Homeland Security Letter Enclosing Final Report for June 6-7, … · Joint Public Information Center - Days 1 and 2 ..... 16 Technical Support Group - Day 1 ... (DHS), Chicago Field

I

OCT - 5 2006

U.S. Department of Homeland Securih Washington. DC‘ 2 0 52 x

Mr. Jim Caldwell Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I11 2443 Warrenville Road Lisle. Illinois 60542-435 1

Dear Mr. Caldweli:

Enclosed is a copy of the Final Report for the June 6-7, 2006, plume and ingestion exposure pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant. The State of Michigan, and Monroe and Wayne Counties fully participated in this exercise. The utility owner/operator, Detroit Edison, also participated in this exercise. The final exercise report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Radiological Eniergency Preparedness program (REPP) Chicago Field Office staff.

There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise. There were two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified for Monroe County and one ARCA identified for Wayne County as a result of this exercise. One previous ARCA each for Monroe and Wayne Counties were resolved during this exercise. The final report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and a detailed discussion of these ARCAs. These issues can be found on Part IV of the final report.

Based on the results of the June 6-7,2006, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Michigan and affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Michigan site-specific to the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, granted on March 9, 1987, remain in effect.

n wn.dhS.gO1’

RECEIVED OCT 1 6 2006

If you should haire :in). questions. please contact William King, Regional Assistancc Committee Chair, REPP Chicago Field Office. at (312) 408-5575.

Sincerely,

W , Craig ConkinyActing Director Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness

Office of the Infrastructure Protection Preparedness Directorate

and Protection L> i v i s i o 11

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Anthony McMurtray, Chief Inspection and Communications Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-6H2 Washington, DC 20555-0001

Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant Exercise - June 6 and 7,2006

-c

-

Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program -

August 30, 2006 I

- - Homeland

(‘liicirgo Field Oflee

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-___-

I I I Homeland Security

Final Exercise Report

Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant

Licensee:

Exercise Date:

Report Date:

Detroit Edison Company

June 6 and 7,2006

August 30,2006

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE

536 South Clark Street, 6th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60605-1521

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. TABLE OF CONTENTS

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111 . .

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IV

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Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3

EXERCISE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................... 5

A . Plume/Ingestion Emergency Planning Zone Description ....................................... 5

B .

C . Exercise Timeline ................................................................................................... 8

EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS ................................................................. 10

A .

B .

Exercise Participants ............................................................................................... 6

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................................. 10

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated .......................................................................... 13

1 . STATE OF MICHIGAN ........................................................................... 15

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18

1.19 1.20

Initial Notification Point ............................................................... 15 Emergency Operations Center ...................................................... 15 State DEQ Laboratory . Day 1 ...................................................... 15

Joint Public Information Center - Days 1 and 2 ............................ 16 Technical Support Group - Day 1 ................................................. 16 Technical Support Group - Day 2 ................................................. 16 Field Team Center (FTC) - Day 1 .................................................. 17 Traffic and Access control Point at FTC ....................................... 17 Field Team 1 - Day 1 ..................................................................... 17 Field Team 2 - Day 1 ..................................................................... 18 Field Team 3 - Day 1 ..................................................................... 18 FTC - Day 2 ................................................................................... 18 Field Team 1 - Day 2 ..................................................................... 19 Field Team 2 - Day 2 ..................................................................... 19 Field Team 3 - Day 2 ..................................................................... 19

Equipment .................................................................................... 20

State Liaison - Wayne County EOC .............................................. 20

SEOC Ingestion Phase - Day 2 ..................................................... 16

FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers . 19 FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker

State Liaison - Monroe County EOC ............................................. 20

... 111

1.2 1 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Wayne County - Taylor Center ............................................................................... 21 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County

Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County

1.22

- Ida Public Schools ...................................................................... 2 1

- Dundee High School .................................................................... 21

1.23

2. RISK COUNTIES .................................................................................... .22

2.1 Monroe County ............................................................................. 22

2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.1.5 2.1.6 2.1.7

2.1.8

2.1.9 2.1.10 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination -

2.1.1 1 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration -

Initial Notification Point ................................................... 22 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... .22

Dosimetry - County Health Department ............................ 23 Traffic and Access Control Point ...................................... 23

Joint Public Information Center Representative .............. .24 County Hotline - EOC ....................................................... 24 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Ida School .............................................................................. .24 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Ida School ....................................................................... 25 Congregate Care - Ida School ......................................... ..25

Dundee High School ........................................................ 25

Dundee High School ........................................................ 26 2.1.12 Congregate Care - Dundee High School ........................... 26

2.2 Wayne County ............................................................................... 27

2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 2.2.6

2.2.7

2.2.8

Initial Notification Point ................................................... 27 Emergency Operations Center ........................................ ..27 Traffic and Access Control Point ...................................... 28 Joint Public Information Center Representative ............... .29 Emergency Alert System Radio Station - WJR ................ 29

Taylor Center .................................................................... 29

- Taylor Center ................................................................... 30 Congregate Care - Taylor Center ...................................... 30

Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination -

Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration

iv

List of Appendices

APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................... 3 1

APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS ..................................... 33

APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT ................ 36

APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO .................................................................................... .5 1

List of Tables

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline ............................................................................................................ 9

Table 2 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ..................................................................... 1 1

V

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 6 and 7,2006, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full-Participation Ingestion Exposure Pathway exercise was conducted in the 1 0-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Chicago Field Office (CFO). The purpose of this exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS' policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on March 23,2004. The qualifjmg emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on February 2, 1982.

DHS wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise. In the State of Michigan the risk counties of Monroe and Wayne participated along with the State government.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all the participants was evident during this exercise.

This Final Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality activities at Monroe and Wayne County out of sequence demonstrations; Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination; Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration; and Congregate Care Centers .

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and adequately implemented them.

No Deficiencies were identified for the State of Michigan or for Monroe or Wayne Counties during this exercise.

There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified for the State of Michigan.

There were no ARCAs from previous exercises for the State of Michigan that were required to be demonstrated during this exercise.

There was one ARCA for Monroe County from a previous exercise that was required to be demonstrated during the exercise.

There were two ARCAs identified during this exercise for Monroe County. One ARCA was successfully re-demonstrated. One ARCA remains as an open issue.

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There was one ARCA for Wayne County from a previous exercise that was required to be demonstrated during this exercise.

There was one ARCA identified during this exercise for Wayne County. This ARCA remains as an open issue.

