the Chinese ceased their aid

to the FNLA in order not to be associated with the South African invasion. Yet in 1979,

under U.S. request and because of its intense desire to combat Soviet hegemonism, China

delivered weapons to UNITA through South African-held Namibia. With a significant Cuban

intervention (a total of nearly half a million Cubans were sent to fight in Angola), the MPLA

483

Dominguez, Make a World,114, 130, 141-145; Piero Gleijeses,Conflicting Missions. Havana, Washington,

and Africa,1959-1976(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 179-180, 328-361, 367-369;

Gilks and Segal, 45-46, 90, 145, 159-161; Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991

(London: Frank Class, 2005); Wright, Destruction, 91.George Wright argued that the Soviet Union only

escalated military support for the MPLA after China and the United States intervened to eliminate the MPLA as

a political factor. The Cuban military presence in Angola expanded in 1978 only after South Africa intensified

destabilization. 484

George, Cuban, 139, 155, 165, 167, 171 185-197, 256, 272; Dominguez, Make a World, 114, 130, 141-145;

Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 328-361, 367-369

167

consolidated its control over Angola and gained international recognition. South Africa was

compelled to withdraw temporarily from Angola.485

The intensification of the Cold War

during the Reagan administration had great implications for the arming of NSAs in Angola,

mainly in President Reagan‘s second term. From 1984 to 1988 Angola witnessed a

devastating war between Cuba, supported by the Soviet Union, and South Africa supported

by the United States. NSAs, mainly UNITA, played a minor role. Encouraged by a green

light from the Reagan administration, South Africa expanded its military involvement in

Angola, incorporating UNITA in its military strategy, while UNITA cooperated with South

Africa to further its aspiration to control Angola. UNITA became a powerful military

organization equipped with captured Soviet weapons it received from South Africa. In 1986

the United States supplied UNITA with sophisticated weapon systems, Stinger surface-to-air

missiles and Taw anti-tank missiles. UNITA was one of the first NSAs that used surface-to-

air missiles against transport aircraft.486

The civil war in Angola was prolonged after all foreign forces left the country in

1991. A major reason was that UNITA acquired additional weapons through private sources,

using Zaire as a transit area and conduit for weapons transfers. A Human Rights Watch

Report from 1996 argued that UNITA rented African private cargo companies to deliver

weapons and other goods from Zaire, South Africa and Brazzaville, into UNITA zones, using

false flight plans. UNITA also smuggled weapons from Zaire across the Angolan border by

land. UNITA funded its illegal arms imports with Angola‘s diamond wealth. Only in 2002,

after forty one years‘ conflict, UNITA and the Angolan government signed a peace treaty.487

The armed struggle against apartheid in South Africa (1961-1990) revealed that

arming of an NSA could play a limited role in a war against a state. Airlifts do not necessarily

prescribe rebels‘ victory. That the South African Armed Forces engaged with the African

National Congress (ANC) mainly on South Africa's neighbors‘ soil rather than in South

Africa itself, demonstrated that both sides acknowledged the importance of logistics. The

ANC wanted to secure a flow of weapons and activists from across South Africa‘s borders,

and Pretoria‘s strategy was to use ―buffer states‖ to protect it from military infiltration. In

1961 the ANC established a military arm, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) that initially had very

limited weaponry, and gradually acquired Soviet weapons. In the 1960s ANC cadres were

485

China, 45-46, 90, 145, 159-161. 486

Wright, Destruction, 85, 93, 103, 110. 487

Human Rights Watch, ―Angola Between War and Peace Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the

Lusaka Protocol,‖ 9, 1 (February 1996).

168

trained in Tanzania, and after the establishment of a Marxist government in Angola in 1975,

the latter served as a major sanctuary for MK; it gained its weapons via Angola. The MK ran

several military camps in Angola where hundreds of ANC operatives passed basic military

training; some visited Russia, China, Cuba and other communist countries for special

training. Zambia hosted the military headquarters of the MK. The ANC smuggled weapons

from Mozambique and Zambia via Botswana where it had some secret storage facilities, into

South Africa.488

From the 1970s the ANC recruited white communist activists in Britain who

volunteered to be gun runners. For example, a couple who pretended to be on a honeymoon,

exploring northern Botswana and southern Zambia, drove a Land Rover loaded with arms.

The MK improved its military skills and became a paramilitary organization, armed with

small arms, mortars and rocket launchers, initiating guerrilla operations across the borders.

Yet, during the war MK faced hardship in infiltrating guerrillas and arms into South Africa

that largely managed to secure its borders. In the 1980s, the ANC was committed to military

activity outside South Africa while failing to mobilize the mass at home for a ―people‘s

war‖.489

Nor did the MK establish a clandestine support network in South Africa. Therefore,

MK activists were engaged in a bloody civil war in Angola or stayed frustrated and resented

in military camps in Angola; some of them even mutinied in 1984, while at home thousands

of students and workers initiated township uprisings. Local militias (amabutho) spread

spontaneously in the big cities of South Africa, employing creative military tactics, using

whatever weapons were available to them (stolen small arms, homemade bombs, and

machetes). Modern arms of the ANC were deployed thousands of kilometers away from the

frontline and were never sent into South Africa. Cherry argues that most people who died in

the liberation struggle from 1960 to 1994 were victims of traditional weapons (machete,

stones, and knobbed sticks). MK activists were spectators and cheerleaders of a revolution

that continued inside their country. In 1990 the MK suspended its armed struggle under the

terms of the peace process between the South African government and the ANC. Later,

488

Janet Cherry, Spear of the Nation. South Affric‟s Liberation Army, 1960-1990s (Athens: Ohio University

Press, 2011), 36, 53-75, 85-96; Anthony Sampson, Mandela. The Authorized Biography (London: Harper

Collins Publishers, 1999), 260-265, 318-319, 426-427; South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to

Democracy in South Africa: 1970-1980, Vol. 2 (UNISA, 2006), 500, 507. 489

Cherry, Spear of the Nation, 36, 53-75, 85-96.In 1978 General Giap advised a visiting delegation from the

ANC to emphasize political activity rather than conducting military operations only. He argued that the

organization and mobilization of the masses was the prerequisite for the development not simply of military

operations but a fully-fledged people‘s war.

169

Mandela admitted that the armed struggle gained modest achievement but argued that they

never believed they could gain military victory against the regime. 490

The Cold War and the Arming of NSAs in the Americas

From the late 1950s onward, Latin America was often a surrogate battleground for the Cold

War superpowers. South America‘s societies, far from fulfilling the promises of their

independence, remained deeply split between wealthy landowners and desperately poor

peasants. Latin America was therefore fertile ground for the spread of Marxism and for other

doctrines that called for social change and for opposition to the United States, though

indigenous guerrillas were weak in weaponry. Since they landed in Las Coloradas beach in

December 1956, Castro and his communist comrades acquired most of their light weapons in

raids on the army‘s posts and camps in the Oriente province; they preferred to enlist armed

people. Gradually, the rebels improved their operational skills and attacked valuable military

targets where they captured heavier weapons such as mortars, bazookas and anti-aircraft

guns.491

They also managed to manufacture improvised light weapons. In August 1958 the

military junta in Venezuela led by Wolfgang Larrazabal sent a plane-load of arms for the

revolutionaries, but for security reasons they had to set fire to the plane. Laqueur argues that

the Cuban Revolution featured very limited military activity, and the great weakness of the

Fulgencio Batista‘s regime, including his demoralized army, explains how Castro seized

power (1957) with very poor weaponry and without any external aid. 492

Under Castro‘s overall direction, Che Guevara orchestrated Cuban assistance to

insurgents in Latin America. Most of these efforts failed in the face of strong counter-

revolutionary measures, factionalism among the guerrillas, lack of support among the

peasantry, and shortage of weapons. Cuba was cautioned about dispatching weapons to

guerrillas in Latin America in order not to give the United States a pretext for intervention.

The Soviets were largely critical of Castro‘s subversive campaigns in Latin America, fearing

it would damage relations with the United States, crippling Moscow‘s efforts to expand its

commercial and diplomatic ties with Latin American governments, and because most Latin

490

Anthony Sampson, Mandela. The Authorized Biography (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), 260-265,

318-319, 426-427; Luli Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (Claremont: New Africa

Books, 2004), 315; Ken Keable, ed., London Recruits. The Secret War against Apartheid (Chambers, U.K.:

Merlin Press, 2012), 108-114, 140-141, 150, 303-310; Ronnie Kasrils,Armed and Dangerous. My Undercover

Struggle against Apartheid (Oxford: Heinemann, 1993), 191, 194-197, 232, 279, 29. 491

Guevara, Che, Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War 1956-1958 (New York: Pathfinder, 1996), 18, 162-

163, 336-337, 313, 325; Laqueur, Guerrilla, 225-227, 250; Upshur et al., World History, 845. 492

Laqueur, Guerrilla, 225-227, 250; Upshur et al., World History, 845.

170

American Communist parties resented Cuban military involvement. Subsequently, rebel

groups in Latin America acquired their arms from regional sources rather than from overseas.

Also, rebels operated in remote and rugged regions in the Andes and the Amazon rainforest,

which were, therefore, less accessible to supplies. Che Guevara himself led a Communist

insurgency (1966-1967) in the mountainous region in Bolivia where he was killed by the

local army. The small group of rebels acquired their limited weaponry (rifles, mortars and

bazookas), by conducting ambushes on sections of the Bolivian army. From the 1980s, the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Peruvian Shining Path and other

South American leftist NSAs have greatly improved their armament due to their heavy

involvement in kidnapping and the drug trade. They were able to raise money and build an

arsenal of weapons by protecting coca farmers from the authorities. They could be better

armed than government forces. 493

The United States used a variety of policies to uproot Marxism in Latin America, and

the Reagan administration (from 1980) pursued a wide range of anti-Marxist policies both

overtly and covertly. The Reagan administration believed the Sandinistas were allied with

Castro and the Soviet Union and were supporting Marxist guerrilla activities in nearby El

Salvador. Therefore, the United States sponsored the Nicaragua Democratic Resistance (the

Contras), an anti-Sandinista guerrilla movement composed of former National Guardsmen,

right-wing figures and defectors from the Sandinista regime.494

The American support of the Contras introduced a unique pattern of NSA arming, an

international network composed of government agencies and private citizens, American and

non-Americans that worked together for supplying weapons to the Contras in order to

overthrow the Sandinista. NSAs have been involved in criminal activity for many years as

part of their arms trade. In ―the Iran-Contra scandal,‖ as it is called, U.S. senior security

officials collaborated with people who were involved in the drug business, in sending

weapons to the Contras without notifying the Congress and in contravention of a

493

James Daniel ed., The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and other Captured Documents (London:

George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1968), 84, 127-129; Laqueur, Guerrilla, 250; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 22-

23, 28-29, 99-100, 217-218; Jorge G. Castañeda, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (London:

Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997), 246; Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining

the Terrorist Threat (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 90; Brown and Fernandez, 104-114, 128-

129, 169; Suzie Baer, Peru‟s MARTA. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (New York: The Rosen

Publishing Group, 2003), 20-21. 494

Upshur et al.,World History, 926-931; Rodney P. Carlisle and Geoffrey J. Golson, The Reagan Era from the

Iran Crisis to Kosovo: Turning Points-Actual and Alternate Histories (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 125-

135;Robert. A. Kagan. Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990(New York: The Free

Press, 1996).

171

Congressional decision (1984) to bar all military aid to the Contras. The report of the Senate

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and

other sources revealed that from 1985 to 1986 the Reagan administration employed a

complex network consisting of air cargo companies, international arms merchants, ex-U.S.

military officers, businessmen with connections to the region involved, Florida-based right-

wing Cuban exiles, and Israeli military advisors. This network contained operatives, transport

aircraft, airfields, stocked warehouses, ships, secure communication devices, and secret Swiss

bank accounts.495

The network purchased weapons (small arms, explosives, mortars, SA-7

SAMs) in Europe (Poland, Portugal), the Far East, the United States and South America,

using front companies and false end-user certificates with funds the Administration obtained

from third countries, private sources and illegal arms sales to Iran. Israel too supplied Soviet

weapons that were captured from the PLO. Weapons shipments were transported by sea and

air to Honduras and Costa Rica, then reshipped by the network‘s transport planes to forward

bases of the Contras in both countries or air-dropped in the north and south of Nicaragua (in

total, around 120 resupply flights).The resupply operation was shut down after being exposed

in October 1986. 496

Panama leader, General Manuel Noriega, a drug-trafficker and dictator, was an

important hub in this network. A few years after he smuggled weapons for the Sandinista and

Marxist rebels in El Salvador, Noriega responded to an American request and air-shipped

weapons for the Contras from Panama to Costa Rica. The same planes used to ship the arms

were then used to fly cocaine from Colombia to the United States. Panama was becoming a

major asset in the U.S. covert war against the Sandinistas already during operation Black

Eagle (1982-1985), but also a money laundering center, and a transit country for narcotics en

route from South America to the United States.497

The Report by the Senate Subcommittee on

Narcotics, Terrorism and International Operations (1988) concluded that ―U.S. officials

involved in assisting the Contras knew that drug smuggling was exploiting the clandestine

infrastructure established to support the war in Nicaragua…. some officials may have turned

495

Senate, Report by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the Committee

on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 100-165, 1989, pt. 36, 40, 84-85 ; Senate, Report of the

Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental Minority and Additional

Views, 100th

Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 100-216, 1987, pt. 3-5, 15, 79-81

496Peter D. Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics. Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 65-78. 497

Carlisle and Golson, 125-135;Mannuel Noriega, The Memoirs of Mannuel Noriega. America‟s Prisoner (New

York: Random House, 1997), 75-83.

172

a blind eye to these activities.‖ This episode demonstrates that states might be using private

organizations to support NSAs at the risk of being exploited by criminal networks. In the

world of NSAs arming, the borders between formal and informal, legal and illegal are

ambiguous. Weapons export by states and private enterprise gunrunning can overlap; they are

not necessarily distinct entities.498

Additional Factors that Influenced the Arming of NSAs in the Cold War

Era

Rebellious NSAs become state-sponsors of NSAs

The Sandinista government‘s support for the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador, the Angolan

government‘s support for the ANC and Mozambique‘s support for the liberation movements

in Namibia, all demonstrated a second generation of state support of NSAs. Liberation

movements that acquired military support from a superpower or a proxy, after gaining

independence or seizing power, provided aid for insurgents in neighboring countries. Often

the independent states supplied weapons they received from the superpower. South Yemen‘s

support for revolutionary insurgencies in North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and especially Oman is

another example.499

In 1967 Britain granted independence to South Yemen, after four years

of guerrilla campaign against British troops and the local Federal Government. Mumford

argues that whereas in Malaya and Kenya the paucity of external funding and weapons

significantly hindered the longevity of the insurgency, in South Yemen the constant stream of

Egyptian arms ensured that a military victory for the British could not be guaranteed with the

assurance it had in previous conflicts. The more radical guerrilla group, the National

Liberation Front (NLF) smuggled arms for the newly formed Yemen Republic into the initial

insurgent front in the Radfan Mountains, followed by an urban guerrilla campaign in Aden,

which emboldened the group making more brazen and public attacks that the British and the

weak royalist forces failed to contain. 500

The Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was controlled by a Marxist-

Leninist party committed to altering the system of government in neighboring states, and

lighting the way for all struggles and progressive people in the Arab World. Oman was the

498

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, 36, 40, 84-85, 91, 136. 499

Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth. The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (Abingdon,

U.K.: Routledge, 2012), 77-94. 500

Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth. 77-94.

173

major target. From the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Dhofar region had been part

of the Sultanate of Oman while local tribes resented the rule from Muscat. The fact that

Dhofar had a common frontier with South Yemen provided a line of logistical support more

than a source of political or military impulsion. Until 1982 the PDRY‘s support for the

People‘s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLO) was overt, sustained,

and comprehensive. South Yemen supplied weapons to the rebels as well as serving as a

transit area for supplies coming from China, Russia and Libya. The PFLO sought to ―free‖

the entire Arabian Gulf; it had base and training camps in South Yemen territory, but Aden

never committed its own forces in a major cross-frontier intervention in Oman. By the middle

of 1970 Omani forces had lost control of almost all Dhofar, but with heavy western military

support and a modern ruler, the Sultan Qabus, the Omani army began to take the offensive

against the guerrillas.501

In late-1973 several thousand Iranian troops were deployed by the

Shah in support of the Sultan Qubus, alongside units of the Jordanian Air Force and British

officers. They constructed a set of three defensive lines running from the desert to the sea, to

inhibit guerrilla arms from reaching the Dhofar interior from South Yemen. China ceased to

support the rebels because of its trade interests in Saudi Arabia. In late-1975 the PFLO ceased

to be a significant military force inside Dhofar, and in March 1976 a de facto cease-fire came

into operation on the Oman-PDRY frontier.502

NSAs’ acquisition of strategic weapon systems

During the Cold War rebel groups acquired weapon systems that changed the military

balance and the theatre of operation against their state-foe. In particular, the position of anti-

air systems upgraded the military strength of rebel groups because the military superiority of

many states was based largely on employing of aircraft and helicopters with which the rebels

could not compete. For example, in 1960 the SoPartido Africano da Independencia da Guine

e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) launched a war of liberation against the Portuguese rule in Ginea-

Bissau. Starting the struggle with captured light weapons, the PAIGC used the friendly

Guinea and Senegal territories to transfer modern arms from Cuba and China. The PAIGC

besieged and intensively shelled Portuguese fortified camps with 120mm mortars and

501

Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy. The Case of South Yemen 1967-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990), 142-157. 502

Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and theShaping of a

Region (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 134-136.

174

cannons thus forcing the latter to abandon important locations and neutralized the Portuguese

anti-guerrilla strategy of using an extensive system of fortified positions scattered throughout

the country. In 1973 the Soviet Union supplied the PAIGC SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.

Until then Portuguese air supremacy made any attempt to bring about the withdrawal or

surrender of the colonial army far too costly for the PAIGC. The employment of the missiles

by the rebels had a devastating impact on the demoralized Portuguese military forces. They

refused to continue the war and in 1974 Portugal granted Ginea-Bissau independence.503

In 1980 Libya supplied the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y

Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) who had been fighting for Western Sahara's independence from

Moroccan control, Soviet-produced SA-6 missile systems. That had a paralyzing effect on the

Moroccan Air Force which had been giving the Moroccans an advantage the POLISARIO

could not hope to match. The appearance of the SA-6 in the Sahara was a dramatic

improvement for the forces of the POLISARIO and had a devastating impact on Morocco‘s

ability to continue achieving success on the battlefield. Morocco turned to the United States

for immediate assistance, and with the American help the Moroccan air force slowly

improved its air tactics and countermeasure performance.504

Conflicts between neighboring countries serve NSAs’ arming

Many of the above case studies confirm that in the international relationship state support for

a rebellious NSA in a neighboring country became an important segment of a state‘s power.

Governments supplied weapons to rebel groups in a neighboring country in order to shape the

latter‘s behavior. Salehyan argues that rebels recognize that state power is constrained by

international borders and will shift some, or even most, activities abroad in order to evade

repression. The establishment of extraterritorial bases allows rebels to recruit and train

fighters, gather supplies during the mobilization phase, and flee to safe ground during the

503

Chabal, P. Cabral. Revolutionary Leadership and People‟s War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1983), 97-105; Chabal, P. Cabral. Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral. Revolution in Guinea (London: Stage 1,

1969), 120, 193. 504

Anthony Cordesman, A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb (New York:

Greenwood, 2002), 62-63; David J. Dean, The Air Force in Law-Intensity Conflict (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air

University Press, 1986), 45-47, 51, 67; John J. Damis, ―The Western Sahara Dispute as a Source of Regional

Conflict in North Africa,‖ in Contemporary Africa: Issues of Development and Integration, eds. Halim I.

Barakat (London: Routledge, 1985), 148-149; Michael Brzoska and Frederic S. Pearson, Arms and Warfare.

Escalation, De-Escalation, and Negotiation (Columbia, Al: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 165, 168,

173; Westad, Global, 352-356; Mahmood Ahmed, Stinger Saga (Xlibris Corporation, 2012), 49-68.

175

combat phase. NSAs have exploited global-regional disputes for their own interests but in the

same manner could be abandoned at some stage by their state-mentor.505

For example, Iran

and Iraq provided great support for opposition groups in both countries against the

background of a lengthy ethnic-religious conflict that reached its highest peak in the

devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The Kurdish minority in northern Iraq struggled for

autonomy from various Iraqi repressive regimes for decades. The Kurds faced the principal

difficulty of obtaining outside allies. Iran, who was the most important regional ally of the

United States, was interested in a prolonged Kurdish-Iraqi war to reduce the capacity of the

pro-Soviet Iraqi regime to embark on an offensive against Iran. From the 1960s, Mullah

Mustafa Barazani‘s Kurdish Democratic Party received weapons and training from Iran, the

United States, and Israel. From 1965, Israeli airplanes carried arms shipments to Teheran for

the Kurds, including small firearms, cannons and Soviet weapons taken from Egypt by the

Israelis in the 1973 war. The Kurdish army, the Peshmerga, turned into a powerful force that

repulsed many Iraqi army attacks in the mountains of Kurdistan, and posed a great security

challenge for the Iraqi government. But in 1975 the Shah preferred striking a deal with

Baghdad, which gave him territorial concessions and an Iraqi curb on Iranian exiles – such as

the ayatollah Khomeini – in return for abandoning the KDP. With the Iranian border closed to

them, the Iraqi Kurds faced disaster.506

Saddam Hussein took advantage of the situation to hit

the Kurds in a major offensive. Mustafa Barazani fled the country to find refuge in Teheran.

Iran renewed its military support for the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war. The Kurdish

guerrillas fought alongside the Iranian army on the northern front and paid a heavy price for

this (Iraqi chemical attack against the town of Halabga in 1988). 507

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) was established in 1945 and

struggled for autonomy against repressive Iranian regimes. The Iranian Kurds waged guerrilla

warfare in western Iran using Iraqi Kurdistan as a sanctuary. When Saddam Hussein invaded

Iran (September 1980), the KDPI supported the Iraqi army on the northern front. The Iraqi

army established a supply route to the Peshmerga of the KDPI near the city of Qasr-e Shirin,

and with Iraqi weapons and ammunition the KDPI forced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard‘s

(IRGC) units to retreat from many cities in Iranian Kurdistan, and established a ―liberated

Kurdish zone.‖ Yet, Iranian forces succeeded in regrouping and launched a series of counter-

505

Salehyan, Rebels, 37. 506

Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy (University

of Michigan Press, 2006), 367-370. 507

Westad, Global, 292.

176

offensive attacks against the KDPI. KDPI hopes of creating a Kurdish autonomy all but

vanished, and the KDPI was reduced to a marginal Iraqi instrument in the Iran-Iraq War and

afterwards. By the early 1990s, in the face of a defeated Iraq and stronger Iran, the KDPI had

suffered brutal reverses: defeat on the battlefield, internal division and assassinations of its

leaders by the Iranians.508

The People‘s Mujahedin Organization (MEK) was established in

the 1960s and developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian dissident group. After

being rejected by the new Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, the MEK launched a terror

campaign in Iran followed by a worldwide campaign against the Iranian government that

stressed propaganda and occasional use of terrorist violence. In 1987, most MEK leaders and

its activists had relocated in Iraq under Saddam Hussein‘s sponsorship. MEK‘s military arm,

the National Liberation Army (NLA) numbered a few thousand fighters, based in military

camps near the Iranian border on the central front. Armed with Iraqi weapons (including

tanks) they conducted cross-border attacks against Iranian troops that amounted to little more

than harassment. MEK became a victim of the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in

Iraq.509

In 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the MEK and transported its troops away from its

military base camps. This action ended the effectiveness of the MEK as a military weapon

directed against the Iranian government.510

The Arming of International Terrorism

The internationalization of terrorism that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s meant

that terror attacks involved more than one country. Terrorists from one country attacked

targets of a second country in the territory of a third one. Terror activity could also be

multinational when terrorists from different nationalities cooperated in an operation. Weapon

smuggling manifested these new trends. European and Palestinian terrorist groups hijacked

flights, took hostages and assassinated politicians and businessmen using improvised bombs

or small arms they smuggled from the Middle East or from Communist countries. Unlike

local-based NSAs who waged wars to ―liberate‖ territories, NSAs specializing in terror

508

David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 3th ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 274-278; Nader

Entessar, Kurdish Politics in the Middle East (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 173. 509

Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass

Destruction (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), 159-160; Stephen E. Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern

Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), 210-211. 510

Vivian H. Gembara and Deborah A. Gembara, Drowning in the Desert: A Jag's Search for Justice in Iraq

(Zenith Imprint, 2008), 148-149.

177

needed only personal weapons, pistols and guns.511

The PLO was the first truly ―international‖

terrorist organization, accounting for more international terrorist incidents than any other

movement. The PLO associated with dozens of different terrorist groups worldwide, mostly

Marxist-Leninist and anarchist groups who employed violence to realize social-political

revolutions and resisted ―western imperialism.‖ Palestinian groups trained foreign terrorists

in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Jordan and South Yemen, and supplied weapons.

International terrorism was deeply associated with the Cold War and the emergence of the

state-sponsored terrorism. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries aided terror

organizations in the name of solidarity with people waging wars of national liberation

although the true motives were the Soviet bloc‘s strategies of Cold War interest in menacing

the United States and its NATO allies. The former sent weapons to countries such as Libya,

Syria, South Yemen, and Cuba: the weapons were re-transported to terrorists in the Middle

East, Africa, Europe and Latin America. Although the Soviet Union provided arms directly to

some terrorist NSAs such as the PLO, the more common procedure was for this assistance to

be provided indirectly. Weapons and training would be supplied by the Soviet Union and the

other Warsaw Pact countries, especially East Germany and Bulgaria, to Third World regimes

and then secretly re-directed to terrorists.512

The use of intermediaries enabled the Soviet

officials to claim that they did not support international terrorism. For instance, KGB

documents revealed that in 1975 Moscow shipped small arms to South Yemen for the

Marxist-Leninist Palestine Liberation Popular Front (PFLP) that specialized in hijacking

Israeli and western jets. 513

Summary

The chapter has focused on the implications of the Cold War for the arming opportunities of

NSAs that fought colonialism and ruling regimes. In a bipolar Cold War international system

when regimes of global intervention took hold, anti-colonial NSAs had a fair chance of

gaining a superpower ally, the Soviet Union or the United States, that would provide

511

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 35-41; Tamar Hermann, Social Movements and Political Protest, vol. 3, part 2:

Terror (Tel Aviv: The Open University Press, 1997), 62-66 (Hebrew). 512

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 35-4;Mark Kramer, ―The Decline in Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World,

1986-1991,‖ in The End of the Cold War and the Third World, eds. Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko

(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 55; Mark Ensalaco, Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to

September 11 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 265; Stefen Aust, Baader-Meinhof. The

Inside Story of the RAF (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 269-270, 295, 353-354, 435; Markus Wolf,

Man without a Face. The Autobiography of Communism‟s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Public Affairs,

1997), 299-313. 513

Albats, KGB, 228-230.

178

weaponsusing remarkable logistic capabilities. Some countries, like Cuba, accepted a

vanguard role to support ideologically close NSAs and were committed to arm them. Other

sponsors could easily abandon their NSA-allies for their own interests, compelling the NSAs

to look for other sources of weaponry, usually in the arms market, otherwise they could face

defeat. Mobilizing the masses including army units (or gaining their neutrality) against

destabilized regimes, they could rise up with very limited weaponry. Thus, revolutionary

guerrilla writers like Mao and Giap emphasized the need of rebel groups to be self-sufficient

in weaponry. The chapterreveals that supporting crossborder armed NSAs became consistent

element in the international states system. States use NSAs against each other‘s. Following

the end of the Cold War, black arms markets became the major source of NSAs‘ weaponry

rather than state sponsorship with one outstanding exception – Iran‘s military support of the

Lebanese Hezbollah and other radical Islamic groups. The next chapter elaborates on these

subjects.

Struggles of ―national liberation‖ between superpowers and guerrilla armies, especially

between the United States and the Vietcong, are the basis of Van Creveld concept of strong

well-equipped armies that are defeated by weak and small NSAs. This chapter demonstrates

that the reality of state-NSA conflict is more complicated. Regardless of Van Creveld‘s moral

reasoning for the outcomes of state-NSA conflict, remove from the equation superpowers‘

military support of NSAs and many of them would fail even though they look ―just.‖ The

Vietcong were not a ―child‖ fighting a grown man as Van Creveld describes them but an

integral part of North Vietnam that was intensively armed by both China and the Soviet

Union. Without aggressive American involvement, the Contras rebels that received large

amounts of weapons had no chance against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

Possessing newly developed anti-aircraft missiles they received from the superpowers, some

NSAs refuted Van Creveld‘s argument about poorly armed rebels. Also, Van Creveld

underestimates geo-strategic considerations that affected NSAs‘ arming. Without transborder

sanctuaries and support, many NSAs would have lost the struggle for national liberation and

social revolution.514

Therefore,the chapter reveals that supporting crossborder armed NSAs

became consistent element in the international states system. States use NSAs against each

other‘s.

514

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 222-225.

179

Following the end of the Cold War, black arms markets became the major source of NSAs‘

weaponry rather than state sponsorship with one outstanding exception – Iran‘smilitary

support of the Lebanese Hezbollah and other radical Islamic groups. The next chapter

elaborates on these subjects.

180

Chapter Six: Contemporary Trends in State Sponsorship of Rebellious

NSAs

Previous chapters review how ancient and modern armed NSAs acquired their weapons,

revealing a shift from self-sufficiency to outside military support that reached a peak in the

Cold War. The next two chapters complete the historical review, dealing with contemporary

trends in the arming of rebellious NSAs. In the context of dramatic technological advances

and a globalized world, the current work aims to reveal how much today‘s NSAs differ from

their predecessors in acquiring weapons, and the factors that facilitate or constrain the arming

efforts of today‘s NSAs. The first of the two chapters analyses state sponsorship of rebel

groups, the dominant source of armaments during the Cold War. The research reviews the

questions, to what extent did the end of the Cold War affect states' patronage of rebel groups,

and whether changes in state sponsorship of NSAs are a cross-national phenomenon. The

core of this chapter analyses Iran‘s military support of radical Islamic NSAs, mainly the

Lebanese Hezbollah. The research argues that Iran-Hezbollah connections, including in the

arming, are ideologicallywell-established, demonstrating a unique organizational structure as

has been demonstrated (from 2011) in Syria‘s civil war.

Foreign Sponsorship of NSAs in the Post-Cold War World

The number of states arming rebellious NSAs grew during the Cold War era as shown in the

table below.515

As discussed in the previous chapter, in a bipolar world both the Soviet Union

and the United States were deeply involved in regional conflicts, supplying huge quantities of

weapons to states and NSAs, directly or through client states, mainly in Southeast Asia,

South and Central America and Africa. Further increases in state sponsorship manifested in

the re-escalation between the West and the East from the early 1980s, following the

515

The research encompasses conflicts between states and NSAs gaining foreign sponsorship including arms

shipments. The research records states supplying weapons to rebel groups for at least three years. The dependent

variable is the number of conflicts; therefore a state could be involved simultaneously in several conflicts

against different NSAs. Information was collected from books about specific conflicts, general books about

insurgency - Stephen Sloan, Sean K. Anderson, The Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, 3th ed. (Lanhamm,

MR.: Scarecrow Press, 2009); Cindy C. Combs and Martin W. Slamm, Encyclopedia of Terrorism(New York:

Infobase Publishing, 2007) – and The United States State Department‘s Country Report on Terrorism (2003,

2012), http://www.state.gov/ j/ct/rls/crt/ ; and Patterns of Global Terrorism(1983, 1993), http://www. higginsctc.

org/ patternsofglobalterrorism/ 1983PoGT.pdf.; http://babel. hathitrust.org/ cgi/pt?id=

mdp.39015078359844;view=1up;seq=12 . The research used major online news websites to collect details on

current conflicts. Claims about states arming NSAs had to be confirmed by at least two different sources.

181

Sandinistas revolution in Nicaragua, the conflict between China and Vietnam in Indo-China

and the Reagan administration‘santi-communist policy that sent weapons to non-democratic

NSAs (and states) deemed to be fighting communism.

Table 1.State-NSA conflicts with foreign sponsorship including arms supply

1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013

Europe 1 5 1 1 1 1

Asia 11 16 23 19 10 10

Africa 4 9 13 10 16 5

The

Americas

6 9 10 1 1 1

22 39 47 30 25 18

The table above shows a decline in the number of states that arm NSAs fighting other

states (from 47 in 1983 down to 18 in 2013). The decline is salient in both Europe and the

Americas where outside military support almost completely disappeared (one case in 2003

and 2013). In Asia and Africa, the decline in state support of rebellious NSAs has been

moderate (10 cases in Asia and 6 in Africa). Contemporary rebel groups are compelled to

acquire weapons from other sources, chiefly through black arms markets. The decline

resulted from the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist

nations of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, many long and bloody wars between governments

and rebel groups that were fueled by a steady flow of weapons from the United States, the

Soviet Union and their proxies came to an end. United Nations‘ peacemaking efforts had

some notable success, occasionally after decades of international pressure to bring a conflict

to an end; as in Cambodia (1991), Mozambique (1992), Angola (2002), and Liberia (2003),

as well as the abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa (1994). Without the financial

and military support of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Korea and Nicaragua,

revolutionary guerrilla movements withered; some were encouraged to compromise, such as

182

in Honduras (1991), El Salvador (1992) and Guatemala (1996) and others ceased to operate

such as the military wing of the Chilean Communist Party (FPMR-D).516

Cramer argues that Soviet leaders in the late 1980s began encouraging the political

resolution of armed conflicts in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

This shift of policy was in keeping with Gorbachev‘s basic effort to improve East-West

relations. In 1989, the Soviet Union and China refused to keep arming Mengista, the dictator

of Ethiopia who failed to suppress the Eritrean Liberation War (started in 1961).517

It was a

major factor for the total defeat of Mengista who was toppled in 1991, and Eritrea was

granted independence in 1993.Also, the great powers might be less interested in the existing

conflicts after a series of humiliating results of Western intervention (Afghanistan and Iraq)

and an economic limit on Russia's ability to supply clients. Other causes could be Russian

and Chinese diplomatic threats against Western intervention such as in Syria (the veto in the

UN against intervention in Syria) and the financial crisis in Europe and the USA.A more

general explanation for the decline refers to the link between a state‘s formation and internal

conflicts that consume armaments. Few new states have beenformed in the last twenty years,

while more than twenty were granted independence following the end of the Portugal‘s

Colonial Wars (1961-1974), and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East Block.

Therefore the potential for additional state-NSA conflicts is decreasing. Ongoing peace

negotiations between governments and rival NSAs could further reduce the number of

conflicts involving foreign sponsorship, such as the peace talks between the government of

Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National

Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN),being conducted in Cuba from 2012.518

516

―Colombia and FARC have Opened Exploratory Peace Talks, Santos Says,‖ Fox Latino News, 28 August

2012, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/08/28/colombia-and-farc-have-opened-exploratory-peace-

talks-santos-says/ (accessed 25 June 2013); ―Colombia peace talks restart in Havana,‖ Today Colombia, 23

April 2013, http://todaycolombia.com/ 2013/04/23/colombia-peace-talks-restart-in-havana/ (accessed 25 June

2013);Bulliet et al. Earth, 898-900; Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson. ―Conflict Propensities in Asian

Rivalries,‖ in Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-level Games, eds. Sumit Ganguly

and William Thompson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 19-20; Heraldo Munoz, The Dictator‟s

Shadow: Life under Augusto Pinochet (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 164; Jose Angel and David E. Spencer,

Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadorian FMLN Guerrillas: Lost Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future

Conflict (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), 4-5, 7, 177-179; Ernest Guevara, Che Guevara

Guerrilla Warfare (Wilmington: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 202. 517

Kramer, 47. 518

Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley: University of California Press,1994); Sloan and

Anderson, Historical Dictionary, 416;;―Obama‘s feckless Syria policy is likely to fail,‖ The Washington Post,

12 July 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-feckless-syria-policy-is-likely-to-

fail/2013/07/11/3e22468a-ea4b-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html (accessed 14 July, 2013);Toby Harnden,

Uzi Mahnaimi and Marie Woolf. ―Has Syria crossed the red line,‖ The Sunday Times, 28 April 2013,

http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/ sto/news/focus/article1251864.ece (accessed 14 July 2013).

183

Foreign sponsorship of rebel groups has declined dramatically but remains a

consistent pattern of the international system. It is an integral part of longstanding conflicts

between neighboring nations that the international community has failed to terminate, such as

between Israel and the Palestinians and between India and Pakistan (over Kashmir).

Sometimes, the United Nations have great difficulty in agreeing on when and how to stop

civil conflicts and abuses in individual countries, and members of the Security Council fear

that intervention could result in long and costly commitment prolonging state-NSA conflicts,

as in the case of Syria‘s civil war. States could play a double game between neighboring

countries and rebel groups fighting each other.519

China is Myanmar‘s largest trading partner

and arms supplier. Still, despite Chinese denials, sources in Myanmar and the Jane‘s

Intelligence Review, argue that in the last couple of years China has supplied large weapon

systems to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), including APCs in 2012, making it the

strongest armed group in Myanmar. Wa are a Chinese-speaking ethnic group, controlling a

wide wedge of territory along the Chinese border in northeast Myanmar, while China is

unhappy with Myanmar‘s improved relations with the West, especially the United States. In

early 2014, Myanmar‘s government and the UWSA maintained a cease-fire agreement and

planned to negotiate a peace agreement. 520

Many of the contemporary state-NSA conflicts are ethnic-religious based and

connected to contests over natural resources. Pakistan is arming Islamic guerrillas in Kashmir

(possibly in Punjab too), radical Islamic terror groups that target India (Lashkar-e-Taiba,

Jaish-e-Mohammed) and separatist NSAs in northeast India that have been fighting the

federal government from its establishment. Uganda and Rwanda supply weapons to

rebellious militias in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where gold mines

are located. There are also ethnic connections between the population of eastern DRC and

adjacent areas of Uganda and Rwanda.There are no accurate details about the amount of arms

contemporary NSAs acquire from their patrons. It seems marginal compared to the

519

Kyaw H. Mon.―Chinese Embassy Denies Wa Army Weapons Sales,‖ Myanmar Times, 4 February 2013,

http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/3967-chinese-embassy-denies-wa-army-weapons-

sales.html(24 August 2013); Zin Linn. ―Burma: Government Reduce Tension with Wa Army,‖ Asian Tribune,

14 July 2013,http://www. asiantribune.com/node/63114 (accessed 24 August 2013); Ian Storey. ―Viewpoints,

China Plays Double Game to Protect its Interests in Myanmar, South China Morning Post, 18 May 2013,

http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1239921/china-plays-double-game-protect-its-interests-

myanmar(accessed 24 August 2013). 520

Myo T. Khine. ―Myanmar‘s Wa Rebels to Join Peace Process ‗When Time Is Ripe,‘‖ Radio Free Asia, 24

January 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/uwsa-01292014180937.html (accessed 20 April

2014); Anthony Davis. ―China Sends Armed Helicopters to Myanmar Separatists‘,‖ Jane‟s, 25 April 2013,

http://www.janes.com/article/12159/china-sends-armed-helicopters-to-myanmar-separatists (accessed 24 August

2013).

184

largequantities of weapons the United States and the Soviet Union supplied to their NSA

clients during the 1970s and the 1980s. RAND Institute researchon state support for

insurgencies argues that the decline in superpower involvement resulted in a decline in the

scale of assistance. From the 1990s, most state supporters have lacked the tremendous

resources that Washington and Moscow lavished on their insurgent proxies during the Cold

War.521

The analysis of NSAs according to the level of outside support reveals different type

of NSAs. Being an extension of the Iranian regime Hezbollah stands at one pole of the scale,

followed by NSAs who regularly acquire military support from a state but are more

independent, such as Indian rebel groups supported by China and Pakistan. Other armed

NSAs acquire weapons from different sources including friendly states, such as the Taliban in

Afghanistan and Shi‘ite rebels in Yemen who get some arms shipments from Iran. Many

NSAs use neighboring countries as transit states and even logistic centers rather than as

weapons suppliers, such as Hamas use of Egyptian territory to traffic weapons from Iran and

Libya to Gaza.522

States that facilitate smuggling operations (such as Sudan‘s aid to Hamas)

differ from states that stay indifferent or try to block arms flow through their land (such as

Panama, Peru, Brazil and Ecuador‘s efforts to intercept FARC arms smuggling to Colombia

via their country. The opposite pole contains self-sufficient NSAs which acquire hardly any

weapons from foreign states, for example, former Maoist guerrillas in Nepal or Pakistani

Taliban and Al Qaeda branches in North Africa and the Arab Peninsula.

In 2005, Byman recorded thirty cases of state support of terrorist groups that included

money, arms and logistics since the end of the Cold War. This is higher than the twenty five

cases of states arming NSAs in 2003 according to the current research (and eighteen in 2013).

Differences between thestudies probably derive from the methodology. The current work

examines instances of state support in specific years (such as 2003, 2013) while Byman

numbers all instances of states that provide support to terrorist groups from 1990 to 2005.

Byman refers to states that provide arms, money and logistics rather than arms only as in the

521

Bulliet et al.,Earth, 922; Arvind Verma. ―Policing in India: Response to Transnational Crime and

Terrorism,‖ in Police Practice in Global Perspective, eds. John A. Eterno and Dilip K. Das (Playmouth:

Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 56-57; E.N. Rammohan. ―The Insurgent North-East,‖ in Problems of Ethnicity

in the North-East India, ed. B.B. Kumar (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company 2007), 36, 59, 78. 522

Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements Trends in Outside Support for

Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), http://www.rand.org/content/ dam/rand/pubs/

monograph_reports/ 2007/ MR1405.pdf (accessed 13 July 2013), 17.

185

current research.523

The same explanations probably stand behind the difference between the

current research and an earlier survey of the RAND Institute about outside support for

insurgencies (1991-2000). The RAND survey found that fourty four insurgencies active since

1991 received significant or critical state support (military, political, financial and logistical

activities) compared to twenty fivestate-NSA conflicts in 2003 in which NSAs received arms

shipments according to the current research.524

The great powers are still deeply involved in arming NSAs willingly or unwillingly.

Russia has backed separatist movements in several newly independent states that enabled it to

gain leverage over incumbent central governments. For example, the Transnistrian separatists

who broke away from the Republic of Moldova (1990) are better armed than the forces of

Moldova due to the active involvement of Russian officers in the creation of the Transnistrian

armed forces (Russian units are still present in the breakaway region). Russia sends weapons

to Syria that delivered it to the Hezbollah. China supplies weapons to Eritrea, which arms

rebel groups fighting in the Horn of Africa, and Darfur rebels are using modern Chinese and

Iranian weapons captured from Sudan‘s armed forces. Superpower weaponry continues to

serve rebel groups many years after former wars ended as part of a globalized arms

proliferation.525

The end of the Cold War in 1989 meant that enormous stockpiles of weapons

from the Eastern Bloc suddenly became surplus. These weapons flooded the black markets,

and were procured by rebel groups around the world. American weapons left behind in

Vietnam were passed on to militant groups in Southeast Asia and elsewhere by the

Vietnamese government and arms traders in Thailand. Following the end of the civil war in

Cambodia, Chinese weapons found their way from Cambodia to rebel groups in neighboring

countries through illicit trade.526

523

Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections. States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2005), 26-32. 524

Daniel Byman et al., Trends, 9-16. 525

Arthur E. Gerringer, Terrorism. From One Millennium to the Next (London: I University, 2002), 272-273;

Mark P. Sulbivan and June S. Beittel. ―Latin America: Terrorism Issues,‖ Congressional Research Service,

2013,http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2063&context=key_workplace&sei-

redir= 1&referer=htt(accessed 25 June 2013); Justin V. Hastings, No Man Land: Globalization, Territory and

Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 2010), 140-145; Alexandru

Baltag, Managing Intractable Conflicts: Lessons from Moldova and Cyprus (Istanbul: Istanbul Kultur

University, 2013), 54, 59-60; Jansuz Bugajski, Cold Peace. Russia‟s New Imperialism (Wesport, CT: CSIS,

2004), 36, 101-103; Ali Riaz, Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh. A Complex Web (London: Routledge, 2008), 67;

Jonah Leff and Emile LeBrun. 526

―Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan,‖ Small Arms Survey,

2014, www. smallarmssurveysudan. org/ .../HSBA-WP32-Arms-Tracing.pdf (accessed 25 August 2014).

186

As the table 1 shows (p.181), of 18 cases of contemporary conflicts with foreign

sponsorship of NSAs, 16 are in Asia and Africa, specifically in Sub-Saharan Africa, South

and Southeast Asia. Developing countries in these regions are among the poorest in the

world, such as the DRC, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan and Yemen.

They are ruled by ineffective governments with corrupt and inept leaders, nepotism and the

abuse of power. They are struggling with famine, rapid population growth, over-urbanization,

extreme wealth inequalities, neo-colonization (exploitation of local people by developed

societies and transnational corporations), waves of displacement and competition for scarce

land and water resources in densely populated areas. As is the case across much of the Asian

and African continents, regional and tribal loyalties and domination of political patronage

undermine states‘ capacity to rule and ensure security including fighting arms trafficking.

Many of the current state-NSA conflicts are conducted in multiethnic and multicultural states

that were invented by European powers, ignoring the natural divisions of the ethnic

populations and geography.527

In the 1960s, the newly independent African states inherited

colonial boundaries, together with the challenge this legacy posed to their territorial integrity

and to their attempts to achieve national unity.Rival communities may perceive that their

security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of state powers.

Conflict in such cases becomes virtually inevitable. Incongruence between state and

nationalism and the violent politisation of ethnicity could facilitate outside intervention in

these troubled countries, including the supply of arms to rebel groups.528

In Africa, the number of conflicts with state sponsorship of NSAs increased in 2003

(16 compared to 10 in 1993), followed by a decline in 2013 (five). Against this background

escalation of sectarian and economic/demographic-based conflicts, such as the civil war in

Liberia (1999-2003) and genocide in Rwanda (1994), spread violence into neighboring

Burundi and the DRC, creating proxy wars, especially in the eastern provinces of DR Congo.

The Horn of Africa was further destabilized from the early 1990s, partly because of the

Islamization and the sponsorship of Islamic terrorgroups bythe National Islamic Front (NIF)

government of Sudan. Following Eritrea‘s independence (1993), Asmara started support for

Sudanese, Ethiopian and Somali armed NSAs to destabilize the region (Sudan supported

527

John J. Macionis, Sociology, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1997), 292-309; J. Cilliers.

―Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review,‖ in Human Rights, Peace and Justice in

Africa: A Reader,‖ eds. Christof Heyns and Karen Stefiszyn (Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2006), 246-

247. 528

Kofi Annan. ―The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in

Africa,‖ Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A Reader,‖ eds. Christof Heyns and Karen Stefiszyn

(Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2006), 240-243.

187

radical Islamic militants in Eritrea). Both Somalia and the DRC served as a battlefield for

proxy wars between their neighbors (Eritrea against Ethiopia and Uganda against Rwanda).

Eritrea and Rwanda armed local warlords to undermine the interests of their foes. East Africa

faces natural disaster (drought), stimulating famine and mass emigrationthat escalate regional

conflicts among armed militias.529

In Africa, the number of state-NSA conflicts with foreign

sponsorship has declined as a result of settlement of inter-states and state-NSA conflicts, such

as in Liberia, Senegal, Cote d‘Ivoire, Burundi, the Cabinda province of Angola and the

formation of the South Sudan.530

More than previously, states use private companies, criminal networks and smugglers

to facilitate arming of their client NSAs. It is a combination of governmental and private

elements, and while in the 1960s and 1970s states were responsible for the whole logistic

operations, contemporary states and their client NSAs are using professional smugglers.

Unlike the Cold War era when the United States and the Soviet Union shipped weapons

across the world, contemporary governments supply weapons to rebellious NSAs, mostly in

neighboring countries, consequently facing fewer logistic and political challenges.531

In

529

Bulliet et al. Earth, 905-910; Lee M. Segmour. ―The Regional Politics of the Darfur Crisis,‖ in The

International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, eds. David R. Black and Paul D. Villiams

(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 55-57; Belachew Gebrewold-Tochalo, Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the

Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa (Famham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 184-185; SPIRI. ―Business as

Usual. Arms Flows to Darfur 2009-2012,‖ Sudan Issue Brief, no. 20 (September 2012),

http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-20-Arms-flows-to-Darfur-2009-

12.pdf(accessed 26 June 2013). 530

Paulos Milkias, Ethiopia (Santa Barbara, CL.: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 407; Guy Arnold, The A to Z of Civil Wars

in Africa(Lanham, MR.: Scarecrow Press, 2008) 159; International Crisis Group. ―Eritrea: Scenarios for Future

Transition,‖ AfricaReport, no. 200 (28 March 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-

africa/ethiopia-eritrea/200-eritrea-scenarios-for-future-transition.aspx(accessed 26 June 2013); Jeremy I. Levitt,

Illegal Peace in Africa: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power Sharing with Warlords,Rebels and Junta

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 67; Savannah de Tessières. ―Reforming the Ranks Public

Security in a Divided Cote D‘ivoire,‖ Small Arms Survey 2011,

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-07-

EN.pdf(accessed 26 June 2013), 196; UNODC. ―Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat

Assessment‖ (February 2013),http://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/ Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/ West_Africa_

TOC_FIREARMS.pdf (accessed 26 June 2013); The Resolve. ―Report: Sudan‘s Renewed Support to the LRA,‖

26 April 2013, https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/theresolve/ HIDDEN+IN+PLAIN+ SIGHT+-

+%5BFINAL+ V%5D .pdf (accessed 26 June 2013); John Prendergast. ―Let them Hunt,‖ Foreign Policy, 13

August 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/ 13/ let_them_hunt (accessed 26 June 2013);

David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of

Philadelphia Press, 2012), 177; Human Rights Watch. ―Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 - Democratic

Republic of Congo,‖ 1 January 1999,

http://www.refworld.org/publisher,HRW,ANNUALREPORT,COD,3ae6a8a7c,0.html(accessed 26 June 2013),

32. 531

Riaz, Islamic, 76; ―Arms Haul Probe Chronology,‖ The Daily Star, 27 June

2011,http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=191743 (accessed 25 July 2013); Paresh

Barua. ―Ulfa chief shot at in Myanmar,‖ The Daily Star, 11 September

2011,http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details. php?nid=201954 (accessed 25 July 2013); ‗An

International Conspiracy,‖ The Week, 3 December 2011, http://week.manoramaonline.com/cgi-

188

January 2014, a Bangladesh court sentenced to death fourteen senior officials, including

former ministers and intelligence chiefs who were all involved in a Pakistani plot to arm

Indian rebel groups with a ten truckloads of Chinese arms and ammunition (small arms and

rockets). The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) funded the purchase from the Chinese

Norinco, a state-owned arms manufacturer. Senior members of the Indian rebel groups and

Bangladeshi smugglers facilitated the shipment from China to the port of Chittagong,

Bangladesh, where it was intercepted (2004) by local policemen. Bangladesh media claimed

it was the largest arms haul in Bangladesh‘s history.532

Scholars highlight the advantages of state sponsorship of rebellious NSAs, being a

low cost, cheap option to destabilize, bleed and even defeat the nation-state. The above table

(p. 181), reveals that for most countries this mode of operation is becoming less valuable

probably because of economic and security considerations. From the 1980s, Libya was top of

the list of states sponsoring terrorism and armed dozens of terror groups around the world. In

order to break out of international isolation and gain lifting of western sanctions, Libya

renounced terrorism (2003), curtailed its support for international terrorism and started to

cooperate with the United States and the United Kingdom in the fight against radical Islamic

groups.533

Often, government changes affect states‘ support of rebellious NSAs in neighboring

countries. In light of the rise of Hugo Chavez‘ socialist government in Venezuela (1999),

both the FARC and the ELNarmed themselves with weapons from Venezuelan army

stocks.534

At the same time, enjoying more security collaboration with Bangladesh and

Myanmar in recent years, the federal government of India inflicted heavy losseson insurgent

groups in the Northeast, such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National

Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in

the state of Manipur, encouraging some of them to lay down their weapons. Therefore, denial

bin/MMOnline.dll/portal/ep/theWeekContent.do?contentId=10550856&programId=1073755753&BV_ID=@@

@,(accessed 25 July 2013). 532

―Bangladesh : 14 to death over 10 truck arms smuggling,‖ Asian Tribune, 1 February 2014,

http://asiantribune.com/node/70449 (accessed 20 April 2014); Kathi Austin. ―Light Weapons and Conflict in

the Great Lakes Region of Africa,‖ in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds.

Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 36. 533

??????? 534

Orlando J. Perez. ―U.S. Security Policy and U.S.-Venezuelan Relations,‖ in Addicted to Failure U.S. Security

Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region, ed. Brain Loveman (Lanham, MR.: Rowman and Littlefield,

2006), 94-98;

189

of outside support from neighboring countries is a precondition of successful

counterinsurgency.535

As in previous decades, lack of external support could be a major constrainton

insurgents‘ operational capabilities. It might bring their struggle to a disastrous end or

lengthen their campaign. In 1975Fretilin, the East Timor guerrilla movement, declared the

independence of the former Portuguese colony.However, the declaration was soon followed

by an invasion of the Indonesian military forces, declaring East Timor to be that country‘s

twenty seventh state. Fretilin gained the sympathy of the western world but no tangible

support and struggled to capture Indonesian army weapons to carry on the fight. Only in 2002

did East Timor become an independent state after up to two hundred thousand people were

killed during the whole Indonesian period from 1976, mainly by the Indonesian army. From

1991 the people of Western Sahara, under Moroccan control, have been waiting for a national

referendum (as declared by the U.N.) that might grant them independence. The local militia,

the POLISARIO, does not have access to the Atlantic seaboard and all imported material has

to come through Algerian territory. But Algeria, who used to arm the POLISARIO,

abandoned them in the 1990s, preferring goodrelations with Morocco because of economic

interests.536

This section reveals that state support is no longer the only, or necessarily the most

important method of arming. Still, state support remains the most effective mechanism to

make a rebellious NSA a lethal military force as the case of Iran arming the Lebanese

Hezbollah demonstrates.

Iran’s Support of Radical Islamic NSAs

Ideological background and the Quds Force

535

Peter H. Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo: Wars and Conflict Minerals in the World‟s Deadliest Place

(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), 40; Human Rights Watch. ―ICC: Congolese Rebel Leader Acquitted

in Court‘s Second Case,‖ 18 December 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/18/icc-congolese-rebel-leader-

acquitted-court-s-second-case (accessed 26 June 2013); Caroline Hellyer. ―Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering on the

Dangerous – the Invisible Frontier in North Rivu,‖ Think Africa Press, 5 December

2012,http://thinkafricapress.com/drc/unreported-invisible-frontline-north-kivu (accessed 26 June 2013); M.S.

Prabhakara.―Mother of Insurgencies or Reinvention,‖ The Hindu, 26 March 2011, http://www. hindu.com/

2011/03/ 26/stories/ 2011032654411200.htm (accessed 26 June 2013); Prakash, Encyclopedia,93-94; Sushant

K. Singh. ―A Toast to Tripura,‖ Mid-Day, 19 February 2013, http://www.mid-day.com/columnists/2013/

feb/190213-opinion-sushant-singh-a-toast-to-tripura-state-assembly-elections.htm, (accessed 18 July 2013);

Riaz, Islamic, 78-79. 536

Paul R. Bartrop and Samuel Totten. ―The History of Genocide: an Overview,‖ in Teaching about Genocide:

Issues, Approaches, and Resources, ed. Samuel Totten (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 45; Cordesman,

Tragedy, 62-69; Sani Shehu, Scorpions under Pillow: Terrorism in Africa (Bloomington, IN: Author House,

2008).

190

Middle East developments in recent years, chiefly the 2006 Lebanon War and the Hezbollah

involvement in the civil war in Syria, have drawn attention to Iran‘s sponsorship of militant

Islamic groups as a unique case of state sponsorship of rebellious NSAs. The thesis suggests

that state sponsorship of NSAs is an old phenomenon intensified by the ideological struggle

between two international groups of states, the West vis–à–vis the East. Byman argues that

ideologically driven regimes, such as Iran, are exceptionally difficult to engage because cost-

benefits calculations that motivate most regimes counts less for regimes that are willing to

sacrifice more standard interests for spreading a particular faith or worldview.537

The Islamic

Republic‘s concept of itself, and the manner it supports friendly NSAs is not different than

the communist export of revolution since the 1920s led by Russia joined in the 1950s by

China. Cuba armed and trained more rebellious NSAs than Iran, and engaged in more

military conflicts around the world. Still, the current sub-section aims to prove that the rise of

the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) and its commitment to ―export the Revolution‖ through

subversive activity, demonstrates not only a different ideological base compared to

communism but a new state-NSA association and integration.538

The Iran-Hezbollah alliance

implies an organic connection rather than a state-proxy model. Hezbollah is an extension of

the Iranian regime much more than a client that serves its patron. Iran supports Palestinian

Islamic groups too, using independent arms smugglers.539

Part of the following section analyses Iran‘s support of armed NSAs from the state

perspective, because it is a remarkable phenomenon in the current international system.

Based on shared religious ideology, the state (in this case, Iran) cooperates with different

NSAs for various purposes including for the acquisition of arms. Hezbollah is a special case

of a rebel group which is an extension of a foreign state and operates as an NSA in its own

537

Byman, Deadly Connections., 26-32. 538

Georgie A. Geyer, Guerrilla Prince. The Untold Story of Fidel Castro (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1991), 303-304. Geyer argues that Cuba assisted around thirty guerrilla organizations, and trained forty five

thousand guerrillas. Gleijlses claims that between 1975 and 1991, over four hundred thirty thousand Cubans

served in Angola (Gleijlses, 155); Georgie A. Geyer, Guerrilla Prince. The Untold Story of Fidel Castro

(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 303-304. Geyer argues that Cuba assisted around thirty guerrilla

organizations, and trained forty five thousand guerrillas. Gleijlses claims that between 1975 and 1991, over four

hundred thirty thousand Cubans served in Angola (Gleijlses, 155). 539

Michael Segal. ―The Revolutionary Guards' Qods Force – Mission Accomplished,‖ in Iran: From Regional

Challenge to Global Threat a Jerusalem Center Anthology, ed. Shimon Shapira (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center

for Public Affairs, 2012), http://jcpa.org/text/downloads/iran-from-regional-challenge-to-global-threat.pdf

(accessed 11 May 2013);Azani, 189; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―The Quds

Force, an Elite Unit of the Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Spearheads Iran‘s Global Terrorist

Campaign. The Terrorist Attack in Bulgaria was, in our Assessment, Part of the Campaign,‖ 21August 2012, 8-

9, 24-25, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/ articles/ Art_20378/ E_137_12f_2140163071.pdf (accessed 11

May 2013).

191

country. Iran‘s arming of Islamic NSAs, mainly Hezbollah and Hamas, with strategic

weapon systems (Scud missiles, medium range rockets) illustrates that state sponsorship is

still currently the most efficient mode of NSAs‘ military build-up. Leading from the early

1990s the so-called ―resistance axis,‖ Iran has provided its client NSAs with military

capabilities usually in the possession of states‘ armies and that balances their technological

inferiority against Israel. Without Iranian military backup, Hezbollah and Hamas could

hardly compete with the IDF, probably the most advanced army in the Middle East.540

Thus,

from 1992 the United States State Department has defined Iran as ―the world‘s principal

sponsor of extremist Islamic and Palestinian groups, providing them with funds, weapons,

and training.‖541

According to the Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, issued by the United

States Department of States in July 2012 ―Iran, the world‘s leading state sponsor of

terrorism…was known to use the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-

QF) and terrorist insurgent groups to implement its foreign policy goals… The IRGC-QF is

the regime‘s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.‖542

Iran has supported radical Islamic groups: to further its Islamic ideology, and to

advance its international political and strategic position. The aspiration to export the Islamic

Revolution to other Muslim societies (and to humanity at large) was an integral part of the

philosophy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the revolution and founded the Islamic

Republic in 1979. Khomeini and his supporters sought to ignore the religious differences

between Shi'ites and Sunnis, as well as the national divisions in the Arab-Muslim world.

They wanted to create an Iranian-led revolutionary Islamic force which would defeat and

eradicate the ―root of evil,‖ the superpowers which were corrupting the world. According to

that concept, which is deeply embedded in the current Iranian regime led by Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei, Iran's principal enemies are the United States ("the big Satan") and its allies,

especially Israel ("the little Satan").543

We shall export our Revolution to the whole world…. The struggle continues

to the whole world… The struggle continues, and wherever there is struggle in

the world against the mustakbirin (oppressors) we are there, too…. Our

540

Steven K. O‘Hern, Iran‟s Revolutionary Guard. The Threat that Grows whileAmerica Sleeps (Washington,

D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012), 91; Byman,Deadly Connections, 79, 265. 541

U.S. Department of State, ―Patterns of Global Terrorism – 1992,‖ in Terrorism. Documents of International

and Local Control, vol. 9, ed. Howard S. Levie (New York: Oceana Publication, 1996), 221. 542

United States Department of State. ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2011,‖ 31 July 2012,

http://www.state.gov/ documents/ organization/ 195768.pdf (accessed 3 May 2013). 543

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary

Guards as the main tool to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran,‖ 2 April 2007,

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/18634 (accessed 28 April 2013).

192

authorities should know that our Revolution is not confined to Iran. The

Revolution of the people of Iran is the starting point of the great Islamic

Revolution of the world under the banner of the Imam of Mahdi… The great

objectives of the revolution, i.e. the establishment of world-wide Islamic

government.544

Khomeini regarded as desirable the use of force and power for the attainment of the

ultimate objective, unity of the Muslim world. All his life, Khomeini advocated the pan-

Islamist utopia of a de-territoriezed Umma united in brotherly love. The concept of Umma is

inherited from Islamic thought, referring to the idea of a supranational community tied

together by an overarching allegiance to a particular religious identity. Khomeini himself and

mainly his successors were forced to slowly move focus from the international agenda to one

more focused on Iran itself, but they have maintained the pan-Islamic rhetoric and in

contemporary Iran the Supreme Leader is called the leader of the Umma rather than of Iran

only.545

Ali Shari‗ati, one of the ideologists of the Islamic Revolution in Iran advocated for

violence: ―Iran should be a community that is in the midst of battles; it has a universal

mission. It is not a self-isolated, closed, and distinct community. It is a shahid (martyr)

community.‖546

Following Iran‘s most revered saint, Husain bin Ali who revolted against the

Muawiyah Caliphate in the seventh century, the Shi‘ite school of thought preaches Jihad

against ―internal enemies,‖ referring to oppressive rulers. Fighting them legitimizes Iran

military support of insurgency. Imam Khomeini states: ―let us overthrow tyrannical

governments by cutting all relations with government institutions, refraining from

cooperating with them, refraining from an action that might be construed as aiding them; and

creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions.‖ For the

founders of the Islamic Republic, Iran has a leading role in facilitating Islamic insurgency.547

544

M.J. Khalili and Manafi S. Anari, eds., Fundamentals of the Islamic Revolution. Selections from the

Thoughts and Opinions of Imam Khomeini (Tehran: The Institution for Compilation and Publication of Imam

Khomeini‘s Works, 2000), 436, 437. 545

BenjaminMacQueen, Political culture and conflict resolution in the Arab world Lebanon and Algeria

(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2009), 29; Rasmus C. Elling, Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and

Ethnicity after Khomeini (New York: Pargrave Macmillan, 2013), 28; ―Supreme Leader Felicitates Islamic

Ummah on Prophet Mohammad‘s Birthday,‖ Al-Manar News,http://www.almanar.com.lb/ english/

adetails.php?eid= 81256&st= umma&cid=25&fromval=3&frid=19&seccatid=32 (accessed 28 May 2013). 546

Ali Shari‘ati. ―A Discussion of Shahid,‖ in Jehad and Shahadat. Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, eds.

Mehdi Abedi, Gary Legenhausen Ali Shari'ati (Huston, TX: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies,

1986), 237. 547

Ali Shari‘ati. ―Shahidat,‖ in Jehad and Shahadat. Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, eds. Mehdi Abedi and

Gary Legenhausen (Huston, TX: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986),173, 177, 198, 191.

193

This role demonstrates rejection of the western traditional distinction between state and

religion, as Khomeini argues: ―…you would clearly see no distinction between religious and

political leadership, and moreover, it would become apparent that political strife is an integral

part of religious duty.‖548

For Khomeini and his heir, Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exporting the

revolution is used to leverage Iranian strategic interests in the Middle East and around the

globe. Iran's principal strategic interest is to achieve regional hegemony by eroding Western

influence in the Middle East and by gaining influence over various countries and

organizations, especially those in the "resistance" camp (including Syria and militant NSAs

such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Iran also aspires to widen its

political, ideological and religious influence in Muslim population centers around the globe,

especially in Africa, South America and Central Asia. Iran was willing to overlook religious

disagreements in order to build up the stature of the Iranian regime throughout all Islam, not

just within the minority Shi‘ite sect. This strategy has direct implications for arming of Iran‘s

non-Shi‘ite NSAs.549

Shortly after coming to power and despite the war with Iraq that commenced in

September 1980, Khomeini‘s government began supporting radical Shi‘ite and Sunni

elements from Afghanistan in the east to North Africa in the west. The success of the

revolution created a monumental Islamic awakening, whose waves reached all the Muslim

countries and communities worldwide. Shi‘ite communities around the globe were

radicalized and hundreds of young Shi‘ites visited Iran for studies and training in the use of

firearms, explosives and executing suicide bombings. Thereafter they returned to their

countries to establish clandestine infrastructures that, during the 1980s, initiated a string of

terror attacks and attempts at destabilization in countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon

and Iraq (often the IRGC supplied the explosives used in the bombings). Extreme Sunni

movements were also assisted. This activity was initially facilitated by the Revolutionary

Guard‘s Office of Liberation Movements, established by order of Khomeini in 1981, and

given the mission of assisting Islamic revolution in other countries and establishing relations

with movements ―fighting for freedom from servitude and fetters of Western and Eastern

548

Naim Qassem, Hizbullah. The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 52. 549

O‘Hern,Iran, 91.

194

imperialism and world Zionism.‖550

Yet, because of cultural and religious differences, the

Islamic Revolution failed to spread into Arab, Sunni lands, and stayed a mainly Iranian-

Shi‘ite phenomenon. Moreover, in light of the civil war in Syria, the Iranians no longer

perceive Shi‘ite and Sunni equally; they are as heavily involved in fighting the Sunnis as they

are in fighting the non-Moslems.551

Iranian support of NSAs is associated with the Resistance (muqawama) doctrine

praised by the Iranian leadership and executed by Tehran clients, mainly the Hezbollah and

Hamas. Rabinovich argues that Resistance is both a form of mind and a concerted policy of

opposition to the United States, and to Israel. The peace process of the 1990s and its sequels

were seen by Iran and radical Islamic NSAs as an attempt to subjugate the Arab world and fit

it into an American order. Iran built the so-called resistance axis (Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas

and smaller Palestinian groups) to contradict the moderate camp, led by Egypt, Jordan, and

Saudi Arabia, negating the very idea of peace with Israel which had to be rejected and

defeated and the alternative – resistance and victory – upheld.552

Operationally, as Ehud

Yaari explains, ―resistance‖ implies a constant state of combat or a persistent warfare.

Following recent engagements with Israel (the 2006 Lebanon War and Israel operations in

the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009 and 2012) Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah and

the Hamas Secretary of the Political Bureau, Khaled Mashal, argued they could survive an

all-out confrontation with a vastly superior military force such as the IDF by employing

classical guerrilla tactics; that is a war aiming at methodical erosion of the enemy‘s resolve

rather than fighting over territory, waging continual warfare if only on a small scale. The goal

is directed at denying victory to the enemy, and not at achieving a quick result. An endless

war requires a steady flow of weapons and the Quds Force is a major mechanism to make

resistance a reality.553

550

Shimon Shapira, Hizbullah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2006), 172-182,

96-97, 106-109, 135-139 (Hebrew). 551

O‘Hern, Iran, 44, 66, 70-71, 177; Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God. From Revolution to

Institutionalization (Palgrave: New York, 2009), 41; Elling, Minorities, 28; ―Squaring up on Syria,‖ Al Ahram,

6-12 September 2012,http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1113/re8.htm (accessed 14 July 2013); Suadad al-Salhy

―Iraqi Shi'ites flock to Assad's side as sectarian split widens,‖ Reuters, 19 June

2013,http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2013/06/19/iraqi-shiite-fighters-flock-to-assads-side-as-syrias-

sectarian-split-widens/ (accessed 14 July 2013). 552

Itamar Rabinovich, The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2012 (Washington,

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 275. 553

Ehud Yaari. ―The Muqawama Doctrine,‖ The Washington Institute, 13 November 2006, http://www.

washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-muqawama-doctrine (accessed 29 May 2013).

195

The Quds Force is the most important and effective tool of the Iranian leadership and

decision-makers for the ―export of the Islamic Revolution.‖It was established in the 1980s

and inherited roles of the Revolutionary Guard‘s Office of Liberation Movements that was

disbanded in 1987, including arming of radical NSAs. It became the IRGC‘s elite unit; the

long arm of Iranian clandestine military and terrorist activity, enabling the regime to strike

perceived enemies abroad, especially the United States, Israel and pro-Western Arab

countries. The Quds Force is one of five branches of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps

(IRGC), which is the strongest military-security body in Iran and the regime‘s main

support.554

The Quds Force funding assignment was to engage in operational and political

activities to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran.555

A short time after taking

office in 1989, Khamenei declared that a leading mission of the Quds Force was to "set up

Hizbullah cells all over the world as part of the…Islamic Revolution in the world."

According to Khamenei, there is no doubt the IRGC will take part in this task: "we are not

claiming that we will send our military forces to other places and intervene in the internal

affairs of others, but rather that the Islamic Revolution is not without responsibility [and

cannot remain indifferent] in the face of armed Hezbollah cells throughout the world."556

Previously, much of the Quds Force activity stayed out of the spotlight and the international

and local Iranian media. Against the background of the uprisings in the Arab World, the

Iranian leadership has been trying, with limited success so far, to translate the changes in the

Middle East (the ―Islamic awakening‖ as Tehran calls it) into achievements, particularly

when it comes to spearheading the Islamist agenda as well as for deterrence and counterattack

assignments. Therefore, Tehran has activated the Quds Force all the more, as part of Iran's

wider strategic response to changes in the regional and international arena and the

intensification of military and political threats involving sanctions. The Quds Force is

regarded as the mechanism of deterrence and counterattack by the Iranian regime. For the

554

O‘Hern, Iran,91. The Iranian armed forces are divided into two armies: the Regular Army which had served

in the pre-revolution time, is better armed and more professional but less trusted by the regime. The Iranian

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established by the Islamic Republic. As the title hints, the IRGC

contains conventional force which is less skillful but its primary assignment is to protect the regime. They are

also responsible for Iran‘s strategic apparatuses, such as the SSMs, supporting Islamic NSAs and initiating terror

attacks against Iran‘s foes. 555

―Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,‖ The New York Times, last updated in 9 October 2009,

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ timestopics/organizations/i/ islamic_revolutionary_guard_corps/ index.

html?scp=10&sq=IRAN%20HEZBOLLAH%20%20WEAPON&st=cse (accessed 3 May 2013); O‘Hern, Iran,

71-74; Shapira, Hizbullah, 172-182. 556

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―The Qods Force, an elite unit of Iran's

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,‖ 10.

196

theory of NSAs‘ arming, the Quds Force demonstrates a remarkable state sponsorship similar

to the CIA and KGB sponsorship of various groups during the Cold War.557

Specifically, the Quds Force is leading Iran‘s growing military involvement in the

civil war in Syria; it uses Hezbollah – Iran‘s premier proxy – to provide critical support to

Bashar Assad‘s regime that might itself become an NSA. The Quds Force is involved

(directly and indirectly) in terror attacks and guerrilla activity throughout and beyond the

Middle East against Iran's foes; for example the deadly attacks on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria

(July 2012), and the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States (October

2011). The Quds Force is also responsible for part of the daily toll U.S. forces in Iraq and

Afghanistan have paid as the former has assisted, including via Lebanese Hezbollah, the

radical Shi‘ite organizations in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Finally, the Quds Force

is supposed to hit back at ―enemy‖ territory, both by itself and through proxies it has

cultivated in case the United States and Israel plan to attack Iran‘s nuclear sites.558

The newspaper Kayhan, which is close to Khamenei and generally reflects his

position, illuminated the ideological aspect of the Quds Force which is often underestimated

in the West:

The IRGC-QF is in fact more than a tangible, operational force; it is an

ideology, an ideology that does not recognize borders, a doctrine that includes

terms and beliefs that exist in direct confrontation with Western culture. …The

IRGC-QF is indeed arming the warriors of the region – but not with weapons,

rather with an ideology that is a thousand times more potent than any weapon.

Qasem Suleimani [the Quds Force commander] has not provided weapons to

anyone in the region; there is no need for it, since he has taught the warriors of

the region how to think in order to strike the body of imperialism….The fear of

the IRGC-QF is the fear of the loss of the significance of the borders. The

IRGC-QF has taught the believers to fight the enemy on his home turf.559

General Ghasem Soleimani has been the commander of the Quds Force since March

1998. In 2011 he was put on America's terrorist list after the discovery of his involvement in

the Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States. His

predecessor was General Ahmad Vahidi, Iran's formerminister of defense, who is also on the

American terrorist list as a result of his involvement in the terrorist attack which blew up the

AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1994. The high command of

557

Segal, Revolutionary Guards, 72-76. 558

Segal, Revolutionary Guards, 72-74. 559

Segal, Revolutionary Guards, 76.

197

the Quds Force is directed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and reports directly to him. The

supreme leader supervises the Quds Force through his permanent representative in the Force

command. The Quds Force is also subordinated to the National Security Council, Iran‘s

supreme strategic policy authority and seems to enjoy high prestige within the Iranian

leadership. It has many resources and influences the strategic and security decisions made in

Tehran, including arming NSAs in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Gaza Strip.560

Soleimani is a very close associateof Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who regards him as

someone who ―is a living martyr of the revolution.‖ On January 24, 2011 Khamenei

promoted Soleimani to the rank of major general, the highest rank in the IRGC since the end

of the Iran-Iraq War, and which is equal to that of the IRGC chief, Mohammad Ali Jafari. For

some time Suleimani emerged as one of the candidates for the presidency of Iran.561

The Quds Force includes staff branches, especially designated headquarters, and

regional geographic headquarters, such as the Lebanon Corps, the Iraq Corps (Ramadan), the

Ansar Corps, which is responsible for Iranian subversion in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and

the Africa Corps. The large scale of Quds Force military activity overseas probably involved

military and government organizations of the Iranian regime, such as financial institutions,

transportation companies, Iranian Regular Army and various governmental ministries. Given

that Iran has been channeling weapons to its proxies, most important is the Quds Force

cooperation with the Iranian Defense Industry Organization (DIO) which produces Iranian

arms and the Iranian Air Force that employs transportation jets. In the 1980s, the Quds Force

was committed primarily to the war against Iraq. During the 1990s, as the Iraqi regime no

longer posed a danger to the Islamic regime, and Iran attempted to disrupt the Israeli-Arab

peace talks, the Force was focused in arming Israel‘s foes. Iran supported radical Palestinian

groups that used terrorism and called for the annihilation of Israel. Encouraged by the outset

of the Second Palestinian uprising (2000), and assisted by the Hezbollah, the Quds Force

intensified its support to Palestinian radical groups, mainly Hamas.562

Being involved in a number of warssimultaneously, the Quds Force channels arms

and tactics between its clients, demonstrating a comprehensive military system. For example,

560

O‘Hern, Iran, 72. 561

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “The Qods Force, an elite unit of the Iran's

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,‖ 18-23. 562

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―The Qods Force, an elite unit of the Iran's

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,‖ 13-14; The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,

―Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main Tool to Export the Revolution,‖ 3-4; Byman,

Deadly Connections, 96.

198

from 2004 coalition troops in Iraq were targeted by Iranian-manufactured armor-piercing

formed projectiles, known as EFPs that were identical to devices used by the Hezbollah

against the IDF.563

Quds Force instructors and Iran‘s clients share accumulated experience

among Iranian-supported NSAs. For instance, in March 2007 coalition forces in Basra

captured Ali Daqduh, a senior Hezbollah operative who was sent (2006) to Iraq to support

Iraqi Shi‘ite militia in training and organizing; he even participated in an operation against

coalition troops in Karbala (January 2007), during which four American soldiers were

abducted and executed. The Quds Force tasked him with establishing a commando unit of

Shi‘ite operatives in Iraq using the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon.564

Iranian military support todifferent NSAs introduces similar patterns while differing

in others such as the scope of assistance, logistic complexity and modus operandi. Iran sent

limited arms shipments, mostly explosives for terror attacks,to the Gulf countries, Azerbaijan

and Pakistan. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, where indigenous

insurgencies were engaging in guerrilla warfare, Iran‘s military support was more extensive

including larger weapon systems. The following section reveals that these differences were

associated with geo-strategic elements and the strength of the target states. Iran employs an

impressive logistic apparatus to channel arms and ammunition to friendly NSAs, including

air and shipping lines, banks and semi-government funds. Facing U.N. sanctions on arms

export and arms embargos, Iran has faced growing challenges to transport weapons overseas,

to both states and NSAs and has been compelled to use various tactics of concealment and

camouflage to smuggle weapons.565

As an illustration, a SIPRI report from 2012 reveals that

the Iranian Shipping Lines (IRISL) has renamed a total of 90 out of 123 ships since 2008.

The company also reflagged a significant percentage of its fleet in order to avoid inspection.

563

Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice. The British in Iraq 2003-2009 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2011), 202. 564

Liz Sly and Peter Finn, ―U.S. hands over Hezbollah prisoner to Iraq,‖ The Washington Post, 16 December

2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-hands-over-hezbollah-prisoner-toiraq/2011/

12/16/gIQABm2oyO_story.html (accessed 30 May 2013); ―U.S. Turns Over Terrorism Suspect Ali Musa

Daqduq to Iraq,‖ The Daily Beast, 17 December 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/17/u-s-

turns-over-terrorism-suspect-ali-musa-daqduq-to-iraq.html (accessed 30 May 2013). 565

Yaakov Katz. ―Iran renaming ships to circumvent sanctions,‖ The Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2012,

http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-renaming-ships-to-circumvent-sanctions (accessed 10 May

2013);Matthew Levitt. ―Disrupting Tehran's Export of Technology and Weapons,‖ The Washington Institute,

Policy 1512, 30 April 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/disrupting-tehrans-export-

of-technology-and-weapons(accessed 10 May 2013); Robert M. Shelala II and others. ―US and Iranian Strategic

Competition: The Impact ofAfghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan,‖CSIS(October 2012), http://csis.org/files/

publication/ 120312_ Iran_ Chapter_X_AfPakCentAsia_AHC.pdf (accessed 22 April 2013).

199

Counter maritime smuggling operations of the US navy reveal that the IRISL has chartered

European-owned ships to conceal its identity.566

The following sections analyze three major cases of Iran‘s arming of Islamic NSAs:

arming of militant groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, logistically a less complicated operation

deriving from regional interests; arming of Hezbollah which reframes the traditional state

sponsorship model; and arming the Hamas and the PIJ, demonstrating complicated smuggling

networks, connecting states and NSAs in trafficking weapons to the Gaza Strip.

Iran’s Arming of Cross border NSAs

Iran is deeply involved in subversive activity in all neighboring countries: Iraq, Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Azerbaijan, derived from both strategic considerations and ideology. Iran

benefited both from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which removed a significant

threat to Iran and greatly increased Tehran's influence in Iraq, and the removal of a

vehemently anti-Iranian and anti-Shia government from neighboring Afghanistan. Still, Iran

was worried about a long-term American presence on its doorstep, regarding that as a threat

to national security especially in Iraq.567

Furthermore, Iran aimed to convince the United

States that attacking Iran, as ithad attacked Saddam Hussein‘s regime and the Taliban, would

be far more costly. Iranian support of NSAs in its backyard demonstrates cross-border

activity. Exploiting long and porous borders, using traditional smuggling trails and pack

animals, the Quds Force is channeling weapons to Islamic insurgent groups in relatively

simple logistic operations.568

Iraq

Iran‘s subversive activity in Iraq derives from Tehran‘s preferencefor a weak Shi‘ite Islamic-

dominated government that is aligned with Iranian interests and does not pose a threat to

566

CSIS (October 2012), http://csis.org/files/ publication/ 120312_ Iran_ Chapter_X_AfPakCentAsia_AHC.pdf

(accessed 22 April 2013). 567

O‘Hern, Iran, 96, 109-110; Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,

2011), 325-326; Toby C. Jones. ―Saudi-Iraq Relation Developing Chaos or Acrimonious Stability,‖ in Iraq, its

Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power, eds. Henri J. Barkey, Scott

B. Lasensky and Phebe Marr (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 105-106. 568

Mohsen M. Milani. ―Iran Strategies and Objectives in Post-Saddam Iraq,‖ in Iraq, its Neighbors, and the

United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power, eds. Henri J. Barkey, Scott B. Lasensky, and

Phebe Marr (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 82, 90.

200

Iran‘s position in the region. Dozens of Quds Force officers and operatives captured by the

coalition forces in Iraq in the last decade are major evidence of that. IRGC arms smuggling

operations in Iraq did not begin with the United States‘ invasion in 2003. The IRGC had

supported Shi‘ite Iraqis opposed to Saddam Hussein for years. The IRGC formed and armed

the Badr Corps, the military arm of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) which

originated among Iraqi refugees in Iran and took part in the fighting against Iraq. The Badr

Corps was extremely experienced in smuggling operations into Iraq supported by the Quds

Force First Corps, known as Ramadan Headquarters. In the post-Saddam period, Iran

provided considerable financial, political and material support to the ISCI and its militia, the

Badr Corps that eventually integrated with the Iraqi security forces.569

Exploiting the political

vacuum that was created in Iraq to increase its influence while undermining the United

States‘ efforts to stabilize Iraq, the Quds Force sponsored the establishment and handling of

new Shi‘ite militias in Iraq. The Mahdi Army under Muqtada al Sadr was the main Shi‘ite

militia in Baghdad for years before it was routed in a series of U.S.-Iraqi offensives and

agreed to a pact in 2008 that generally halted attacks. A breakaway group of Sadrists, the

Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq (League of the Righteous) carried out attacks against

Coalition forces and other Iraqi security personnel and civilians before the American army

pulled out of Iraq in late 2011. With the withdrawal of U.S. military, Iranian backed militias

have observed a cease-fire, opting to pursue opportunities in the political spectrum.

Throughout the American presence there was a continuous, little reported and far more

deadly struggle between Shi‘ite and Sunni groups for control over areas of Iraq. The Shi‘ites

gradually 'ethnically cleansed' mixed-areas in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Since the

American withdrawal the Shi‘ite dominated government has received the support of the

Shi‘ite militias, but they are still attacking Sunnis – though less frequently.570

569

Jones, Saudi-Iraq,107; Benjamin King and Matt Schroeder. ―Surveying the Battlefield: Illicit Arms in

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia,‖ in Small Arms Survey 2012. Moving Targets, August 2012,

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2012/eng/Small-Arms-Survey-2012-Chapter-10-

EN.pdf (accessed 20 April 2013); O‘Hern, 97-98; Michael Ware, ―Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq,‖ Time

Magazine, 15 August 2005, http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,1093747-5,00.html (accessed

30 April2013). 570

United States Department of States. ―Iraq 2013 Crime and Safety Report: Baghdad,‖ OSAC, 18 April 2013,

https://www.osac.gov/ Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13912 (accessed 27 June 2013); Iver

Gabrielsen.―Why Did Violence Decline during the US ―Surge‖ in Iraq,‖ Small Wars Journal, 4 February 2013,

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-did-violence-decline-during-the-us-%E2%80%9Csurge%E2%80%9D-

in-iraq (accessed 13 July 2013); Michael Knights. ―Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown,‖

Jane‟s Intelligence Review, 30 September 2011, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ uploads/ Documents/

opeds/ 4e8b0eba7c0a2.pdf (accssed 13 July 2013).

201

As a manifestation of Iran‘s growing influence in Iraq, the Quds Force has steadily

funneled money and arms to Shi‘ite NSAs as well as training their activists in both Iran and

Lebanon. The Iranians provided large quantities of weapons, some newly produced,including

rockets, mortars, Iranian versions of anti-tank missiles and SAMs, plastic explosives and

small arms which were smuggled mainly along the porous southern border. In July 2011, the

director general of the intelligence division in Iraq's interior ministry, Hussein Kamal, argued

that "there has been a systematic flow of weapons into Iraq for the past eight years. Of course

they try to say it is not state-sponsored. But when weapons are flowing from the borders of a

sovereign state, it is very clear where the blame lies.‖571

The most effective weapon the Quds

Force provided its proxies in Iraq was the EFP, which is an improvement of the shaped

charge; a tube packed with explosive and capped with a metal (usually copper) platter, that

can penetrate armor and spray metal shards inside the vehicle compartment. The EFP is more

lethal than any IED seen before in Iraq thus causing large numbers of U.S. and coalition

casualties. The Quds Force also supplied a special trigger that uses a passive infrared sensor

to fire the EFP that could overcome countermeasures the U.S. forces employed against

roadside IEDs. Some of the passive infrared sensors found in Iraq were traced to sensors

shipped to Iran in large orders from manufacturers in Taiwan and Japan. An intelligence

report of the U.S. forces argued that organized networks aligned with the IRGC were

supplying EFPs as early as 2005. The use of EFPs as well as Iranian improvised rocket-

assisted munitions (IRAMs), an improvement on the ordinary mortar,led to the heaviest

monthly casualties of the United States military in Iraq in three years in June 2011when

fourteen of its soldiers were killed in action. At least twelve of them were killed by Iranian-

based insurgency groups.572

Senior American military personnel in Baghdad showed examples of explosives

bearing serial numbers and Iranian script. One of the Americans said that the Revolutionary

Guards‘ Quds Force had supplied the explosives. From 2008 and 2009, U.S. and Iraqi forces

seized 1,000 arms caches in Iraq that contained more than 900 weapons reportedly of Iranian

571

Martin Chulov. ―Qassem Suleimani: the Iranian general 'secretly running' Iraq,‖ The Guardian, 28 November

2011,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/28/qassem-suleimani-iran-iraq-influence (accessed 19April

2013); ―US accuses Iran's envoy to Iraq,‖ BBC News, 7 October 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7032557.stm

(accessed 19 April 2013); Ernesto Londoño. ―At least 5 killed in attack on militia,‖ The Washington Post, 13

February 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-13/world/36909082_1_shiite-militia-kataib-

hezbollah-mahdi-army(accessed 19 April 2013). 572

Ware, 15 August 2005; O‘Hern, 102-103; Michael Knights. ―Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US

drawdown,‖ Jane‟s Intelligence Review, 30 September 2011, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/

uploads/Documents/opeds/4e8b0eba7c0a2.pdf (accessed 13 July 2013).

202

origin, many of them found in Maysan province that borders Iran.573

In 2007, during a raid on

a Shi‘ite arms storehouse in the city of Hillah in southern Iraq, Iranian-manufactured armor-

penetrating side charges were found. Some of them were plate charges which had been

camouflaged in plastic made to look like rocks, reminiscent of the charges used by Hezbollah

in south Lebanon against the IDF in the 1990s. Infrared sensors were also found, as were

electronic detonators and information about explosives exclusive to Iran. Ten SA-7 anti-

aircraft missiles were also found in the raid, manufactured in China and repainted by Iran.

Armed with Iranian-produced rockets, the Shi‘ite guerrillas could launch indirect fire attacks

over U.S. targets in Baghdad‘s International Zone and Basra.574

In September 2007, U.S.

forces in the Kurdish city of Sulamaniyah arrested Mahmoud Farhadi, a senior Quds Force

officer, arguing he was involved in transporting weapons across Iraq‘s border (Iran claimed

he was a commerce official).575

Iran purchased advanced weapon systems for the Iraqi insurgents. For example, the

latter fired the anti-tank weapon, RPG-29, that could penetrate the armor of most Western

main battle tanks including the British Challenger tank and the U.S. Abrams tank. Iran

procured RPG-29s from Russia.576

Also, in late February 2007 a British newspaper revealed

that 100 sniper rifles sent to Iran by the Austrian firm of Steyr-Mannlicher between 2004 and

2005 for use against drug smugglers operating along the Afghanistan border had found their

way into the hands of the Shi‘ite opposition and were actually used to carry out attacks

against the coalition forces in Iraq. The rifles are extremely accurate and their ammunition is

manufactured in Iran.577

573

King and Schroeder, ―Surveying,‖ 317-318. 574

Micheal Ware. ―Hezbollah agent played deaf before confessing,‖ CNN, 2 July 2007,

http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/07/02/iraq.hezbollah/index.html?iref=nextin(accessed 20 April

2013); James Glanz and Richard A. Oppel. ―U.S. Says Raid in Iraq Supports Claim on Iran,‖ The New York

Times, 26 February 2007,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/middleeast/26weapons.html?pagewanted=print&_r=(accessed 20

April 2013); Barbara Starr and Chelsea J. Carter. ―Official: Militias using Iranian weapons to target U.S. in

Iraq,‖ CNN, 5 July 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/ 2011/WORLD/ meast/07/03/ iraq.us. militia. attacks/

index.html (accessed, 19 April 2013). 575

―U.S.: Iran Smuggling Missiles and Other Advanced Weapons into Iraq,‖ Fox News, 24 September 2007,

http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/09/24/us-iran-smuggling-missiles-and-other-advanced-weapons-into-

iraq/#ixzz2UliNjEr6 (accessed 30 May 2013). 576

King and Schroeder, ―Surveying,‖ 326. 577

Thomas Harding. ―Iraqi insurgents using Austrian rifles from Iran,‖ The Sunday Telegraph, 25 March 2007,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1542559/Iraqi-insurgents-using-Austrian-rifles-from-Iran.html

(accessed, 20 April 2013). 577

Anthony Lloyd. ―Iraqi fears grow as Iran-backed militia that killed Britons gains political power,‖ The

Times, 12 March 2013, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/iraq/article3711011.ece(accessed

20 April 2013).

203

The Iranians have used middlemen to smuggle weapons into Iraq, probably for

security reasons.The most effective smuggling network for getting Iranian IED‘s across the

border into Iraq was run by Iran-based Abu Mustafa al Sheibani, known as the leader of the

Sheibani Network that funnels Iranian arms to Iraqi Shi‘ite militias. A former Badr Corps

commander, Sheibani supervised operations of weapons smuggling to Baghdad in Saddam

Hussein‘s time. After the American invasion, al Sheibani carried on for his old masters

against a new enemy – the United States and coalition troops. In 2007 he smuggled rockets

from Iran using them to shell Coalition Forces. Western sources claimed that al Sheibani‘s

network was the first to smuggle EFPs into Iraq. These were smuggled from Iran in trucks

hauling cigarettes, sheep, cement, crates of fruit, or propane gas cylinders through the

southern Iraqi cities of Basra, Amara, and Diwaniyah. Another route for EFPs was through

the southern marshes and waterways that connect Iran and Iraq, especially in the area of

Qal‘at Salih, a small town southeast of Amara. Theycould be unloaded anywhere along the

shoreline. Eventually, the EFPs arrived in Sadr City, a violent Shi‘ite neighborhood in

Baghdad, from where they were distributed to Shi‘ite militias. Seeing Hezbollah as a role

model and being trained in Lebanon, the Sheibani network become an operational militia,

called League of the Righteous that conducted guerrilla and terror attacks against coalition

convoys and soldiers and Iraqi government officials. By 2006 Sheibani was on Baghdad‘s

most wanted list but in 2010 the Shi‘ite dominant Iraqi government allowed him to return

from exile in Iran and he joined the Iraqi political system.578

Iran‘s influence over the Shi‘ite community should not be exaggerated. Iraqi Shi‘a are

opposed to Khomeini‘s version of the Vilayat-e-Faqih; as shown in the Iraq-Iran War most of

them are Iraqis first and Shia second. There is suspicion and mistrust of Persians by Iraqi

Sunnis as well as many Iraqi Shia. Iran is not the sole source of weapons for Iraqi NSAs. The

Shi‘ite insurgents in Iraq confirmed a basic principle in NSAs arming – the use of various

methods of arming to gain sustainability. They looted weapons from Iraqi government

depots, mainly after the fall of the regime in 2003; former soldiers have sold some of the

weapons that now circulate illicitly in Iraq. Reports indicate that members of the reconstituted

578

O‘Hern, Iran, 104; U.S. Department of Treasury. ―Treasury Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi

Insurgency,‖ 1 September 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp759.aspx

(accessed 30 April 2013); ―Iraq: Return of Sheibani's killer squads,‖ UPI.com, 30 September 2010,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/09/30/Iraq-Return-of-Sheibanis-killer-squads/UPI-

36301285859253/ (accessed 30 April 2013); Fairweather, War, 159-160.

204

Iraqi army and police have sold their weapons on the black market, including those procured

with United States government funding.579

Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and declaration of a cease fire by

Iran-backed militias (in late 2011-early 2012) Iran tasked a new goal for its Iraqi clients – to

support Assad's forces in Syria. Iran established (late 2011) the Abu al-Fadhel al-Abbas

Brigade (LAFA), a transnational militia, based on the Shi‘ite diaspora, mainly from

Iraq,numbering (early 2014) about 10,000 militants. Prominent among them are operatives

from the Asae'b al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.580

Originally, the

LAFA was formed to defend the compound of the grave of Al-Set Zaynab from the

SunniGlobal Jihad attacks. It was involved in fighting around the compound and the Syrian

army has employed them for other operations across the strategically vital southern

Damascus sector. The Quds Force and the Hezbollah are training the Shi‘ite volunteers both

in Iran and Lebanon. They enter Syria via Damascus on Iranian flights or by road from Iraq.

The Quds Force arms the LAFA and a source claimed they are well equipped. Unlike other

patrons of NSAs, Iran forms new organizations to serve its interests, rather than only

supplying weapons. An American security expert speculated that once they return from Syria

for good, Iraqi volunteers could become a security threat to the Iraqi government as well as a

common feature of Iranian-backed proxy wars elsewhere.581

Afghanistan

Iran‘s military support of Islamic NSAs in Afghanistan is limited compared to Lebanon and

Iraq, and Iranian weaponry is not a dominant part of local insurgencies‘ armament. Still,

Afghanistan demonstrates a special case where Iran‘s regional interests overshadow the

traditional religious gap. Historically Iran supported the Shi‘ite Hazara in western

579

King and Schroeder, ―Surveying,‖328; Milani, Iran, 86, 96. 580

Milani, Iran, 89-90, 95; Anthony Lloyd. ―Iraqi fears grow as Iran-backed militia that killed Britons gains

political power,‖ The Times, 12 March 2013, http://www.thetimes.co. uk/tto/news/world/ middleeast/iraq/

article3711011.ece (20 April 2013); King and Schroeder, ―Surveying,‖328. 581

Michael Knights. ―Iran‘s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria,‖ The Washington

Institute, 27 June 2013,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-foreign-legion-the-role-

of-iraqi-shiite-militias-in-syria (accessed 2 July 2013); Mona Mahmood and Martin Chulov.―Syrian war widens

Sunni-Shia schism as foreign jihadist join fight for shrines,‖ The Guardian, 4 June

2013,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/04/syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrines-volunteers (accessed 2 July

2013); Saud al Sarhan. ―From Qussair to Yabrud: Shiite foreign fighters in Syria, Al Monitor, 13 February 2014,

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2014/03/qusair-yabroud-shiite-foreign-fighters-

syria.html#(accessed 24August 2014).

205

Afghanistan against the Sunni Pashtun, and sent weapons to Hazara militias since the days of

the Soviet occupation. In the 1990s, Tehran poured arms, ammunition and fuel into the anti-

Taliban Northern Alliance, mainly to the Persian-speaking Tajiks (under the command of

Ahmed Shah Massoud) against the Pakistani-supported Pashtun Islamists‘ regime. After

NATO forces conquered Afghanistan in 2001, Iran continued to supply weapons to the

Hazara militia groups but on a more limited scale due to ideological differences.582

Despite

historic animosity, Iran has been arming the anti-Shi‘a Taliban from around 2007, in order to

weaken and tie down the American military in Afghanistan and put pressure on the Afghan

government. Although not the primary source of support for the Taliban, Quds Force arms

shipments to the Taliban aim to distract the United States from focusing on Iran and its

nuclear program. Commentators have argued that the decision to provide weapons to the

Taliban is not a product of Iranian government policy but an independent internal decision by

elements in the IRGC, though the government does little to stop it. Yet, growing quantities of

arms and the centralized character of Iranian command of external operations imply a state-

driven involvement. Iranian support of NSAs in Afghanistan is probably directed by the

Fourth Quds Force Corps which is responsible for activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and

Asian republics.583

In recent years, NATO‘s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intercepted

many attempts to smuggle weapons from Iran into Afghanistan such as in the Herat province

that borders Iran, while seizing Iranian-made weapons in caches that were found in the

Taliban‘s areas of operations. For example, in March 2011 British Special Forces intercepted

an Iranian shipment of forty-eight 122mm rockets in Nimruz province in southwest

Afghanistan bordering Iran and Pakistan. British intelligence claimed that the logistics of the

shipment were arranged by a Taliban facilitator in Iran.584

In the same province, in June 2010,

Afghan authorities reported their seizure of nineteen tons of explosive devices that had been

transferred inside a container from Iran over a bridge linking Afghanistan and Iran. In April

and May 2011, American troops in the Helmand province captured vehicles smuggling a

582

Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A Chronology and Reference Guide (Santa

Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 198; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central

Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 72. 583

Alireza Nurder and Joya Laka. ―Iran‘s Balancing Act in Afghanistan,‖ Rand (2011),

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013);

King and Schroeder, ―Surveying,‖ 335; Shelala et al., ―US,‖ 5-11. 584

Michael Gordon. ―U.S. Says Iranian Arms Seized in Afghanistan,‖ TheNew York Times, 18 April 2007,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18military.html (21 April 2013).

206

variety of Iranian manufactured weapons for the Taliban, including mortar rounds, RPG-7s,

small arms, C-4 explosives and the powerful explosive formed projectiles (EFP).585

Iranian and Syrian Arming of the Hezbollah

The roots of the Iran-Hezbollah alliance

The Hezbollah arming project is remarkable in two ways: the heavy and advanced weapon

systems Iran has provided Hezbollah and the unique relationship between the Iranian

leadership and Hezbollah. Iranian support of Hezbollah is best manifested by the Hezbollah

strategic artillery apparatus that balances Hezbollah military inferiority against its major foe –

the State of Israel, developing a deterrence equation with a much stronger army. US Defense

Secretary, Robert Gates, announced in April 2010 that Hezbollah had more missiles than

most of the world's countries, which it received from Iran and Syria.Hezbollah is almost

entirely dependent on Iran and Syria too, for weapons supply but enjoys the strategic and

operative backing of the Islamic Republic with considerable military abilities committed to

take care of its arming needs. It is very likely that Hezbollah operatives are not required to

undertake weapons trips around the world as NSAs usually do; they receive a regular supply

of weapons from Iran for free.586

585

Julian Borger and Richard Norton-Taylor.―British special forces seize Iranian rockets in Afghanistan,‖ The

Guardian, 9 March 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/09/iranian-rockets-afghanistan-taliban-

nimruz(accessed 21 April 2013); ―Iran arms smuggler captured by NATO in Afghanistan,‖ BBC, 24 December

2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12073334 (accessed 21 April 2013); ―Afghans find tons of

explosive devices transferred from Iran,‖CNN, 6 October 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/ 2010/WORLD/

asiapcf/10/06/afghanistan.iran.weapons/index.html (accessed 21 April 2013); Nima Elbagir. ―Iran Supplies

Weapons to Taliban,‖ 4 News, 18 March 2110, http://www.channel4.com/news/iran-supplies-weapons-to-

taliban (21 April 2013); Ben Farmer. ―Iranian weapons getting through to Taliban,‖ The Sunday

Telegraph,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5477283/Iranian-weapons-getting-

through-to-Taliban.html (accessed 22 April 2013); Declan Walsh. ―Afghanistan war logs: US covered up fatal

Taliban missile strike on Chinook,‖ The Guardian, 25 July 2010, http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/ 2010/

jul/25/afghanistan-taliban-missile-strike-chinook(accessed 29 April 2013); Shelala et al., ―US,‖ 9-10; O‘Hern,

111. 586

―Hezbollah armed with improved missiles – US,‖ 28 April 2010, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk /2/hi/8647909.

stm (accessed 21 May 2013).

207

More interesting from the theory of arming perspective, is the mechanism of arming

Hezbollah and its significance regarding the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. Many

countries have supported NSAs, some intensively, but Iran-Hezbollah relations are more

comprehensive and multidimensional than the regular state-proxy model. Byman argues that

this close relationship is perhaps the strongest and most effective relationship between a state

sponsor and a terrorist group in history. Hezbollah is almost part of the Iranian regime, both

politically and militarily, conducting countless services for Tehran. Iran is embedded within

Hezbollah‘s command and control system and the latter‘s operational apparatuses are part of

Tehran‘s military arsenal for wartime. Hezbollah is an Iranian stronghold in the heart of the

Arab world, providing Iran with a military option to both attack Israel and destabilize the

region during a crisis without direct involvement. Hezbollah might fire rockets and missiles

into Israel in case of a war between Iran and Israel. The 2006 Lebanon War and mainly

Syria‘s civil war have demonstrated that arming Hezbollah is a triple mechanism involving

Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, because of the key role Syria has been playing for the Hezbollah

military buildup. Hezbollah‘s efforts to rescue the Assad regime illustrate the flexibility of

state-NSA relations. Hezbollah who used to be sponsored by Syria has become, together with

Iran, the sponsor of Assad. The weapon systems Iran (and Syria) provided to Hezbollah and

the missions Hezbollah executes under Iran‘s directions signify a new meaning of state

sponsorship.587

Hezbollah (Party of God) was established under the auspices of Iran‘s IRGC following

its entry (in June 1982) into the Syrian-controlled Beqa‘a Valley of eastern Lebanon to

organize resistance to Israeli invasion. It was Iran that acted to establish Hezbollah among

Lebanese Shi‘ite forces that it assembled under its auspices. It was Iran that acted as

middleman and unified these forces, and it also provided them with a common shelter and aid

at the start of their journey. Iranian clerics sought to convert Lebanon into an Iranian-style

Islamic state, as part of the Islamic nation with Iran at its centre. They set up Hezbollah to

compete with and eventually replace the Amal Shi'ite movement, which is nationalist-secular,

and which refused to subordinate itself to the revolutionary Islamic regime in Tehran.588

Lebanon and Iran share a religious connection embedded in the Lebanese Shi‗ite community,

587

Byman, Deadly Connections, 80. 588

O‘Hern, 48; Azani, 186. During the 1960s and the 1970s, many of the Shi‘ite clerics from Lebanon trained at

Iraqi Shi‘ite seminaries in Najaf where they associated with senior exiled Iranian clerics, primarily Ayatollah

Khomeini. Among them were Subhi Tufayli and Abass Musawi the first two leaders of Hezbollah. The

establishment of Hezbollah is often described as a response to Israel's June 1982 Operation "Peace for Galilee",

but in fact, though that operation provided a back-drop and opportunities for the Iranians to establish Hezbollah,

their attempts to "export the revolution" would have led to them doing so in any case.

