110
Hot Topics and Recent Decisions on the Applica3on of the A5orney client Privilege and the Work product Doctrine in the Corporate Arena Mary Blatch Mark Hopson Stephen Marzen

!HotTopics!and!RecentDecisions! on!the!Applicaon!of!the ...webcasts.acc.com/handouts/ACC_Privilege_Presentation_AM15.pdf · • Upjohn!rejected!the!“control!group”!theory,!which!limited!privilege!to!

  • Upload
    buidieu

  • View
    212

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

 Hot  Topics  and  Recent  Decisions  on  the  Applica3on  of  the  A5orney-­‐

client  Privilege  and  the  Work-­‐product  Doctrine  in  the  Corporate  

Arena  

Mary  Blatch  Mark  Hopson  

Stephen  Marzen  

Agenda  •  Privilege  Basics  •  Internal  Inves3ga3ons  •  Waiver  of  Privilege  and  Excep3ons  •  Interna3onal  Privilege  Rules  

Privilege  Basics  

Basic  Elements  of  Privilege  

•  Although  federal  and  state  laws  have  minor  differences,  generally  privilege  requires  proof  of  the  five  C’s:  – A  Communica3on  –  of  Confiden3al  informa3on  –  between  a  Client  –  and  Counsel  –  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  or  providing  legal  Counsel  

4  

Basic  Elements  of  Privilege  

•  Privilege  runs  both  ways:  

– protects  client’s  provision  of  informa3on  to  lawyer  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  legal  advice  and  

–   lawyer’s  rendering  of  legal  advice  to  client  

5  

Ethics  Rules  –  MR  1.6  

•  ABA  Rule  1.6:  Confiden3ality  of  Informa3on  

–  Generally,  prohibits  disclosure  without  informed  consent  

–  Broader  than  the  privilege;  applies  to  all  informa3on  rela3ng  to  a  client  

–  Permissive  disclosure  in  limited  situa3ons,  e.g.,  to  prevent  substan3al  bodily  harm  or  financial  injury  to  others  

6  

Ethics  Rules  –  MR  1.13  •  ABA  Rule  1.13:  Organiza3on  as  Client  

–  Organiza3on  not  management  or  shareholders  is  the  client    –  Up  the  ladder  repor3ng  obliga3on  for  legal  viola3ons  likely  to  substan3ally  

injure  the  corpora3on  before  permissive  disclosure    –  “A  lawyer  represen3ng  an  organiza3on  may  also  represent  any  of  its  directors,  

officers,  employees,  members,  shareholders  or  other  cons3tuents  subject  to  the  [conflict  of  law]  provisions  of  Rule  1.7”  

 –  To  avoid  the  conflict  and  disqualifica3on  issues,  in-­‐house  a5orneys  who  

perform  legal  services  for  individual  directors  or  officers  should  insist  on  wri5en  waiver  agreements  

7  

Which  Lawyers  Are  En3tled  to  the  Privilege?  

•  For  privilege  to  a5ach,  a5orneys  must  be  “authorized”  to  prac3ce  law.  Gucci  America,  Inc.  v.  Guess?,  Inc.,  2011  WL  9375  (S.D.N.Y.  Jan.  3,  2011)  

•  Authoriza3on  generally  requires  the  that  lawyer  be  a  licensed  member  of  the  bar.  See  Anwar  v.  Fairfield  Greenwich  Ltd.,  982  F.Supp.2d  260  (S.D.N.Y.  2013)  

8  

Privilege  in  the  Corporate  Context  •  U.S.  Supreme  Court  held  in  Upjohn  v.  U.S.,  449  U.S.  383  

(1981),  that  privilege  applies  to  corpora3ons  and  to  in-­‐house  as  well  as  outside  counsel  

•  The  purpose  of  the  privilege  “is  to  encourage  full  and  frank  communica3on  between  a5orneys  and  their  clients”  (Upjohn,  449  U.S.  at  389)  

•  Applying  privilege  in  the  corporate  area  enables  corpora3ons  to  obtain  more  effec3ve  legal  assistance  and  to  comply  with  the  law  

9  

Who  is  the  Client?  •  Upjohn  rejected  the  “control  group”  theory,  which  limited  privilege  to  

communica3ons  by  high-­‐level  corporate  managers  and  a5orneys  

•  Control  group  test  “frustrates  the  very  purpose  of  the  privilege”  by  discouraging  the  communica3on  of  relevant  informa3on  by  employees  necessary  for  a5orneys  to  render  effec3ve  legal  advice  to  the  corpora3on  (Upjohn,  449  U.S.  at  392)  

•  Upjohn  adopted  a  func3onal  approach  that  examines  whether  the  communica3ons  were  made  –  by  employees  with  informa3on  necessary  for  the  corpora3on  to  

secure  legal  advice;  or  –  to  employees  who  had  a  “need  to  know”  the  legal  advice   10  

11  

Who  Is  the  Client?  •  Privilege  applies  so  long  as  “the  communica3on  [was]  not  disseminated  beyond  those  persons  who,  because  of  the  corporate  structure,  need  to  know  its  contents”  (Diversified  Indus.  Inc.  v.  Meredith,  572  F.2d  596,  609  (8th  Cir.  1977))  

•  Waiver  may  occur  if  the  communica3on  is  disclosed  to  employees  who  are  not  in  a  posi3on  to  act  or  rely  on  the  legal  advice  contained  in  the  communica3on  

12  

Power  To  Assert/Waive  the  Privilege  •  Resides  in  the  corpora3on’s  management  (Commodity  Futures  

Trading  Comm’n  v.  Weintraub,  471  U.S.  343,  348  (1985))  

•  “[W]hen  control  of  a  corpora3on  passes  to  new  management,  the  authority  to  assert  and  waive  the  corpora3on’s  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  passes  as  well”(id.  at  349)  

•  “New  managers  installed  as  a  result  of  a  takeover,  merger,  loss  of  confidence  of  shareholders,  or  simply  normal  succession  may  waive  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  with  respect  to  communica3ons  made  by  former  officers  and  directors”  (id.)  

Internal  Inves3ga3ons  

Upjohn  Co.  v.  U.S.  449  U.S.  383  (1981)  

•  Privilege  applies  to  communica3ons  between  company  a5orneys  and  company  employees  if:    

–  they  concern  conduct  within  the  scope  of  employee’s  corporate  du3es  and  

–  employee  was  aware  ques3oning  was  to  obtain  informa3on  in  order  to  provide  legal  advice  

14  

Upjohn  Co.  v.  U.S.    •  In  an  internal  inves3ga3on,  communica3ons  conducted  for  a  

“legal  purpose”  are  protected  by  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  

–  Protects  communica3ons;  not  underlying  facts  

•  A5orney-­‐client  privilege  is  applicable  outside  of  li3ga3on  context,  especially  where  the  purpose  is  promo3ng  compliance  with  the  law  

•  Recognizes  tension  between  “legal  advice/purpose”  vs.  “business  advice/purpose”  

15  

Standard  Inves3ga3on  Protocol  Conduc3ng  Interviews:  •  Give  and  document  Upjohn  warnings  •  Purpose  of  interview  is  to  obtain  informa3on  in  order  to  

provide  legal  advice  to  the  company  –  Counsel  represents  the  company  and  not  the  employee  –  Interview  is  protected  by  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  –  Privilege  belongs  to  the  company  and  not  the  employee  –  Company  may  choose  to  disclose  informa3on  obtained  during  interview  to  third  par3es,  including  the  government  

