Historian Uri Milstein Debunks the Myths of Deir Yassin

8/3/2019 Historian Uri Milstein Debunks the Myths of Deir Yassin

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Historian Uri Milstein Debunks the Myths of DeirYassin

Historical and Investigative Research, posted 9 Oct. 2005

by Francisco Gil-White http://www.hirhome.com/israel/milstein-deir-yassin.htm________________________________________________________

The following is reprinted from:

Milstein, Uri 1996 History of the War of Independence: Out of crisis came

decision. Vol. 4. A. Sacks, trans. New York: University Press of America.

(pp.376-396)

NOTE: ETZEL is the accronym for Irgun Zvai Leumi or 'the Irgun' for short.

________________________________________________________

On April 9, the London BBC, relying on Raanans communique to the press, reported200 Arabs killed at Deir-Yassin.150The following day, ETZELs radio station quoted

254 killed, according to Raanans report to ETZEL headquarters in Tel Aviv. Thatsame day, Pail sent his report to Galili, quoting the same figure and repeating it at

least three more times: in his sworn statement to the Jabotinsky Institute, in a press

interview and in an article published by the newspaper Yediot Aharonot. Thenumber of Arabs killed at Deir-Yassin was 254, according to tallies by the GADNA

troops and Jerusalem residents who had to bury the dead since the ETZEL and LEHI

men abandoned the village and refused to do that job. The number of slain has beendetermined by those who were best qualified to do so. It is pointless to turn to other

sources that have inferior means of knowing the truth.151 Pails SHAI superior,David Cohen (Avni), confirmed several years later that he remembered Pailquoting that figure in his report. Since the figure seemed exaggerated, he added,

we asked him how he had arrived at it. Pail answered, I didnt count them all, buttheres a report by the man himself, meaning, of course, ETZELs Jerusalemcommander - Raanan.152IDF researchers wrote in the draft for the State Book in

the 1950s that 240 Arabs were killed at Deir-Yassin.153 For more than ten years,Yitzhak Levi, who had access to classified documentation on the subject, investigated

the events of the War of Independence in Jerusalem. During the action and after it,he writes, about 254 people were killed.154 This figure has been published hundredsof times in Hebrew, Arabic and other languages.

Nobody counted bodies, not even those who buried them, says Moneta.

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[MONETA:]

Everyone exaggerated. Most of them had never seen so many dead before, and the

high figure was convenient for all involved. The dissidents [Revisionists] wanted to

brag and scare the Arabs. The Hagana and Jewish Agency wanted to smear the

dissidents and scare the Arabs. The Arabs wanted to smear the Jews. The Britishwanted to smear Jewish terrorists. They all latched on to a number invented by

Raanan. We loaded 30 bodies onto the truck. That was the main group. There wereabout another 30; all told - about 60 bodies. I reported that to my SHAI operator, who

reported to his chiefs.155

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They spoke about 61 dead, says Idelstein.156 Gihon, who examined the village on

Shealtiels instructions on the afternoon of April 9, says, I didnt count the bodies. I

estimated four ditches full of bodies, twenty in each, and a few dozen more in thequarry. I threw out a figure: 150.157SHAIs Yonah Feitelson, who toured Deir-Yassin early on April 10, told his superiors that he had seen 80 dead.158When Arielireturned from Deir-Yassin on the 13th, he told his wife that his GADNA unit had

buried 70 corpses and blown up another 40, a total of 110.159 In 1981, an ex-villager,

Mohammed Aref Samir, told an interviewer that 94 bodies were gathered thatday.160 Bir-Zeit University researchers arrived at a figure of 110 after interviewing

survivors.161 The number of dead appears to have been 110.

How were the old people, men, women and children killed at Deir-Yassin on April 9?

A circular distributed to senior Hagana personnel on April 18, 1948, stated, The firstwounded and dead among the dissidents, caused confusion in their ranks. Discipline

was affected. Each little group conducted a separate battle. The assault was carried out

cruelly. Entire families were killed, bodies piled up on each other.162 Eyewitnessaccounts and other documents support those SHAI findings.

The question remains whether those people were killed during the battle or after it. On

a massacre following the battle there is only the account of Meir Pail, who claims

that he was in the village during and after the battle.

