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HC 63-xxiv

House of Commons

European Scrutiny Committee

The Convention on the Future of Europe and the Role of National Parliaments

Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2002-03

HC 63-xxiv Published on 16 June 2003

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House of Commons

European Scrutiny Committee

The Convention on the Future of Europe and the Role of National Parliaments

Twenty–fourth Report of Session 2002–03

Report, together with formal minutes

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 5 June 2003

The European Scrutiny Committee

The European Scrutiny Committee is appointed under Standing Order No.143 to examine European Union documents and— a) to report its opinion on the legal and political importance of each such document and, where it

considers appropriate, to report also on the reasons for its opinion and on any matters of principle, policy or law which may be affected;

b) to make recommendations for the further consideration of any such document pursuant to Standing Order No. 119 (European Standing Committees); and

c) to consider any issue arising upon any such document or group of documents, or related matters.

The expression ‘European Union document’ covers — i) any proposal under the Community Treaties for legislation by the Council or the Council acting

jointly with the European Parliament;

ii) any document which is published for submission to the European Council, the Council or the European Central Bank;

iii) any proposal for a common strategy, a joint action or a common position under Title V of the Treaty on European Union which is prepared for submission to the Council or to the European Council;

iv) any proposal for a common position, framework decision, decision or a convention under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union which is prepared for submission to the Council;

v) any document (not falling within (ii), (iii) or (iv) above) which is published by one Union institution for or with a view to submission to another Union institution and which does not relate exclusively to consideration of any proposal for legislation;

vi) any other document relating to European Union matters deposited in the House by a Minister of the Crown.

The Committee’s powers are set out in Standing Order No. 143. The scrutiny reserve resolution, passed by the House, provides that Ministers should not give agreement to EU proposals which have not been cleared by the European Scrutiny Committee, or on which, when they have been recommended by the Committee for debate, the House has not yet agreed a resolution. The scrutiny reserve resolution is printed with the House’s Standing Orders, which are available at www.parliament.uk.

Current membership

Mr Jimmy Hood MP (Labour, Clydesdale) (Chairman) Mr Richard Bacon MP (Conservative, South Norfolk) Mr Colin Breed MP (Liberal Democrat, Cornwall South East) Mr William Cash MP (Conservative, Stone) Mr Michael Connarty MP (Labour, Falkirk East) Tony Cunningham MP (Labour, Workington) Mr Wayne David MP (Labour, Caerphilly) Mr Terry Davis MP (Labour, Birmingham Hodge Hill) Jim Dobbin MP (Labour, Heywood and Middleton) Mr Mark Hendrick MP (Labour, Preston) Miss Anne McIntosh MP (Conservative, Vale of York) Mr Jim Marshall MP (Labour, Leicester South) Angus Robertson MP (SNP, Moray) John Robertson MP (Labour, Glasgow Anniesland) Mr Anthony Steen MP (Conservative, Totnes) Mr Bill Tynan MP (Labour, Hamilton South)

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 3292/5465. The Committee’s e-mail address is [email protected]

ESC, 24th Report, Session 2002-03 1

Contents

Report Page

Summary 3

Introduction 5

The role of national parliaments 6 The EU’s legislative process 7

Public meetings of the Council 7 National parliament scrutiny reserves 8 Interval between COREPER and Council 9 Legislative procedures 10 Information for national parliaments 10 Co-decision and conciliation 10 The Commission and national parliaments 11

Subsidiarity and proportionality 11 Collective activity by national parliaments 13

COSAC 14 Scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy 14 Scrutiny of Europol 15

Election of the Commission President 15 General statement on the role of national parliaments 15 Conclusion 16

The Convention’s proposals 17

The Convention 21

Conclusions and recommendations 23

Formal minutes 24


Summary

The Report follows up some of the proposals made in our Report on Democracy and accountability in the EU and the role of national parliaments in June 2002, and also highlights the more significant proposals in the draft treaty articles produced by the Convention’s Praesidium.

The role of national parliaments

National parliaments do not want a new institution to represent them, or to obstruct or delay the EU’s legislative process, but do need information and the time to express views before decisions are made. They require these, above all, in order to make their own governments accountable.

One of the most important requirements is that the Council of Ministers should meet in public when legislating; otherwise the role of individual Ministers cannot be reliably ascertained and they cannot therefore be held to account. We strongly support the provision in the draft Articles that the Council shall meet in public when legislating.

There should be a full transcript of Council debates held in public, and preferably also audio and video recordings. The principle of an official, public record of Council debates held in public is so important it should be provided for in the constitutional treaty.

Where a legislative proposal is placed on a Council agenda for decision, the agenda should indicate whether any national parliament scrutiny reserves are outstanding, and the Council should publish its reasons if it nevertheless proceeds.

Unless the Council adopts a Commission legislative proposal without amendment, ten clear days should elapse between consideration of the item by COREPER and the Council adopting a common position, except in cases of urgency. Rejecting this for the sake of the ‘efficiency’ of the legislative process would indicate that scrutiny by national parliaments is of such little importance that a pause of even a few days is unacceptable; the needs of national parliaments need to be built into the EU’s legislative system rather than recognised only when wholly convenient.

We urge that Council meetings in public when legislating be only the start of creating a more orderly and transparent legislative process.

We are disappointed that the Convention seems likely to recommend an extension of the co-decision procedure without any consideration of how the process could be made more transparent.

Two weeks’ notice should be given of new provisions and exceptions to be proposed in Conciliation Committees, unless these meet certain conditions.

The Commission should have a duty to respond promptly to requests for information and questions from national parliaments or their committees about its proposals.

The Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality is important in giving national

4 ESC, 24th Report, Session 2002-03

parliaments for the first time a formal role in the EU’s legislative process, but is inadequate because national parliaments’ objections could simply be overridden. We would strengthen the relevant Protocol in four ways. The early-warning mechanism should cover proportionality as well as subsidiarity. The Commission should be required to give detailed reasons, related to the national parliaments’ objections, for proceeding regardless. There should be provision for objections to be made following the convening of a Conciliation Committee. The Commission should be required to withdraw its proposal if two-thirds of national parliaments or their chambers object.

Greater inter-parliamentary co-operation, especially meetings bringing together sectoral or departmental committees, could be achieved informally, without treaty articles. Meetings involving national parliamentarians and MEPs should be jointly organised; the national parliament input to this could best be provided through COSAC.

There should be regular meetings of members of the defence, foreign affairs and European affairs committees of national parliaments to scrutinise the European Security and Defence Policy.

If the Commission President is to be elected, national parliamentarians as well as MEPs should have voting rights.

There should be a statement in the Protocol on the role of national parliaments acknowledging the importance of the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s activities.

The Convention’s proposals

The draft Articles must be taken seriously, but will go through many more stages before any are finally agreed.

