HOCHSCHILD_Work, Feeling Rules, And Social Structure

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Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social StructureAuthor(s): Arlie Russell HochschildSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Nov., 1979), pp. 551-575Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778583.

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Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social StructureArlieRussellHochschildUniversityfCalifornia, erkeley

This essay proposes n emotion-managementerspectives a lensthrough hich o inspect heself, nteraction,nd structure.mo-tion, t is argued, anbe andoftens subject o actsofmanagement.The individual ftenworks n inducing r inhibitingeelingso asto render hem appropriate" o a situation. he emotion-manage-ment erspectiveraws n an interactiveccount femotion.t dif-fersfrom he dramaturgicalerspectiven the one hand and thepsychoanalyticerspectiven theother. t allowsus to inspect tcloser ange han ither f those erspectivesherelationmong mo-tive experience,motionmanagement,eeling ules,and ideology.Feeling ules reseenas the ideof deology hatdealswith motionandfeeling.motionmanagements thetype f workttakes ocopewithfeeling ules.Meaning-makingobs,more ommonn themid-dle class,putmorepremiumn the ndividual's apacity o do emo-tionwork.A reexaminationfclass differencesn childrearingug-geststhatmiddle-class amilies reparetheir hildren oremotionmanagement oreand working-classamilies repare hem ess. Inthiswayeachclasspreparestschildrenopsychologicallyeproducetheclassstructure.

Social psychology as sufferednderthe tacitassumptionhatemotion,becauseit seemsunbidden nd uncontrollable,s notgoverned y socialrules.Social rules,fortheirpart,are seen as applying o behavior ndthought,ut rarely o emotion r feeling.f we reconsiderhe nature femotion2nd thenature fourcapacity o try haping t,we are struckbythe mperialcopeof socialrules. ignificantinks mergemong ocialstructure,eelingules,motionmanagement,ndemotivexperience-linksI try o trace n thisessay.The purposes to suggest n area for nquiry.I This paper summarizes art of the argumentpresentedn a forthcomingook. Thisstudy has beengenerously upportedby a Guggenheim ellowship.Althoughgratitudein footnotes ike this is (as this paper demonstrates)conventionalized,nd althoughconventionmakesauthenticity ard to decipher, wantanywayto express ppreciationto Harvey Faberman,Todd Gitlin,Adam Hochschild,RobertJackson,JerzyMichaelo-wicz, Caroline Persell,Mike Rogin, Paul Russell, Thomas Scheff,Ann Swidler, JoelTelles, and theanonymousreviewers orthe AIS.2 I define motion s bodily cooperationwith an image, a thought, memory-a coop-eration of whichthe individual s aware. I will use the terms emotion"and "feeling"interchangeably,lthoughthe term "emotion"denotes a state of being overcome that"feeling"does not. The term emotionmanagement"s used synonymously ith "emo-tionwork" and "deep acting."@) 1979 by The University f Chicago.0002-9602/80/8503-0003$02.00

AJS Volume85 Number3 551


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American ournal fSociologyWhy s the emotive xperiencefnormal dults n daily ife as orderlyas it is? Why, generally peaking, o people feel gay at parties, ad at

funerals, appyat weddings? his question eads us to examine, ot con-ventions fappearance r outwardomportment,ut conventionsffeeling.Conventionsf feeling ecome urprisingnlywhenwe imagine, y con-trast,what totally npatterned,npredictablemotiveifemight ctuallybe like at parties, unerals, eddings,ndinthefamily r work ife f nor-mal adults.ErvingGoffman1961) suggests oth the surprise o be explained ndpart of the explanation: . . . We find hatparticipants illhold n checkcertainpsychologicaltatesand attitudes, or after ll, the verygeneralrule that one enter nto the prevailingmood n the encounter arries heunderstandinghatcontradictoryeelings ill be in abeyance.... So gen-erally,n fact, oes onesuppress nsuitableffect,hatwe need to lookatoffenseso thisruleto be remindedf ts usual operation" Goffman 961,p. 23). If we take thispassageseriously,s I urgewe do, we may be ledbackto the lassic uestion f ocialorder rom particular antage oint-that f emotionmanagement.rom hisvantage oint, ules eem ogovernhow people tryor trynot to feel n ways "appropriate o the situation."Such a notion uggestsbow profoundlyhe individual s "social," and"socialized"to try o pay tribute o official efinitionsf situations, ithno less thantheir eelings.Let me pause to pointout thatthere re twopossible pproaches o thesocial ordering f emotive xperience. ne is to studythe social factorsthat nduceor stimulate rimary i.e., nonreflective,hough y definitionconscious) motions-emotions assively ndergone.he other s to studysecondary cts performedpontheongoing onreflectivetream fprimaryemotive xperience.he firstpproach ocuses n how socialfactors ffectwhatpeoplefeel, he econd n how socialfactorsffect hatpeoplethinkand do about what theyfeel (i.e., acts of assessment nd management).Thosewhotake the first pproachmight egard hosewho take the econdas being overly ognitive." ut infact hetwo pproaches re compatible,and indeedthesecond, akenhere, elies n some accumulation f knowl-edgegarneredrom hefirst.3If we take as our objectoffocuswhat t s people hink r do aboutfeel-3 For comprehensive,f somewhatdated,reviewsof thetheoretical pproachesto emo-tion, eeHillman(1964), Carlson et al. (1959), Reymert 1950), and McDougall (1937).These reviews exclude several more recenttheoretical ttempts by Tomkins (1962),Arnold (1968), and Plutchik (1962). For a psychoanalytic ccount, see Rapaport(1953). Also see Rabkin (1968), Sprout (1952), Scheff 1973, 1977a, 1977b), Levy(1973), and Katz (1977). Various social scientistshave developed theirapproachesvia inspectionof a particularemotion or feeling, s for example, jealousy (Davis1936; Clanton and Smith 1977), envy (Foster 1972), embarrassmentGoffman1956;Grossand Stone 1964), and love (Goode 1974; Swanson 1965). For a selectivereviewsee Hochschild 1975).552


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EmotionWorkings, everal uestions merge. irst,withwhat ssumptionsbout emotionand situation o we begin? n otherwords, a) howresponsives emotionto deliberate ttempts o suppress r evoke t? (b) What sociological p-proach s mostfruitful?econd,what re the inks mong ocial structure,ideology, eeling ules, nd emotionmanagement?o beginwith, c) arethere eeling ules? d) How do we know boutthem? e) How are theserulesusedas baselinesn socialexchanges?f) What nthenature f workandchildrearingmight ccount ordifferentaysadultsofvaryinglassesmanage heir eelings? shallsketch utlines fpossible nswerswith heaim, n somemeasure, f refininghe questions.TWO ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION AND FEELINGIn order o address he first uestion,wemight onsiderwobasicaccountsof emotion nd feeling oundn social psychology:he organismicccountand the nteractiveccount.The twoapproaches iffern whattheymplyabout our capacity omanage motion, nd thus nwhattheymply boutthe mportancef rules boutmanagingt. I cannotdo full usticeheretothequestion f whatemotions and how t is generated,or can I offerfullreactionothe mple iteraturenthat uestion.According o theorganismiciew, heparamountuestions oncern herelation femotion o biologically iven instinct" r "impulse." n largepart,biologicalfactors ccountforthequestions he organismicheoristposes.The earlywritingsf Sigmund reud 1911, 1915a,1915b; see Lof-gren 1968), CharlesDarwin ([1872] 1955), and in some though ot allrespects,WilliamJames (Jamesand Lange 1922) fit this model.4Theconcept emotion" efersmainly o strips f experiencen which here sno conflictetween ne and another spectof self; the ndividual floodsout," is "overcome." he imagethat comesto mind s that of a sudden,4W. McDougall (1948) and, to some extent, . S. Tomkins (1962) also fitthisclassi-fication. oth focuson therelationof emotionto driveor instinct Tomkins elaboratesa relationbetween emotion and "drive signals" wherebyemotion is said to amplifydrivesignals). The central ssueson whichthe two theoretical amps divide are fixity,reflexivity,nd origin. 1) The organismic heorists, nlike their nteractive ounter-parts, assume a basic fixity f emotion, based in biologicalgivens. (2) They assumethat social interactiondoes not basically affect motions; the social surfaceremainswhat is implied by the term"surface." n the interactive ccount.this s not the case.Labeling, management, nd expressionof feeling more clearly differentiatedy theinteractionists) re processeswhich can reflexivelyact back" on emotion, nd indeedcome to constitutewhat we mean by the term"emotion." (3) Again, the organismictheorists re more concernedwithtracing motion back to its origins.For Freud andJames the originswere energicor somatic, and for Darwin, phylogenetic. he inter-active theorists re less concernedwith origin than with the interface f a situationand experience.The focus on origin eads the organismic heorists o focus on com-monalitiesbetween differenteoples, and betweenpeople and animals. The focus onsocial interface eads the interactionists o focus on differences.or recent nnovationsin the interactive radition, ee Kemper (1978) and Averill 1976).

