History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 6 Issue 2 1989 [Doi 10.2307%2F27743889] Daniel E. Flage -- The Essences of Spinoza's God

North American Philosophical Publications

The Essences of Spinoza's GodAuthor(s): Daniel E. FlageSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 147-160Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27743889 .

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History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 6, Number 2, April 1989

THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD

Daniel E. Flage

Next, the third definition is not sufficiently clear to us. I reported what you, Sir, said to me at the Hague, that a Thing can be considered in two ways, either as it is in itself, or as it is in relation to something else. . . . But we do

not see clearly what this distinction would be ... .

?Letter to Spinoza from Simon de Vries, 24 February 1663

SPINOZA

describes the essence of substance (1) as consisting of attri

butes,1 (2) as expressed by attributes (E ld6, lplOs) and (3) as identical with power (E lp34). Even though one might consistently maintain either (1) and (2) or (2) and (3), (1) and (3) appear to be inconsistent, because

Spinoza does not take power to be an attribute of substance.2 Further, the contention that God or God's essence is composed of a multiplicity of attributes (E lp9 and lpll) is inconsistent with Spinoza's apparent commitment to the simplicity of God (KV 1,2, p. 70). Are these genuine inconsistencies, or do they mark an implicit distinction between two senses of "essence" in Spinoza's philosophy?

In this paper I argue that there are two senses of "essence" operative in

Spinoza's Ethics, and that these alternative notions reflect different rela tions between a substance and its attribute(s).3 First, I show that in the

opening propositions of the Ethics Spinoza writes as if attributes are con stituents of substance and as if substances can be distinguished into kinds on the basis of their attributes. Next, I show that in Propositions 9 and 10 there is a shift from discussions of attributes as constituents of substance to discussions of attributes as expressions of substance, a shift that reflects a dismissal of any metaphysically significant notion of the constitutive essence of substance. Finally, I show that following Proposition 10 Spinoza was concerned with the nature of substance per se, and it is the essence of substance per se that is expressed by the attributes. That discussion also will make clear the sense in which the essence of Spinoza's God is simple. If my argument is sound, it explains why attempts to discover a single relation between substance and attributes in Spinoza's philosophy have

proven unsuccessful.4

In developing my case, I employ the following interpretative schema. I distinguish between two ways of conceiving of substance that correspond

147



148 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

to the two kinds of real definitions between which Arnauld distinguishes in the Port-Royal Logic.5 First, corresponding to a definition per genus et differentiam is a conception of substance in terms of its essential form or principal attribute, that is, a conception in which a thing in subsumed under the genus substance and differentiated into a kind on the basis of its form or attribute. Descartes's clear and distinct ideas of substance are

examples of such a genus-species conception of substance. Second, corre

sponding to what Arnauld called a "description," that is, a definition that

"gives some information about the nature of a thing by expressing the

proper accidents of any referent of the defined word,"6 is what I shall call a mediate or relative conception of substance. Such a conception will

single out a subject or substratum per se, although it does not provide one with knowledge of the nature of the substratum singled out. Such a

conception of substance seems to be found in Descartes,7 it is clearly found in the works of John Locke and Thomas Reid,8 and there are several

passages that suggest that Spinoza also allowed relative conceptions of substance (compare Letters 9 and 10). As we shall see, this distinction between two ways of conceiving of substance will help us understand how

Spinoza consistently can suggest that the attributes constitute the essence of substance, while the essence of God or substances itself is power.

Given this interpretive schema, let us now turn to Spinoza's Ethics.

I. The Constitutive Essence of a Kind of Substance

In the opening propositions of the Ethics, Spinoza begins to weave an elaborate tapestry. As he slowly reveals it, he at first seems to be pre senting a traditional theory of substance, a theory allowing that there is an indefinitely large number of finite substances of various kinds. As more strands are woven into the tapestry, of course, one discovers that the picture differs significantly from what one had expected: there is no

more than one substance of a given kind (E lp5); all substances are infinite (E lp8); and there is but one substance (E lpl4). In this section I examine some of the strands Spinoza initially weaves into his tapestry. I show that in the opening propositions of the Ethics Spinoza was con cerned with what I call the "constitutive essence" of substance. This is what Aristotle called the substantial form9 and what Descartes called the principal attribute of a substance.10 As it functions in traditional

metaphysical theories, the constitutive essence of a substance is that in virtue of which a substance is a substance of a particular kind, that is, the ontological ground for distinguishing substances into kinds. As it functions in an epistemological context, the constitutive essence is that which one knows regarding a substance of a kind. We shall see that

Spinoza initially writes as if the constitutive essence of a substance is

metaphysically significant, but, as we shall see in the next section, he concluded that the constitutive essence is merely of epistemic significance.

