Home Guard Froces in NATO

George J. Stein I

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of the various Home Guard f&ces:i~~E$r@za~‘~ ‘1 NATO are not well known. ~’ ,: ~:::’ : ,+: ~‘,

The 20th centuw hiitc&cal backgtcq&:, ‘, the Home Guard’derives from Europe’s world War II experience, in which the Nazi bl@&& ;‘, against one country after &nother demon&g&I that the systems of cgxscription and mgbiliid,, tioti of reserve forces was inadequate to fieldthe

based on the models of rwrml Switzerland’s militia army and neutral United States’ National Guard. Shortly after the war, Norway and Denmark followed the Swedish example and established Home Guard forces as part of a

Since the adoption. . . okxibie response in 1967 and the increasing reali- xatiot~ tbat fonvatd defense rtquims an um

UEuauy rapid and effective mobilization system fii cz&We deterrence, many Euro- pean cn&aty thinkers have argued tbatan . * otgamzed, m-place Home Guard in each

NATO country adds a smidJ, but important, measure ofsecurily.

sysmn of “total defense.” Most other nations retunrf22 to the mow traditional system of conscript,ion and a mobilization~ej~~d~nt re~ervc force.

Since the adoption by NATO of flexible response in 1967 and the increasing realization that furward defcnsc requires an unusually mpid and elicctive mobilization system for credible dctcrrencc, many Ewopcan military thinkers have argued that an organized, in-place Home Guard in each NAT0 country adds a sn~all, hut irqxvtant, marsure of security and deter* rcnce against a Warsaw Pact surprise attack, As NAT0 has cxamincd the problem of how to ncxmZdi;c the wenvhelmirtg reinforcement capaciry of the Warsaw Pact thrwgh “f&won forccs attack,” it has sirnclltaneor,lsly had to pay increasing attention to defending its own rear area t,rarUport grid, prq&r.ioned materiel and mobilization base a the f&ward dcfenx !

ainrt rapid penetration of me, domestic sabotage and

specialist airlxme or hclibome Sprrrucz s&0- rage troops Home Guard t&L3 are seen as an especially effective insurance during the fiat crucial days of a crisis or conflict, as they decrezx the likelihoxl of successful disruption of the NATO rtx area.

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To place the discussion of NATO Home Guard forces in its proper context, certain potentially confusing or overlapping terms must be clarified. These are:

o Territorial defense forces and militia forces.

February 1990 l MILITARY REVIEW

service obligation-either voluntary, as in Great Britain and the United States, or conscript, as in the remainderofNATO-and who can be mobilized in time of need to serve in either the NATO*assigned regular standing forces or in the national territorial defense forces. Both the US National Guard and the Reserve can be seen as NATO “reserve” available for mobilization. With the exception of Luxembourg, all members of NATO maintain reserve forces. Most important in the context of flexible response and forward defense, however, are the questions, raised by the concerns about both the quality of peacetime training and the effectiveness of rapid mobilization of the various NATO reserve formations, as to the immediate contribution of these forces to deterrence against surprise attack.

Home Guard forces are small, lightly armed nux&z~ forces recruited on a local basis for the defense of vital political, military or national economic key points in their immediate vicinity. In general, a Home Guard may be manned by ivlunteers, by regular,military personnel assigned to Home Guard units or by those persons serving a reserve liability and who are assigned to the Home Guard rather than the regular reserve or the territorial army (IA). Home Guard forces are usually mobilization dependent during peacetime and normally do not represent part of the standing forces, Un- like the reserve, however, the essential char- acteristic of European NATO Home Guard formations is that they can be mobilized and de- plv,ed to their defense assignments on very short notice; that is, within 24 hours.

The operational mission of Home Guard forces invariably includes:

‘0 Guarding mobilization depots and reserve assembly areas. l Guarding key national military supplies

and NAM depots. . Guarding teleuxnmunications centers. l Guarding key points in the national and

NATO rear area tmmportation net such as air. fields, rail lines and bridges.

MILITARYREVIEW l February 1990

0 General surveillance of the national territory, especially axas suitabk for infiltration by hostile airborne, commando or specialist S@sw sabotage traps.