Articles to which the House should pay particular attention, because of problems with them or because of their significance, include those relating to the EU exercising its competences ‘in the Community way’, the EU’s legal personality, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU competences, the ‘flexibility clause’, decision-making in the European Council, the Presidency of the European Council and Council formations, qualified majority voting, co-decision, the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’, the EU’s external action, own resources, co-operation among countries which have adopted the euro, and ratification of treaty changes.

The Convention

The Convention has been extremely valuable as a way of preparing for the Inter-Governmental Conference openly, and involving parliamentarians fully in that preparation. However, the Convention is not a representative body; making decisions without voting has given too much power to the Praesidium; and the Convention has not fully responded to the Laeken Declaration’s emphasis on democracy and transparency. Its work will be an extremely important contribution to the IGC, but its recommendations will need to be carefully considered by national parliaments, as well as governments, well before the IGC.


Introduction

1. There has been increasing recognition of the potential importance of the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Convention, which consists of representatives of governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the European Commission, began work in February 2002 and is due to report to the European Council on 20 June this year.1 Since the beginning of 2003 it has been compiling a draft constitutional treaty or constitution to replace the existing treaties (the first full draft of which was published by its Praesidium on 27–28 May), and it is unclear to what extent the Inter-Governmental Conference which will subsequently consider the Convention’s work will be willing to reopen issues on which there was consensus in the Convention. Depending on what the Convention is able to agree between now and mid-June, the debates currently under way there could determine the organisation of the EU for decades to come.

2. We have taken a consistent interest in the Convention since it was first agreed there should be one, and reported in November 2001 on how we thought it should operate.2 Our major examination of the issues debated in the Convention was our Report on Democracy and accountability in the EU and the role of national parliaments, published in June 2002.3

3. The central problem we sought to address there was the disconnection or disengagement between citizens and EU institutions — reflecting one of the main themes in the European Council’s Laeken Declaration, which provided the terms of reference for the Convention. However, the work of the Convention ranges much wider. We are currently, for example, completing an inquiry into its proposals relating to the criminal law. We have recently taken evidence from the Government’s representative on the Convention, the Rt Hon Peter Hain, on that and other aspects of the Convention’s work.4

4. In this Report we have two aims: to follow up some of the proposals we made in Democracy and accountability in the EU and the role of national parliaments, and to highlight some of the more significant proposals in the draft treaty articles produced by the Convention’s Praesidium. We also make some observations on the Convention itself. References here to the draft constitutional treaty are to the version published on 27 and 28 May.5

1 It is likely that the Convention will continue to sit into July in order to complete its consideration of Part III of the

constitutional treaty.

2 Fifth Report from the European Scrutiny Committee, 2001-02, HC 152-v, Convention to prepare for the 2004 Inter-Governmental Conference.

3 Thirty-third Report, 2001-02, HC 152-xxxiii.

4 Taken on 25 March; to be published in HC 554-II; available on the Committee’s website. References to ‘Q’ in this Report are to that evidence.

5 CONV 724/1/03 and CONV 725/03.The draft preamble (CONV 722/03) and the revised version of Part I, Title IV on Institutions (CONV 770/03) have also been used.



5. There has been wide agreement in the Convention and outside that the involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the EU should be increased, but much less agreement on what is required to achieve this. This matters because national parliaments have considerable potential to increase democratic pressures in the EU and to help to link citizens to the EU institutions and decision-making, both through influencing their own Ministers in the Council and through expressing views to the Commission and the European Parliament. This potential exists because national parliaments are closer to their citizens than any EU institution is. Numbers illustrate the point: there will be about 10,000 national parliamentarians in the enlarged EU, compared with just over 700 MEPs. Also, as we have argued before, national parliaments reflect the culture and history of their country and their Members can spend more of their time in their constituencies.6 The EU can ill afford to neglect such a powerful source of democratic legitimacy.

6. What national parliaments do not want is clear. They do not want, and have not requested, a new institution to represent them. They do not wish to obstruct or delay the EU’s legislative process, except to provide the small amounts of time needed for parliamentary scrutiny and in respect of proposals breaching the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (as discussed below). Nor, again, have they any wish to usurp the role of the European Parliament or other institutions. National parliaments and the European Parliament have complementary roles, and can jointly contribute to the ‘parliamentarisation’ of the EU sought by the European Parliament.7 Some of what we seek is also advocated by many MEPs, notably public meetings of the Council when legislating.

7. The requirements of national parliaments are in principle simple: information and the time to express views before decisions are made. They require these, above all, in order to fulfil their acknowledged vital role of making their own governments accountable. National parliaments also need proper procedures to ensure this happens.

8. Some changes, such as the proposed early-warning mechanism relating to subsidiarity, have attracted wide support in the Convention, but it is not clear that what the Convention has so far proposed will make a significant difference in practice to the role of national parliaments in the EU. Some proposals made on behalf of national parliaments have been objected to as potentially affecting the freedom of action of one of the EU institutions or as clashing with some other priority, such as the ‘efficiency’ of the legislative process. In practice, since they do not constitute an EU institution, national parliaments are sometimes treated less favourably than organisations which have a clearer status in the EU, such as the Committee of the Regions.8 It is for these reasons, and because European legislation affects people in the UK, that we have returned to the matters discussed in our earlier Report, to insist that national parliaments’ ability to scrutinise their own

6 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 3.

7 See the European Parliament’s resolution of 7 February on relations with national parliaments (P5-TA (2002) 0058) and the ‘Napolitano report’ of January 2002 on that subject (A5-0023/2002).

8 e.g. as regards a right of direct access to the European Court of Justice on subsidiarity matters.


governments and to act as a link between citizens and the EU is treated as pivotal, and thereby to strengthen democracy in the EU.

9. As well as referring back to our previous Report, we have drawn on the report of the Convention’s working group on national parliaments (WG IV),9 oral evidence from Mr Hain, amendments to the first version of the draft constitutional treaty put forward by Gisela Stuart, David Heathcoat-Amory and Lord Tomlinson (UK parliamentary representatives on the Convention) and others, and the debates in the Standing Committee on the Convention.

The EU’s legislative process

10. Other than in respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, national parliaments have not sought a formal role in the EU’s legislative process. However, it is essential that the legislative process does not continue to operate in a way which significantly reduces their ability to make their own governments accountable.

Public meetings of the Council

11. One of the most important requirements is that the Council of Ministers should meet in public when legislating. Not only is legislating in secret objectionable in principle, but, whereas members of the Council of Ministers individually are in theory accountable to their national parliaments and their electors, the role of individual Ministers in collective decisions arrived at secretly cannot be reliably ascertained and Ministers therefore cannot be held to account. Our previous Report emphasised the need for the Council to meet in public when legislating, noting that consequential changes would need to include the European Council also meeting in public when legislating, Council documents being published without the policy stances of Member States being blanked out, and reform of the system of agreeing ‘A points’ without discussion.10 Some progress was made at the Seville European Council, but public meetings were limited to parts of the legislative process and to legislation subject to co-decision by the Council and the European Parliament.