The first ARCA for Monroe County was identified at the Monroe County Health Department under Criterion 1 .e. 1 - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, whereby all 200 Arrow- Tech Direct-Reading Dosimeters did not have evidence of current calibration.

The second ARCA for Monroe County was identified at the Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination demonstration at Dundee High School under Criterion 3 .a. 1 - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, whereby two Dundee Fire Department crew members interviewed concerning their knowledge of radiation exposure control were not able to adequately explain the use of personal dosimetry and individual exposure limits. This ARCA was successfully re-demonstrated during the exercise.

One prior ARCA for Monroe County, Issue Number 23-02-5.b. I-A-01, regarding Public Inquiry Hotline (Emergency InformatiodRumor Control Center) staff providing inaccurate or improper information to the public after confusing a Utility Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) with a State PAO, was resolved.

The only ARCA for Wayne County was identified under Criterion 5.b. 1 - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, whereby the two EAS messages sent to the EAS radio station were missing attachments containing evacuation routes and included incorrect television station call letters.

One prior ARCA for Wayne County, Issue Number 23-02-5.a. 1 -A-02, wherein the EAS messages, simulated broadcast at 1039 hours and 1305 hours by Wayne County, were in conflict with the Governor’s PAOs, was resolved.

A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Part N of this report.

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11. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. DHS’ activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350,351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

The FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for DHS’ initial and continued approval of State and local governments’ radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments‘ participation in joint exercises with licensees.

DHS’ responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

0 Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;

0 Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

0 Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17,1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and

0 Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Agriculture; - U.S. Department of Energy; - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; - U.S. Department of the Interior; - U.S. Department of Transportation; - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; - - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

U.S. Food and Drug Administration; and

Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (RPCC), which is chaired by DHS.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant to FEMA Region V by the State of Michigan and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 22, 1982. Formal approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on March 9, 1987, under 44 CFR 350.

3

A REP Ingestion exercise was conducted on June 6 and 7,2006, by DHS to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the DHS Chicago Field Office RPCC Chairman, and approved by DHS Headquarters.

The criteria utilized in the DHS evaluation process are contained in:

0 NUREG-O654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

0 FEMA-REP- 14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual." September 1991; and

0 FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" as published in the Federal Register NoticeNol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.

Section I11 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities, which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions, if applicable, for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARC As assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

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111. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the June 6 and 7,2006, REP Ingestion exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and hnctional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of the actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zonehgestion Pathway Zone Descriptions

The Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant is comprised of approximately 1,120 acres of land owned by the Detroit Edison Company (Edison). The site is bounded on the north by Swan Creek, on the east by Lake Erie, on the south by Pointe Aux Peaux Road, and on the west by Toll Road. Entrance to the site is from Enrico Fermi Drive (a private road owned by Edison) to the west, and from Pointe Aux Peaux Road to another private road owned by Edison to the south.

The plant is approximately six miles northeast of Monroe, Michigan; 30 miles southwest of downtown Detroit, Michigan; and 25 miles northeast of downtown Toledo, Ohio. The latitude of the site is 41" 57' 48" north and the longitude is 83" 15' 3 1 I' west. Site elevations range from the level of Lake Erie, on the eastern edge of the site, to approximately 25 feet above the lake level, on the western edge of the site.

The 1 0-mile EPZ includes parts of Monroe and Wayne Counties in Michigan; parts of Lake Erie; and the southern tip of Essex County, (Bay Point) Canada. Most of the 10- mile EPZ lies within Monroe County. Coordinated efforts occur between the two counties, which are divided into five Protective Action Areas. The following jurisdictions are located within the 10-mile EPZ: Ash Township, Carleton Village, Berlin Township, Estral Beach Village, Exeter Township, South Rockwood Village, Frenchtown Township, Monroe City, Monroe Township, Raisinville Township, Brownstown Township, Gibraltar City, Flat Rock City, and Rockwood City. The population in the 10- mile EPZ, based on the 2000 census, is 88,897.

Land use within the EPZ is diverse. About 55 percent of the land is farmland; the majority of agricultural land is located in Monroe County. The portion of Wayne County nearest to Detroit is a growing residential suburb. Twelve state parks and recreational areas, and several light industries are located within the 10-mile EPZ.

There are three major roads within 10 miles of the plant, Interstates 75 and 275, and U.S. Route 24. Their closest approach to the plant is 4.1 miles, 4.2 miles and 5.8 miles, respectively. Five railroad lines operate within 10 miles of the plant. These include the Canadian National Railroad, the Norfolk Southern Railroad, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, the Detroit Toledo and Ironton Railroad, and the Detroit and Toledo Shore Line Railroad. There are no major airports within 15 miles of the site.

5

The following protective action areas are included within the 10-mile EPZ: areas 1,2, 3, 4, and 5.

The 50-mile Ingestion Pathway EPZ for the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant includes portions of Canada, all of Monroe and Wayne counties, parts of Macomb, Oakland, Livingston, Washtenaw, Jackson, and Lenawee Counties in Michigan. The 50-mile Ingestion Pathway EPZ also includes part of Lake Erie, all or parts of Erie, Fulton, Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, and Wood Counties in Ohio. The Michigan 2000 census indicates over 5,500,000 people are within the 50-mile EPZ, of which approximately 3.3 million are in Oakland and Wayne Counties.

B. Exercise Participants

The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 6 and 7, 2006:

STATE OF MICHIGAN

Department of Agriculture Department of Community Health Department of Environmental Quality Department of Information Technology Department of Military and Veterans Affairs Department of Natural Resources Department of State Police Department of Transportation Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division Family Independence Agency Michigan Disaster Medical Assistance Team Office of the Governor - Executive Office Office of Services to the Aging

RISK JURISDICTIONS

MONROE COUNTY

County Board of Commissioners Emergency Management Division Emergency Medical Services Family Independence Agency Fire Services Frenchtown Township Health Services Human Services Information Technology Department Intermediate School District

6

Michigan State University Agricultural Extension Services Monroe City Police Services Prosecutor's Office - Public Inquiry Public Affairs Public Works Road Commission Sheriffs Office Social Services

WAYNE COUNTY

Brownstone Police Department Brownstown Township City of Gibraltar City of Flat Rock City of Rockwood County Board of Commissioners Department of Health and Human Services Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department of Public Service Family Independence Agency Fire Services Police Services Regional Education Services Agency Sheriff's Office Social Services Wayne County Crisis Team Wayne County Fire Department Mutual Aid Association