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American ournal fSociologyautomatic eflexyndrome-Darwin'snstant narl xpression,reud's en-siondischarge t a given breaking ointof tension verload,James ndLange's notion fan instantaneous nmediated isceral eaction o a per-ceived stimulus, he perception f which s also unmediated y socialinfluences.In thisfirstmodel, ocial factors an enter n only nregard o howemo-tionsare stimulated nd expressed and even here Darwin took the uni-versalist osition) see Ekman 1972, 1973). Social factors re not seenasan influence n how emotions re actively uppressed r evoked. ndeed,emotion s characterized y the fixity nd universalityf a knee-jerk e-actionor a sneeze. n thisview, ne could as easilymanage n emotionsone could manage knee erk or a sneeze. f theorganismicheorist ereto be presented iththe concept f feeling ules,he or she wouldbe hardput to elucidatewhat theserules mpinge n, or whatcapacity ftheselfcouldbe calledon to try o obey a feeling ule see Hochschild 977). Re-centattemptso linkan organismicotion femotion o socialstructure,such as Randall Collins's 1975) wonderfullyold attempt,ufferrom heproblems hat were mplicit n the organismicccountto beginwith.ByCollins, s by Darwin on whomhe draws, motions re seenas capacities(or susceptibilities) ithin person, o be automaticallyriggered,s Collinsdevelops t, by oneoranother roup ncontrol f the ritual pparatus hatdoes the "triggering"1975, p. 59). A whollydifferentvenueof socialcontrol, hatoffeeling ules, s bypassed, ecause the ndividual's apacitytotry o,ortrynotto feel-that to which herule pplies-is not uggestedby theorganismic odelwithwhichCollins egins.In the nteractiveccount, ocial influences ermeatemotionmore n-sistently, ore ffectively,nd at more heoreticallyosited unctures.nlarge part, sociopsychologicalactors ccountforthequestions he nter-activetheorist oses. The writings f Gerth nd MIills 1964), Goffman(1956, 1959, 1961, 1967, 1974), Lazarus (1966), La7arus and Averill(1972), Schachter nd Singer 1962), Schachter 1964), Kemper 1978),Averill 1976). andaspects f ate Freudian ndneo-Freudianhought itthismodel.To invoke he Freudianvocabulary, he magehere s not thatof a "runaway d," but of an ego and superego, cting pon, haping, ag-ging,however neffectively,emporarily,r consciously, heid.5 Emotionis sometimes osited s a psychobiological eans of adaptation-an ana-5The stresson will (included n the concept of ego, but not all that "earo"refers o)is not a clean dividerof the organismicfromthe interactive heorist. chachter ndGerthand Mills, whom I see as members f the interactive amp, lay no particularstresson volition.Goffmantresses hephenomena hatcall tacitlyforwill.He stressesthe patterned esultsof it,but providesno theoretical ccount of will itself.He positsno actor qua emotionmanagerwho might ccomplish heacts that, by inference,mustget accomplished o pull off he encounters e describes o well. In myview, we mustreinstitute self capable of experiencing motion and of working on it in sociallypatternedways. (On the ssue of will,see Piaget in Campbell [1976]; Solomon [1973].)554


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EmotionWorklogue to other daptivemechanisms,uch as shivering hencold or per-spiring henhot.But emotion iffersrom hese ther daptivemechanisms,in thatthinking,erceiving,nd imagining--themselvesubjectto the n-fluencef normsnd situations-are ntrinsicallynvolved.As in thefirstmodel, ocialfactorsffect owemotionsre elicited ndexpressed.However,n addition, ocial factors uidethemicroactionsflabeling Schachter1964; Schachter nd Singer1962; Katz 1977), in-terpretingGerth nd Mills 1964), andmanagingmotionLazarus 1966).These microactions,n turn, eflect ack on thatwhich s labeled, nter-preted,nd managed. heyare,finally,ntrinsico whatwe call "emotion"(see Schafer1976). Emotion,n this econd choolof thought,s seenasmoredeeply social. Lazarus's (1966) work n particularends empiricalweight o the interactivemodel. t suggests hatnormal dults, uch asuniversitytudentsn whom e conductedxperiments,avea considerablecapacity o controlmotion.t is more ontrol hanone mightxpect roma smallchild, n insane dult, r an animal, romll of which reud n hisearlierwritingsnd Darwindrew nspiration. ut since t is theemotiveexperiencef normal dultswe seek to understand, e would do well tobeginwith he nteractiveccount.6The Interactive ccount fEmotion nd SocialPsychologyIf emotionsndfeelingsan to somedegree emanaged, ow mightwegeta conceptual raspof themanaging ct from social perspective?he in-teractive ccountof emotioneads us intoa conceptual rena"between"theGoffmanianocus n consciouslyesigned ppearances n theonehandand the Freudianfocuson unconsciousntrapsychicvents n theother.The focusof Mead (1934) and Blumer 1969) on conscious, ctive, ndresponsiveesturesmight ave beenmostfruitfulad nottheir ocusondeedsand thoughtlmost ntirelybscured he mportancef feeling.SeeShott 1979] foran attempt o consider motion rom symbolicnter-actionist erspective.) he self s emotionmanagers an idea thatborrowsfrom oth ides-GoffmanndFreud-but squares ompletely ithneither.Here can only ketch uta fewbasicborrowingsnd departures,ocusingonthedepartures.ErvingGoffmanGoffmanuides ur attention o socialpatternsn emotive xperience. ecatches n irony:moment omoment,he ndividuals actively egotiating6 My own accountof emotiondrawson thatproposed by Katz (1977). For Katz emo-tion is generated by a "schematicdiscrepancy," hat is, a discrepancybetween theindividual's schemata and his currentperception,memory, r imaginingof an eventor object. Also see the interesting ork of Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman (1979).