208

about one-third of Lebanon‘s population. The founding of Hezbollah was comprised of

Lebanese Shi‘ite clergy in various regions who had strong pre-existing ties with their Iranian

counterparts. The former rejected Lebanese and Arab nationalism and advocated for an

Islamic state in Lebanon based upon the concept of the velayet faqih (rule of the Jurist).This

principle, which was cultivated by Ayatollah Khomeni, states that the community of Islam is

obligated to subjugate itself to the authority of the most senior cleric in its midst and to obey

his will. Officially, Khomeini was the leader of Hezbollah and Hojat al Islam Ali Akbar

Mohtashemi Pour, the Iranian ambassador in Syria, was appointed to head the Hezbollah

organization. Hezbollah‘s charter of 1985 (the Open Letter) reveals that Hezbollah is the

only organization in the Shia world outside of Iran which officially subscribes to the Wilayat

al Faqih.589

During the early 1990s, following dramatic domestic and regional changes

(mainly, the Taif Agreement of 1989 that ended Lebanon‘s civil war) Hezbollah was

compelled to soften its dogmatic Islamic rhetoric and demands for an Islamic state. Hezbollah

joined the Lebanese political system and emphasized national motives but maintained its

Islamic and Iranian identities.590

In 1992, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah became the personal

representative of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in Lebanon, demonstrating the

close relations between Iranian and Hezbollah leaderships. Hezbollah is a political party, part

of the Lebanese government, and influential in internal Lebanese politics. But Nasrallah

maintains his argument that Hezbollah sustains its ideological commitment to the Islamic

Republic and to the velayet al-faqih even though such declarations provide grist to Hezbollah

critics, and in recent years, the March 14 political group, who deride the organization as an

Iranian puppet.Hezbollah subordination to the velayet al-faqih has direct operational

implications as can be understood from the statements of senior Iranian and Hezbollah

officials. Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah‘s deputy secretary general explained in an

interview in the Lebanese newspaper Nahar al-Shabab in July 2009 that Hezbollah could not

begin an operation against Israel without religious authorization from the ruling cleric in Iran.

However, he added, the ruling cleric is not supposed to go into detail about how the attack

589

Shapira, Hezbollah, 192-196; Bergman, Iran, 69; Eyal Zisser. ―Iranian Involvement in Lebanon,‖ INSS,

Military and Strategic Affairs 3, 1 (May 2011), 7. 590

Shapira, Hezbollah, 53-63, 124-138, 185-191. Historically, Iran-Hezbollah relations are outstanding. Some

similarity exists with medieval Catholic military orders (such as the Teutonic Order of the thirteenth century)

that conducted crusades in the Levant and the Baltic under the blessing and material support of the pope. See for

example, Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades: 1147-1254 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 246-

247.

209

would be carried out.591

In an interview with Al Kawthar, the Iranian Arabic TV (April 2007)

Qassem argued that Hezbollah accepted the authority of the Iranian leadership and received

religious guidance from it in every facet of its fighting against Israel (for example, when to

fire rockets and carry out suicide bombing attacks). Hence, Iran-Hezbollah relations redefine

the interaction between state sponsor and its client. Iran‘s control over Hezbollah weaponry

and operational capabilities surpasses previous employments of NSAs by host countries for

insurgency and terror. But it is the religious-base linkage that turns the Iran-Hezbollah

connection into an extraordinary structure of state sponsorship of an NSA. 592

IRGC‘s initial expedition (2,500 members) arrived in Lebanon with plenty of cash,

much-needed weapons, and a proven method for mobilizing Lebanon‘s long dormant Shi‘ite

underclass. Syria prevented them from participating directly in the fighting against Israel and

large numbers of them returned to Iran. The remaining 1,000-1,500 Iranians entrenched

themselves in Sheikh Abdallah camp in Ba‘albak (which they took over from the Lebanese

army), and at the Zabadani camp in Syria, which became an important logistic facility near

the Lebanese border. The IRGC force was involved in military training, raising the religious

consciousness of the local people and spreading the teachings of Khomeini in preparation for

the struggle against Israel. IRGC staff indoctrinated Shi‘ite volunteers who came to Ba‘albak

from all over Lebanon with the Iranian revolutionary doctrine. The focus on jihad against

outsiders converged perfectly with the interests of Iran‘s newly born Islamic Republic which

hoped to legitimize itself in the Arab world and retaliate against the ―Great Satan.‖ 593

Syria was suspicious of Iran‘s influence in Lebanon, considering it to be within its

sphere of influence. Therefore, Damascus channeled Iranian arms shipments to Damascus

airport rather than Beirut.594

Khomeini and the secular Bath socialist Hafez al-Assad were

odd allies, but they had common enemies, Israel and the United States. There was also an

ideological aspect – while orthodox Islam considers the Alawite Muslims infidels, they have

been considered border-line Shi‘ites by Iran and Lebanese Shi‘ite clerics. This religious

591

Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God. Inside Hezbollah‟s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel(New York:

Random House, 2011), 92-94; 482. 592

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Center, ―Hezbollah as the strategic long arm of the Iranian

regime,‖17 June 2012, www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/ articles/ Art.../ E_115_12_459755210.pdf‎ (accessed 21

May 2013). 593

Shapira, Hezbollah, 53-63, 106-108, 124-138; Gabriel G. Tabarani, How Iran Plans to Fight America and

Dominate the Middle East (Bloomington, FN: Author Hose, 2008), 82-86; O‘Hern, Iran, 44-49; ―Naim Kassem

Talking About Wilayat Fakih,‖ You Tube, 4 June 2009,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=popAVMlW_8A(accessed 21 May 2013). 594

Azani, Hezbollah, 191. Azani argues that in light of the peace talks with Israel in the mid-1990s, Syria

refused to allow Iran to equip Hezbollah with heavy artillery.

210

legitimacy facilitated the close collaboration between the Shi‘ites in Lebanon and the Syrian

regime from the time of Hafez al-Assad to the present day. Iran managed to develop strategic

relations with Damascus and recruited its cooperation among other things, by free supply of

oil and publicly reaffirming that Alawi are Muslim. The 1982 Lebanon War and the Syrian-

Iranian alliance provided the Iranians with the opportunity to get their foot in the door of the

Arab-Israeli (Moslem-Jewish) conflict. Kramer argues that Syria opened Lebanon‘s back

door to Iran‘s emissaries, who were invited to inspire resistance against the foreigners.

Damascus became the indispensable link in the import-export trade in the Islamic revolution,

and that partnership produced dramatic successes.595

From the 1980s Iran senthundreds of arms shipments to Hezbollah, by air, sea and

land, and Hezbollah slowly assumed leadership of the military struggle against Israel in the

security zone along the Israeli-Lebanese border, until it became the IDF‘s main adversary on

this front, eclipsing the Palestinian organizations that were previously Israel‘s bitter

adversaries there. Accompanied by other Iranian regime agencies and foundations, the Quds

Force led the establishment of a state within a state in Shi‘ite centers in Lebanon (the south,

Beka‘a Valley and Dahiya, the Shi‘ite-populated southern neighborhood of Lebanon's capital

city, Beirut). By 1990 Hezbollah was no longer a militia, but an organized military force with

a core of regular troops and a gradually more regular reserve force. Today it is a regular non-

state army with career troops and reserves. At the same time, Hezbollah is a political and

social movement whose goal is to promote Shi‘ite interests in Lebanon. Under Iranian

sponsorship, Hezbollah has also become an economic empire that includes industrial

factories, small and medium sized businesses, and real estate. Hezbollah contains religious-

cultural institutions, a judicial and arbitration system, television and radio stations, social

welfare activities among the Shi‘ite communities of Lebanon (medical and educational

services, a youth movement, and charitable funds), and construction and rehabilitation

activities. Hezbollah rose out of the Shi‘ites who generally lived on the margins of Lebanese

society and the geographical periphery of the state and it is seen as the main ―achievement‖

of Tehran‘s strategy to export the Islamic revolution. Iranian military support of Hezbollah

strengthened and installed Hezbollah among the Shi'ites in Lebanon and helped the

organization construct a military infrastructure with greater capabilities than many states.

Beyond concern for the Shi‘ite population and the desire to export the revolution, Lebanon

595

Martin Kremer. ―The Oracle of Hizbullah. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah,‖ in Spokesman for the

Despised. Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, ed. Scott R. Appleby (Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press, 1997), 141; Shapira, Hezbollah, 107-108; O‘Hern, Iran, 44-49.

211

was becoming a small scale manifestation of a great confrontation between Iran and its major

regional foes (the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia).596

The Quds Force has a separate command that operates in Lebanon and Syria in

support of Hezbollah. IRGC‘s staff in Lebanon isinvolved in almost every aspect of

Hezbollah‘s day to day military activity. Iran has two permanent representatives in the Majlis

al-Shura, the higher executive body of Hezbollah, one of whom might be the commander of

the IRGC in Lebanon. Iran regularly and generously funds the organization (hundreds of

millions of dollars per year); the Quds Force formulates operative plans for Hezbollah and

provides operatives with military training, both in Lebanon and Iran.597

Hezbollah‘s elite

units, such as the External Security Organization that executes terror attacks out of Lebanon,

are mutually subordinated to Hezbollah and the Iranian leadership. Hasan Nasrallah the

Secretary General of Hezbollah and Mustafa Badr al Din, the military commander, work very

closely with IRGC seniorcommanders, both in Lebanon and Iran. Badr al Din heads the Jihad

Council, the institution within Hezbollah headquarters responsible for constructing a military

force and preparing it for emergencies, which is being supervised and assisted by the Quds

Force. Badr al Din is the main suspect in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq

Hariri in February 14, 2005. He replaced his cousin and brother-in-law, Imad Mughniya who

was assassinated in Damascus,allegedly by Israel (2008). Mughniya was a very strong figure

in Hezbollah partly, because of his close ties with the Iranian leadership who acknowledged

his operational expertise. Mughniya constructed the military infrastructure of the Hezbollah

in Lebanon which was used against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War, and at the same

time commanded many terrorist attacks carried out against Israelis, Westerners and Arabs in

Lebanon and beyond. Both Hezbollah and Iran were determined to revenge Mughniya‘s

596

Jamal Somhari, Padlallah. The Making of a Radical Shi‟ite Leader (London: SAQI, 2005), 123; The Mair

Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the

main tool to export the revolution,‖ 6-7; Shapira, Hezbollah, 124-125, 140; O‘Hern, Iran, 44-49; Ronen

Bergman, The Secret War with Iran. The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle against the World‟s Most Dangerous

Terrorist Power (New York: Free Press, 2007), 53, 59; The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information

Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 25; Azani, Hezbollah, 177; Zisser, ―Iranian

Involvement,‖7, 9. 597

Azani, Hezbollah, 235-236; The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Using the Quds

Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main Tool to Export the Revolution,‖ 2-11; Shapira,Hezbollah, 162-

163, 190; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖

15-17.

212

assassination in spite of repeated failures to attack Israeli targets across the world, and in July

2012 Hezbollah terrorist attacked an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria killing six people.598

Iran arms Hezbollah to become a powerful NSA

Both Iranian and Hezbollah leadership employ a policy of ambiguity regarding Iranian

military support. Yet, arming has been the major aspect of the Iranian role in the military

buildup of Hezbollah and the Quds Force deserves credit for converting Hezbollah into a

military organization of significant capabilities. The operational needs of Hezbollah, Iran‘s

military industry‘s capabilities and Syria‘s policy toward Hezbollah have all shaped both the

quantity and quality of arms supplied to Hezbollah. In the 1980s Iran supplied mainly small

arms, RPGs, mortars and short range rockets, helping Hezbollah to rise as a powerful militia

that could counter Amal. Hezbollah's role in fighting the IDF at that stage was minimal –

most attacks were either by Palestinians or by Amal.599

Hezbollah took the leading role only

from 1991. Against this background, Iran sharply stepped up arms shipments to Hezbollah,

equipping it with weapons procured from foreign countries or that Iran self-produced based

on Chinese and North Korean technologies. The supply of standard 122 mm rocket launchers

with a range of 20 kilometers enabled Hezbollah to start firing rockets into Israel, thus

defeating the purpose of the Israeli presence in south Lebanon and creating a pattern of

reciprocity (balance of terror) with the IDF. Iran assisted Hezbollah in accelerating the

construction of an operational, logistic, and organizational framework in southern Lebanon

and Beirut. Iran provided Hezbollah with access to modern ATGMs with tandem warheads.

These were capable, in certain circumstances, of penetrating the armor of the Israeli Merkava

tank.600

The supply of the US-made TOW ATMs to Hezbollah demonstrates the implications

of arms proliferation in modern times: the TOW missiles had been delivered from Israel to

Iran as part of the arms-for-hostage affair during the 1980s. The Iranian government had

598

Mark Perry. ―The Driver. An exclusive look inside the mysterious death and life of the world's most

dangerous terrorist not named Osama bin Laden,‖ Foreign Policy, May-June 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.

com/articles/2013/04/29/ the_driver (accessed, 1 June 2013); Stoyan Nenov. ―Bulgaria says bomber in Burgas

attack was Algerian: report,‖ Reuters, 7 April 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 04/07/us-bulgaria-

blast-hezbollah-idUSBREA36 0F820140 407 (accessed, 23 May 2014). 599

Blanford, Warriors, 133, 198. 600

Blanford, Warriors, 214-215, 226-227, 304-305; Azani, Hezbollah, 184, 241; Tony Bryan, Modern Israeli

Tanks and Infantry Carriers 1985-2004 (Cambridge: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 32; ―Iran: We will help 'cut out

the cancer of Israel,‖ The Telegraph, 3 February 2012,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9059179/Iran-We-will-help-cut-out-the-cancer-of-

Israel.html (accessed 21 May 2013); Byman, Deadly Connections, 97.

213

transferred the TOWs to Hezbollah who used the missiles against the IDF in southern

Lebanon. Supply of EFPs and other IEDs was critical for Hezbollah‘s guerrilla-style war of

attrition against IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA). IDF casualties caused by

Hezbollah were limited; an average of twenty per year, but eventually the Israeli government

decided that a change of strategy would be better than continuing the fight inside Lebanon.

The IDF withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000) caused an immediate drop in Hezbollah

attacks, and the new Israeli strategy (defend along the border) proved better for a few years,

until 2006.601

The IRGC‘s Quds Force was behind the military buildup of Hezbollah that continued

and intensified without any interruption by either the Lebanese government or Israel, after the

IDF unilaterally withdrew from the security zone in south Lebanon and deployed along the

international border (the Blue Line). For instance, in November 2004 Hezbollah launched an

Iranian manufactured UAV into Israel, and Israeli intelligence claimed that IRGC officers

were involved.602

This event was the basis upon which the movement‘s deterrence against

Israel was established. It allowed Hezbollah to portray itself as the ―protector of the South‖

from possible Israeli aggression. Hezbollah rejected local and international calls for its

disarmament (mainly the Security Council resolution 1559 from 2004 calling for disarming

militias including Hezbollah), arguing that Israel still occupied Lebanese soil (the Shebaa

Farms), the ―resistance‖ weapons were needed to release Lebanese prisoners from Israeli

jails, and to support the Palestinian struggle for national liberation.603

Nasrallah argued that

fighting against Israel should continue until its annihilation. The task of protecting Lebanon

from Israeli aggression was imposed upon the resistance, and therefore, it must remain

armed. Israel is an illegitimate entity that must disappear. The Syrian withdrawal from

Lebanon in 2005 left Iran as the only country with a direct military presence on Lebanese

soil.604

Iran has shipped arms to Hezbollah by air, sea and land. In the 1980s and 1990s

Iranian Air Force transport jets freely delivered weapons to Hezbollah via Syria. More

recently, faced with the embargo placed by the Security Council on exporting weapons from

601

Blanford, Warriors, 133, 198, 214-215, 304-305; The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information

Center, ―Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main Tool to Export the Revolution‖ 8-9. 602

Milton Hoenig, ―Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terrorism,‖ Public Interest Report vol.

67, 2 (Spring 2014), http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Hezbollah-Drones-Spring-2014.pdf 603

Azani, 199, 224, 234; Kremer, ―Oracle,‖ 115. 604

Hassan Nasrallah. ―Interview with New TV,‖ in Voice of Hezbollah. The Statements of Sayyed Hassan

Nasrallah, ed. Nicholas Noe (London: Verso, 2007), 388-389.

214

Iran and the ban on Hezbollah's arming according to resolution 1701 (2006), the Iranians use

civilian airlines supposedly flying civilian equipment according to their bill of lading. The

Quds Force has used Iran‘s national air carrier, Iran Air, and other commercial airways (such

as Mahan Air) to transport military equipment for both friendly NSAs and states. Arms

supplies for Hezbollah are loaded onto Iranian planes and land at Damascus International

Airport, coordinated with Syria. Hezbollah‘s logistic unit is responsible for transporting the

weapons from Syria to Lebanon in trucks where they are smuggled to the Beqa‘a Valley,

greater Beirut and south Lebanon. Until recent years Iranian transport flights to Syria

wentmainly over Turkey which occasionally intercepted the flights.605

In March 2009, for

example, the Turks forced an Iranian cargo plane on its way to Aleppo, Syria, to land for

inspection. In its cargo the Turks found some 2,000 mortars, light weapons and ammunition.

The bill of lading stated the plane was transporting car parts. A UN experts report later

published estimated that similar aerial cargoes were sent from Iran to Syria and were not

inspected by the Turks or were not reported to the UN.606

Iran might also use longer but safer

routes for air shipments.From 2012, western intelligence sources have reported that Iran is

using Iran Air, Mahan Air and Yas Air fleets to deliver large quantities of weapons to the

Syrian regime and Hezbollah, on an almost daily basis, assisting them to suppress the Syrian

uprising. Due to the firm Turkish position against Assad‘s rule, the supply operation is

executed across Iraqi airspace thanks to Iraq and Iran‘s close relations since the American

withdrawal from Iraq leaving a Shi‘ite dominated government in power there.607

Iranian aerial arms supply activity has demonstrated flexibility and creativity taking

advantage of various opportune situations. For example, the Mair Amit Intelligence and

Terrorism Information Center claims that on at least nine occasions the Quds Force used

Iranian and Syrian cargo planes flying humanitarian aid in to the earthquake victims at Bam

(in southeastern Iran) to take large quantities of weapons for Hezbollah on their return flights

(December 2003 – January 2004).A technical incident exposed an aerial link between Iran,

Islamic NSAs and weapons exporters in the Far East. In December 2009, a cargo plane on its

605

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist

Organization,‖ 57. 606

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary

Guards as the main tool to export the revolution,‖ 8.US Treasury Department. ‖Treasury Sanctions Major

Iranian Commercial Entities,‖ 23 June 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-

releases/Pages/tg1217.aspx (accessed 10 May 2013); US Treasury Department. ―Treasury Targets the IRGC‘s

Increasing Control over Iran‘s Economy.‖ 607

Louis Charbonneau. ―Exclusive: Western report - Iran ships arms, personnel to Syria via Iraq,‖ Reuters, 19

September 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/us-syria-crisis-iran-iraq-

idUSBRE88I17B20120919 (accessed 10 May 2012).

215

way from North Korea to Iran was forced to land in Bangkok because of a technical problem.

The Thai authorities exposed a cargo of thirty five tons of weapons including surface-to-air

missiles, rocket propelled grenades and maybe 240mm rockets too. According to press

reports the cargo was intended for Hamas or Hezbollah.608

Cases of interceptions of Iran‘s maritime arms smuggling for Hezbollah have revealed

parallel use of the high seas to channel arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon, directly or via Syria‘s

ports. For instance, in November 2009 the Israeli navy stopped a shipment of arms delivered

from Iran to Syria intended to reach Hezbollah in Lebanon. The shipment left the port of

Bandar Abbas in mid-October in a ship from Iran's national shipping company heading to the

port of Damietta, Egypt. There the load was transferred (2-3 November 2009) to a cargo ship

called ‗Francop‘ flying the flag of Antigua and Barbados. The ship was German owned and

operated by the Cypriot company 'UFS Cypriot Shipping Company'. It was intended to reach

Syria and stop at the ports of Limassol and Beirut. The ship's crew, including the Polish

captain, claimed that they were unaware of the ship's contents. The arms discovered onboard

the ship amounted to over 500 tons of arms, hidden in 36 containers, disguised as a

commercial shipment of polyethylene bags. The bags were placed on all sides of the

containers with the weapons, sheets of Styrofoam and corrugated plastic separating the bags

from the weapons crates. This amounted to over 2,000 107 mm rockets, some 700 122 mm

rockets, thousands of mortar shells, 106 mm recoilless gun ammunition, hand grenades and

light weapons' ammunition. A false bill of lading was used according to which it contained

24,228 polyethylene bags. It is possible that the smugglers‘ confidence in not being caught

led them to leave so many Iranian inscriptions onboard the ship, including on some of their

containers and polyethylene bags.609

A different naval smuggling method was revealed in

August 2010 when in the Italian port of Gioia Tauro local police discovered an Iranian

shipment of seven tons of the explosive, RDX, packed in sacks labeled "milk powder," which

is similar in appearance to RDX. This type of explosive is used in the warheads of

608

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary

Guards as the main tool to export the revolution,‖8; Yoko Kubota. ―Israel Says Seized North Korean Arms were

for Hamas, Hezbollah,‖ Reuters, 12 May 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/12/us-israel-korea-

north-idUSTRE64B18520100512 (accessed 21 May 2013); Nate Thayer. ―The Front Companies Facilitating

North Korean Arms Exports,‖ NK News Org., 30 May 2013, http://www.nknews.org/2013/05/the-front-

companies-facilitating-north-korean-arms-exports/ (22 August 2013). 609

Matthias Gebauer and Ulrike Putz, ―36 Containers from Iran: Israel Stops German Ship Carrying Weapons

for Hezbollah,‖ Spiegel Online International, 5 November 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/36-

containers-from-iran-israel-stops-german-ship-carrying-weapons-for-hezbollah-a-659424.html, (21 May 2013);

―Israel Navy seized the "Francop" vessel carried Iranian cargo to Hezbollah,‖ You Tube, 4 November 2009,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sXsmM1B28T0 (accessed 21 May 2013).

216

Hezbollah's missiles and rockets. The Greek-owned ship had arrived from the Iranian port of

Bandar Abbas under the Liberian flag and the container was to be transferred to a different

ship and sent to the Syrian port of Latakia.610

The land route from Iran to Syria and Lebanon is probably used less for trafficking

weapons because of security risks. While Iraq turns a blind eye to overland arms shipments

from Iran to the Syrian regime, Turkey is determined to intercept arms shipments to Syria.

For example, in April 2011, Turkish security forces stopped a convoy of Iranian trucks

carrying a large quantity of weapons and ammunition adjacent to the Syrian border.

Previously, the Turks were less committed to monitor trucks from Iran crossing their

territory.611

Israel and the US complained(August 2006) to Turkey about a shipment of rocket

parts and spare parts transported in a truck that traveled from Iran through Turkey to Syria,

intended for Hezbollah. The railroad tracks connecting Syria and Iran through the south of

Turkey were used in the past for weapons trafficking to Hezbollah.612

In May 2007, Kurdish

rebels attacked a freight train in the south of the country that was making its way from Iran to

Syria. As a result the train stopped and several cars were derailed. In an inspection carried out

by Turkish security forcesa large weapons shipment was found hidden between boxes of

building materials, including 300 rockets and light weapons.613

From state sponsorship to a triangle alliance

The 2006 Lebanon War (July-August 2006) demonstrated the effects of Iran and Syria‘s

arming of Hezbollah and prominent among these effects was the rocket apparatus. On the eve

of the war Hezbollah had more than twenty thousand rockets with ranges long enough to

allow them to attack the greater Tel Aviv area and the northern region. Under close IRGC

supervision, Hezbollah successfully carried out a plan for methodical rocket fire on Israel.

610

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. ―In recent months two more Iranian attempts

to ship weapons were exposed,‖ 15 March 2011, http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/site/html/

search.asp?isSearch= yes&isT8=yes&searchText=T90& (accessed 3 May 2013). 611

Turkey Foils Iranian Arms Shipment to Syria,‖ Ynetnews, 8 April 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/ articles/

0,7340,L-4104311,00.html(accessed 21 May 2013). 612

Eli Lake. ―Iranian Shipments to Hezbollah Strain Israeli-Turkish Relationship,‖ New York Sun, 23 August

2006, http://www.nysun.com/foreign/iranian-shipments-to-hezbollah-strain-israeli/38364/ (accessed 21 May

2013). 613

― The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Hezbollah as a Strategic Arm of Iran,‖ 20-

21; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. ―One year since the acceptance of UN

Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the second Lebanon war: An interim report,‖ 13 August 2007,

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/ pdf/ PDF_ 07_ 145_ 2.pdf (accessed 20 April 2014), 16.

217

During the fighting Hezbollah fired almost four thousand rockets of various types at Israeli

population centers, killing fifty three Israelis and causing considerable damage.614

Armament

and skillful logistic doctrine were key elements of the artillery campaign as Nasrallah

explained: ―We made sure that the capabilities we needed for a long war were available to us,

and they are still. Anyone who wants to disarm us should know this. We divided our

capabilities in a way that would make cutting off the supply lines futile.‖615

Hezbollah had

surprised the Israeli Navy, firing Chinese-manufactured land-to-sea C-802 cruise missiles it

had received from Iran few years earlier at an Israeli missile ship,damaging the boat and

killing four crew members (some reports claimed that IRGC soldiers fired those missiles).

Using Iranian and Syrian supplied advanced anti-tank missiles, Hezbollah disrupted theIDF's

limited ground offensive. Hezbollah adapted its use of anti-tank missiles for mobile fire

support against Israeli troops taking cover in buildings and ambushing IDF‘s armored

vehicles.616

An IDF helicopter shot down by Hezbollah fire in August 2006 was hit by an anti-

tank missile. The war also demonstrated the sophisticated intelligence system Hezbollah had

developed and implemented regarding Israel and its security infrastructure along the border,

thanks to Iranian aid in both equipment and expertise, far beyond anything seen in most

rebellious NSAs in history. For example, Quds Force supplied Hezbollah with the latest

Iranian electronic interception devices and jamming equipment to monitor and block Israeli

military communications.617

The 2006 Lebanon War manifested a dramatic development of Hezbollah military

buildup – Syrian integration into the Iran-Hezbollah arming system. Both Iran and Hezbollah

have conducted a great portion of the arming activity in Syrian territory. While Bashar

Assad‘s father regarded Nasrallah as a subordinate, and had regarded Iran as an ally to a

limited extent, exploiting Iran‘s support of Hezbollah for his own purposes, Bashar saw

Hezbollah as a strategic partner and Hezbollah‘s leader as a mentor, embracing the

organization and creeping closer to Tehran. Hezbollah and Iran have exploited Bashar

Assad's sympathy to the organization since his appointment as the Syrian President (2000) for

upgrading Hezbollah‘s military activities to the level of an Iranian military unit. Iran could

send greater quantities of weapons and more advanced systems across the border into

614

Bergman, Iran, 61, 255; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait

of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 52-53. 615

Nasrallah, ―Interview with New TV,‖ 396-397. 616

Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hizballah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palymave

Macmillan, 2008), 293; Bergman, Iran, 257, 273. 617

Blanford, Warriors, 121, 337-339, 343-344.

218

Hezbollah‘s arms depots. Hezbollah stored some of the quality weaponsit had been receiving

from Iran in Syria, based on the assumption that Israel would avoid attacking the storage

facilities in Syria.618

Syria was no longer only a transit country for weapons sent from Iran to

Lebanon. From about 2001, it became a major arms supplier of Hezbollah, with or without

coordination with Iran. Syria is a storage base for much of Hezbollah‘s advanced arms, a

training site and a major weapons supplier for Hezbollah.619

In the 2006 Lebanon War the

majority of Israeli casualties were inflicted by weapons that came from Syria, in particular,

Chinese-made 220 mm (50 km and 70 km range) and 302 mm (115 km range) surface-to-

surface rockets, enabling Hezbollah to hit the city of Haifa. Syria supplied Hezbollah with the

latest Russian antitank weapon systems it purchased from Russia(with Iranian money)the

Kornet anti-tank missiles and an improved version of the RPG-29, all of which were used

effectively by Hezbollah operatives against IDF troops in South Lebanon. 620

The above trends became more radical following the end of the war of 2006. The IDF

severely damaged Hezbollah‘s military infrastructure, but, in spite of the embargo imposed

on arms shipments to Hezbollah, Iran and Syria replenished, increased and upgraded

Hezbollah's rocket arsenal in both quality and quantity. Hezbollah remains the only faction in

Lebanon to retain its heavy weapons, and was not willing to give these up without a fight.621

Already in 2005 Nasrallah made his stand clear:

Weapons without the resistance have no value…If anyone – listen to me – if

anyone tries to disarm the resistance, we will fight with him the way the martyrs

fought in Karbala, because we know that any action of this kind would be an

Israeli action, an Israeli decision, and a move to further Israel‘s interests. We will

618

Yaakov Katz. ―Syria Increasing Arms Shipments to Hezbollah,‖ The Jerusalem Post, 16 July 2011,

http://www. jpost.com/ Defense/Syria-increasing-arms-shipments-to-Hezbollah (accessed 3 May 2013). 619

Yaakov Katz. ―Hezbollah May Transfer Weapons Cache if Assad Falls,‖ The Jerusalem Post, 26 June 2011,

http://www.jpost. com/ Defense/Article.aspx?id=226585 (accessed 3 May 2013). 620

Tim Lister. ―Wikileaks:Syria accused of supplying SCUD missiles to Hezbollah,‖ CNN, 7 December 2010,

http://edition.cnn.com/ 2010/ WORLD/ meast/12/06/ us.wikileaks.syria/index.html(accessed 3 May 2013);

Bergman, Iran, 255-256, 374; Blanford, Warriors, 337-338; Azani, Hezbollah, 235. 621

Dominique Avon and Anais-Trissa Khatchadourian, Hezbollah. A History of the “Party of God” (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 2012), 71-100; Azani, Hezbollah, 231.Following the devastating damage of the 2006

Lebanon War and fearing more ―luxury war,‖ the March 14 alliance, a Christian Sunni-Druze coalition,blamed

Hezbollah for conducting a Syrian-Iranian policy that was damaging Lebanon. They demanded the disarmament

of Hezbollah and termination of its operations out of Lebanon. Hezbollah leadership, on the other hand, was

determined to preserve the ―resistance‖ with its heavy weaponry. Hezbollah was willing to use the arsenal of the

―Resistance‖ against other Lebanese, threatening to seize power. Being the most powerful group in Lebanon,

armed with Syrian-Iranian backup, Hezbollah could easily overcome the Sunni-Moronic opponents whom it

called ―Zionist collaborators.‖

219

consider any hand that tries to seize our weapons as an Israeli hand, and will cut it

off.622

Within a year after the end of the 2006 war, Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah

had already renewed its entire military organizational structure and its armaments. With its

new arsenal of long-range rockets, Hezbollah is able to continue launching heavy barrages at

Israeli‘s population centers from the depth of Lebanese territory even if the IDF conquered

South Lebanon. Therefore, the IDF‘s capability of removing the rocket threat would be

questioned, enhancing Hezbollah‘s image as a surviving organization and an invincible

opponent.623

Hezbollah has an estimated one hundred thousand short, medium and long range

rockets and missiles (including 5,000 rockets and missiles with range more than 100 km),

five times what it had during the last Lebanon War. More shipments of unknown numbers

have continued to arrive from Iran since.624

The upgraded quality of the Hezbollah missile arsenal includes the addition of precise

long-range missiles which have the capability to pinpoint targets deep within Israel, as

claimed by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. By late 2009, Hezbollah had acquired the

Syrian-manufactured M-600 short-range ballistic missile (250 km range). In May 2010, Israel

passed to the London Times satellite photographs of the largest Syrian missile bases, located

25 kilometers northeast of Damascus, near the town of Adra where Hezbollah operatives had

been training. The site reportedly includes living quarters for Hezbollah fighters, arms sheds

of rockets and missiles and a fleet of trucks used for transferring weapons across the border.

The facility was believed to be one of several used as a base for weapons deliveries. Israeli

and American intelligence reported that Syria transferred about ten Scud missiles (300-500

km range) to the Shi‘ite organization to be stored in a Syrian warehouse used by Hezbollah.

With these missiles, Hezbollah could target the nuclear reactor at Dimona in southern Israel,

622

Hassan Nasrallah. ―We will Consider any Hand that Tries to Seize our Weapons as an Israeli Hand,‖ in Voice

of Hezbollah. The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, ed. Nicholas Noe (London: Verso, 2007), 340, 349. 623

Guy Aviad. ―Hezbollah‘s Force Buildup of 2006-2009: Foundations and Future Trends,‖ Military and

Strategic Affairs 1, no. 3 (December 2009), http://d26e8pvoto2x3r. cloudfront.net/ uploadimages/ Import/(FILE)

1269344472 .pdf (accessed 3 May 2013); Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel. ―A Disciplined Hezbollah

Surprises Israel with Its Training, Tactics and Weapons,‖ The New York Times, 6 August 2006,

http://www.nytimes.com/ 2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html (3 May 2013); Harel and Isssacharoff,

34 Days,89, 243, 263-264, 347, 372, 378, 384; Blanford, Warriors,433.

624Roni Daniel, ―Next Campaign in the Noth Stonger than Potetive Edge,” Israel Channel 2, September 5,

2014,http://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security-q3_2014/Article-88f20864f764841004.htm(accessed

11January2015).

220

225 km south of the Lebanese border.625

In 2011, Israeli and western intelligence sources

reported that the Assad regime transferred to Hezbollah 700 km range Scud-D missiles which

could bring all of Israel within Hezbollah‘s range (as well as Jordan, the south of Turkey and

northern Saudi Arabia).626

In numerous statements, Nasrallah affirmed the build-up of a

strategic missile apparatus. In August 2012, in a speech given on the Iranian-initiated annual

Jerusalem Day, Nasrallah boasted that Hezbollah had "precise missiles, a small number of

which can hit pinpoint targets." He added that Hezbollah had a number of missiles which

could strike precisely at a large number of targets in Israel and that Hezbollah had their

coordinates. Striking those targets, he said would "turn the lives of thousands of Zionists into

a living hell." He said he meant tens of thousands of dead Israeli civilians, not 300 or 400 or

500.627

A few months earlier, in a televised speech commemorating Ashoura, Nasrallah

argued that ―the battle with us will range over the whole of occupied Palestine [Israel] – from

the Lebanese border to the Jordanian border and the Red Sea… from Kiryat Shmona to

Eilat.‖ The Hezbollah manifest of 2009 for the National Dialogue affirms that Hezbollah

defines itself via an endless conflict with Israel while pretending to be a national army,

subsequently demanding a steady supply of weapons.628

Facing the continuous threat of an Israeli attack against its nuclear infrastructure, Iran

regards Hezbollah‘s long range arm as part of an Iranian response to such an attack, or in an

offensive scenario, as part of an Iranian military initiative. Zisser argues that without

Hezbollah, Iran‘s ability to deter Israel from operating against Iran and against its nuclear

facilities is highly limited.629

In November 2011, Sayed Yahya Rahim Safavi, former

commander of the IRGC and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei‘s advisor, stated in an interview

by Al Alm TV that ―Iran does not need to target the Zionist entity with ballistic missiles. Our

625

Nicholas Blanford. ―Satellite images show Scud missiles ‗at Hezbollah base,‖ The Times, October 8, 2010,

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2759405.ece (accessed 2 May 2013). 626

―US embassy cables: Arms smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.‖ Gaurdian.co.uk, 7 April 2011,

http://www. guardian. co.uk/ world/2011/ apr/07/ israel-gaza (accessed 3 May 2013).

―Hezbollah has missile base in Syria,‖ The Jerusalem Post, 28 May 2010, http://www.jpost.com/ MiddleEast/

Article.aspx?id=176734 (accessed 2 May 2013); Michael Gordon and Andrew Lehren. ―U.S. Strains to Stop

Arms Flow,‖ The New York Times, 6 December 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/07wikileaks-

weapons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 2 May 2013); ―Report reveals alleged Hezbollah arms supply

route,‖ Now Lebanon, October 26, 2010, http://www.nowlebanon. com/ NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=201316

(accessed 2 May 2013). 627

―Hezbollah says its 'precision rockets' could kill tens of thousands of Israelis,‖ Haartz, 17 August 2012,

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hezbollah-says-its-precision-rockets-could-kill-tens-of-

thousands-of-israelis-1.459027(accessed 9 May 2012). 628

―Nasrallah vows to strike Tel Aviv if Lebanon hit,‖ The Daily Star, 27 November 2012,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Nov-27/196223-nasrallah-vows-to-strike-tel-aviv-if-lebanon-

hit.ashx#ixzz2U3hrGOWg (accessed 21 May 2013). 629

Zisser, 11.

221

friends in Hezbollah, in Lebanon, are now capable of targeting, with Katyusha rockets, all the

settlements, which were constructed with billions of dollars. They are all within the 25-30

kilometer range of the Katyusha rockets… Therefore, I believe that the Zionists know full

well that if they start a war, they will be targeted with full force from Southern Lebanon, as

well as by Hamas and by Iran. The number and range of the Iranian missiles are

unlimited.‖630

On a few occasions Safavi emphasized that "Sayid Hassan Nasrallah regards

himself as a soldier of the Iranian Leader.‖ 631

Iran and Hezbollah‘s commitment to rescue Bashar Assad‘s government at any cost

signifies Syria‘s role as a transit state of Iranian weapons shipments for Hezbollah, as well as

an independent source of weapons and strategic and diplomatic backing for the organization.

Following the fragmentation of Syria and the growing military involvement of Hezbollah in

the fighting, it became unclear who is the state and who is the NSA, for both Iran and

Hezbollah have played a critical role in changing the power balance in Syria‘s civil war in

favor of Assad during 2013. They regard the preservation of the Assad regime as of supreme

strategic interest. Hassan Nasrallah is risking Hezbollah‘s own raison d‘etre (dragging

Lebanon into the war in Syria, undermining the security of Lebanon‘s Shi‘ite community,

alienating regional Arab public opinion) in order to secure Hezbollah‘s strategic interests in

Syria especially in the arming field.632

Nerguizian argues that Assad‘s Syria has been a key

lifeline of support to Hezbollah from its patron Iran, and its loss could prove critical to

Tehran‘s ability to influence the Levant and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the group‘s long

term local and regional posture. While other ways exist for Iran to deliver weapons to

Hezbollah, most are subject to interdiction. Though Israeli air strikes are a growing threat,

overland routes are still the most effective means of resupply.633

Nasrallah stated: ―Syria is

the back of the resistance. It is the supporter of the resistance. The resistance cannot stand by

while its back is being exposed and its support is being broken.‖634

630

―Former IRGC Commander General Rahim Safavi: If Israel Starts a War, It Will Be Targeted With Full

Forceby Hizbullah, Hamas, and Iran; The Number and Range of Our Missiles Is Unlimited,"Memri, 25

November 2011, http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/3218.htm(accessed 21 May 2013). 631

―Yahya Rahim Safavi, Senior Security Affairs Advisor to Supreme Leader gives interview,‖ Iran Daily Brief,

4 June 2012, http://www.irandailybrief.com/2012/06/04/yahya-rahim-safavi-senior-security-affairs-advisor-to-

supreme-leader-gives-interview/ (accessed 21 May 2013). 632

Aram Nerguizian. ―Assessing the Consequences of Hezbollah‘s Necessary War of Choice in Syria,‖ CSIS, 17

June 2013, http://csis.org/publication/assessing-consequences-hezbollahs-necessary-war-choice-syria(accessed

23 June 2013), 1-7.

633

Nerguizian. ―Assessing the Consequences of Hezbollah,‖ 1-7. 634

―Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah,‖ Al Manar TV, 25 May 2013.

222

Therefore, Hezbollah provides the Assad regime with guidance, military training in

guerrilla warfare, intelligence and weapons, and combat support. Several thousands of

Hezbollah troops are fighting alongside Assad‘s troops against the Syrian opposition and

Hezbollah lost few hundred operativesin Syria, though acquiring battlefield experience. The

Shi‘ite organization played a critical role in recapturing Qusayr (June 2013), a strategically

important Syrian border town which is a major transit route for weapons and fighters from

Lebanon. Qusayr is also a key pipeline for overland weapons transfers from Iran via Syria. In

March 2014, Hezbollah troops assisted the Syrian army to take over the city of Yabrud,

located near the main road leading from Damascus to Homs. Should Hezbollah commit major

forces as far afield as Aleppo, this could expose the group to overstretch in terms of its forces

and supply lines.635

Assad is repaying Hezbollah by supplying it with sophisticated weapons systems.

Israel security sources assess that with his back to the wall, President Assad might supply

Hezbollah with chemical weapons too. Israel declared it will do whatever it takes to prevent

Hezbollah profiting from Syria‘s turmoil by smuggling ―game changer‖ weapons across the

Lebanese border.636

From early 2013, Israeli warplanes destroyed, mostly in Syrianterritory, a

number of convoys and warehouses of weapons, such as Russian-made SA-17 anti-aircraft

missiles and Yakhont long range anti-ship missiles that Assad planned to supply to Hezbollah

as well as Iranian-made Fath-110 SSMs that have the range to strike Tel-Aviv and much of

Israel from southern Lebanon.637

635

Isabel Kershnermarch.―Israel Watches Warily as Hezbollah Gains Battle Skills in Syria,‖ The New York

Times, 10 Mach 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/world/middleeast/israel-watches-warily-as-

hezbollah-gains-battle-skills-in-syria.html?_r=0(accessed 20 April 2014); ―Hizbullah Secretary-General, His

Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: An exclusive interview with As-Safir Lebanese Daily,‖ AL-Safir, 9 April

2014, http://assafir.com/Article/129/345739/SameChannel(accessed 20 April 2014). 636

Crispian Balmer. ―Israel vows to deny Hezbollah weapons as details of Syria raid emerge,‖ Reuters, 1

November 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-israel-syria-idUSBRE9A00NU20131101

(accessed 20 April 2014). 637

Sheera Frenkel and Martin Fletcher. ―Israeli Airstrike Destroys Syrian Convoy Taking hi-Tech Weapons to

Hezbollah,‖ The Times, 31 January 2013,

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article3673459.ece (accessed 3 May 2013); Barbara Starr,

Sara Sidner and David Ariosto. ―U.S. Official: Israeli Jets Strike Convoy in Syria,‖ CNN, January 31, 2013,

http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/30/world/meast/israel-syria-strike (accessed 3 May 2013); The Meir Amit

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 21-24; Louis

Charbonneau. ―Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons lifeline to Syria's Assad – envoys,‖ Reuters, 14 March 2013,

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/uk-syria-crisis-iran-idUKBRE92D11W20130314 (accessed 10 May

2013); ―US slams Hezbollah involvement in Syria,‖ The Daily Star Lebanon, 25 April 2013,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Apr-25/215020-us-slams-hezbollah-involvement-in-

syria.ashx# axzz2SkdcHU27 (accessed 10 May 2013); ―U.N. chief says Lebanon‘s border must be controlled,‖

The Daily StarLebanon, 25 April 2013, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Apr-20/214417-

un-chief sayslebanons-border- must-be-controlled.ashx#ixzz2SpJ2cSOL (accessed 10 May 2013); Anne

223

Hezbollah‘s involvement in Syria is only one example of the organization‘s wide

activity as a proxy and subcontractor of Iran. From the 1980s, Hezbollah has conducted

subversive activity and terror attacks to exact revenge on Iran‘s opponents and deter them

from trying to harm it. These operations offer Iran a degree of deniability and include the

kidnapping of Western citizens in Lebanon, attacking government and Western targets in

Kuwait, and attacking an American military compound in Saudi Arabia (1995).638

The most

recent examplesareHezbollah attack against a bus load of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in 2012,

causing the death of five Israelis and a Bulgarian, and the Bahrain government‘s accusation

that Hezbollah is involved in a series of explosions in Manama. Hezbollah has trained

operatives of Iranian proxies from Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain, as part of Iran‘s efforts to build

up their military infrastructure. Also, Hezbollah shares information and evaluations with Iran

regarding Israel and the IDF. The next sub-section describes both Iran‘s and Hezbollah‘s

(assisted by Syria) arming efforts of Islamic NSAs in another region - the Palestinian

Territories, mainly the Gaza Strip, which have become in the last decade a major contest

between Iran and Israel. 639

Iran’s Military Buildup of Hamas and the PIJ

During Operation Pillar of Defense (14-21 November 2012) Hamas and the PIJ launched

eight Iranian produced medium-range Fajr-5 rockets and M75 self-manufactured rockets (75

km range)based on Iranian technological expertise, targeting Israeli civilian population

centers, including – for the first time – a number of rockets fired at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Many other medium-range rockets were destroyed by an Israeli airstrike at the outset of the

Barnard, Michael R. Gordon and Jodi Rudoren. ―Israel Targeted Iranian Missiles in Syria Attack,‖ The New

York Times, 4 May 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/israel-

syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 10 May 2013); ―Syria: Hezbollah triumphs, but loses veterans,”

UPI.com, 30 May 2013, http://www.upi.com/ Top_News/ Special/2013/05/30/Syria-Hezbollah-triumphs-but-

loses-veterans/UPI-98951369939886/ (accessed 23 June 2013); Morris Loveday. ―Hezbollah chief defends

group‘s involvement in Syrian war,‖ The Washington Post, 25 May 2013,

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-25/world/39515702_1_hezbollah-chief-sunni-future-movement-

mashghara (accessed 23 June 2013); Nerguizian, 3-4, 6;Amos Harel and Gili Cohen. ―Reports: Israeli planes

attack Hezbollah targets on Lebanon-Syria border,‖ Haaretz, 24 February 2014,

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.576210(accessed 20 April 2014). 638

Aviad, ―Hezbollah‘s Force Buildup of 2006-2009;‖ Harel and Issacharoff, 89; Blanford, Warriors, 357. 639

The Mair Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist

Organization,‖ 18 December 2012, 49, 82-126; http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/ Art_20436/

E_158_12_ 12317 230 28.pdf (accessed 9 May 2013); ―Bahrain first Arab country to blacklist Hezbollah as

terrorist organization.‖ Al Arabiya, 9 April 2013,http://english.alarabiya.net/ en/News/middle-east/ 2013/

04/09/Bahrain-first-Arab-country-to-blacklist-Hezbollah-as-terrorist-organization.html (accessed 23 April

2013).

224

operation. Operation Pillar of Defenseaffirms Iran‘s important role in the military buildup of

Palestinian militant groups. Iran‘s arms shipments to the Gaza Strip in recent years, the

delivery of Iranian technological know-how, and training of Palestinian operatives, have been

critical for the establishment of the Hamas and to some extent the PIJ too, as military

organizations rather than terror groups.640

Hamas being the major force in the Gaza Strip, the

following section focuses on its military buildup. 641

Hamas and Hezbollah present different types of NSAs regarding state sponsorship.

Hezbollah is almost completely integrated into the Iranian regime, militarily and politically,

while Hamas is autonomous, acquiring weapons from other sources. In recent years, Iranian

weaponry enabled the Hamas movement to create a balance of deterrence against Israel while

increasingly challenging Fatah‘s traditional dominance of the PLO and becoming an

alternative government for the Palestinian Authority. Creating a large arsenal of rockets in the

Gaza Strip was intended to give Iran the possibility of opening another front against Israel in

addition to the Lebanese front in the north. 642

The 1979 revolution in Iran played a critical role in consolidating the Islamic revival

in the Palestinian territories, inspiring Palestinian fundamentalists by demonstrating the

ability of revolutionary Islam to overthrow mighty enemies like the Shah. Iran and Hamas

share some principles of Islamic fundamentalism, such as a return to the foundations of

religion as a solution to the hardships of the individual and society and hatred for the west

and modernity. But they are not natural allies; the former is governed by clerical Shi‘ite elite

whereas Hamas is a wing of the Moslem Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamic movement. Unlike

Hezbollah, while being assisted by Tehran, Hamas has always been an independent

organization and was not subordinated to Iran‘s agenda. Similar to Hezbollah, Iran‘s

commitment to arm the Palestinian militant groups is deeply rooted in the doctrine of the

640

The PIJ, much smaller, less flexible and pragmatic than Hamas, preaches a violent blend of jihadism and

Palestinian nationalism, and violent imposition of an Islamic government in Palestine as part of a first step

toward the Islamization of the world. Although a Sunni organization, the PIJ ideologically differs from Hamas

by adhering to the Khomeini-Shi‘ite principle of a wilayat al-faqih; the PIJ‘s policy is greatly influenced by

Tehran. 641

―Ceasefire Agreement Comes into Effect,‖ IDF, 21 November 2012, http://www.idfblog.com/ 2012/11/21/

ceasefire-agreement-comes-into-effect/ (accessed 14 May 2013). The IDF reports that of those 1,506 rockets

fired from Gaza, more than 875 rockets hit open areas in Israel, 421 were intercepted by the ―Iron Dome‖ anti-

missiles system, 58 hit urban areas, and 152 were failed launch attempts. By comparison, in Operation Cast

Lead (late 2008-early 2009), the Palestinians fired 640 rockets. 642

Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti.Hezbollah and Hamas. A Comparative Study (Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press, 2012), 109-110; Azani, Hezbollah, 28; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Information

Center, ―Hezbollah Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 74; Ziad Abu-Amr. ―Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and the

Origins of Hamas,‖ in Spokesman for the Despised. Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, ed. Scott R.

Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 231.