12. WG IV stated that ‘more openness and transparency in the work of the Council was essential to facilitate and improve the active involvement of national parliaments in the EU’. It recommended that ‘The Council should act in public in all cases where it exercises its legislative functions. Policy coordination as well as other activities should also be carried out with open doors as much as possible. Clear reasons should be given when closed sessions were deemed necessary.’11 Working group IX on the simplification of legislative and other instruments stated that ‘To reinforce clarity, it is not sufficient to simplify procedures or instruments; the Institutions must sit in public when they are exercising legislative functions, i.e. when they are defining the fundamental policy choices of the Union’s action.’12

9 CONV 353/02.

10 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, paras. 18-27.

11 CONV 353/02, paras. 7-8.

12 CONV 424/02, p. 22.


13. We strongly support the provision in the draft constitutional treaty that the Council shall meet in public when legislating.13 We share the view of WG IV that the Council should normally meet in public except when it specifically decides not to do so, in which case it should publish its reasons for meeting in private, but holding all legislative meetings of the Council in public would still be a historic step towards a more accountable EU. (We note that the draft Article should refer to when the Council is discussing or adopting a legislative proposal, rather than ‘discussing and adopting’.)

14. However, to be accountable, it is not enough for the Council simply to meet in public: a record of the debate is also required. It will be difficult for any national parliament to send an observer to all Council meetings; there is no reliable way of determining in advance which Council meetings will prove important; and without an agreed record of what was said and done there will be endless scope for differences of interpretation. Any Member of a national parliament will be aware of how much harder it would be to hold Ministers to account without an official transcript of debates. WG IV recommended that ‘Records of Council proceedings should be sent within 10 days to the European Parliament and the national parliaments, parallel to the transmission to governments.’14 We believe such a record of proceedings should include a full transcript, as in national parliaments, and preferably also audio and video recordings.

15. The principle of an official, public record of Council proceedings taking place in public is so important that it should be provided for in the constitutional treaty itself, and we therefore propose the following addition at the end of article I-49.2 (which refers to meetings of the European Parliament and the Council in public):

‘Each shall publish promptly a transcript of such proceedings held in public.’

National parliament scrutiny reserves

16. Presidencies frequently press governments to agree to legislative measures which national parliaments have not had time to consider and on which national parliament scrutiny reserves have been placed. In our previous Report we listed recent examples of inadequate time for consultation, and emphasised that ‘time for scrutiny by national parliaments should be seen not as an optional add-on but as a fundamental aspect of accountability.’ We called for either incorporation of national scrutiny reserves into EU procedures or a minimum length of time between consideration of a text by COREPER (or publication of a new text) and its agreement by the Council, in either case with tightly-drawn provisions allowing for cases of urgency.15 WG IV recommended that ‘Parliamentary scrutiny reserves should be given a clearer status within the Council’s rules of procedure. Such reserves should furthermore have a specified time limit, so as not to unnecessarily block the decision procedure.’16

17. Specifying an overall time limit for scrutiny is difficult, since the opportunity for scrutiny by national parliaments may depend on governments providing necessary

13 Article I-49.

14 CONV 353/02, para. 8.

15 HC 152-xxxiii, paras. 34-47.

16 CONV 353/02, para. 20.


information, such as a regulatory impact assessment, which may be delayed. A time limit is needed only if national parliament scrutiny reserves are able to prevent the Council proceeding. We would therefore support a less binding mechanism, which could be achieved through the Protocol on the role of national parliaments by means of the following paragraph:

‘When a legislative proposal is placed on a Council agenda for decision, the agenda shall indicate whether any national parliament scrutiny reserves are outstanding, and if agreement is reached despite such a scrutiny reserve, the Council shall publish its reasons for having proceeded.’

18. It may be objected that the Protocol should not specify the Council’s internal procedures in this way. However, the existing Protocol, especially its six-week period between publication and agreement of proposals, was intended precisely to restrict the Council’s right to behave as it pleased, since it had been found that the Council could not be relied on to organise its business in a way that allowed national parliaments to scrutinise proposals. The same applies here.

Interval between COREPER and Council

19. Since the establishment of the six-week period between publication of a legislative proposal and its inclusion on a Council agenda for agreement, national parliaments have most often experienced problems in respect of revised proposals, often containing significant new provisions, to which the six-week rule does not apply.17

20. COSAC agreed in October 2000 that ‘a minimum 15-day time period, or one week in urgent cases, should be observed between the final reading of a text by COREPER and the Council decision’.18 As WG IV noted, the Council’s own rules of procedure provide for a clear week to elapse between a legislative item being considered at COREPER and the Council.19 We would support a compromise of ten days — which should allow just enough time for a parliamentary committee meeting weekly to comment — as in the following addition to the Protocol on the role of national parliaments (proposed by Gisela Stuart and others):

‘Unless the Council adopts the Commission’s legislative proposal without amendment, ten clear days shall elapse between consideration of the item by COREPER and the Council adopting a common position, subject to exceptions on grounds of extreme urgency, the reasons for which shall be stated in the act or common position.’

21. The revised version of the Protocol now states that ‘Ten days must elapse between the placing of a proposal on the Council agenda and the adoption of a common position.’20 We welcome this recognition that further provision is needed, but the wording does not actually provide what is required. Effective scrutiny depends on a text being available,

17 See HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 34.

18 XXIIIrd Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees (COSAC), 2000, p. 65.

19 CONV 353/02, para. 20.

20 Protocol, para. 4.


rather than simply an item being placed on an agenda (for which the Council’s own Rules of Procedure already require 14 days notice anyway). Also, the wording is confined to adoption of common positions, whereas the previous stage of reaching political agreement is at least as important.

22. The response to the proposal for ten clear days between COREPER and Council will provide a good indication of attitudes towards national parliaments and parliamentary scrutiny. Rejecting it for the sake of the ‘efficiency’ of the legislative process would indicate that delays of months or even years caused by governments disagreeing are regarded as acceptable, but scrutiny by national parliaments is of such little importance that a pause of even a few days is unacceptable. The needs of national parliaments must be built into the EU’s legislative system, rather than recognised only when wholly convenient.

Legislative procedures

23. Even with the measures so far proposed in this Report, the Council’s legislative procedures would still fall short of the standards observed in national parliaments. For example, it is usual in national parliaments for amendments to be submitted and published in advance, so that those potentially affected have the chance to comment. We recognise that this is harder to achieve in the Council, which meets less frequently than a national parliament and in which negotiation as opposed to debate is an especially important part of the process. Nevertheless, we urge that Council meetings in public when legislating be only the start of creating a more orderly and transparent legislative process, with the same safeguards for affected parties that exist in national parliaments.