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American ournal f Sociologya courseof action,but in the ongrun, ll the actionseems ikepassiveacquiescence o social convention.he conservingf conventions not apassivebusiness.Goffman'spproachmight imply e extended nd deep-enedby showinghatpeoplenotonlytry oconformutwardly,ut do soinwardly s well. "When they ssueuniforms,hey ssue skins" Goffman1974) couldbe extended: and two nches f flesh."Yet, ronically,o studywhy ndunderwhat onditionsparticipants. .hold n check ertain sychologicaltates . ." (Goffman 961,p. 23), weare forced artly ut of theperspective hichgave birth o the nsight.shalltry oshowwhythis s so,what the remediesmight e, andhow theresultscould be conceptually elated to aspects of the psychoanalytictradition.First,Goffman,orreasonsnecessary o his purpose,maintains orthemostpart a studied isregard or he inksbetween mmediateocial situa-tionsand macrostructuren theone hand, and individual ersonalityntheother. f one s interestedndrawinginks mong ocial tructure,eelingrules, nd emotionmanagement,his tudied isregard ecomes problem.Goffman'ssituationism"s a brilliant chievement,ne that mustbeunderstoods a developmentn the ntellectual istoryfsocialpsychology.Earlier n the century number fclassicworks inked ocial structureopersonality,r "dominantnstitutions"o "typical dentities,"nd thusalso relatedfindingsn sociologynd anthropologyo those npsychologyorpsychoanalyticheory. hesestudies ppeared n a numberffields-inanthropology,uth Benedict 1946); in psychoanalysis,rich Fromm(1942), Karen Horney 1937), and Erik Erikson 1950); in sociology,David Riesman 1952, 1960), Swanson nd Miller 1966), and Gerth ndMills (1964).Possiblyn response o thisparadigmGoffmanroposed n intermediatelevel of conceptual laboration,between" ocial structurend personality.His focus s on situations,pisodes, ncounters.he situation,heepisodi-cally emergentncounter,s notonlynearly ivorced rom ocial structureand fromersonality;eeven eems o ntend is ituationisms ananalyticsubstitute ortheseconcepts see Goffman 976, p. 77). Structure, eseems osay,can be notonly ransposed ut reduced in anddown,"whilepersonalityan be reduced up andout" to the tudy fhere-now,one-theninteractional oments.Each interactionalpisodetakeson the character f a minigovernment.A cardgame, party, greetingn the treet xactsfroms certaintaxes"in theform fappearanceswhichwe "pay" for he sake of sustaining heencounter.We arerepaid nthecurrencyfsafety rom isrepute.ThankstoHarveyFarberman or iscussionnthispoint.)This modelof thesituation ua minigovernment,hileusefulforGoff-man'spurposes,eads us awayfromocial structurend personality-two556


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EmotionWorkconceptswithwhich ny studyof feeling ulesand emotionmanagementwouldbe wise todeal.7To studywhy nd underwhat conditionspartici-pants .. hold n checkcertain sychologicaltates . ." (Goffman961,p. 23), we areforced ut of thehere-now,one-thenituationismnd back,in part at least, to the social structurend personality odel.We are ledto appreciate he mportance f Goffman's ork, s it seemshe doesnot,as the critical et of conceptual onnectingissuesby which tructurendpersonality,eal ntheir wnright,re more reciselyoined.Specifically,fwe are to understand he origin nd causesofchange n"feeling ules"-this underside f ideology-we are forced ack out of astudy f the mmediateituationsnwhich hey howup, to a study f suchthings s changingelations etween lassesor the exes.If we are to investigate heways people tryto manage feeling,weshallhave to positan actor capable of feeling, apable of assessingwhena feelings "inappropriate,"nd capable of trying o managefeeling. heproblem s thattheactor Goffmanroposes oes not seemto feelmuch,snot attuned o,does not monitor losely r assess,does not actively voke,inhibit, hape-in a word,workon feelingsn a way an actorwouldhaveto do to accomplishwhat Goffmanays is, in fact, ccomplishedn oneencounterfter nother.We are leftknowing bout"suppressive ork" sa final esult, utknowing othing f the process r techniques ywhichit is achieved. f we are to argue thatsocial factors nfluence ow we tryto managefeelings,f we are to carry he social that far,we shall havetocarry ur analyticfocusbeyond he "black box" to whichGoffmanlti-matelyrefers s.Goffman'sctorsactivelymanage outer mpressions,ut theydo notactivelymanage nnerfeelings. or example, typicalGoffmanianctor,Preedyat thebeach (Goffman 959), is exquisitely ttuned o outwardappearance, but his glances inward at subjective feeling re fleetingand blurred.The very topic, sociology f emotion, resupposes hu-man capacity for, f not the actual habit of, reflectingn and shapinginnerfeelings, habit itselfdistributed ariously cross time, ge, class,and locale. This variationwoulddropfromightwerewe to adoptan ex-7Time: to link the momentaryct of emotion work with the conceptof personality,we must alter our perspective n time.An emotive episode and the attemptto shapeit is, afterall, a brief trip of time.Situations such as Goffman tudies are also short.The focus is on the act, and the act ends,so to speak, when the theatercloses andstarts again when it reopens. If we extend Goffman'snalysis, by speaking now of"deep" acting, we, like him, are focusingon short episodes,on "stills" fromwhichlong movies are composed.The notion of personalitymplies a fairlydurable, trans-situationalpattern.The Casper Milquetoast personalitymay lead an anxiety voidantlife of 73 years. Not momentary tills,but many decades are at issue. Again, wemust shift our situationistfocus at the structural nd when we come to speak ofinstitutions, hich live even longer than people do.

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American ournal f Sociologyclusivefocuson the actor's ttentivenesso behavioral acade and assumea uniform assivity is-a-vis eelings.

This skew n the theoreticalctor s related o what frommyviewpointis another roblem:Goffman'soncept f acting.Goffmanuggests hatwespend good deal of effort anagingmpressions-thats, acting.He positsonly one sortof acting-the directmanagementf behavioral xpression.His illustrations,hough, ctuallypoint o two types f acting-the directmanagementf behavioral xpressione.g., thegiven-offigh, he houldershrug), nd the managementf feeling romwhich xpression an follow(e.g., the thought f some hopelessproject).An actor playing he partof King Lear might o about his task n two ways. One actor,followingtheEnglish choolof acting,might ocuson outward emeanor, he con-stellation f minute xpressions hat correspond o Lear's sense of fearand impotent utrage.This is the sortof actingGoffmanheorizes bout.Another ctor, dhering o the American r Stanislavskychoolof acting,might uide his memories nd feelingsn such a way as to elicitthe cor-respondingxpressions. he first echnique e might all "surface cting,"the second deep acting."Goffman ailsto distinguishhe first rom hesecond, nd he obscures he mportance f "deep acting."Obscuring his,we are leftwith he mpressionhat ocial factors ervade nlythe "socialskin," he tried-foruter ppearances f the ndividual.We are leftunder-estimatinghe powerofthe social.In sum, fwe are to accept the nteractiveccountof emotion nd tostudy heselfas emotionmanager,we can learnfromGoffmanboutthelinkbetween ocial ruleand feeling. ut to elaborate his nsight e mightwell selectively elaxthe theoretical trictures offmanas stoicallym-posed against focus n socialstructurend onpersonality.FreudThe need to replaceGoffman'sblack-box sychology" ith ometheoryofself,nthefull enseoftheterm,mighteem o ead to Freudian r neo-Freudian theory. et, here, as with Goffman,nly some aspectsof theFreudianmodel eemuseful omy understandingf conscious, eliberateeffortso suppress r evokefeeling. shallbriefly iscusspsychoanalytictheoryoshow omepoints fdeparture.Freud,of course,dealt withemotions, ut forhimtheywerealwayssecondaryo drive.He proposed general heoryf sexual and aggressivedrives.Anxiety, s a derivative f aggressivend sexual drives,was ofparamount mportance, hilea wide rangeof otheremotions,ncludingjoy, ealousy,depression, eregivenrelativelyittle ttention. e devel-oped,and manyothershave sinceelaborated,heconcept fegodefensesas generally nconscious,nvoluntarymeans of avoidingpainfulor un-558


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EmotionWorkpleasant ffect. inally henotion f"inappropriateffect"s used topointto aspectsofthe ndividual's gofunctioningnd not used topointto thesocialrules ccording owhich feelings or is not deemed ppropriateoa situation.Theemotion-managementerspectives indebted oFreudfor hegeneralnotion fwhatresourcesndividuals f differentortspossessfor ccom-plishing hetask ofemotionwork as I havedefinedt) and for henotionofunconsciousnvoluntarymotionmanagement.he emotion-managementperspective iffersromhe Freudianmodel nits focus nthefull ange femotionsnd feelings nd its focuson conscious nd deliberate ffortsoshape feeling. romthisperspective, e notetoo that inappropriatemo-tion"has a clearlymportantocial s wellas intrapsychicide.Let mebrieflyllustrate hedifferencesetween hetwoperspectives.nShapiro'swell-known ork n "neurotictyle," egives n example:

Anobsessive-compulsiveatient-asober, echnicallyinded nd activeman-was usually onspicuouislyackingn enthusiasmr excitementncircumstanceshatmight eem owarranthem. n oneoccasion,s hetalked bout certainrospectfhis,namely,hegoodchance f an im-portantuccess n hiswork, is sober xpressionasmomentarilynter-ruptedy a smile.After fewmoreminutesftalking,uring hich emaintainedis sobernessnlywith ifficulty,ebegan uitehesitantlyospeak fcertainopes hathehad only lluded o earlier. henhe brokeinto grin. lmostmmediately,owever,eregainedisusual omewhatworriedxpression.s he didthis, esaid, Ofcourse, heoutcomes byno means ertain,"ndhe saidthis n a tone hat, fanything,ould ug-gesttheoutcomewas almost ertain o be a failure. fter ickingffseveral f thespecificossibilitiesor hitch, e finallyeemed o behimselfgain, o tospeak. Shapiro 965, . 192, mphasis ine]

What seems nterestingboutthisexamplediffersccordingowhetherone takes the psychiatric erspective r the emotion-managementer-spective. irst,to thepsychiatristn thecase above,whatcircumstanceswarrantwhatdegree nd type of feeling eemsrelatively nproblematic.A doctor knows"what nappropriateffect s; themainproblem s notso much to discernmisfits f feeling o situationbut to explain themand to cure the patientof them. From the emotion-managementer-spective, n the otherhand, the warranting unction f circumstancesis problematic. urther,he meansused to assess thiswarrantingunctionmay well be the same for a psychiatrists for a salesclerk r schooldisciplinarian.or, in a sense we all act as lay psychiatristssing un-examinedmeansofarrivingt a determinationbout ust "what"circum-stanceswarrant thatmuch"feeling f"that sort."Whatthepsychiatrist,hesalesclerk,nd the schooldisciplinarian ayshare s a habit ofcomparing,ituatione.g., highopportunity,ssociatedwith an accomplishmentt work) with role (e.g., hopes,aspirations,x-

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American ournal fSociologypectations ypical f,and expected rom,hoseenacting he role). Socialfactors an enter n, to alter howwe expect role to be held,orplayed.If, for xample, hepatientwere "sober, echnically inded nd active"woman nd ifthe observer rightly rwrongly) ssumed r expected erto value family nd personal ies over worldly uccess, ess enthusiasmtthe prospect f advancemight eem perfectlyappropriate." ack of en-thusiasmwouldhave a warrant f that social sort.Again, f thepatientwas an antinuclear ctivist ndhis discovery ad implicationsornuclearenergy, hat would alter thehopes and aspirations e might e expectedtohave at work nd mightwarrant ismay, ot enthusiasm.We assess the "appropriateness"f a feeling y making comparisonbetween eeling nd situation, ot by examining he feelingn abstracto.This comparison ends the assessora "normal" yardstick-a sociallynormalone-from which to factorouitthe personal meaning ystemswhichmaylead a worker o distort is viewof "the" situation nd feelinappropriately ith regard to it. The psychiatrist olds constant hesociallynormal enchmarknd focuses n whatwe have ust factoredut.The student f emotionmanagementolds constantwhat s factored utand studies hesociallynormal enchmark,specially ariationsn it.There s a seconddifferencen what,from he two perspectives,eemsinterestingn the above example.Fromthe emotion-managementerspec-tive,what s interestings thecharacter nd directionfvolitionnd con-sciousness. rom the psychiatricerspective, hatis of more nterestspre-will nd nonconsciousness.he man above is not doing motionwork,that s,making conscious,ntended ry t altering eeling.nsteadhe iscontrolling is enthusiasm y "being himself," y holding, n Schutz'sterm, "natural ttitude."He "no longerneeds to struggle otto grin;he is not n a grinningmood" (Shapiro 1965, p. 164). In order o avoidaffectiveeviance,ome ndividualsmayface a harder ask thando others,the taskof consciously orkingn feelingsn order o makeup for a nat-ural attitude"-explanable n psychoanalyticerms-that gets them nsocial trouble. he hysteric orkingn a bureaucraticettingmayfacethenecessity ormore motionwork hanthe obsessive ompulsive hofits nmorenaturally.In sum, the emotion-managementerspective osters ttention o howpeople try o feel,not,as forGoffman,owpeople try o appearto feel.It leads us to attend o howpeopleconsciously eel ndnot, s forFreud,how people feel unconsciously.he interactiveccountof emotion ointsto alternate heoreticalunctures-between onsciousnessf feeling ndconsciousnessf feeling ules,betweenfeeling ules and emotionwork,between eeling ules nd socialstructure.n the remainderf this ssay,itis these unctures e shallexplore.560


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EmotionWorkEMOTION WORKBy "emotion ork" refero the ct of tryingo changendegree r qualityan emotion r feeling. o "work n" an emotion rfeelings, for ur pur-poses, the same as "to manage"an emotion r to do "deep acting."Notethat emotionwork"referso theeffort-the ct of trying- ndnot totheoutcome,whichmay ormay not be successful. ailed actsofmanagementstill ndicatewhat deal formulationsuide the effort,ndon that ccountare no less interestinghanemotionmanagementhatworks.The verynotion f an attempt uggests n active tancevis-'a-viseeling.In my exploratorytudyrespondentsharacterizedheir motionworkbya variety factiveverbforms; I psychedmyself p.... I squashedmyangerdown. . . I tried ard ot to feeldisappointed. . . I mademyselfhave a good time. . . I triedo feelgrateful. . . I killedhehope hadburning." here was also the activelypassive form,s in, "I let myselffinally eel ad."Emotionwork differs rom motion control"or "suppression." helatter woterms uggest n effort erely o stifle r prevent eeling. Emo-tionwork"refersmore roadly o the act of evoking r shaping, s wellassuppressing, eelingn onself. avoid the term manipulate" ecause itsuggests shallowness do notmeanto imply.We can speak, hen, ftwobroad types f emotionwork:evocation,n which hecognitive ocus s ona desiredfeelingwhich s initially bsent, nd suppression,n which hecognitive ocus s on an undesired eelingwhich s initially resent.Onerespondent,oing out witha priest20 years her senior, xemplifiesheproblems f evocative motionwork: "Anyway, started o try nd makemyselfike him. mademyself ocus n the way he talked, ertain hingshe'd done n thepast.... When was withhim didlikehimbut wouldgo home nd write n my ournalhow much couldn't tandhim. keptchangingmy feeling nd actuallythought really ikedhim wlhile waswith imbut a couple fhours fter e was gone, revertedack to differentfeelings...."8 Another espondentxemplifieshe work,not of workingfeeling p, but of workingeeling own:

Last summer was goingwith guy often, nd I began o feelverystronglybouthim. knew hough,hathe had justbroken p with8The illustrations f emotion work come froma contentanalysis of 261 protocolsgiven to students n two classes at the University f California,Berkeley, n 1974.Many of the illustrations ome fromanswersto the question,"Describe as fully ,ndconcretely s possible a real situation, mportant to you, in which you experiencedeitherchanging real situationto fityour feelings r changingyour feelings o fitasituation.What did it mean to you?" Three coderscoded the protocols.The findingswill be reported n a later study. I will only mentionhere that 13% of themen but32% of the women were coded as "changingfeeling" nstead of changing ituation,and of those who changed feelings,far more women reporteddoing so agentiallyrather than passively.

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American ournal fSociologygirl year go because he hadgottenooseriousbouthim, o I wasafraid o show ny motion. also was fraidfbeing urt,o I attemptedto changemy feelings. talked myselfntonot caring bout Mike . . .but must dmit t didn'twork or ong. o sustainthisfeeling had toalmost nventbad things bouthimand concentrate n themor continueto tell myselfhe didn't care. It was a hardening f emotions,'d say. ttook- lot of work nd was unpleasant,ecause had to concentratenanythingcould indhatwas rritatingbouthim.