In essence, Home Guard forces rvould be deployed to various key points in the very early, opening stages of a crisis or conflict. As lightly armed auxiliary troops, the Home Guard is not expected to defeat a determined attack; rather, the likelihood of an attacker meeting armed resistance at major key points is seen as both a deterrent and an important contribution to the disruption or delaying of an attacker’s plans for a swift vititory before general mobilization of the reserve forces could be accomplished. In general, once mobilization of the territorial defense forces or the reserve forces is complete, the Home Guard is transferred to static defense of key points. And, while the territorial defense

Reserve forces are usualIy corn sed of personnel who have complet

Jo. . . an m&al

milhy&~n&volun~ as in Great B&ah and the United States or conhpt, as in the remainder ofNATb

-and who can be mobilizedin time of need to serve in either the NATO

assigned regukr standing forces or in the national territorial defense forces.

doctrines of neutral Sweden and Switzerland and nonaligned Yugoslavia anticipate that their Home Guard and militia forces would continue guerrilla warfare and sabotage in the event of military occupation, the Home Guard forces in NATO Europe explicitly reject such a role. That is to say, the Home Guard forces of Euro- pean NATO are not “partisans” or “resistance fighters.”

The European NATO cmmtries that have adopted the Home Guard model include the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Den- mark, United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

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After active service, the German coosctipt soldier passes into a one-year

ready reserve status and can be recalled to duty by the mioisrerofdefense. After his

year in the ready reserve, the soldier k transferred to the alert reserve f&r the

remainder of his reserve fia bility

gades (Heimacxhr&ig&n) of 14 infantry, 10 atmored and six artillery battalions. These six

brigades range from 65 rt to “5 percent fully manned. TWO of t TV SIX bngades, the 51% and 56th Home Defense brigades, ate manned at 85 percent readiness in peacetime and have been assigned to NATO where, in addition to their territorial defense role, they serve as an important operational reserve for the I (FRG) Corps. The other six brigades ate essentially equipment-holding units in peacetime and would require, realistically, at least three weeks’ opetatiowal training before becom- ing fully combat effective. Further, there are 15 equipment-holding home defense regiments commanded by the VBK, 150 home defense companies commanded by the VKK and some 300 equipment-holding security platoons for key point defense at military installations or gwxnmental assets. These security platoons are usually under the control of the base or facil- ity commander.

While the home defense brigades ate clearly territorial defense forces, the temaining home clefewe regiments, companies and security pla- trams are ahost Home Guard forces in their mission of rear area and key their close cooperation wit tY

int security and the appropriate

civilian authorities. Mobilization and training issues, however, limit the effectiveness of these Heimarsclw forces in a Home Guard operational role. As noted, the TA is essentially a reserve force. After active service, the German conscript soldier passes into a one-year ready reserve status and can be recalled to duty by the minister of defense. After his year in the ready reww, the soldier is transferred to the alert reserve (Alarmresewtiten ) for the remainder of his reserveliability. Fully90percent oftheman- power availabLe to the TA is from the alert rc?;erve. and these reservists cannot be m&i- lized until the federal government, not the rain- ister of defense, has declarcul a “state of defense.” Likewise, the maximum training for the alert reserve is three two-week periods during the five years of reserve liability. Since the

February 1990 l MILITARY REVIEW

HOME GUARD

members of the alert reserve do not keep their weapons and supplies at home, their ability to deploy immediately to key points as required of an adequate Home Guard is limited. The TA, then, while it has prepared the home defense forces for a territorial defense role, has not prepared, trained or equipped sufficient home defense forces for the important Home Guard role. This lack of an immediately deployable key point defense force is an important gap in West German security planning. Finally, it should be noted that the Federal Border Guard (~u~gxwscLtz), under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, is a full-time profes- sional police force like the &e&an Gendamwie and thus, does not, perform any Home Guard function in peacetime.

Wotway Norway, although a member of NATO, has

adopted a total defense approach to national swxity much like the systems in Sweden and Switzerland and has achieved a remarkable integration of military and civilian planning. Norway’s small peacetime standing force con- stitutes only 15 percent of its armed forces. The remaining 85 percent depends on rapid mobilization of the reserve forces. Unlike most nations, Norway has assigned a large part of the logistic, transport, medical and supply functions for the armed forces to civilian authorities, including the civil defense organization, so rhat all mobilized reserves move directly to combat functions. Most of the mobilized reserve would serve in a local territorial defense role to hold Norwegian territory un,tit the arrival of NATO reinforcenwnts. Regular exercises demonstrate the ability of Norway to mobilize rapidly.