Information for national parliaments

24. The revised version of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments provides for the Commission, the Council and the Court of Auditors to send legislative proposals and other documents directly to national parliaments. This is a welcome recognition of the right of national parliaments to receive such documents, but it will make little difference in practice to those national parliaments, such as the UK’s, which already receive them (usually promptly in our case) through national governments. Also, it is not clear that a national parliament will gain much if it receives large numbers of documents but nothing from its own Government explaining what impact the proposals in the documents would have and the Government’s policy towards them. To us, the information provided by the Government on each document (in the form of an Explanatory Memorandum signed by a Minister within ten days of the document being deposited) is as important as the document itself. It would not be appropriate for an EU treaty to intervene in the relations between governments and national parliaments, but we note that the Copenhagen Parliamentary Guidelines, recently adopted by COSAC, state that governments should provide national parliaments with easily accessible, clearly-worded material on Community legislation.

Co-decision and conciliation

25. The co-decision process, as currently organised, makes it extremely difficult for national parliaments, and indeed for anyone not directly involved, to follow the progress


of legislation, given the uncertain timescales and the secrecy of the conciliation stage (if any).21 It compares unfavourably with the situation in bicameral parliaments such as our own, in which the process of reaching agreement between two legislative chambers is much more open. We note that many of the arguments against conciliation taking place in public — essentially that it would drive negotiations underground — are the same as those advanced against the Council legislating in public.

26. In our previous Report we argued that ‘any extension of co-decision to new areas should be conditional on a change in the present procedure so that it can operate in a way which is both effective and transparent’.22 We are disappointed that the Convention seems likely to recommend an extension of co-decision without any consideration of how the process could be made more transparent.

27. It is particularly important to prevent unexpected new provisions arising from compromises agreed during conciliation. We therefore propose the following article:

‘Following the convening of a Conciliation Committee, new provisions and exceptions not included in the Council’s common position or the European Parliament’s amendments, unless constituting a direct compromise between the two positions and not imposing new duties or creating new exceptions unforeseen in the two positions, may not be considered until two weeks after they have been published.’

The Commission and national parliaments

28. In its White Paper on European governance, the Commission called for a ‘reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue’, and expressed the view that ‘the involvement of national parliaments and their specialised European affairs committees ... could ... be encouraged’.23 The following proposed addition to the Protocol on the role of national parliaments builds on the Commission’s words:

‘The Commission shall respond promptly to requests for information and questions from national parliaments of the Member States or their committees about its proposals.’

Subsidiarity and proportionality

29. In our previous Report we emphasised that national parliamentarians should have a role in determining questions of subsidiarity, given that the EU institutions are not in practice keen on applying the principle and that national parliaments do not have an inherent, institutional interest in transferring powers to the EU level.24 Working group I (on subsidiarity) and WG IV proposed that national parliaments be given a formal role in the EU’s legislative process in monitoring application of the principle of subsidiarity.25

21 See HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 90.

22 HC 152-xxxiii, para. 91.

23 European governance: a White Paper, July 2001, pp. 16-17.

24 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 113.

25 CONV 286/02; CONV 353/02, para. 26.


Their proposal for an early-warning mechanism is incorporated in the Praesidium’s draft Protocol on application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which provides that, if a third of national parliaments send reasoned opinions to the Commission indicating that a legislative proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission shall review its proposal.26

30. The Protocol is important in that for the first time national parliaments would have a formal role in the EU’s legislative process. However, we regard the proposal as inadequate because objections by the specified proportion of national parliaments could simply be overridden by the Commission.

31. We would strengthen the Protocol in four ways. First, we would extend it to cover the closely-related principle of proportionality. The Praesidium has rejected this on the grounds of ‘the essentially legal nature of the principle of proportionality (the use of one legal instrument or of another)’.27 However, the principle of proportionality is that ‘any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.’28 This is not just a matter of what sort of legal instrument is used but also concerns the extent of the action taken by the Community. Although the question of proportionality is capable of analysis by a court, it also has a substantial element of political judgment, and should therefore be covered by the early-warning mechanism.

32. Secondly, we would re-word the duty placed on the Commission to give reasons for deciding to amend or maintain its proposal, by requiring it to give ‘detailed reasons for its decision, relating these to the reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments’.

33. Thirdly, as some members of WG I proposed,29 we would provide for national parliaments to make reasoned opinions following the convening of a Conciliation Committee in respect of the compliance of the Council’s common position or the European Parliament’s amendments with the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, and for such reasoned opinions to be taken into account.

34. Fourthly, we support Gisela Stuart’s proposal that if two-thirds of national parliaments or their chambers present reasoned opinions objecting to a Commission legislative proposal on grounds of subsidiarity the Commission shall be required to withdraw its proposal.30 Though such a provision would be used only very rarely, since there will hardly ever (if ever) be enough national parliaments taking the same view, it would have important symbolic value, indicating that the views of national parliaments have to be taken seriously.

35. The subsidiarity early-warning mechanism could be applied to measures put forward under the proposed ‘flexibility clause’ (draft Article I-17).31 For proposals made under that

26 The threshold would be one quarter in the case of proposals relating to the area of freedom, security and justice

under Article III-160.

27 CONV 724/03, annex 2, p. 145.

28 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

29 CONV 286/02, p. 7.

30 CONV 540/03.

31 See para. 56 below.


article it is especially important that the early-warning mechanism is an effective one, since such proposals potentially extend EU competence.

Collective activity by national parliaments

36. In our previous Report we called for joint meetings of national parliamentarians and MEPs, jointly organised, to consider matters such as the Commission’s annual policy strategy and work programme and to question Commissioners on it.32 We believe that giving national parliamentarians the opportunity not only to confer but also to engage directly with and question those making policy at European level is essential to raise the level of interest in EU matters in national parliaments, to improve the quality of European scrutiny at national level and to enable national parliaments to act as a bridge between citizens and EU institutions. Examples would be members of foreign affairs committees questioning the High Representative on the annual report on the Common Foreign Security Policy or COSAC’s proposed annual session with Commissioners on the Commission’s annual legislative and work programme. We emphasise that the aim is to increase the ability of national parliaments and the European Parliament to carry out their own tasks rather than for one to interfere in the work of the other.

37. European Parliament committees already invite members of national parliaments to some of their meetings, and Commissioners and Commission staff sometimes appear before committees of national parliaments. However, national parliaments are rarely if ever consulted in advance about the European Parliament’s meetings and their purposes, subjects and formats, and, as for Commissioners, it would be difficult for any Commissioner regularly to visit all 15 national parliaments, let alone 25 following enlargement.