Often motionwork s aidedby setting p an emotion-workystem, orexample, elling riends f all the worst aults f theperson ne wanted ofall outof love with, nd thengoing o thosefriends orreinforcementfthisviewof theex-beloved. his suggests nother oint: emotion ork anbe done by the self upon the self,by the selfupon others, nd by othersupon oneself.In each case the ndividual s conscious f a moment f "pinch," r dis-crepancy, etweenwhat one does feeland what one wantsto feel whichis, n turn, ffectedy what ne thinks ne ought o feel n such situation).In response, he ndividualmay try o eliminate he pinchby workingnfeeling. oththe sense of discrepancynd the response o it can vary ntime. hemanagingct,for xample,an be a five-minutetopgapmeasure,or t can be a more ong-rangeradual ffortuggested y the erm workingthrough."Therearevarious echniquesfemotionwork.One is cognitive: theat-tempt o change mages, deas; or thoughtsn the service f changing hefeelings ssociatedwiththem.9 second s bodily: the attempt o changesomatic-rother hysical ymptomsfemotion e.g.,tryingo breathe low-er, trying ot to shake). Third,there s expressiveemotionwork: tryingto change xpressive esturesn the ervice f changingnner eeling e.g.,tryingo smile, r to cry). This differs rom impledisplay n that t isdirected oward hange n feeling. t differsrom odilyemotionwork nthat he ndividual ries o alter rshapeone or another f the lassicpublicchannels or he expression f feeling.Thesethree echniquesre distinct heoretically,ut they ften, fcourse,go togethernpractice. orexample:9 There may be various types of cognitiveemotionwork. All can be describedasattempts o recodify situation.By recodification mean reclassificationf a situationinto what are previously stablishedmentalcategoriesof situations.As in an initial,moreautomatic codification f a situation, eliberate ecodification eansasking onself(a) What category n my classificationchema of situationsfits this new situation?(the schemamay includeblame-in situations, lame-out ituations, redit-in ituations,credit-out ituations, tc.), and (b) What category n my classification chemaof emo-tions fits theemotion 'm feeling ightnow? (i.e., is it anger,generalanxiety,disap-pointment?). In deliberaterecodifications,ne tries to change the classification foutward and inward reality. (To translate this idea into Lazarus's framework,wemight speak of the individual trying onsciously to alter his or her appraisal of asituation o as to change the coping process Lazarus 1966].)562


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EmotionWorkI was a starhalfbackn high chool. efore ames didn't eel heup-surge fadrenalin-in word wasn't psyched p." (Thiswasdue toemotionalifficultieswasexperiencingnd still xperience-Iwas alsoan A student hose radesweredropping.) avingbeen n thepastafanatical,motional,ntenselayer, "hitter"ecognizedycoaches s averyhardworkernda playerwith desire,"hiswas very psetting.did everything could to get myself uip." would try to be outwardly"rah rah" or get myself cared of my opponents-anythingo get theadrenalinlowing.tried o looknervousnd ntenseefore ames,o atleast he oaches ouldn'tatch n.... When ctuallywasmostly ored,or nany vent, ot up."I recall efore negamewishingwas inthestandswatching y ousin layfor isschool, atherhan outhere."

Emotionwork ecomes n objectof awarenessmost ften, erhaps,whentheindividual's eelings o not fitthe situation,hat s, when the atterdoes not ccount or r egitimateeelingsnthe ituation. situationsuchas a funeral) ften arrieswith t a proper efinitionf itself "this is atime f facing oss"). This officialrame arrieswith ta senseofwhat t sfittingofeel sadness). It is when histripartiteonsistencymong itua-tion,conventionalrame, nd feeling s somehow uptured,s when thebereavedfeelsan irrepressibleesireto laugh delightedlyt thethoughtofan inheritance,hat ule ndmanagementome ntofocus. t is then hatthemorenormal low f deep convention-themorenormal usion f situa-tion, rame, nd feeling-seemsike an accomplishment.The smoothly arm irlinehostess, heever-cheerfulecretary,he un-irritated omplaint lerk,the undisgusted roctologist,he teacherwholikes every tudent qually, nd Goffman'snflappableokerplayermayall havetoengage ndeep acting,n acting hatgoeswell beyond hemereorderingf display.Work o makefeelingnd frame onsistent ith itua-tion s worknwhichndividualsontinuallynd privatelyngage.But theydo so inobeisance orulesnotcompletelyftheir wnmaking.FEELING RULESWe feel.We try o feel.We want to try o feel.The social guidelineshatdirecthow we wantto tryto feelmay be describables a set ofsociallyshared, lbeit oftenatent not thought boutunlessprobed t), rules. nwhatway,we mayask, are these ules hemselvesnown nd howare theydeveloped?1010 That we can single out such a thing as "feelingrules" is itself commentary nthe ironic posture of the self legitimated n modern culture. Modern urban culturesfoster much more distance (the stance of the observingego) from feeling than dotraditional cultures. Jerzy Michaelowicz, a graduate student at the University ofCalifornia, an Diego, observed that traditional nd tight-knit ubcultures ut peopledirectly nside the framework f feeling rules and remove ironic distance or senseof choice about them. He reported n some research n which one Hassidic rabbi wasasked, "Did you feel happy at the Passover ceremony?" "Of course " came the in-credulous reply.

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American ournal fSociologyTo beginwith, et us consider everalcommon orms f evidenceforfeeling ules. n common arlance,weoften alkaboutour feelingsr those

of others s if rights ndduties pplieddirectlyo them. or example,weoften peak of "having he right" o feelangry t someone. r we saywe"shouldfeelmoregrateful" o a benefactor.We chide ourselves hatafriend'smisfortune,relative's eath, shouldhavehit us harder," r thatanother's ood uck,orour own, houldhave nspiredmore oy. We knowfeeling ules, oo,from owothers eact o what heynfer rom uremotivedisplay.Anothermaysay to us, "You shouldn't eelso guilty; t wasn'tyourfault," r "You don't have a right o feel ealous,givenour agree-ment."Anothermay simply eclare n opinion s to the fit f feeling osituation, r may cast a claim upon our managerialtance,presupposingthis opinion.Othersmayquestion r call for an accountof a particularfeelingn a situation, hereas heydo not ask for n accounting f someother ituated eeling Lymanand Scott 1970). Claims nd callings or naccount an be seen as rule reminders. t other imes, personmay, naddition, hide, ease, ajole,scold, hun-in a word, anction s for mis-feeling." uch sanctions re a clue to the rulesthey re meant o enforce.Rights nd duties etout the proprietiess to theextent one can feel"too" angry r "notangry nough"),thedirectiononecan feel ad whenone shouldfeelhappy),and the duration f a feeling, iven he situationagainstwhich t is set.These rights nd duties f feelingre a clue to thedepth f social convention,o one final each f socialcontrol.There s a distinction,n theory t least,between feeling ule as it isknown yoursenseofwhatwe can expect o feel na given ituation,nda rule as it is known your senseof whatwe shouldfeel n that ituation.Forexample, ne mayrealisticallyxpect knowing neselfndone's neigh-bor's parties) to feel boredat a large New Year's Eve party nd at thesametime cknowledgehat twouldbemore ittingo feel xuberant. ow-ever, expect ofeel"and "should deallyfeel"often oincide,s below:

Marriage,haos, nreal, ompletelyifferentnmanyways han imag-ined.Unfortunatelye rehearsedhe morningf ourweddingt eighto'clock. hewedding astobeat eleven 'clock. t wasn'tike thought(everyone ould nowwhat odo). Theydidn't. hat mademe nervous.Mysister idn't elpmegetdressed rflatter e nordidanyonen thedressingoom ntil askedthem). was depressed. wanted o be sohappy n ourweddingay. never reamed ow nyone ould ry t theirwedding. weddings "thehappy ay" of one's ife. couldn't elievethat ome fmybestfriendsouldn'tmake t tomyweddingnd thatadded o a lotof ittle hings.o I starteduttothe hurchnd all thesethingshat alwayshoughtould othappent mywedding ent hroughmymind. broke own-I cried oing own. Be happy" toldmyself.Think f thefriends,nd relativeshat re present.But I finallyaid tomyself,Hey people ren't etting arried, ouare. t's forRich [myhusband] nd you.")Fromdown heprettyong isle we ooked t each

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EmotionWorkother'seyes. His love for me changedmywholebeing.From thatpointon we joinedarms. was relieved nd the tensionwas gone.In one senseitmeantmisery-but n the truesense of twopeoplein love and wantingto share life-it meantthe world to me. It was beautiful. t was inde-scribable.