225

Islamic Republic – albeit, given that Sunni Islam is a rival to Iran's Shi'ite Islam, a different

section of that doctrine, defeating the Jews is more urgent than defeating the Sunni

Moslems.643

At the center of Khomeini policy was the Iranian strategy of bolstering Palestinian

resistance, and indeed expanding the scope of the low intensity irregular warfare against the

Jewish state by launching a multinational jihad, spearheaded by the Islamic Republic‘s

Revolutionary Guards in concert with local Shi‘ite paramilitary auxiliaries.644

According to

Khomeini:

Our intention has always been to stand by our Palestinian brothers, and

wherever we have power, we will join them in defending their rights like

brothers standing as equals in the same line of battle as them…We must

all rise up and destroy Israel, and replace it with the brave nation of

Palestine… We say Israel must be erased from the pages of history, Beit

al – Moqaddas, belongs to the Muslims and is their first pillar… with the

final defeat of the Iraqi government, pave the way for an advance

towards Beit al Moqaddas.645

Tactically, arming the Palestinians has been a greater logistic-security challenge for

Iran. While Tehran enjoys easy access to Lebanon through Syria and the porous Lebanese

border, it is more difficult to transport weapons into the Gaza Strip because of its relative

distance from Iran and tight Israeli inspection.646

Publicizing Iran’s arming of Palestinian NSAs

Due to Iranian political interests, the round of escalation between Israel and the Palestinian

militant groups (November 2012) emphasized the unique profile of Iran‘s arming of

Palestinian NSAs. Iran usually employs a policy of denial regarding its military support of

radical Islamic NSAs. Toward the end of this round of fighting, Tehran and its NSA clients

643

Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah, 109-110; Azani, Hezbollah, 28; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Information

Center, ―Hezbollah Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 74; Abu-Amr, 231; Shaul Shay, The Axis of Evil: Iran,

Hizballah, and Palestinian Terror (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005). 644

Somhari, Padlallah, 174. 645

Ruhollah Khomeini, Palestine from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini (Tehran: The Institute for the

Compilation and Publication of the Works of Ayatollah Khomeini, 1999), 97, 133, 166. 646

Amir Kulick. ―Lebanon light: Lessons from the Operation in Gaza and the Next Round against Hezbollah,‖

Military and Strategic Affairs 1, no. 1 (April 2009), 51-66,http://cdn.www.inss.org.il .reblazecdn.net/ upload/

(FILE)1272779461.pdf(accessed 15 May 2013).

226

initiated a media campaign showering praise on Iran‘s military, financial and technological

support for the Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip. Iran probably felt its regional

interests were at risk from rival Sunni Muslim states: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

being elected to govern Egypt and assuming patronage of Hamas and the growing

involvement of Turkey and Qatar in Gaza – all of which are rival states of Iran. At the same

time, Syria‘s civil war created a political dispute between Hamas, which is ideologically

committed to supporting the Syrian rebels, and Iran and Hezbollah which intensively back

Bashar Assad. As a result, the events in Syria reinterpreted and reframed Iran‘s role of

arming Hamas. It became another arena of engagement between the rival players of Syria‘s

civil war rather than manifestation of Iran‘s traditional support of the Palestinian struggle

against Israel.647

Speaking before the parliament on November 21, 2012 Chairman Ali Larijani said,

"We are proud to defend the people of Palestine and Hamas ... and that our assistance to them

has been both financial and military." General Mohammed Ali Jafari, Commander of the

Iranian Revolutionary Guards, denied supplying rockets to Gaza, claiming that Iran had

supplied Hamas with the technology to produce long-range Fajr-5 missiles, so the missiles

would not have to be shipped to Gaza.648

The daily newspaper Kayhan said that while Hamas

was firing Iranian missiles at Israel and the leaders of Arab countries remained silent, Hamas

fighters and hundreds of millions of Muslim observers in the region now knew better than

ever that Iran was the one supporting the Palestinian people and that it placed no significance

whatsoever on differences between Shi‘ite and Sunni Muslims.649

The Iranian website

Tabnak, affiliated with Mohsen Rezaee, currently the secretary of the Expediency

Discernment Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, argued:

If not for Iran's financial and military support of Hamas, the results of the

current confrontation would have been completely different. The Iranian

missiles launched into Israeli were the main cause of the Israelis' fear and

the ceasefire forced on Israel. What, on the other hand, did Hamas' Arab

647

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist

organizations. Iran supports the military buildup of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip

and seeks to rebuild their military capabilities after Operation Pillar of Defense, especially their rocket-

launching networks,‖ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,‖20 January 2013,

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20459/E_267_12_1055464410.pdf (accessed 14 May 2013). 648

―Iran president congratulates Hamas on 'victory',‖ Ahramonline, 24 November 2012,

http://english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/2/8/59027/World/Region/Iran-president-congratulates-Hamas-on-

victory.aspx (14 May 2013). 649

―Iran fires missiles used by Hamas,‖ UPI, 14 March 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-

News/2013/03/14/Iran-fires-missiles-used-by-Hamas/UPI-78981363258500/(accessed 14 May 2013); The Meir

Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist

organizations,‖ 14.

227

and Turkish friends do?650

The PIJ leader, Ramadan Shallah stated: ―the weapons that are being used today to

resist this Israeli aggression and arrogance…come mainly from Iran… the weapons are either

Iranian manufactured, or their purchase has been funded by Iran.‖ The Islamic Jihad

commander also said ―the entire world knows this and it is no secret‖. He also stressed that

―if there is a difference of opinion with Iran regarding what is happening in Syria, I do not

think that there is any difference of opinion between ourselves and Iran – as the Islamic

resistance – regarding what is happening in Palestine or in the Gaza Strip.‖ Shallah also

called on the Arab states to arm the Palestinian factions. He stressed that ―regarding the

symbolic Palestine, we are 100 percent with Iran. Iran has given us all the support, aid and

assistance... It is not reasonable that arming the resistance in Gaza should be limited to or

monopolized by Iranian arms…we want arms from all the Arab states.‖ He stressed that ―it is

important that the Palestinians should have arms to defend themselves.‖ The PIJ displayed a

Kornet anti-tank missile, probably supplied by Iran, at an exhibition of weapons used by the

PIJ during Operation Pillar of Defense.651

Senior Hamas officials (after a certain delay) joined the campaign praising Iran's

military aid.For example, Mahmoud al-Zahar, one of the Hamas leaders, praised Iran for its

military and financial support of the Palestinian militant groups, while stressing Hamas'

political independence. He said that ―we have the right to take money and weapons from

Iran,‖ and that the money had been invested in developing missiles which had a longer range

than those received from Iran. He admitted that some of the rockets had been manufactured

in Iran and that Iran supported Hamas with weapons and money adding that Iran had never

asked for anything in return but only that the rockets be used to "liberate Palestine." 652

After

Operation Pillar of Defense, posters thanking Iran were hung at the main intersections in

Gaza City, possibly by PIJ activists. The objective was "to emphasize the important role

played by Iran in the fighting by giving the Palestinian resistance military and financial

650

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist

organizations,‖ 14. 651

―Gaza missiles Iranian-made or financed – Islamic Jihad,‖ Asharq Al-Awsat, 21 November 2012,

http://www.aawsat.net/2012/11/article55239800 (accessed 14 May 2013). 652

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist

organizations,‖ 13.

228

support." The posters were written in Arabic, Farsi, English and Hebrew on a background

illustration of Iranian manufactured Fajr-5 rocket launchers.653

Hamas‘ production of the M75 rockets in the Gaza Strip with Iranian assistance

reveals another unique characteristic of Iran‘s arming of Palestinian NSAs – the importance

of self-production in order not to be dependent on external sources of support and to be able

to fight Israel for a long period of time. More than Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies and in

spite of Israel aerial attacks, Palestinian groups established a military industry in the Gaza

Strip based on Iranian technological know-how.654

Adnan al-Ghul, Hamas senior operative

and the founder of Hamas‘ weapons industry received extensive training and expertise in

manufacturing missiles, explosives and small arms in Iran (early 1990s). Thereafter he

masterminded a series of spectacular terror attacks in Israel (1996), and supervised the

production of the first Qassam models (2001) targeting Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip (he

was killed by Israel in 2004). Hamas manufactures and uses IEDs with higher armor piercing

capabilities, such as the EFPs (called Shawaz, Arabic for ―flame‖), plate and hollow charges,

based on technological knowledge transmitted by Iran and Hezbollah. While the latter

received UAVs from Iran, the IDF claims that Hamas has attempted to manufacture UAVs.655

In March 2008, the Sunday Times interviewed a Hamas explosive technician who revealed

that "One of the things that has been helpful is that they (Iran) have taught us how to use the

most ordinary things we have here and make them into explosives…anything they think will

be useful, our guys there (in Iran) e-mail it to us right away.‖656

Arms smuggling system of Hamas and the PIJ

653

―Gazans thank Iran for help in battling Israel,‖ New York Post, 28 November 2012, http://www. nypost.com/

p/news/international/gazans_thank_iran_for_help_in_battling_JPufoByZFAHLVP9JUkAfpM (accessed 14 May

2013); ―Hamas: Jews will think twice before attacking Iran,‖ Ynet News, 24 November 2012,

http://www.ynetnews.com/ articles/0,7340,L-4311107,00.html (accessed 15 May 2013). 654

Kareem Khadder, Nick Thompson and Tim Hume. ―Gaza perfume named after Hamas rocket, inspired by

Palestinian 'victory',‖ CNN, 12 December 2012,http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/12/world/meast/gaza-rocket

perfume-m75(accessed 15 May 2013). 655

Israeli Security Agency. ―Operation Pillar of Defence,‖http://www.shabak.gov.il/ english/enterrordata/

reviews/pages/operationpillarofdefense.aspx (accessed 15 May 2013);Steven Erlanger. ―Leader Celebrates

Founding of Hamas With Defiant Speech,‖ New York Times, 8 December 2012,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/middleeast/khaled-meshal-hamas-leader-delivers-defiant-speech-on-

anniversary-celebration.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 May 2013). 656

Marie Colvin. ―Hamas wages Iran‘s proxy war on Israel,‖ The Sunday Times, 9 March 2008,

http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/ sto/news/world_news/ article82296.ece#page-1 (accessed 16 May 2013);

Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas. The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement (New York: Nation Books,

2007), 63-68.

229

The logistic-organizational aspect of arming Hamas and the PIJ by the Quds Force is a

remarkable phenomenon(Figure 1, p. 230). For Iran, channeling weapons to the Gaza Strip is

a more complicated and risky operation as it lacks a friendly transit state that borders Gaza.

Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade over the Gaza Strip and shared information about

smuggling plans. Moreover, the IDF has allegedly employed its long operational arm to strike

arms convoys in Sudan and vessels carrying weapons in the Red Sea while the U.S. navy

patrols the Arabian Sea. Weapons shipments to Hamas and the PIJ make long journey of

manyhundreds of kilometers from Iran to the Gaza Strip, passing through territories of

countries, unstable regions and varying terrains (deserts, mountains).657

Egypt‘s position is

one of the factors greatly influencing Iran‘s arming of Hamasbecause the Sinai Peninsula has

become a 'bottleneck' in recent years for arms convoys wishing to enter the Gaza Strip.

During the regime of former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian security forces

made some effort to thwart weapons smuggling through Egypt (with partial success).

Regarding Hamas as a terror group and a national security threat, the military regime of

General Abdul-Fatatah el-Sisi has waged (from September 2013) uncompromising

waragainst smuggling of weapons in the Sinai Penisula.658

These challenges have created a complicated arms smuggling system of which the Quds

Force is one component.The arming of Hamas and the PIJ is a multinational system,

encompassing different elements, both states and NSAs.Until the divergence between Iran

and Hamas in light of Syria‘s civil war, this system contained IRGC's Quds Force in Iran,

Syria and Lebanon,and the Sudanese government. Hamas leaders and smuggling controllers

(such as Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, killed in the UAE in 2010 and his successor, Kamal Ranja,

killed in Damascus in 2012) operated mainly from Damascus where they could easily interact

with Quds Force officials.659

The smuggling systems also include members of Hamas'

657

Karl Vick. ―Arms from Iran: A rash of intercepted Shipments,‖ Time, 17 March

2011,www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2059443,00.html(accessed 23 May 2013); ―Hamas acquires

Russian-made anti-tank missiles,‖ World Tribune, 23 December 2010, http://www.worldtribune.com/

worldtribune/ WTARC/ 2010/ me_hamas1283_12_23.asp(accessed 23 May 2013); ―A Battle between two Long

Arms,‘ Economist, 2 April 2009,http://www.economist. com/node/13415259 (accessed 12 May 2013); ―Report:

Israel Carried out 3 Attacks on Sudan Arms Smugglers,‖ Haaretz, 28 March

2009,http://www.haaretz.com/news/report-israel-carried-out-3-attacks-on-sudan-arms-smugglers-

1.273055(accessed 12 May 2013). 658

Samer al Altrush. ―Egypt`s Gaza Smugglers Shrug off Reports of Border Barrier,‖ The Telegraph, 18

December 2009,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6817385/Egypts-Gaza-smugglers-shrug-off-

reports-of-border-barrier.html(accessed 12 May 2013); ‖Hamas Slams Egypt for Tunnel Deaths,‖ Aljazeera, 29

April 2009, http://english.aljazeera net/news/ middleeast/ 2010/ 04/20104 295193 65 60 680.html(accessed 13

May 2013). 659

Ronen Bergman. ―The Dubai Job,‖ GQ, January 2011, http://www.gq.com/news-politics/big-

issues/201101/the- dubai-job-mossad-assassination hamas? Current Page=1(accessed 12 May 2013); Amos

230

military wing in Gaza who received the weapons, the operators of the Rafah tunnels and

smuggling activities, Bedouin smugglers and weapons traffickers in Egypt and Sinai, and

arms dealers in Sudan and Yemen. Each of these elements has haddifferent motives (political,

ideological, and financial); they had separate well-defined roles and there was little mobility

between them. For instance, cases of Iranian military officials, trafficking weapons to the

Gaza Strip themselves is unheard of, probably for reasons of security.660

Iran was responsible for the first segments of the smuggling operation, trafficking

arms to Sudan by sea and air. For example, in 2009 Iran chartered Sudanese Badr Airlines

airplanes to transport irregular cargoes from Iran to Sudan via Oman and Saudi Arabia or via

Jordan and Egypt. From Sudan the arms were apparently smuggled to the Gaza Strip using

local smugglers through Sudan and Egypt. No details were divulged on the specific cargo on

these aircraft, and it is assumed they carried Iranian arms, mainly rockets.661

Harel and Avi Issacharoff. ―What is Sudan hiding about the air strike it blamed on Israel,‖ Haaretz, 7 April

2011,http://www.haaretz.com/ print-edition/news/what-is-sudan-hiding-about-the-air-strike-it-blamed-on-israel-

1.354512(accessed 23 May 2013); Sadam Al Ashmouri. ―Yemeni Arms Bazaars Move Underground,‖ Yemeni

Times, 19 October 2009; Elior Levy. ―Assassination in Damascus: 'Mabhouh's aide' killed,‖ Ynet News, 28 June

2012, http://www. ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4248468,00.html (accessed 15 May 2013). 660

“Egypt court bans Palestinian Hamas group,‖ Aljazeera, 5 Mach 2014, http://www.aljazeera. com/ news/

middleeast/ 2014/03/egypt-court-bans-palestinian-hamas-group-2014348358109790. Html (accessed 20 April

2014). 661

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Most of the Weapons found aboard the M/V

Victoria en route to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip were of Iranian manufacture, including mortar

shells and anti-ship C-704 missiles. The shipment is another example of Iran's strategy of smuggling weapons,

with Syrian collaboration, to the terrorist organizations,‖ 18 March 2011, http://www.terrorism-

Info.org.il/malam_multimedi/English/eng_n/html/iran_e108.htm(12 May 2013);Vick, ―Arms from Iran;‖Con

Coughlin. ―Is Iran trying to set up a new arms smuggling route to Gaza from Sudan,‖ The SundayTelegraph, 27

April 2013, http://blogs. telegraph. co.uk/news/concoughlin/100214157/is-iran-trying-to-set-up-a-new-arms-

smuggling-route-to-gaza-from-sudan/ (accessed 14 May 2013).

231

Figure 1. Weapns‘ smuggling routes destained for the Gaza Strip and the Sinai

Peninsula

Iran

Bandar Abbas

Tehran

Mersin

Umm Qasr

Turkey

Iraq

Syria

Latakia

Port Sudan Sudan

Yemen

Eritrea

Egypt

Alexandria

Libya Sinai

Gaza

Saudi Arabia

Israel

Khartoum

Legend

land route

air route

maritime route

Kassala

Qena

Jordan

Lebanon

In April 2013, based on information from western diplomats,the Sunday Telegraph

reported on unscheduled Iranian cargo flights that had been logged between Tehran and

232

Khartoum. The sources assessed that Iran was trying to smuggle significant quantities of arms

to Gaza via Sudan.662

Sudan, which has close relations with both Iranian and Palestinian radical groups (as

well as Sunni Jihadis), is an important transit state for delivering weapons to the Gaza Strip.

Military cooperation between Sudan and Iran dates back to the early 1990s. Iran has been a

major supplier of weapons to the Islamic regime of President Omar Bashir, supporting him

against rebel groups in the South Sudan (which broke away to become an independent

country in 2011) and the western region of Darfur.663

For many years Hamas has employed

an operational infrastructure in Sudan. Mahmoud al Mabhouh, a senior Hamas operative who

was responsible for arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip was reported as working in Sudan.

He was assassinated in Dubai (2010) apparently by the Israeli Mossad.664

On October 2012

Israel allegedly attacked forty containers in the al-Yarmouk weapons factory and arms depot

near Khartoum. Media reports claimed the facility was operated by the IRGC and produced

weapons destined for Hamas, and one report claimed that the target was a drone-ammunition

store. Assuming these reports are correct, similar to Syria, Sudan‘s role in arming Hamas

surpasses the traditional model of a transit state.665

To reach Sinai Iranian arms are transported by land and sea routes that have been used

for thousands of years to transport goods from Sub-Saharan Africa to the Middle East.

Sudanese smugglergangs, mostly from the Rashaida tribe, moved the cargos with trucks to

the Egyptian border through the desolate expanses of the Nubian Desert in east Sudan. The

Egyptian army captured a few arms consignments near the Sudanese border, but could not

block its full 1,275 kilometer length. The tribesmen know the desert routes well and enjoy the

662

Con Coughlin. ―Is Iran trying to set up a new arms smuggling route to Gaza from Sudan,‖ The

SundayTelegraph, 27 April 2013, http://blogs. telegraph. co.uk/news/concoughlin/100214157/is-iran-trying-to-

set-up-a-new-arms-smuggling-route-to-gaza-from-sudan/ (accessed 14 May 2013). 663

―Israel Accuses Sudan of Aiding Iranian Arms Flow, but Keeps Silent on Mysterious Airstrike,‖ Foxnews, 25

October 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/25/israel-accuses-sudan-aiding-iranian-arms-flow-but-

keeps-silent-on-mysterious/(accessed 15 May 2013). Sudan‘s president, Omar al Bashir, has been indicted by

the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 664

―Iran naval task force 'docks in Sudan,‖ BBC, 29 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-

20121580 (accessed 14 May 2013); Rana Rahimpour. ―Why is Iran's Ahmadinejad visiting Africa,‖ Africa

Review, 16 April 2013, http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/Why-is-Ahmadinejad-in-Africa/-

/979182/1749812/-/uaigt9z/ -/index.html (accessed 14 May 2013); David L. Phillips and Ahmed Hussain Adam.

―Bashir‘s Sudan and Iran: an Alliance of Terror,‖ Sudan Tribune, 11 January 2013,

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45145 (accessed 14 May 2013); ―Israel Accuses Sudan of Aiding

Iranian Arms Flow, but Keeps Silent on Mysterious Airstrike,‖ Foxnews, 25 October 2012,

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/25/israel-accuses-sudan-aiding-iranian-arms-flow-but-keeps-silent-on-

mysterious/ (accessed 15 May 2013). 665

William Lloyd. ―Did Israel Bomb a Sudanese Ammunition Depot,‖ Time World, 25 October 2012,

http://world.time.com/ 2012/10/25/did-israel-bomb-a-sudanese-ammunition-depot/ (accessed 15 May 2013).

233

security services of other tribes through whose territory the cargo passes. Hamas and the PIJ

exploited their skill, and their Arab identity contributed to the business relationship between

the two parties.666

Arms also reached Sudan from Eritrea and Yemen, a major arms market

serving fighting militias in Somalia, Sudan and other countries in the region. Hamas exploits

the lack of government supervision of these routes but this might work both ways – several

Hamas arms convoys passing through Sudan or the Red Sea have been attacked from as early

as 2009 in operations attributed to Israel. Israel would neither confirm nor deny its

involvement, but a senior Israeli defense official made it publically clear that Sudan is ―a

dangerous terrorist state,‖ an enemy like Hamas and Iran. Accumulated reports imply that

Israel has launched a clandestine campaign of air strikes and naval commando operations to

block Iran‘s efforts to arm Palestinian radical groups in Gaza. The effectiveness of these

counter arms smuggling operations is disputed since plenty of weapons continue to reach

Gaza either from Sudan or Libya.667

As an illustration, Time Magazine reported that in

January 2009 Israel attacked a large truck convoy in the Sudanese desert, which was carrying

Fajr rockets and other Iranian arms for Hamas. The arms shipment was transported to Sudan

by sea. Eventually, other Fajr shipments reached Gaza.668

In November 2012 a Palestinian

militant group fired an advanced ATGM at an IDF patrol jeep near the border fence between

Israel and the Gaza Strip, wounding four soldiers. Israeli security officials estimated the

missile was acquired from the stores of the disintegrated Libyan army rather than from

Iran.669

Bedouins from Sinai, Egyptian citizens, mostly from the Sawarka and Romaylat

tribes, received Iranian arms shipments on Egyptian soil. They moved north along the Red

666

Security Council, ―Letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751

(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, ‖ 11

July 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%

7D/Somalia%20S%202012%20545.pdf 667

John Young. ―The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization,‖ Small Arms Survey (2007),

http://protection.unsudanig.org/ data/east/ YoungThe%20 Eastern%20Front% 20and%20the% 20Struggle%

20against%20Marginalization%20(May07).pdf (accessed 12 May 2013). 668

Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff. ―Reports in Sudan: Israel struck Two Weapons Convoys in Past Month,‖

Haaretz, 25 December 2011,http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/reports-in-sudan-israel-struck-

two-weapons-convoys-in-past-month-1.403521 (accessed 15 May 2013);Harel and Issacharoff. ―What is Sudan

hiding about the air strike it blamed on Israel;‖ Ron Ben Yishi. ―Terror`s Alternate Route,‖ Ynet news, 15 March

2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4042721,00.html. (accessed 12 May 2013); Dan Williams,

―Sudan: A Front for Israel‘s Proxy War on Sinai Jihadi,‖ Reuters, 25 October 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/25/us-sudan-planes-israel-idUSBRE89O1D720121025 (accessed 15

May 2013); ―Israel, Iran scrap over Red Sea zone.‖ UPI.com, 30 October 2012. http://www.upi. com/ Top_

News/Special/2012/10/30/Israel-Iran-scrap-over-Red-Sea-zone/UPI-83281351619305 (accessed 26 April 2013). 669

Elior Levy and Neri Brenner. ―PRC unveils video documenting attack on IDF jeep,‖ Ynet News, 13

November 2012, http:// www. ynetnews. com/ articles/0,7340,L-4304855,00.html (accessed 15 May 2013).

234

Sea coast in uninhabited areas, crossed the Suez Canal to the Sinai Peninsula and smuggled

the weapons to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah tunnels. While security supervision in the

south of Egypt is slack, it is tighter in the Suez Canal area. Therefore it is likely that the

smugglers mask the weapons shipments with civilian goods or that they bribe the Egyptian

security forces and thus successfully enter the Sinai Peninsula. It is estimated that the

smugglers split up their convoys and send a few trucks at a time so as to not draw suspicion.

Before transporting the weapons into the Gaza Strip through the tunnels they store them in

their houses, caches in open areas or storage facilities.670

In June 2011 Egyptian security

forces in central Sinai seized a store of explosives waiting to be smuggled into the Gaza Strip.

The weapons cache was discovered in a two meter deep pit, covered with palm leaves. The

Palestinian militant groups have exploited Israel's respect for Egyptian sovereignty as well as

the weakening control of the Egyptian government over the Bedouins in Sinai, especially

since the outset of the 2011 revolution against President Mubarak‘s government, to smuggle

large quantities of weapons through the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian and Israeli sources have

claimed that Hamas is smuggling advanced weapons (rockets, SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles)

into Sinai and Egypt.Egyptian authorities blame Hamas for supporting its longstanding allies,

the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who were removed from power in July 2013 and are

fighting the Egyptian army.671

Facing the IDF already in the entry to the Red Sea, Iran attempted to smuggle

weapons to Gaza through friendly ports, using various concealment tactics. For example, in

March 2011 Israel's naval forces captured the 'Victoria', a German owned ship, operated by a

670

Abigail Hauslohner. ―The Trouble with Sinai: Egypt`s Mexico Problem,‖ Time, 21 March 2010,

www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1973918,00.html(accessed 23 May 2013); Ayman Mohyeldin and

Adam Makary. ―Egypt Divided Sinai,‖ Al Jazeera, 26 September 2010, http://english.aljazeera net/

photo_galleries/ middleeast/201092612153319304 (accessed 12 May 2013). 671

―Egypt Intercepts Weapons from Sudan Border for Gaza,‖ The Jerusalem Post, 16 March 2011,

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-intercepts-weapons-from-Sudan-bound-for-Gaza(accessed 23 May

2013); ―The Smuggling Industry through the Rafah Tunnels,‖ Al Arabiya, 15 May

2009,http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/2161.htm(accessed 23 May 2013); Christopher More. ―The Race to

Rebuild Rafa`s Tunnels is on,‖ France 24, 24 January 2010, http:/ /www.france24.com/en/20090123-race-

rebuild-rafahs-tunnels- (accessed 12 May 2013); Samer al Altrush. ―Egypt`s Gaza Smugglers Shrug off Reports

of Border Barrier,‖ The Telegraph, 18 December 2009,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6817385/Egypts-Gaza-smugglers-shrug-off-reports-of-border-

barrier.html(accessed 16 May 2013); ―Hamas Slams Egypt for Tunnel Deaths,‖ 29 April 2009; ―How Israel

Foiled an Arms Convoy Bound for Hamas,‖ Time World, 31 March 2009, http://www.time.com/

time/world/article/0,8599,1888352,00.html (accessed 16 May 2013); ―Hamas reeling from Egyptian crackdown

on Gaza tunnels,‖ Al-Ahram, 22 July 2013, http://english.ahram. org.eg/ NewsContent/

2/8/77071/World/Region/Hamas-reeling-from-Egyptian-crackdown-on-Gaza-tunn.aspx(accessed 28 July 2013);

Yoav Zitun.―Israeli officials concerned Sinai violence may cross border,‖ Israel News,18 July 2013,

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4407011,00.html. (accessed 28 July 2013); David Stout.―Egyptian

Military Setting Sights on Hamas: Report,‖ The Time, 14 January 2014,

http://world.time.com/2014/01/14/egyptian-military-setting-sights-on-hamas-report/(accessed 20 April 2014).

235

French maritime transport company (CMA-CGM) while flying a Liberian flag. The 'Victoria'

was carrying 50 tons of armaments (approximately 2,500 60 mm and 120 mm Iranian-made

mortar bombs, six Iranian-made copies of 35 kilometer range Chinese C-704 anti-ship

missiles, small-arms ammunition and communications equipment) hidden in three of the

containers behind bags of cotton and lentils. The arms were marked with lettering in Farsi

and the C-704 instruction manuals were in Farsi with the emblems of Iran and the IRGC. The

IDF claimed it was the first attempt by Iran planned to supply anti-ship missiles to Palestinian

militants in the Gaza Strip. The ship was loaded in Latakia, Syria, sailed first to Mersin, south

Turkey, and was captured en route to Alexandria, Egypt (Iran might have sought to exploit

the destabilization in Egypt to increase smuggling of arms to Gaza through the Egyptian

mainland). After capture, the ship was led to Ashdod, Israel, where the cargo was unloaded.

CMA-CGM was probably unaware of the military cargo on board, however, this wasn't the

first time Iran had used CMA-CGM to smuggle arms.672

In October 2010, Nigerian security

forces captured the ship 'M/V Everest', owned by the IRGC and operated by CMA-CGM

under a Liberian flag. It had sailed from the port of Bandar Abbas, Iran, to the port of Apapa,

Nigeria, carrying 107 mm rockets and 120 mm mortar bombs intended to reach Gambia and

possibly separatist elements in West Africa. The French company claimed to be unaware that

the shipment included arms, citing the containers' bill of lading that stated they contained

building supplies.673

Iran‘s arming of the Palestinian militant groups reveals the remarkable role Hezbollah

plays as part of the Iranian military system. From 2000, Hezbollah became a part of the

Iranian efforts to build up the military infrastructure of Hamas, and Hezbollah‘s operational

approach became a role model for Hamas on how to conduct asymmetrical warfare while

taking advantage of conditions on the ground and Israel‘s weaknesses (such as the use of

violence to affect Israeli public opinion and decision makers). The military infrastructure

established by Hezbollah in Lebanon and the use it made of rockets, IEDs and anti-tank

missiles were a source of inspiration for the Palestinians.674

Aside from training Palestinian

672

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―Most of the Weapons found aboard the M/V

Victoria.‖ 673

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ―In recent months two more Iranian attempts

to ship weapons were exposed.‖ 674

There are a number of basic differences between the conditions in Lebanon and those in the Gaza Strip, and

Hamas has attempted to take them into consideration. For instance, the Gaza Strip is small and its area is

defined, while Lebanon has depth from which the terrorist organizations can operate and gives them a much

longer breathing space. South Lebanon, where the hard core of Hezbollah‘s infrastructure is located, is

mountainous and forested, while the Gaza Strip is flat and exposed.

236

militants and conducting joint terror attacks with the PIJ, Hezbollah was involved in

smuggling weapons to the Palestinian Territories by land and by sea, some of them as a joint

operation with Palestinian radical groups.In June 2001, Jordanian security forces arrested

three members of Hezbollah transporting twenty five rockets of 107 mm caliber, which had

been transferred from Lebanon via Syria to Jordan and were obviously intended to reach the

Palestinian territories.675

From the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000), Hezbollah recruited

Arab-Israeli citizens and used them, among other things, to smuggle weapons and

technological know-how about IEDs and rocket production, to the West Bank. This was part

of a joint Hezbollah-Iran intelligence and terrorist campaign in the Israeli arena during

whichHezbollah funded and directed Palestinian terrorist squads. Unit 1800 of Hezbollah

provided financial aid, explosives, and weapons to its networks in the West Bank and

Gaza.676

In late 2008 the Egyptian security services detained members of a Hezbollah network

operating in Egypt. The network was handled by Unit 1800, which provides support to the

Palestinians through the countries bordering Israel. During questioning, the network

operatives said that Muhammad Qabalan, the network‘s chief handler in Lebanon, was

involved in infiltrating operatives and smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip. The weapons,

which included high-quality C-4 plastic explosives, were intended for preparing explosive

belts and IEDs to be used in terrorist attacks against Israel. There were many other details,

including charges that they had been storing ―explosive belts.‖ Egyptian officials claimed the

Hezbollah cell had planned to buy a ship to ferry weapons into Egypt, for eventual shipment

to Gaza, and to smuggle weapons there through tunnels.677

Hassan Nasrallahadmitted

Hezbollah‘s plot, arguing: ―If aiding the Palestinians is a crime, then I am guilty and proud of

it.‖ 678

675

Azani, Hezbollah, 225; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Information Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a

Terrorist Organization,‖ 73-81. 676

Amir Kulick. ―Arabs and Hizbollah‘s Covert War against Israel,‖ INSSInsight, no. 129 (September 2009),

http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=25&incat=&read=3259(accessed 2 June 2013); Yossi Melman.

―The Prying Game,‖ Haaretz, 23 July 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/the-prying-game-

1.193564 (accessed 2 June 2013). 677

―Egypt Accuses Hezbollah of Plotting Attacks and Arms Smuggling to Gaza,‖ The New York Times, 13 April

2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14egypt.html (accessed 15 May 2013). 678

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Information Center, ―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 73-81.

237

Hamas‘ refusal to side with the Assad regime and its support for the Syrian rebels

caused Hamas‘ relations with until recently close allies, Syria, Iran and the Hezbollah to

deteriorate. Consequently, Hamas leadership admitted that Iran cut its support but it is not

clear if that includes arms shipments too. Unlike Hezbollah Hamas enjoys additional weapon

sources including the Libyan and Yemeni arms markets. But as Hamas improved and

regularized its military organization and acquired heavier weapon systems, it was more

dependent on Iran for its military buildup.679

During 2012, Hamas‘external headquarters were

compelled to move from Syria and some of the staff relocated to Egypt and Qatar. Hezbollah

ordered Hamas personnel in Lebanon to leave the country. Without an operational

headquarters in Damascus, Hamas probably faces greater challenges to coordinate arms

trafficking to Gaza. Iran probably maintains its military support of the PIJ, which is neutral

toward Syria‘s civil war, regarding a stronger PIJ as an efficient tool to undermine Hamas

authority in the Gaza Strip.680

Hamas and the PIJ demonstrate two different modes of state

sponsorship of an NSA: Hamas being more independent and guarding its sovereignty and the

PIJ is more subordinated to external authority.681

During late 2013 Iran supplied dozens of Syrian-manufactured M-302 rockets with a

range of around 150 km to Hamas.In March 2014 in the Red Sea, Israeli naval forces

intercepted an Iranian shipment of 40M-302 rockets, and 180 122MM mortar shells, probably

intended for Palestinian groups in Gaza. Israeli allegations portrayed sophisticated planning –

the Iranian airshipped the Syrian weapons to Iran where they were loaded onto a civilian

cargo ship that made a stop in an Iraqi port to add containers of cement as a camouflage. This

episode integrates state sponsorship and the outcome of a civil war, serving the arming of

NSA.682

679

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Information Center. ―Hezbollah. Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist

Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,‖ June 2003, http://www.terrorism-

info.org.il/ data/ pdf/PDF_simuchin_349_2.pdf (accessed 17 May 2013), 81.Roi Kais; ―Tear between

Hezbollah, Hamas: 'Leave Lebanon,'‖ Ynet News, 30 May 2013,http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-

4386246,00.html (accessed 24 June 2013). 680

―Chehab, 172;―Top Hamas official: We left Syria due to Assad regime's crackdown,‖ Haaretz, 26 February

2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/top-hamas-official-we-left-syria-due-to-assad-regime-s-

crackdown-1.414957 (accessed 18 May 2013); Paul Martin. ―Hamas Leader Speaks on Violence-negotiations-

and-peace,‖The Time, 7 December 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/12/07/hamas-leader-speaks-on-violence-

negotiations-and-peace/ (accessed 18 May 2013). 681

Mohammed Daraghmeh. ―Palestinians not worried by Israel-Iran war,‖ Reuters, 19 September 2012,

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/palestinians-not-worried-israel-iran-war(accessed 25 May 2013); Islamic Jihad

contemplate moving from Syria,‖ Asharq al-Awsat, 4 August 2012, http://www.aawsat.net/

2012/08/article55241111 (accessed 17 May 2013). 682

Taylor Schlacter.―Israel Intercepts Iranian Arms Shipment,‖The Guardian, 10 March 2014,

http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/israel-intercepts-iranian-arms-shipment/ (accessed 20 April 2014).

238

Summary

This chapter reveals that state sponsorship of armed NSAs has reduced since the end of the

Cold War, helping to put an end to many long conflicts. Iran‘s military support of radical

Islamic groups, mainly Hezbollah, is currently the major expression of outside support to

NSAs, deriving mostly from religious motives. Armed NSAs devoted to persistent conflict

like Hezbollah and Hamas, require steady supply of weapons which they acquirefrom Iran.

As seen in Syria‘s civil war, Hezbollah is an operational extension of the Iranian regime far

more than a regular alliance. This war demonstrates the strength of an NSA that used to be

armed by a state that becomes its main defender. In a number of unstable regions in Africa

and Asia rebel groups acquire weapons, exploiting rivalry between neighbor states.

The chapter questions the validity of Smith and Van Creveld`s paradigm of states-

NSAs conflict. They regard NSAs as a homogenous and monolithic category while in reality

they are extremely diverse and that affects the profile and outcomes of state-NSA conflicts.

Iran‘s extensive support of Hezbollah and Hamas might be a particular case but with

tremendous effects over the Middle East. But these two scholars devalue the strength of

present NSAs both in their arguments and terminology. Van Creveld calls NSAs armed with

long range rockets and anti-ship missiles like Hezbollah a ―lightly armed‖ guerrilla force

instead of a military organization. He does not address the special links between Hezbollah

and Iran, being much more than a proxy and sponsor. Calling Palestinian Hamas that controls

the Gaza Strip and until recently had a government of its own an insurgency is inaccurate.683

The collaboration between governments and NSAs in order to arm friendly NSAs has

evolved into complicated systems using the advantages of globalization. The arming of

Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip demonstrates the operation of SOSs: these

systems are independent of each other; they are highly diverse and geographically dispersed,

easily communicating with each other, and performing emergent behavior (large shipments of

smuggled weapons). These SOSs featureevolutionary development overtime, such asusing

the outcomes of the civil wars in Libya and the destabilization of Egypt to locate new sources

of weapons as the next chapter elaborates.

The next chapter demonstrates the growing importance of black markets for NSAs‘

military buildup. Collapsing regimes, stockpiles of weapons from previous wars, corrupt

683

Van Creveld, Changing Face of War, 272.

239

government officials and officers are all part of the transition from a state-based system of

NSAs‘ arming to private/transnational-networks of arms smuggling that serve many of the

current rebel groups.

Chapter Seven: Major Trends in the Arming of Contemporary NSAs

The previous chapter reveals a decline in state sponsorship of armed NSAs following the end

of the Cold War and Iran‘s military support of Hezbollah and other Islamic armed groups

240

being exceptional. The current chapter concludes the review of NSAs‘ arming efforts from

antiquity to the present day. It reveals a reverse trend – contemporary NSAs that are

struggling to arm themselves are compelled to be more self-sufficient and independent than

during the Cold War. NSAs acquire weapons through leakage and looting from states‘

armies, demonstrating a timeless modus operandi, and few depended mostly on this method.

Eritrea‘s struggle for independence from Ethiopia (1961-1993) and Nepal‘s Maoist People‘s

War against the royal government (1996-2005) manifest a role model for successful uprising

with limited weaponry. Engaging demoralized, undisciplined, poorly trained and poorly

equipped government forces, highly skillful, well-disciplined NSAs could gain victory,

though lacking outside aid and financial popular and backup. The Afghan Taliban‘s war

against President Karzai‘s government and al Qaeda groups fighting in Syria and Iraq feature

a similar pattern.684

The following chapter focuses on two other more influential mechanisms assisting

contemporary NSAs to decrease the force imbalance with governments; both use

globalization to facilitate NSAs‘ arming and operations. The first of these mechanisms is the

acquisition of weapons through intensive use of black arms markets. Armed NSAs acquire

weapons from local dealers and international arms traders, smuggling shipments through

porous borders and failed states into their sanctuaries. They are deeply involved in illicit

trade, chiefly the narcotics trade, enabling them to secure a steady flow of funds to procure

weapons and ammunition. The theory of arming of NSAs argues that NSAs‘ favored mode of

arming is modified by the emergence of new weapon systems; and the organizational

structure and operational approach of rebel groups. Contemporary NSAs have adopted an

asymmetric approach, attacking the weakness of stronger opponents. Thus, the second

mechanism refers to NSAs‘ intensive use of Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) in

guerrilla warfare against regular armies and in terror attacks against civilians. In this context,

the chapter addresses the powerful combination of suicide bombing (with or without IEDs),

radical Islamic doctrine, and globalization outcomes, mainly transnational NSAs, active

684

Rhoderick Chalmers. ―State Power. The Security Sector: Ideologies and Interests,‖ in Nepal in Transition.

From People‟s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel David M. Malone and Suman Pradhan

(Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 72-74; Sudheer Sharma. ―The Nepali State and the

Maoist Insurgency 1996-2001,‖in Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion, ed. Michael Hutt

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 50; Marcus, Ethiopia, 209-211; Paul B. Henze, Layers of Time:

A History of Ethiopia (London: C. Hurst and Company, 2000), 323.

241

diaspora, wireless communication and trans-oceanic transportation. This combination has

enabled NSAs using terror to challenge international security in a way never seen before.685

Contemporary NSAs’ Use of Black Arms Markets and Arms Dealers

NSAs’ use of Illicit arms trade

The following sub-section discusses three aspects of contemporary rebel groups arming

through private elements rather than states: using black arms markets, associating with

international arms traffickers and dealers, and funding arms purchases through illegal trade in

goods, mainly narcotics. Consequently, even without state support many NSAs with some

financial resources manage to sustain longstanding conflicts, inflicting heavy casualties on

governments. Black arms markets are vital for the readiness and maintenance of NSAs‘ force.

For many years, NSAs have associated with private companies and dealers not committed to

export regulations but profit-motivated and with insurgents struggling to acquire arms.

Today, NSAs are part of much larger global trade systems. Lacking financial and equipment

support from states some have become deeply involved in illicit trade of goods, especially

narcotics, as anattractive source of funds to an extent that could undermine their political

goals.

Armed NSAs associate with black arms markets which are defined as the agents of a

completely illegal trade of weapons. Evidently, governments too still play an important role

in the illicit arms trade, because government intelligence services organize and finance illegal

arms deals for proxies, and corrupt politicians are involved in selling and shipping weapons

to NSAs. Therefore, NSAs are sharing gray markets, which are defined as covert supplies of

weapons from a state to a non-state-actor in another country. Stohl and Grillot argue that

black and gray arms trades are intricately intertwined. Many shadows of gray significantly

complicate the illegal truck in arms. NSAs have also become expert at acquiring weapons by

legal means, by utilizing loopholes in existing laws and regulations.686

685

Richard Clutterbuck. ―Trends in Terrorist Weaponry,‖ Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, 2 (1993): 138. 686

Capie, Small Arms,193; Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot, The International Arms Trade (Cambridge: Polity,

2009), 94, 132; Robert Muggah and Martin Griffiths. ―Reconsidering the Tools of War: Small Arms and

Humanitarian Action,‖ Humanitarian Practice Network. Network Paper 39 (2002), http://www.

smallarmssurvey.org/ fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/

SASHPN%202002%20Tools%20of%20war.pdf(accessed 29 October 2013); Louis Charbonneau. ―U.N.

242

The private arms trade has operated from ancient times, and in recent decades has

become a dominant method of arming NSAs, integrating outcomes of the end of the Cold

War, the rise of global commerce, and privatization of transportation services and arms

industries. The illegal trade in weapons is a relatively small part of the world global trade in

arms. In 2002, Muggah and Griffiths estimated the illicit small arms trade at close to one

billion dollars (10-20% of the total trade). Current figures are probably much higher since by

2013 the total arms trade had risen to seventy billion dollars. The illicit trade in arms is

believed to be among the causes of instability and violent conflicts. The distinction between

legal and illegal arms trade has always been partial because of a continuous leaking of

weapons from states to NSAs in different ways; stealing, looting, and the deliberate supply of

weapons by states via proxies.687

Current research identifies five major black arms markets

serving armed NSAs: Southeast Asia, East Africa and Yemen; North Africa and the sub-

Sahara, the Balkans and the United States. Spreading over a large territory and featuring a

transnational smuggling network, they feed a considerable number of NSAs as well as

criminal gangs. They are located near active war-zones or in former regions of conflict that

have a surplus of poorly guarded weapons. Most of the host governments are weak and

cannot monitor their porous land and maritime borders. Large black arms markets share a

country-based division of labor: countries that produce or export arms, transit states and

NSAs who are the consumers. Active players include arms dealers, smugglers, brokers, sea

and air crews, gunsmiths, rebels, terrorists, drug traffickers, money changers, corrupt army

officers, governmental officials, and politicians. Black arms markets are subordinated to

security considerations (therefore less likely to offer large weapon systems), and supply and

demand roles.688

These black arms markets differ in age, size, number of NSAs involved, amount of

weapons traded, involvement of governments, and self-production of weapons. In Southeast

Asia and Yemen the arms trade stems from a long tradition of smuggling and contraband

trade, whereas contemporary black arms markets in North Africa and the Balkans are

relatively new. North African and Southeast Asian markets are used mainly by regional rebel

groups (internal focus) whilst the Balkan arms market channels weapons mainly to overseas

NSAs (external focus). The U.S., Philippines, and Yemen black arms markets are connected

overwhelmingly approves global arms trade treaty,‖ Reuters, 2 April 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/us-arms-treaty-un-idUSBRE93 10MN 20130402 (accessed 29

October 2013). 687

Stohl and Grillot,International, 93, 95. 688

Stohl and Grillot,International, 93, 95.

243

to indigenous gun-carrying cultures and local weapons production. Serving many NSAs over

a large territory, Southeast Asian and East African-Yemen arms markets feature the most

complex structures. All trade in small arms; the Yemeni market specializes in explosives,

while heavier weapons systems (anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons) can be found in Libya

and the Balkans.

Black arms markets highlight a strong link between NSAs‘ operations and

topography, which influenceson their methods of transportation. Rebellious NSAs tend to use

maritime ratherthan air transportation because of fewer security risks. Maritime

transportation also allows transfer of greater bulk (more weapons / bigger weapons) than

aerial transportation. Armed NSAs that purchase weapons through black markets in Southeast

Asia and Yemen-East Africa are intensively using naval transportation. They exploit the long

coasts and archipelagos of these regions for easy smuggling.689

In the Balkans air

transportation is dominant and NSAs are smuggling weapons through North Africa by land.

A substantial part of NSAs‘ smuggling activity, including transshipping of arms cargo, is

takes place near the coast in littoral regions like the port city of Chittagong in Bangladesh and

Aden in Yemen. The sea serves as an easy highway and acts as a catalyst for promoting arms

smuggling by NSAs. NSAs in land-locked counties, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, are

heavily reliant on smuggling weapons though neighboring countries. For internationally

isolated NSAs like Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda regional branches, black arms markets are

extremely important.690

An Al Qaeda training manual from the 1990s contains a special

lesson about purchasing illicit weapons, transporting them using cautious measures, storing,

and selecting a weapons arsenal.691

Southeast Asia arms market. A number of factors have contributed to the development of a

significant black arms market in Indochina, serving many NSAs(Figure2, p. 245). This region

contains a large number of inter-state conflicts, post-conflict zones with availability of small

arms, and long maritime and continental frontiers which are difficult to monitor and police.

Most of the states in Southeast Asia are ―weak states,‖ lacking the capacity to effectively

689

Hoovestal,Globalization, 86, 96. 690

―Eliciting Yemeni Cooperation for Arms Smuggling Interdiction Efforts,‖ Telegraph, 3 February

2011,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/somalia-wikileaks/8302245/S-ELICITING-YEMENI-

COOPERATION-FOR-ARMS-SMUGGLING-INTERDICTION-EFFORTS.html (accessed 11 January 2015);

Vijay Sakhuja. ―Chaos in the Littorals: An Overview of South Asia,‖ in Maritime Counter-Terrorism. A Pan-

Asian Perspective, ed. Swati Paraskam (New Delhi: Plarson Longman, 2008), 99. 691

Intelligence Resource Program. ―Al Qaeda Training Manual. Lesson Four: Organization Militay Bases,‖

http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf (accessed 25 October 2013).

244

control their borders and interdict arms traffickers (to illustrate, Indonesia is responsible for

policing more than17,000 islands that stretch across an area equal to one-sixth of the equator;

Myanmar and Thailand share a 2,500 kilometer border, much of which is thick jungle,

isolated from major towns or roads), while suspicions and mutual distrust among countries in

Southeast Asia cripple joint counter-smuggling activity.692

The Southeast Asian arms trade system has witnessed a major change in recent years,

demonstrating the dynamics of role changes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Asian rebel groups

acquired most of their weapons (everything from assault rifles to surface-to-air missiles)from

the post-conflict states of Vietnam and Cambodia through Thailand. The government of

Vietnam sold weapons left behind by the Americans (including an estimated 1,500,000 small

arms and 150,000 tons of ammunition) to communist allies and terror groups around the

world. A portion of these weapons was traded on local black markets. The LTTE were the

first to access Cambodian weaponry, followed by Indian separatist groups such as the

Nationalist Council of Nagaland and the United Liberation Front Arm. The Small Arms

Survey reports that by 2006, due to a collection and destruction operation, only 22,000 to

85,000 weapons continued to circulate illegally in Cambodia, compared to 153,600 to

216,250 in 1998.693

Weapons from the Cambodian military‘s arms depots and warehouses

probably still leak to illicit trade, but Cambodia is no longer a prominent regional weapons

source. Accumulated information suggests China, Thailand and the Philippines have become

primary sources of arms and ammunition to armed NSAs in northeast India, southern

Thailand, southern Philippines, remote border areasof Myanmar, and Indonesia (mainly the

GAM in Aceh), in addition to local criminal groups. In 2008, the Jane‘s Intelligence Review

claimed that China had replaced Cambodia and Thailand as the main supplier of weapons to

the insurgent groups in India‘s Northeast, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. This theme was first

confirmed by the large arms shipment that was intercepted in Bangladesh in 2004 on its way

692

Archana Padyaya, India's fragile borderlands: the dynamics of terrorism in north east India (I.B. Tauris,

2009),53;David Capie, Small arms production and transfers in Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian National

University, 2002), 69-70. 693

Christina Wille. ―How many Weapons are in Cambodia,‖ Small Arms Survey, Working Papers, no. 4 (June

2006),http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP4-Cambodia.pdf (accessed

11 August 2013), 30; The Small Arms Survey Institute reports that in 1993 the total pool of Cambodian conflict

weapons was 320,000 and 463,000. In 1998, the total number of weapons outside government control was

between 153,600 and 216,250. By 2006, due to a collection and destruction operation, only 22,000 to 85,000

weapons continued to circulate illegally in Cambodia.

245

from China to rebel groups in northeast India, and by arms caches of Chinese weapons found

in Myanmar near the Chinese border.694

The United Wa State Amy (UWSA), a Myanmar rebel group operating in the

northeast of Myanmar along the border with China, acts as a middleman between Chinese

arms manufacturers and insurgent groups in the Northeast, with most weapons routed through

China‘s Yunnan province. According to sources in Bangkok, the UWSA buys weapons from

China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and sells them to other insurgents for profit.

Sources claim the UWSA have been manufacturing small arms under an informal franchise

from NORINCO. Muse-Ruili is the main border crossing between Myanmar and China. Ruili

has long been a legal and illegal trading center, seen as the ―wild west‖ of China, in part

because of its proximity to the drug producing region that covers Myanmar, Thailand and

Laos, as well as human trafficking. From here, arms shipments take the long route to

Myanmar and from there are moved to the Indian border at Tamu, opposite Manipur.695

Many of the exports are shipped from the Chinese ports of Zhanjiang, Guangzhou and Hong

Kong. Usually, the buyers of these arms take delivery of the ammunition at the Chinese

docks and do the shipping themselves. Cambodia operates as a transit state; many of the

Chinese consignments are shipped to Sihanoukville, on the southern coast of Cambodia,

moving on to ports in the Gulf of Thailand for land transport to ports such as Ranong on the

Andaman Sea coast. Arms trade between NSAs demonstrates a process of commercialization

and privatization of NSAs‘ arming, facilitated by globalization. It is no longer only a force

buildup mechanism but a source of income.696

694

Anthony Davis. ―China Sends Armed Helicopters to Myanmar Separatists‘,‖ Jane‟s, 25 April 2013,

http://www.janes.com/article/12159/china-sends-armed-helicopters-to-myanmar-separatists(accessed 24 August

2013); Ved Prakash, ed., Encyclopedia of Terrorism in the World, vol. 1 (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2011), 22-

24; Capie, Small Arms, 27, 100-101. 695

Prakash, Encyclopedia,22-24; Toshihiro Kudo. ―Border Economies in the Greater Mekoy Subregion,‖ in

Border Economies in the Greater Mekong Sub-region, ed. Masami Ishida (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,

2013), 291-292. 696

David Mayun. ―Arms, Drugs Seizure in Sayaing Border Town,‖ MIZZIMA, 17 March 2013,

http://www.mizzima.com/ news/inside-burma/9072-arms-drugs-seizure-in-sagaing-border-town.html(accessed

24 August 2013); Subir Bhaumik.―Where Do Chinese Guns Arming Rebels Really Come From,‖ BBC, 3

August 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10626034(24 August 2013).