38. A grand inter-parliamentary structure such as the Congress proposed by the Praesidium raises fears of a new institution such as a second or third chamber, and would meet very infrequently (probably only once a year),33 though we note the usefulness of the WEU Assembly (a body established by treaty) in the defence field. The co-operation we advocate, especially meetings bringing together sectoral or departmental committees, could be achieved informally, without treaty articles.

39. We emphasise that meetings involving national parliamentarians and MEPs should be jointly organised, rather than the former simply being asked to attend ad hoc European Parliament meetings. We believe the national parliament input to such joint organisation could best be provided through COSAC. This would be consistent with WG IV’s recommendation that COSAC become ‘a stronger network for exchange between parliaments’.34

32 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 140.

33 CONV 724/1/03 REV 1, p. 38, Article X.

34 CONV 353/02, para. 36.


COSAC

40. In our previous Report we sought to redefine COSAC’s main role as ‘assisting national parliaments to improve their scrutiny of government activities in the EU, by sharing best practice and information and acting as a strategic body on behalf of national parliaments’.35 Some progress has been made, though with difficulty because of differing views about what COSAC is for and because of the requirement of unanimity for rule changes. In particular, COSAC’s rules now provide that ‘The principal business on every draft agenda shall be derived from COSAC’s role as a body for enhancing national parliamentary scrutiny by exchanging information, in particular on the practical aspects of parliamentary scrutiny’, and agreement has been reached that a secretariat should be established, though the details remain to be worked out.36

41. We welcome the wording added to the latest draft of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments stating that COSAC ‘shall in addition promote the exchange of information and best practice between Member States’ Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees’.

Scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy

42. When the Western European Union (WEU) existed, its activities were scrutinised by the Assembly of the Western European Union, whose proceedings helped to inform the work of national parliaments and their committees. The WEU’s responsibilities and institutions have since been transferred to the EU, though the WEU Assembly continues to exist. There is however no clear arrangement for collective scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy (or common security and defence policy as it is described in the draft constitutional treaty). The UK Government has argued, correctly, that the primary scrutiny role should rest with national parliaments, who should carry out that scrutiny both individually and collectively, but, while regarding the WEU Assembly as inappropriate for that task, it has failed to propose any alternative form of collective scrutiny.37

43. A consequence of that failure is that the draft constitutional treaty seeks to entrust the scrutiny role entirely to the European Parliament, which has no responsibility for any military forces.38 We consider it essential that there be regular meetings of members of the defence, foreign affairs and European affairs committees of national parliaments to scrutinise the ESDP. It could be modelled on the WEU Assembly but with fewer members. We do not regard the addition to the draft Protocol on the role of national parliaments providing for COSAC to organise inter-parliamentary conferences on the common security and defence policy39 as an adequate substitute, since such conferences are likely to be ad hoc and ill-resourced, and COSAC does not itself include members of defence committees. We therefore propose the following draft article:

35 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 150.

36 Both agreed at the Athens COSAC, May 2003.

37 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, para. 147.

38 Article I-40.

39 Protocol, para. 9.


‘There shall be an assembly of national parliamentarians meeting at least three times a year to scrutinise the European Security and Defence Policy. Numbers entitled to attend from each national parliament shall be proportionate to the representation of Member States in the European Parliament. The assembly shall be serviced by a permanent secretariat. The cost of the assembly shall be borne by the governments of the Member States.’

Scrutiny of Europol

44. A new role for national parliaments in scrutinizing the work of Europol is proposed in the draft articles on the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.40 We will discuss this in our forthcoming Report on those draft articles.

Election of the Commission President

45. In our previous Report we opposed election of the Commission President because it would weaken the Commission’s ability to rise above sectional interests, which is its raison d’être, and would significantly change the balance between the European institutions, while not necessarily doing much to reconnect citizens and EU decision-making. Of the different options, we were least attracted by that of election by the European Parliament.41 We still believe that election of the Commission President by the European Parliament would do little or nothing to increase interest in European Parliament elections or to reconnect citizens and EU decision-making.

46. At present, draft Article I-26 provides for the President of the Commission to be ‘elected’ by the European Parliament, but the European Parliament would simply vote for or against a single candidate put to it by the European Council. Mr Hain told us that the Government was ‘willing to look at, with certain very big safeguards, electing the Commission President through some method, provided that does not involve being hostage to a particular faction and provided that the outcome is one that the Council can accept’, and indicated that it might be agreed as a trade-off for creation of an elected President of the European Council.42 However, if the Convention does decide on election of the Commission President, we believe that national parliamentarians as well as MEPs should have voting rights. The voting could take place within each parliament rather than an electoral college being assembled in a particular place. Splitting those rights equally between MEPs and national parliamentarians would mean that debate on the merits of the candidates would take place in national parliaments, bringing the issues closer to citizens, and that the Commission President would not be beholden to a majority in the European Parliament.

General statement on the role of national parliaments

47. WG IV recommended that the constitutional treaty contain wording acknowledging ‘the importance of the active involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the

40 Articles I-41, III-172.

41 HC 152-xxxiii, 2001-02, paras. 79-80.

42 Q 30.


European Union, in particular by ensuring the scrutiny of governments’ actions in the Council, including the monitoring of the respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’.43 Words about the importance of national parliaments have not always led to appropriate actions, but we nevertheless believe that inclusion of such wording in the constitutional treaty would be worthwhile. We therefore propose that the second paragraph of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments be amended to read as follows:

‘ACKNOWLEDGING, however, the importance of the active involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union, particularly in scrutinising governments’ actions in the Council and monitoring respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and the need for them to be able to obtain information and express views on legislative and other proposals before decisions are made.’

Conclusion

48. Our proposals, taken together, would provide a sound basis for increasing the role of national parliaments in the EU and the effectiveness of their scrutiny of governments, and thereby their ability to act as a link between citizens and the EU, without creating new institutions or in any significant way impeding the legislative process. We are confident that they would significantly strengthen the EU, and especially democracy within the EU.

43 CONV 353/02, para. 8.


The Convention’s proposals

49. It needs to be emphasised that the draft constitutional treaty which has begun to arouse public interest has not yet been agreed by the Convention as a whole. Prior to 27 May all that existed was the Convention Praesidium’s first draft of parts of the constitutional treaty, based, not always very closely, on the reports of the Convention’s working groups and their reception by the Convention plenary. Parts of the current version reflect discussion of that first draft in the Convention plenary, though they are still the work of the Praesidium, and parts have not yet been discussed at all in the plenary. While the draft articles must be taken seriously, since they could eventually be enacted, they will go through many more stages, including an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), before any of them are finally agreed.