16  

Standard  Inves3ga3on  Protocol  

Inves3ga3on  Findings  and  Report:  •  Deliver  in  wri3ng?  •  Wri5en  report  or  bullet  points?  •  What  is  the  target  audience?  But:  also  consider  conduc3ng  a  non-­‐privileged  inves3ga3on  and  

report  •  Appropriate  for  discrete  issues  •  Where  disclosure  is  certain  and  facts  understood  •  Avoids  waiver  arguments  •  Maintains  privilege  on  related  communica3ons  

17  

In  re  Kellogg  Brown  &  Root  [KBR]  Inc.   37  F.  Supp.  3d  1  (D.D.C.  Mar.  6,  2014)  

•  FCA  Relator  served  discovery  requests  for  documents  created  as  part  of  a  rou3ne  Code  of  Business  Conduct  internal  compliance  inves3ga3on  required  under  DOD  regula3ons  

•  District  Court  ruled  documents  not  privileged  unless  KBR  proved  that  “the  communica3on  would  not  have  been  made  ‘but  for’  the  fact  that  legal  advice  was  sought”  

•  District  court  held  that  did  not  meet  the  “but  for”  standard  because  internal  inves3ga3on  was  “undertaken  pursuant  to  regulatory  law  and  corporate  policy”  and  not  primarily  to  obtain  legal  advice  

18  

In  re  Kellogg  Brown  &  Root  [KBR]  Inc.    756  F.3d  754  (D.C.  Cir.  2014)  

•  D.C.  Circuit  rejected  “but  for”  standard  •  Legal  advice  need  not  be  the  primary  purpose  •  Correct  standard:  “Was  obtaining  or  providing  legal  advice  a  

primary  purpose  of  the  communica3on—meaning  one  of  the  significant  purposes  of  the  communica3on?”  

•  “Helping  a  corpora3on  comply  with  a  statute  or  regula3on—although  required  by  law—does  not  transform  quintessen3ally  legal  advice  into  business  advice”  

19  

In  re  Kellogg  Brown  &  Root  [KBR]  Inc.    756  F.3d  754  (D.C.  Cir.  2014)  

•  Fact  that  inves3ga3on  conducted  by  in-­‐house  counsel  “without  consulta3on  with  outside  lawyers”  “does  not  dilute  the  privilege”  

•  Fact  that  interviews  conducted  by  non-­‐a5orneys  not  disposi3ve  (“communica3ons  made  by  and  to  non-­‐a5orneys  serving  as  agents  of  a5orneys  in  internal  inves3ga3ons  are  rou3nely  protected”)  

•  Fact  that  KBR  employees  were  not  “expressly  informed  that  the  purpose  of  the  interview  was  to  assist  the  company  in  obtaining  legal  advice”  is  not  disposi3ve  (no  “magic  words”)  

20  

In  re  General  Motors  LLC  IgniLon  Switch  LiLgaLon,  14-­‐MD-­‐2543  (JMF)  (S.D.N.Y.  Jan.  15,  2015)  

•  GM  retained  outside  counsel  to  conduct  an  internal  inves3ga3on  into  igni3on  switch  defect  –  Notes  made  of  interviews  were  not  transcribed  –  Report  submi5ed  to  Congress,  DOJ  and  other  agencies  –  Plain3ffs  sought  discovery  of  underlying  interview  notes  

•  District  court  followed  KBR:  “So  long  as  obtaining  or  providing  legal  advice  was  one  of  the  significant  purposes  of  the  internal  inves3ga3on,  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  applies,  even  if  there  were  also  other  purposes  for  the  inves3ga3on”  

21  

Paterno  v.  NCAA/Penn  State  •  Plain3ffs  seeking  documents  from  outside  counsel’s  

inves3ga3on  into  Sandusky  scandal  •  State  trial  court  held  that  engagement  le5er  did  not  reference  

“securing  either  an  opinion  of  law,  legal  services  or  assistance  in  a  legal  ma5er”    

•  Also  held  that  disclosure  to  NCAA  and  Big  Ten  caused  subject  ma5er  waiver  of  any  privilege  that  did  exist  

•  On  appeal,  ACC  filed  amicus  brief  asking  Superior  Court  of  Pennsylvania  to  reverse  ruling  –  Argues  that  holding  discourages  universi3es,  corpora3ons,  and  non-­‐profits  from  conduc3ng  inves3ga3ons  into  alleged  misconduct  

22  

Prac3ce  Pointers  •  The  burden  is  on  the  party  claiming  privilege  •  Best  prac3ce  is  to  expressly  state  when  an  inves3ga3on  or    

communica3on  is  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  legal  advice  •  Don’t  label  all  documents  “Privileged  and  Confiden3al”    •  Don’t  assume  labeling  as  “Privileged  and  Confiden3al”  is  

disposi3ve  •  Don’t  assume  that  including  in-­‐house  counsel  (“cc”)  on  a  

communica3on  will  establish  privilege  •  Limit  distribu3on.    Watch  out  for  “Reply  All”  

23  

Prac3ce  Pointers  

•  When  prac3cal,  segregate  business  from  legal  advice  in  separate  documents  or  separate  sec3ons  of  documents  

•  Document  that  internal  inves3ga3ons  are  conducted  under  direc3on  of  legal  counsel    

•  Follow  inves3ga3on  protocol  of  documen3ng  Upjohn  warnings  

•  Decide  format  and  content  of  deliverables  before  inves3ga3on  begins  (e.g.,  do  we  really  need  to  prepare  interview  memoranda?)  

24  

Choice  of  Law  Rules  for  Privilege  

•  In  federal  cases,  analysis  starts  with  Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  501  

–  Generally,  federal  common  law  governs  privilege  

–  In  civil  cases,  state  law  governs  privilege  for  claims  under  state  law  

•  Court  applies  its  state  choice  of  law  rules  to  determine  what  state’s  substan3ve  privilege  law  governs  

25  

Know  What  Law  Applies  

•  KBR’s  “one  of  the  significant  purposes”  test  is  not  applied  uniformly  in  all  jurisdic3ons  

–  Jurisdic3ons  disagree  about  standard  for  determining  whether  communica3ons  are  for  the  “primary  purpose”  of  seeking  legal  advice  

–  Jurisdic3ons  construe  privilege  narrowly  and  require  that  legal  advice  be  the  sole  purpose  of  the  communica3on  or  the  primary  purpose  

26  

Waiver  Based  on  Disclosure  to  Government  Agencies  

Voluntary  Disclosure  •  Voluntary  disclosure  may  have  benefits  in  criminal  and  civil  

cases  

–  Federal  Sentencing  Guidelines  –  SEC  –  An3trust  immunity/leniency  

•  Avoiding  interven3on  in  qui  tam  li3ga3on  

•  Voluntary  disclosure  also  may  be  beneficial  in  maintaining  regulatory  rela3onships,  minimizing  ancillary  li3ga3on  and  cost,  and  protec3ng  reputa3on  

28  

Voluntary  Disclosure  

•  Benefits  are  difficult  to  quan3fy  and  oten  do  not  lead  to  a  posi3ve  outcome  