Norway maintains a large (72,iXl men) Home Guard (Heimwmet) to assist the regular armed forces with local territorial defense, key point defense and cooperation with the civilian authorities. The Home Guard is organized into 18 county districts, 84 sectors and over 500 parish areas, with three to six eight-man combat

teams per parish. It is claimed that the Nor- wegian Home Guard can be mobilized ,in 4 hours, but serious questions exist as to wheth- er the Home Guard is more symbolic than real. Only about 15 percent of Norway’s Home Guard are volunteers. Tne remainder is made up of some active personnel on special assign ment, but the majority consists of conscripts assigned to the Home Guard rather than the active forces. Conscripts serving with the Home Guard, however, receive only three months of basic training, and other members of the Home Guard have a trivial training liability of a mere two days per year. Finally, although Norway has about 36,ooO men and women in the regular armed forces and 72,OC0 in the Home Guard, the Home Guard receives less than 3 percent of the annual military budget. Increased training and a greater share of the defense budget could transform this large Home Guard, currently useful only as a war-fighting,

MlLlTARY REVIEW l February IBBO 31

*-“pattion rcsi~tancc, into a genuine detep rent to any Warsaw Pact attempt co “cum the northern tla& by occupying Norway.

&i&mark Denmark, like Norway< has adopted a total

defense m&xal security policy within NATO. Dcnrn$rk maintains a small field army of about 7,000 men serving their ninemonth conscript duty in the active dtiv standing force (St&n& S&) and 4,000 men serving their l&month a&e reserve in the augmentation force (U~~~~~) which, like the German teady m, can be recalled quickly to their former units. Thii force can be su lemented by a general mobilization of t e reserves r (40,500 men) to setve in either the field atmy or

d DPniehsRcu&ypolicybasedon ciiL?ell coahvJ&eHameGuanihasgnwnto

oyer 7;%oaO men and women.

in Iogistics and combat support. The Danish “Jutland Division,” for example, is one of the highest-readiness units in the Danish amy but is manned at only 20 petcent of its wartime strength. At best, it would take a week after general mobilization for the best,prepared unit in the Daniih army to be ready to, assist the German 6th wetgm&er and Slst H&n- atschtdnigd in Schleswig-Holstein, West Germany. Fully mobilized, the Danish an& forces can muster about 70,ooO men and women.

On the other hand, Denmark maintains a very impressive Home Guard (Hiemmeuaemets). Begun in 1946 by former Resistance members who distrusted the regular armed forces because

of their rapid capitulation to the Nazi inva- sion and who demanded, then, a Danish security policy based on citizen control, the Home Guard has grown to over 78,ooO men and women. The Danish Home Guard is organized into army, naval and air force sections with the large ground observer corps as part of the Air Force Home Guard. Until recently there were separate women’s sections of all three arms but, as of October 1989, women and men now serve together in fully gender-integrated units at all levels of the Home Guard. The Army Home Guard is organized into about 35 districts and more than 500 companies. In general, the Danish Home Guard will support the tenitorial defense of the country through guarding key points, general combat alongside the field army, reconnaissance, special warfare such as obstacle preparation, bridge demolition and sabotage, refugee control and rescue work in cooperation with the Civil Defense authorities.

Unlike the situation in Norway, afJ members of the Danish Home Guard are volunteers. Vol- unteers, approximately 60 percent of whom are former service personnel, apply to the local and ci&m authorities for permission to join. Basic training for inexperienced volunteers is 100 hours during the first year, 50 hours during the second and third years and 24 hours per year thereafter. Volunteers who have completed their regular military service are exempted from basic training and serve 24 hours of proficiency training each year. Normally, training is con- ducted in the local unit with which the volunteer will serve, but special fourday training exercises ate available. Civilian wages lost by participating in Home Guard training are fully reimbursed. Most important for their ability to be a credible contribution to a total defense deterrent, members of the Daniih Home Guard keep their uniforms, equipment and weapons, iddii machineguns and antitank rockets, at home. Standard weapons of the w~ll-atmed Danish Home Guard include individual titles, the MG 62 machinegun, the M72 LAW 66mm antitank rocket, the 84mm cd Gustav anti-