RISK SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Dundee Community Schools - Dundee High School Ida Public Schools - Ida Middle/High School Taylor School District - Taylor Center

PRIVATENOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS

American Red Cross Detroit Edison Company Dundee Volunteer Fire Department Ida Volunteer Fire Department Mercy Memorial Hospital Monroe Community Ambulance Monroe County Community College Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services WJR Radio Station

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C. Exercise Timeline

Table 1, on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

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W

State of Monroe Michgan County

I I

Wayne Joint Public County Information Center

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0828 0928

I

0829 0842 N/A 0908 0915 NIA

I I

N/A

1315

NIA

I

N/A 1150 N/A

NIA NIA N/A

1323 NIA NIA

I I I I I I I

Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: June 6 and 7,2006 - Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant

Emergency Classification Level or Event

Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Simulated Release of Radioactive Materials Simulated Release of Radioactive Materials Terminated

Time

Utility Declared

0815 0855 0956 1122 1139 N/A

Facility Declared Operational State: Declaration State of Disaster Local: Declaration State of Emergency Exercise Terminated 1 st Early Precautionary Action Decision: Agricultural Advisory - placed animals on stored feed and protected water in areas 1 ,2 ,4 2nd Early Precautionary Action Decision: Embargo areas 1 ,2 ,4 3rd Early Precautionary Action Decision: Embargo areas 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 1st Protective Action Order: Evacuate areas 1 & 2 and restrict marine activity out to 5 miles 1st Siren Activation 1 st EAS Activation 2nd Protective Action Order: Evacuate areas I , 2, 3, & 4 and restrict marine activity out to IO miles 2nd Siren Activation 2nd EAS Message Recommendation to take KI: Areas 1 & 2 Recommendation to take KI: Areas 3 & 4

I I I I

1022 1 1015 1 0937 1 1110 1020 I N/A I N/A I NIA NIA I 0910 1 0937 1 NIA 1358 I 1355 I 1355 I 1415

1320 NIA

1133 I N/A 1 N/A 1 1305 I I I

N/A I 1140 I NIA I NIA

NIA I NIA I 1334 I NIA 1230 I 1230 I N/A I 1351 1330 I N/A 1 1330 I NIA

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the June 6 and 7, 2006, REP Ingestion exercise to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria fiom Federal Register NoticeNol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25,2002, that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed

A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Section 1V.B.)

Blank - Not scheduled for demonstration

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I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Table 2. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

DATE AND SITE: June 6 and 7,2006 - Enrico F e d 2 Nuclear Power Plant (Sheet 1 of 2)

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I.EGI:NU: M = Met (No Deficiency or AKCA(s) assessed) D = Ikficiency assessed

A = ARCA(s) assessed (Not affecting health and safety of puhlic) U = Unresolved AK<'A(s) from prior exercise(s)

Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration N = Not demonstrated as scheduled (Reason explained in Section 1V.U.

I I I I I ( I I I I I I

Table 2. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

DATE AND SITE: June 6 and 7,2006 - Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant (Sheet 2 of 2 )

I I I 1 I

LEGEND: M = Met (No Deficiency or AKCA(s) assessed D = Deficiency assessed

A = AKCA(s) assessed (Not affecting health and safety of public) U = 1Jnresolved AR(’A(s) from prior exercise(s)

Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration N =Not demonstrated as scheduled (Keason explained in Section 1V.U.)

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this subsection relative to criteria demonstration status.

Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective Action - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria that were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason(s) they were not demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that maybe discussed in this report.

A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

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0 An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

DHS has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among DHS Field Offices and site-specific exercise reports within each Field Office. It also is used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifjrlng number of Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

0 Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number, corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Code.

0 Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

0 Criterion Number - An alpha and two-digit number corresponding to the criteria numbers in the six Exercise Evaluation Areas described in Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80 dated April 25, 2002, which amends FEMA-REP 14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual.

0 Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports. Plan issues are reported to the State(s) via a letter from the RPCC Chairman. Therefore, standardized issue numbers are not assigned to Plan Issues.

0 Exercise Identification Number - A separate two- (or three-) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

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1. STATE OF MICHIGAN

1.1 Initial Notification Point

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

MET: Criteria 1 .a.l and 1 .d.l

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE

1.2 Emergency Operations Center

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1; l.c.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.a.l; 2.b.2; 2.c.l; 3.b.l; 3.d.l; 5.a.l; and 5.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE




1.3 State DEQ Laboratory - Day 1

a. MET: Criteria 1 .e. 1 and 4.c. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





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1.4 SEOC Ingestion Phase - Day 2

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

C.


MET: Criteria 2.d.l; 2.e.l; 3.e.l; 3.e.2; and 3.f.l




1.5 Joint Public Information Center - Days 1 and 2

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria l.a.1; 1.c.l; l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.e.2; and 5.b.l




1.6 Technical Support Group - Day 1

a. MET:Criteria l.a.1; l.d.1; l.e.1;2.a.1;2.b.1;2.b.2;and2.c.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


e.


PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE


1.7 Technical Support Group - Day 2

a. MET: Criteria 2.d.l; 2.e.l; 3.e.l; 3.e.2; and 3.f.l

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b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.





1.8 Field Team Center (FTC) - Day 1

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria2.a.l;2.b.l;2.b.2; 3.a.l; 3.b.l;4.a.2;4.a.3; and4.b.1




1.9 Traffic and Access Control Point at FTC

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

C.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and 3.d.l




1.10 Field Team 1 - Day 1

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; and4.a.3


17




1.1 1 Field Team 2 - Day 1

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

C.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; and 4.a.3





a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; and 4.a.3




1.13 FTC - Day 2

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and4.b.1



18



a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

C.


MET: Criteria l.d,l; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and4.b.l





a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

C.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and 4.b.l





a. MET:Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1;3.a.l;3.b.l;and4.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.





1.17 FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers

19

a. MET: Criteria l.d.1; I.e.I;3.a.l;3.b.l;and6.a.I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





1.18 FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.b.l




1.19 State Liaison - Monroe County EOC

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 5.a.l; and 5.b.l




1.20 State Liaison - Wayne County EOC

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

MET: Criteria 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 5.a.l; and 5.b.l

20

C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE




1.21 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Wayne County - Taylor Center

a. MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





1.22 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County - Ida Public Schools


b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





1.23 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County - Dundee High School


21

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2. RISK COUNTIES

2.1 MONROE COUNTY

2.1.1 Initial Notification Point

a. MET: Criteria 1 .a. 1 and 1 .d. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.