•  May  require  extensive  (and  expensive)  development  and  analysis  of  evidence  that  government  might  not  be  able  to  duplicate  

•  Oten  requires  difficult  disciplinary  decisions  including  termina3on  

•  May  require  waiver  of  the  aOorney-­‐client  privilege  

29  

Yates  Memo  to  Federal  Prosecutors  

•  September  9,  2015:  DOJ  issued  memo  to  federal  prosecutors  na3onwide  with  new  policies  priori3zing  prosecu3on  of  individual  employees—not  just  companies—and  puung  pressure  on  companies  to  turn  over  evidence  against  employees  

•  Calls  for  inves3gators  to  focus  on  individuals  from  the  incep3on  of  a  case,  rather  than  wai3ng  un3l  the  case  against  the  corpora3on  is  resolved  

•  Ra3onale  that  prosecu3ng  employees  who  perpetrated  a  crime  within  a  company  will  deter  future  illegal  ac3vity,  give  incen3ve  to  make  changes  in  corporate  behavior,  and  ensure  proper  par3es  are  held  responsible  

30  

DOJ  “Ground  Rules”  for  Coopera3on  

•  DOJ  Criminal  Division  pursuing  culpable  individuals;  company  may  be  liable  as  well  •  DOJ  will  strongly  consider  its  ability  to  prosecute  individuals    •  Company  should  share  informa3on  about  all  individuals  involved,  regardless  of  

their  posi3ons  in  company’s  management  •  Company  should  share  informa3on  about  termina3on  or  other  employment  ac3on  

with  DOJ  before  it  occurs,  especially  where  a  non-­‐ci3zen  is  involved  or  conduct  occurred  abroad  

•  Company  should  iden3fy  hot  documents  to  DOJ  before  interviewing  individuals  so  DOJ  can  consider  approaching  individuals  before  company  counsel  does  

•  Company  should  no3fy  DOJ  before  sharing  documents  with  individuals  who  are  represented  by  their  own  legal  counsel,  so  that  DOJ  will  not  be  surprised  by  individuals  who  have  already  reviewed  and  discussed  the  documents  with  counsel  

31  

Waiver  Agreements  

•  Elements  of  a  waiver  agreement:    –  Scope  –  Detailed  subject  ma5er  of  waiver  and  par3cular  type  of  work  product  and  communica3ons  waived  

–  Limita3ons  –  Specify  types  of  work  product  and  communica3ons  for  which  privilege  is  not  waived  (e.g.,  interview  memos)  

–  Use  –  Specify  use  of  privileged  informa3on,  including  sharing  with  other  government  agencies  

32  

No  Selec3ve  Waiver  •  “Selec3ve  Waiver”  permi5ed  in  Diversified  Industries,  Inc.  v.  Meredith,  572  

F.2d  596  (8th  Cir.  1977)  –  Voluntary  disclosure  of  privileged  material  to  an  agency  does  not  waive  

privilege  as  to  private  li3gants  •  Not  followed  in  other  courts      See  In  re  Steinhardt,  9  F.3d  230  (2d  Cir.  1993)  

–  Steinhardt  provided  Wells  submission  to  SEC  which  included  privileged  communica3ons  marked  “FOIA  CONFIDENTIAL  TREATMENT  REQUESTED”  

–  Civil  plain3ffs  brought  mo3on  to  compel  produc3on  of  Wells  submission  –  Order  compelling  Wells  submission  affirmed.      Privilege  is  waived  by  

voluntary  submission  to  SEC  in  connec3on  with  inves3ga3on  

33  

DOJ  Waiver  Rules  

•  Filip  Memorandum  2008  –  Issued  in  response  to  concerns  that  DOJ  “used  the  threat  of  criminal  indictment  and  prosecu3on  .  .  .  to  coerce  corpora3ons  to  waive  privilege  or  work  product  protec3on  against  their  will”  

–  “Coopera3on  will  be  measured  by  the  extent  to  which  a  corpora3on  discloses  relevant  facts  and  evidence,  not  its  waiver  of  privileges”  

–  Policy  prohibits  federal  prosecutors  from  demanding  privilege  waivers  

 

34  

SEC  Waiver  Rules  •  2001  Seaboard  Report    

–  Characterizes  “complete  coopera3on”  including  fact  that  company  “did  not  invoke  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege,  work  product  protec3on  or  other  privileges  or  protec3ons  with  respect  to  any  facts  uncovered  in  the  inves3ga3on”    

•  2013  Enforcement  Manual  –  “Voluntary  disclosure  of  informa3on  need  not  include  a  waiver  of  privilege  to  be  an  effec3ve  form  of  coopera3on  and  a  party’s  decision  to  assert  a  legi3mate  claim  of  privilege  will  not  nega3vely  affect  their  claim  to  credit  for  coopera3on”  

–  However,  a  privilege  waiver  may  be  “a  means  (where  necessary)  to  provide  relevant  and  some3mes  cri3cal  informa3on  to  the  staff”  

35  

Supervisory  Audit  Waiver  Rules  

•  CFPB  2012  Bulle3n:“[B]ecause  en33es  must  comply  with  the  Bureau’s  supervisory  requests  for  informa3on,  the  provision  of  privileged  informa3on  to  the  Bureau  would  not  be  considered  voluntary  and  would  thus  not  waive  any  privilege  that  a5ached  to  such  informa3on”    

•  12  U.S.C.  §  1828(x):    Submission  of  privileged  materials  to  bank  regulators  in  context  of  supervisory  audit  does  not  waive  privilege  

•  Sec3on  1828(x)  does  not  apply  in  enforcement  context  •  CFPB  rule  (12  CFR  Part  1070)  says  this  policy  applies  to  work  

product,  but  the  statute  does  not  discuss  work  product    

36  

Subject-­‐Ma5er  and  Selec3ve  Waiver  of  Privilege  

Federal  Rules  of  Evidence  

•  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  502  (a):    In  the  event  of  an  inten3onal  waiver  in  federal  court  or  to  a  federal  office  or  agency,  the  waiver  extends  to  an  undisclosed  communica3on  or  informa3on  if  the  communica3ons  concern  the  same  subject  ma5er  and  if  fairness  so  requires  

•  When  does  fairness  require?    “[T]o  prevent  a  selec3ve  and  misleading  presenta3on  of  evidence  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  adversary”      

•  Federal  courts  may  issue  binding  orders  limi3ng  waiver  •  Not  intended  to  otherwise  “alter”  exis3ng  privilege  rules  •  Does  not  change  rules  on  “selec3ve”  waiver.    Advisory  

Commi5ee  Notes  38  

Applica3on  of  Rule  502  

•  Gruss  v.  Zwirn,  2013  WL  3481350  (S.D.N.Y.  July  10,  2013)  (waiver  occurred  where  company  “deliberately,  voluntarily,  and  selec3vely”  presented    privileged  informa3on  to  SEC  –  despite  confiden3ality  agreement  with  SEC)  

•  US  v.  Treacy,  2009  WL  812033  (S.D.N.Y.  Mar.  24,  2009)  (relies  on  FRE  502  to  uphold  par3al  waiver  of  certain  interview  memoranda)  –  Criminal  defendant  obtained  all  interview  memoranda  shared  with  DOJ  

–  Undisclosed  memoranda  did  not  concern  the  same  subject  –  No  evidence  of  selec3ve  or  misleading  disclosure  