In any given situation,we often nvestwhat we expect to feelwithidealization. o a remarkable xtent hese dealizations arysocially. fthe"old-fashionedride" bove anticipates "right" o feel ealousat anypossiblefuture nfidelity,he young flower hild" belowrejects ust thisright.. . .when I was livingdownsouth, was involvedwith groupofpeople,friends.We used to spend most evenings fterworkor school together.We used to do a lot ofdrugs, cid, coke or just smokedope and we hadthis philosophy hatwe were very communal nd did our best to shareeverything-clothes, oney, ood, nd so on. I was involvedwith hisoneman-and thought was "in love"withhim.He in turnhad toldme thatI was very mportant o him.Anyway, his one woman who was a verygood friend f mine at one time and thisman startedhavinga sexualrelationship,upposedlywithoutmy knowledge. knewthough nd had alot of mixedfeelingsbout t. I thought,ntellectually,hat had no claimto theman,and believed n factthat no one should ever tryto ownan-other erson. believed lso that t was none ofmybusiness nd I had noreasonto worry bouttheir elationshipogether, or t had nothing eallyto do withmyfriendship ith either f them. also believed n sharing.But I was horribly urt, lone and lonely,depressed nd I couldn't hakethedepression nd on top of those feelings feltguiltyforhaving hosepossessivelyealous feelings. nd so I would continue oing ut with hesepeople everynight, nd try o suppressmy feelings.My ego was shattered.I gotto thepointwhere couldn't ven laugh around them.So finallyconfronted yfriends nd left forthe summer nd traveledwitha newfriend. realized aterwhata heavy situation t was, and it took me alongtimeto get myself ogether nd feel whole again.

Whether theconvention alls for trying oyfully o possess, or trying asual-ly not to, the individual compares and measures experience against anexpectationoften dealized. It is left for motivation "what I want to feel")to mediate between feelingrule ("what I should feel") and emotion work("what I tryto feel"). Some of the time many of us can livewith a certaindissonance between "ought" and "want," or between "want" and "try to."But the attempts to reduce emotive dissonance are our periodic clues torules of feeling.A feeling rule shares some formal properties with other sorts of rules,such as rules of etiquette,rules of bodily comportment, nd those of socialinteraction n general (Goffman 1961). A feeling rule is like these otherkinds of rules in the followingways: It delineates a zone withinwhich onehas permission to be freeof worry,guilt, or shame with regardto the sit-uated feeling.Such zoningordinances describe a metaphoricfloor nd ceil-

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American ournal f Sociologying, here eing oom ormotion ndplaybetweenhe wo.Likeother ules,feeling ules can be obeyedhalfheartedlyr boldlybroken, he atter tvarying osts.A feeling ule can be in varying roportionsxternal r in-ternal. eelingrulesdifferuriously rom ther ypes frules n thattheydo notapplyto actionbut to what s often aken s a precursoroaction.Thereforehey end o be latent ndresistanto formalodification.Feelingrulesreflect atterns f socialmembership.omerulesmaybenearlyuniversal,uch as therulethatoneshouldnotenjoykilling r wit-nessing hekilling f a humanbeing, ncludingneself.1" therrulesareunique to particularocialgroups nd can be used to distinguishmongthem s alternate overnmentsrcolonizers f ndividualnternalvents.FRAMING RULES AND FEELING RULES: ISSUES IN IDEOLOGYRulesformanaging eelingre implicitnany deologicaltance; they rethe bottomide" of deology.deology asoften eenconstrueds a flatlycognitive ramework,acking ystematicmplications orhow we managefeelings,r, ndeed, orhow we feel.Yet,drawingnDurkheim1961),12Geertz 1964), and npartonGoffman1974), we can think f deologysan interpretiverameworkhatcan be describedn terms fframingulesandfeelingules.By "framingules" referotherules ccording owhichweascribe efinitionsrmeaningsosituations. orexample, n individualcandefine he ituationfgettingired s yet nothernstancefcapitalists'abuseofworkers r as yetanother esult fpersonal ailure. n eachcase,theframemayreflectmore eneral ule bout ssigninglame.By"feelingrules" refer o guidelines ortheassessment f fits nd misfitsetweenfeelingnd situation. or example, ccording o one feeling ule, ne canbe legitimatelyngry t theboss or company; ccording o another,necannot. ramingndfeelingules reback tobackandmutuallymply achother.11 But this, oo. seems to be culturally ariable.ErvingGoffman ointsout thathang-ings in the 16th centurywere a social event that the participantwas "supposed toenjoy," a rule that has sincedisappeared n civiliansociety.12 Durkheim, n The ElementaryForms of Religious Life, conveys just this under-standingof the relation of world view to feeling ules: "When the Christian,duringthe ceremonies ommemoratinghe Passion, and the Jew,on the anniversary f thefall of Jerusalem, ast and mortify hemselves,t is not in givingway to a sadnesswhich they feel spontaneously.Under these circumstances,he internalstate of thebeliever s out of all proportion o the severeabstinences o whichtheysubmitthem-selves. f he is sad, it is primarily ecausehe consents o being ad. And he consents oit in orderto affirm isfaith" (Durkheim1961, p. 224). Again,"An individual . . ifhe is stronglyttachedto thesocietyof whichhe is a member, eelsthat he is morallyheld to participating n its sorrows and joys; not to be interestedn themwould beequivalentto breakingthe bonds unitinghim to the group; it would be renouncingall desirefor t and contradicting imself" 1961, p. 446, emphasesmine).566


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EmotionWorkIt follows hatwhenan individual hanges n ideological tance,he orshedrops ld rules nd assumesnewones forreactingosituations,ogni-

tively nd emotively. senseof rights nd duties applied to feelingsnsituations s also changed.One uses emotion anctions ifferentlynd ac-ceptsdifferentanctioningromthers. or example, eelingules nAmeri-can societyhave differedormen and womenbecause of theassumptionthat theirnatures ifferasically.The feminist ovementringswith t anew set of rulesforframinghework nd familyifeof men ndwomen:the samebalance of prioritiesn work nd family ow deallyapplies tomen as to women.This carrieswith t implicationsorfeeling. womancannow s legitimatelyas a man) become ngryrather han imply psetordisappointed) ver abusesat work, inceherheart s supposed obe inthatwork nd she has the right o hope, s much s a manwould, or d-vancement. r, a manhas theright o feel ngryt the oss ofcustodyfhehas shownhimself he fitterarent. Old-fashioned"eelingsre now assubjectto new chidings nd cajolings s are "old-fashioned"erspectiveson the amearray f situations.Onecandefy n ideologicaltancenot imply y maintainingn alterna-tive frame n a situation utby maintainingn alternativeetof feelingrights nd obligations. ne candefy n ideologicaltanceby nappropriateaffectnd byrefusingo performhe motionmanagementecessaryo feelwhat,according o the official rame, t wouldseem fittingo feel.Deepacting r emotion ork, hen, an be a form fobeisance o a givendeologi-cal stance,axemotionmanagementclue to an ideologyapsedor rejected.As some deologies ain acceptance nd others windle, ontendingetsoffeeling ulesrise and fall.13Sets of feeling ulescontend or place inpeople'sminds s a governingtandardwithwhich o compare he actuallived experiencef, say, theseniorprom, heabortion, he wedding, hebirth,hefirstob, thefirstayoff,hedivorce.Whatwe call "thechangingclimate fopinion" artly nvolves changed ramingf the"same" sortsofevents. or example, achof twomothersmay feelguilty bout eavinghersmallchild t day care whileworking ll day. One mother, feminist,may feel hat he shouldnot feel s guilty s shedoes. The second, tradi-tionalist,may feelthat she shouldfeelmoreguilty han, n fact, he doesfeel.Part of whatwe refer o as the psychologicalffects f "rapid socialchange," r "unrest," s a change n the relation f feeling uleto feelinganda lack of clarity boutwhattherule ctually s, owing o conflictsnd13 Collins suggests hat deologyfunctions s a weapon in the conflict etween ontend-ing elites. Groups contendnot only for access to the means of economicproductionor the means of violence but also for access to the means of "emotionproduction"(1975, p. 59). Rituals are seen as useful tools for forging motional solidarity thatcan be used against others) and for settingup status hierarchies that can dominatethose who findthat the new ideals have denigrating ffectsn themselves).