2.1.2 Emergency Operations Center

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1; l.c.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.c.l; 3.c.l; 3.c.2; 3.d.l; 3.d.2; 5.a.l; and 5.b. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE



e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: Criterion 5.b.l

Issue No.: 23-02-5.b. 1 -A-01

Description: The Public Inquiry Hotline (Emergency InfonnatiordRumor Control Center) staff provided inaccurate or improper information to the public after

22

confirsing a Utility Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) with a State PAO. In addition, they advised people that they could enter an area that had been evacuated, under a PAO, to retrieve personnel goods and relatives, but that the police probably would stop them.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The previous issues of issuing incorrect information were not repeated. The PI operation made extensive and consistent use of visual aids, and shared only approved and current information.


2.1.3 Traffic and Access Control Point

a. MET: Criteria 1 .d. 1 ; 1 .e.l; 3.a. 1; 3.b. 1 ; and 3.d. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.1.4 Dosimetry - County Health Department

a. MET: NONE

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Criterion 1 .e. 1

Issue No.: 23-06- 1 .e. 1 -A-01

Description: Monroe County Health Department Arrow-Tech 0-2.0 Roentgen dosimeter (200 units) did not have evidence of current calibration.

Possible Cause: Documentation lost or administrative process failed to order calibration.

Reference: NUREG-0654, H. 10.

Effect: Uncalibrated DRDs cannot be relied upon for measurement of absorbed dose by DRD users.

Recommendation: Immediately replace DRDs in question with currently

23

calibrated DRDs, and investigate why DRDs were not calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

Schedule of Corrective Action: The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality now has the assignment of the calibration for the DRDs for the Counties. Calibration shall take place in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. This Criterion will be demonstrated during the Fermi 2 2008 REP exercise.




2.1.5 Joint Public Information Center Representative

a. MET: Criterion 5.b. I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.1.6 County Hotline - EOC

a. MET: Criterion 5.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE




f. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED: NONE

2.1.7 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Ida School

24


b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.1.8 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Ida School

a. MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l and 6.a.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.





2.1.9 Congregate Care - Ida School

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

C.

MET: Criteria 1 .d.l; 1 .e.l; 3.a.l; and 6.c.l




f. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: NONE

2.1.10 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Dundee High School


b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Criterion 3.a.l

25

Issue No.: 23-06-3.a. 1 -A-02

Description: Two Dundee Fire Department crew interviewed concerning their knowledge of radiation exposure control were not able to adequately explain the use of personal dosimetry and individual exposure limits.

Possible Cause: Fire Department crew require more extensive training regarding exposure control, use of personal dosimetry and individual exposure control limits.

Reference: NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b

Effect: During a real event, the individuals interviewed may not appropriately manage their individual radiation exposure in an appropriate manner.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: In agreement with the exercise controller at the location, a re-demonstration was performed. After a brief period in which the individuals reviewed the information provided in the dosimetry packet, the evaluator determined that they had obtained the information needed to manage their exposure in compliance with federal and state regulations, and applicable plans, and procedures.




2.1.1 1 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Dundee High School


b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.1.12Congregate Care - Dundee High School

a. MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.c.l

26

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.2 WAYNE COUNTY

2.2.1 Initial Notification Point

a. MET: Criteria 1 .a. 1 and 1 .d. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.2.2 Emergency Operations Center

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1; 1.c.I; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.c.l; 3.c.l; 3.c.2; 3.d.l; 3.d.2; and 5.a.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Criterion 5.b. 1

Issue No.: 23-06-5.b. 1-A-03

Description: The two EAS messages sent to WJR for broadcast were missing attachments containing evacuation routes, and included incorrect television station call letters.

Possible Cause: Although the pre-scripted message forms had a place holder for the radio station to read an attached list of evacuation routes, Wayne County EOC did not include an attached list. The change in call letters for television channel 20 appears to have been overlooked during the last revision of the Wayne County Emergency Operations Plan.

27

Reference: NUREG 0654 E.5, 7; G.2.a; G.4.c

Effect: Evacuees without an Emergency Preparedness Booklet would not have information on the routes they should follow. The outdated call letters for television channel 20 could confuse some viewers about which station to receive information from.

Recommendation: Ensure that Wayne County EOC procedures adequately instruct staff to review EAS messages and insert applicable information into the pre-scripted message. The pre-scripted forms should be structured so that place holder locations cannot be easily overlooked. In addition, the public information annex to the Wayne County Plan and the pre-scripted forms should be revised to include the correct call letters for all radio and television stations listed on the form.

Schedule of Corrective Action: The Wayne County plan will have the radio and television stations’ fiequency numbers only and not the call letters because of constant, recurring changes in ownership. Training for the EAS procedures will include adequate instruction to the staff on the steps to take to proceed with the pre-scripted messages for the radio and television stations. This Criterion will be demonstrated during the Fermi 2 2008 REP exercise.


e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: Criterion 5.a. 1

Issue No.: 23-02-5.a. 1 -A-02

Description: The Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, simulated broadcast at 1039 hours and 1305 hours by Wayne County, were in conflict with the Governor’s PAOs. The EAS messages instructed the general public to ”evacuate immediately”, and at the same time instructed farmers to stay behind and “shelter their animals and provide stored feed and water”.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: Wayne County removed the generic Agricultural Advisory information from the pre-scripted EAS messages. During this exercise, the State of Michigan and Wayne County issued Agricultural Advisories separate from the EAS messages with the Governor’s PAOs regarding evacuation of the general public. Wayne County issued EAS messages at 1 I50 hours and 1334 hours regarding the evacuation of the general public. Wayne County issued Agricultural Advisory messages to Radio Station WJR at 1 109 hours and 12 1 8 hours.


2.2.3 Traffic and Access Control Point

28

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and 3.d.l




2.2.4 Joint Public Information Center Representative

a. MET: Criterion 5.b. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e.




f. PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED: NONE

2.2.5 Emergency Alert System Radio Station - WJR

a. MET: Criterion 5.a.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.





2.2.6 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Taylor Center

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l

29

c.





2.2.7 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Taylor Center

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria 1 .d.l; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l




2.2.8 Congregate Care - Taylor Center

a.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.


MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and6.c.1




30

APPENDIX 1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations that were used in this report and the REP Program.