39  

In  re  General  Motors  LLC  IgniLon  Switch  LiLgaLon,  14-­‐MD-­‐2543  (JMF)  (S.D.N.Y.  Jan.  15,  2015)  

•  GM’s  agreement  to  make  final  report  public  and  share  it  with  Congress  and  various  agencies  did  not  waive  privilege  for  underlying  interview  memoranda  

•  Counsel’s  delivery  of  Upjohn  warnings  proves  GM  intended  to  maintain  privilege  of  communica3ons  in  interview  memos  

•  Holds  that  KBR  is  consistent  with  Second  Circuit  standard:    legal  advice  was  “one  of  the  significant  purposes  of  the  internal  inves3ga3on”  

•  Privilege  is  not  lost  because  “nonlegal  considera3ons”  are  included  in  a  communica3on  that  includes  legal  advice  

40  

Paterno  v.  NCAA/Penn  State  •  Disclosure  of  independent  report  by  outside  counsel  waived  

a5orney-­‐client  privilege  as  to  underlying  documents  •  ACC  amicus  brief  urged  Superior  Court  to  reject  that  

argument  –  “There  are  oten  good  reasons  for  privilege  holders  to  disclose  the  conclusions  of  an  inves3ga3on  to  the  government  or  other  third  par3es,  e.g.,  to  report  viola3ons  of  the  law,  facilitate  se5lement,  and/or  obtain  reduced  sanc3ons.  If  companies  know  that  disclosure  of  an  inves3ga3on  report  will  automa3cally  waive  all  materials  and  communica3ons  rela3ng  to  the  report,  they  will  be  less  likely  to  release  reports,  thereby  disserving  the  companies'  stakeholders  as  well  as  the  public”  

41  

At-­‐Issue  Waiver    of  Privilege  

At-­‐Issue  Waiver  •  Privilege  may  be  waived  if  a  party  puts  the  privileged  

communica3on  at  issue  by  relying  on  it  to  support  “a  claim  or  defense.”  In  re  Cnty.  of  Erie,  546  F.3d  222,  228-­‐29  (2d  Cir.  2008)  

•  The  doctrine  of  “at-­‐issue”  waiver  recognizes  that  a5orney-­‐client  communica3ons  cannot  be  used  as  both  “a  sword  and  a  shield”  

•  “[E]ven  if  a  party  does  not  a5empt  to  make  use  of  a  privileged  communica3on,  he  may  waive  the  privilege  if  he  asserts  a  factual  claim  the  truth  of  which  can  only  be  assessed  by  examina3on  of  a  privileged  communica3on.”  Bowne  of  New  York  City,  Inc.  v.  AmBase  Corp.,  150  F.R.D.  465,  488  (S.D.N.Y.  1993)  

43  

ScoO  v.  Chipotle  Mexican  Grill,    2014  WL  7236907  (S.D.N.Y.  Dec.  18,  2014)  

•  In  FLSA  case,  magistrate  judge  held  that  Chipotle  was  required  to  produce  privileged  communica3ons  because  its  affirma3ve  defenses  under  29  USC  §  259  and  §  260  put  them  at  issue  

•  Sec3on  259  provides  an  affirma3ve  defense  if  employer  was  ac3ng  in  good  faith  reliance  on  a  regula3on,  order  or  ruling  of  Labor  Department  

•  Sec3on  260  limits  liquidated  damages  if  the  viola3on  was  based  on  good  faith,  objec3vely  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  classifica3on  of  employees  was  consistent  with  FLSA  standards  

•  Chipotle  did  not  plead  reliance  on  advice  of  counsel  –  and,  in  fact,  specifically  disclaimed  reliance  on  advise  of  counsel  

44  

ScoO  v.  Chipotle  Mexican  Grill,    2014  WL  7236907  (S.D.N.Y.  Dec.  18,  2014)  

•  Court  holds  that  defenses  necessarily  put  “good  faith”  at  issue  and  that  defendant  cannot  “plead  around”  evidence  of  its  state  of  mind  

•  Deposi3ons  and  discovery  responses  prove  that  Chipotle  did  receive  advice  of  counsel  

•  Privilege  waived  because  evidence  of  “legal  advice”  “may  well  demonstrate  the  falsity  of  [company’s]  claims  of  good  faith  belief.”    Plain3ffs  are  en3tled  to  know  if  defendant  “ignored  counsel’s  advice”  

•  Chipotle  may  amend  its  answer  to  eliminate  good  faith  defenses  

45  

ScoO  v.  Chipotle  Mexican  Grill,    2014  WL  7236907  (S.D.N.Y.  Dec.  18,  2014)  

•  In  effect,  plain3ffs  successfully  forced  disclosure  of  legal  advice  in  order  to  disprove  “good  faith”  –  even  though  company  is  not  relying  on  legal  advice  to  prove  “good  faith”  

•  May  be  limited  to  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act?  •  But  see  19  U.S.C.  §  1592  (In  penalty  case,  if  Customs  proves  importer  

made  false  statement  or  omission,  “the  defendant  must  affirma3vely  demonstrate  that  it  exercised  reasonable  care  under  the  circumstances”)  

•  U.S.  Customs  and  Border  Protec3on  (“CBP”)  guidance  provides  reasonable  care  may  be  established  by  consul3ng  a  customs  expert,  such  as  an  a5orney  or  a  customs  broker  or  consultant  

46  

In  re  Kellogg  Brown  &  Root  [KBR]  Inc.    Part  II  (D.C.  Cir.  August  11,  2015)  

•  On  remand,  District  Court  finds  waiver  because  –  Required  under  FRE  612  because  in-­‐house  counsel  reviewed  

inves3ga3on  report  in  prepara3on  for  deposi3on  –  at  which  privilege  was  claimed  

–  KBR  waived  privilege  under  “at  issue”  doctrine.    KBR  sought  an  inference  that  the  privileged  inves3ga3on  uncovered  no  misconduct  by  this  “chain  of  reasoning:”  (1)  an  inves3ga3on  of  alleged  misconduct  was  conducted,  (2)  any  misconduct  was  required  to  be  reported  to  DOJ  and  (3)  no  report  was  made  to  DOJ  in  this  case  

47  

In  re  Kellogg  Brown  &  Root  [KBR]  Inc.    Part  II  (D.C.  Cir.  August  11,  2015)  

•  Held:    District  Court’s  balancing  test  under  612  was  inappropriate  and,  in  any  event,  accorded  insufficient  weight  to  privilege  

•  Plain3ff  no3ced  the  30(b)(6)  to  inquire  about  the  privileged  inves3ga3on  

•  Counsel  had  “no  choice”  but  to  review  privileged  material  to  prepare  

•  Simply  reviewing  privileged  communica3ons  prior  to  tes3mony  does  not  cons3tute  using  a  wri3ng  to  refresh  recollec3on  under  612  

48  

In  re  Kellogg  Brown  &  Root  [KBR]  Inc.    Part  II  (D.C.  Cir.  August  11,  2015)  

•  Held:    No  ”at  issue”  waiver  because  KBR  did  not  “ac3vely”  seek  a  “posi3ve  inference’  from  the  privileged  inves3ga3on  

•  Statements  were  only  in  the  “recita3on  of  facts”  and  not  in  the  argument  sec3on  