50. Many of the draft articles reproduce parts of the existing treaties little changed. There are also some welcome provisions not in the existing treaties, such as a duty on the Council to meet in public when legislating, and a role for national parliaments in respect of subsidiarity. Many integrationist ideas put forward in the Convention do not appear in the draft articles. However, there are also some draft articles which are unlikely to be acceptable to the UK. We summarise here those aspects of the draft treaty to which we believe the House should pay particular attention, either because they could cause problems for the UK or might be amended in unacceptable ways or simply because of their importance. For a detailed examination of the earlier draft of the constitutional treaty we refer Members to the valuable series of Reports produced by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union.44

51. We note that in some areas the current draft improves on its predecessor. In particular, the former Article 1 replaced the existing references to the ‘high contracting parties’ (i.e. the Member States) establishing the European Community and the European Union by the following wording: ‘Reflecting the will of the peoples and the States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes a Union … ’45 The current Article I-1 now makes clear that the EU’s competences are conferred on it by the Member States.

52. The reference to the EU exercising the competences conferred on it ‘on a federal basis’ has been replaced by the expression ‘in the Community way’.46 The meaning of this expression and its consequences will need to be examined closely.

53. Article I-6 provides for the EU to have legal personality, with the corollary that there would no longer be two separate inter-governmental ‘pillars’ outside the European Communities (the former first pillar). How much difference this made would depend chiefly on the extent to which in the areas covered by the former second and third pillars (the Common Foreign and Security Policy and police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters) unanimity was replaced by qualified majority voting and on the role given to the

44 HL Papers 61, 70, 71, 81, 93, 105, 106, 107, Session 2002-03.

45 CONV 528/03, Article 1.

46 Ibid.; CONV 724/1/03 REV 1, Article 1.


European Court of Justice in these areas. Our Report on the proposals relating to the criminal law will examine this in respect of the former third pillar.

54. Article I-7 provides for the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights to be Part II of the constitutional treaty. This could potentially result in a considerable extension of EU competence to areas covered by the Charter. Provision needs to be made to safeguard the division of competences between the EU and Member States, and to give the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) priority over the Charter. The Government has been seeking ‘horizontal clauses’ which would prevent the Charter extending EU competence,47 and Articles II-51 and II-52 appears to provide some protection, though this will need to be closely scrutinised. We welcome the fact that Article I-7 provides that the EU shall seek accession to the ECHR, since accession would reduce the likelihood of divergence in the interpretation of human rights between the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. Article I-7 and Part II do not provide the citizen with any remedies for breach of their fundamental rights.

55. Title III of the draft treaty (Articles I-9 to I-17) sets out competences. This largely reflects what is in the existing Treaties, but there is some increase of EU competence, notably the ‘exclusive competence to establish competition rules within the internal market’ (Article I-12). We are concerned about the prospect of exclusive EU competence in the ‘Conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy’ and how this might affect the management of marine resources at all levels.48 We welcome the explicit provision in Article I-9 that ‘Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States’.

56. Article I-17 is the ‘flexibility clause’, providing that, where the constitutional treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council (acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and with the assent of the European Parliament) may nevertheless take action in order to attain one of the objectives set by the constitutional treaty. This goes further than the existing Article 308 EC, which referred only to powers ‘necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community.’ In particular, it extends the ‘flexibility’ to the former second and third pillars. The requirement for unanimity in the Council on the exercise of powers under this article is the minimum safeguard required.

57. Article I-20 provides that the European Council shall normally take decisions by ‘consensus’. It is not clear what this would mean in practice.

58. Article I-21 provides for a President of the European Council, elected by the European Council by qualified majority for a 2½ year term, renewable once. Article I-23 does not abolish the system of rotating Presidencies as regards individual Council formations, but provides that the European Council may decide that the Presidency of a Council formation (other than that of Foreign Affairs) should be undertaken by a Member State for at least a year.

47 Q 40.

48 Article I-12.


59. Article I-24 considerably reduces the size of the majority required for qualified majority voting compared with what was agreed at Nice, by removing the requirement for a certain proportion of the weighted votes of Council members. A bare majority of Member States would be sufficient, provided they represented at least three-fifths of the EU’s population.

60. Article I-33 provides for co-decision (renamed ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’) to be the legislative procedure for all or virtually all legislation other than that in the former second and third pillars. As we have argued above, making the procedure more transparent should be a precondition for any such extension.49

61. The proposals relating to ‘the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article I-41 and III-153 to 173) provide for an ‘integrated management system for external borders’, ‘minimum rules’ in criminal matters, criminal prosecutions initiated by Eurojust, a European Public Prosecutor and other controversial provisions. We will be reporting separately on these articles.

62. The articles relating to ‘External Action’ (Articles I-15, 39 and 40 and III-188 to 210) provide for a Foreign Minister who will also be a Vice-President of the Commission50 some qualified majority voting,51 the Foreign Minister to present the EU’s case in the Security Council on matters on which the EU has defined a position, and ‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence’.52

63. Article I-53 leaves unchanged the requirement for unanimity as regards the ceiling on own resources and the creation of new own resources, while making the detailed arrangements subject to qualified majority voting. We are concerned that the UK’s rebate does not appear to be one of the matters on which decisions would be made by unanimity.

64. Article III-81 formalises co-operation among the countries which have adopted the euro, providing that they ‘shall coordinate their action among themselves and with the Commission with a view to adopting common positions on monetary matters within the competent international financial institutions and conferences.’

65. No change is made to the requirement for treaty changes to be ratified by each Member State. However, the Praesidium does raise the possibility of ‘a streamlined amendment option (Council acting unanimously, after consultation of the European Parliament, without ratification by national parliaments) for certain provisions of Part Three which do not affect the objectives, values or competences of the Union.’53 Some in the Convention have argued for parts of the treaty to be amendable without national ratification, or for the new treaty to come into force as soon as most States have ratified it, leaving the others outside the refounded EU. Either would be unacceptable.

66. In our previous Report we argued that the reference to ‘ever-closer union’ in the existing treaties should be removed, because a treaty should not seek to commit the peoples

49 Para. 26 above.

50 Q 51.

51 See QQ 55-7 and Article III-196.

52 Article I-15.

53 CONV 728/03, p. 10.


it covers to such a vague and open-ended process.54 The draft preamble to the constitutional treaty refers not to the union becoming ever-closer but to the peoples of Europe being ‘united in an ever closer fashion’.55 However, regrettably, the preamble to Part II refers to the peoples of Europe ‘creating an ever closer union among them’.

67. Nothing is said in the draft constitutional treaty about opt-outs, such as those of the UK on border controls and the euro. Mr Hain told us that there was no threat to the UK’s opt-outs.56

54 HC 152-xxxiii, para. 116.

55 CONV 722/03.

56 QQ 64-9.


The Convention

68. The Laeken European Council expected the Convention to finish its work in March 2003,57 and for this to be followed by a period of reflection before the Convention’s work was re-examined at an IGC. The Convention will now be presenting its work to the European Council on 20 June 2003, and there have been calls inside and outside the Convention for the IGC to be brought forward to 2003 and for the IGC simply to endorse the Convention’s work. This should be resisted, for reasons we give below.