ACP ALARA ARCA ARES

CFO CFR CPm

DEQ DHS DRD

EAS EBS EMS EMHSD EOC EOF EPZ EW

FEMA FIA FTC

HP HS

ICF

JPIC

KI

M&D mR mR/hr MS- 1

Access Control Point As Low As Reasonably Achievable Area Requiring Corrective Action Amateur Radio Emergency Service

Chicago Field Office Code of Federal Regulations counts per minute

Department of Environmental Quality U.S. Department of Homeland Security Direct-Reading Dosimeter

Emergency Alert System Emergency Broadcast System Emergency Medical Service Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Planning Zone Emergency Worker

Federal Emergency Management Agency Family Independence Agency Field Team Center

Health Physics or Health Physicist High School

ICF Consulting

Joint Public Information Center

Potassium Iodide

Monitoring and Decontamination milliRoentgens milliRoentgens per Hour Medical Services Drill

31

MSP Michigan State Police

NIA Not Applicable NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRP National Response Plan NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654lFEMA-REP- 1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation

of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980

NWS National Weather Service

OR0 Off-site Response Organization osc Operations Support Center

PA0 Protective Action Order PAR Protective Action Recommendation

R R/hr RACES RASCAL RCP RCS REA Reg. rem REP RERP RPCC

Roentgen Roentgens per hour Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Radiation Emergency Area Registration Roentgen Equivalent Man Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency Response Plan Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee

SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SGTS Standby Gas Treatment System

T/L Team Leader TCP/ACP TSC Technical Support Center

Traffic and Access Control Point

32

APPENDIX 2

EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DHS Department of Homeland Security ICF ICF Consulting

TITLE NAME ORGANIZATION

RPCC Chair Exercise Director Regional Site Specialist

William King Gary Naskrent Clinton E. Crackel

DHS DHS DHS

EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION EVALUATION SITE

STATE OF MICHIGAN

Initial Notification Point

Emergency Operations Center - Day 1

Glen Kinnear

Sandra Bailey (TL) Clint Fransen Glen Kinnear Douglas Stutz

ICF

DHS ICF ICF ICF

DEQ Laboratory Marynette Herndon ICF

Emergency Operations Center - Day 2

Sandra Bailey (TL) Marynette Herndon Glen Kinnear

DHS ICF ICF

Joint Public Information Center Pat Tenorio DHS

Technical Support Group - Day 1

Technical Support Group - Day 2

Richard Grundstrom ICF

Richard Grundstrom Marynette Herndon

ICF ICF

Field Team Center - Days 1 and 2 Harry Harrison ICF

Field Team Center - TACP Clark Cofer ICF

33

EVALUATION SITE

Field Team 1 - Day 1 Field Team 1 - Day 2



FTC - M&D EWS

FTC - M&D EW Equipment

State Liaison - Monroe County EOC

State Liaison - Wayne County EOC

State DEQ Rep. - Taylor Center

ORGANIZATION EVALUATOR

David Seebarf Steve Denson

ICF ICF

Steve Denson Gary Goldberg

Gary Goldberg David Seebart

ICF ICF

ICF ICF

Tracey Green

Robert Duggleby

ICF

ICF

Harral Logaras DHS

Delwyn Kinsley

Gary Bolender

DHS

ICF

State DEQ Rep. - Ida Schools

State DEQ Rep. - Dundee HS

MONROE COUNTY

Initial Notification Point

Neil1 Howey

Douglas Stutz

ICF

ICF

Terri Connors-Hartman DHS

Emergency Operations Center Clint Crackel (TL) Terri Connors-H artman Harral Logaras Roy Smith Patrick Taylor

DHS DHS DHS ICF ICF

Traffic & Access Control Point Roy Smith ICF

Dosimetry - Health Department

Monroe County JPIC Rep.

County Hotline - EOC

Evacuee Vehicle M&D - Ida Schools

Harral Logaras DHS

Pat Tenorio DHS

Terri Connors-Hartman DHS

Patrick Taylor ICF

34

EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION

ICF Evacuee M&D/Reg. - Ida Schools Robert Duggleby

Congregate Care - Ida Schools William McCance ICF

Evacuee Vehicle M&D - Dundee HS Gary Bolender Neill Howey

ICF ICF

Evacuee M&D/Reg. - Dundee HS William Vocke ICF

Congregate Care - Dundee HS William McCance ICF

WAYNE COUNTY

Initial Notification Point Neill Howey ICF

Emergency Operations Center Carolyn Sturghill (TL) Delwyn Kinsley William Vocke Carl Wentzell

DHS DHS ICF ICF

Traffic & Access Control Point Carl Wentzell ICF

Wayne County JPIC Rep. Pat Tenorio DHS

Emergency Alert System Radio Station - WJR

William McCance ICF

Evacuee Vehicle M&D - Taylor Center

Tracey Green ICF

Evacuee M&D/Reg. - Taylor Center Roy Smith ICF

ICF Congregate Care - Taylor Center Carl Wentzell

35

APPENDIX 3

EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

This appendix lists the exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration in the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006, and the off-site extent-of-play agreement approved by DHS CFO on May 3 1,2006.

The exercise criteria, contained in FEMA “Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology” as published in the Federal Register NoticeNol. 67, No 80, dated April 25,2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980.

Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among off-site plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by DHS to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criteria.

A. Exercise Criteria and Extent-of-Play

Listed below are the specific REP criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 1 : EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

CRITERION l.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and facilities in a timely manner.

CRITERION l.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the O R 0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

CRITERION l.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, a t least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

CRITERION 1 .e.l : Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

CRITERION 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system,

36

including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

CRITERION 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and O R 0 dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

CRITERION 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADS) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if O R 0 policy).

CRITERION 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

CRITERION 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria.

CRITERION 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

CRITERION 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

CRITERION 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

CRITERION 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

CRITERION 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

CRITERION 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

37

CRITERION 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

CRITERION 3.e.l: The O R 0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

CRITERION 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

CRITERION 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS

CRITERION 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

CRITERION 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

CRITERION 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

CRITERION 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision- making.

CRITERION 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

CRITERION 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in as timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

38

CRITERION 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the decision by the O R 0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

CRITERION 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

CRITERION 6.a.l: The reception centedemergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

CRITERION 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

CRITERION 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

CRITERION 6.d.l: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

B. Extent-of-Play Agreement

The extent-of-play agreement on the following pages was submitted by the State of Michigan, and Monroe and Wayne Counties in preparation for the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on March 6, 2006. The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each exercise criterion listed in Subsection A of this appendix.