There can be no question that the constitutive essence of a substance



THE ESSENCES OF SPINOZA'S GOD 149

plays a significant role in Spinoza's philosophy, for the notion of attributes as constituents of substance comes to the fore in the definitions he offers in Part I of the Ethics. The term "attribute" is defined as "what the intellect perceives of substance, as [tanquam] constituting its essence" (E ld4), and the term "God" is defined, in part, as "a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes" (E ld6, emphasis added). To determine whether the constitutive essence plays a metaphysical role in Spinoza's philosophy, as it does in the philosophies of Aristotle and Descartes, or

merely an epistemological role, let us turn to the opening propositions of the Ethics.

In Proposition 2 Spinoza writes, "Two substances having different attri butes have nothing in common with one another" (E lp2). Although he claims this evident from the definition of "substance" (E lp2d), that is, the claim that substance is "what is in itself and is conceived through itself (E ld3), it is intelligible only in conjunction with the definition of

"attribute," for it is on the basis of its attributes that a substance is conceivable (E ld4). If there were two substances having different attri

butes, then they would have nothing in common, for insofar as the attri butes would be distinct, all the modes that fall under them also would be distinct: no modes of these two (putative) substances would be of the same kind. Given the notion of a constitutive essence, Spinoza can ask whether and how distinctions can be drawn among substances.

In Proposition 4, Spinoza addresses this issue. He wrote, "Two or more distinct things are distinguishable from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections" (E lp4). Leaving open the possibility that there are numerically distinct

substances, the proposition merely asserts that if there are two or more

substances, then they are distinguished from one another on the basis of their attributes or affections (modes). The proposition suggests that

Spinoza allowed a plurality of substances and distinguished among them on the basis of their constitutive essences: insofar as one knows which attribute constitutes the essence of a substance of a particular kind, one has grounds for drawing numerical distinctions among substances. This

suggests that Spinoza was using the notion of the constitutive essence of a substance for metaphysical purposes.

While in the proposition Spinoza merely suggests a commitment to the

metaphysical notion of constitutive essence, in the demonstration he iden tifies the attributes with the essence of substance. In his words, "There

fore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of

things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by D4), their attributes, and their affections" (E lp4d). In

claiming that a substance is "the same" thing as its attributes and affec

tions, Spinoza is concerned with the metaphysical notion of the constitu tive essence of substance: the attributes of substance are identical with the essence of substance, indeed, he suggests, with the substance itself. This also is suggested by Spinoza's definition of substance (E ld3), for it




seems that it is only if an attribute is an (improper) part of substance that substance can be conceived through itself.11 If this is correct, then, for purposes of classification, one can know what a substance is?one can

provide an explication of the nature of substance (compare E lp20d)?on the basis of its attributes. This does not imply, however, that one is

conceiving of a substance as it is in itself, that is, that one is conceiving of a substance as subject or substratum, as "that which is neither predic able of a subject nor present in a subject."12

Spinoza's concern with the constitutive essence of substance continues in the demonstration of Proposition 5, indeed, the intelligibility of the demonstration depends upon the stronger thesis that every substance has a principal attribute. In defending the proposition that "In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute" (E lp5), Spinoza wrote:

If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to be distin

guished from one another either by a difference in their attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by P4). If only by a difference of attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute. But

if by a difference in their affections, then since a substance is prior in nature

to its affections (by PI), if the affections are put to one side and [the sub stance] is considered in itself, i.e. (by D3 and A6), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, i.e. (by P4), there

cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature or attribute], q.e.d. (E

lp5d)13

Assuming that every substance has one attribute that constitutes its

essence, Spinoza's proof is intelligible. If one accepts a version of the

principle of the identity of indiscernibles, then to deem two substances

different, there must be a discernible difference between them. A differ ence in the principal attributes of substance would be a sufficient ground for drawing this distinction. But if one assumes that one distinguishes among substances solely on the basis of their principal attributes, then if one assumes that there were two substances each having A as its

principal attribute, then there would be no basis for drawing a numerical distinction between those (putatively distinct) substances: the principle of the identity of indiscernibles would commit one to claiming that there is but one substance having A as its principal attribute, not two sub stances. Notice, however, that apart from the notion of a principal attri

bute, the same conclusion cannot be drawn. If one allowed that the essence

of a substance might be composed of several attributes, then there could be two substances having attribute A so long as there is at least one

other attribute that is not common to them, for example, one substance

might have the constitutive essence AB while the other has the constitu tive essence AC.U