69. The Convention has been extremely valuable as a way of preparing for the forthcoming IGC openly and debating the issues in public. As it approaches the end of its work it has even begun to engage public attention in the UK. It has also had the great merit of fully involving parliamentarians in the preparation of an IGC for the first time. However, the Convention method also has weaknesses.

70. First, the Convention is not a representative body, and its role is to prepare for the IGC rather than to make final decisions. Provisions agreed by a broad consensus in the Convention will be influential, but they must be judged by the persuasiveness of the arguments underlying them rather than having inherent authority as the decisions of a representative assembly. As we noted before the Convention began, the legitimacy of ‘democratically-elected governments is inevitably greater than that of an appointed Convention, and the Convention therefore cannot bind the IGC.’58

71. Secondly, the Convention has not been making decisions by voting. Instead, the Praesidium — the least representative part of the Convention — decides whether consensus exists. We argued before the Convention began that there should be provision for voting, to avoid giving too much power to the Praesidium.59 The argument used against having votes is that the Convention is not a representative body in which all voices have the same weight. However, a similar objection applies with almost equal force to deciding on amendments according to how many people have signed them or spoken in their favour (as the Praesidium is doing). Proceeding by consensus will be especially difficult in the final stages of the Convention, since there may again be large numbers of amendments tabled and there are deep divisions on several issues. Much will depend on how the final stages are managed. Governments should satisfy themselves that any draft constitutional treaty emerging from the Convention does indeed have the authority of the Convention behind it.

72. Thirdly, although the Laeken Declaration emphasised the need to increase democracy and transparency, the Convention has sometimes seemed more interested in the relationship between the main institutions within the EU, and more recently in the detail of a draft constitutional treaty. The Convention has paid attention to transparency, notably in deciding that legislative meetings of the Council should be in public, but there has, for

57 Laeken Declaration, 15 December 2001.

58 HC 152-v, 2001-02, para. 16.

59 Ibid., para. 14.


example, been no examination of ways of strengthening the relationship between the European Parliament and the electorate.

73. Mr Hain told us:

‘If the Convention comes out with a consensus position … , then that will have a lot of force in the IGC because these are difficult issues to negotiate a common agreement on and I do not think people will be anxious to re-open them, ourselves included. But if there is no consensus over significant areas, then that becomes a very important focus for IGC negotiations and for input by national parliamentarians.’60

74. The Convention’s work will be an extremely important contribution to the IGC, but we emphasise the need for its recommendations to be carefully considered by national parliaments, as well as governments, well before the forthcoming IGC.

60 Q 71.


Conclusions and recommendations


1. The requirements of national parliaments are in principle simple: information and the time to express views before decisions are made. They require these, above all, in order to fulfil their acknowledged vital role of making their own governments accountable. (Paragraph 7)

2. One of the most important requirements is that the Council of Ministers should meet in public when legislating. (Paragraph 11)

3. We strongly support the provision in the draft constitutional treaty that the Council shall meet in public when legislating. (Paragraph 13)

4. We believe such a record of proceedings should include a full transcript, as in national parliaments, and preferably also audio and video recordings. (Paragraph 14)

5. The needs of national parliaments must be built into the EU’s legislative system, rather than recognised only when wholly convenient. (Paragraph 22)

6. Although the question of proportionality is capable of analysis by a court, it also has a substantial element of political judgment, and should therefore be covered by the early-warning mechanism. (Paragraph 31)

7. If the Convention does decide on election of the Commission President, we believe that national parliamentarians as well as MEPs should have voting rights. (Paragraph 46)

The Convention

8. The Convention’s work will be an extremely important contribution to the IGC, but we emphasise the need for its recommendations to be carefully considered by national parliaments, as well as governments, well before the forthcoming IGC. (Paragraph 74)


Formal minutes

Thursday 5 June 2003

Members present:

Mr Richard Bacon Mr William Cash Mr Michael Connarty Mr Wayne David Jim Dobbin

Mr Mark Hendrick Angus Robertson John Robertson Mr Anthony Steen Mr Bill Tynan

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr Michael Connarty was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report [Convention on the Future of Europe and the Role of National Parliaments], proposed by the Chairman,61 brought up and read.

Draft Report [Convention on the Future of Europe and the Role of National Parliaments], proposed by Mr Cash, brought up and read, as follows:

We repeat the fundamental objections, in principle, which we expressed with Angela Watkinson MP in the alternative draft Report submitted to the Committee in June 2002.

Since then the European Convention has published its interim proposals for the proposed European Constitution. No Member State has objected to these proposals and the United Kingdom Government has concurred in the principle of a European Constitution, although it has proposed certain amendments. These amendments are by no means consistent with, for example, the statement of the Foreign Secretary in the Times newspaper of May 28th in respect of the proposed European Constitution: “The new European Constitution [sic] is also something Britain supports. It will create a stable rule book setting out clearly the primacy of nation states.” Despite the provisions of Article 1-5 regarding national identities, Articles 1-1, 1-9, 1-10 and 1-11, which will collectively override Article 1-5, clearly provide the prevailing principle that the “European Constitution establishes the European Union on which the Member States confer competences to obtain objectives they have in common” and that “the Union shall coordinate the policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these objectives ...”. This is reinforced by Article 1-10 which asserts that “The European Constitution, [note the comma] and law adopted by the Union’s Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States”. The statement of the Foreign Secretary flies in the face of the proposals.

61 The Report was prepared by Mr Jimmy Hood, the Chairman of the committee. Subsequent references to the

Chairman, however, are to Mr Michael Connarty, who was the Chairman on the day.


These provisions (in addition to those conferring exclusive and shared competence on critical matters of significance (Articles 1-12 and 13)) and conferring legal personality (Article 1-6) and Article 1-9 (as well as other provisions) amount to a revolutionary principle that the proposed European Constitution overrides the United Kingdom Parliament’s authority and sovereignty in principle.

Article A of Part III of the proposed Constitution would repeal the existing Treaties and provide, as set out, for a consolidated new Treaty, with critically important new powers, de novo, and with the incorporation of a new principle of the superiority of the Constitution over our own, apart from the primacy of individual laws, and justiciable by the European Court of Justice as a new Supreme Court of the European Union. This will undermine our democratic principles of government, the voter in the General Election choosing which laws are to govern us and the practical effect of Questions in Parliament holding Ministers to account in critical areas of the levers of government, with full discussion in public and on the record.

It may be argued that none of this alters the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, namely that no Parliament can bind its successors, and that it would be open to any future Parliament, if a Bill were enacted approving these provisions, to amend or repeal these provisions in their application to the United Kingdom and that the proposed Constitution provides for withdrawal for any Member States which so determines. The withdrawal provisions, however, which we hope would not need to be invoked, are dependent within the proposed Constitution on QMV and the consent of the European Parliament — not the freely negotiated agreement of a sovereign Parliament.