39

STATE OF MICHIGAN AND MONROE AND WAYNE COUNTIES' EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

FOR THE FERMI 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REP EXERCISE

June 6 and 7,2006

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion l.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, noti@ and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will be fully activated. State personnel will be mobilized in accordance with procedures with the exception of personnel reporting to the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs and the JPIC. State personnel reporting to the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOC will be pre-positioned at the State Police 2nd District Headquarters and will report when mobilized by the SEOC. State personnel reporting to the JPIC will begin participation 30 minutes after the arrival of Monroe County JPIC personnel. The State Field Team Center personnel will begin participation 30 minutes after the decision to activate the facility. State personnel involved in out of sequence demonstrations will be pre-staged. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing.

The Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs will be fully activated. Personnel will be mobilized in accordance with procedures, including those responding to the JPIC. Personnel involved in out of sequence demonstrations will be pre-staged. Rosters will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing.

Note: Any interaction with the DOE Home team will not be evaluated.

Criterion l.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This objective was demonstrated by Monroe and Wayne Counties on September 24,2002. The SEOC was demonstrated during the Palisades exercise on June 4,2002. Both County and the State EOCs is permanently set-up. The JPIC, which was demonstrated on September 24,2002, will be set-up during the morning of 6/6/2006. Setup time will be provided in the table of out of sequence demonstrations to allow evaluation by Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Criterion l.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the OR0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

This criterion will be demonstrated at county EOCs, the SEOC, JPIC, FTC and in all out of sequence demonstrations.

Criterion l.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

40

This criterion will be demonstrated at the SEOC, FTC, Monroe and Wayne Countip' EOCs, and the JPIC. If both the primary and back-up systems fail, this objective may be demonstrated by successful use of an alternate method of communication.

Criterion l.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Equipment, maps, displays, and other supplies will be demonstrated to support emergency operations at the SEOC, JPIC, and Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs. Personnel demonstrating traffic and access control points will demonstrate knowledge of where to secure traffic control equipment. The FTC will be demonstrated. Potassium iodide and dosimetry are stored at the Monroe County Health Department, Wayne County EOC, and at the MSP/EMD office in Lansing. Monroe County will provide dosimetry/KI records and give briefings at the Public Reception Decontamination Center demonstration on June 5 and 7 2006. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality also maintains supplies of potassium iodide and dosimetry for use by its personnel. Documentation related to KI shelf life extension is maintained by MSP/EMD and will be provided to DHS for review.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers will be demonstrated by the SEOC. Authorization to exceed state exposure limits will be demonstrated. If the scenario does not provide an opportunity to demonstrate these items, a controller inject

will be issued to demonstrate the ability to perform these actions.

This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the Regional Preparedness Coordinating Committee.

Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and O R 0 dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

The Technical Support Group in the SEOC will evaluate licensee and Field Team Center provided information and complete an independent analysis of scenario data. Dose assessment evaluation will be conducted with the individuals performing at the FTC.

This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee.

This criterion does not apply to Monroe and Wayne counties.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and

41

necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADS) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if O R 0 policy).

This criterion will be demonstrated by the Executive Group in the SEOC in conjunction with applicable support staff, i.e. FTC and Community Health.


This criterion does not apply to Monroe and Wayne counties.

Criterion 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the Executive Group in the SEOC in conjunction with applicable support staff through the decision to recommend the use of KI to institutionalized persons.

Lists of transportation dependent and special needs populations are kept by Monroe and Wayne counties. No personnel will be moved. Equipment lists and rosters will be available in the Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs. No phone calls to transportation dependent persons will be made.

The School Services Representatives in the Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs will make phone contact with affected school districts if schools are in session. No scenario information will be discussed during these calls.

Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO’s planning criteria.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the Technical Support Group in the SEOC in conjunction with applicable support staff through the capability to project dose to the public for the ingestion exposure pathway and to recommend protective actions

The State of Michigan will assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies. This assessment will include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. The radiological impacts on the food and water will then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria. Timely and appropriate recommendations will be provided to the SEOC Ingestion Pathway Committee (IPC) for communication and implementation decisions.

The SEOC will coordinate with Federal resources, as identified in the National Response Plan (NRP), and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

Criterion 2.e.l: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as

42

appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the SEOC. The capability to develop decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return coordinated as appropriate.

Relocation: The State of Michigan will demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas. Compare these estimates with PAGs, will be made. Decision criteria will be applied for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs and control access to evacuated areas. Decisions will be made for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs.

Re-entry: The State of Michigan will identify the location of control points. Demonstrate, at the FTC, decision making and based on policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Return: The State of Michigan will demonstrate the SEOC Ingestion Pathway Committee (IPC) decision making, as appropriate, based on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/geological features, (Areas 1,2,3,4 and 5) which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return.

The SEOC will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources (e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the State of Michigan, Monroe and Wayne Counties during out of sequence reception center, decontamination center, and access control demonstrations when dosimetry is issued for use by emergency workers. The Monroe County and State of Michigan demonstrations will be initiated by the Monroe County briefing on use of KI and dosimetry. The briefing on dosimeters and KI use for the State of Michigan access control demonstration will be at FTC.

This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.

Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

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This criterion will be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstrations for Monroe and Wayne Counties and the state of Michigan. Response personnel will demonstrate knowledge of when it is appropriate to take KI, but not actually ingest KI.

KI will be distributed to emergency workers in Monroe and Wayne Counties along with their dosimetry. The state will demonstrate this objective at the Field Team Center and through decision-making and directives to implement appropriate Protective Action Orders.

This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator

Note-Wayne County KI will be in the form of candy.

Criterion 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion will be demonstrated in the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs via EOC staff discussions which may include evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent. These discussions will be documented in situation logs. Actual contacts to special population groups will not be made. Monroe and Wayne counties will contact a minimum of four providers of transportation services which may include public transit authorities, school systems for buses, ambulance services, or firehescue services. An attempt will be made to contact a third of the total number of transportation providers. There will be no discussion of scenario information during these calls.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion will be demonstrated in the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs as driven by the scenario. If schools are not in session, the DHS evaluator will conduct an interview with the school representatives in the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs.

An EV-2 interview will be conducted in Monroe County. Refer to the Table of Exercise Demonstrations for specific times and locations.

Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Decisions related to traffic and access control will be demonstrated in the Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs. Monroe and Wayne Counties, and the State of Michigan will demonstrate one traffic and access control point each. State of Michigan will be demonstrated at the FTC. Demonstration locations will be determined during the exercise at a time agreed upon by the DHS evaluator, the State Controller, and the county emergency management coordinator. Staffing of all other access and traffic control points will be simulated.


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Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

This Criterion will be demonstrated through discussions at the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs. Messages will be injected by the State Controller to drive this demonstration. Personnel will deal with the impediments by discussing the need for equipment, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. If the impediment posed involves road closures that would have been known to exercise participants during the course of normal operations, this information will be provided to the players as part of the initial conditions for the exercise. All contacts, actual or simulated will be logged.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Michigan.

This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator

Criterion 3.e.l: The O R 0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion will be demonstrated in the SEOC the capability to implement protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway in conjunction with applicable SEOC support staff, i.e. MDA, DEQ, and Community Health.

The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources (e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion will be demonstrated with the pre-distributed public information in the EPZ.

Development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion pathway zone (IPZ) protective actions will be demonstrated by the SEOC during exercise play by formulation of protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. The SEOC will demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Actual field play of implementation activities may be simulated. Actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

This criterion will be demonstrated at the JPIC via dissemination of announcements/ public information and briefings in coordination with the SEOC.

Criterion 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the SEOC, coordinated as appropriate the capability to develop decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return.

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Relocation: The State of Michigan will demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. The State of Michigan will also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels above the PAGs.

Re-entry: The State of Michigan will demonstrate, the capability to control re-entry and exit of individuals who need to temporarily re-enter the evacuated area, to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the evacuated area. County monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established, and may also be used, as appropriate.

Return: The State of Michigan SEOC IPC will demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. The IPC will demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identi@ the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads and schools.


EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State personnel. Three field teams will demonstrate this criterion.

Field teams will have instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments will be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the State's plans and procedures, including radiological protectiodexposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample collection media. All instruments, including air sampling flow meters, will be operated, maintained, and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. A label indicating such calibration will be on each instrument or verifiable by other means. An appropriate radioactive check source will be used to verify proper operational response for each radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 Rhr) and for high range instruments when available.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

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This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State and Federal personnel.

Field measurements will be taken to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifylng protective actions. Teams will be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources (e,g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State personnel. Three field teams will demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates to the field team center coordinator (FTCC), dose assessment.

The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources (e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc), if available.

Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State personnel. Three field teams will demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. -

The samples that will be taken for laboratory testing will be crops in season, milk, water, vegetation, air and soil. -

The State of Michigan will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources (e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc), if available. -

Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

-

- This criterion will demonstrate laboratory operations and procedures for measuring, analyzing, preparing, preserving and receiving samples. This includes logging information, preventing contamination of the lab during this exercise at the State DEQ Laboratory in Lansing, Michigan. Samples will be pre-staged to match samples taken at the FTC. -

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EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

The Monroe County Sheriff Department central dispatch is the primary activation point for the public warning sirens. The Emergency Alert System is activated by Wayne County. To demonstrate this criterion, the State will provide information to Monroe and Wayne Counties for release in the Emergency Alert System messages. An interview with WJR radio station personnel will be conducted by DHS following transmittal of EAS messages.


Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to noti@ the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the O R 0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

The Fermi 2 Plant EPZ does not contain any DHS approved exception areas. If a siren failure occurs, Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs will demonstrate actions to notify the public in areas where siren coverage is not adequate.

Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

This will be demonstrated at the JPIC via dissemination of Emergency Alert System announcements in coordination with the SEOC, Monroe, and Wayne counties EOC. All media briefings will be conducted at the JPIC.

A public inquiry hotline will be operated by Monroe County during the exercise by personnel based at the Monroe County Emergency Management Office. Trending is performed by the Rumor Control Coordinator, who identifies trends and ensures appropriate information is provided to the public inquiry operators and the JPIC for inclusion in press briefings.


EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

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Criterion 6.a.l: The reception centerlemergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Monroe and Wayne Counties will each fi.11ly demonstrate separate public receptionl decontamination centers out-of sequence from the exercise.

Personnel will not go through alert, mobilization, activation, or shift changes. State DEQ HP personnel will provide assistance as requested during these demonstrations. The public reception center will demonstrate 1 /3 of the monitoring teams required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to that facility within a 12 hour time period. Each team will monitor six individuals. The State of Michigan Field Team Center will demonstrate emergency worker decontamination.

Monroe and Wayne Counties will not demonstrate the Emergency Worker Decontamination Center .


Criterion 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

The State of Michigan Field Team Center will also demonstrate this criterion. Emergency vehicles will be monitored and decontaminated as appropriate.

Monroe and Wayne Counties will not demonstrate the Emergency Worker Decontamination Center.


Criterion 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

Monroe and Wayne Counties will each hl ly demonstrate a congregate care center out of sequence with the exercise. This facility will be set up in advance of the demonstration. Personnel manning the center will not go through alert, mobilization, activation, or shift changes.


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- Criterion 6.d.l: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

-

This criterion will be demonstrated during the MS- 1 exercise on October 25, 2006

This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator. -

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APPENDIX 4

EXERCISE SCENARIO

This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequences of events that were used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006.

The full-participation exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Michigan and Detroit Edison Company, and approved by DHS/CFO on May 3 1,2006.

During the exercise, controllers from the State of Michigan either gave or telephoned “inject messages”, containing scenario events andor relevant data, to those persons or locations who would normally receive notification of such events. These inject messages were the method used for invoking response actions by OROs.

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FERMEX 2006 - EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

0730

0745

0750

0755

0810

0825

0850

Rx power / EDG 14 are in a Safety System Outage to repair a crushed sensing line. Tech Spec 3.8.1 has been entered. CTG 11-1 is operable. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.1 has been completed, offsite power is available and the breaker alignment is correct.

Announce start of Exercise.

Annunciator 5D5 “TBCCW Pumps D/P Hi/Lo”. 7D61 “Station Air Compressor Trouble” (trip of N TBCCW pump). Expected actions: Send TB Rounds to investigate.

TB rounds reports outboard pump motor bearing is very hot. Expected actions: Operating pump trips. Simulator Control Room starts Standby Pump.

Seismic event - 6D69. Expected actions: Send a person to D30-K800, Active Seismic Central Recorder, to perform 23.612,”Seismic Monitoring” (RR H11-P831). Enter AOP 20.000.01.