Up to this point we have seen that Spinoza uses the notion of the constitutive essence of substance when raising questions regarding the

distinguishability of substances. We also have noted that Spinoza appeals




to the constitutive essence of substance in offering an explication of the essence (or existence) of substance (E lp20d). Prior to Proposition 10, the

only place Spinoza claims that the attributes express the essence of sub stance is in the definition of "God" (E ld6 and E ld6e), and one might well claim that attributes are self-expressive.15 In turning to Propositions 9 and 10, however, there is a shift from considerations of the grounds for

distinguishing among substances to a consideration of the nature or

analysis of substance per se and a consequent shift from a consideration of attributes as constituting the essence of substance to a consideration of attributes as expressing the essence of substance. So let us turn to these propositions.

II. Propositions 9 and 10: The Shift

Proposition 9 reads, "The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to if (E lp9), and the proof consists of nothing more than the claim that "This is evident from D4" (E lp9d), that is, it is evident from the claim that an attribute is "what the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence" (E ld4). The definition of sub stance is neutral with respect to the number of attributes a substance

possesses. To the traditional substance theorist, both the proposition and the proof are puzzling, since the traditional substance theorist assumes that each substance has exactly one form or attribute that constitutes its essence.16 Further, as we noted above, Spinoza seems to accept the same view in his proof of Proposition 5. Thus, one asks whether Spinoza's earlier arguments provide grounds that support Proposition 9. I believe

they do, but to see this we must briefly digress and consider the Cartesian notion of "degrees of reality."

To the twentieth century reader, the notion of degrees of reality is

puzzling. As Curley notes, Descartes's notion of degrees of reality cannot be equated with degrees of existence,17 and Descartes's occasional sugges tion that the notions of reality and perfection are synonymous is of little

help. Nonetheless, there is a theme Descartes occasionally sounds which is somewhat more helpful, namely, that degrees of reality are to be identified with degrees of independence. Thus, in the "Arguments for the Existence of God and the Distinction between the Soul and the Body Arranged in Geometrical Fashion" Descartes suggests there are but three degrees of

reality, namely, the reality of a mode, the reality of a finite substance, and the reality of an infinite substance.18 If Spinoza also understood degrees of

reality as degrees of independence, Proposition 9 follows from the proofs Spinoza already had advanced. Remember that in Proposition 5, Spinoza had argued that there is but one substance of a particular kind. Hence, if there are both extended substances and thinking substances, there can be no more than one substance of each kind. At that point, one assumes that

Spinoza is concerned with finite substances. But in Proposition 8 he argues that "Every substance is necessarily infinite" (E lp8), that is, while there still might be a multiplicity of substances, each substance is infinite in its




kind.19 Consider what this implies. Assuming that there is a multiplicity of substances, that there are but three degrees of reality, and that each substance has but one constitutive attribute, the claim that every sub stance is necessarily infinite implies that each substance possesses the same degree of reality possessed by every other, namely, the highest degree of reality. Hence, if there were both an extended substance and a

thinking substance, each would be an independent infinite being, and each would exist in a particular way (as defined by its attribute). But if all sub stances are infinite and one can still concern oneself with degrees of reality, that is, independence, the only ground for deeming one substance more real than another is on the basis of a multiplicity of ways in which it is

independent, that is, on the basis of a multiplicity of attributes. Thus, a substance composed of two attributes would be "more real" than a sub stance composed of but one attribute. It is this kind of consideration that seems to be behind Spinoza's conclusion in Proposition 9 that "The more

reality or being each thing has" that is, the more respects in which it is

independent, "the more attributes belong to it."