•  Statement  was  only  in  a  footnote  (court  does  not  “indulge  in  cursory  arguments  made  in  a  footnote”)  

•  Par3es  were  on  summary  judgment  and  any  “inference”  from  statements  had  to  have  been  drawn  against  KBR  

•  Cannot  be  reconciled  with  Chipotle  

49  

Crime-­‐Fraud  Excep3on      

Crime-­‐Fraud  Excep3on  •  Applies  where  “there  is  a  reasonable  basis  to  suspect  that  the  

privilege  holder  was  commiung  or  intending  to  commit  a  crime  or  fraud  and  that  the  a5orney-­‐client  communica3ons  or  a5orney  work  product  were  used  in  furtherance  of  the  alleged  crime  or  fraud.”  In  re  Grand  Jury  Subpoena,  705  F.3d  133,  153  (3d  Cir.  2012)    

•  “If  the  a5orney  merely  informs  the  client  of  the  criminality  of  a  proposed  ac3on  [or  lack  thereof],  the  crime-­‐fraud  excep3on  does  not  apply”  since  that  advice  alone  cannot  be  used  “in  furtherance”  of  a  crime.  In  re  Grand  Jury  Subpoena,  745  F.3d  681,  692-­‐93  (3d  Cir.  2014)  (3d  Cir.  2014)  (excep3on  applied  where  client  used  a5orney’s  advice  in  furtherance  of  the  crime)  

51  

Co-­‐Client  and  Common-­‐Interest  Excep3ons  to  Waiver  

Co-­‐Client  Excep3on  Requires    Consent  and  No  Conflict  

•  Counsel  can  serve  mul3ple  clients  on  same  ma5er,  consistent  with  rules  of  professional  conduct,  if  –  all  clients  consent  and  –  no  substan3al  risk  of  the  lawyer  being  unable  to  fulfill  her  du3es  to  them  all  

Restatement  (Third)  of  the  Law  Governing  Lawyers  §§  128-­‐31.    

53  

Co-­‐Client  Excep3on  Avoids  Waiver,  but  No  Privilege  between  Co-­‐Clients  

•  Communica3ons  between  co-­‐clients  and  their  a5orney  are  protected  against  third  par3es    

•  No  unilateral  waiver  (except  probably  for  client’s  own  communica3ons  concerning  only  itself)  

•  But  communica3ons  in  joint  representa3on  are  not  privileged  in  li3ga3on  between  co-­‐clients  

In  re  Teleglobe  CommunicaLons  Corp.,  493  F.3d  345,  366  (3d  Cir.  2007)   54  

Common-­‐Interest  Excep3on  Dis3nguished  

•  Applies  where  clients  pursue  common  legal  interest  through  separate  counsel.  See  United  States  v.  Schwimmer,  892  F.2d  237  (2d  Cir.  1989)  

•  No  need  for  “actual  li3ga3on  [to  be]  in  progress  for  the  common  interest”  doctrine  to  apply  (Schwimmer  at  244),  but  “[t]he  common  interest  must  be  a  legal”  rather  than  a  “commercial  or  financial  interest”  (Blanchard  v.  EdgeMark  Fin.  Corp.,  192  F.R.D.  233,  237  (N.D.  Ill.    2000))  

55  

Common-­‐Interest  Default  Rules  •  Protects  privilege  only  of  communica3ons  in  furtherance  of  common  interest  

•  Confiden3ality  owed  to  co-­‐defendants  –  cannot  use  joint  defense  informa3on  against  co-­‐defendants  

•  To  clarify  rules,  and  preserve  op3ons  to  disclose  and  cross-­‐examine,  best  prac3ce  is  to  agree  on  rules,  oten  in  wri5en  common  legal  interest  or  joint  defense  agreement  (JDA)  

56  

Parent/Subsidiary/Affiliate  Issues  

In  re  Teleglobe  CommunicaLons  Corp.,    493  F.3d  345  (3d  Cir.  2007)  

 •  Bell  Canada  Enterprises  acquired  Teleglobe  and  Teleglobe’s  subsidiaries  

•  BCE  in-­‐house  counsel  jointly  represented  BCE  and  Teleglobe  on  securi3es  filings  –  both  public  companies  

•  BCE  ceased  further  funding  and  Teleglobe  and  its  subsidiaries  filed  for  bankruptcy  

•  Teleglobe’s  U.S.  subsidiaries  as  debtors  in  bankruptcy  sued  BCE  and  demanded  privileged  communica3ons  

58  

Teleglobe  Appellate  Decision  •  Joint  representa3on  of  BCE  and  Teleglobe  did  not  include  the  Debtors  à  adverse  li3ga3on  proviso  to  the  co-­‐client  excep3on  did  not  apply  

•  Funneling  documents  through  supposedly  “conflicted”  in-­‐house  counsel  did  not  deprive  parent  BCE  of  its  privilege:  Eureka  principle  

•  Remand  for  eviden3ary  hearing  on  Garner  fiduciary  excep3on  to  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  

493  F.3d  at  380-­‐86  (3d  Cir.  2007)  

59  

60  

Eureka:  Client  Retains  Privilege    Even  if  Counsel  Had  Conflict  

•  A5orney  jointly  represented  insurer  and  insured  in  li3ga3on,  which  insured  se5led  without  insurer’s  consent  

•  Both  insurer  and  insured  thought  they  had  retained  the  same  a5orney  for  bad-­‐faith  refusal  to  consent  to  se5lement  

•  Insurer  moved  to  compel  confidences  to  support  affirma3ve  defense  of  non-­‐coopera3on  

•  Held:  “[C]ounsel’s  failure  to  avoid  a  conflict  of  interest  should  not  deprive  the  client  of  the  privilege”  (Wigmore;  Restatement  Third)  

•  Policy:  “openness  and  coopera3on  between  joint  clients  .  .  .  does  not  apply  to  ma5ers  known  at  the  3me  of  the  communica3on  not  to  be  in  the  common  interest  of  the  a5orney’s  two  clients”  

Eureka  Inv.  Corp.  v.  Chicago  Title  Ins.  Co.,  743  F.2d  932  (D.C.  Cir.  1984)  (per  curiam)  

61  

Red  Flags  for  In-­‐House  Conflicts  •  Parent  begins  to  consider  exi3ng  certain  businesses  (poten3al  sale)  

•  Parent  begins  to  consider  dives3ng  certain  subsidiaries  (poten3al  spin  off)  

•  Subsidiary  begins  to  encounter  substan3al  opera3ng,  financial,  or  legal  problems,  such  that  bankruptcy  becomes  a  real  possibility  (poten3al  insolvency)  

Solu3ons  Imprac3cal  or  Ineffec3ve  Apparent  Solu1ons  

•  Separate  in-­‐house  counsel  for  parent  and  subsidiary  

•  In-­‐house  counsel  for  parent  and  separate  outside  counsel  for  subsidiary  

•  Contract  provisions  or  waivers  

Poten1al  Pi5alls  

•  Imprac3cal:  Teleglobe  court’s  sugges3on,  but  ma5er  segrega3on  difficult  with  central  func3on  or  small  staff  

•  Imprac3cal:  requires  JDA  with  outside  counsel  and  $  

•  Likely  ineffec3ve:  some  courts  have  rejected  (especially  in  bankruptcy)  