246

Yunan

China

To Africa and

the Middle East

Figure 2. Weapns‘ smuggling routes in Southeast Asia

247

Surrounded by neighbors coping with insurgencies and on-going conflicts, Thailand

serves as the hub of the East Asian arms smuggling network. Previously, Thailand‘s arms

trade was based on surplus arms smuggled from post-war Cambodia. Today, Thailand is an

important center for the brokering and facilitating of weapons transfers from additional

sources. Asian rebel groups are making new business connections in Thailand; they procure

and store weapons in hideouts and coordinate arms transportation. The rebels operate offices

in Thailand and their procurement officers often visit Bangkok. For example, Bangkok hosted

Anthony Shimray, chief arms procurer of a faction of the Nationalist Council of Nagaland

(NSCN-IM). In 2009, he paid an advance to a Bangkok company to source a few thousand

rifles, rocket launchers, and ammunition for Naga and other insurgent groups in India, from a

weapons supplier in mainland China (India arrested Shimray in late 2010). Riaz explains that

the illegal arms trade in Thailand has taken an organized shape and some influential members

of Thai society (businessmen, the military, and politicians) have become involved in this

hugely profitable trade. To illustrate, until a few years ago weapons destined for the Tamil

Tigers were frequently shipped on trawlers, some of which were owned by former or serving

members of the Thai military. Large arms bazaars allegedly operate in the Three Pagoda Pass

near Myanmar‘s border and on the Ranong coast in the south.697

Thailand is also an arms

transit state. In 2007, Hmong ethnic rebels resident in the United States planned to smuggle

weapons (including Stinger SSMs and LAW ATMs, purchased in the United States) through

Thailand into Laos to overthrow the local communist government. Burmese rebels like the

Karen National Union (KNU) and Shin State Army (SSA), smuggle weapons by land through

Thailand, with the porous Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Myanmar borders making these

transfers relatively easy to accomplish.698

In March 2012 Thai police intercepted ten rocket

launchers a local smuggler planned to smuggle over the northern Myanmar border to

insurgents in exchange for drugs. In March 2013 Thai police confiscated more than 100,000

rounds of ammunition and four rocket launchers which Thai arms dealers (one of them a

697

Padyaya,India, 53-56; Capie, Small Arms, 20, 24, 69-71, 92-93. 698

―General Vang Pao: former CIA-backed warlord Laos,‖ The Nation, 6 June 2007,

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/ 2007/06/06/ politics/ politics_30036096.php (24 August 2013);Sandeep

Unnithan. ―ChineseGunrunners of North-East,‖ India Today, 28 May 2011,

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chinese-agents-smuggle-arms-to-spread-militancy-in-north-

east/1/139538.html(accessed 25 August 2013); P. Naveen. ―Maoist attack: Chinese grenade, bullets found at

Darbha ambush site,‖ The Time of India, 31 May 2013 (accessed 25 August 2013).

248

former police officer) planned to smuggle across the border to Myanmar, allegedly for rebels

in Shin state. 699

With more than 10,000 vessels fishing Thai waters and a large number of islands

where weapons can be transshipped, patrolling the vast waterways and islands is extremely

difficult. The most important areas of activity for arms smugglers using sea routes are the

islands off the coast of Phuket, as well as the southern provinces of Ranong and Satun. The

LTTE used to operate logistic bases in southern Thailand for storing and transshipping

weapons. In recent years, Thai authorities have not reportedthe capture of vessels loaded with

large arms cargo. Weapons destined for Indonesian rebels, such as the Aceh, are shipped

through south Thailand and from there across the Strait of Malacca to Aceh. Malaysia is an

important crossing point, on land and sea, for arms smuggling from Thailand and the

Philippines to Indonesian armed NSAs. Weapons for armed NSAs in India and Myanmar are

transshipped from southern Thailand via the Three Pagoda Pass and the Ranong coastline,

then by Burmese insurgents in fishing vessels, through the Andaman Sea to Cox Bazaar in

Bangladesh. From here, the arms are routed to destinations in Northeast India and Myanmar

through different routes. Insurgent groups of South and Southeast Asia use anything from

commercial ocean freighters to fishing boats to deliver arms. Speedboats are frequently used

to unload cargo at sea and ferry the shipments through the coastguard patrol line to shore. 700

Bangladesh is another important segment of Southeast Asian NSAs‘ arms trade

system. Originally serving as a transit state for weapons shipments from Indochina, in the

1990s Bangladesh became a destination state because of growing insurgency in South Asia,

including jihadist groups in southeast Bangladesh. For Indian and Burmese insurgents, it

makes strategic sense to have bases in Bangladesh as it provides them proximity to the Cox

Bazaar port – the key receiving point of weapons consignments shipped from the black

markets of Southeast Asia. This change demonstrates the dynamics and flexibility of arms

smuggling activity. For example, Rajkumar Meghen, the leader of the UNLF, used to operate

699

―Police arrest suspected arms smuggler,‖ The Phuket News, 26 March 2012,http://www.

thephuketnews.com/police-arrest-suspected-arms-smuggler-29416.php (accessed 11 August 2013); Aung M.

Myint. ―Thai Police Seize Myanmar-Bound Weapons,‖ Radio Free Asia, 15 July 2013, http://www.rfa.org/

english/ news/ myanmar/ammunition-07152013175254.html (accessed 27 August 2013). 700

Capie, Small Arms, 18-27, 92-96; Denik I. Witarti. ―Malaysia as the Crossing Point for Illicit Trafficking of

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to Indonesia: Issues and Challenges,‖ Sociology Study, vol. 2, 5 (May

2012): 357-358.

249

from Bangladesh, acquiring weapons from China. In a joint Indo-Bangladeshi operation, he

was arrested in Dhaka in August 2010.701

The Philippines is both a large producer and importer of firearms to be consumed by

the general population, criminal gangs (in Japan and Taiwan too) and to a lesser extent, by

Marxist and extremist Islamic NSAs. There are at least 1.9 million illicit guns in the

Philippines, twice the number of the estimated legally registered firearms (930,000). The

Philippines‘ ―shadow gun economy‖ is based on impressive local arms factories, both legal

and illegal, mainly on Cebu Island (300,000 people work in local workshops), and leakage

from loose stockpiling of guns in various police and military units. Philippines law

enforcement authorities appear helpless to stop production.702

As in Yemen and Pakistan,

Philippino armed NSAs are using the local culture of gun ownership (close to that of the

United States) and homemade weapons to arm themselves. While some insurgent groups

have their own limited production capacity, most weapons are bought, stolen or captured

from Philippines security personnel. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was able to pay high

prices for weapons on the black market, thanks to a successful campaign of hostage-taking

during the 2000s. Military sources in the Philippines reported (2013) that the communist

insurgent New People Army (NPA) had received large quantities of AK-47 rifles from

abroad. The rifles were smuggled in foreign ships loading ore from the mines in the south.

Some of the rifles were new and had defaced serial numbers. Local media hinted the rifles

could have been smuggled from China.703

Being an archipelago, it is easy to smuggle weapons out of the Philippines, and its

black arms markets in Mindanao serve NSAs in Malaysia and Indonesia. In the last decade,

rebel groups in North Maluku, Poso, and Papua have all smuggled weapons from the

Philippines to resist the Indonesian government. The Philippines‘ arms markets have served

terror groups too. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombing, acquired

explosives in Mindanao.704

A former member of the JI recorded that he used to travel to

Mindanao, buying small arms there and smuggling them in fishing boats or tankers heading

to Indonesia from the Philippines. No one ever checked their bags. The long coastline and

land borders make it difficult for the Indonesian, Malaysian and Filipino governments to

701

Padyaya,India, 50-53; Capie, Small Arms, 70-72; Myint, ―Police Seize;‖ Unnithan, ―Chinese Gunrunners.‖ 702

Jaime Laude. ―AFP seeks NPA's supplier of AK-47s,‖ Philippines Head Star Headlines, 19 July 2013,

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/07/12/964721/afp-seeks-npas-supplier-ak-47s(accessed 27 August

2013). 703

Witarti, ―Malaysia‖353-355. 704

Capie, Small Arms, 21-22, 67-74.

250

secure completely.705

In the second half of 2011, Indonesia foiled a JI plot to bomb the

Singapore embassy in Jakarta. The terror group (Abu-Umar‘s cell) smuggled weapons into

Indonesia from the Philippines through Malaysia.706

In February 2013, a group of two

hundred militants, followers of the Sulu Sultan, Jamalul Kiram III,invaded Sabah (Malaysia),

located on the northeastern tip of Borneo Island, claiming ownership of Sabah. From nearby

Mindanao,the militants (including Abu Sayyaf members) organized the operation and

smuggled weapons. 707

Though lacking reliable numbers, Southeast Asian rebel groups probablyconsume

lighter and fewer arms stockpiles compared to Middle Eastern and some African NSAs. In

contrast to previous decades, current state-NSA conflicts in Southeast Asia are mostly low

intensity, featuring guerrilla warfare and in a few cases, terrorism. The majority of local rebel

groups do not seek regime change or a religious revolution but regional autonomy or

disengagement from the central government.708

The Balkan Arms Market. Wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s created a large surplus

of weapons used by rebel groups and authoritarian regimes in different war zones. Regardless

of the wind-down of conflicts, enhanced law enforcement measures and various anti-arms

trafficking initiatives, local black markets and the internal arms trade have been flourishing in

the Balkans. The breakdown of the Albanian government in 1997 led to the looting of large

amounts of arms and ammunition from army stockpiles. Sources estimate those one million

light weapons, one million five hundred thousand rounds of ammunition and thousands of

tons of explosives became available on the black market in south-eastern and central Europe.

For the most part, these weapons ended up in the hands of local armed NSAs: the Kosovo

Liberation Army (KLA) that fought Serbia; the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the

National Liberation Army (NLA). These last two are ethnic Albanian nationalists closely

705

Capie, Small Arms, 21-22, 67-74; Kate McGowan. ―The Gunmakers of the Philippines,‖ BBC News, 20

March 2013,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21840183 (accessed 12 August 2013); Motoki Yotsukura.

―Philippines Underground Teeming with Gunsmiths,‖ TheAsahi Shimbuni, 27 December 2011,

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/south_east_asia/AJ201112270001n (accessed 12 August 2013); Ed Quitoriano.‖

Illicit Gun Trade Thriving in Philippines,‖ Inquirer Net, 12 January

2013,http://opinion.inquirer.net/44717/illicit-gun-trade-thriving-in-philippines (accessed 12 August 2013); Amy

Chew. 706

―Jakarta foils terrorist plot against Singapore Embassy,‖ Asia One, 13 November 2011,

http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20111113310372.html#sthash.WWjjgpkT.dpuf 707

―Porous borders leave Sabah open to invaders,‖ Aljazeera, 22 March

2013,http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/2013319141436491978.html (12 August

2013(accessed 12 August 2013); Alfred Dalizon. ―Arms smuggling now punishable up to 40 years

imprisonment,‖ Journal Online, 2 July 2013,http://www.journal.com.ph/index.php/news/national/53435-arms-

smuggling-now-punishable-up-to-40-years-imprisonment(accessed 26 August 2013). 708

Capie, Small Arms, 21-22, 67-74.

251

linked to the KLA that fought for ―Greater Albania‖ from 2001. They acquired arms from

Serbia and neighboring Kosovo too. Arsovsta and Kostakos report on Macedonian police

seizures of large amounts of weapons hidden in bunkers or buried underground. The ANA

purchased these weapons from criminal groups in neighboring countries, smuggling the

weapons into Macedonia on horses.709

Criminal groups from the Balkans gradually started to export their weapons to other

regions, mainly to criminal gangs in West Europe and on a smaller scale to foreign armed

NSAs too. In the late 1990s, Michael McKevitt, founder of the Real IRA, traveled to former

Yugoslavia, establishing an arms supply network that purchased weapons (such as the anti-

tank rocket system RPG-18 and high explosives) from Croatian mafia and from Bosnia-

Herzegovina, smuggling them back into Ireland, exploiting the open borders policy of the

European Union.710

In August 2000, police in Croatia seized a rocket launcher, seven anti-

tank weapons, 130 tons of plastic explosives and other munitions allegedly destined for the

Real IRA. In 2000 European authorities discovered an attempt by the ETA to buy Croatian

arms from the IRA. Balkan weapons were also transported to overseas armed groups.711

Amnesty International reports significant quantities of weaponry have been shipped from the

Balkans via off-shore arms brokers to Rwanda since 2002, specifically from surplus stocks in

Albania, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. From late 2002 to mid-2003, Israeli-based Verona

Commodities and British Virgin Island (BVI) brokered at least ten flights, mainly for

ammunition, from Albania‘s state-run arms marketing company MIECO, using two African

airline companies. These shipments probably served Rwanda-backed rebels in the east Congo

DR.712

During 2012, Yugoslavian advanced weapons appeared to be used by Syrian rebels

too. The rebels posted videos on YouTube showing anti-tank weapons such as RPG-22, M79

and M60 used against Syrian army tanks and posts. Media reports claim Saudi Arabia

financed the purchase of large quantities of weapons from Croatia. Transport aircraft carried

these weapons to Jordan and they were then smuggled into Syria. Croatia‘s Foreign Ministry

and arms export agency denied that such shipments had occurred, but a Croatian daily

709

Jana Arsovska and Panos A. Kostakos.―Illicit arms trafficking and the limits of rational choice theory: the

case of the Balkans,‖ Trends Organized Criminal, no. 11 (2008): 361-369; Stohl and Grillot, International,101. 710

Arsovska and Kostakos, ―Illicit arms,‖ 366; .R. Oppenheimer, IRA.The Bombs and the Bullets. A history of

deadly ingenuity(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009), 171-172. 711

A.R. Oppenheimer, IRA.The Bombs and the Bullets. A history of deadly ingenuity(Dublin: Irish Academic

Press, 2009), 171-172. 712

Peter Danssaert and Sergio Finardi. ―The Arms Flyers. Commercial Aviation, Human Rights, and the

Business of War and Arms,‖ IPIS, July 2011, http://www. ipisresearch.be/ publications_detail. php?id=

368&lang=en (accessed 30 August 2013), 62.

252

newspaper reported a large number of Jordanian cargo planes at Zagreb Airport from late

2012. 713

Yemen-Northeast Africa’s arms markets. Complex traditionally-based arms smuggling

networks have spread from the Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden to the Horn of

Africa. These networks are further linked to arms markets in North Africa, East Asia and the

Middle East. They serve a variety of armed NSAs in one of the most unstable regions in the

world: Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula(AQAP) has a stronghold in Yemen, Shi‘ite Houthi

rebels in north Yemen, radical Islamic Al Shabaab in Somalia with branches in Uganda and

Kenya, Ethiopian Somalis in the Ogaden region and rebel groups in Darfur. All these armed

NSAs have been exploiting inter-state rivalries (mainly Eritrea against Ethiopia), weak

governments, divided societies, traditional maritime and on-land smuggling cultures, to build

up military force. Therefore they associated with seamen, smugglers, arms traders (who use

the same routes which have been used from as early as the Middle Ages), warlords, corrupt

government officials and army officers.714

With a 2,500 kilometer long coast-line, Yemen is the hub of arms smuggling

networks. Demonstrating a tribal culture of arms possession and spiraling political violence,

Yemen has more than sixty million firearms, which means that there are three times as many

firearms as there are Yemeni citizens. Around twenty arms markets are operating all over the

country, due to inter-tribal fighting, on-going ethnic, religious, sectarian and political

conflicts (the last major one was the Yemeni Revolution of 2010-2011 and fighting continues

on a lower scale to this day). Weapons of all kinds are sold, from small arms to rocket-

propelled grenades, even surface-to-air missiles, and other types of explosives.715

Weapons

from pastwars and leakage from poorly guarded army stockpiles find their way to arms

713

―Syria Suriye - FSA rebels attack SAA positions with M79 Osa,‖ YouTube, 16 May 2013,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=84UsYu8xUCw(accessed 1 September 2013); ―M60 Recoilless Gun, Al-

Qaysa, Syria,‖ YouTube, 13 July 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6oOWeNyHkGM(accessed 1

September 2013); C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt.―Saudi Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with Croatian Arms,‖

New York Times, 25 February 2013, (accessed 1 September 2013); 714

Marta Colburn. The Republic of Yemen: Development Challenges in the 21st Century (London: CIIR, 2002),

50; ―Yemen seizes weapon-loaded ship coming from Iran.‖ SABA, 2 February

2013,http://www.sabanews.net/en/news297178.html (accessed April 26, 2013). 715

Ahmed Dawood. ―Weapons and revenge at local arms market,‖ Yemen Times, 3 December

2012,http://www.yementimes.com/en/1630/report/1690/Weapons-and-revenge-at-local-arms-market.htm

(accessed 7 September 2013); Mohammed Jumeh. ―Weapons in Yemen: Commercial and Political Interests.‖

Asharq Al Awsat, 4 March 2013, http://www.aawsat.net/2013/03/article55294657(accessed 7 September 2013);

Louis Charbonneau and Michelle Nichols.―Exclusive. Arms ship seized by Yemen may have been Somalia-

bound - U.N.,‖ Reuters, 7 January 2013, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/52370323/ns/business-

stocks_and_economy/t/exclusive-arms-ship-seized-yemen-may-have-been-somalia-bound---un/ (accessed 7

September 2013).

253

markets. Moreover, Yemen's borders have seemed to amount to open gates for the

importation of smuggled weapons. For example, in March 2011 Dubai police foiled an

attempt to smuggle sixteen thousand handguns from Turkey to Yemen. The shipment was

destined for Saada, apparently arranged by independent arms dealers.Authorities found the

weapons in a red cargo shipping container, hidden behind boxes of furniture wrapped in

plastic in a Dubai warehouse.716

From early 2013, Yemen authorities have confiscated more

than twenty thousand small arms smuggled from Turkey. The Lebanese newspaper Daily Star

interviewed Ahmad Saif, director of the government-funded Sheba Center for Strategic

Studies who argues that local arms dealers (many of them are sheikhs) are obtaining licenses

from the Defense Ministry and are legally importing weapons, mainly from Ukraine and

Turkey. Part of the shipment goes to the ministry, while the other part goes to the black

market. The Yemeni government has attempted to reduce the vast number of arms and to

control the arms trade, but government officials themselves have a great interest in continuing

the arms trade.717

To illustrate, in October 2009 a shipment of weapons from China was

seized in Hodeida Governorate. The Yemeni media reported that the ship carried fake

documents that had been signed by Yemeni Defense Ministry officials. The ship was

permitted to leave, possibly with its cargo.718

The Yemen black arms trade serves mainly local terror and insurgency activity. Saleh

al Tays al Waeli was a Yemeni illegal arms trader, allegedly selling explosives and weapons

to the Al Qaeda cell that was responsible for the suicide attack against the guided-missile

destroyer, USS Cole (October 12, 2000; seventeen American soldiers were killed). The

American army killed him in 2013. Moreover, Yemen‘s geo-strategic location makes it an

important transit point for arms flown to Africa and the Middle East, serving terrorists and

insurgents. Al-Qaeda attacked government and American targets in Saudi Arabia using

weapons they smuggled across the Yemeni border. In August 2002, Al Qaeda operatives

shipped two SA-7 missiles from Yemen to Somalia and then into Kenya. A few weeks later

716

―Dubai police foil attempt to smuggle weapons to Yemen,‖ Arabian Business.com, 24 March

2011,http://www.arabianbusiness.com/dubai-police-foil-attempt-smuggle-weapons-yemen-389784.html (8

September 2013). 717

Tik Root. ―Yemeni authorities complicit in weapons trade,‖ The Daily Star Lebanon, 27 March 2013,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Mar-27/211566-yemeni-authorities-complicit-in-weapons-

trade.ashx#axzz2eBFwJG7H(accessed 7 September 2013). 718

Adnan Shihab. ―Advanced Weapons Floods into Yemen,‖ National Yemen, 22 December

2012,http://nationalyemen.com/2012/12/22/advanced-weaponry-floods-into-yemen/ (accessed 22 December

2012); Ali I. Al-Moshki. ―Yemen Intensifies Coastal Security,‖ Yemen Times, 13 May

2013,http://www.yementimes.com/en/1676/news/2335/Yemen-intensifies-coastal-security.htm (accessed 8

September 2013).

254

they attempted to down an Israeli passenger jet with the missiles but missed.719

A UN report

from mid-2013 states Yemen was the top source of arms to Somalia. Lacking a functioning

central government, Somalia has witnessed a bloody civil war since 1991.720

In 2009, the Al Shabaab radical Islamist group that later merged with Al-Qaeda,

became a dominant force within Somalia, in light of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from

Somalia, and the pragmatisation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the former major

opposition group, who reconciled with the Transnational Federal Government (TFG).

Following the local tradition of low-intensity warfarethe Al Shabaab militants captured and

controlleda large territory, including airports and multiple port cities in southern Somalia,

allowing the importation of large stocks of weapons and other goods. Al Shabaab possessed

armored vehicles, rockets, some field artillery, anti-aircraft cannon, anti-tank weapons and

speed boats, posing a security risk to Somalia‘s neighbors too.721

By late 2012, a large foreign

expedition (composed of Africa Union forces, and the Ethiopian army) and the Somali

Transnational Federal Government‘s army forced Al Shabaab out of southern and central

Somalia (including the capital, Mogadishu) but Al Shabaab is still dominant in rural areas.

Smuggling explosives from Yemen and adopting Al Qaeda tactics, Al Shabaab regrouped

and launched a campaign of suicide bombings against government and foreign targets,

mainly in Mogadishu, some of which were sophisticated (more than ten suicide attacks from

early 2013).722

719

Tabarani, 209-212; ―USS COLE,‖ Global Jihad, 10 July 2007, http://www.globaljihad.net/

view_page.asp?id=301 (accessed 3 November 2013). 720

Security Council. ―Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea Issues List of Individuals Identified

Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008),‖ SC/9904, 12 April 2010,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9904.doc.htm (accessed 8 September 2013);Jonathan Fighel.―Al

Qaeda - Mombassa Attacks, 28 November 2002,‖ ICT , 13 June 2011,http://www.ict.

org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/942/currentpage/6/Default.aspx (accessed 7 September 2013);Paul Handley.

―Yemen key transit hub for Hamas arms: leaked memos,‖ AFP, 7 December

2010,http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gt-b9BxFFjALRyWKhgmrgZoPMfGA?docId=

CNG.14a4e293d01a51c1733429bdd67c8378.a41 (accessed 7 September 2013); Charbonneau and Michelle

Nichols.―Exclusive: Arms ship seized by Yemen may have been Somalia-bound: U.N.,‖ Reuters, 1 July

2013,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/02/us-somalia-arms-un-idUSBRE96101E20130702 (accessed 7

September 2013).

721

Abdirahman Hussein and Abdi Sheikh.―Al Shabaab bombers strike Mogadishu restaurant, 15 dead,‖ Reuters,

7 September 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/07/us-somalia-blasts-idUSBRE98607I20130907

(accessed 12 September 2013); Matengo Chwanya.―Al Shabaab Claims Responsibility for Somalia Blasts,‖

Stream Africa, September 2013,treamafrica.com/news/al-shabaab-claims-responsibility-for-somali-blasts/‎

(accessed 12 September 2013). 722

―Al-Shabab launch suicide raid on Somali hotel,‖ Aljazeera, 19 March 2014,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/03/al-shabab-suicide-bomb-attack-somali-hotel-

201431813415994401.html(accessed 21 April 2014); Mohamud, Osman,―Somalis decry al-Shabaab's use of

255

Al Shabaab‘s persistent struggle against the governments of East Africa has been

facilitated by a steady flow of weapons. The U.N. Security Council stated (2010) that

Yemen‘s senior arms dealer, Sheikh Fares Mohammad Mana (the governor of Sa‘ada

province) was involved in supplying weapons, some of which he purchased in East Europe,

to militants in Somalia (in 2011, Mana was arrested and released after few months). Using

the unregulated and lawless coastal strip, northern Somali businessmen and warlords from the

Boosaso area are involved in smuggling and brokering arms from Yemen ports for Al

Shabaab.723

Weapons are smuggled in diesel containers and fishing boats to Somalia and

Sudan. U.S and Yemeni navies and the autonomous Puntland authorities in northeast Somalia

have been seizing boats and ships carrying arms and explosives from AQAP to Al Shabaab

forces in southern Somalia.724

For example, in October 2012 Puntland authorities seized an

arms consignment for Al Shabaab unloaded from a Yemeni dhow on the northeast Somali

coast. The thirty seven sacks contained 220 RPG-7 rockets, small arms, and two sacks of

ammonium nitrate and explosive materials.725

Eritrea is another major arms supplier in East African smuggling networks. In July

2012 the Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea noted that ―Eritrea is currently

a marginal actor in Somalia.‖ Yet, it reported Eritrea has ―relationships with arms dealers

and facilitators in Somalia known to have provided services and support to Al Shabaab,‖ as a

strategy to confront its historical rival Ethiopia, which deploys troops in Somalia (therefore

an arms embargo is still imposed on Eritrea). Senior staff in the Eritrean security services

have been involved in smuggling weapons from Yemen into northern Somalia for Al

child suicide bombers,‖ Sabahi, 5 March 2014,

http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2014/03/05/feature-02(accessed 21 April 2014). 723

―Somalia: Arms Race vs Arms Embargo,‖ Aljazeera, 12 February 2013,

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ insidestory/2013/ 02/201321 2732567777.html (accessed 8 September

2013); Dahir Alasow.―U.S intercepts ship suspected of carrying weapons for Al-Shabaab,‖ Suna Times, 16

August 2011, http://www.sunatimes.com/view.php?id=1298(8 September 2013); Mohamed Kassim. ―How lack

of international treaty fuels arms smuggling trade,‖ The Star, 9 January 2013, http://www.the-

star.co.ke/news/article-102107/how-lack-international-treaty-fuels-arms-smugglingtrade#sthash.

CmaYdCpf.dpuf (accessed 9 September 2013); Security Council. ―Letter dated 11 July 2012 from the Chair of

the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and

Eritrea,‖ S/2012/545, 13 July 2012, www.securitycouncilreport.org/.../Somalia%20S%202012%20545.pdf‎

(accessed 9 September 2013), 10-11, 31-35. 724

Security Council. ―Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea Issues List of Individuals Identified

Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008),‖ SC/9904, 12 April 2010,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9904.doc.htm (accessed 8 September 2013). 725

―Somali Forces Seize Weapons,‖ Arab News, 22 July 2012, http://www.arabnews.com/somali-forces-seize-

%E2%80%98al-qaeda-weapons%E2%80%99 (accessed 8 September 2013).

256

Shabaab, and joint Yemeni and Eritrean crews operate the boats.726

Eritrean senior officers

command arms smuggling and human trafficking networks, collaborating with Rashiada

tribal criminal gangs and Arab Bedouins from Egypt. They have smuggled large quantities of

weapons (such as rocket launchers and anti-aircraft missiles) through the Sinai Peninsula for

Palestinian arms groups in Gaza and increasingly to Salafi-Jihadi groups in Sinai. The

Eritrean government might stop air shipping of weapons to radical Islamists in Somalia, but it

is heavily involved in the regional arms trade, funneling state-NSA conflicts in Somalia,

Ethiopia and Sudan.727

Being associated with two arms trade systems Sudan plays a unique

role: it is a transit state for smuggled weapons from Eritrea and Yemen for armed groups in

Egypt and Gaza Strip.728

Black arms markets in Yemen and the Horn of Africa clearly demonstrate how rebel

groups exploit environmental-political conditions, such as failed states, fragmentation of

societies, inter-states rivalries, and porous borders. Local NSAs are part of complex

heterogeneous networks, comprising governments and entrepreneurs, traditional frameworks

and modern processes. Islamic NSA involvement in spectacular terror attacks (discussed later

in this chapter) multiplies the importance of these arms markets though the former do not

necessarily smuggle large quantities of weapons.

Libyan Arms Market. Contemporary rebellious NSAs and criminal groups are the first to

benefit from weak or collapsing states where disintegrated armies fail to secure arms depots.

Libya demonstrates well this timeless principle of the theory of arming of NSAs. The

collapse of the Gadhafi regime in Libya (October 2011) after a civil war that lasted a year,

resulted in an unchecked flood of weapons out of Libya to Al Qaeda-linked militants across

726

Tom Shanker and Robert F. Worth. ―Yemen Seizes Sailboat Filled with Weapons, and U.S. Points to Iran.‖

New York Times. 1 January 2013,http://www.nytimes. com/2013/01/29/

world/middleeast/29military.html?_r=1&; (accessed April 26, 2013). 727

Security Council S/2012/545, 19-21; Merion Estefanos.‖Beduin Rashaida: The Human Traffickers in North

East Africa,‖ Asmarian Independent, 9 March 2011, http://asmarino.com/articles/958-eritrea-bedouin-rashaida-

the-human-traffickers-in-north-east-africa(accessed 11 September 2011); Security Council. ―Letter dated 24

July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907

(2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council,‖ S/2013/440, 25 July

2013,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/

s_2013_440.pdf(accessed 11 September 2013), 24-25; Phoebe Greenwood. ―Eritrea's brutal trade in weapons

and people that is too lucrative to stamp out,‖ The Guardian, 12 July 2012,http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2012/jul/17/eritrea-people-trafficking-arms-sinai (accessed 16 September 2013). 728

Zeinab M. Salih.―Arms Proliferation in Khartoum. Who is responsible,‖ The Niles, 21 December 2009,

http://www.theniles.org/articles/?id=78#sthash.iJ3Zv8Rq.dpuf (accessed 16 September 2013); SAP. ―Business

as usual: Arms flows to Darfur 2009-12,‖ Sudan Issue Brief, no. 20 (September 2012),

http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-20-Arms-flows-to-Darfur-2009-

12.pdf(access 30 October 2013); Ahmed Eleiba.―Sinai Part III,‖ Al-Ahram, 11 September 2013,

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ News/4066/17/Sinai-%E2%80%94-Part-III.aspx(accessed 13 October 2013).

257

northern Africa.729

The rise of radical Islamic NSAs in North Africa and the Sahel belt in

recent years was greatly facilitated by a proliferation of modern weapons from Libya. These

weapons are traded and trafficked by a complex network of Bedouin smugglers and Jihadist

militants from Mauritania in the west to Egypt in the east. Libya‘s looted weapons strongly

demonstrate the connection between force build up and force execution among rebel groups.

A stronger regime in Libya, which is not likely to arise in the near future, could reduce the

illicit arms trade.730

Being a former major arms importer, Libya could offer a variety of weapon systems

including small arms, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, rockets, and explosives as well as

more advanced light anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile systems. During the civil war, Libyan

militias looted Libyan military depots and sold weapons to arms smugglers and radical

Islamic groups. In the security vacuum that characterizes Libya since the fall of Gaddafi,

heavily armed militias have challenged government authorities, refusing to disarm or join the

national army. They are building their own arsenals against the background of resurgent

tribalism and regionalism; some are threatening to secede from Libya, others connected to Al

Qaeda have been involved in terror. The Islamists militants who attacked (September 11,

2012) the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, killing the U.S. ambassador and three other U.S.

nationals, were well organized and armed. Reports note they fired RPGs, mortars and rockets

into the two American compounds.731

Libya‘s government has struggled to bring armed

militias under control. For example, in August 2012 the Libyan Interior Ministry reported

they seized more than one hundred tanks and nearly thirteen rocket launchers from a pro-

Gaddafi militia southeast of Tripoli. Militias sell their weapons on the black arms market

directly to foreign militants from war-ridden countries or to arms dealers from third countries,

who then sell them to warring factions. Most notable are the Strela and more advanced anti-

aircraft missiles.732

The American government assessed that Gaddafi‘s forces had about

twenty thousand SA-7 of which a few hundred have already been smuggled to rebellious

729

―Libyan Weapons Arming Qaeda Militants across Northern Africa,‖ Saudi Gazette, 22 February 2013,

http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20130222154170(accessed 5

August 2013). 730

Yahir H. Zoubir. ―Qaddafi‘s Spawn,‖ Foreign Affairs, 24 July 2012, http://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/137796/yahia-h-zoubir/qaddafis-spawn(accessed 5 August 2013); ―Libyan

authorities seize 100 tanks from militia loyal to Gadhafi,‖ World Tribune, 31 August 2012,

http://www.worldtribune. com/2012/08/31/libyan-authorities-seize-100-tanks-from-militia-loyal-to-gadhafi/

(accessed 5 August 2013). 731

―Benghazi Consulate Attack Fast Facts,‖ CNN, 10 September

2013,http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/10/world/benghazi-consulate-attack-fast-facts/ (accessed 30 October

2013). 732

Zoubir, ―Qaddafi‘s Spawn;‖World Tribune, 31 August 2012.

258

NSAs in North Africa and the Gaza Strip, creating a major risk to civilian air traffic.

Armedwith advanced weapon systems, radical Islamic NSAs could destabilize countries

neighboring Libya that have been weakened by the uprisings in the Arab World and internal

sectarian conflicts.733

In Mali, the Tuarag, a nomadic Berber people who live in the Sahara, complained

against discrimination and neglect by the government in far-off Bamako. In January 2012, the

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched a rebellion, with

returned gunmen who fought with Gaddafi bringing with them weapons from Libya.

Exploiting the lack of central order after the government had just been toppled in a military

coup, the MNLA seized northern Mali, declaring (April 2012) Azawad‘s independence.734

In

just a few months the power balance in northern Mali changed as Ansar al-Din, a Tuarag

jihadist militia, supported by a dissident group of Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM), defeated the secular MNLA and established control over MNLA-held

territories. The AQIM operates mainly in the northern coast areas of Algeria and parts of the

desert regions of southern Algeria and northern Mali. Only with massive outside military

support, comprising the French army and African-led international Mission in Support of

Mali (AFISMA), did the government of Mali recapture the north in early 2013, pushing back

radical Islamic militants into Algeria and Niger. Scholars noted that unlike previous

rebellions in north Mali the current rebellion has been difficult to put down because of the

influx of weapons and war-hardened fighters from Libya. In April 2011, African sources

reported a convoy of eight Toyota pickup trucks crossed into Chad, Niger and into northern

Mali from desert armories in eastern Libya. The cargo contained RPGs, anti-aircraft missiles,

small arms, ammunition and explosives.735

A year later, the Nigerian army intercepted an

AQIM truck containing around six hundred and fifty kilograms of explosives that were

marked as belonging to the Libyan army. The Algerian army intercepted many attempts by

AQIM operatives to smuggle Libyan weapons into the AQIM stronghold in northern Mali

through southern Algeria. One source describes Libya as an ―open air arms market‖ which

has allowed AQIM to acquire large quantities of heavy weapons. While still employing terror

tactics, AQIM‘s acquisition of heavier weapon systems signifies that Al Qaeda regional

branches who seek to control territory, are adopting a military structure closer to that of

733

Zoubir, ―Qaddafi‘s Spawn;‖World Tribune, 31 August 2012. 734

―Mali Crisis: Key Players,‖ BBC, 12 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-

17582909(accessed 5 August 2013). 735

Walid Ramzi. ―Algeria: Nation Thwarts Mali Arms Smuggling,‖ All Africa, 16 April 2013,

http://allafrica.com/stories/201304171015.html(accessed 5 August 2013).

259

regular armies. Despite temporary operational setbacks in Mali and southern Algeria, the

AQIM remains a major strategic threat to North Africa.736

In predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria, weapons looted in Libya assisted the

Bako Haram, a radical Islamic militia, to intensify its struggle against the Nigerian

government and Christians. Nigerian Islamic militants, who sought to establish an Islamic

state in the north, are crippling economic activities, mainly in the states of Borno and Yobe,

compelling the government to declare a state of emergency in May 2013 in three northern

states.737

In 2012, Bako Haram militants visited north Mali to join the fight there, and they

have returned with heavy weapons smuggled from Libya. They are connected to AQIM who

train them in north Mali and south Algeria; therefore they have adopted AQIM terror tactics,

suicide bombing and kidnapping foreigners. Nigerian security apparatuses have intercepted

many arms caches in the north, containing military-grade weaponry, such as RPGs and anti-

aircraft guns, which upgrade the firepower of the rebels. Arms smugglers are using Nigeria‘s

leaking borders, making effective control of smugglers a mirage. They employ various

concealment and deception tactics to transfer looted Libyan weapons into Nigeria, including

fuel tankers and bags of grain with little attention given from security agents. Arguing the

armed group is better equipped than the Nigerian militia fighting it, a Nigerian senior official

admitted: ―given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko

Haram.‖738

Libyan military arsenals appear to be a substantial source of arms supplies for Syrian

rebels. The arming of these rebels differs from arming jihadist groups in Africa, being

logistically more complicated because of security considerations, and demonstrating

involvement of both state and sub state elements. In August 2012, Free Syrian Army (FSA)

spokesmen reported a Libyan ship carrying more than four hundred tons of apparently

736

Zoubir, ―Qaddafi‘s Spawn;‖ ―Libya: Al-Qaeda Receive Looted Libyan Weapons,‖ The Telegraph, 4 April

2011,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8427540/Libya-al-Qaeda-

receive-looted-Libyan-weapons.html (accessed 5 August 2013); Mel Frykberg. ―Libyan Weapons Arming

Regional Conflicts,‖ IPS, 2 September 2012,http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/libyan-weapons-arming-regional-

conflicts/ (accessed 5 August 2013). 737

―Nigerian Islamist Militants Return from Mali with Weapons Skills,‖ ADG Regate, 7 June

2013,http://africaim.com/nigerian-islamist-militants-return-from-mali-with-weapons-skills/ (accessed 6 August

2013). 738

―Boko Haram: Plot to shoot down Jonathan‘s plane foiled,‖ Vanguard, 10 March

2013,http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/boko-haram-plot-to-shoot-down-jonathans-plane-foiled/#sthash.

QRckkYFp.dpuf(accessed 6 August 2013); Tayo Babarinde. ―Arms Stockpile: North Prepares for War over

2015,‖ Nigeria Tribune, 21 July 2013,http://www.tribune.com.ng/ news2013/index.php/ en/component/ k2/

item/17169-arms-stockpile-north-prepares-for-war-over-2015 (accessed 6 August 2013); ―Boko Haram 'stronger

than Nigerian army',‖ Aljazeera, 17 February 2014,http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/boko-haram-

stronger-than-nigerian-army-2014217194247251822.html (accessed 21 April 2014).

260

humanitarian aid docked in Iskenderun, Turkey. The cargo, reported as the largest

consignment of weapons since the uprising, contained, among other things, SA-7 anti-aircraft

missiles and RPGs. This shipment was followed by air deliveries of Libyan weapons to the

Free Syrian Army (more than twenty, one source reported), landed in south east Turkey or

Jordan and then transferred over the border into Syria.739

A Reuters reporter in a Benghazi

military base watched a container of weapons (small arms, rocket launchers and ammunition)

being prepared for delivery to Syrian rebels, and in northern Syria the New York Times

reportedabout crates with Libyan marked weapons in the possession of a FSA affiliated

group.740

Libyan militias who sympathize with Syrian rebels supply the weapons while the

weak Libyan government turns a blind eye or is ―actually directly involved‖ as a U.N. report

notes. Syrians living abroad and Arab donors are funding and even coordinating arms

supplies to the FSA. One of them, Abdul Basit Haroun, originally a Libyan businessman

residing in Britain and currently a Libyan warlord, claimed (mid 2013) he sent to Syria

twenty eight metric tons of weapons by air or sea, using a Benghazi-based relief organization

as a front company. Turkish authorities‘ support has been vital for delivering military aid into

Syria, enabling the FSA to operate on Turkish soil.741

Also, the Qatari government finances

arms shipments to Syrian opposition, and has provided cargo aircraft to deliver weapons from

Libya to Syria via Turkey. Most of the weapons have been relatively light, but included a

number of second-generation anti-tank systems that have been destroying Syrian tanks.

Though Libyan weaponry has not kept up with the enormous ammunition demand of Syrian

rebels, they are critical to sustain the Syrian rebels‘ war against the powerful Syrian army(but

the SA-7 never got into Syria). Weapons‘ commercialization and recycling means that both

Libyan and Syrian rebels have relied on Russian manufactured weapons, though Russia has

supported Gaddafi and Assad.742

739

Sheera F. Antakya. ―Syrian Rebels Squabble over Weapons in Biggest Shipload Arrives from Libya,” The

Times, 14 September 2012, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article3537770.ece (accessed

6 August 2013). 740

Jessica Donati, Ghaith Shennib and Firas Bosalum .‖The adventures of a Libyan weapons dealer in Syria,‖

Reuters, 18 June 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-libya-syria-

idUSBRE95H0WC20130618(accessed 7 August 2013); C.J. Chivers, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti. ―In

Turnabout, Syria Rebels Get Libyan Weapons,‖ The New York Times, 21 June

2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/world/africa/in-a-turnabout-syria-rebels-get-libyan-

weapons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 7 August 2013). 741

Harald Doornbos, and Jenan Moussa. ―Comrades in Arms,‖ Foreign Affairs, 10 July 2013,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/10/how_libya_is_sending_weapons_arms_syrian_rebels

(accessed 7 August 2013). 742

Doornbos, and Moussa. ―Comrades in Arms.‖

261

The U.S’s Arms Market. The United States is the world‘s largest conventional arms

exporter (thirty percent of global arms exports), and has the highest gun ownership rate in the

world (88.8 guns per one hundred people).The Second Amendment of the American

Constitution (1791) secures the right of people to bear arms and this is one of the reasons the

United States has the highest per capita rate of firearm-related murders of all developed

countries.743

Although the United States has a vast array of federal and state laws governing arms

purchase and ownership, as well as elaborate and comprehensive arms export regulations,

significant loopholes have allowed foreign NSAs, including terrorist networks, to acquire

U.S. weapons with relative ease. They use gun shows, straw purchasing, and ordering gun

kits through the mail and employ corrupt gun dealers.744

More than other weapons markets,

immigrants to the United States affiliated with foreignarmed NSAs are playing an important

role in facilitating arms smuggling.Thus, during the twentieth century the IRA smuggled

weapons and explosives they acquired in America‘s arms markets across the Atlantic in small

successive consignments into Ireland more than other NSAs. They have been using strong

local support networks and trading with local gangsters. According to Oppenheimer, by the

early twenty-first century the supply of weapons from the United States had become

increasingly restricted due to U.S. federal agencies‘ policy of stemming the flow of illegal

weapons to Ireland in light of 9/11 and British government pressures.745

The Colombian FARC regards the U.S. as a major source of weapons. In the last

decade, U.S. security agencies intercepted plots in different stages to smuggle weapons for

the FARC by American citizens with a Latino background; payment was made in cocaine or

743

SPIRI. ―China replaces UK as world‘s fifth largest arms exporter, says SIPRI,‖ 18 March 2013,

http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2013/ATlaunch(accessed 17 September 2013); Gun homicides and

gun ownership by country, The Washington Post, 17 December 2012,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/special/nation/gun-homicides-ownership/table/ (accessed 17 September 2013). 744

Oppenheimer, IRA, 137-154; Jim Cusack. ―How the IRA set up an arms deal with Boston gangster James

'Whitey' Bulger,‖ The Independent, 24 February 2013, http://www.independent.ie/ opinion/analysis/how-the-ira-

set-up-an-arms-deal-with-boston-gangster-james-whitey-bulger-29090605.html(accessed 17 September 2013);

Julián Aguilar. ―Report Highlights Issues with Gun Running into Mexico,‖ The Texas Tribune, 3 April 2013,

http://www.texastribune.org/2013/04/03/amid-gun-debate-smuggling-mexico-continues(accessed 17 September

2013). 745

Catharine Wilson. ―Miami gun store owner charged in plot to arm Colombian rebels,‖ South Florida Sun-

Sentinel, 30 September 2004, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/ exile/gun-store.htm(accessed 22 September

2013); U.S. Attorney‘s Office.―Lebanese Man Sentenced to 12 Years in Prison for Conspiring to Provide

Material Support to Terrorists,‖ FBI, 11 October 2012,http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-

releases/2012/lebanese-man-sentenced-to-12-years-in-prison-for-conspiring-to-provide-material-support-to-

terrorists (22 September 2013); Matthew Levitt. ―Iran, Hizballah, and the Threat to the Homeland,― The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 March 2012,

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/LevittTestimony20120321.pdf(accessed 22 September 2013).

262

U.S. currency. In 2004 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives uncovered

in a Miami neighborhood warehouses full of weapons hidden in ceiling, freezers and washing

machines. They seized seven hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, gunpowder and two

hundred weapons (including machine guns). The supplier was a local gun shop owner, a

member of a U.S.-Venezuelan group that shipped containers loaded with arms and

ammunition to ports in Venezuela, assisted by corrupt Venezuelan custom officials.746

The

customers were the FARC and their right-wing rival paramilitary groups, the United Self-

Defense Forces. The smugglers planned to ship one million rounds of rifle ammunition in

two cargo containers. Cragin and Hoffman provide a detailed analysis of smuggling networks

trafficking illicit weapons from North America to Colombia via Central America,usingvariety

of land and sea routes which are difficult to monitor. El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua

serve as collection points and distribution hubs where the weapons are gathered together in

small clusters and delivered into the black market. The FARC stores weapons in Panama

before smuggling into Colombia.747

The rise of global trade and transportation capabilities stimulated stronger links

between U.S. black arms markets and overseas business partners. The U.S. legal system‘s

indictments and convictions reveal intensive attempts of local and foreign arms dealers,

occasionally working together, to smuggle weapons outside the country. Criminal gangs have

been predominant customers and they trade directly and indirectly with foreign terrorists and

insurgents. American security employees with access to weapons stockpiles (such as soldiers

deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan) were involved in arms smuggling.748

For example, the FBI

arrested (2013) three brothers, one of them an veteran NYPD veteran police officer and one a

custom border officer, on allegations of smuggling rifles (from 2009) they purchased through

dealers in the United States to the Philippines, disassembling the weapons and smuggling

them out of the United States in disguised shipments. A third brother residing in the

Philippines would deliver the guns to customers whom authorities claim had likely gang,

746

―Three Venezuelans plead guilty to participating in weapons ring,‖ A.P., 23 December 2004,

http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/apnews/stories/122304/D875FUJ00.shtml (accessed 22 September 2013). 747

Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman,Arms Trafficking and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003),

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1468.pdf (accessed 13 July 2013), 20-

26;Department of Justice. ―Three Colombians Plead Guilty to Conspiring to Support the FARC and Alien

Smuggling Charges,‖ 7 December 2007,

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_980.html(accessed 22 September 2013). 748

U.S. Department of State. ―Arms Export Control Compliance and Enforcement and the UN Program of

Action for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW),‖ 3 July 2006, http://2001-

2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/68550.htm (accessed 22 September 2013).

263

even terrorist connections.749

A similar conspiracy was intercepted in 2003 when U.S.

authorities arrested a U.S. citizen of Philippine origin who led an organization trading

American guns for drugs from the Philippines with the Abu-Sayyaf Group.750

In 2009, the

FBI disrupted a Hezbollah support cell of ten Lebanese nationals, most of them American

citizens from the New York area. Among other things, they planned to smuggle one thousand

and five hundred Colt machine guns from Philadelphia to the port of Latakia. Like other U.S.

based Hezbollah cells, this one was linked to criminal activity of Hezbollah infrastructure in

the Tri Border Area in South America.751

Because of geographic location, black arms markets of the United States manifest a

global influence. Foreign armed NSAs use diaspora communities, wireless communication,

trans-Atlantic trade and U.S. overseas military involvement, facilitating arms smuggling.

NSAs’ Arms Logistic Mechanisms

Globalization introduces new opportunities for NSAs‘ smuggling activity; the ability to

transport large quantities of weapons by sea or air to the most remote locations. NSAs have to

demonstrate considerable logistic skills, safely delivering arms shipments into their

sanctuaries. NSAs that enjoy state sponsorship, like Hezbollah, can rely on the transportation

apparatus of their patrons, thereby reducing security risks. Most NSAs have to find other

solutions, which will be discussed here. Self-sufficiency in arms transportation is a great

challenge for NSAs for financial and security reasons. Therefore the Tamil Tigers‘ Liberation

Front (LTTE) arms smuggling campaign stands out. From 1987, the LTTE waged a bloody

lengthy war against the government of Sri Lanka, introducing a real security challenge. By

749

Jim Hoffer. ―New York City police officer, 2 brothers accused of smuggling guns,‖ New York News, 6

September 2013, http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/ local/new_ york&id=9238453 (accessed 16

September 2013). 750

Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism, 2ed. (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 2001), 10-12. 751

Sophia Pearson. ―Five Men Accused of Trying to Buy U.S. Missiles, Guns,‖ Bloomberg, 23 November 2009,

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aA6I04g_.4ZU(accessed 17 September 2013);

―Vegas Man Headed To Prison In Navy Seal Weapons Case,‖ CBS, 30 July 2012,

http://lasvegas.cbslocal.com/2012/07/31/vegas-man-headed-to-prison-in-navy-seal-weapons-case/(accessed 17

September 2013); FBI. ―Four Indicted for Conspiring to Support Hizballah; Six Others Charged with Related

Crimes,‖ U.S. Attorney‘s Office,24 November 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-

releases/2009/ph112409.htm(accessed 22 September 2013); ―From America to South America: Ties Get

Stronger in the Tri-Border Region,‖ Financial Times, 8 December 2011,

http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1768313&seqNum=8(accessed 22 September 2013).