But notice what this entails. One way to conceive of substance is on the basis of the genus-species model of definition: substance is taken to be a genus and attributes to be differentia among kinds of substances. In contending that a substance can have more than one attribute, Spinoza implicitly rejects the genus-species conception of substance, for if a sub stance can have more than one form or attribute, then no attribute is

guaranteed to constitute the specific difference among substances.

Speaking of this in terms of its definitional correlates, Spinoza rejects a

genus and species real definition of substance in favor of a "description" consisting of an enumeration of the attributes of a substance (compare El, 39).20 If one knew all the attributes of substance, one's knowledge would be adequate (KV II, 22, p. 139).21 But even if one's knowledge of substance is not adequate?that is, even if one does not know all the attributes constituting substance (compare KV II, 22, p. 139; compare Letter 64)?Spinoza's contention that there is but one substance allows him to single out that being on the basis of any attribute (compare E

2p7s). Such a conception of substance is mediate or relative: it allows one to single out the substance itself, but it provides one with no knowledge of the nature of substance per se.22

Thus far, Spinoza has been concerned exclusively with the constitutive essence of substance. In the scholium to Proposition 10, however, there is a shift away from the claim that attributes constitute the essence of substance to the claim that attributes express the essence of substance, and the language of expression is used throughout the remainder of the first book of the Ethics. As we shall see, this shift in usage corresponds to a shift away from a concern with a kind of substance to a mediate or relative conception of substance per se. So let us turn to the scholium to

Proposition 10 and examine it with some care.

Spinoza wrote:




From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid

of the other), still we cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of substance that each

of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the reality, or being of substance.

So it is far from absurd to ascribe many attributes to one substance.

Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it has, the more it has

attributes which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity. And con

sequently there is also nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite

must be defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

But if someone asks by what sign we shall be able to distinguish the diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show

that in Nature there exists only one substance, and that is absolutely infi

nite. So that sign would be sought in vain. (E lplOs.)

We shall consider each paragraph of the scholium in its turn.

The first paragraph is little more than an explication of the implications of Propositions 9 and 10. In Proposition 10 Spinoza claimed that "Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself (E IplO), and from this it follows that two attributes of a single substance are conceived as really distinct: the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. In Descartes's scheme, this would be sufficient to claim that there are two distinct substances,23 but in (provisionally) retaining the notion of degrees of reality with respect to substances while maintaining that all substances are infinite, Spinoza rejects that notion of a principal attribute, and, in so doing, he rejects the Cartesian grounds for drawing distinctions among substances. With this, the metaphysical notion of a constitutive essence is abandoned. Here Spinoza does not claim that the attributes constitute the essence of substance, rather he claims that each attribute expresses the "reality, or being of substance." Since "It pertains to the nature of substance to exist" (E lp7), an attribute expresses one

way in which a substance exists, and given the attribute, one can infer that a substance of the relevant kind exists.

In the second paragraph of the scholium Spinoza continues to concern himself with attributes as expressions of the "reality, or being of sub stance." In claiming that "each being must be conceived under some attribute" (E lplOs), Spinoza seems to be shifting away from a concern with conceiving of the constitutive essence of a substance, that is, con

ceiving of the nature of a thing of a kind, to conceiving of the substance

per se: one conceives of the substance as the thing that expresses a certain attribute (compare E 2p7s). One's conception of substance is mediate or relative: one singles out a substance per se as opposed to the essence of a substance of a kind.24 While one might remain concerned with the constitutive essence of a substance, Spinoza indicates in the third para




graph of the scholium that that notion now becomes a purely epistemic notion that can fulfill no metaphysical purposes. While the adequacy of one's idea of substance might increase as one knows more attributes, the attributes are neither identical with substance per se nor do they ground distinctions among kinds of substances. On the other hand, insofar as one is concerned with the attributes as expressions of the essence of

substance, it is the essence of substance per se that is singled out. This raises the question of the analysis of substance per se.

III. The Analysis of the Essence of Substance Per Se

Up to this point we have been concerned with the constitutive essence of substance, that is, the grounds for drawing distinctions among sub stances. The road from Proposition 4 to the scholium of Proposition 10 is a road leading from the hypothesis that there are many substances to the thesis that there is but one substance, and, consequently, a road

leading away from the possibility of drawing numerical distinctions among substances. Hence, the metaphysical notion of the constitutive essence of substance is replaced by a purely epistemological notion of the constitutive essence of substance: insofar as substance is conceived as

composed of attributes, this merely provides one with an explication of the nature of substance.25 Beginning with the scholium to Proposition 10, however, Spinoza focuses on the contention that the attributes of substance express the essence of substance. As we shall see, his concern with the expressed essence of substance is a concern with the essence of substance per se, and Spinoza analyzes the notion of substance per se in terms of power, that is, the ability to exist (compare E lplld3).