Seismic readings indicate 0.02g horizontal and vertical. Conditions are met for HU1, Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area. There are no reports of damage but several security proximity alarms come in. Expected actions: Shift ManagedEmergency Director (SM/ED) declares UNUSUAL EVENT.

Time expires for declaring HUl .

Second seismic event - 6D69. Expected actions: Send a person to D30-K800, Active Seismic Central Recorder, to perform 23.612,”Seismic Monitoring” (RR Hll-PS31). Seismic readings indicate 0.09g horizontal and vertical. JMessage #6).

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SRV "E" opens (1 D61, "SRV OPEN") and will not close for five minutes. (Mini-scenario 40A). Expected actions: Enter AOP 20.000.25, "Failed Safety Relief Valve,"

Receive 2D82, "RE3 Torus Sump Level HiHi/LoLo". A leak in Torus has occurred with a slow decrease in Torus level and respective increase in sump level. The leak fi-om the Torus cannot be isolated therefore this reflects a Loss of Primary Containment. Expected actions: Enter EOP 29.100.01, Sheet 2, Primary Containment Control, and Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control. Enter Tech Spec 3.6.1.1, Loss of Primary Containment. The crew should initiate a normal reactor shutdown.

Conditions are met for HA1, Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area as indicated by the stuck open SRV and/or the leak fi-om the Torus resulting form the earthquake. Expected actions: The SM/ED declares an ALERT based on HA1. SM/ED makes decision to perform Assembly and Accountability (AAA) (Message # 7).

SM/ED initiates ECOS [Messape 7A).

State Actions:

MSP Operations notified by plant. MSP Operations notifies MSP/EMD and MDEQ/DWRPS. SEOC activation begun. MSP Operations notifies Monroe and Wayne Counties. Activation of JPIC and FTC begun. SEOC notifies DHS and Ontario.

Monroe County Actions:

Sheriff Dispatch notified by plant and MSP LEIN. Sheriff Dispatch notifies Monroe and Wayne Counties. Dispatch notifies EM & Chairperson. EOC activation begun.

Wayne County Actions:

Sheriff Dispatch notified by plant and MSP LEIN. Sheriff Dispatch notifies Monroe and Wayne Counties. Dispatch notifies EM & Chairperson. EOC activation begun.

0905 Monroe County Actions:

EOC activation underway. Hotline opened to SEOC.

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EOC activation underway. Hotline opened to SEOC.

091 0 72C-3C fault - Loss of LPCI Valves (Restored power to 72C-F by shifting to 72F-5c). (Mini-scenario - 40B).

State Actions:

SEOC Operational. Governor may declare State of Emergency/Disaster. Hotlines opened to plant and counties. Plant instructed to terminate notifications to Monroe and Wayne Counties. Notifications to counties via SEOC.


EOC operational. Siren system and EAS station placed on standby. WD & CCCs placed on standby.


EOC operational. Siren system and EAS station placed on standby. R/D & CCCs placed on standby.

091 5 Fire in Division 2 Switchgear Room. (Mini-scenario - 40C)

0920 Loss of 65E power - 4160 Buses - due to fire. (Mini-scenario - 40C) Expected Action: Enter AOP 20.300.653, Loss of Bus 65E.

State Actions:

Plant notifies SEOC within 15 minutes. Notification to counties via SEOC. If not done previously, declare State of Emergency/Disaster.

JPIC Actions:

JPIC activation begun. Utility personnel will not demonstrate A/N or facility setup.

State, Monroe and Wayne Counties JPIC personnel pre-positioned.

0955 High Drywell pressure (>1.68#) due to LOCA inside containment. EDG 13 trips on high

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differential electrical and will not run. Failure of LPCI valves, loss of Division 2 RHR. The fault in Breaker 72C-3C prevents powering 72 CF Bus. Loss of 65F. Loss of Level Control Instrumentation (5D115). HPCI fails to start. (Mini-scenario - 40D) Expected actions: Enter EOP 29,100.01, sheet 1 and sheet 2 for RPV and Primary Containment Control, SM/ED declares SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on FS1 - due to loss.

JPIC Actions:

Communications initiated with SEOC. JPIC operational.

FTC Actions:

Communications initiated with SEOC. FTC operational. Initial Prep and briefing. Monitor and sample plume (4 teams). Communicate w/FTC.

101 0 Time expires for declaring FS 1

FTC Actions:

Initial PP surface samples & transfer. Survey contour(s) points (Teams include FRMAC/RAP/staff).

1 100 Leak worsens in containment to drive level down to <TAF. Large fuel failure starts. Emergency Depressurization actions taken. Expected Action: S W E D declares GENERAL EMERGENCY based on FG1- due to loss of Reactor Coolant System and Primary Containment, and a Potential Loss of Reactor Clad. Initial PAR - evacuate areas 1 and 2 based on plant status. (Message #lo)

State Actions:

Evaluates PAR. Decides on a Protective Action Order (PAO). Issues P A 0 to counties. Requests federal assistance via DHS. Issues hrther PAOs as needed.


Sound sirens. Issues EAS message. Implements PAO. WD and CCCs activated.

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JPIC Actions:

Informed of GE and PA0 by SEOC. Informs media.

1 1 15 Time expires for declaring FGl .

1 125 CHRRMs read -1 3,000 R/hr.

1 130 Torus low pressure tap to Division 1 Torus level and pressure instruments breaks (T50- R802A and T50-R804A). This causes these two readings to indicated "pegged high." Large release enters Reactor Building. (Mini-scenario - 40E)

1135 Effluent Radiation monitors in alarm. Confirmed release through Div 1 SGTS.

1200 Direct an environmental sample to be performed. lMessage #11)

1230 Dose Calculations indicate exceeding a Protective Action guideline for Adult Thyroid Dose beyond 5 miles. There are no dangerous travel conditions or a short controlled release. Expected Action: Emergency Officer recommends a change in PAR to evacuate areas 1,2,3, and 4 due to dose assessment calculations.

1245 If a change in PAR has not been developed - implement. [Messape #12)

13 15 Termination from exercise can occur when the following conditions are met: {Messape #13)

Team(s) are dispatched to stop the release. State EOC controller concurs with termination. At least one environmental sample is collected, analyzed, and documented.

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Documents

Homeland Security Letter Enclosing Final Report for June 6-7, … · Joint Public Information Center - Days 1 and 2 ..... 16 Technical Support Group - Day 1 ... (DHS), Chicago Field