62  

63  

Risk-­‐Based  Approach  to  Avoid    In-­‐House  Conflicts  

•  Be  alert  to  parent  considera3on  of  subsidiary’s  poten3al  sale,  spin  off,  or  insolvency  

•  Have  subsidiary  retain  separate  outside  counsel  to  represent  it  on  ma5ers  in  which  it  may  become  adverse  to  the  parent  

•  Iden3fy  and  document  respec3ve  lawyers’  clients  and  the  scope  of  their  representa3ons  

•  Enter  into  common  legal  interest  agreement  

Teleglobe  Remand:    Garner  Fiduciary  Excep3on  

•  The  excep3on:  “where  the  corpora3on  is  in  suit  against  its  stockholders  on  charges  of  ac3ng  inimically  to  stockholder  interests,  protec3on  of  those  interests  as  well  as  those  of  the  corpora3on  and  of  the  public  require  that  the  availability  of  the  privilege  be  subject  to  the  right  of  the  stockholders  to  show  cause  why  it  should  not  be  invoked  in  the  par3cular  instance.”  Garner  v.  Wolfinbarger,  430  F.2d  1093,  1103-­‐04  (5th  Cir.  1970)  

•  The  (good)  “cause”  standard:  eight  factor  ad  hoc  balancing  test  including  the  seriousness  of  the  alleged  corporate  wrongdoing,  the  need  for  the  requested  documents,  and  their  unavailability  through  other  means  

64  

Garner’s  Mixed  Ra3onales  •  Commentators  have  described  the  fiduciary  excep3on  as  

applying  to  “internal  warfare”  or  “almost  clients”  •  Fith  Circuit  relied  on  

–  Common  law  trust  rule:  “when  a  trustee  obtain[s]  legal  advice  rela3ng  to  his  administra3on  of  the  trust,  and  not  in  an3cipa3on  of  adversarial  legal  proceedings  against  him,  the  beneficiaries  of  the  trust  ha[ve]  the  right  to  the  produc3on  of  that  advice.”  Wachtel  v.  Health  Net,  Inc.,  482  F.3d  225,  231  (3d  Cir.  2007)  

–  Co-­‐client  excep3on:  persons  who  shared  lawyer  can’t  assert  privilege  against  each  other  in  subsequent  li3ga3on  

–  Crime-­‐fraud  excep3on  to  the  a5orney-­‐privilege  –  Statutory  rights  to  books  and  records  

65  

Garner  Codifica3on  •  Garner’s  fiduciary  excep3on  is  “codified”  in  §  85  of  the  

Restatement  (Third)  of  the  Law  Governing  Lawyers  with  10  factors  

•  Restatement  §  85  relies  on  “[t]wo  policy  considera3ons”:  –  Directors’  and  officers’  duty  to  inform  shareholders  and    –  Risk  that,  “in  li3ga3on  against  their  cons3tuents,  the  ques3on  of  

waiver  may  not  be  decided  objec3vely”  •  Garner  applied  the  fiduciary  excep3on  to  a  shareholder  

deriva3ve  suit,  but  the  “decision  does  not  turn  on  whether  that  claim  is  in  the  case  or  out”  (430  F.2d  at  1097  n.11)  

•  Subsequent  courts  have  generally  but  not  always  applied  the  excep3on  to  other  claims  of  fiduciary  malfeasance  (e.g.,  non-­‐deriva3ve  shareholder  suits,  trust  ac3ons,  partnership  disputes)  

66  

Wal-­‐Mart  v.  Indiana  Elec.  Workers  •  Delaware  Supreme  Court  recognizes  fiduciary  excep3on  

(Garner  had  been  applied  by  Court  of  Chancery  before)  •  Stockholder  sought  “informa3on  regarding  the  handling  of  

the  WalMex  Inves3ga3on,  whether  a  cover  up  took  place,  and  what  details  were  shared  with  the  Wal-­‐Mart  Board,”  all  of  which  were  necessary  to  inves3ga3ng  the  alleged  fiduciary  breaches.    

•  Delaware  Supreme  Court  ordered  Wal-­‐Mart  to  produce  privileged  documents  on  handling  of  internal  FCPA  inves3ga3on  

Wal-­‐Mart  Stores  Inc.  v.  Indiana  Electrical  Workers  Pension  Trust  Fund  IBEW,  No.614-­‐2013  2014  WL  3638848  (Del.  July  23,  2014)  

67  

De  Vries  v.  Diamante  Del  Mar  •  Master  in  Delaware  Court  of  Chancery  emphasized  three  of  

Garner’s  eight  factors:    –  Colorable  claim  (3)  –  Unavailability  from  other  sources  (4)  and    –  Specificity  of  request  (no  “fishing  expedi3on”)  (7)  

•  In  plenary  ac3ons,  fiduciary  excep3on  is  “narrow,  exac3ng  and  intended  to  be  very  difficult  to  sa3sfy”  

•  But  lower  standard  applies  in  Delaware  ac3on  to  inspect  records  –  credible  basis  to  infer  wrongdoing  

De  Vries  v.  Diamante  Del  Mar,  L.L.C.,  2015  WL  3534073  (Del.  Ch.  June  3,  2015)  

68  

Garner  Applica3on:    Asserted  Internal  Law  Firm  Privilege  

•  Garner  considera3ons  apply  if  law  firm  has  underlying  work  conflict  –  Counsel  has  fiduciary  duty  to  corporate  client,  including  du3es  not  to  withhold  

informa3on  and  affirma3ve  ethical  duty  (MRPC  1.4)  to  provide  informa3on  bearing  on  representa3on  

–  Underlying  work  conflict  may  materially  limit  counsel’s  ability  to  represent  corporate  client  

•  Garner  “internal  warfare”  ra3onale  applies  to  law  firm  partner,  but  less  well  to  outside  counsel  to  law  firm  

•  Commentators  suggest  a  balance:  no  privilege  for  advice  by  lawyers  on  ma5er,  but  allow  privileged  communica3ons  with  outside  counsel  and  perhaps  dedicated  in-­‐house  counsel  (Hazard  &  Hodes,  The  Law  of  Lawyering  §  9.6.3  at  9-­‐29  (Supp.  2012)  

69  

In-­‐House  Traps:  Client-­‐to-­‐Client  Talk  Not  Privileged  •  “[T]he  communica3on  must  be  shared  with  

an  aOorney  of  the  member  of  the  community  of  interest  .  .  .  .  [S]eparate  a5orneys  share  informa3on  (and  not  the  clients  themselves)  .  .  .  .”  (Teleglobe,  493  F.3d  at  364)  

•  Communica3ons  between  the  clients  (absent  a  lawyer)  are  not  privileged,  which  is  why  the  lawyers  should  tell  their  clients  not  to  discuss  the  ma5er  among  themselves.”  (Professor  Stephen  Gillers,  RegulaLon  of  Lawyers  285  (8th  ed.  2009))  

•  Example:  client-­‐to-­‐client  communica3ons  held  not  privileged  in  Hoffman-­‐LaRoche,  Inc.  v.  Roxanne  Laboratories,  Inc.,  2011  WL  1792791  (D.N.J.  May  11,  2011)  