Following Proposition 10, there are nine propositions, demonstrations, corollaries, or scholia in the first part of the Ethics that allude to the relation between substance and its attributes (E lpll, lpl6d, lpl9d, lp20d, lp25c, lp29s, lp31d, lp32d, and lp36d).26 In all but two of these (E lpll, and lp20d), Spinoza uses exclusively the language of expression either to indicate the relation between an attribute and the essence of substance or to suggest that the attributes are self-expressive. In this section I begin by examining the two passages in which Spinoza suggests that the attributes constitute (are components of) the essence of substance, showing that the notion of the constitutive essence is a purely epistemic notion. Second, I examine those passages in which Spinoza suggests attri butes are self-expressive, arguing that these provide a link between the notions of the constitutive and expressed essence of substance. Finally, I examine the passages in which Spinoza claims that the attributes express the essence of substance and show that the essence expressed is

power, that is, the ability to exist (E lplld3).

Beginning with his definition of "God" (E ld6), Spinoza occasionally juxtaposes the claim that attributes are constituents of God or God's essence and the claim that attributes as expressions of God's essence. In




Proposition 11 Spinoza quotes his definition of "God," writing, "God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists" (E lpll). Spinoza's claim that God consists of infinite attributes is surprising, since in his definition of "attri bute" he claimed that an attribute is "what the intellect perceives of sub

stance, as constituting its essence" (E ld4, emphasis added). Hence, one would expect Spinoza to claim that the attributes constitute the essence of God. Does Spinoza draw a distinction between substance itself and its essence? There is some evidence that he does not, for, as we saw above, he identifies substance with its attributes and affections in the demonstra tion of Proposition 4. But if one identifies Spinoza's substance itself with its essence, two puzzles arise. First, since God or substance consists of a

multiplicity of attributes, then either the essence of God is complex or God consists of a multiplicity of essences. The essential complexity of God is inconsistent with the position defended in the Short Treatise (KV I, 2, p. 70), while the suggestion that God has a multiplicity of essences seems to be inconsistent with the notion of an essence. Second, if one

grants that God is essentially complex,27 then the attributes reasonably can be deemed parts of a substance. But if attributes are proper parts of a substance, then they are ontologically prior to the whole (compare CM

II, 5, p. 324), which is contrary to Proposition 1 of the Ethics. Hence, if

Spinoza identifies substance itself with its constitutive essence, he seems to be championing an inconsistent position.

On the other hand, if the interpretation for which I have been arguing is correct and the constitutive essence of substance is merely of epistemic sig nificance, we might avoid these inconsistencies. Under this interpretation, the attributes constitute the substance as it is known, but they are expres sions of the essence of substance per se (compare E ld4). In this case, the essence of substance per se might be simple, but insofar as the essence of substance per se is multiply expressed, substance is known in a multiplicity of ways and conceived as if it were complex.28 This resolves the appar ent inconsistencies we noted above. But if the constitutive essence of

Spinoza's substance (God) is only of epistemic significance, one should find evidence that this is so. Such evidence if found in the demonstration of Proposition 20.

Defending the claim that "God's existence and his essence are one and the same" (E lp20), Spinoza argued:

God (by P19) and all his attributes are eternal, i.e., (by D8), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore, the same attributes of God which

(by D4) explain God's eternal essence at the same time explain his eternal

existence, i.e., that itself which constitutes God's essence at the same time

constitutes his existence. So his existence and his essence are one and the

same, q.e.d. (E lp20d.)

Spinoza here uses both the language of expression and of constitution.

Notice, however, that he is using the epistemological notion of explana tion. The attributes, as constituents of the essence of God explain what




God is, that is, they allow one to know what God is. They also explain, or allow one to know, the ways in which God exists. These same attributes

express the essence and existence of God. If one takes existence to be a

property,29 then existence?a single property?is expressed by each of the attributes of God. Further, since Spinoza deemed God an absolutely infi nite being, not merely a being that is infinite in its own kind (E ld6e), each of the attributes must express this absolute infinity of both essence and existence (compare E lpl9 and E lpl9d). Again, this suggests that the essence of God that is expressed by the attributes is conceptually distinct from those attributes.