264

2009, the Sri Lankan army defeated the LTTE and the Sri Lankan civil war had ended but the

LTTE smuggling skills remain a role model.752

The LTTEhad a close nexus with the sea and it controlled a major part of the Sri

Lankan coast. The organization's naval power was the basis for its sturdy stance against the

Sri Lankan army for some thirty years. Sri Lanka is an island nation and the Tamils have a

long tradition of fishing, maritime trade and smuggling, thus the LTTE smuggling came by

sea. During the 1980s LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, decided that there was a need

for an independent armschannel because Indian military assistance was limited and of poor

quality and because of his concern that India would cease to support the LTTE.The

LTTEquickly adjusted to the need to acquire ammunition after a peace accord was signed

between India and Sri Lanka in 1987. He ordered the establishment of a merchant fleet tasked

with secretly transporting arms from around the globe to Sri Lanka, which would also carry

out civilian trade as a source of income for the organization. The task was assigned to the

organization's chief procurer, Selverasa Pathmanathan (KP, arrested in 2009).753

The LTTE's merchant fleet was one of the organization's outstanding strengths

enabling the LTTE to independently transfer weapons across the high seas, defending the

territory under their control in north and east Sri Lanka and to inflict great damage on the Sri

Lankan army. In the early 2000s the organization's use of charter ships grew after their own

fleet was exposed. The LTTE operated approximately ten merchant ships, dozens of

speedboats and hundreds of fishing boats. The registered owners of the LTTE shipping

companies were senior operatives in the organization and the crew sometimes included armed

military operatives.754

During the 1990s and until the war's end in 2009, the LTTE transported

large amounts of high quality weapons by sea, including: light aircraft, cannons, rockets and

mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition, light weaponry, advanced

communications systems, night vision equipment and even a torpedo launcher and

missiles.The LTTE smuggling system was very centralized and had clear command and

752

Neil De Votta. ―The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,‖

Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1021-1051.

753

Swamy Narayan, Inside an Elusive Mind- Prabhakaran (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2003), 109; Vijay

Sakhuja. ―The Dynamics of LTTE`s Commercial Maritime Infrastructure,‖ ORF Occasional Paper (2006):114;

David Capie. ―Trading the Tools of Terror. Armed Groups and Light Weapons. Proliferation in Southeast Asia,‖

in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia.Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, ed.

Paul Smith (Armonk: East Gate Books, 2005), 191-195; Neil De Votta. ―The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,‖ Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1021-1051. 754

Brade O`Neill., Insurgency and Terrorism. Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington: Brassy‘s,

1990), 148-152.

265

control patterns.755

KP, the chief procurer of the organization, closely managed the

acquisition efforts. He worked under Prabhakaran, the autocratic leader, but probably enjoyed

plenty of leeway in his work because of the many years he spent outside Sri Lanka. KP and

his assistants traveled the world, signed procurement deals with arms dealers or corrupt

military officials using front companies, mediators, and bank accounts that they managed in

various countries.Mao's comparison of guerrilla warfare to a fisherman casting his nets at sea

seems very appropriate for KP's way of working: he split the smuggling activity between

different areas, managed it in a centralized fashion and moved the center of his activity from

one location to another in accordance with the security situation. LTTE's fleet of ships

blended well in the massive merchant traffic passing through the Sunda Malacca and Lombok

straits, just as the boats carrying the arms to the island's shores blended well with the dozens

of small fishing trawlers operating off the shores of east and north Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu.

Sri Lankan government success in dismantling the LTTE merchant fleet played an important

role in terminating the civil war.756

NSAs lacking LTTE‘s logistic skills might collaborate in purchasing and smuggling

weapons, especially when sharing borders and theatres of operation. The Islamic Movement

of Uzbekistan (IMU) is an old ally of the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda, fighting alongside

the Taliban against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan

government. According to unconfirmed reports IMU acts as a go-between in arms supplies to

the Taliban. In three separate incidents in late 2012 the ISAF arrested three IMU arms

facilitators who smuggled rifles, mortars and explosives into Afghanistan for IMU and

Taliban militants.757

Aside from training and shelter, Indian and Burmese rebel groups joined

forces to facilitate arms shipments from China, Thailand and other sources through

Bangladesh and Myanmar. Myanmar rebels were more involved in maritime smuggling while

northeastern Indian insurgents negotiated arms deals in Thailand and China. Previously,

755

Van de Voorde Cecile. ―Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE),‖ Police Practice and Research 6, no. 2 (2006): 185-196. 756

―LTTE Gun Runner Netted,‖ The Nation, 7 January 2007, http://www

.lankalibrary.com/phpBB/viewtopic.php?t=3173 (accessed 26 August 2013); Greg Sheridan. ―Sri Lanka's path

to peace,‖ The Australian, 13 September 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/sri-lankas-path-

to-peace/story-e6frg6z6-1226718017231(accessed 21 April 2014). 757

Shakar Saadi. ―IMU suffers casualties, loses Taliban trust,‖ Central Asia Online, 29 November 2012,

http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2012/11/29/feature-02(accessed 19 September

2013).

266

Indian (for example the ULFA) and rebel groups from the Philippines allegedly associated

with the LTTE, using its powerful fleet to acquire weapons from overseas markets.758

The third and most used smuggling method by contemporary NSAs is through

privateers. Armed NSAs associate with smugglers and gunrunners, sharing cross-border

smuggling networks. Hamas‘ use of traditional networks of African and Arab Bedouin

smugglers is discussed in chapter six. The globalization process which created a new type of

arms smuggler serving states as well as rebel groups will be reviewed in the following

paragraphs.Stohl and Grillot refer to ―individuals who negotiate and arrange weapons

transfers and purchases or sales in exchange for the transaction or some kind of fee.‖ They

are product of globalization, an integration of modern transportation and privatization of the

arms trade. During the Cold War they were well-connected individuals, running arms for

either the United States or the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War time, they maintained their

connections, finding that illegal arms dealings were quite lucrative. Large sections of the

state-run networks engaged in transport, training, provision of arms and equipment, money

laundering and the like were privatized – not only in the hope of a more peaceful globe, but

as part of the downsizing of the defense and security sectors that followed the collapse of the

Berlin Wall.759

Rebellious NSAs benefitted from the rise of globalized association between

private arms dealers and brokers and arms-producing states without proper export control,

mainly in former Soviet Union countries, where governments looked to modernize and

upgrade and quickly get rid of obsolete and surplus stocks. Their great times were during the

1990s. In recent years private arms dealers are under stronger state supervision but still play

an important role in arming both states and NSAs.760

International arms dealers have benefited from a lack of government oversight and

control, and, in some cases, direct government support. Feinstein explains that they operate

from many locations around the world, transferring money, weapons and other goods across

multiple jurisdictions through intricate channels, and are seldom physically present when the

weapons are delivered. Prosecuting arms dealers is also difficult because of a lack of political

will. The dealers employ logistic assets usually owned by states, operating beyond

geographic boundaries. They operate in different regions, employing transnational business

networks, demonstrating globalization. They mask themselves by conducting legal business

758

Prakash,Encyclopedia,58-59, 93-94, 102-107,265; Riaz, Islamic, 72. 759

Stohl and Grillot,International, 107-108. 760

Stohl and Grillot,International, 108.

267

with governments and international organizations, undermining differences between states

and NSAs. Their remarkable logistic capabilities, though very expensive to hire, are a great

advantage for insurgents looking for high quality weapons systems. For armed NSAs under

international sanctions, located in remote areas, international arms dealers driven only by

economic interest are natural partners.761

Most of the weapons supplied in defiance of arms

embargoes from the 1990s came from East European states such as Bulgaria, Serbia and

Ukraine. The lack of control often begins at the weapon stocks ostensibly controlled by

armed forces, extends to production facilities and goes on to border controls. Arms dealers

use various methods for skirting the legal system and flouting the law. Loopholes in national

laws, weak law enforcement and gaps in border surveillance, have been major problems

facing the implementation of arms embargoes. 762

Vicktor Bout, a Russian national, was regarded as the largest arms trafficker in the

world until he was arrested in Bangkok (2009), after trying to sell weapons to American DEA

agents pretending to be Colombian FARC representatives. In 2012, Bout was convicted by a

United States court, and sentenced to twenty five years in a U.S. prison. Bout, known as ―the

merchant of death,‖ had tremendous success, a combination of the Soviet Union collapse, the

end of the Cold War and globalized trade. Using his connections with Russian aviation and

airport officials, Bout exploited political and economic chaos to purchase old yet very

efficient Antonov and Ilyushin cargo jets in Russia in the early 1990s. Unemployed

experienced former Soviet pilots and flight crews were easy to hire. With assembly lines in

arms factories across Russia‘s interior and in former East Europe states shut-down because of

a lack of money for material and salaries, Bout could cheaply buy a variety of weapons, from

rifles to helicopters. Older weapons written off as destroyed were shipped to clients

(including insurgents) in developing countries as top-grade arms. Russia was a safe haven for

Bout, and he allegedly shared profits with Russian government, military and intelligence

officials, demonstrating government involvement in black arms trade.763

761

Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death. Money, Guns, Planes and the Men who Make War

Possible (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 16; Michael Brzoska and George A. Lopez. ―Putting Teeth

in the Tiger: Policy Conclusions for Effective Arms Embargoes,‖ in Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the

Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes, eds. Michael Bazoska and George A. Lopez (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group

Publishing, 2009), 246-251. 762

Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World. Insdide the Global Arms Trade (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 154,

169; Stohl Grillot, International,108. 763

Farah and Braun, Merchant, 15-17, 36; Bazoska and Lopez, ―Putting Teeth,‖ 247; Feinstein, Shadow, 115.

268

Farals and Braun describe Bout as a globalized phenomenon: Bout ―built an operation

that ranged across continents and hemispheres, carefully scattering planes, handpicked

employees, corporate entities, and hidden wealth, creating a formidable empire capable of

operating at a moment‘s notice in dozens of cities across the world.‖764

Bout‘s cargo jets took

off from Belgium to East European countries where weapons consignments were loaded.

From there, they might fly to Sharjah, were the weapons shipment could be stored for later

flights, transported to other planes, or flown on, after refueling toward night landing zones in

Afghanistan. The planes could fly directly south into Africa. On the way back, Bout‘s planes

were loaded with payments for the weapons deliveries, mainly diamonds and gold. For

international arms dealers like Bout every combatant was a legitimate customer. Bout‘s

planes armed warring factions in several different conflicts, arming the UNITA and

government troops in Angola and several sides in the prolonged wars that continue to

convulse the Congo DR, as well as the Liberian-backed Revolutionary United Front of Sierra

Leone (RUF) rebel group. Bout transported supplies to American troops in Iraq and

Afghanistan while delivering arms to the Taliban. Bout's major advantage was his impressive

logistic arm, demonstrating arms smugglers with global transportation skills, facilitating

NSAs‘ arming efforts. Bout had a private air force which grew to more than sixty Russian

cargo planes and a handful of American planes purchased in the late 1990s, making him the

top private supplier and transporter of weapons. One of his last operations, in 2007, was to

purchase two Boeing aircraft from American companies via front companies in order to

smuggle more weapons to war zones.765

In his final meeting with DEA agents disguised as FARC representatives in Bangkok

(April 2009) Bout offered a $15 million deal including 700-800 surface-to-air missiles, 5,100

AK-47 firearms, millions of rounds of ammunition, C-4 explosives, night-vision equipment,

ultra-light air-planes and unmanned aerial vehicles. All these weapons were to be supplied by

an arms manufacturer in Bulgaria, and would be air-dropped into Colombia by two hundred

parachutes, during a fly-over from Nicaragua to Guyana.766

Bout was jailed in August 2012,

and an NGO called The Conflict Awareness Project published a detailed report claiming that

764

Farah and Braun, Merchant, 15. 765

Farah and Braun, Merchant, 18, 39, 43, 159; Feinstein,Shadow, 119; George Gao. ―Merchants of Death: Fly

under the Radar of U.N. Arms Trade Treaty,‖ IPS, 28 August 2013,http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/merchants-

of-death-fly-under-the-radar-of-u-n-arms-trade-treaty/ (accessed 29 August 2013); United States Department of

Justice. ―Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Extradition Of Richard Ammar Chichakli on Money Laundering,

Wire Fraud, and Conspiracy Charges,‖ Case 1:09-cr-01002-WHP24 May 2013, http://www.justice.gov/

usao/nys/ pressreleases/ May13/ ChichakliRichard ExtraditionPR.php (accessed 1 September 2013). 766

Feinstein, Shadow, 165.

269

two of Bout‘s former associates sought to re-establish his arms smuggling business by setting

up an air cargo company registered in Mauritius. Consequently, the Mauritius government

refused to grant the dealers the Air Operation Certificate needed to facilitate their arms

smuggling plans.767

Globalized trade and international transportation services create more opportunities

for armed NSAs and their business partners. A single arms smuggling operation could be

geographically dispersed over many countries, involving a network of companies and

practising extensive labour differentiation. Having each company set up to complete a

separate part of the transaction in a separate jurisdiction, enables arms brokers to disguise

their identity and in many cases escape prosecution. Stohl and Grillot note that brokers

particularly like to set up freight-forwarding and transport services that provide the aircraft,

boats and other transportation methods to move concealed weapons between sellers and

buyers.768

United Nationsexperts investigateda foiled attempt by North Korea to airlift a large

arms shipment to Iran, apparently for Hezbollah or Hamas (December 2009). The aircraft

was seized by Thai authorities at Bangkok airport where it had stopped to refuel. As many as

eight companies were involved at various levels in the brokering of arms from North Korea

with connections to at least ten different countries spanning Asia, the Pacific, the Middle

East, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Aside from North Korea and Iran, two Ukrainian

citizens planned and coordinated the arms smuggling operation, using a Georgian registered

company, operating the IL-76 (previously, the plane was controlled by Viktor Bout).769

A

UAE-based company owned the IL-76 aircraft that took off from Ukraine and an air company

from Kazakhstan supplied the crew for the flight. The Ukrainian arms dealers opened a shelf

company in New Zealand which chartered the plane from the Georgian company. Well-

known Kiwi businessmen established a shelf company, listing a young Chinese immigrant as

767

Karen McVeigh. ―Viktor Bout Associates Exploited Flaws in International Law UN Study Finds,‖ Guardian,

17 July 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2012/ jul/17/viktor-bout-associates-arms-

smuggling(accessed 29 August 2013); Kathi L. Austin. ―Viktor Bout‘s Gunrunning Successors: A Lethal Game

of Catch Me if You Can,‖ Conflict Awareness Project, August 2012, http://conflictawareness.org/wp-

content/uploads/2012/08/ConflictAwarenessProjectReport-13August2012.pdf (accessed 29 August 2013). 768

Danssaert and Finardi, 47-66, 97, 144; Stohl and Grillot, International,109. 769

Oxfam Case Study. ―Brokers without Borders. How illicit arms brokers can slip through gaps in the Pacific

and international arms control system,‖ 18 October 2010,

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/brokers-without-borders-report-181010.pdf (accessed 29

August 2013), 9-10; Nate Thayer.―The Front Companies Facilitating North Korean Arms Exports,‖ NK News

Org., 30 May 2013, http://www.nknews.org/2013/05/the-front-companies-facilitating-north-korean-arms-

exports/ (22 August 2013).

270

the sole director of the company. She was director of seventy eight similar companies, all of

which were located at the same mailing address in Auckland. The front company in New

Zealand contracted with a shelf company in Hong Kong to transport apparently ―oil industry

spare parts‖ from Pyongyang to Tehran. A bogus Spanish citizen living in Barcelona was

named as the director of the shelf company. This complex network served to conceal and

deceive. Those who were involved in the actual transport of the proscribed cargo and who set

up the web of front companies knew very little, if anything, about the real cargo. Under

existing international law, weapons merchants have few obligations to ensure their arms

supplies go to legitimate armies of states. Cargo carriers have little legal obligation to view

and confirm what their containers really hold. Registration of planes in a country far from

where they are actually based, using only an on-paper company and nominee directors, is

only one of many deception tactics using by arms traffickers.770

NSAs Fund their Arms Purchases

The third aspect of contemporary NSA arms trade is their involvement in the illicit trade of

goods. NSAs‘ finance issues are beyond the scope of the current research which briefly

discusses aspects of funding closely linked to NSAs‘ arming. Lacking state sponsorship and

facing expensive arms markets, contemporary NSAs are encouraged to collect fu

nds. They generate revenue from a wide range of sources, some of which are new and

facilitated by globalization.Hazen notes the greater the number of sources of support the NSA

can develop, the more options it has for accessing resources it needs, and the more adaptable

it can be when the flow of resources from any given actor changes. Globalization and global

trade have created new opportunities for NSAs‘ fundraising, critical for their arming.

Theycould also ignite internal dynamics and shape the strategies of NSAs.Armed NSAs that

control natural resources have their own source of income and are more independent and

powerful.771

From late 2013, the ISIS has seized control of the oil and gas fields in the north

and east of Syria, exporting the oil through middlemen overseas and allegedly to its major

foe, the Assad regime. But,in the most basic form, helpless civilians are the easiest target for

armed NSAs‘ fundraising. For example, a U.N. report about the Congo DR civil war notes

770

Andrew Koubaridis. ―Probe into Huge Arms Seizure,‖ The New Zealand Herald, 9 January 2010,

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/ news/article.cfm?c _id=1 &objectid= 10619216 (accessed 22 August 2013);

―Kiwi company linked to arms,‖ The New Zealand Herald, 20 September 2009, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/

nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10616608 (accessed 23 August 2013); Farah and Braun, 18, 40;

Danssaert and Finardi, ―Arms Flyers,‖ 93-94. 771

Hazen, Rebels, 179.

271

the M23 rebel group of east Congo has been generating income of around $180,000 a month

from taxes they exact from the population in the areas where they have been active.772

From the nineteenth century, fundraising among foreign diasporas has been a favorite

channel for NSAs to arm themselves. For example, since the outbreak of open war between

Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan state in 1983, the Tamil diaspora, estimated at

around one million people, has provided money for weapons. At the height of the conflict the

diaspora contributed an estimated $200 million a year to the Tigers. Money raised in North

America and Europe was often sent to operatives in Asia to procure weapons and other war-

related items. Fundraising was essential for the LTTE to sustain of a long civil war.

Following the 9/11 attacks the LTTE‘s international status deteriorated, since it was declared

a terrorist organization by many western countries, weakening the Tigers‘ ability to raise

funds. This has proved crucial in their demise. Many Tamils became reluctant to give to the

LTTE or its front groups for fear of being arrested on terrorism-related charges. Therefore,

the LTTE leadership faced growing difficulties to finance its activities including the purchase

of arms.773

The 2009 arrest of Selverasa Pathmanathan (KP) who ran the LTTE weapons

procurement and financial networks, had disastrous outcomes for the movement‘s financial

system because KP revealed the whereabouts of hundreds of LTTE overseas bank

accounts.774

Radical Islamic groups (such as Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Taliban) receive donations from

wealthy people in the Gulf region and Islamic charities working globally. These financial

NSAs have masked funding of terrorist activity as humanitarian relief (Dawa). Some funds

collected for charitable causes have eventually found their way into terrorist hands;

frequently the donors are unaware of the true nature of the recipients, though Zarate notesthat

the donors of al Qaeda demanded that their funds be leveraged specifically to launch

772

Louis Charbonneau and Michelle Nichols. ―Exclusive - Rwanda army officers aiding M23 rebels in Congo -

UN experts,‖ Reuters, 28 June 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/28/uk-congo-democratic-un-

idUKBRE95R0XA20130628(accessed 27 September 2013);; Ben Hubbard, Clifford Krauss and Eric

Schmittjan. ―Rebels in Syria Claim Control of Resources,‖ New York Times, 28January 2014,

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-control-of-

resources.html?_r=0(accessed 24 August 2014). 773

―NPA earned 'only' P26M in recent election racket — military,‖ Yahoo News, 22 May 2013,

http://ph.news.yahoo.com/npa-earned-only-p26m-recent-election-racket-military-074220390.html (28September

2013); Alexis Romero. ―More NPA surrenders in 2012 – military,‖ Philippines Star, 4 March

2013,http://www.philstar.com/headlines/ 2013/03/04/915722/more-npa-surrenderees-2012-military (accessed 28

September 2013); Sheridan, 14 September 2013. 774

International Crisis Group. ―The Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,‖ Asia Report 186, 23 February

2010,http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186%20The%20Sri%20Lankan% 20T

amil%20Diaspora%20after%20the%20LTTE.ashx (accessed 24 September 2013), 1-7.

272

significant attacks. Radical Muslim clericsauthorizedterrorist funding, calling it a holy war by

financial means (Al-Jihad bil-Mal).Exploiting lack of effective monitoring of funds and

foundations, extreme Islamic groups have used modern banking and wireless communication

as well as informal value transfer systems (the Hawala, money transfer without money

movement), discreetly channeling money for operations.775

For example, in early 2013 Saudi

Arabian authorities arrested the head of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation and other members.

They were accused of using charity funds to finance Al Qaeda terrorist activity including the

building of an SA-7 factory in Saudi Arabia for Al Qaeda in Iraq (in 2004 Al Haramain, the

largest Saudi Islamic charity, was outlawed by the Security Council due to its support of Al

Qaeda). Ongoing war with devastating humanitarian outcomes facilitates fund raising. Jabhat

al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant that wage war against the Assad regime,

raise funds through the social media, especially from wealthy people in Qatar and Kuwait.

They have smuggled money in cash across the Turkish-Syrian border in suitcases, using it to

purchase weapons.776

NSAs mobilize financial resources through criminal activities; some they execute

mainly by themselves while criminal elements associate with them in executing more

complicated activities. Bank robbery continues to be popular among rebel groups. The

National Popular Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Philippines Communist Party (CPP),

extorts politicians and business firms. Philippines authorities claimed in 2012 that the NPA

extorted more than $500,000 dollars, and from early 2013 they have collected around

$600,000 from local politicians during midterm elections, for ―permit-to-campaign‖ in areas

under their control.777

Globalization makes foreign citizens more vulnerable targets for

kidnapping for ransom along with locals. In 2012, the Under Secretary at the U.S.

Department of Treasury noted AQIM was likely profiting most from kidnapping for ransom,

collecting tens of millions of dollars through kidnapping for ransom operations since 2008.

The AQAP too has collected millions of dollars through such operations since 2009, and the

775

Juan Zarate, Treasury‟s War. The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare(New York: Public Affairs,

2013), 70-80; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.―Islamic Charity and Terrorism,‖ 2

September 2005,http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF1/MAR26_05_838717358.pdf (accessed 5

November 2013); Security Council. ―Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988,‖ 6

January 2012,http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTI15712E.shtml (accessed 5 November 2013). 776

Charles B. Bower. ―Hawala, Money Laundering, and Terrorism Finance: Mirco-Lending as an End to Illicit

Remittance,‖ Journal International Law and Policy 379 (2008-2009): 1-2, 8-9; ―Trial of terror suspects

continues,‖ Arab News, 27 March 2013,http://www.arabnews.com/news/446206 (accessed 5 November 2013). 777

―Abus got only P4M from us, says wife,‖ Global Nation, 25 March 2013,

http://globalnation.inquirer.net/70113/abu-sayyaf-only-got-p4m-not-p7m-says-aussie-kidnap-victims-

wife#ixzz2fxXeMjPG(accessed 26 September 2013).

273

Abu Sayyaf Group has raised kidnapping for ransom to a fine art, obtaining more than $2

million dollars in ransom payments since 2008.778

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is

well funded but exploits the presence of Western journalists, aid workers and doctors in Syria

for kidnappings forransom.779

In 2012, a Philippine research center claimed ninety percent of

ASG funding was sourced from kidnapping and extortion activities. Forging documents and

money and human trafficking are additional criminal activities popular among contemporary

NSAs.780

Links between criminality and arms smuggling are as old as the history of rebellion.

Rebels, terrorists and criminals have been fellow travelers in the underground, locked in what

Peters calls ―an increasingly symbiotic relationship.‖781

Still, classic drug smugglers are

driven by greed whereas militants‘ criminal activity is a means to an end. From the late

twentieth century, armed NSAs‘ deeper involvement in the narcotics trade has become a

significant development, making some of them very rich.782

According to the UN Office on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghan Taliban leadership is earning upwards of $200 million

annually from the drug trade. Hoffman calls it a ―strategic alliance‖ between criminal

organizations and terrorist and guerrilla organizations.783

Afghanistan is the world‘s largest

producer of opium; Colombia is the world‘s largest producer of coca derivatives (cocaine),

followed by Peru, and Myanmar is the world‘s third largest producer of illicit opium. All

feature powerful armed NSAs, benefitting from the drugs trade, sustaining long protracted

wars. Previously, armed NSAs‘ involvement in the drug trade was relatively limited; they

imposed taxes and protection payments on drug field peasants and drug traffickers, operating

in or through their territory. To increase their profits they have come to play a much more

778

Ashley Lindsey. ―In Syria, Militants Revive Kidnapping for Ransom,‖ Stratfor, 21 May 2014,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/syria-militants-revive-kidnapping-ransom#axzz3BJY8wcMZ(21 August 2014). 779

Department of the Treasury. ―Remarks of Under Secretary David Cohen at Chatham House on Kidnapping

for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge," 10 May 2012,http://www.treasury.gov/press-

center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx (29 September 2013). 780

―Abu Sayyaf relies on kidnapping to survive,‖ Inquirer News, 3 February 2012,

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/139107/abu-sayyaf-relies-on-kidnapping-to-survive (accessed 26 September 2013);

Leela Jacinto. ―What‘s in a name? Boko Haram gets a new terror title,‖ France 24, 15 November 2013,

http://www.france24.com/en/20131115-nigeria-boko-haram-terrorist-group-usa-implications-designation/(21

April 2014); Michele Kelemen. ―Syria's Moderate Rebels Fight A Battle On Two Fronts,‖ NPR, 4 November

2013,http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/11/04/242367909/syrias-moderate-rebels-fight-a-battle-on-two-

fronts (21 April 2014); 2014, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/syria-militants-revive-kidnapping-

ransom#axzz3BJY8wcMZ(21 August 2014). 781

Gretchen Peters,Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda(New York:

Macmillan, 2009). 782

CIA. The World Factbook.‖ Illicit Drugs,‖ https://www.cia.gov/ library/ publications/the-world-factbook/

fields/2086.html (accessede 28 September 2013); Hoffman,Inside Terrorism, 18. 783

Hoffman,Inside Terrorism, 18.CIA. The World Factbook.‖ Illicit Drugs,‖ https://www.cia.gov/ library/

publications/the-world-factbook/ fields/2086.html (accessede 28 September 2013).

274

pivotal role in the narcotics industry. Nowadays, they purchase weapons to protect their

economic assets and to fight government poppy-eradication teams.784

From the 1990s, the Colombian FARC began to deal directly with marijuana and coca

farmers, trafficking their products to the Colombian drug cartels. They also protected the

trade in their ―liberated zones‖ promising to liberate and protect peasants from exploitation

by the drug lords. FARC's estimated revenues from the cocaine trade were in the hundreds of

millions of dollars. Resources obtained through cocaine trafficking allowed FARC to acquire

plenty of weapons, escalating their level of operations. They possessed influence over the

Colombian government, obtaining, in 1999, a large territory, a ―demilitarized zone,‖ covering

forty percent of Colombia's territory. In the last decade, with strong American support, the

Colombian army inflicted serious setbacks on the FARC, but they are still a live threat.785

A number of scholars argue the FARC drug business has been exaggerated by the

Colombian government and the United States. Yet it is virtually impossible to separate the

drug trafficking from the activities of the insurgents and they acquire weapons to protect their

illegal economic assets. To illustrate, the FARC have permanent camps in northern Brazil

from where they traffic weapons into Colombia and cocaine into Brazil. Cragin and Hoffman

note that small single-engine charter planes transport weapons from Brazil, Paraguay and

Suriname into small airfields in FARC‘s demilitarized zone in Colombia. Drug traffickers use

these planes to smuggle drugs to North America.786

Furthermore, cargo planes carrying

drugs from South America have been intercepted in Mali and Guinea Bissau in recent years.

Traffickers transfer large parts of the drug shipments further to consumers in Europe, paying

784

Ran Morean. ―The Taliban‘s Life of Luxury,‖ Newsweek, 12 June 2013,http://www. thedailybeast.com/

newsweek/2013/06/12/the-taliban-s-new-role-as-afghanistan-s-drug-mafia.html (accessed 28 September

2013);―Afghan Sweep Seizes Weapons, Drugs,‖ CBCnews, 19 February

2011,http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/afghan-sweep-seizes-weapons-drugs-1.998393 (accessed 4 November

2013); Gretchen Peters, How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne

Books, 2009), 18. 785

Sayaka Fukumi, Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America. EU and US Policy Responses (Aldershot: Ashgate,

2008), 18, 101-110; Martin Gus, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 4th ed.

(London: SAGE, 2013), 214; ―Plan Colombia and the FARC,‖ Colombia Politics, 26 May 2013,http://www.

colombia-politics.com/plan-colombia-farc/ (accessed 27 September 2013); Vijay Sakhuja. ―Chaos in the

Littorals: An Overview of South Asia,‖ in Maritime Counter-Terrorism. A Pan-Asian Perspective, ed. Swati

Paraskam (New Delhi: Plarson Longman, 2008), 99;William Boot. ―Burma‘s Fastest Growing Business:

Drugs,‖ The Irrawaddy, 25 October 2012, http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/17275(accessed 27 September

2013); Morean, ―The Taliban‘s Life of Luxury.‖ 786

Cragin and Hoffman, 38;Nelza Oliveira. ―FARC trafficking drugs in Brazil, officials say,‖ Infosurhoy.com, 7

June 2010, http://infosurhoy.com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/main/2010/06/07/feature-02(accessed 24

September 2013), 18, 101-110; Fukumi, Cocaine, 18, 101-110; Marc Chernick. ―FARC-EP. From Liberal

Guerillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents,‖ in Terror, Insurgency and the State, Ending

Protracted Conflicts,eds. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 71-77.

275

tax for moving via AQIM territories (AQIM uses these revenues to buy Libyan weapons).

Unconfirmed reports claim the FARC is involved in this clandestine air-traffic to one of the

world‘s poorest and most lawless regions, trading cocaine and other drugs for weapons with

West African criminal networks and AQIM. In late 2010 the executive director of the

UNODC told a special session of the UN Security Council that drugs were being traded by

"terrorists and anti-government forces" to fund their operations from the Andes, to Asia and

the African Sahel. This phenomenon demonstrates how globalization creates new

opportunities for NSAs‘ arming.787

NSAs‘ intensive involvement in criminal activities could strongly affect their

structure and operational activity. When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan (1996-2001) they

relied heavily on opium for funding. After the Taliban‘s defeat in late 2001, opium played a

crucial role in the movement‘s resurgence in the 2000s, helping to rearm the ―new Taliban.‖

The Afghan Taliban‘s growing involvement in the drug business has taken many forms in all

aspects of the process: cultivation, refinement, and transportation, though the Taliban do not

control the Afghan drugs trade. The Taliban are part of multinational corporations drawing

together many diverse actors with divergent long-term objectives for a common purpose: the

generating of profit and the expansion of corporate power.788

Shaty calls them the ―network

of networks,‖ comprising local commanders, corrupt political officials and police (also in

Pakistan and Iran), farmers, local and international criminal groups, terrorists and insurgents.

They may have diverse motivations but they join an alliance which seeks to destabilize

Afghanistan, thwarting the government‘s efforts at reconstruction. The drug alliance serves

the Taliban‘s arming efforts, enabling them to fuel and intensify insurgency and terror in

Afghanistan. Drug smuggling corridors have been used by Al Qaeda and the Taliban to

transport militants and weapons to Afghan and Pakistan-based Islamist groups.789

Furthermore, in 2008, the United States arrested and indicted Haji Juma Khan, leader

of an international opium, morphine and heroin trafficking organization, based principally in

787

Joe Bavier.―UN: Drug smuggling on the rise in Africa,‖ IOL, 26 February

2013,http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/un-drug-smuggling-on-the-rise-in-africa-1.1476765#.UkUCulqN1jo

(accessed 27 September 2013); Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo. ―Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation network,‖

Reuters, 13 January 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/01/13/us-drugs-security-aviation-idUSTRE60

C3E820100113 (accessed 27 September 2013); Colin Fremeen. ―Revealed: how Saharan caravans of cocaine

help to fund al-Qaeda in terrorists' North African domain,‖ The Independent, 26 January 2013, http://www.

telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9829099/Revealed-how-Saharan-caravans-of-

cocaine-help-to-fund-al-Qaeda-in-terrorists-North-African-domain.html (accessed 27 September 2013). 788

Frank Shanty, The Nexus. International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan (Santa Barbara:

Praeger, 2011), 134-135. 789

Shanty, The Nexus, 134-135.

276

the Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan. He was financing the Taliban war

against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, in return for protection for the

organization‘s drug trafficking operations. Demonstrating the drugs traffickers‘ contribution

to the arming of NSAs, Time Magazine reported that Khan employed a fleet of cargo ships to

move Afghan heroin out of the Pakistan port of Karachi. At least three of these ships returned

from the UAE with plastic explosives and anti-tank mines which were secretly unloaded in

Karachi and sent overland to Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. Other reports claimed Khan

smuggled Iranian weapons including powerful explosives devices for the Afghan Taliban.790

Taliban‘s growing involvement in the drugs trade has organizational side effects, such as

reports about mistrust and internal competition over drugs spoils among high-level Taliban

officials and disputes between Taliban‘s leadership in Pakistan (the Quetta Shura),

controlling the drug money, and regional commanders in Afghanistan who were demanding

larger revenues. The drug businesses have intensified the Taliban‘s fragmentation; regional

commanders allegedly behave more like members of a criminal syndicate than a political

force. They run their own mobile labs and possess drugs stockpiles. Commentators argue that

they are committed mostly to fighting the government eradication teams.791

Simpler modes of illicit trade are still popular among NSAs. From antiquity NSAs

have traded the goods they harvested, hunted, produced or stole, for weapons. In recent years,

rebels in East and Central Africa (LRA of Uganda, Somalian Al-Shabaab, and Janjaweed of

Darfur) have raided wild nature reserves, willing to travel hundreds of miles from their

sanctuaries. Better armed than regular poachers, they are hunting down hundreds of elephants

and rhinos every year, trading their tusks for weapons with Arab and Asian traders. Their

ancestors acted similarly on a limited scale compared to the ongoing slaughter of these

animals even though the ivory trade is banned today. While in the nineteenth century ivory

was exported mainly to European markets now it is popular in China, Thailand and the Gulf

States following their economic growth.792

790

United States Attorney. Southern District of New York. ―United States of America V. Haji Juma Khan,‖ 21

April 2009,http://www.justice.gov/ usao/nys/pressreleases/April09/khanhajijumas2indictmentpr.pdf(accessed 4

November 2013). 791

Capie, Small Arms, 64; Tom Moreau. ―The Taliban‘s Life of Luxury,‖ Newsweek, 12 June

2013,http://mag.newsweek.com/2013/06/12/the-taliban-s-new-role-as-afghanistan-s-drug-mafia.html (accessed

28 October 2013); Tom Coghlan. ―The Taliban in Helmand,‖ in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the

Afghan Field, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 119-154; Shanty, Nexus,

146-151, 157-158, 162-163; Peters, 3-4, 104-127, 159-160. 792

Horand Knaup and Jan Pual. ―Blood Ivory: Brutal Elephant Slaughter Funds African Conflicts,‖ Spiegel

Online, 13 September 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/blood-ivory-brutal-elephant-slaughter-

277

The relationships between militants and criminals can evolve in various ways, which

could impact upon the ability of militant groups to gather arms. Armed NSAs could facilitate

drug traffickers‘ activities within their area of influence in return for serving operational

tasks. For example, for years Hezbollah has controlled drug cultivation and production sites

in the Beqaa Valley and south Lebanon, from where the drugs are shipped to Israel.

Hezbollah cooperates with Lebanese-Israeli drug networks, using them for operational

activity.793

In July 2012 a network of Israeli drug smugglers was exposed. As part of its

criminal activities, the network helped deliver twenty-five powerful C-4 explosive devices

from Lebanon to Israel apparently for Palestinian terror cells. The explosives were hidden in

the backyard of a drug dealer from Nazareth. Israeli security sources assume Hezbollah was

planning to use the explosives to launch a wave of terrorist attacks in Israeli territory.794

Weapons can be exchanged between armed NSAs and criminal networks. In 2012, a

Lebanese national was sentenced to twelve years in prison in the United States for conspiring

to supply stolen American weapons from Iraq to the FARC in return for more than one ton of

cocaine. His cousin, allegedly amember of Lebanese Hezbollah, shipped the arms (rifles,

machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and C-4 explosives) from Iraq, storing them in

Mexico.795

NSAsManufacture Weapons Use Explosives, IEDs and Suicide Bombing

Contemporary NSAs manufacture weapons

Unlike ancient and medieval NSAs, most contemporary armed NSAs are fighting largely

with weapons they have not manufactured but have acquired through outside aid and black

markets. They cannot produce modern weapon systems (such as artillery, tanks and ships)

due to limited technological knowledge, shortage of resources and infrastructures and

security considerations (they have to be mobile and the state could target their production

assets).Self-production of weapons became economically unprofitableas NSAs could easily

funds-african-conflicts-a-855237.html(accessed 23 September 2013); Steve Finch. ―An end to elephants in

Africa? Species at crisis point as illegal ivory trade grows rapidly,‖ The Independent, 6 March 2013,

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/an-end-to-elephants-in-africa-species-at-crisis-point-as-illegal-

ivory-trade-grows-rapidly-8523165.html(accessed 23 September 2013). 793

―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 71-73; O‘hern, Iran, 29. 794

―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 71-73. 795

―Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,‖ 71-73.

278

procure most of their armaments elsewhere, however many NSAs manufacture small arms

and ammunition and explosive devices, especially when waging a longstanding war.796

Only a few NSAs are involved in manufacturing larger weapon systems, which

involves much greater research and challenges related to production as well as security. They

enjoy sanctuary or control over territory where they can safely run production facilities.

These organizations feature stronger military profiles, centralized command, research and

production apparatus, skillful engineers, and logistic capabilities. They employ smuggling

and tactics of deceit to purchase and transport raw materials. One example is the Palestinian

militant groups in the Gaza Strip, discussed in the previous chapter, which established a

rocket production industry with Iranian support. The dense habitation in areas of the Gaza

Strip, especially in the refugee camps, provides a sanctuary for this military industry. Hamas

has used laboratories, students and staff members of the Faculty of Sciences at the Gaza

Islamic University for rocket production, smuggling raw materials for rocket production from

Egypt into Gaza through underground tunnels.797

India‘s huge territory and population serve as a cover for military infrastructures of

indigenous insurgency. In September 2006 the Andhra Pradesh police seized nearly 900

empty rocket-propelled grenades in two locations along with 27 launchers in gunny-bags.

These were produced by the Indian Maoist guerrillas (Naxal) in the southern Indian state of

Tamil Nadu and were smuggled by a private transport company into Naxal hideouts in the

Nallamalla forests of East India. A few months later in the same region, Indian police found a

dump with 270 rockets and launchers, with equipment to assemble another one hundred

rockets. Authorities claimed these weapons were produced at the same Naxal factories.798

In

2012, Indian authorities in Kolkata arrested the head of the Naxal technical committee who

allegedly revealed in his interrogation a large scale Maoist project to produce rockets in

different infrastructures across India. The Indian government argues that the Naxal are

796

Security Council, ―Letter dated 15 February 2013 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to

resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,‖ 9 March 2013,

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-

8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_99.pdf; ―The Quds Force,‖ 11. 797

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. ―The Islamic University in the Gaza Strip: An

Academic Institute 29 Controlled by Hamas, supported by external Sources including from western countries,‖

28 April 2010, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_10_090_1.pdf (accessed October 2013) (Hebrew). 798

―Naxals in possession of 600 rockets: Mastermind Techni Anna,‖ Mp MidDay, 2 January 2013,

http://www.mpmidday.com/madhya-pradesh/raipur/29215-naxals-in-possession-of-600-rockets-mastermind-

techni-anna.html(accessed 5 October 2013).

279

committed to becoming self-sufficient in regards to weaponry.799

In 2005, the Maoist

leadership established the Technical Research Arms Manufacturing Unit (TRAM), mandated

to manufacture and supply weaponry and to acquire and skills and technology. The Maoists

produce small arms, explosives, IEDs, and rockets.800

Lacking outside support, NSAs involved in more intensive warfare are facing greater

challenges to maintain their force. The main and most useful weapons of the Syrian rebels are

those stolen from Syrian army arsenals or units and those smuggled from Libya.Still, they

manufacture improvised weapons to fill major gaps in their armories. More than any other

current NSAs, the Free Syrian Army fighting the Assad regime from 2011 follows

longstanding patterns of arming by rebel groups. Not only have they practised the persistent

principle of field modification of arms, they also use ancient weapon systems. Syrian rebels

transform former civilian factories, sheds, warehouses, and even caves into makeshift

laboratories to manufacture a variety of improvised weapons from small arms, IEDs mortar

shells and RPGs to short range multiple rockets launchers, cannons and armored

vehicles.801

Mainly in Syria‘s north, rural communities serve as prime sites for the production

of weapons because of the ready availability of agricultural tools, equipment, and chemicals.

Former mechanics, government engineers, carpenters and plumbers are among the workers,

while boys are helping their fathers to mix explosive powder and to melt iron.802

Improvisation is a key point: they collect unexploded Syrian government bombs for

ammunition production, such as in a former steel and iron factory in Aleppo which is now

being used to produce mortar shells. They make rockets out of pieces of wood and lead, build

armored cars using corrugated iron, and make trebuchets from planks of wood and catapults

which are used to hurl fire bombs and missiles into enemy territory. Building weapons with

cheap materials implies giving fighters with limited means or limited access to traditional

799

Rajnish Sharma.―NIA: Naxals fine-tuning rocket-launcher tech,‖ The Asian Age, 7 June 2012,

http://archive.asianage.com/india/nia-naxals-fine-tuning-rocket-launcher-tech-612(accessed 5 October 2013). 800

Karn Kowshik and Jaya Menon.―900 rockets meant for AP Naxals seized, TN firm under the scanner,‖ The

Indian Express, 8 September 2006,http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/900-rockets-meant-for-ap-naxals-

seized-tn-firm-under-the-scanner/12284/ (accessed 5 October 2013); ―AP Police unearth Naxal arms dump,‖

The Indian Express, 17 March 2007,http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ap-police-unearth-naxal-arms-

dump/25879/ (accessed 5 October 2013). 801

Anna T. Day. ― Inside the Free Syrian Army‘s ‗Candy Factories,‘ the Secret Rebel Arms Workshops,‖ The

Daily Beast, 23 October 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/ articles/2012/10/23/ inside-the-free-syrian-army-

s-candy-factories-the-secret-rebel-arms-workshops.html(accessed 5 October 2013). 802

Jaymi Mccann.―The Syrian trebuchet: Rebels resort to Roman-style weapons in their bloody fight against

Assad's troops,‖ The Daily Mail, 26 July 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2378815/The-Syrian-

trebuchet-Rebel-fighters-resort-Roman-style-tactics-using-DIY-catapults-battle-Assad.html#ixzz2goVBT7W8

(accessed 5 October 2013).

280

infantry arms, an inexpensive way to fight. Yet, a united well-armed Syrian rebel army would

have more chance to overthrow the Assad regime.803

NSAs’ use of explosives, IEDs and suicide bombing

Homemade explosives are made in ad hoc laboratories without the required prerequisites to

make explosives to the high standards and levels of stability as those manufactured in an

official laboratory. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are explosives charges that are not

made in an official factory, implying for instance lower safe standards and usually less

explosive energy per weight of bomb. The weapons most commonly employed by NSAs

around the globe continue to be small arms and light weapons, but NSAs‘ use of remote-

controlled, booby-trap and suicide-activated explosive charges is perhaps the most important

development in NSAs‘ armament in modernity.804

As discussed in previous paragraphs, no

longer could NSAs imitate a state‘s weapons arsenal by themselves. IEDs enable them to

reduce their military inferiority against national armies. Rebellious NSAs cannot capture

territory or seize governments with explosives and bombs alone; they still need arms, yet, by

using explosives in terrorist and guerrilla attacks, they can irritate regular armies and instill

fear in the civilian population. Post-War World Two liberation movements used bombs too.

The strategy of current NSAs is heavily dependent on IEDs, which have become more

sophisticated and are now used efficiently against civilians and soldiers. Iraq is devastated by

the severity of constant suicide bombings against rival ethnic groups; the Pakistani

government can hardly contain the radical Islamic campaign of terror against the local

population; Al Qaeda Central and its branches threaten international transportation;

Hezbollah has demonstrated its capability to target Israeli interests overseas. These are but a

few examples of contemporary political and security issues fuelled by armed NSAs and their

use of explosives and bombs.805

Wilkinsonexplainsthat the more economically developed and

803

Erin Banco. ―Otugunned but Unbroken in Fight for Aleppo,‖ The Daily Beast, 18 August 2012,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/18/syrian-rebels-outgunned-but-unbroken-in-fight-for-

aleppo.html(accessed 17 October 2013); C.J. Chivers. ―Syrian Rebels Hone Bomb Skills to Even the Odds,‖

New York Times, 18 July 2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels-hone-

bomb-skills-military-analysis.html?_r=0 (accessed 24 October 2013). 804

Capie, Small Arms, 188. 805

Paul Wilkinson, ed. Technology and Terrorism (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012), 2; Capie, Small Arms,

188.

281

technologically sophisticated societies become, the more they inevitably present an

abundance of vulnerable terrorist targets within their infrastructure, central and local

government, and the industrial and business sectors. Modern technologies have created new

vulnerable ―key points‖ in all industrialized societies, including airports, airlines, railways,

government offices, and embassies. They are soft targets for NSAs using IEDs and suicide

bombing.806

Chapter three discusses initial use of high explosives in the second half of the

nineteenth century. Since the second half of the twentieth century armed NSAs have

intensively used IEDs to attack military and civilian targets. The IRA has been a pioneer in

the acquisition of military grade explosives (in the 1980s, Libya supplied them with the

powerful semtex), and smuggling of bomb components from the United States. This greatly

enhanced the IRAs‘ ability to construct undetectable and highly powerful IEDs. They adapted

the use of homemade weaponry and indigenous technologies, many of which became more

sophisticated and powerful from the late 1970s on, such as road mines targeting passing

British patrols; homemade mortar bombs and firing systems (for example the spectacular

1991 mortar attack at Downing Street, while a Cabinet meeting was in process) and

numerous bombs that contained hundreds of kilograms of homemade explosives, using

remote control and timing devices. The creation of these required considerable expertise.807

Explosives and bombs suit NSAs‘ strategy because they can be manufactured almost

anywhere and come in many forms, ranging from a small pipe bomb to a sophisticated device

capable of causing massive damage and loss of life. The only certain limits that can be placed

on the ability to construct and deploy IEDs, apart from the laws of physics and access to a

minimal amount of resources, are those of the human imagination itself. An Al Qaeda manual

from the 1990s explains: ―explosives are believed to be the safest weapon for the

Mujahideen. [Using explosives] allows them to get away from enemy personnel and to avoid

being arrested.‖808

According to Oxley, a ―bomb‖ is no longer a recognizable sphere or pipe,

nor does it necessarily need a blasting cap or squib. Every bottle or can of hair spray or

shaving cream, or even a vacuum bottle of coffee is a possible device.809

Explosive

production is relatively simple and does not require lengthy instruction. IEDs are easy to

806

Wilkinson, Technology and Terroris, 188. 807

Oppenheimer, IRA, 141, 162-171. 808

Intelligence Resource Program. ―Al Qaeda Training Manual. Lesson Fourteen: Kidnapping andAssassination,

Using Pistols and Rifles,‖ http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf (accessed 25 October 2013). 809

Jimmie C. Oxley. ―Non-Traditional Explosives: Potential Detection Problems‖ (Kingston: University of

Rhode Island), http://energetics.chm.uri .edu/ system/files/UKTERROR-1.pdf (accessed 24 October 2013), 20.

282

deploy, relatively cheap and have repeatedly proven to be highly effective. They enable

armed NSAs with minimal technological skills to successfully attack and harm their targets

or in the case of terrorism proper, to affect the psychological state, perceptions, and behavior

of the target audiences they are trying to influence. They might use a near simultaneous series

of bombings, involving secondary and tertiary explosions that are designed to kill bystanders

and emergency personnel. 810

Compared to standard weapon systems, NSAs can easily and legally purchase raw

material for explosives. They acquire agricultural fertilizers (ammonium nitrate and urea),

acids (sulfuric acid and nitric acid), and combustible chemicals (hydrogen peroxide, gasoline,

acetone and potassium chloride) on the open marketfrom local traders, some of whom are

members or supporters. All materials are frequently used in industry, agriculture,cosmetics

and medicine. Terrorists do not have a problem purchasing detonators, ignition equipment or

timing devices. Occasionally, they steal factory-made explosives and use mortar shells, RPG

rockets and grenades to make IEDs.Operationally, bombs enable terrorists and insurgents to

access valuable targets, without exposing their intentions or having to stay at the site of the

explosion. Explosive charges integrate within NSAs‘ doctrine of being mobile, flexible,

initiative and surprising. IEDs are difficult to identify, disarm or defuse. More than other

weapon systems, NSAs‘ use of explosives and IEDs is part of a cat and mouse game, move

and countermove; a process of mutual learning and adaptation. Every time security is

changed to adapt to a particular threat, the terrorist planner must come up with a new attack

plan (often involving a new type of improvised explosive device) to defeat the enhanced

security measures.811

For example, terrorist planners such as Imad Mughniyeh's team in

Lebanon adjusted to increased perimeter security at embassies and government buildings by

developing and deploying very large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Jihadist

810

Jeffrey M. Bale. ―Jihadist Cells and IED Capabilities Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the

West,‖ Strategic Studies Center (November 2012), http://www.google.co.nz/ url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=

1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil%2Fp

ubs%2Fdownload.cfm%3Fq%3D1134&ei=i_1lUsimF4yNkwW_x4GgCA&usg=AFQjCNGcQ3IfUeJtyKTK1cy

v7YbFqDHxHg(accessed 22 October 2013),5-6, 10, 15; Bruce Hoffman. ―Low-intensity Conflict: Terrorism

and Guerrilla Warfare in the Coming Decades,‖ in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Howard Lawrence

(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 144. 811

Committee on Homeland Security. House of Representatives. ―Security Handling of Ammonium Nitrate, ―

H.R. 3197, 14 December 2005, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg35932/html/CHRG-

109hhrg35932.htm(accessed 24 October 2013); Scott Stewart. ―Intelligence Briefing: The Role of IEDs in

Terrorism,‖Stratfor.com, 28 May 2013,http://www.billoreilly.com/

site/rd?satype=13&said=12&url=%2Fb%2FIntelligence-Briefing%3A-The-Role-of-IEDs-in-

Terrorism%2F898313665552307630.html(accessed 30 October 2013).

283

planners have responded to changes in airline security measures by adopting baby doll

bombs, shoe bombs, liquid bombs and underwear bombs.812

The effectiveness of explosives has improved dramatically from the early 1980s when

the Hezbollah launched its first suicide attacks against Israeli and western targets in Lebanon.