Privileged  •  “If  informa3on  that  is  otherwise  privileged  is  

shared  between  par3es  that  have  a  common  legal  interest,  the  privilege  is  not  forfeited  even  though  no  a5orney  either  creates  or  receives  that  communica3on.”  Gucci  America,  Inc.  v.  Gucci,  2008  WL  5251989,  *1  (S.D.N.Y.  2008)  

•  “These  documents  contain  discussions  of  counsels’  opinions.  Being  communica3ons  between  par3es  with  a  community  of  interest,  they  are  each  privileged  under  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege.”  Heidelberg  Harris,  Inc.  v.  Mitsubishi  Heavy  Indus.,  Ltd.,  1996  WL  514997,  *2  (N.D.  Ill.  1996)  

•  Teleglobe  limita3on  “largely  lost  in  contemporary  jurisprudence”  (Paul  R.  Rice  et  al.,  A5orney-­‐Client  Privilege  in  the  United  States  §  4:35,  at  529  (2014))  

70  

In-­‐House  Traps:    Confidences  Between  Co-­‐Clients  

No  Secrets  Duty/power  to  inform  •   Restatement  (Third)  of  the  

Law  Governing  Lawyers  §  60  cmt.  k  

•   Johnson  v.  Superior  Court  (Cal.  Ct.  App.)  

•   Professor  Stephen  Gillers,  Regula3on  of  Lawyers  286  (8th  ed.  2009)  

Secrets  Kept  

Duty  of  loyalty  •   ABA  Opinion  08-­‐450  (2008)  

(which  Professor  Gillers  characterizes  as  “a  poorly  drated  analysis”)  

71  

In-­‐House  Traps:  Unilateral  Waiver  Waiver  Restatement  Third  •  Co-­‐clients  and  common-­‐

interest  clients  can  waive  the  privilege  to  their  own  communica3ons,  absent  contrary  agreement  

•  Waiver  of  privilege  in  document  containing  communica3ons  by  more  than  one  client  requires  agreement,  unless  the  non-­‐waiving  client’s  communica3ons  can  be  redacted  

No  Waiver  

California  •  “[A]  waiver  of  the  right  of  a  

par3cular  joint  holder  of  the  privilege  to  claim  the  privilege  does  not  affect  the  right  of  another  joint  holder  to  claim  the  privilege”  

•  California  Evidence  Code    §  912(b)  

72  

In-­‐House  Traps:  Common  Interest  –  Iden3cal  or  Similar  

Iden1cal  •  “A  community  of  interest  exists  among  

different  persons  or  separate  corpora3ons  where  they  have  an  iden3cal  legal  interest  with  respect  to  the  subject  ma5er  of  a  communica3on  between  an  a5orney  and  a  client  concerning  legal  advice.  .  .  .  The  key  considera3on  is  that  the  nature  of  the  interest  be  iden3cal,  not  similar,  and  be  legal,  not  solely  commercial.”  Duplan  Corp.  v.  Deering  Milliken,  Inc.,  397  F.  Supp.  1146,  1172  (D.S.C.  1974)  

•  This  .  .  .  standard  .  .  .  coined  in  Duplan  .  .  .  has  been  widely  followed.“  Paul  R.  Rice  et  al.,  A5orney-­‐Client  Privilege  in  the  United  States  §  4:36    

Similar  

"[T]he  common  interest  .  .  .  may  be  either  legal,  factual,  or  strategic  in  character.  The  interests  of  the  separately  represented  clients  need  not  be  en3rely  congruent."  Restatement  (Third)  of  the  Law  Governing  Lawyers  §  76  cmt.  e.    

73  

Interna3onal  Privilege  Rules/  Cross-­‐Border  Privilege  Issues    

Attorney-Client Privilege Abroad

•  Privilege in United States applies to in-house counsel •  A few countries outside the United States do not treat

communications with counsel as privileged •  Many countries outside the United States (especially

civil law countries) do not treat communications with in-house counsel as privileged (e.g., in-house and outside counsel in France are different professions)

75  

Choice  of  Privilege  Law  –  U.S.  Courts  •  Privilege  law  chosen  based  on  country  with  which  the  

communica3ons  “touch  base.”  Anwar  v.  Fairfield  Greenwich  Ltd.,  No.  09  Civ.  118(VM)(FM),  2013  WL  3369084,  at  *1  (S.D.N.Y.  Jul.  8,  2013),  aff’d,  982  F.Supp.2d  260  (S.D.N.Y.  Nov  08,  2013)  

•  “Touching  base”  analysis  considers    –  Where  rela3onship  was  entered  into  –  Place  rela3onship  centered  at  3me  of  communica3on  –  Jurisdic3on  where  advice  pertains  

•  U.S.  privilege  law  typically  applies  to  “[c]ommunica3ons  rela3ng  to  legal  proceedings  in  the  United  States,  or  that  reflect  the  provision  of  advice  regarding  American  law  .  .  .  even  though  the  communica3on  may  involve  foreign  a5orneys  or  a  foreign  proceeding.”  (Gucci  America,  Inc.  v.  Guess?,  Inc.,  271  F.R.D.  58  (S.D.N.Y.  2010))  

76  

EU  and  BRIC  Privilege  Table  No  Legal  Professional  Privilege  

LPP  only  for  Outside  Counsel  

LPP  for  In-­‐House  and  Outside  Counsel    

China   Austria    Bulgaria    Czech  Republic  Finland    France    Greece  India  Italy  Poland  Russia  Sweden  

Belgium  Brazil  Canada  Denmark  Germany  Israel  Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  South  Africa  UK  

77  

EU: Belgium, Germany, UK

•  Belgium –  Expressly rejects Akzo Nobel –  But LPP protects in-house attorneys only if they are members of

the Belgian Institute for Company Lawyers •  Germany

–  LPP applies to attorneys enrolled at the German Bar and other EU-member states

–  But not likely foreign lawyers •  United Kingdom

–  In-house counsel communications must meet “dominant purpose” test

–  “Client” narrowly defined – employees and officers tasked with obtaining legal advice from outside and in-house counsel

–  Does not extend to many classes of employees or to in-house counsel’s communications with third parties

78  

European Union •  “Legal Professional Privilege” (LPP)

–  European equivalent to U.S. attorney-client privilege –  Each EU member state has national and EU privilege rules

•  EU regulatory investigations under European Commission do not treat in-house counsel as legal professionals for purpose of LPP (Akzo Nobel) – LPP only if –  Communications made for purposes, and interests of,

client’s right to defense; and –  Emanate from an independent lawyer (in-house counsel

is not independent) who is entitled to practice in EU 79  

Akzo Nobel v. European Commission (Sept. 2010)

•  Facts: EC seized documents in antitrust investigation, including emails with in-house counsel and company

•  Held: communications with in-house counsel not privileged •  Reasoning: in-house counsel lacks ability to exercise

professional independence because: –  Economically dependent on client, and –  Cannot ignore commercial strategies pursued by employer

•  Limitations: –  Applies to EU law and action –  EU member states are not bound by decision in framing privilege

rules in their own jurisdictions

80  

Implications of Akzo Nobel •  1.  Risk  for  U.S.-­‐based  in-­‐house  counsel  

–  During  EC  inves3ga3ons,  communica3ons  from  U.S.  in-­‐house  counsel  are  likely  not  privileged  

•  2.  Risk  for  U.S.-­‐based  outside  counsel  –  Outside  counsel  likely  must  qualify  to  prac3ce  law  within  EU  (e.g.  