But the evidence based on the demonstration of Proposition 20 might be deemed inconclusive, and it is unquestionable that Spinoza often writes as if the attributes are strictly self-expressive. In the demonstration of

Proposition 16, he writes that "the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind" (E lpl6d). In the corollary to Proposition 25, he wrote, "Par ticular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way" (E lp25c). And in the demonstrations of Propositions 31 and 32, Spinoza explicitly claims that modes of thought are expressions of the attribute of thought. Do these attributes also express an essence of God that is

something distinct from the attribute itself? I believe they do, and to see

why this is plausible we should look briefly at Spinoza's discussion of Natura naturans.

In the scholium to Proposition 29, Spinoza formally introduces the distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata. Of the former he wrote:

From the preceding I think it is already established that by Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through it self, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, i.e.

(by P14C1 and P17C2), God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. (E

lp29s.)

If my interpretation is correct, the definition of Natura naturans?and, indeed, the definition of "substance" at the beginning of the Ethics (E ld3)?is intelligible. God as Natura naturans is conceived through himself insofar as one conceives of the attributes of God. If there God and his attributes are identical (compare E lp4d), then in conceiving of the attri butes (constitutive essence) of God, one conceives of what God is qua

Natura naturans. But God is conceived as Natura naturans only insofar as God is conceived as a free cause, that is, a being whose nature and actions are not determined by some other substance (compare E Ip8s2). It is the nature of God as free cause, that is, as substance per se, that is

expressed by the attributes singularly and conjointly.

Given his concern with Natura naturans, that is, God as free cause, Proposition 34 fits nicely into Spinoza's system: it provides an analysis




of the nature of substance per se. As Spinoza wrote, "God's power is his essence itself (E lp34; compare CM 2, 6, p. 152 and 2, 10, p. 167). His

proof reads as follows:

For from the necessity alone of God's essence it follows that God is the cause

of himself (by Pll) and (by P16 and P16C) of all things. Therefore, God's power, by which he and all things are and act, is his essence itself, q.e.d. (E lp34d.)

The power of God, that is, the ability to be and to act (compare E IplldS), is the essence of God as Natura naturans. Insofar as God qua Natura naturans is the cause of God qua Natura naturata (E lp29s), they are conceived as distinct. Further, insofar as the attributes of Natura naturans

express, rather than constitute, the essence o? Natura naturans, they are

conceived as distinct from that essence. It is for this reason that Spinoza must introduce something other than the attributes to provide his analysis of the nature of God qua Natura naturans. Insofar as God qua Natura naturans is conceived as a cause of his own existence and of all other

things (as affections of substance) (compare E lp36 and E lp36d), and insofar as power is the ability to exist (E lplld3), power provides an

analysis of God or substance as it is in itself: it provides an explication of what it means to claim that God or substance is "that which is in itself (E ld3). One of the characteristics of an adequate analysis is that the terms in

the analysandum are distinct from the terms in the analysans. In the case of Spinoza's God, the analysandum can be expressed as "the thing that is extended and thinks and . . . ," where the ellipsis points would be filled in with any attributes God possesses that are not known to human

beings (compare Letter 64), that is, it is an expression of an adequate or

quasi-adequate idea of the constitutive essence of God. Such a conception is mediate or relative, that is, it is not an adequate conception: it singles out a particular object without providing one with knowledge of the inherent nature of the object singled out.30 The analysans, on the other

hand, is power, and as such it is distinct from the analysandum. Spinoza's analysis of the nature of God or substance as power is formally adequate.