Suicide activity is defined as an attack during which the terrorist reaches his/her objective or

its vicinity carrying or wearing an explosive device which he/she is supposed to detonate to

blow him/her up.813

Mainly from the early 1990s, Hezbollah was a role model for other

NSAs– the Palestinian terror groups (Islamic and national), radical Islamic groups (Algerian,

Egyptian and Chechen) and sectarian NSAs such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the

PKK in Turkey. They all adopted the suicide weapon, executing suicide attacks to cause

greater harm in comparison to other types of terrorism, to gain a psychological advantage or

as a result of contest between fellow organizations. Being an extreme tactic, suicide attacks

enable NSA access to highly secure targets inflicting massive damage, something they could

never achieve by conventional means.814

Referring to the London bombing, Ayman Al

Zawahiri, the current leader of Al Qaeda, noted one of the major strengths of suicide

bombing tactics: ―like its glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid, this

blessed battle has transferred the battle to the enemies' land."815

Globalization facilitates

terrorists‘ accessibility to the heartland of their enemies. Suicide bombing terrorism has

become a ―strategic weapon,‖ due to its lethal ability to cause terrible destruction, its great

public and media impact, its ability to disrupt daily life and the relative ease with which it can

be funded and carried out. One of the advantages of suicide bombing is that it is difficult to

deter a person who has decided to die anyway – so guarding against them is very difficult, the

guard himself will certainly die if he intercepts the bomber. Armed NSAs, considering

themselves the weaker side of the confrontation, represent the use of suicide bombing

terrorism as the best response to governments‘ military superiority. In fact, NSAs are

physically militarily weaker than states but analysis of relative military strength in any

conflict should take into consideration many non-physical factors as well, such as national

812

Scott Stewart, ―Terrorism and the Exceptional Individual,‖ Startfor, 17 May 2012,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/terrorism-and-exceptional-individual#axzz3OSw0pEAR (accessed 11 January

2015). 813

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.).―Suicide Bombing

Terrorism during the current Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation (September 2000- December 2005), 1 January

2006,http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_19279_2.pdf (accessed 28 October 2013), 6. 814

Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 54, 62-63, 90-95, 101-102. 815

Alan Cowel. ―Al Jazeera Video Links London Bombings to Al Qaeda,‖ The New York Times, 2 September

2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/02/international/europe/02london.html?_r=0 (accessed 26 October

2013).

284

solidarity, culture, sustainability (including sensitivity to war casualties), morale of the

fighters and the civilians, geography and intelligence capabilities, which can balance

inferiority in weaponry or numbers. 816

Suicide terror and guerrilla attacksare a long-established phenomenon with roots back

in antiquity, the most famous users being the medieval Nizari Ismaili sect (popularly known

as 'Hashshashin') as it struggled to survive against the Sunni majority, and Al-Qaeda is not

the only NSA that has been using suicide bombers. Influenced by Abdullah Azzam, the

theoretician of global Jihad, radical Islamists regard suicide bombing as martyrdom

(Istishhad), the ultimate form of devotion to God, and the peak of Jihad. From the late 1990s,

the intensive use of suicide bombers, the large scale of devastating terror attacks using

complex devices and mainly the transnational profile of Al Qaeda have made terrorism more

lethal. In 2013, Al Qaeda central and global jihad organizations were responsible for the

majority of 291 suicide bombings around the world (a 25 percent increase in the number of

attacks compared to 230 in 2012).817

In his book, ―Knights under the Prophet‘s Banner,‖

Ayman Al Zawahiri explains the background and strength of the suicide bombing weapon:

The Mujahid Islamic movement must escalate its methods of strikes and tools of

resisting the enemies to keep up with the tremendous increase in the number of its

enemies, the quality of their weapons, their destructive powers… the need to

inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent… the need to concentrate on

the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting

damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in terms of

casualties.818

Al Qaeda‘s suicide terror and guerrilla attacks best demonstrate NSAs‘ attempts to

reduce the level of military inferiority by using a weapon which is very hard to dismantle

rather than acquiring standard weapons or neutralizing systems (such as anti-tank missiles).

Unlike classic guerrilla doctrine, suicide terror and guerrilla attacks are not committed to

preserve insurgents‘ life; on the contrary – what is important is the relative payoff: how much

damage has been caused in return for the martyr's life.

Globalization has facilitated the proliferation of bombs making skills. From 1996,

more than 20,000 Islamic militants from across the world have participated in military

816

―Suicide Bombing Terrorism during the current Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation,‖ 30. 817

Rosner , Yogev and Schweitzer, ―Dying,‖1; Mohammed M. Hafez. ―Dying to be Martyrs. The Symbolic

dimension of Suicide Terrorism,‖ in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism. The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed.

Ami Pedahzur. (London: Routledge, 2006), 54-80. 818

Laura Mansfield, trans., His Own Words. A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri (Old

Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2006), 222-223.

285

training, including bomb making, in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Federally

Administrative Tribal Area (FATA), as part of Osama bin Laden‘s vision to create an

international Jihad corps. Many have a cosmopolitan background as they have been living in

a country other than the one in which they were raised. Al Qaeda has used the more trusted,

skillful and western passport holders to execute spectacular suicide attacks.819

Multinational Islamic militants‘ networks are spreading explosive skills across the

world, facilitating collaboration in terror plots, introducing Pakistan as an important hub.

Composed of skilled and motivated ideologues willing to die, these transnational Islamist

networks have empowered explosives threats. More than other weapon systems, explosives

skills are diffusional, as textbooks, manuals and videos are available through the internet, and

more than other organizations Al Qaeda is using these special features of explosives. It is

now possible for individuals all over the world to access the Internet and find information

about how to obtain chemicals and other materials needed for making IEDs.820

In early 2013,

Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan first published detailed online terrorist guidance in English

(―the explosive course‖). Allegedly written by senior explosive experts (some of whom have

since been killed), using tables and diagrams, the book explains how to acquire and

manufacture explosives and how to prepare a variety of IEDs (the editor notes that more

books on the subject will be published).821

The AQAP also publishes an online English

magazine, ―Inspire‖ which teaches bomb manufacturing. Revolutionary guerrilla

commanders of the twentieth century have written manuals, read by guerrillas across the

world, but globalization greatly facilitates proliferation of homemade explosives knowledge,

though as Pale explains, information about building explosive devices found on the Internet

cannot normally be a substitute for obtaining hands-on bomb making training from experts,

followed by frequent practice of the lessons learned. In a few cases, Pakistani-based Al

819

―Pakistan: Osama Bin Laden Urges Muslims to Launch Suicide Attacks against United States,‖

IslamabadAusof in Urdo, 3 April 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf(accessed 26 October

2013), 256; Thomas Hegghammer. ―Abdalla Azzam. The Imam of Jihad,‖ in Al Qaeda in its own Words, eds.

Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 100-101; Wright,

Destruction, 304; Assaf Malich. ―Abdallah Azam, Hamas and Al Qaeda. Concepts of Jihad and Istishhad,‖

Military and Strategic Affairs 2, no. 2 (October 2010), 81-93. 820

Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis. ―Evolving terrorists tactics, techniques, and Procedures,‖

Special Report, no. 7,http://terror-mirror.com/books/ etrrep014.pdf (accessed 19 October 2013), 14-19; Ami

Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 8-20, 79, 90-102; Institute for Near East and Gulf

Military Analysis. ―Evolving terrorists tactics, techniques, and Procedures,‖ Special Report, no. 7,http://terror-

mirror.com/books/ etrrep014.pdf (accessed 19 October 2013), 14-19;; Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 8-20, 79, 90-102. 821

Abu-Habbab al Misri, The Explosives Course (Al Qaeda Global Publisher, 2010),

http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/ 2011/01/shaykh-abc5ab-khabbab-al-mie1b9a3rc4ab-the-explosives-course.pdf

(accessed 22 October 2013), 17.

286

Qaeda bombs experts communicated with terrorists located at target states, guiding them in

solving technical problems. The combination of deadly explosives, suicide bombers and

transnational networks has enabled Islamic armed NSAs to launch spectacular terror attacks,

some of which have had strategic implications.822

Analysis of spectacular terror attacks and foiled terror plans reveals how easy it is for

NSAs to acquire and smuggle explosives and devices. To illustrate, on 7 July 2005 four

British citizens of Pakistani and Jamaican descent launched suicide attacks on a London

Underground train and a double-decker bus, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700.

The 7/7 duo were recruited, trained and directed by an Al Qaeda senior operational activist,

Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Kashmiri descent living in Pakistan since 2002, involved in

many terror plots, and killed in November 2008 by the Americans in Waziristan. They used a

two-bedroom flat in Leeds as a bomb factory. As instructed from Pakistan, they made bombs

from a unique mixture of hydrogen peroxide distilled by boiling down hair products, and an

organic material – black paper. Using codes, Rauf helped them to work through the technical

difficulties with the hydrogen peroxide. The detonators were made from hexamine tablets

from camping stoves and a light bulb. The terrorists purchased large amounts of the

chemicals in the months before the attack in a beauty supply shop and a gardening store.

They spent just five hundred pounds on hydrogen peroxide. None of the vendors raised

concerns about why the men wanted so much.823

Lady Justice Hallet, the coroner at the

inquests, noted: ―you get cross-examined by the chemist if you want to buy too many aspirin,

but you can buy as much hydrogen peroxide on the market.‖ On the morning of the attack,

the terrorists traveled to London by train, carrying the explosive charges in breathable

Goretex bags for security.824

NSAs acquire explosives and other ingredients for bombs using similar tactics of arms

acquisition. Being inexpensive, easy to make and devilishly hard to detect, the fertilizer

822

AQAP, Inspire 26 (Summer 2010), https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-inspire-magazine-

volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf. (accessed 7 October 2013). 823

Duncan Gordham. ―We have never seen a bomb like 21/7 devices,‘‖ The Telegraph, 11 July

2007,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557106/Weve-never-seen-a-bomb-like-217-devices.html

(accessedes 7 October 2013); Karen McVeigh.―July 7 bomb factory revealed at inquest.‖ The Guardian, 1

February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/01/july7-uksecurity(accessed 7 October 2013); Nic

Robertson Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister.―Documents give new details on al Qaeda's London bombings,‖

CNN, 30 April 2012,http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/index.html

(accessed 7 October 2013); Raffaello Pantucci.―A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida‘s British Operative,‖

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 24 July 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-biography-of-

rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative (accessed 7 October 2013). 824

―7/7 inquests: Coroner warns over bomb ingredient,‖ BBC, 1 February 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-

12337575(accessed 15 October 2013).

287

ammonium nitrate is perhaps the most favored explosive among NSAs.They acquire this and

other fertilizers (UREA), exploiting the intensive agriculture use of fertilizers. NSAs like the

Hezbollah enjoy state sponsorship and possess military grade explosives such as TNT and C-

4.825

Other NSAs, such as the Maoist guerrillas of India (Naxals) and the Colombian FARC,

are stealing from mining companies, hijacking trucks carrying ammonium nitrate, raiding

mining facilities to plunder explosives and detonators, and exploiting illegal mining to get

explosives.826

Thus, mines are a favorite place to steal or purchase standard explosives for

terrorism. The perpetrators of the Madrid bombings (March 11, 2004) associated with native

Spanish criminals, traded drugs for dynamite stolen from a mine in northern Spain (200 kg of

dynamite was exchanged for 35 kg of hashish). The terrorists, mostly Moroccans living in

Spain and linked to Al Qaeda, detonated ten bombs hidden in sports bags on four commuter

trains at the height of the morning rush hour in Madrid, killing 191 people and wounding

1,700.827

Armed NSAs‘ use of specific explosives is linked to their mode of arming. On

October 12, 2002 two suicide bombers of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiya (one of them

driving a car bomb) attacked nightclubs in the touristic district of Kuta on the Indonesian

island of Bali, killing 202 people, mostly tourists, including 88 Australians. It was the

deadliest act of terrorism in the history of Indonesia. The bombs were made of TNT,

operating as a booster for the homemade explosive mixture of potassium chloride, aluminum

powder and sulfur. TNT, a military-grade explosive, is harder to acquire, while the other

chemicals are common in industry. Therefore, the Jemaah Islamiyah used their ties to the

southern Philippines, to purchase TNT from a local mine, smuggling it into Indonesia.

Hastings explains that archipelagos are laced with tiny islands ideal for hiding boats and

illicit goods, and the terrorists enjoyed relative freedom of movement in Java and Bali.828

The

terror infrastructure easily purchased (September 2002) the other ingredients for the bombs at

a chemical store in East Java. Feeling secure, they sent the chemicals in unaccompanied

825

Suhas Chakma. ―Mining and Arming of the Maoists,‖ India Human Rights Report Quarterly, no. 1 (July-

September 2010), http://www.achrweb.org/ihrrq/issue1/mining.html (accessed 15 October 2013) 6-11. 826

Aislinn Laing Sean Rayment and Mehdi Meddeb. ―Al-Qaeda explosive used in Marrakesh bomb,

investigators reveal, as family mourns slain Briton,‖ The Telegraph, 18 October

2013,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/africaandindianocean/morocco/8485666/Al-Qaeda-

explosive-used-in-Marrakesh-bomb-investigators-reveal-as-family-mourns-slain-Briton.html (accessed 18

October 2013); Oxley, ―Non-Traditional,‖6. 827

US Department of Defense. ―Charge against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani,‖ 31 March 2008, http://www.

defense. gov/news/d20080328ghailani1.pdf (accessed 9 October 2013); Benjamin Weiser. ―Witness in 1998

Bombings is Identified at a Hearing,‖ The New York Times, 19 September 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/

2010/09/20/nyregion/20ghailani.html?_r=0 (accessed 9 October 2013). 828

Hastings, No Man, 96-103.

288

baggage by regular courier service from East Java to Bali where they made the bomb and

prepared the car bomb. Originally, the Jemaah Islamiyah planned to purchase five to seven

tons of TNT in the Philippines for spectacular terror attacks in Singapore but were

intercepted. For their next terror attacks in Indonesia (such as the suicide attacks against

western hotels in Jakarta in 2003 and 2009) they used improvised explosives.829

As with arms production, NSAs which possess a base area could operate more

established explosives laboratories and IED factories in residential areas (farms, flats and

mosques), and industrial areas as well as remote camps in forests and mountains.Jihadi

groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, Al Shabaab in Somalia, AQIM in

Algeria, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, operate such infrastructures. They use unexploded

ordnance (artillery shells) and ammonium nitrate to produce mines, hand grenades, explosive

belts, vests, bags, road side bombs, pipe bombs, and booby-traps. In one of these factories in

Yemen, Ibrahim al Asiri, AQAP explosive mastermind, has in recent years built sophisticated

bombs to attack American targets. Asiri, a Saudi national and a former chemistry student,

used PETN, a plastic explosive hard to detect by security.830

On December 25, 2009

(Christmas Day) Umar Farouq Abdulmtallan, a Nigerian citizen, attempted to detonate a

device hidden in his underwear on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit but it failed to detonate

properly and he was arrested.831

In 2010, AQAP smuggled two devices hidden in ink toner

cartridges on planes bound from Yemen to the United States, which were intended to

detonate in mid-air. PETN explosives were inserted in place of the organic material inside the

toner cartridges, which explains why the X-ray equipment did not detect anything unusual.

One device got as far as the UK, East Midlands airport; another reached Dubai airport. The

plot was thwarted at the last minute by a tip-off from a Saudi informer inside AQAP, but the

group has promised to keep trying.832

Bomb makers of Al Qaeda invest a great deal of

thought and effort into designing and camouflaging of the IEDs; for example by the use of an

illuminated picture frame for the IED casing or booby-trapped video tape. Owing to these

efforts, terrorists have been able to penetrate security perimeters and pass undetected through

rigorous security checks. Moreover, the AQAP is allegedly testing the use of a suicide

829

N. C. Asthana and Anjali Nirmal, Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities (Chaura Rasta: Pointer Publishers,

2009), 263. 830

Michael Andrews and Colin Freeman. ―Yemen's hunt for master bomber Ibrahim al-Asiri,‖ The Telegraph,

10 August 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/10235147/Yemens-hunt-for-master-

bomber-Ibrahim-al-Asiri.html(accessed 12 October 2013). 831

―Why al-Qaeda in Yemen scares the West,‖ BBC, 6 August 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-

east-23593126 (accessed 12 October 2013). 832

―Why al-Qaeda in Yemen scares the West,‖ BBC.

289

bomber, carrying a bomb inside his body, in what might be a new phase in NSAs‘

armament.833

In 2009, AQAP‘s Al-Ashiri developed an IED that was inserted into the anal crevice

of his brother Abdullah in an attempt to kill Saudi Arabian Deputy Interior Minister, Prince

Mohammed Bin Nayef, the leader of the Saudi effort to break al Qaeda‘s base in the

kingdom. The bomb detonated, killing Abdullah, but not Prince Mohammed. Militants

carrying weapons are one fighting system composed of separate components, while terrorists

carrying bombs inside their bodies might demonstrate something new; a complete integration

between man and a weapon. 834

NSAs could use suicide bombing tactics without explosives. The Al Qaeda attack

on the United States (9/11, almost 3,000 people killed), the largest terror attack in modern

times, was executed without conventional weapons or explosives, therefore having significant

implications on the theory of NSAs arming. In light of NSAs‘ difficulties launching a direct

attack using conventional weapons on enemy soil, the 9/11 event demonstrates NSA seizing

an enemy asset and turning it into a deadly weapon. It is similar, but more sophisticated and

lethal, than hijacking or blowing up a plane in flight or using a vehicle to drive over

pedestrians. Causing death on a grand scale was a goal in itself. Al Qaeda attacks on the

World Trade Center and the Pentagon haveredefinedwhat is a weapon system. Al Qaeda

spent roughly half a million dollars to destroy the World Trade Center and cripple the

Pentagon, causing damage worth several trillion dollars, illustrating a major advantage of the

suicide terrorists‘ weaponry – it is both cheap and lethal.835

The intensive use of IEDs and suicide terrorism in recent decades by many NSAs has

introduced new security challenge for states and governments. Reviewing states-NSAs wars

(for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Chechnya, Sri Lanka and the war against

transnational terrorism), reveals states are using a wide range of countermeasures, defensive

and offensive, to prevent and foilwhich differs in extent, effectiveness and success. Countries

have tightened security measures in airports, flights, ports, embassies and other government

833

―Why al-Qaeda in Yemen scares the West,‖ BBC. 834

―Preparation of Camouflaged IEDs by Al-Qaeda in Yemen,‖ Detonator Magazine (May-June 2013),

http://www.mlppubsonline.com/display_article.php?id=1454525&_width= (accessed 19 October 2013). 835

Lauren B. O‘Brien. ―The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11,‖ FBI, September 2011,

http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/the-evolution-of-

terrorism-since-9-11(4 November 2013); Lindsay Blakely. ―Cost of 9/11 in dollars,‖ CBS, 8 September

2011,http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57292565/cost-of-911-in-dollars/ (accessed 6 November

2013).

290

and public buildings. They have attempted to better monitor movement of people and

commodities across their borders.836

To better combat domestic terror, some states changed

their laws, granting law enforcement agencies more leverage for intelligence gathering and

investigating. In some states, trade of weapons, chemicals and fertilizers is under strict

regulation. To reduce and block terrorists‘ and insurgents‘ mobility, security forces are

intensively patrolling and barricading and new outposts and roads have been constructed; a

number of states even built fences. Countries strengthened and re-organized security agencies

with the goal of improving readiness and cooperation.837

More than before governments are

sharing information and cooperating on the ―global war on terrorism.‖ While these measures

and many others have enabled governments to foil many terror plans and improve security,

determined suicide bombers are hard to stop, particularly in democracies. In this context,

joint anti-trafficking efforts have significantly increased since the 9/11 terrorist attacks

mainly on a bilateral and national basis. Multilateral initiatives by the United Nations to

reduce arming of NSAs are still limited in scope and less effective.838

Improving tactical and operational intelligence and development of advanced

intelligence technologies are key points in the war against terror. Offensive tactics, based on

accurate intelligence collected by governments, include arrest or ―targeted assassinations" of

terrorists of different ranks, both domestically and across the borders. Launching special

operations and employing accurate fire, they dismantle terror infrastructures including

headquarters and command networks, explosives labs, arms caches, arms shipments and

training facilities, as well as making an effort to dry up NSAs‘ financial sources. Extreme

counter-terror measures might include waging conventional wars against armed NSAs

sanctuaries, deploying large numbers of troops, seizing territories for long time and relocating

the civilian population to isolate insurgents and terrorists. States‘ armies differ in their

success in defeating terror, and many governments have acknowledged complete solutions to

conflict with NSAs should be reached by political means.839

Summary

836

Yaacov Amidror, The Art of Intelligence (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 2006), 79-91, 119-122 (Hebrew). 837

Capie, Small Arms, 199-200.

838

Yaacov Amidror, The Art of Intelligence (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 2006), 79-91, 119-122 (Hebrew);

David Kilcullen. ―Taliban and Counter-Insurgency in Kunar,‖ in Decoding the New Taliban: Insight from

theAfghan Field, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 235-244; Capie, Small

Arms, 199-200. 839

Amidror, Intelligence, 79-91.

291

This chapter reviewed two major mechanisms used by contemporary armed NSAs to

decrease their military imbalance with governments and states. First, they employ an

asymmetrical strategy, making and intensively using IEDs against military and civilian

targets. Some armed NSAs are trying to defeat governments by attacking the home front. In

particular, the suicide bombings of Jihadist terrorist groups are a powerful murderous weapon

against stronger forces, integrating religious fundamentalism, transnational organization, and

improvised devices. Still, suicide bombing could cause overwhelming counter effects for

NSAs using terror tactics.

The second mechanism is acquisition of weapons through black arms markets, enabling

NSAs to sustain wars against governments and occasionally defeat them. The weapons,

mostly small arms, are the surplus from former wars or looting from destabilized countries,

transported across the world by networks of smugglers and arms dealers, integrating both

features of globalization and old traditions. Armed NSAs play an important role in the illicit

global trade of goods, mainly narcotics, assisting to build up their force. They are integrated

into arms smuggling networks that function as Federation of Systems (FOS). These entities

are transnational, borderless, and flexible enjoying strong logistic and financial backup. The

Arab turmoil has escalated the activity of these FOS, creating new opportunities for

acquisition of weapons and smuggling. The divided international community has no chance

of disrupting the smuggling FOS.

Thus, Smith and Van Creveld are focused on analyzing the weakness of the West,

underestimating the military advantages of contemporary NSAs. They are too committed to

the concept of a mighty army that faces great difficulties in defeating a small armed group.

Some NSAs that are discussed in this chapter are well-funded, better equipped and organized

than the incompetent state armies that fight them such as in Mali, Nigeria and Yemen. Many

attributes of contemporary state-NSA wars reflect Smith‘s model of ―war amongst the

people.‖ Western armies are involved in timeless conflicts, fighting so as not to lose their

force, often in multinational groupings. Still, as this chapter reveals, this is only part of the

picture because many non-western armies have fought armed NSAs and achieved absolute

victory (Sri Lanka) or suffered defeat (Sudan). A more comprehensive approach is needed.

NSAs can sustain ―timeless‖ conflict as long as the borders of the state are porous and

neighboring countries are lawless or supportive.840

840

Smith, Utility of the Force, 17.

292

The outcomes of state-NSA wars are affected by a variety of factors far beyond

weaponry, such as international intervention, strength of government, unity of rebels and

their success in mobilizing the people. The new developments in NSAs‘ arming highlight the

need for a comprehensive theory that would address the military buildup of present NSAs.

The final chapter of the thesis offers such a theory.

Chapter Eight:A Theory of Non-States-Actors’ Arming

The thesis focuses on a research problem – that armed NSAs play an important role in

domestic and international politics but neither their arming methods, nor the factors that

shape these methods, are clear. Present explanations are incomplete becausethey address

partial aspects of the problem, such as discussing arms smuggling and activities of NSAs

separately. The thesis deals with the process of the buildup of NSAs‘ force, the action of arms

smuggling, and the interaction between NSAs and their geo-strategic environments. The

outcome is a theory about NSAs‘ arming, grounded in comprehensive data from the history

of rebellions, though information on ancient rebels is limited. The project has value because it

provides a comprehensive account of NSAs‘ arming over different times, and a holistic

explanation of factors facilitating and constraining smuggling activities of diverse NSAs all

over the world. The theory of arming of NSAs offers generic phases and principles

characterizing past and present NSAs and probably the NSAs of the near future.

This chapter‘s goal is to condense the data presented in previous chapters into a small

set of categories that explain how NSAs build up their force. The first part of the chapter

conceptualizes methods NSAs have used to acquire weapons, and the causal background: this

segment is the center of the theoretical explanation of NSAs‘ arming. The chapter proceeds

with a debate on the outcomes of the research in light of theories of globalization and

classical models of guerrilla warfare. Finally, future trends of NSAs‘ choice and acquisition

of weaponry are suggested.

The thesis focuses on NSAs‘ arming and smuggling operations. Guevara noted that

―without arms it is of no use to speak of organizing an army and of waging armed

struggle841

‖ Still, acquiring and transporting weapons are only first steps in the process of

military buildup. NSAs store the weapons they acquire in hideouts which could present

difficulties for large and sensitive weapon systems. As demonstrated through the research,

841

Guevara, Che Guevara,134.

293

many weapons caches have been discovered by government forces. Acquiring new and

complicated systems, rebels are obliged to recruit professional instructors otherwise the

weapons would be useless. In extreme situations, smuggled weapons were not used at all

either because they did not address NSAs‘ operational needs or because of political-security

considerations, such as fear of the state‘s counter-action. Failing to acquire weapons in one

way or another NSAs were likely to be defeated, but this did not always happen. The arming

dimension could be neutralized by powerful external factors, such as the strength and policy

of the state‘s army. The history of revolts reveals that neutralization of the national army and

mobilization of some military units in favor of the rebels secured the successes of the rebels

even when unarmed, such as in the French Revolution of 1830, the Islamic Revolution in Iran

in 1979 and the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.

NSAs have Built up their Military Force along Similar Paths

Rebellious NSAs have been a persistent phenomenon from ancient times. There were always

those who revolted and took up arms against central rule. Beyond weaponry, rebellious NSAs

win wars because of effective and united leadership, an efficient operational approach,

support of the local population, and in modern times,the world media‘s sympathy. Weapons

are not necessarily the most important factor but rebels need weapons to fight. Usually

revolts erupt after the organizers acquire some weapons while many revolts lose their

momentum, and operations are ineffective due to shortages of arms and ammunition. The

history of rebellions tells the story of revolts which almost died out due to shortage of

weapons, such as when American Patriots used wooden bullets against the Imperial Army

and when the Irish Volunteers in the early twentieth century practised with pikes because the

British blocked arms smuggling routes from Europe into Ireland. NSAs‘ armament has been

vital for the buildup of their force that has enabled both the employment of that force and

sustainability.

This study questions how NSAs have acquired their weaponry through the history of

rebellion and examines the differences between past and present methods of arming of rebel

groups. Empirical evidence reveals both continuity and changes in different time periods. In

spite of dramatic political and technological changes, rebel groups in different periods have

employed similar methods to acquire weapons. Self-production, looting and stealing, external

support and arms trade were always the major methods for NSAs to acquire weapons, though

the importance of each method and the type of arms changed remarkably overtime(Figure3,

294

p. 293). The methods of arming have remained largely unchanged while the content, the

weapons themselves and technologies, have changed.

Self-production of weapons. This was the most reliable method of acquiring weapons

because NSAs could rely on their own efforts, but nowadays it is the hardest to achieve,

especially where advanced conventional weapons systems are wanted. Rebels who

manufacture their own weaponry are more independent, and capable of securing large

stockpiles. In antiquity, self-production was the rule while today only NSAs that lack external

support are motivated to use this method, manufacturing improvised weapons to fill major

gaps in their armories. In recent decades, self-production has become increasingly vital for

the arming of rebellious NSAs due to the intensive and efficient use of IEDs by contemporary

NSAs. Self-production could be a cheaper method of arming, as well as safer as acquisition

of components and raw materials can be made through legitimate outlets. At the same time,

NSAs‘homemade conventional weapons and explosives could be less effective because

NSAs have limited resources (funds and technology) and they need to improvise. Larger

weapons systems like rockets are produced in immobile infrastructures that could be easy

targets for the security forces of the state, mainly by aerial strikes. Furthermore, more

295

sophisticated weapons, such as guided missiles, cannot be manufactured in improvised

workshops. From antiquity, rebel groups have recruited foreign military experts and sent

operatives overseas for technological training, helping to establish weapons factories.

Stealing and looting. Living off the enemy is the most popular and one of the oldest methods

of arming of NSAs. It is also the major manifestation of a conflict between well-armed

regular armies and rebel groups with limited resources. Rebels can loot the army of the

country they are fighting, stealing from their arms depots as well as buying weapons from

corrupt government officials and military men. Also, soldiers who defect carry their guns

with them, and friendly service men can assist rebels to acquire weapons. Struggling to arm

themselves, NSAs engage the state armies mainly to capture booty. Demoralized armies were

always a good source of weapons for NSAs, whether it was the Chinese imperial army

fighting Vietnamese guerrillas in the fifteenth century or the Ethiopian army fighting Eritrean

insurgents in the late twentieth century. In the life circle of a weapon system, it could be

looted in different stages: production, distribution, storage, operation and as war surplus.

Capturing states‘ weapons could be part of a special operation of an NSA with a

psychological effect which is more important than the weapons themselves. In the 1940s,

Mao Tse Tung called this method ―self-reliance‖ and claimed that Washington was the

weapons source of the Chinese Communist guerrilla s, and that Chiang Kaishek, the leader of

the Nationalists,was the transportation officer. Similar claims about Washington‘s role could

have been made in the last decade by the Afghan Taliban, and Sunni and Shi‗ite insurgents in

Iraq. Leaking of weapons could lead to an absurd situation in which both the state‘s army and

the rival NSA are fighting with the former‘s weapons, such as in 2004 when the U.S. military

fought Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Fallujah.842

The stealing-looting method is traditionally linked to deception, and deceit and

creative planning. In 1860, Garibaldi on his way to conquer Sicilysuccessfully managed to

persuade the commander of a local arsenal on the Tuscan coast that his expedition was under

secret orders from the government, and that he should provide weapons and ammunition. In

1918 Irish porters, supporters of the Irish Volunteers in a British port, took advantage of their

842

Harkavi, War, 198; David Bellavia, House to House. An Epic Memoir of War(Free Press: New York, 2007),

28.

296

job and stole boxes of weapons from a U.S. ship. This method could be simple, available at

no cost and guerrilla strategists argue it secures rebels‘ independence. But NSAs‘ weapons

arsenalsare not standard because they acquire any gun available. Stealing and capturing

weapons is risky; there is no guaranteeof gaining large booty and the method is harder to

employ when the central government is strong.Usually, the larger and more complicated

weapons systems are out of reach for NSAs‘ smugglers, including fighter aircraft and naval

units. 843

Support of a friendly state.State support is the most effective mechanism to make a

rebellious NSA a lethal military force.Regarded by scholars as ―gray market‖ operations,

state sponsorship occurs when states are motivated by political and ideological reasons to

supply standard weapons to NSAs. The English supplied weapons to the Spanish guerrillas

who fought the French in the early nineteenth century, during the Cold Warthe Soviets

provided massive support to rebel groups around the world and from 2012 Saudi Arabia and

Qatar have supplied weapons to Syrian rebels. Often, the shipments are covertly sent without

asking for payment, and with better logistic capacity states could provide large quantities of

weapons to NSAs. States might also take care of the transportation of the arms shipments. In

recent decades the largest captured arms shipments to NSAs were linked to states‘ support,

such as the 1986 weapons shipment from Cuba to Communist rebels in Chile, the 2004

weapons shipment from China to northeast Indian insurgents and Iranian shipments to the

Palestinians. Possession of new weapon systems by NSAs usually stemmed from state

sponsorship, involving mortars, rockets, cannons and most importantly anti-aircraft and anti-

tank missiles. States‘ support of NSAs has been part of general patronage and sponsorship

includes other aspects such as training of rebels, aid in operational planning, and funding.

The supporter of an NSA could be a neighboring country, regional power, super

power, former NSA that had become an independent state and other NSAs. Of great

importance in modern are states devoted, mainly for ideological reasons, to supply weapons

to many NSAs and facilitate the transportation of NSAs‘ weapons for example, Cuba during

the Cold War, Sudan and Afghanistan in the 1990s and contemporary Iran. Helping an NSA

to recover from war losses best demonstrates the advantage of state sponsorship, such as a

year after the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War Iran refilled Hezbollah rockets arsenal, after they

843

Ron Field,Garibaldi: The Background, Strategies, Tactics and Battlefield Experiences of the Greatest

Commanders of History (Cambridge: Osprey, 2011), 29.

297

were destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. NSAs use countries bordering the target state mired

in war for illicit arms trade, front companies and arms caches.

External support can be a game changer within state-NSA‘s conflict featuring

strategic outcomes. The Vietminh defeated the French in 1953 and gained independence after

receiving heavy weapons from China and the U.S.S.R. Hezbollah became the strongest

military force in Lebanon after receiving huge amounts of Iranian weapons. A state could

change the profile of its involvement in supporting a rebel group as a result of political-

strategic developments. For example, since the end of the civil war, Cambodia, the country

which was once on the receiving end, emerged in the 1990s as the biggest supplier of surplus

small arms to South Asia and in recent years has operated as a transit state for Chinese

weapons being smuggled to Indian insurgent groups.

The analysis of NSAs according to the level of outside support reveals different

patterns. Being an extension of the Iranian regime, Hezbollah stands at one end of the scale,

followed by NSAs who regularly acquire military support from a state but are more

independent, such as Indian rebel groups supported by China and Pakistan. Other armed

NSAs acquire weapons from different sources including friendly states. Many NSAs use

neighboring countries as transit states and even logistic centers rather than as weapons

suppliers. The opposite end contains self-sufficient NSAs which rarely acquire weapons from

foreign states, for example, Maoist guerrillas in Nepal or Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda

branches in North Africa and Yemen.

In order to secure support NSAs might need to adopt the agenda of their backers, and

many states prefer to attack their foes with a proxy NSA. Therefore, although resources and

sanctuary may be valuable, by accepting outside aid rebel groups lose some of their

organizational autonomy. Encouraged by their own interests, governments can switch sides

between rival NSAs and states, abandoning their former allies. In addition, when the host

government of an NSA decides to close its borders, the target government has a better chance

of defeating the rebellious NSA – this, for example, happened to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq in

the mid-1970s after they were abandoned by the Shah of Iran. Lack of external support could

be a major constraint on insurgents‘ operational capabilities and might lengthen their

campaign or bring their struggle to a disastrous end.

Using thearms trade. This is an old pattern of NSAs‘ arming that has been integrated within

trade exchanges in human civilization. From antiquity to the present time, rebels have traded

298

weapons for goods or cash. They are old customers of black arms markets, referring to the

illicit covert selling of weapons to NSAs by private entities, violating laws of established

governments and international embargos. Contemporary black arms trade follows the old

markets in exchange relations, some of the locations and even transportation routes. Other

than that, differences are huge, in scale, intensity and modus operandi. Past rebels purchased

arms in workshops, town markets and through merchants‘ caravans. The present trade in

arms is less committed to localities due to modern transportation. The black arms trade

involves smugglers, arms dealers, arms traffickers, money changers, adventurers, rebels, and

corrupt officials. Unlike state sponsorship, the illicit arms trade is always accessible for NSAs

because their business partners are interested mainly in profit. Therefore, arms traffickers

could simultaneously serve the state and an NSA which fight each other. States have less

capacity to monitor this black arms trade that involves privateers rather than foreign

governments and takes place across their borders. Still, procuring, buying, transporting and

storing weapons cost a lot of money. Logistic operations could be complicated and highly

risky as some states have remarkable counterinsurgency capabilities. Criminal smugglers are

willing to trade with rival sides and are less reliable.844

The arms trade method combines both old traditions and new developments. Armed

NSAs, such as Aceh rebels in northern Sumatra and Somaliland rebel groups, have a long

history of resisting central government, incorporated with the regional maritime arms trade

network. The trade is more than an arming instrument, it is a cultural institution. For other

NSAs, the arms trade facilitated strategic changes, empowering their operational readiness. In

the late 1950s and through the 1960s, Marxist and Maoist armed groups in South America

had been struggling to acquire weapons by looting and from some Cuban supplies. In the

1980s, the narcotics business enabled some of them to trade in arms, greatly enhancing their

military skills.

The four methods of arming have worked timelessly. To illustrate this point, the

Jewish Maccabees who revolted against the Seleucid Empire in the second century B.C.

fought with simple artifacts found in the environment, improvised weapons they

manufactured and heavier weapons looted in battles. They recruited well-armed Jewish

cavalry who served in one neighboring kingdom and were assisted by another. More than two

thousand years later, the Free Syrian Army has been fighting the Assad regime mainly with

844

Klare, ―International,‖ 21.

299

weapons looted from the Syrian Army, improvised artillery and explosives charges they have

manufactured with available materials, as well as some foreign military support. The ancient

Jewish and the modern Syrian rebels use completely different weapons and military

technologies but share similar techniques to build up their force.

The four methods of arming are the core of this project. They can be illustratedby

numerous episodes of NSAs‘ arming, from antiquity to this day. Self-production, stealing and

looting are domestic methods, while state sponsorship and the illicit arms trade are externally

oriented. The separation into four methods of arming is an artificial construct for the purpose

of analysis. In reality they are strongly interwoven. For indigenous production of weapons

NSAs might need external support andto steal a state‘s technology in order to manufacture

weapons. For example, without Iranian help, the Hamas probably could not produce medium

range rockets in the Gaza Strip. Stolen weapons from the state army and military industry are

being injected into the black market and purchased by NSAs. Black arms trade crosses

friendly and unfriendly countries to reach NSAs, and both the arms trade and state

sponsorship are involved in trafficking weapons from external sources andare often carried

out by private smugglers. Governments supply weapons to NSAs via arms traders and black

arms markets and fund NSAs‘ procurement activity. The combination between government

military support and illicit trade is an old phenomenon. From the late twentieth century this

combination has escalated, creating heterogeneous networked arming systems which will be

discussed later. The four methods of arming have similar features. For example, to some

extent they all use concealment, camouflage and deception, because rebels need to secure

their goods.

Why over thousands of years have different types of arming been employed? The

answer probably goes beyond the military aspect, rooted in the very basic social structures

and political institutions that have dominated human civilizations. Weapons smuggling is an

integral part of the imbalance of relations between ruler and citizens, elite and marginalized

groups, and states and non-state actors. Often NSAs possess smaller and more limited

material resources in relation to those available to the state. Weapons smuggling and alliance

with a third party help reduce the imbalance. This logistic activity is the basis for the NSA's

military buildup, derived from its own operational perception and intended to enable the

implementation of force and carrying out an operational mission.

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Coding of arming activity by NSAs enables the thesis to suggest a set of propositions

about similarities in the arming of rebellious NSAs. Insurgents of different eras including the

present time, began their struggle with weapons they found in the environment; they even

used the same artifacts (stones, clubs, machetes, and axes), followed by capturing the

weapons of their foes and making field modifications. The Great Jewish Revolt against Rome

began in 66A.D. with limited weapons, including slings and the bows and arrows people used

for hunting. Medieval peasants rose up against their landlords with agricultural tools and at

the outset of the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli Defense Forces in the West Bank and

Gaza in 1987, rioters used mainly stones. Other revolts, insurgencies and terror campaigns

started with just a few guns, given as a gift or smuggled from the army by activists under

service. Leaders and commanders of NSAs regarded limited weaponry not only as a

constraint but as an opportunity to mobilize the people and preach self-sacrifice. For

example, Ayman al Zawahiri:

It is always possible to attack an American or a Jew, to kill him with a bullet or a

knife, a simple device, or a blow with an iron rod. Setting fire to their property with

a Molotov cocktail is not difficult. With the means available, small groups can

spread terror among Americans and Jews.845

Initial engagements between rebels and rulers usually highlighted the superior force

of the latter. Rebels managed to decrease this imbalance due to the diffusion of weapons and

military technology. During the nineteenth century the British did not face problems seizing

Afghanistan. Soon the Pashtun tribes inflicted defeats on the powerful imperial army (1838-

43, 1878-80), among other reasons because they were well-armed. They possessed hand-

made rifles manufactured in local bazaars and purchased high quality weapons such as

swords and iron cannons across the border in Iran and Pakistan. In 1979, the same land was

conquered by the powerful Red Army which was welcomed by the central government in

Kabul. Gradually, local Mujahedeen inflicted heavy losses on the Russians, getting enormous

weapons shipments, including anti-aircraft missiles, from the United States. In 1989 the

Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

Until recent decades, almost every new weapon system and type of military

technology was initially used by state-armies, but eventually fell into the hands of NSAs, who

sometimes even manufactured the weapons, whether it was a siege machine in antiquity,

firearms in early Modern Times, or mortars, rockets and tanks today. Mercenaries, auxiliary

845

Mansfield, His Own Words, 198.

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units, warfare tradition, great power rivalry and arms trade – have all been mechanisms of

arms diffusion, serving NSAs‘ arming efforts. They are trans-time dimensions because the

historical review records their influence in different time periods. The dominant principle is

that because of a state‘s interests and constraints such as occasional limited manpower,

weapons and military technology have been leaking from the state to NSAs via different

methods. For instance, German tribes served in the Roman Army as mercenaries in late

antiquity. In the Middle-Ages, the Slavs and Turks fought for Byzantium. The Jewish

Brigade consisted of Jewish volunteers who served in the British Army in World War Two.

In 2011, sub-Saharan African tribes served as mercenaries in Gaddafi‘s army. All those

NSAs were introduced to new weapons and combat tactics by the state agents. Back in their

home countries, these ex-mercenaries and volunteers shared their weapons and military skills

with local NSAs that were involved in uprising and insurgency. The theory of arming of

NSAs emphasizes the great similarity between rebels of different time periods.

Self-production and looting of weapons predominantly characterize poor NSAs while

large scale arms trade is more often linked to well-funded NSAs. Funding the acquisition and

production of NSAs‘ arms was always major challenge for NSAs. One of the basic

weaknesses of rebel groups compared to rulers or governments is limited financial resources.

NSAs that controlled natural resources or were well-funded by foreign countries and migrant

diaspora had a great advantage. They could purchase weapons independently, improving

operational skills and escalating their military activity. Poor NSAs without external support

have struggled to sustain wars and occasionally ended up in turmoil.

The role set of rebellious NSAs show similaritiesregardless of time differences. Most

notable are their relations with criminal groups and individuals.By the state‘s and the rulers‘

laws, insurgents and rebels have been called criminals, and links between criminality and

arms smuggling are as old as the history of rebellion. Rebels, terrorists and criminals have

been fellow travelers in the underworld, occasionally switching identities. For example,

NSAs could become more involved in the dealing of illicit goods rather than the political

struggle (FARC and elements of the Taliban) while criminal gangs could become involved in

terror and insurgency (Mumbai-base organized crime involves in Islamic terror in India).

Still, criminals are driven by greed whereas in most cases militants‘ criminal activity is a

means to a political or ideological end. What has changed over the years is the pattern of

these exchanges. Previously, rebels traded commodities for illegal weapons and outlaws

smuggled weapons for them. In modern times, they still make these exchanges in currency,

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and some of the rebel groups have developed their own logistic apparatus. The exchange

relationship between NSAs and criminal gangs has become more longstanding, complex and

diverse. NSAs sell weapons to criminal gangs and the latter help them in forging documents,

money laundering and transactions. NSAs provide protection to drug dealers in return for

money and operational services. In the twenty-first century, NSAs and criminal syndicates

are partners in the global narcotics business, mobilizing tremendous incomes that are used to

procure weapons.846

Mechanism of Changes and Developments Shaping NSAs’ Arming Activity

The thesis suggested that the arming of NSAs in the pre-globalization era depended on the

sources they could find in their close environment and region, primarily self-production and

looting and stealing, while in the global era NSAs have more options to get weapons. This

proposition is strongly proved through the historical review: while using the same methods to

acquire weapons over the history of rebellion, the dynamic of the arming process of NSAs

has changed significantly overtime (Figure3, p. 293). A combination of technological,

political, social and cultural factors has influenced the buildup of the force of NSAs. Because

of these factors the emphasis of NSAs‘ arming has shiftedamong the four methods – self-

production, stealing and looting, state sponsorship and illicit arms trade – in different periods.

In antiquity rebels fought mostly with weapons they captured, produced or inherited

and were taught to use from childhood. External support was less common and involved large

expeditions from an ally or patron-state. Looting the rivalstate‘s arms depots became more

prominent among the rebels of late antiquity and the Middle Ages due to the weakening and

collapse of great empires and kingdoms, such as West Rome and Byzantium. Self-production

of weapons was still the most dominant arming method for medieval NSAs.

The rise of international trade made possible by routes such as the Silk Road Route

that connected Europe and China, improved NSAs‘ access to arms, but it was a minor

channel, serving mainly medieval ruling elites. From the early modern period the military

balance between states and NSAs shifted against the latter, because government armies and

military industry controlled the production of firearms, followed by heavier and more

complicated weapon systems (artillery). NSAs of the nineteenth century faced larger regular

armies, which were well trained and equipped. Powerful bows of NSAs could no longer

846

Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror News in South-Asia: States, Security and Non-State-Actors (Oxon: Routledge,

2011), 48-66.

303

compete with improved firearms of the Europeans. Mass production of ammunition,

necessary for lengthy conflicts, posed new challenges for NSAs with limited resources. The

weakness in weaponry of most native peoples in Asia, America and Africa facilitated the

colonization of their continents.

The colonization of the Americans, Africa and Asiaresulted in the growing

importance of external support and arms trade for NSAs, though still less dominant than self-

production and leaking. European rulers began for the first time to view arms transfers as a

potentially significant instrument in continental power politics. Rebel groups benefitted from

the Europeandrive will to influence alliances and the outcome of battles by sending weapons

and troops, within and outside Europe. The more weapons colonial powers sent from Europe

to their military forces in the colonies and the more trade in arms that evolved between

European merchants and native people, the greater chances rebellious NSAs had to get some

of these arms supplies via black-market trade or plundering.

In the first half of the twentieth century NSAs‘ arming challenges increased with the

introduction of more sophisticated weapon systems – tanks, submarines, aircraft carriers, and

fighter aircraft. NSAs could no longer imitate the state military arsenal by themselves, and

self-production of weapons became almost impossible. The leaking method was less valuable

for rebels in light of further strengthening of the nation-state which marked its borders,

enforced a monopoly over military force, secured maritime sovereignty, and regulated the

arms trade. Even if NSAs could acquire some of these weapons they were not able to

maintain or use them. For victory, rebellious NSAs had to change their arming strategies.

They could secure external support, from direct military involvement of a patron to a covert

supply of arms and ammunition only. Superpower intervention, because of their great logistic

capability and access to advanced weapon systems, could dramatically improve NSAs‘ force.

In the second half of the twentieth century state sponsorship was NSAs‘ most

efficient mechanism to acquire weapons and improve military capabilities. During the Cold

War both the Soviet Union and the United States competed in mobilizing third party allies,

states as well as NSAs, providing them with weapons and other essential logistic support. The

Americans and the Soviets supported rebel groups across the world directly or through

proxies. The superpowers‘ support of rebel groups was entirely a government operation or a

combination of government and private elements, seeking to disguise the formers‘

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involvement. This combination demonstrated a transition from state sponsorship channel to

arming NSAs through the black arms trade.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a decline in state sponsorship. As revealed in

chapter six, in the early 1980s, almost fifty state-NSA wars featured external military support,

decreasing to eighteen in late 2013. States were still deeply involved in arming NSAs using

proxies, arms dealers and criminal groups to support NSAs, but rebels had to find new

sources of weapons. Iran and Syria‘s massive military support of Hezbollah is an exception.

As of early 2014, the arms trade is the most dominant arming method of NSAs.

Contemporary NSAs acquire most of their weaponry through black arms markets. The most

important are located in Southeast Asia, Yemen and East Africa, the Balkans, Libya and the

United States. In countries with weak governments and corrupt administration, mainly in

Africa and Asia, NSAs capture weapons leaked from military stockpiles or taken in combats.

What stands behind the dynamic of NSAs‘ arming methods, and why do NSAs

employ different methods of arming in different eras as the above paragraphs reveal? The

answer is rooted in four categories: the type of NSA and their operational approaches, the

emergence of new weapon systems, the political regime, and social and cultural aspects.

These elements explain the variance in NSA arming patterns; if they shift, they stimulate

changes both within NSAs and in the external environment, creating opportunities and

constraints. In dealing with contemporary NSAs, many of the change-stimulators have been

influenced by processes of globalization.

The type of NSA and its operational approach. Rebellious NSAs are a big and diverse

category as a result of different geo-strategic conditions and local

traditions.Theorganization,structure, and the command and control apparatus of an NSA are

causal conditions that influence NSAs‘ arming methods. Extreme contrast existed, for

instance, between the well-organized and funded American Patriots who fought Britain, and

the Dutch who sustained eighty years of independent war against the Hapsburgs, mobilizing

considerable quantities of firearms and other arms, as against poor communities of former

slaves in Latin America who barely acquired gunpowder. Also, Greek rebels of the early-

nineteenth century who almost lost their war of independence against the Turks due to poor

leadership and internal division, and who was eventually rescued by great European powers.

A strong link exists between the organizational skills of rebellious NSAs and their

operational readiness in light of limited resources. For example, the late nineteenth century

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saw the emergence of the modern political party seeking social power. Revolutionary

political parties such as Russia‘s Bolshevik Party, the Chinese Communist Party and the more

contemporary communist parties in Nepal and India have all been involved in subversion

against central governments, building an efficient military arm. Fighting stronger regimes and

professional armies, they operatedwith limited weaponry and financial resources. Many of

therevolutionary parties seized power or sustainedlongstanding wars because of their

remarkable organizational and mobilization skills, compensating for their lack of basic

armaments. Waging guerrilla war, they made the best of the limited weapons they possessed.

Some of thecommunist movements gained external support but mostly they had to live off

their foes.

NSAs‘ military doctrine affects their arming needs and vice versa. NSAs that use

mainly terror require less ammunition than NSAsthat are committed to guerrilla warfare. In

the early 1990s, without organizational backup and with just a few operatives but great

planning and technological skills, Ramzi Yusuf‘s terror network was responsible for the first

attack on the World Trade Center and was very close to executing more spectacular

terrorattacks around the globe. On the other hand, fighting against regular armies, NSAs

seeking to ―liberate‖ land, being able to repulse counter attacks, and eventually seizing

power, require heavier weapons systems, such as armored vehicles and artillery and larger

quantities of ammunition. Consequently, the more military-style NSAs depend on external

arms sources. To illustrate this point, the al Qaeda Central organization specialized in lethal

terror strikes, using mainly explosives and in the 9/11 attacks no firearms were used. In

recent years, the decentralization of al Qaeda has resulted in the establishment of local

branches in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and North Africa. Aiming to seize land and establish an

―Islamic Emirate,‖ these branches use conventional weapons, acquired through black arms

markets and looting. The operational doctrine of rebel groups influences the method of

arming.847

The organization of an NSA is coordinated with the firepower it requires.

Contemporary NSAs exist between two poles: at the one end military-like organizations, such

as Hezbollah and Hamas, possessing centralized leadership, controlling territory and armed

with heavy weapons systems such as rockets, surface-to-surface missiles and anti-ship

missiles, usually received from a state sponsor; at the other end, low-level organized NSAs

847

Fergus Mason, Before 9/11. A Biography of World Trade Center Mastermind. Ramzi Yousef (Anaheim, CA:

Absolute Crime Book, 2013).