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American ournal f Sociologycontradictionsetween ontendingets of rules.Feelings nd frames redeconventionalized,utnot yetreconventionalized.e may, ike themar-ginalman, ay,"I don'tknowhow shouldfeel."It remains o note hat deologies anfunction,s RandallCollins ightlynotes 1975), asweapons n the onflictetween ontendinglites nd socialstrata.Collins uggests hatelitestry o gain access to theemotive ifeofadherentsy gainingegitimateccessto ritual,which orhim s a form femotive echnology.eveloping is view,we can add that lites, nd ndeedsocial groupsn general, truggle o assert he egitimacyf their ramingrules and theirfeeling ules. Not simplythe evocationof emotion utlaws governingt can become, n varying egrees, hearena of politicalstruggle.FEELING RULES AND SOCIAL EXCHANGEThe seeminglytatic inks mongdeology, eeling ules, nd emotionman-agement omealive in the processof social exchange. tudents f socialinteraction ave meanttwo things y the term social exchange." omehave referredo the exchange fgoodsand services etween eople Blau1964; Simpson1972; Singelmann 972). Others G. H. Mead) have re-ferredo an exchange fgestures, ithout hecost-benefitccountinge-ferredointhefirst sage.Yet acts of display, oo,maybe consideredex-changed" n the imited ense thatthe individual eryoften eelsthatagestures owedto oneself r another. refer, hen, oexchange f actsofdisplaybased on a prior, haredunderstandingfpatternedntitlement.Any gesture-a cool greeting,n appreciativeaugh,theapologyforanoutburst-ismeasured gainst prior ense ofwhatis reasonably wedanother, iventhesortof bond involved.Against hisbackgroundmea-sure, omegestures ill eemmore han mple, thers ess.The exchange fgestures as, n turn, wo aspects; t is an exchange fdisplay cts (Goffman969, 1967)-that is, of surface cting-and also anexchange f emotionwork-that is, of deep acting. n either ase, rules(displayrulesorfeeling ules),onceagreedupon, stablish heworth f agesturendarethus sed nsocial exchanges a mediumf exchange. eel-ing rules stablish he basis of worth o be ascribed o a range f gestures,including motionwork.Emotionwork s a gesturen a social exchange;it has a functionhere nd is not to be understoodmerely s a facetofpersonality.There eem o be twoways n which eelingules ome ntoplay nsocialexchange. n the first,he individual akes the "owed" feeling o heart,takes t seriously. or example, youngwoman n the eveofhercollegegraduation elt nxious nddepressed utthoughthat he"ought o feelhappy,"and thatshe "owed thishappiness" o herparentsformaking568


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EmotionWorkhergraduation ossible.The parentsfeltentitled o a seriesof gesturesindicating erpleasure.The younggraduate ould "pay" her parents nemotive isplay, surface ctingdissociated rom er "real" definitionfthesituation.Goingone step further,he could pay themwitha gestureof deep acting-of tryingo feel.The mostgenerous esture f all is theact of successful elf-persuasion,f genuinefeeling nd frame hange,deep acting hat ells,thatworks, hat n the end s notphony since t iswhat heemotions) thought is none he ess not "natural" ift.The secondwayfeeling ules ome ntoplayinexchange s shownwhenthe ndividual oes not take theaffectiveonventioneriously;he or sheplays with t. For example, n airport bservation: hereare two airlineticket gents, neexperienced,ne newon the ob. The newagent s facedwith hetaskof rewritingcomplex icket involvinghange fdate, owerfare, nd credit fthe differenceetween he previous ndpresent aretobemade toward n airtravel ard, tc.). The newticket gent ooksfor he"old hand,"who sgone,while hecustomersn ine hift osturesndstareintentlyt the newagent.The "old hand" finally eappears fter 0 min-utes,and thefollowingonversationakesplace: "I was looking oryou.You're supposedto be my nstructor." ld hand: "Gee," withan ironicsmile, I am really orry. feel o bad I wasn'there to helpout" (theyboth augh). The inappropriate eelinglack ofguilt, r sympathy) anbe playedupon na way that ays, Don't takemynonpaymentnemotionwork, r display workpersonally. don't want to workhere.You canunderstandhat."The laughter t an ironic istance romhe ffectiveon-ventionuggests lso an intimacy;we donotneedthese onventionsoholdus together. hatwe share s thedefiance f them.COMMODITIZATION OF FEELINGIn thebeginning e asked howfeeling ulesmight ary n salience crosssocial classes.One possible pproach othis uestions via theconnectionsamong ocial exchange, ommoditizationf feeling, nd the premium,nmanymiddle-classobs,onthecapacity o managemeanings.Conventionalizedeelingmaycome to assumethepropertiesf a com-modity.When deepgestures fexchange nter he market ector nd arebought nd sold as an aspectof laborpower,feelings re commoditized.Whenthemanager ivesthecompany is enthusiasticaith,when heair-linestewardess ivesher passengers erpsyched-up utquasi-genuine e-assuring armth, hat s soldas an aspectof aborpowersdeep acting.Butcommoditizationf feelingmaynothaveequal salience or ll socialclasses. t mayhavemore alience or hemiddle lass thanfor heworkingclass. The wayeach class socializes ts childrenmay,furthermore,reparethem orfuture emands or he killofemotionmanagement.

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American ournal f SociologyWhen speakof socialclass, t s notstrictlypeaking o ncome, duca-tion, roccupationaltatus hat refer, uttosomethingoughlyorrelated

to these-the on-the-jobaskofcreating nd sustainingppropriatemean-ings.The bankmanager, he BM executive, or xample,maybe required,in part,to sustain definitionfself, ffice,nd organizations "up andcoming," r "on thego," "caring," r "reliable,"meaningsmost ffectivelysustained hrough cts upon feeling. eelingrules are ofutmost aliencein jobs such as these; rule reminders nd sanctions re more n play.It is not, s ErichFromm uggests,hat hemodernmiddle-class an"sellshis personality,"ut that,moreprecisely,many obs call for n apprecia-tionof displayrules, eeling ules, nd a capacityfordeep acting.Working-classobs moreoftencall for the individual's xternalbe-havior nd theproducts f t-a car part assembled, truck elivered 00miles way, road repaired. he creation nd sustaining f meanings oeson, but t is not such an importantspectof work.Physical abor s morecommoditized, eaning-makingnd feeling, ess. Surely, oo, there reworking-r ower-classobs thatdo requirehe apacity osustainmeaningsandto do so,whennecessary, y emotion ork;the obs ofprostituteEl-merPascua, work n progress) ndpersonal ervant equire eelingmanage-ment.Butto theextent hatmeaning-makingork ends o be middle-classwork, eeling ules re more alientnthemiddle lass.There re obs, ike that fsecretaryrairline tewardess, ith elativelylow financial ewards nd little uthority, hichnonethelessequire highdegree f emotion nd displaymanagement.uch obs are often illed ywomen,many fwhom omefromhemiddle lass. Such workersre espe-cially mportants a sourceof insight bout emotionmanagement. eingless rewarded ortheirwork hantheir uperiors, hey re more ikely ofeeldetched rom,nd be perceptivebout,therulesgoverning eep act-