Febtuafy 1590 l MILITARY REVIEW

tank recoilless rifle and communication&gnal equipment compatible with that of the field army. Denmark claims that over 50 the Home Guard could be mobilize

rcent of Cr. wlthin 2

hours. Despite the well-known antinuclear, and

some would say anti-NATO, sentiment in&n_ mark, plus a steady reduction in spending on the regular armed forces, the Danish Home Guard remains very popular and has no shortage of volunteers from which to select the ve’y best. The only serious problem with the Home Guard as an organization is the need for more, and more realistic, training, especially to coun. ter the developing Warsaw Pact capabilities of airborne andspecialistlsabotage units. Unfortu- nately, a well-organized and popular Home Guard is no substitute for properly equipped and trained regular forces. Home Guards are awifiary forces, not substitute forces. As the Danish Home Guard is allocated a mete 2 per-

Nonvay maintains a %

e (72,000 m&j

cent of the military budget, it is a continuing HomeGuardtoassigt ereguhamed

temptation to rely increasingly on the Home forces with lOra tertito&ldefense, key

Guard in an attempt to buy national security poht defense and cooperahbn with the

“on the cheap.” The Danish Home Guard is a civil&m authorities. The Home Guardis OP

very good Home Guard; it is not, however, an &into fScountydi9m*ct9, S4sectom

adequate national defense even within the azidoverMOpa&h areas, with thwe to

NATO Alliance. t-man combat teams

United Kingdom The British army can be divided between the battalions, three yeomanry reconnaissance corn--

British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) comprising panic=,, two volunteer regiments of the Special I British Corps in Germany and the British gar- Air Service (SAS) and the British Home Guard. risen in Berlin, and the United Kingdom Land Great Britain has been divided into 11 home

Forces (UKLF) in Great Britain, which super- defense regions and subdivided further into 77 vises recruirment and training, and controls tactical areas that are based on the local county both the regular and TA reinforcement bri- area. Each of the 11 regions has only one bat-

gades of I (UK) Corps. Since the defense talion as a mobile reserve to be dispatched in

reforms of 1965, the “category A” units of the support of units guarding key points and other TA have been seen as the primary reserve for installations, This system is clearly inadequate.

deployment to Europe and the “category B” In an attempt to better protect lower-priority units seen as the home defense of the United kq points and release better-trained men for

Kingdom. Forces available for home defense more essential home defense duties, the British, include some regular army personnel from the in 1982, revived the World War II Home Guard training camps, some “category B” TA units as the “Home Service force,” a “category c”

organized as three-company, truck-mounted unit of the TA.

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etherlands The army of the Netherlands may be divided

&ween those units of the I (NL) Corps assigned to NATO and the TA for home defense. In Sctuality, the LXltch maintain only one rein- forced armored brigade of the I (NL) Corps &ployed forward in Germany. The remainder of the corps is in the Netherlands during peacetime and is, to a large degree, mobilization dependent. The well-known Dutch RIM @irect Intake Into Reserve Units) system of mobilization suggests that the remaining troops of I (NL) Corps could be ready to move to their battle positions in Germany within four days. While mobilization exercises within the Netherlands have been held, the ability of the corps to actually deploy in strength in Gw many, together with its armor and supplies on rsilway flatcars, has never been tested.

The home defense force, the 9,000-man TA, is composed of two brigades divided into battalions and companies. The personnel for these mobilizationdependent reserve brigades are men who have completed their active service, their short-leave service and their 20lnonth RIM assignment. The missions of the TA are maintaining rear area security, the NATO and national lines of communication and key point defense. While the TA could be mobilized on fairly short notice, in reality it would take three to four weeks of refresher trainin before they would be sufficiently combat rea i y to contrib- ute effectively to NAT0 rear area security. The problem is inadequate training. The peacetime training of the TA battalions and companies is on a six-year cycle. Year one is a mobilization exercise for officers and key personnel; year two, the same with a review of operational plans; year three repeats year one for new personnel; years four and five repeat years two and three; and in year six, there is a field exercise for the soldiers. While onemight hope that individual reservists can retain their skills with one exercise every six years, it is doubdul. With the exception of a few active duty security companies, the TA cannot be seen as an effective

34 February i990 l MILITARV REVIEW

Lkspite the we&known antinuclear, andsome wouldsay; in lkmna.&, plus a steady reduction in spedn on theregukarmedforce, t

Danish Home Guanrlremains ve~popuhuand $ as no shortage of voloM&em Tom wbkhtoselecttheverybestTheooiy

i&ion is the need& more, andmone wi&theHomeGoaniasanogarr

especkaTy to couMer the developing Warsaw Pact capabilities ofairborne and s~h&&abotage UN&z.