306

that use cold weapons, homemade bombs, waging what Abu Mus‗ab al-Suri called

―individual jihad.‖ Homegrown isolated Jihadist cells in the West illustrate this tactic as well

as popular, but poorly organized protest movements, using stones and Molotov cocktails. In

between, are NSAs such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Abu Sayyaf Group and the

Indian Naxal, who wage guerrilla and terror warfare, using small arms and IEDs. Abd al Aziz

al-Muqrin, al Qaeda‘s guerrilla theoretician called these NSAs urban and mountain

guerrilla.848

NSAs‘ operational doctrine does not stand by itself, but stems from enemy strategy

and tactics. The level of force a government uses to suppress a revolt and insurgency is linked

to the strategy and operational approach adopted by the rebels, influencing their armament.

Unarmed popular protest being violently abused by security forces (shooting live ammunition

at protesters) might be radicalized, using stones and small arms. Further oppression

encourages protestors to use firepower, such as at the outset of Syria‘s civil war. Intensive

use of tanks by government forces encourages rebels to acquire anti-tank weapons systems.

However, when the security forces of a state, particularly the army, avoid engaging the

people, they facilitate the removal of the unguarded regime, such as the Islamic revolution in

Iran in 1979 and the revolution in Egypt in 2011.

The emergence of new weapons. Over the history of rebellion NSAs adopted and modified

weapon systems which they manufactured or acquired from external sources. These weapons

influenced their arming methods and operational doctrine. At the same time, NSAs‘

operational approach dictates the weapons they require and influences their arming activity.

Featuring special advantages, such as long range, high mobility and security of the users,

some weapons systems greatly improved the buildup of the force of NSAs and operational

readiness. Such weapons systems reduced the military imbalance between NSAs and states

and were strategically important. On the other hand, states adoptedNSAs‘ weapons and

occasionally coopted NSAs. For example, the medieval Welsh by using the indigenous

longbow with its exceptional firepower, mobility and longer range than other bows of that

time, waged successful guerrilla warfare against the much stronger Anglo-Norman rule

during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. They demonstrated integration between a deadly

instrument and military doctrine creating a lethal fighting system that inflicted heavy losses

on the Norman knights. The English kings recruited Welsh bowmen and used them in the

848

Cigar, Al Qa„ida, 112, 123.

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One Hundred Years War against the French. Another example is the appearance of

gunpowder during the late Middle Ages and early modernity which resulted in thedistinction

between arms and ammunition. Unlike spears, swords, maces and axes, rifles, pistols and

cannons, accompanied later by more complicated weapons system, required ammunition to

be used. At first manufacturing ammunition for these weapons was no more complicated than

manufacturing ammunition for bows, slings or ballistae, almost anyone could do it. But, as

the technology developed it gradually came to require expertise, machinery and raw materials

not available to everyone. The employment of ammunition-based weapons greatly challenged

poor rebel groups that needed to secure ammunition supplies. For NSAs possessing large

stockpiles, ammunition means sustainability, the capacity to wage prolonged war. Running

out of supplies, NSAs reduce their level of operations.

IEDs have demonstrated that the appearance of a new weapon system could change

the way NSAs fight and obtain arms. The weapons most used by NSAs worldwide are small

arms. But NSAs‘ use of remote-controlled, booby-trap and suicide-activated explosive

charges is perhaps the most important development in NSAs‘ arming in modernity. From the

second half of the nineteenth century,NSAs‘ growing use of high explosives and improvised

explosive devices has had revolutionary effects on theiroperational ability and arming

methods. The strategy of current NSAs is heavily dependent on IEDs, which have become

more sophisticated and are now used efficiently against civilians and soldiers. Explosives and

bombs suit NSAs‘ strategy of waging a war of attrition both in the frontline against the

enemy and in the heart of his territory, because they can be manufactured almost anywhere

and come in many forms, ranging from a small pipe bomb to a sophisticated device capable

of causing massive damage and loss of life. Integrated in terror or guerrilla tactics, homemade

explosives have dramatically enhanced NSAs‘ ability to challenge powerful states and attrite

regular forces and mainly civilian populations while reducing their own exposure to enemy

attacks.

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed another demonstration of the

strong link between military technology and NSAs‘ operational capacity. NSAs benefitted

from the development of portable ―fire-and-forget‖ missiles and light portable automatic

weapons with a high rate of fire. These weapons systems could reduce the power balance

between regular armies and terror and guerrilla NSAs, enabling the latter to bring down

helicopters and fighter aircraft and to penetrate tanks‘ armor – major symbols of the state‘s

military superiority. In recent decades NSAs have spent a lot of effort trying to acquire these

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costly weapons, usually obtaining them via allied governments and black arms

markets.Armed with RPGs, militants in Chechnya, Lebanon, Egypt, Afghanistan, Somalia

and Iraq managed to face much stronger regular forces. The growing use of anti-tank and

anti-air missiles by armed NSAs‘ illustrates asymmetric strategy. Rebels seek to neutralize

weapons they cannot acquire by using other weapon systems that are cheaper, available and

efficient.849

A number of scholars regard present NSAs, many of them allegedly poor irregular

forces, as ones which are rarely in a position to obtain and operate major weapons systems

and for the most part use small arms and light weapons. They argue that supply of heavy

weapons belongs to government-to-government sales.850

Yet numerous NSAs are well-funded

and equipped with modern weapons and employ regular forces. The thesis highlights Iran‘s

supply of medium and long range rockets and missiles to the Lebanese Hezbollah and

Palestinian militant groups who also produce rockets. More than other conventional

weapons,rockets have affected NSA‘ military strategy and the power balance between them

and the state.

Rockets are long-range artillery fire, reliable, simple to operate, low cost and have

massive fire power especially when using multiple rocket launchers. Mostly, NSAs do not

possess air capability but NSAs‘ rocket fire makes state bordersand air defences meaningless.

Rockets are an inaccurate artillery system, but persistent rocketfire,even on a small-scale,

against civilian population centers disrupts daily routines, inflictinga negative psychological

effect. It serves the strategy of winning by not losing. Since Israel withdrew from the Gaza

Strip in 2005, militants have fired more than 11,000rockets into Israel. Today almost the

whole of the Israeli population is under rocket threat from the Gaza Strip, Sinai and Lebanon.

Israel has successfully developed and used anti-rocket missile systems, but rockets could still

be an effective mechanism for NSAs to establish a balance of deterrence against a state.

Differing from other NSAs, both Hezbollah and Hamas operational approaches focus on an

artillery campaign against Israel. Unlike other NSAs they control territory and employ

regular forces. Still, NSAs possessing heavier weapon systems like rockets becomeless

mobile and more vulnerable. They are compelled to develop logistic skills to smuggle

rockets over long distances, which can be very risky. Adding GPS guidance to these rockets,

849

Wilkinson,Technology, 2. 850

Michael T. Klare. ―The International Trade in Light Weapons: What have We Learned,‖ in Light Weapons

and Civil Conflicts. Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffery Boutuell and Michael T. Klare (Oxford:

Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 9.

309

a level of sophistication just around the corner for the more advanced NSAs, will provide

them ability almost equivalent to the advanced armies of the major states, drastically reducing

these armies‘ advantage in aerial firepower.851

The political framework. The thesis reveals that changes in political regimes have

influenced NSAs‘ efforts at armament; they are the most important causal conditions of

NSAs‘ arming. In antiquity it was much easier to take arms and revolt against rulers, but the

punishment for those who failed would have been more lethal. In the pre-state world people

faced fewer lawful limitations to carry a weapon,and men were expected to carry a weapon in

many cultures.Usually empires did not disarm defeated communities and they could keep

their armies and fleets, being committed to provide the conqueror with troops in times of war.

The rise of the nation statein modern times made rebels‘task to acquire weapons a

harder one. States enforced a monopoly over military force, imposed border control, secured

maritime sovereignty, and regulated the arms trade. They signed international agreements

seeking to counteract the illegal sales of arms. From the NSAs‘ perspective, it is much

hardertoday to mobilize external support to fight legitimate governments than fighting

foreign invaders. At the same time, the establishment of multiethnic and multicultural states,

while their borders neglect demographic division, facilitated sectarian wars and consequently

the proliferation of weapons. From another angle, governments are using every means to

manipulate their own laws and international commitments, supplying weapons to NSAs

which are fighting their rivals, mainly neighboring countries. Terrorists and insurgents have

become expert at acquiring weapons through legal means, by utilizing loopholes in existing

laws and regulations.

Often, efforts of NSAs to acquire weapons manifested a global process rather than

being disconnected cases. European colonialism demonstrated how great powers used their

military superiority to seize the Americas, followed by Africa, Asia and Oceania. Still,

colonialism facilitated the proliferation of firearms among natives‘ NSAs through the

expansion of global trade, building arms factories in the new colonies, recruiting native

soldiers and in some cases rebellious NSAs exploited competition between colonial powers.

The global arms trade was an instrument to secure colonial rule but eventually it provided

native NSAs with better armament to resist colonialism. Similar mechanisms worked during

851

IDF. ―Rocket Attacks on Israel From Gaza,‖ 23 Mach 2014, http://www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-

attacks-toward-israel/ (accessed 23 Mach 2014).

310

the Cold War. In a bipolar international system when regimes of global intervention took

hold, both the Soviet Union and the United States stood opposed to each other as nation-

states, as ideologies, and as economic and political systems. They were competing globally in

'collecting' rival third party allies, states as well as NSAs, and provided them with weapons

and other essential logistic and operational support. The superpowers exploited rebel groups

because they could weaken the rival superpower's hold on a particular region. At the same

time, the United States and the Soviet Union transported huge amounts of advanced weapons

systems to war zones such as Afghanistan, Angola and El Salvador. Many of these shipments

were supplied free of charge to NSAs, fighting colonial powers or governments. NSAs‘

arming has been subjected to dramatic changes as a result of political developments.

Religious-based regimesare devoted to support affiliated NSAs. In the 1990s, the

Islamic governments of Sudan and Afghan Taliban focused on supporting terrorist and

insurgent groups mainly for ideological reasons, having facilitated the arming of NSAs. The

Islamic republic of Iran is an extreme manifestation of this pattern, changing not only the

scope of the support but also re-defining state sponsorship of an NSA. Many countries have

supported NSAs, some intensively, but Iran-Hezbollah relations are more comprehensive and

multidimensional than the regular state-proxy model.Based on shared religious ideology

Hezbollah is a special case of a rebel group which hasbecome an extension of a foreign state

– Iran – and that operates as an NSA in its own country– Lebanon. The arming of Hezbollah

by Iran is perhaps the core of this integration, including the supply of a huge amount of

weapon systems and the building of Hezbollah‘s remarkable strategic artillery apparatus.

Mostly important, Iran employs an elite military organization, the Quds Force, with a special

branch in Lebanon and Syria.The Quds Forceis responsible for converting Hezbollah into a

military organization of significant capabilities, the most skilled military NSA in the world.

Tehran‘s commitment to strengthen Hezbollah and the latter‘s total subordination to the

Iranian supreme leader are an important development in the history of rebel groups.

Another political factor that influences the arming of NSAs is regime strength. From

antiquity, diffusion of political power, and disintegration of kingdoms and empires, led to the

looting of governments‘ depots by NSAs who faced no real obstacles smuggling weapons.

The same rule applied both when Byzantium was declining in the second half of the eleventh

century and much later after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Seizing the

regime‘s arsenals was an important stage in revolutions escalating the collapse, such as in the

French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

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NSAs engaging stronger governments that command professional and disciplined

security forces have to acquire weapons from external sources and to conduct complicated

and risky smuggling operations. In this context, the relationship between neighboring

countries is extremely important to understand NSAs‘ ability to smuggle weapons. One of the

major conclusions of this thesis is that regardless of globalization, denial of outside support

from neighboring counties is a precondition of successful counterinsurgency. Porous borders

encourage arms smuggling whereas secured borders as a result of inter-state security

cooperationcould lead to defeating NSAs.

A number of principles modifiedthe military buildup of NSAs regardless of time

period. For example, throughout history empires and superpowers armed NSAs, using them

for security tasks like fighting enemies and protecting their masters‘ properties. At a later

stage, these groups might turn their weapons against their patrons as a result of geo-strategic

changes. Alexander the Great recruited and armed Jewish archers; later in the Maccabees

Revolt (167-160 B.C.) Jewish archers fought against Alexander‘s weakening heirs, the

Seleucids. In the 1980s, the United States and Pakistan armed Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to

fight the Soviets. From the late 1990s, Islamic militants became a major international terror

threat (Al Qaeda), followed by an increasing domestic challenge to Pakistan‘s government

(Pakistani Taliban). When governments militarize NSAs they might plant the seeds of a

future revolt.

Also, the surplus of weapons from former wars has been used to arm rebels of the

next wars, which is connected to recycling of weapons via the arms trade. The research

confirms Klare‘s argument that an increase in supply of small arms especially, encourages

NSAs who are at war to expand or prolong their operations and for potential belligerents to

commence fighting. General Simon Bolivar revolted against and eventually defeated Spanish

rule in South America (1811-1826), because, among other things, he transported large

quantities of war-surplus arms and other supplies which Britain was only too happy to sell off

after the Napoleonic Wars. The vast quantities of weapons left over from the Cold War were

recycled into the global arms traffic through a variety of channels including illicit black-

market dealers and state support. Addressing the problem of proliferation of weapons, the

U.N. has been initiating in former war zones such as Cambodia and El Salvador,

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decommissioning and collecting programs to remove small arms from open circulation with

partial success. 852

Social, cultural and religious aspects. The coding of NSAs arming through history reveals

social and cultural factors explaining NSAs‘ arming efforts. Warfare tradition and culture of

arms possession and trade have been important mechanisms that assisted NSAs revolting

against powerful regimes. Giap, for example, explained that ―during its many thousands of

years old history, the Vietnamese people have always been able to maintain heroic tradition

of struggle against foreign aggression.‖ The history of rebellion provides extensive evidence.

The Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan, local peoples of the Caucasus, and Māori

people of New Zealand have all demonstrated a highly developed fighting capacity and a

tradition of resistance to central governments and foreign intruders. In different time periods,

they performed remarkably well against regular and professional armies of empires and

superpowers, because they inherited the art of manufacturing weapons, the skill to rapidly

absorb new weapons, integrating terrain and special features of a weapons system, such as

rifles with accurate aiming, into a lethal fighting system.853

To illustrate this argument, the LTTE had a close nexus with the sea and controlled a

major part of Sri Lanka‘s coast. The organization's naval power was the basis for its sturdy

stance against the Sri Lankan army for some thirty years. Sri Lanka is an island nation and

the Tamils have a long tradition of fishing, maritime trade and smuggling. The LTTE

operated a merchant fleet tasked with secretly transporting arms from around the globe to Sri

Lanka. Earlier, Irish porters working in Great Britain‘s ports, smuggled weapons into Ireland

by sea for the Irish Volunteers. For many centuries the Bedouin tribes of northeast Africa and

the Sinai Peninsula traded in goods from Yemen and the Horn of Africa. In the last decade,

they have been using the same tracks and social networks to smuggle weapons into Egypt and

Gaza.

Religion could affect NSAs‘ operational approach and arming. Radical Shia and

Sunni clerics have legitimized suicide terrorism, arguing it is the weapon of the weak people

who ―lack the technology and lethal weapons available to the U.S. and European counties.‖854

Religion plays a key role here. The Iranian Revolution and the rise of the Salafi-Jihadi school

852

Klare, ―International,‖ 14-17. 853

Giap, People‟s War,11. 854

Richard J. Leitner and Peter M. Leitner, eds., Unheeded Warnings. The Last Reports of the Congressional

Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, vol. 2, The Perpetrators and the Middle East

(Washington, DC: Crossbow Books, 2007), 166.

313

of thought encouraged suicide terrorism, calling it martyrdom, ―the ultimate form of devotion

to God,‖ ―a goal itself.‖ Being an extreme tactic, suicide attacks enable NSAs access to

highly secure targets inflicting massive damage, something they could never achieve by

conventional means.Suicide terrorism is a unique integration between religious-based

operations and a weapon (terrorists wearing an explosives belt or vest, driving a car bomb or

a truck bomb).

Another social factor is that NSAs have been linked to different types of social groups

operating overseas, using their cross-border logistic skills for arms smuggling. The

interaction between NSAs and foreign diaspora is not monolithic and has its own dynamic.

Residing in Western Europe, the Ottoman Empire and North Africa,Jewish merchants of the

Middle Ages and modern world, many of whom were immigrants,used international

connections to facilitate trade including in arms serving both states and NSAs. They

demonstrated NSAs operating as a network. In the second half of the nineteenth century,

Irish-Americans established the highly operational organization, Clan-ne-Guel, which

specialized in smuggling weapons from the United States and Europe into Ireland including

American guns that were superior to the British weapons. During the Irish Civil War (1921-

1923) following the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, a splinter-group of Clan-ne-Guel was

committed to military support of the anti-treaty republican movement. This emigrant

organization became a subversive NSA against the Free State government, attempting to

smuggle weapons into Ireland. In another type of overseas NSA, Lenin was assisted by a

multi-national network of socialist activists across Europe in smuggling weapons into Russia

before the revolution. Thus, foreign immigrants were involved in the arming of NSAs in

different ways as a result of political developments both in the old homeland and their new

countries.

The Arming of rebellious NSAs in a Globalized World

Drawing on the available literature, the thesis suggests that the arming of NSAs in the pre-

globalization era was based on relatively simple systems in terms of the number of role

players, division of labor and geographical deployment, whereas arming of NSAs in the

globalization era involves more complex systems including many more participants, a

division of labor that is more differentiated and larger geographical dispersion. Testing of

these propositions uncoversmuch evidence of important changes caused by globalization,

modifying the arming process of NSAs. But relatively complex arms smuggling

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systemsoperated in the pre-globalization era too. The major argument is that globalization

empowers threeintegrated legs of the illicit trade in arms –proliferation and circulation of

weapons to war zones of NSAs; the logistic apparatus of smugglers including the use of

containers; and NSAs‘involvement in the illicit trade, mainly in narcotics. Globalization has

improved rebel groups‘ access to weapons and some NSAs are better armed than the armies

they are fighting.Even without state support many NSAs with some financial resources

manage to sustain longstanding conflicts, inflicting heavy casualties on governments.

Politically, in light of globalization effects, authoritarian regimes face greater challenges in

monopolizing power.

Thegrowing illicit arms trade presents a challenge to the territorial state system.Still,

states-NSAs‘ engagements affirm that the world system is powerfully governed by nation-

states, because often states are the ones that both strengthen and weaken NSAs. Strong

governments with skillful security agencies and secure borders can contain the effects of

globalization, and governments too are being assisted by modern technologies and better

counter-smuggling activity. The thesis argues that globalization has been a significant

facilitator in the buildup of NSAs‘ forces.

Past and present trades in arms serving NSAs share similar patterns: both play a small

role compared to the legal arms trade. Arms markets are located in the same regions as

centuries ago. Rebels have traditionally traded goods with weapons and smugglers are using

the same routes as their ancestors. Privatization processes have always served rebels‘

smuggling interests; previously they rented ships and today they rent aircraft. Ancient and

medieval rebels acquired weapons in the small world they were living in whereas the present-

day rebels can get them from the other side of the world. Ancient and medieval rebels, if they

lived near iron mines, were able to manufacture fine swords and present NSAs find it cheaper

and more efficient to import firearms rather than self-produce them. Ancient and medieval

arms trade was mostly local and regional, constrained by distances. Medieval merchants

departed the traditional workshops, becoming independent and mobile players who could

associate with rebels. In the early modern world the arms trade became inter-continental, and

following the Industrial Revolution the nineteenth century witnessed a breakthrough in the

scope and complexity of the arms trade. A global arms trade system which operated largely

on a commercial logic was effectively beyond the control of governments, selling weapons to

rebellious NSAs. The global arms trade has grown from the late twentieth century,

undermining distance because weapons could be transported all over the world. Logistics

315

became a great business within the arms trade because of larger shipments and longer

distances. Unlike previous times, merchants are not involved in the smuggling operations

which are the subject of professional smugglers and arms traffickers. Using modern

technologies, highly skilled NSAs can now arrange and monitor inter-continental smuggling

operations from overseas rather than waiting for the merchant‘s caravan.

Modern technologies have facilitated NSAs‘ arming activities, offering more

opportunities to arm themselves, but they have become more reliant on external sources.

From the early nineteenth century, rebellious NSAs have been running a growing part of their

arming activity across borders, first in neighboring countries then using foreign diaspora and

today by sending permanent representatives overseas. Today, most NSAs‘ arming activities

can be planned far away from the war zone. Globalization is responsible for this dramatic

development. It is a powerful intervening element in state-NSA conflict, helping rebel groups

to reduce military inferiority. Patron states and arms dealers are using modern transportation,

containerized shipping and cargo jets, facilitating movement of large quantities of modern

weapons for rebel groups around the world.Similar to the general trade system, weapons

smuggling networks integrate maritime and inland transport, creating an effective system,

such as in Southeast Asia. Digital and wireless communications enable arms smugglers and

logistic officers to coordinate complex smuggling operations in isolated regions.

Globalization enables NSAs to conduct arms shopping journeys around the world and to

negotiate on-line deals without visiting the arms dealer.

Free trade encourages NSAs and their business partners to use tactics of deception

regarding both the final destination and content of shipments while governments and

international cargo carriers are reluctant to– or cannot – monitor the legitimacy of shipments

of goods. Rebels have always used deception to secure shipping of weapons, for instance

using free trade ports since the early nineteenth century. Globalization facilitates the

employment of more complicated techniques. Growing labor differentiation in shipping

operations which are geographically dispersed serves NSAs‘ plans, such as when a ship is

owned by a one company, registered in a second country, operated by a different company,

using international crew who allegedly do not know the true nature of the cargo. Also, the

privatization of arms industries serves NSAs because the industries are motivated mainly by

profit and don‘t care about the customer‘s identity.

316

Confirming the thesis‘ poposition of more complex smuggling systems in the global

era, the black arms trade is the best manifestation of the influence of globalization, dealing

with a worldwide diffusion of weapons across national borders, often beyond the control of

national states. The thesis highlights at least five major arms trade networks in Southeast

Asia, Yemen and East Africa, the Balkans, North Africa and the United States. They are

spread over a large part of the world, trafficking weapons across porous land and maritime

borders, consequently fueling dozens of wars between states and NSAs. The networks are a

loose association of multinational rebels, terrorists, smugglers, brokers, arms dealers,

criminals, money changers, politicians and army officers, all cooperating for profit.

Therefore, the intensive black arms trade has resulted in the circulation of arms which

is an old phenomenon that since the end of the Cold War has become global through the

expansion of transatlantic and online trade. In a global world, disarmament and

demobilization in a former war zone easily become a driving force of other conflicts

elsewhere. To illustrate this point, Somali militants are fighting with Iranian and North

Korean armssmuggled from Libya and Colombian rebels used American weapons left in

Vietnam and supplied to the Marxist guerrillas in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

The smuggling networks feature division of roles between states: suppliers,

consumers, transit states, collecting points, and distribution hubs. In light of strategic

developments such as war and peace, the division is dynamic and states as well as NSAs

change their roles. Recipients of arms become exporters and vice versa; NSAs become

independent stateswhich are being fragmented.The networks overlap, for example Chinese

weapons are being funneled to arms market in Yemen and the Horn of Africa; rebel groups in

Syria are linked to the black arms markets both in the Balkans and North Africa.

The more complex systems of weapons smuggling in the global era also demonstrate

a growing mixture of identities. Insurgents are deeply involved in the narcotics trade and

government officials are serving rebels‘ interests. Differences between legal and illegal trade

and between gray and black markets are unclear. Governments are involved in the

proliferation and circulation of weapons consumed by NSAs more than before. Security

agencies are using black arms markets to arm NSAs who fight proxy wars. NSAs trade

weapons with other NSAs,manifesting a process of commercialization of their struggle. It is

no longer only a force buildup mechanism but a source of income.

317

Vital for the illicit arms trade are international arms brokers and traffickers who

arrange purchase and transferof weapons around the world, enjoying close links to senior

army officers and politicians both in arms-producing states without proper export control and

states in war. Ignoring international embargos, they associate with rebellious NSAs, helping

them to secure a supply of advanced weapon systems. The arms brokers are global nomads,

the product of globalization because they integrate transnational activity, modern

transportation, privatization of the arms trade, and intensive state-NSA conflicts. They have

been operating in different regions, employing transnational business networks,

demonstrating globalization. In the eighteenth century American Patriots used privateers to

smuggle weapons across the Atlantic into North America, but contemporary arms dealers

possess greater logistic assets usually owned by states and larger business networks. Like

traditional nomads, arms brokers and smugglers seek mobility, it is the core of their survival.

Occasionally they use the same logistic tools, camels and mules, but unlike old nomads the

new nomads share global networks and possess greater logistic capacity. Globalization

undermined the value of traditional trade communities such as Jewish merchants. In the past,

Jews‘ cosmopolitan profile and international trade connections were unique, serving some

armed NSAs. With global communication and transportation, these skills are in less demand.

Globalization escalates the integration between the arms trade of NSAs and other

illicit trade. NSAs share in criminal syndicates‘ production and exporting of illicit goods,

mainly drugs, and the mechanism of globalization. It is part of their core existence rather than

an income. Hamas runs smuggling activities via the underground tunnels of Gaza and they

are a significant segment of the local economy. The FARC are deeply involved in

maintaining the drugs business out of Colombia. The drugs trade has made rebel groups

wealthy, capable of funding the purchase of weapons for longstanding conflicts.

Describing the illicit arms trade as only a global phenomenon simplifies the subject,

and Ritzer‘s bipolar terms, glocalization and grobalization, could better explain the

complexity. The illicit arms trade is deeply linked to dominant local elements. Hubs of

smuggling networks are located in countries with old black arms markets and strong

traditions of gun possession and homemade weapons, such as Yemen, Pakistan, the United

States and the Philippines. The black arms markets operate mainly in countries featuring

spiraling political violence, incursion and hostile relations with neighboring countries. Global

proliferation of weapons has fuelled these conflicts rather than created them. State-NSA

conflicts are the integration of the ―local‖ and the ―global‖ including the sphere of weaponry.

318

Pashtun tribes' arms arsenal is based on traditional gun manufacturing, located in the same

villages as in the nineteenth century, and nowadays replicating modern Russian and

American guns. Many radical Islamic groups fighting the ―infidels‖ demonstrate some global

homogenization (grobalization) because they share Salafi ideology, practise operational and

logistic cooperation, and employ suicide terror. Some of the Salafi groups even submitted

themselves to al Qaeda Central in Pakistan. For instance,Al Shabaab in Somalia, Ansar Bait

al Muqadas in Egypt and Jubhat al Nusra in Syria are involved in local state-NSA conflicts

that have been radicalized and have become more transnational, waging suicide terrorism

domestically and in neighboring countries, and mobilizing foreign nationals, some of whom

are suicide bombers. Other rebellious NSAs, such as the Naxal of India and the Popular

Liberation Army in the Philippines, share Marxist and Maoist ideas with fellow movements

in foreign countries, but they sustain a strong national character, only interacting with global

networks of arms smuggling.

Globalization‘s effect on state-NSA conflict and the arming question should not be

overestimated. NSAs were involved in complex heterogeneous international smuggling

networks hundreds of years ago, using complicated deception tactics. Arms smuggling of

NSAs remains a physical matter as it used to be in the past. Contemporary rebels and

insurgents face the challenge of acquiring weapons and physically moving those, sometimes

over long distances like their ancestors. Global information and communication technologies

pose difficult challenges to nation-states which are defined in terms of territorial boundaries,

but weapons are not a virtual issue; they still need to cross borders in one way or another.

Smugglers are deeply linked to territory and lack the ability of trans-world simultaneity. As

Scholte notes, the world is not borderless and territory is still relevant. Air-shipping

undermines territory but cargo is subject to flight certificates and so weapons are smuggled

mainly on land and water. Salehyan correctly argues that NSAs might find recruits and

support from diaspora communities and state patrons further abroad, but the ability to launch

and sustain combat operations will critically depend on nearness to the target state.855

Mobile phone communication is seen as shifting place-based social relations to

decentralized networks. Global smuggling networks rely heavily on wireless communication

and feature a decentralized profile, but they are linked to localities and many are strategically

centralized with clear command and control systems. Technology has boosted human

855

Salehyan, Rebels, 37; Hanson, 24/7, 212.

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mobility even through rough terrain. To this day, however, topography has great significance,

as the NSA goes underground, by sea and across undeveloped areas on land to hide and

defend its smuggling activity, whereas the terrain presents it with limitations and constraints.

Regardless of globalization, the business of NSAs‘ arming is still subordinated to both time

and space and cannot be executed at distance. Therefore, understanding the past and present

arms smuggling of NSAs is deeply connected to the geographic profile of the theater of

operation. NSAs‘ arming analysis is basically geo-strategic; rebels seeking to acquire

weapons first consider the geographic conditions of their environment: the implication of

being in a landlocked area or an island, the topography of the borders, the security situation

along the borders, the relations between the rebels and neighboring countries and the

smuggling routes they might use. These causal conditions are crucial whether internet and

mobile phone services are available or not and whether an NSA is transnational or regional.

An analysis of Hezbollah‘s powerful weapons arsenal should focus on Syria‘s role as

a friendly transit state between Iran and Lebanon and the porous Lebanese border. Syria‘s

strategic importance to both Iran and Hezbollah explains why they are extremely committed

to backing the Assad regime. Living in an island-state, an NSA has a greater challenge to

acquire weapons than in a country bordering other countries. At the same time, maritime

borders are the hardest to block, and an NSA fighting a country with a long coastline and

possessing logistic skills has a great advantage. The LTTE‘s naval fleet that smuggled

weapons from around the world into Sri Lanka is a good example. Colombia borders five

states and has a long coastline. The FARC could easily smuggle weapons on land or via the

sea into their sanctuaries in southern Colombia, and if one border was well-secured they

could use another. Geography facilitates the smuggling system of the FARC.In light of

growing interception capabilities by the states‘ security services, the underground world is

maybe the last secure channel for NSAs to smuggle weapons safely. Being blocked on land

and on sea by Israel and partly by Egypt, the Hamas movement took advantage of the terrain

in North Sinai, digging hundreds of tunnels across the border with Egypt and smuggling a

huge amount of weapons into the Gaza Strip. Geo-strategic considerations of NSAs, some of

which have not changed for centuries, overshadow the outcomes of globalization.

Arms smuggling networks go through porous borders manifesting weak governments,

failed states and certain geographic profiles, but this is not a ―borderless world‖ in a global

society as radical advocators of globalization argue. Many states failed to secure their borders

against arms smuggling though they possessed powerful regular armies, but borders are far

320

from being a diminishing function and in some cases neighboring countries jointly improve

the security along their borders, reducing the smuggling problem, as in the cases of India-

Bangladesh, Thailand-Malaysia and Israel-Egypt. In this context, today‘s states are better

equipped to respond and counter the arms smuggling problem. Operational intelligence and

modern military technologies enable states to intercept arms shipments at an early stage and

target arms brokers across the borders. The personal nature of mobile phones serves counter-

smuggling efforts.

The final part of the globalization segment deals with the concepts of Systems of

systems (SOS) and of Federation of Systems (FOS) which are useful theoretical toll for

explainingthe sophistication and strength of contemporarysmuggling networks. The study

findsthat complex smuggling networks operated in the pre-global world, demonstrating

organizational diversity and geographic distribution, such as in Indochina in the mid-

nineteenth century and the arming of the American Revolution in the late eighteenth century.

But modern technology has taken smuggling of weapons to a new level. The growing

integration between government and non-government players in the illicit arms trade has

created complicated structures. For example, the arms smuggling activity of Hamasfocused

on transporting high quality weapons systems, especially rockets, from Iran into Gaza

through various geographical arenas and transport routes. The smuggling of Iranian weapons

into Gaza demonstrates SOS because a combination of states and NSAs jointly executed

smuggling operations. The smuggling controllers, sitting in Hamas' headquarters in Syria, the

members of the Hamas military wing who received the weapons, the operators of the Rafah

tunnels and smuggling activities, Bedouin smugglers and weapons traffickers in southern

Sinai, members of the IRGC's Quds Force in Iran, Syria and Lebanon and arms dealers in

Sudan and Yemen– are all components who differ in their background, but share a common

goal, knowingly or unknowingly – to smuggle arms to the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This

factor, as well as their ability to cooperate, is vital components in the system's formation and

its ability to survive. Each of these elements had a separate well defined role and there was

little mobility between them. For instance, cases of Iranian military officials trafficking

weapons to the Gaza Strip themselves are unheard of, probably for reasons of

security.Hamas' smuggling system, dispersed over a large territory, featured a heterogeneous

national, cultural, and political system. Modern communication secured connectivity between

the system components. They were independent of one another and useful in their own right,

321

loosely connected, cooperating for economic and political interests. For instance, Sudanese

and Egyptian gunrunners smuggled work-seekers and narcotics independently.

The growing instability in the Middle East in recent years demonstrates the

evolutionary dimension of the SOS. Their structure and purpose have been modified in light

of strategic changes. Iran temporarily stopped sending weapons to Hamas due to Hamas‘

support of the Syrian rebels – renewing its support only after the Hamas repented when it lost

the support of the deposed Moslem Brotherhood regime in Egypt. Bedouin tribes in Sinai

who used to smuggle weapons for Palestinian groups in Gaza became weapons‘ customers,

waging war against the Egyptian government after the removal of the Moslem Brotherhood

rule. Terror infrastructures in Gaza who used to be assisted by arms dealers and smugglers in

Sinai are now assisting Jihadigroups in Egypt. The Egyptian army is struggling to defeat

Ansar Bait al Muqadas and other local Jihadi NSAs because Sinai is a large weapons and

explosives arsenal, making it very easy for the Jihadists to revolt. The Federation of Systems

dominant in northeast Africa has proved to be flexible, changing some of its components and

labor division, using the advantages of globalization.

Links between black arms markets demonstrates a higher level of system complexity,

a FOS. The thesis reveals that illicit arms trades in East Asia, Yemen and the Horn of Africa

and North Africa are connected because Chinese weapons are delivered or smuggled to East

Africa, finding theirway to arms markets in Sudan and Eritrea moving on to NSAs in Egypt

and Gaza that are usingLibyan arms markets. The latter serve rebel groups in Sudan and

Nigeria too. Compared to the arming system of Hamas and Jihadist groups in Egypt, the

federation of black arms markets features a bigger system with a very limited amount of

centralized control and authority. Using Krygiel terminology, these markets are much more

heterogeneous along trans-national dimensions, demonstrating much greater geographic

dispersion because they are located in different continents. Each arms market operates

independently possessing its own sources of goods and client NSAs; therefore they are

characterized by significant autonomy.856

The FOS of the black arms markets features some

degree of competition due to numerous arms traders while Iran has been Hamas‘ sole source

of advanced weapons systems. Finally, the FOS is based on shared economic interests more

than the SOS of Hamas arming that has featured tighter control because Hamas and the

Iranian Quds Force are centralized military organizations.

856

Sage and Cuppan, ―Systems Engineering,‖328.

322

Adapting a system perspective of the global arms trade has significant implications

forcounter insurgency and counter terrorcampaigns. Blocking the smuggling of weapons by

SOS and POS is more challenging than in the past because thesmuggling networks have

remarkable funding and logistic capabilities. They are flexible, ready to exploit new sources

of weapons and use new smuggling routes. The black arms markets are not isolated but

connected to each other and that makes them sustainable. A divided international community

cannot cope with the proliferation of weapons among NSAs because some states are part of

the smuggling systems and the international community lacks enforcing tools against them.

Western leaders prefer to deal with regional crises such as civil wars and atrocities in Arab

and African countries usinga policy of containment instead of massive direct intervention.

Therefore UN resolutions about monitoring the global arms trade are ineffective.

Military Thought in light of NSAs’ Arming

This final segment of the thesis discusses several theoretical propositions about state-NSA

conflicts, known as a-symmetric war, in light of other existing knowledge. The

comprehensive analysis of NSAs‘ arming enables the thesis to debate the nature of war.

Some scholars argue the nature of war has changed because states are fighting mainly NSAs

and the rival sides engage in small wars. They regard NSAs as decentralized, formless

networks, waging local terror and guerrilla warfare, arming with light weapons, fighting

amongst the people and therefore hard to target. The nation state is allegedly fighting for its

supremacy. Its security forces often lack utility, and instead of trying to defeat NSAs by

military means they should mobilize the will of the people. The current thesis rejects this

view. NSAs were always present, challenging governments‘ rule, waging both irregular and

regular wars. There is nothing new with a-symmetric wars; medieval peasants fighting with

bows and arrows against mounted cavalry manifested a-symmetrytoo.857

Though Abu-

Mus‗ab al Suri advocated for a decentralized individual Jihad it remains a minor part of the

global terror which is directed through centralized organizations. Present NSAs are a

heterogeneous category, featuring different structures, military doctrines, tactics and

armament profiles. Referring to NSAs as a monolithic group is misleading. Small wars and a-

symmetric wars are not the same thing and contemporary NSAs fighting conventional wars

differ from classical insurgents and terrorists. They wage symmetric and high-intensity

warfare against states, such as the war between ISIS and the Iraqi army. Some NSAs, such as

857

Schweitzer and Oreg, 240-243; Harkabi,War, 125.

323

Hamas and Hezbollah, build their force before or after wars rather than during campaigns,

undermining the human dimension which is the center of small wars. 858

Theoretical writing on the a-symmetric wars usually emphasizes the military imbalance

between states and NSAs which are weaker. The thesis reveals that in reality this is not

always the case, including the arming dimension. The U.S. Army is much better armed than

the Afghan Taliban and the Iraqi insurgents. But the Afghan Army and the Iraqi Army are

facing great difficulties fighting local NSAs and the Nigerian Army is engaging the powerful

Boko Haram. Mali‘s military failed to engage the AQIM without French support. In many

ongoing conflicts NSAs are equipped with heavy and modern weapons systems – sometimes

superior to the states‘ military forces.Van Creveld and Smith highlight the lightly armed

NSAs, but new processes have emerged and not all insurgents are fighting with knives and

rifles. Committed to their concept of huge military imbalance between states and NSAs,

Smith and Van Creveld marginalize the fact that armed groups have exploited globalization

to build up their force and execute sophisticated operations. Thecurrent study suggests the

importance of exploring actual arming conditions of each NSA instead of drawing line at

1945 as Smith and Van Creveld do.

NSAs can secure weapons supplies via a state sponsor and mainly the black arms

trade. The turmoil in the Middle East has escalated these methods. In Libya, Yemen, Syria,

and Iraq armed NSAs have seized large parts of the country, threatening to remove the central

governments that have failed to repulse them. In contrast to the concept of Van Creveld and

Smith, these NSAs occupy the second or the third stage of Mao`s model of insurgency.

Moreover, the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas are running a state within a state,

exploiting the weakness of the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Authority. These

NSAs have no problems in operating training camps, facilitating smuggling of weapons and

build weapons storages in areas undertheir control. The better armed NSAs are usually the

more military-type organizations, featuring a hierarchical structure, headquarters, training

camps, arms depots and uniforms.Even in the nineteenth century military scholars forecasted

this trend, arguing that the proliferation of modern weapons via global trade greatly

strengthens the ―savages‖ against ―civilized powers.859

‖ Giap‘s old argument that ―an army

[of a rebel group]fighting for a cause can with appropriate strategy and tactics… conquer a

858

Smith, 301-304, 327-331; Schweitzer and Oreg, 240-243; Harkabi,War, 125. 859

Maguire Miller. ―Differences between Guerrilla and Regular Warfare,‖ in Walter Laqueur, ed.,The Guerrilla

Reader. A Historical Anthology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 118-121.

324

modern army of aggressive imperialism,‖ is not valid in numerous contemporary conflicts

between states and well-armed and funded NSAs. The Vietminh and later the Viet Cong

possessed modern weapons too, but today NSAs‘ arming is a more important factor than

before. 860

Contemporary NSAs have a great advantage over past NSAs because they can attack

soft targets in the heart of the rival government, sending suicide bombers or shelling

residential areas from a distance using civilians as a human shield. They undermine the

sovereignty of states that face greater constraints than before in fighting NSAs, due to

growing awareness of fatalities among bystanders and their own forces. In the nineteenth

century, the Irish Volunteers attacked strategic targets in London too but that was an

exception. Today, quite a few well-funded NSAs, featuring highly operational skills and

cross-border connections can launch a worldwide campaign against a state, focusing on

civilian targets. The Chechens fought the Russians both in Grozny and in Moscow; Hezbollah

fought Israel in South Lebanon, North Israel and in many foreign countries. NSAs are not

necessarily weaker than states and any power comparison should take into consideration a

variety of factors, such as national morale, internal cohesion andinternational support. In the

same manner, a state‘s capacity to counter rebellious NSAs should not be underestimated.

Advanced military technologies and surveillance skills have offered governments better tools

to counter NSAs and their arming efforts. States could attack NSAs‘ interests overseas,

targeting their sanctuaries and inflicting heavy damages.

Al Qaeda strategists read and might be influenced by Mao‘s guerrilla doctrine. Also,

scholars use classical guerrilla texts to explain on-going state-NSA conflicts. The implication

however could be problematic. Suicide terrorismand martyrdom attacks of Jihadist NSAs

should not be confused with the Maoist‘s guerrilla doctrine. Their religious-based strategy

contrasts the core of Mao thought. Devoted to their ideology, Jihadists bombers do not

attempt ―to preserve the force,‖ as classical insurgents do. On the contrary – what is

important for them is the relative pay-off: how much damage has been caused in return for

the martyr's life.Revolutionary strategists like Guevara noted that guerrilla ―is a means –

means to an end… one must use the concept of guerrilla warfare in the limited sense of a

860

Giap, People‟s War, 28.

325

method of struggle in order to gain that end,‖ while some Jihadist as well as Hezbollah

leaders emphasized the endless resistance against Israel and the United States. 861

Mao and Giap emphasized the popular profile of fighting against a stronger enemy,

calling it a ―people‘s war.‖ Giap noted the goal is ―to educate, mobilize, organize and arm the

whole people in order that they might take part in the resistance.‖ Guerrilla units are

composed of the people.862

But, many of the Salafi-Jihadi groups are closed elite groups,

targeting their own people. In Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt and other states, Jihadist NSAs

have been massacring civilians and security forces, claiming they are ―infidels.‖ Former

AQAP‘s commander, Al Muqrin, states: ―To anyone who is an enemy of God and his

Prophet we say, we have come to slaughter you.‖ It is doubtful they are keen to ―win the will

of the people.‖ Both the activity of well-armed Jihadist NSAs and the writing of al Qaeda‘s

military strategists reveal a different picture to that which some scholars portray. Jihadi NSAs

have a clear strategy that some mistakenly call ―irrational,‖ to establish an Islamic caliphate.

While Mao and Giap‘s doctrines are embedded with national-cultural influences, Jihadist

scholars advocate for a supranational Islamic community. Abu Mus‗ab al Suri criticized al

Qaeda for serving ―regional aims‖ rather than the agenda of global Jihad. However, in Mali,

Somalia, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Jihadi NSAs have become more localized, attempting to

seize land and establish some type of Islamic government. They use suicide terror as well as

guerrilla and regular warfare to implement a strategic goal of forming a new world system.863

Contemporary NSAs depart from Mao‘s doctrine in another respect. Mao

acknowledged that the supply of weapons and ammunition is most difficult but shortage of

arms was an operational advantage since it promoted the militarization of the people and the

conduct of guerrilla warfare which Mao saw as the key to victory. Giap, like Mao, regarded

self-reliance as a prominent feature of the resistance and a manifestation of the spirit of the

Communist party rather than being a constraint. Jihadist strategists have called for endless

conflict with the United States and Israel, but unlike the Vietminh and the Red Army they

enjoy easy access to weapons supplies. Departing from a strategy of self-reliance, they are

becoming more militarized rather than attempting to militarize the people.864

861

Che Guevara,Che Guevara Speaks. Selected Speeches and writings(New york: Pathfinder, 1967), 73. 862

Giap, Pepole‟s War, 27. 863

Tira, ―Limitations,‖72-73; Smith, 301-305; Cigar,Al Qa„ida, 129; Phillip Holtmam, Abu Mus „ab Al Suri‟ s

Jihad Concept(Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 2009), 120, 145. 864

Mao, On Guerilla Warfare, 44-46, 71-72, 87, 97; Giap, People‟s War, 55, 103, 135; Cigar, Al Qa„ida, 123.

326

Mao and Lenin emphasized the historical-cultural context of a guerrilla movement,

rejecting ―abstract generalizations‖ on international guerrilla warfare. But the circulation of

weapons among different war zones, the operation of trans-Atlantic smuggling networks, the

distribution of explosive skills via the internet and mobile phones all demonstrate strong

transnational links. The arming of different NSAs makes them more homogenous, tactically

and operationally, such as the growing use of IEDs in guerrilla and terror campaigns across

the world and the adoption of suicide terrorism by a growing number of Salafi-Jihadi‘s

NSAs.865

Analyzing NSAs‘ arming systems, the thesis outlines the continuing importance of

Mao‘s perception of the role of the ―base areas,‖ serving as strategic backup for the guerrilla

forces. NSAs‘ sanctuaries are vital for the buildup of their force, particularly when they

possess heavy weapons systems. NSAs use sanctuaries for arms manufacturing, storage,

testing and training sites. Connecting to supply lines of weapons, they are located in remote

areas of the target state and across the borders in neighboring countries. NSAs‘ sanctuaries

highlight the subordination of state-NSA conflicts to inter-state relations. Governments‘

ability to mobilize security cooperation of a neighboring country is the key to securing

borders and blocking smuggling routes.

Theoretically, Mao argued that being logistically self-reliant the guerrilla is

independent of provision lines that could be attacked by the enemy, but many of today‘s

NSAs act differently. The more weapons NSAs obtain from external sources, the greater they

are dependent on supply lines. Mao argued that rebels get most of their weapons at the front

sending them back to the rear, while contemporary NSAs acquire most of their ammunition

through cross-border sanctuaries. Weapons smuggling networks are the supply lines of

rebellious NSAs; mostly they are safe from being blocked because of lack of unity in the

international community, mistrust among neighboring countries and due to geographic

conditions. In recent decades, rarely was an NSA‗s operational capability maintainedafter its

supply lines were intercepted. For example, the Sri Lankan army defeated the powerful

LTTE, among other reasons, because it destroyed the LTTE‘s cargo fleet. Securing porous

borders is the key to crippling rebellious NSAs. In previous times military strategists

865

Mao, On Guerilla Warfare, 48-50.

327

encouraged commanders to wage incendiary attacks against the enemy‘s storehouses and

supply lines. This advice is relevant to present state-NSA‘s conflicts.866

The Al Qaeda organization and other Jihadist groups re-defined weapons systems in

two ways: the 9/11 attacks demonstratedan NSA seizing an enemy asset and turning it into a

deadly weapon.Causing death on a grand scale was a goal in itself. Suicide bombing

manifests integration between the warrior and his weapon, making them a deadly tool. As

Hoffman notes, the intensive use of suicide bombers, the large scale of devastating terror

attacks using complex devices and the transnational profile of Al Qaeda have made terrorism

more lethal.Abu Mus‗ab al Suri regarded decentralized and leaderless terror cells as a key for

the victory of the Moslem World over the West. But, the history of revolts demonstrates that

Al Suri‘s individual doctrine is not realistic. Engaging powerful foes, Jihadist NSAs cannot

facilitate their strategy without centralized organization.Thus, in contrast to Abu Mus‗ab al

Suri‘sanalysis, ISIS, the leading Jihadi group of the present time is seizingterritory in Syria

and Iraq through ―open front,‖ after forming regular force, aiming to establish an Islamic

state.867

State-NSA conflicts are a permanent component of the international world system;

therefore, rebel groups will always require arms and ammunition using mainly the black arms

trade. A growing number of NSAs might acquire rockets and missiles, but usually NSAs will

continue to be weak in weaponry compared to states, lacking the skills and logistic

requirements to maintain and operate heavier weapons systems like fighter aircraft and battle

ships. New technologies, listed in the next paragraphs, might help NSAs to attack

governments‘ interests, but in the near future rebel groups will focus on acquisition and

transportation of weapons as before.

In 2012 in the United States, rifle parts were printed for the first time using

three dimension technologies(3D).Scientists forecast that in the future people

might fabricate weapons when and where they need them. When available in

mass production, the 3D printing technology could remarkably facilitate

NSAs‘ arming efforts with fewer security risks, creating a serious problem of

866

Sun Tzu, Tha Art of War(Minneapolis: Filiquarian Publishing, 2006),101-102. 867

Harkabi, War, 192-193.

328

weapons control for governments. For the time being, weapons are physical

artifacts and trafficking will remain a challenge for rebellious NSAs.868

NSAs might escalate the use of cyber terrorism against states. A single

terrorist in a remote location could potentially inflict tremendous damage on a

state, attacking critical infrastructure, demonstrating a lethal global weapon.

Armed NSAs, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have conducted simple to

moderate cyber-attacks, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS),

defacement of government Internet sites and attacks on servers, data banks,

and computer systems of government and private companies. Hiring highly

skilled hackers or assisted by friendly states possessing extreme cyber

weapons, NSAs might initiate destructive attacks against core operational

systems of critical infrastructures, such as water, electricity, and public

transportation. At present, NSAs lack the advanced technologies and

operational intelligence needed for these kinds of attacks, which anyway could

not guarantee a regime change.869

NSAs that are committed to terror might intensify the use of modern

transportation, aircraft and trains, to execute spectacular attacks. They could

target sensitive infrastructures such as gas and nuclear installations, causing

mass fatalities.

Summary

The thesis concludes that conflicts involving rulers and governments versus rebel groups

have been a persistent aspect of the world‘s politics. Rebels have always faced the challenge

to build military force including acquisition of arms, although arming was not necessarily the

most important factor that shaped the outcomes of their struggle. Over the history of

rebellion, rebel groups used the same methods to obtain weapons: self-production, stealing

and looting, state sponsorship and illicit arms trade. A set of factors, political, social, cultural,

technological and organizational, both facilitated and constrained NSAs‘ ability to practise

868

Hod Lipson and Melba Kurman, Fabricated: The New World of 3D Printing.The Premise and Peril of a

Machine that Can Make almost Anything (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013). 869

Gabi Sibon, Daniel Cohen and Aviv Rotbart. ―The Cyber Threat of Terrorist Organizations,‖Military and

Strategic Affairs4,3(December 2013): 1-20 (Hebrew).

329

the four methods of arming. As a result the dynamic of the arming process of NSAs has

changed significantly over time.

One of the major changes in the history of rebel groups is that from the nineteenth century,

they have employed mainly external sources to acquire weapons rather than self-production

because the technology of modern weapons is more difficult to improvise. Another dramatic

development, dating from the second half of the twentieth century is the intensive use of

IEDs by armed NSAs, enabling them to reduce the power imbalance against the state. Present

NSAs could easily acquire and ship weapons systems over long distances using the

mechanisms of globalization. Therefore they could sustain long lasting wars against much

stronger foes. Still, arms smuggling remains a time-place-based challenge for NSAs, while

governments improve their counter-smuggling skills. Consequently, in the near future NSAs‘

efforts to obtain weapons will dominate their conflicts against states.

In light of the evidence presented here, this thesis does not accept that a single theoretical

model can fully explain how every NSA might seek to arm themselves. The complex history

of warfare and rebellion should encourage scholars of NSAs to explore the distinctive

circumstances of each NSA, including their geo-strategic position, financial resources, social-

cultural background, and operational approach.

330

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