AM&S  Europe  Ltd.  v.  Commission)  –  Therefore,  U.S.-­‐based  outside  counsel  communica3ons  would  not  

be  privileged  

•  3.    Risk  of  inadvertent  waivers  of  U.S.  privilege  –  Valid  U.S.  privileges  can  be  waived  if  party  “voluntarily”  

compromises  confiden3ality  of  relevant  documents  –  Turnover  of  documents  to  EC  could  be  deemed  waiver    

81  

82  

Denying  In-­‐House  Counsel  LPP  Disserves  the  Purposes  of  the  Privilege  •  Frustrates  compliance  by  cuung  in-­‐house  lawyers  out  of  sensi3ve  planning  discussions  where  they  can  prevent  problems:  “an  uncertain  privilege  is  the  same  as  no  privilege  at  all”  (Upjohn)  

•  Extending  LPP  to  in-­‐house  counsel  would  not  lose  material  evidence,  because  without  LPP  the  communica3ons  will  likely  not  occur  

Protec3ng  LPP  Cross-­‐Border  •  Spot  the  issue  

–  Don’t  assume  similar  eviden3ary  and  discovery  rules  –  Become   familiar   with   varia3ons   in   scope   of   LPP   where   company  

does  business    •  Encourage  in-­‐house  lawyers  to  be  licensed  in  jurisdic3ons  in  which  they  

reside  to  obtain  LPP  on  ma5ers  of  na3onal  (not  EU  compe33on)  law  •  Communicate  cri3cal  advice  

–  Through   local   outside   counsel   (vast   majority   recognize   LPP   for  outside  counsel)  

–  Orally  •  Contractually   avoid   li3ga3on   in   unfavorable   forums:   licensing,  

distributor,  vendor,  employment,  and  other  contracts  may  provide  an  opportunity  to  prevent  future  privilege  issues  

83  

In-­‐House  Tips  

Remind  Internal  Clients  •  E-­‐mail  is  for  facts,  not  feelings  •  Sending  a  courtesy  copy  to  in-­‐house  counsel  does  not  make  

the  e-­‐mail  privileged,  even  in  the  United  States,  and  certainly  not  outside  

•  For  sensi3ve  form  documents,  revise  the  form  to  collect  privileged  communica3ons  in  one  sec3on  and  document  the  privileged  nature  of  the  sec3on  for  ready  redac3on  

•  Limit  distribu3on  of  legal  advice  to  those  who  genuinely  need  to  know  

85  

For  In-­‐House  Counsel  •  Who  is  your  client?  Act  appropriately  if  they  are  “almost  clients”  or  not  clients  –  Poten3al  waiver  or  conflict  issues  with  “almost  clients”  –  Upjohn  or  Miranda  warnings  may  be  appropriate  with  non-­‐clients  

•  Are  you  providing  legal  or  business  advice?  If  it’s  important  that  the  legal  advice  remain  privileged,  consider  saying  that  it’s  legal  advice  and  marking  it  accordingly  

86  

PRIVILEGE  JEOPARDY!  

Internal  Inves1ga1ons   Potpourri   Waiver  and  Excep1ons  

Who’s  the  Client  

200   200   200   200  

400   400   400   400  

600   600   600   600  

800   800   800   800  

1000   1000   1000   1000  

These  federal  rules  don’t  require  internal  inves3ga3ons  per  se,  but  have  played  a  substan3al  role  in  encouraging  companies  to  undertake  inves3ga3ons  when  appropriate.  

Internal  Inves3ga3ons  -­‐  $200  

In  conduc3ng  an  internal  inves3ga3on,  it  may  be  advisable  for  in-­‐house  counsel  to  consult  with  these  individuals  for  assistance.  

Internal  Inves3ga3ons  -­‐  $400  

The  warning  typically  given  to  employees  before  they  par3cipate  in  an  internal  inves3ga3on  being  conducted  at  the  request  of  their  employer.  

Internal  Inves3ga3ons  -­‐  $600  

When  members  of  this  corporate  department  or  division  undertake  an  internal  inves3ga3on,  it  should  be  made  clear  that  a  purpose  of  the  inves3ga3on  is  to  secure  legal  advice.    

Internal  Inves3ga3ons  -­‐  $800  

The  KBR  court  rejected  the  narrow  but-­‐for  test  for  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  in  favor  of  this  test.  

Internal  Inves3ga3ons  -­‐  $1000  

The  protec3on  from  disclosure  given  to  documents  prepared  in  an3cipa3on  of  li3ga3on.    

Potpourri  -­‐  $200  

This  party  bears  the  burden  of  establishing  a  par3cular  communica3on  is  privileged.  

Potpourri  -­‐  $400  

Unlike  the  common  law,  this  type  of  legal  system  oten  does  not  recognize  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  in  the  corporate  context.    

Potpourri  -­‐  $600  

DAILY  DOUBLE  

In  a  federal  case,  this  law  controls  the  applica3on  of  the  a5orney-­‐client  privilege.  

Potpourri  -­‐  $800  

This  decision  out  of  the  European  Union  held  that  communica3ons  with  in-­‐house  counsel  are  not  privileged.    

Potpourri  -­‐  $1000  

This  applies  when  communica3ons  are  used  in  furtherance  of  an  alleged  crime  or  fraud.  

Waiver  and  Excep3ons  -­‐  $200  

DAILY  DOUBLE  

Voluntary  disclosure  of  a  poten3al  viola3on  of  law  to  federal  officials  may  some3mes  require  waiver  of  this.    

Waiver  and  Excep3ons  -­‐  $400  

If  you  incorporate  the  advice  of  counsel  as  a  defense,  you  may  have  to  reveal  that  privileged  advice  under  this  legal  theory.    

Waiver  and  Excep3ons  -­‐  $600  

This  type  of  privilege  waiver  may  occur  when  privileged  communica3ons  on  a  par3cular  topic  are  inten3onally  disclosed  to  third  par3es.    

Waiver  and  Excep3ons  -­‐  $800  

This  excep3on  to  a5orney-­‐client  privilege  waiver  may  apply  when  clients  with  a  shared  legal  issue  work  together  with  counsel  and  exchange  privileged  informa3on.    

Waiver  and  Excep3ons  -­‐  $1000  

This  model  rule  of  professional  conduct  states  that  a  lawyer  employed  by  an  organiza3on  represents  the  organiza3on  ac3ng  through  its  duly  authorized  cons3tuents.    

Who’s  the  Client?  -­‐  $200    

When  an  in-­‐house  a5orney  is  advising  both  a  parent  corpora3on  and  its  subsidiaries,  this  en3ty  generally  holds  the  privilege.    

Who’s  the  Client?  -­‐  $400    

In  a  corporate  seung,  this  type  of  problem  can  arise  when  an  in-­‐house  a5orney  advises  both  the  business  and  an  individual  employee.  

Who’s  the  Client?  -­‐  $600    

A  2015  DOJ  memo  announced  new  policies  priori3zing  this  in  corporate  inves3ga3ons  and  prosecu3ons.  

Who’s  the  Client?  -­‐  $800    

This  group  of  corporate  fiduciaries  may  some3mes  need  legal  counsel  independent  of  the  company’s  in-­‐house  a5orneys.  

Who’s  the  Client?  -­‐  $1000