ing. Deep acting s less likelyto be experienceds partof the selfandmore ikely o be experienceds part of the ob. Just s we can learnmoreabout "appropriate ituation-feelingits"by studyingmisfits,o too wecanprobably nderstandommoditizedeeling etter romhoseforwhomit is a salient orm f alienationsee Kanter's 1977] excellent hapters nsecretaries).CLASS, CHILD REARING, AND EMOTION WORKMiddle- ndworking-classarents end ocontrol heir hildrenndifferentways (Kohn 1963, 1969; Bernstein 971). Given thegeneralpattern fclass inheritance,ach class tends to prepare ts childrenwiththe skillsnecessary o "its" typeof workenvironmentnd to pass on class-appro-priateways.Middle-class arents endto control ia appealsto feeling,nd thecon-570


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EmotionWorktrol s moreof feeling.14he working-classarent, y contrast,ends tocontrol ia appealstobehavior,ndthecontrols more fbehaviornd itsconsequencesKohn 1963; Bernstein971). That s,themiddle-classhildis more ikely obe punished or feeling hewrongway,orseeing hingsin thewrongight," rhaving he"wrongntention," hereas heworking-class child s more ikely o be punished orwrong ehavior nd its con-sequences. he classdifferencen socializationmounts odifferentegreesoftraining or hecommoditizationffeeling. his is yetanotherway theclassstructureeproducestself.ThankstoCaroline ersell or hispoint.)It maywellbe that, specially mong hemiddle lass, a correspondingvalue is nowplaced on "authenticity,"n things s they truly re" or"oncewere."Authenticity,hich ionelTrilling asdescribed s the"newmoralvirtue,"when t refers o unworked-overeeling,may be renderedscarcefor hose n themeaning-makingector. or this ector, hepatternmaybe that of conventionalizingeeling, uttingt on themarket, ndlooking or authenticity"see Trilling 972).15SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONWhy,we asked at thebeginning,o we feel n waysappropriate o thesituation s muchofthetime s we do? One suggestednswer s: becauseweactively ry omanagewhatwe feel n accordancewith atent ules. norder o elaborate his uggestion e considered irst heresponsivenessfemotion oacts ofmanagements it is treatedn theorganismicnd inter-active ccount femotion. ccordingothe nteractiveccount,we arenot14 As Kohn comments, . . . middleclass mothers re farmorelikelyto punishtheirson physicallyfor what they call loss of temperthan for behavior defined s wildplay. They appear to findthechild's oss of temper, ut nothiswild play,particularlyintolerable" 1963, p. 308). Again, ". . . The interview eports ndicate that the dis-tinctionbetweenwild play and loss of temperwas most oftenmade in termsof thechild's presumed ntent, s judged by his preceding ctions . . if his actionsseemedto stemfrom hefrustrationf not havinghis own way, theywere udged to indicateloss of temper" Kohn 1963).15Accordingto Trilling,the place of "sincerity," s a moral virtue,has been taken(Trilling'sverb s "usurped") by "authenticity."incerity efers o the relationbetweeninnerfeeling nd outwarddisplay.Trillingoffersmanydefinitionsf authenticity,utone seemsto refer o the relationbetweenthe selfas emotionmanagerand theinnerfeelings o managed. He citesWordsworth's oem"Michael" about a veryold shepherd:"WhenMichael,afterhaving osthis son Luke to thecorruption f thecity,continuesto build the sheepfoldwhich he and the boy had ceremonially egun together,hisneighbors eportof him thatsometimeshe sat the whole day, 'and never liftedup asingle stone"' (1972, p. 93). There is no act of selfupon feeling;he is not psychinghimself up" or "down," he is not "lettinghimself" eelgrief, r deliberately gettinginto" his grief. t is on this ccountcalled "authentic," nd deemednowadaysvaluable.Whatnow ironicallyunderminesuthenticity,s a virtue, s the culturalbelief n themutabilityof inner feeling nd the individual'scapacity,with therapeuticguidanceor otherwise, ia "emotionwork" or otherwise, o changefundamentally hat is notimplacablyascribedafter ll.

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American ournal f Sociologyalwayspassive vis-a-visn uncontrollablelood ffeeling,nd those cca-sionaleffortso actively hape ourfeeling an sometimes e effective.ak-ing this ccount beganto articulateheemotion-managementerspectivefirst y distinguishingt from hedramaturgical erspective n the onehand and the psychoanalyticerspective n the other. then suggestedsome links amongemotive xperience, eep acting, nd feeling ules. nturn, eeling uleswere een as thebottom ide of ideology nd thereforesubject othe amepressures or hange s are deologies.Conventionsf feeling i.e., whatone is supposed o feel) are used insocial exchangebetween ndividuals.ndividuals peratetheir xchangesaccording o a priorsenseof what is owed and owing. ndividuals eethemselvess being wed and as owing estures f emotion ork, nd theyexchange uch gestures. eople bond, n the emotive ense, ither y ful-filling he emotive equirementsituations all forth e.g., the graduatetrying o feel happy) or by holdingust these requirementso one side(the ironic icket gent cknowledginghe sincere eelingdue" theotherevenwhileplayingwith hatnotion fdebt).Just s gestures f emotionwork an be exchangedn private, o theycan be exchangedn themarketplace,s an aspectof whatis sold andbought s labor power. n such a casewe can speak of the "commoditiza-tion" ofemotionwork.This prevailsmoreforworkers hose ob it is tomake and sustainmeanings e.g., "this is an up-and-comingompany";"this s a pleasant, afeairplane")-jobs foundmore n themiddle lass.Commoditizations less salientforthose n physical abor or nonsocialmental abor,more ommonn theworking lass. A reexaminationf classdifferencesnchildrearing uggestshatmiddle-classamilies repare heirchildren or motionmanagement ore,working-classamiliesess.Each,in this way, prepares ts children o psychologicallyeproduce he classstructure.The emotion-managementerspective an be appliedto anynumber fareas. We know ittle bouthowfeeling ulesvary n content rom neoccupation o another. he funeral arlordirector,hedoctor, hecom-plaints clerk,the day-careworker ll apply a senseof "should"to thesituatedfeelings hat emerge n the courseof a week. How do these"shoulds"differ? rosscuttingccupationalnd classdifferences,hey relikely o exhibit ultural ifferencesssociatedwithgender nd ethnicity.Indeed, goodplace to study hangenfeeling uleswouldbe the trata fpersons orwhom heright f mento cry, r feelfearful,s extendedvera greater angeof situations, nd forwhom heright fwomen o openanger s extended ver a larger, anction-free,one. How has thisset offeeling ules, s theundersideffeministdeology,ltered heunderstandingbetweenmen and womenas to what feelings re latently owed" and"owing"?We need to ask how differentexes,classes, and ethnic nd572


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EmotionWorkreligious roupsdiffern thesense of what one "ought to" or "has theright o" feel n a situation.How differents theburden f hiddenworktrying o obey latent aws? Finally, n whose nterest re thesefeelingrules?Somemanaging ffeeling romotes hesocial good.Some doesnot.Surely heflightttendant'sense that he"shouldfeel heery" oesmoretopromote rofit orUnited hanto enhanceher own nnerwell-being.REFERENCESArnold,Magda B. 1968. The Nature ofEmotion.Baltimore:Penguin.Averill,JamesR. 1976. "Emotion and Anxiety:Sociocultural,Biological,and Psycho-

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HOCHSCHILD_Work, Feeling Rules, And Social Structure