Thus, the initial puzzle regarding the apparent inconsistencies among Spinoza's discussions of the relations between substance and its attributes has been resolved. Spinoza is concerned with the constitutive essence of substance when he claims that the attributes constitute the essence of substance. Such a notion of the essence of substance might allow one to draw distinctions among kinds of substances?if there were such distinc

tions?and, if one's conception of the constitutive essence of Spinoza's substance contained all the attributes of substance, one's idea would be

adequate. Once Spinoza had shown that there is but one substance, allu sions to the constitutive essence of substance could have merely epistemic import: in knowing the constitutive essence of substance one merely has an idea of the nature of God. On the other hand, power is the essence of




God or substance per se. Power is expressed by each of the attributes, but on this conception of the essence of substance, the attributes do not con stitute the essence of substance. In showing this, I have also shown that insofar as there are two notions of the essence of substance in Spinoza's philosophy, any attempt to discover a single and unique relation between substance and its attributes is futile. Insofar as one is concerned with the constitutive essence of substance or God, the relation between an attribute and a substance is the relation of a part to a whole; insofar as one is concerned with the expressed essence of substance or God, the relation between an attribute and substance is the relation of effect to cause. It also shows that insofar as one is concerned with the constitutive

essence, the essence of God is complex, but insofar as one is concerned with the expressed essence, the essence of God is simple.31

The University of Texas at Austin Received January 15, 1988

NOTES

1. Benedict Spinoza, Ethics, Part 1, definition 4; Part 1, definition 6; and Part 1, propo sition 10, scholium, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans, by E. M. Curley,

vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Further references to the Ethics (E)

will be by Part, definition (d) or proposition (p), and demonstration (d), scholium (s),

explication (e), or corollary (c). Thus, "E lplOs" will denote Ethics, Part I, Proposition

10, Scholium. All references to Spinoza's works will be to the Collected Works, and will

be made parenthetically within the text of the paper in accordance with the following set

of abbreviations. Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect = El: Short Treatise on God,

Man, and His Weil-Being =

KV; Parts I and II of Descartes' 'Principles of Philosophy" =

PP; Cogitata Metaphysica = CM.

2. While Spinoza does not deny power is an attribute of God, his comments in Letter 64

that thought and extension are the only attributes of God known by humans suggests

that power is not an attribute.

3. The ontological status of Spinoza's attributes, that is, the question whether attributes

have an objective ontological status or are merely the ways in which human minds know

or classify substance, has been a subject of considerable controversy. If my interpretation is correct, it will show that there is a grain of truth in both interpretations: attributes as

constituents of substance are subjective, while attributes as expressions of the essence of

substance per se might be objective. (On the controversy, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, The

Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning, 2 vols. [New

York: Schocken Books, 1934], I, pp. 146 and 152-56; Francis S. Haserot, "Spinoza's Defi

nition of Attribute," Philosophical Review, vol. 62 [1953], reprinted in Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. by S. Paul Kashap [Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1972], pp. 28-42; Francis S. Haserot, "Spinoza and the Status of Universals," Phil

osophical Review, vol. 59 [1950], reprinted in Studies in Spinoza, pp. 43-67; Carroll R.

Bowman, "Spinoza's Doctrine of Attributes," Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5 [1967],




p. 60; Warren Kessler, "A Note on Spinoza's Concept of Attribute," in Spinoza: Essays in

Interpretation, ed. by Maurice Mandelbaum and Eugene Freeman [LaSalle, Illinois: Open

Court, 1975], pp. 191-94; E. M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation

[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969], pp. 16-18; Charles E. Jarrett, "Some

Remarks on the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Interpretation of Attributes," Inquiry, vol. 20

[1977], pp. 447-56; Stanley C. Martens, "Spinoza on Attributes," Synthese, vol. 37 [1978],

pp. 107-11; Paul Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza [New York: New York University Press,

1979], pp. 72-88; Linda Trompetter, "Spinoza: A Response to De Vries," Canadian Journal

of Philosophy, vol. 11 [1981], pp. 525-38; Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics

[Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1984], pp. 61-64; R. J. Delahunty,

Spinoza [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985], pp. 116-17.)

4. Cf. Molke S. Gram, "Spinoza, Substance, and Predication," Theoria, vol. 34 (1968),

pp. 222-44.

5. Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans, by James Dickoff and

Patricia James (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), p. 165.

6. Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, p. 165.

7. Cf. Ren? Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Section 52, in Oeuvres de

Descartes, publi?es par Charles Adams & Paul Tannery: Nouvelle Presentation, ed. by B.

Rochot, P. Costabel, J. Beaude, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964-74), Vol. 8A, pp. 24-25; The

Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans, by John Cottingham, Robert Stroothoff, and

Dugald Murdoch, 2 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Vol. 1, p. 210; The

Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans, by Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (London:

Cambridge University Press, 1911), Vol. 1, p. 240. Further references to Descartes's

Principles will be made by Part and Section. Further references to the Oeuvres de Descartes

will be abbreviated AT; further references to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes will

be abbreviated CSM; further references to The Philosophical Works of Descartes will be

abbreviated HR.