Mome Guard. To remedy this problem, the Dutch, in 1984, reformed their national reserve, which had existed an paper since 1948, into a new home guard, the Kvrps Nuriotlale Reserve KNR).

The KNR is under the operatic& cotgo1 of the National Territorial Command. Its current strength is about 6,COO mq, organized into 50 security companies and abuur 140 security platoons. These companies and platoons are normally commanded by the 11 provincial military govetnoa. The basic unit is the platoon (PcL otcm), organized with one officer, four noncom- missi:oned officers (NCOs) and 29 soldiers.

Each platcun is usually assigned to key point d&we in its immediate vicinity and, as all members of the latoon have an intimate knowledge of their ocal area, a KNR platoon is P a model home bward unit. Several platoons can be combined into a home defense company under a company staff with two officers, four NCOs and 17 soldiers. Standard weapons in each KNR platoon include I5 NATO FN (Fabrique Nation&) rifles, 14 UZI sub, machineguns, four Bren guns, five pistols and one rocket launcher. Enlistment is entirely WI- untary and is open to males between the ages of 19 and 49 who have finished their active duty in

MUTARY REVIEW l February 1900 35

one of the armed services. A soldier serving his 2Omonth RIM wsewe duty may petition to m&x to the Home Guard.

The operational mission of the Dutch Home Guard is the &warding of key pints such as b&a, mdidio and cnmmtmicatint~s assets, the

Theo rational mission of the Dutch Home uandistheguardingofkeypohs ir such as b&&es, radio and communications wets, tbcmifway i and, most

inp~ot, the other elements of the Dutch army during ita mobilization.

railway infrasm~cture and, most important, the other elements of the Durch army during its mobilization phase. ‘!%ning is on a four-year cycle but is much more active than that of the TA. While the Iegagalminimurn training liability is SO hauls per year, in actuality 100 hours is the norm. Basic tmining usually occurs in segments of 3 to 5 hours one night each month. Twice each year a full platoon or company-size exer- &se is held for al! members of the unit; once each year, a weekend exercise is held for al! members of the unit; and once every four years, a week-long field exercise is held. These training exercises are all mission specific and may include, in addition to standard key point defense in their immediate locality, exercises with the security units of the national railroad, airfield defense and even sewing as “aggressor” forces for the regular army. Additional training for platoon commanders and NC& by the provincial military commander consists of 50 hours per year and four weekend briefings yearly to update operxional plans. Although small in

n&yq the Dutch Home Guard’s security companies and platoons provide a vital contti- bution to NATO rear area security and Dutch territorial defense. As a!! members of a KNR platoon must live within 10 miles of their pla toon headquarters, their ability to mobilize and deplq to their assigned operational area on sev era1 hours’ notice is impressive. Current Dutch plans propose to expand the KNR to about 200 platoons by the mid-1990s and, although conscripts could be assigned to the KNR, sufficient volunteers have been available to make this unnecessary.

With the increasing recognition within European NAT0 circles that rear area security and the protection of reserve mobilization assets are essential to both the deterrent and war-fighting credibility of forward defense, there has been a simultaneous recognition of the minor, but strategically crucial, operational role for Home Guard forces. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, the home defense security companies and security platoons of the TA are, as currently manned, capa- ble of operating as a quick reaction Home Guard if shifted away from cadre equipment- holding units to a more active and mission- specific Home Guard role. Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, each in its own nationally distinctive manner, have taken the appropriate measures to develop an effective Home Guard force.

The Home Guard, once seen as a last-resort effort, composed of well-meaning but overage and undertrained locals, is enjcying a renaiv sance in European NATO. Well-trained, properly equipped and highly motivated, the Home Guard forces are a small, but important, contribution to deterrence and the defense of Europe against the surprise attack. D/k

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Documents

Home Guard Froces in NATO