This proposed European Constitution is far removed from the principles previously put to the British people in the White Papers which have been published on the constitutional and legal implications of United Kingdom Membership of the EC/EU, including Cmnd 3301 (1967), not to mention the advice of the Lord Chancellor (Lord Kilmuir) to Edward Heath of 14 December 1960 and subsequent White Papers, all of which encompass an entirely different set of circumstances.

A new White Paper on the same implications is therefore now essential, as is also, following such a White Paper, a Referendum on the principles and revolutionary policies involved in the proposed Constitution and before the IGC has concluded and a Bill presented to Parliament.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. — (The Chairman.)

Amendment proposed, to leave out ‘Chairman’s draft Report’ and insert ‘draft Report proposed by Mr William Cash’. — (Mr William Cash.)

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.


Ayes, 2 Mr Richard Bacon Mr William Cash

Noes, 4 Mr Wayne David Jim Dobbin Angus Robertson Mr Bill Tynan

Main Question put and agreed to.

Ordered, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1 read. An Amendment made. Amendment proposed, in line 11, at the end to add ‘The acceptance of the principle of a constitutional treaty or constitution by the EU Member States for the EU would mark the final stage in the ending of the United Kingdom as an independent nation State.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.

Paragraph 2 read. Amendment proposed, in line 5, at the end to add ‘with its alternative draft Report by William Cash MP and Angela Watkinson MP.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraphs 3 to 5 agreed to.

Paragraph 6 read. Amendment proposed, in line 1, at the beginning to insert ‘The national parliaments are in grave danger, including our own, of betraying the trust of the voters they represent by accepting undemocratic European Government and these constitutional proposals.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 7 read. Amendment proposed, in line 2, after ‘made.’ to insert ‘by Government and if necessary to amend or overturn those decisions by democratic vote.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Another Amendment proposed, in line 2, to leave out ‘these’ and insert ‘information and time’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Amendments made. Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.


Paragraph 8 read. Amendment proposed, in line 2, to leave out ‘it is not clear that’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Another Amendment proposed, in line 3, to leave out ‘a’ and insert ‘no’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Amendments made. Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.

Paragraph 9 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 10 read. Amendment proposed, in line 2, after ‘have’, to insert ‘astonishingly and negligently failed to insist on and argue for their proper democratic role and have’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 11 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 12 to 14 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 15 read. Amendment proposed, in line 5, after ‘promptly’ to insert ‘and before decisions are finally taken’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 16 read. Amendment proposed, in line 12, at the end to add ‘We insist however that individual parliaments must retain the right to veto decisions and to amend or repeal European legislation if they so determine on behalf of their electors.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.


Paragraph 22 read. Amendment proposed, in line 7, at the end to add ‘We object to the reduction of their role to one of mere “involvement”’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 23 read. Amendment proposed, in line 2, after ‘fall’ to insert ‘far’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. An Amendment made. Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.


Paragraph 24 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 25 read. Amendment proposed, in line 1, after ‘organised’ to insert ‘and proliferating with serious adverse consequences for democratic decision-making’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 26 read. Amendment proposed, in line 3, leave out ‘are disappointed’ and insert ‘object’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.


Paragraph 28 read. Amendment proposed, in line 8, at the end to add ‘National parliaments are not merely to be involved but are to be treated as pivotal to the democratic process with the right to vote, amend or repeal European legislation.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 29 read. Amendment proposed, in line 11, at the end to add ‘We insist that any national parliament, not one third of them, shall have such rights.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 30 read. Amendment proposed, in line 4, at the end to add ‘and because it should apply to any one parliament.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.


Paragraph 34 read. Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out ‘support’ and insert ‘reject’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Another Amendment proposed, in line 4, to leave out from ‘proposal.’ to the end of line 7 and add ‘and we propose that this proposal should apply to any one parliament.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.



Paragraph 36 read. Amendment proposed, in line 13, at the end to add ‘Indeed we repeat our insistence that national parliaments with democratic accountable procedures individually are the pivot of the democratic process.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.


Paragraph 40 read. Amendment proposed, in line 10, at the end to add ‘We believe that these should be based on the assumption that national parliaments individually are the pivot of the democratic process.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.


Paragraph 42 read. Amendment proposed, in line 11, at the end to add ‘We believe that this reflects the desire of other Member States to shift ESDP away from national autonomy and reflects the UK Government failure to insist on this in practice.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 43 read. Amendment proposed, in line 11, before ‘There’ to insert ‘In recognition of the requirement that ESDP remains within the autonomy of individual Member States,’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Another Amendment proposed, in line 16, at the end to add ‘Decisions which are taken within the assembly shall be unanimous.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.


Paragraph 47 read. Amendment proposed, in line 7, to leave out ‘would be worthwhile’ and insert ‘is essential’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Amendment proposed, in line 10, to leave out ‘active involvement of national parliaments’ and insert ‘pivotal role of national parliaments individually’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Another Amendment proposed, in line 15, at the end to add ‘and to veto, amend or repeal European legislation if they so determine.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.


Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 48 read. Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out ‘sound’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraphs 49 and 50 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 51 read, amended, divided and agreed to (now paragraphs 51 and 52).

Paragraph 52 read and agreed to (now paragraph 53).

Paragraph 53 read. An Amendment made. Another Amendment proposed, in line 12, at the end to add ‘It will also be necessary to reassert the right of the UK Parliament to amend or repeal any such legislation derived from the above.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraph 54).

Paragraph 54 read, amended and agreed to (now paragraph 55).



Paragraphs 57 to 61 read and agreed to (now paragraphs 58 to 62).


A paragraph — (The Chairman) — brought up, read the first and second time, and added (now paragraph 64).




Paragraph 66 read. Amendment proposed, in line 1, after ‘Council’ to insert ‘which did not expressly authorise a constitutional treaty’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 68).

Paragraph 67 read. Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out from the beginning to ‘As’ in line 2. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 69).


Paragraphs 68 to 71 read and agreed to (now paragraphs 70 to 73).

Paragraph 72 read. Amendment proposed, in line 2, to leave out ‘carefully considered by’ and insert ‘fully debated on the Floor of the House of Commons following the publication of a White Paper by the Government with at least two days allocated for the purpose and by other’. — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Another Amendment proposed, in line 3, at the end to add ‘and the Government must commit itself to a referendum on the principle, at least, of a European Constitution before seeking to implement it by Bill in the United Kingdom Parliament.’ — (Mr William Cash.) Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived. Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 74).

Resolved, That the Report, as amended, be the Twenty-Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select Committees (reports)) be applied to the Report.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 18 June at half-past Two o’clock.

Documents

House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee › pa › cm200203 › cm... · House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee The Convention on the Future of Europe and the Role of National