8. See John Locke, A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester, in

The Works of John Locke (1823; reprint edition Darmstadt, West Germany: Scientia

Verlag Aalen, 1963), Vol. 4, pp. 21-22; Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the

Human Mind, ed. by Baruch Brody (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 07-10. I have

examined Locke's account in some detail in "Locke's Relative Ideas," Theoria, vol. 47

(1981), pp. 142-59; see also my Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions: A Reconstruction based on

His Theory of Meaning (London: Croom Helm, 1987), Chapter 4.

9. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans, by W. D. Ross, Z 6 1031al5-1032all, in The Basic

Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 789-91.

10. Descartes, Principles, I, 53 and 63.

11. See KV, I, 2, pp. 70-71 and Letter 32; cf. William Sacksteder, "Spinoza on Part and

Whole: The Worm's Eye View," in Spinoza: New Perspectives, ed. by Robert W. Shahan

and J. I. Biro (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), pp. 139-59, and William

Sacksteder, "Simple Wholes and Complex Parts: Limited Principles in Spinoza," Philos

ophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 45 (1985), pp. 393-406.

12. Aristotle, Categories, trans, by E. M. Edghill, 5 lbll-12, in McKeon, The Basic Works

of Aristotle, p. 9.

13. The square brackets are Curley's. See Spinoza, Collected Works, 1:411, note 10.

14. It should be noted that this is consistent with Proposition 5 insofar as Spinoza is




concerned with the nature (essence) of substance: it is only his gloss of "nature" as the

singular "attribute" which raises this problem.

15. Cf. E lpl6d lp21d, and lp31d. I shall discuss these passages below.

16. Cf. Descartes, Second Replies, AT 7:132; CSM 2:95; HR 2:32; Descartes, Principles I,

53, 63; and Simon de Vries's letter to Spinoza of 24 February 1663, (Letter 8).

17. E. M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1978), p. 129.

18. Descartes, Second Replies AT 7:165; CSM 2:117; HR 2:56; cf. PP la4, p. 243, and

Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, pp. 130-31.

19. Notice Spinoza's distinction between infinity in kind and absolute infinity at E ld8e.

20. Cf. Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, p. 165.

21. Cf. Descartes, Fourth Replies, AT 7:220; CSM 2:155; HR 2:97; Descartes, Principles,

I, 11.

22. Notice that this is analogous to singling out the same person by the names "Israel"

and "Jacob" (Letter 9), and it provides an answer to de Vries's query regarding two ways in which a thing can be conceived (Letter 8). This is a point Donagan and others seem to

have missed. See Alan Donagan, "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes," in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Majorie Grene (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 167-68.

23. Cf. Descartes, Second Replies, AT 7:132; CSM 2:95; HR 2:32; Descartes, Principles 1,60.

24. Conceiving of substance in this manner might assume that attributes are objective, since one singles out substance per se as the thing that has such and such an attribute.

On the other hand, one could do equally well in singling out substance per se on the basis

of a finite mode, viz., as the thing that has such and such a finite mode. Only substance

is sufficiently independent to be properly a thing.

25. There is a sense in which substance is conceived as a complex whole composed of

attributes. See KV I, Dialogue I, pp. 75-76.

26. Spinoza also had a reductio ad absurdum argument to show that thought constitutes

the idea of God at E lp21d, but that issue is not germane to our discussion.

27. Some scholars seem to hold that Spinoza considered the essence of God complex. Cf.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics, p. 18.

28. Here the attributes are conceived as if they constitute substance per se: the attributes

are subjective constituents of substance.

29. Cf. Descartes, Meditation Five, AT 7:65; CSM 2:45; HR 1:180-181.

30. Cf. Locke, Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, in Works, 2:21-2; Reid, Essays on the Active

Powers of the Human Mind, pp. 07-10.

31. Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the University Research Insti

tute of the University of Texas at Austin. I wish to thank Edwin Allaire, A. P. Martinich

and Ronald J. Glass for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.



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History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 6 Issue 2 1989 [Doi 10.2307%2F27743889] Daniel E. Flage -- The Essences of Spinoza's God