_____________________________________________________

[MEIR PAIL:]

I saw groups of ETZEL and LEHI men going house to house, firing Tommy guns at

anyone they found inside. Throughout the battle, I didnt observe any difference in


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behavior between ETZEL and LEHI men. I saw almost no [Arab] men - I assume they

escaped when the battle began -but mainly women, old people and children. .hey

were murdered in groups, crowded into room corners and sprayed with bullets. In the

afternoon, they caught 15 or 20 men, who were unarmed when I saw them, got them

on a truck and drove off to Jerusalem. I heard later that they paraded the Arabs

through Jerusalem, a sort of victory parade. There were war whoops and calls fromthe crowd, Take ten pounds and let me kill one! but they didnt. They drove those

Arabs back to the village and murdered them in the quarry between Givat-Shaul andthe village. I saw them in die afternoon. The massacre in the village lasted several

hours. Not one commander shouted or tried to prevent it... I shouted and searched for

the commanders with the help of a LEHI man whod invited me. They asked him,Who is this? He answered, A buddy from my Palmach days. I screamed, Have

you gone mad? Youre doing terrible things! Then a LEHI commander answered,Its none of your business. Another one asked, What should we do with them? I

said, Take them to the Arab zone.

I dont know whether they sobered up on their own or my shouts might have got tothem; at any rate, I saw them later, leading the remaining women and children to the

school building. There were about 250 or 300 of them. I heard arguments over

whether to blow up the building on the people inside. In the afternoon, they

transported them all to the Arab zone in town. I left. While leaving, I saw the EZZEL

and LEHI men, murder on their faces, coming out of the village with sheep, chickens

and other loot.163

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Moshe Idelstein, the friend who supposedly had invited Pail to Deir-Yassin, asserts,

I didnt invite Meir Pail and he wasnt at Deir-Yassin.164

Other ETZEL and LEHI men state that Pail was not at Deir-Yassin and could nothave been there without their knowing it. Zetler, Raanan, Barzilai, Lapidot andZelivansky state that they did not see Pail at Deir-Yassin.165 Pails claims also go

unsubstantiated by Hagana personnel. Statements by Shealtiel, Mart, Eldad andSchiff mention neither his name nor his code names (Avraham and Ram). Pail

spoke about exchanges between him and Palmach soldiers in Deir-Yassin. Eren and

Gihon, who were acquainted with Pail at the time, did not see him at Deir-Yassin.166Shlomo Havilyo, the Haganas western Jerusalem commander, was at Givat-Shaul on

April 9th. I didnt see Meir Pail, he says. I knew him well. Id remember it if hewas there.167Arieli, who supervised the burials, says that he did not see Meir Pailat Deir-Yassin, much less talk with him about the number of bodies buried or any

other matter.168


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Seven captives paraded on trucks through the city streets by ETZEL later were taken

to the Deir-Yassin quarries and murdered, SHAI reported on April 12, 1948.169 As

soon as the village was taken, men, women and children were loaded onto trucks and

driven through the streets of Jerusalem, Yitzhak Levi wrote in 1971, lots of themwere later brought back to the village and killed by rifle and machine gun fire. This is

the truth as set down and recorded in the national institutions.170 Levi elsewherequotes Pails statement.171 Yonah Ben-Sasson disclaimed the alleged massacre at the

quarry. Although he found the dissidents preparing to kill the Arabs there, he

prevented the shooting.172Pail claims that he sent a roll of pictures of the slaughter toGalili with his report; personnel at the IDF Archives confirm that their files contain

photographs of bodies from Deir-Yassin but say that the photos are undated and do

not show how the people depicted were killed. A British team (police officers, a

doctor and a nurse) interrogated survivors at Silwan. No doubt the Jewish attackerscommitted many sexual atrocities, wrote CID Assistant Director Richard C. Catling,who headed the team, on April 15, 1948.

_____________________________________________________

[CATLING:]

Many tender-aged schoolgirls were raped and later butchered. Old women were

abused as well. There is a story going round about a young girl literally torn in half.

Many infants were slaughtered and killed. I saw an old woman, who claimed she was

ninety-four, that had been beaten on the head with rifle-butts. Bracelets were ripped

off arms and rings off fingers, earlobes were cut off women for the earrings.

_____________________________________________________

A Deir-Yassin woman told one interrogator, A man shot my sister Dalya, who wasnine months pregnant, in the neck, and then cut her belly with a butchers knife.

Naaneh Khalik, 16, said, I saw a man pick up a sword and split my neighbor Jamilfrom head to toe. Then he did the same thing to my uncle Fathi on the steps of ourhome.173These statements do not mesh with Dr. Engels report and that of Drs.

Avigdori and Druyan, who examined the bodies at Deir-Yassin and found no evidence

of abuse or rape. According to their findings, all deaths were caused by gunshot

wounds.

Thirty-three years later, the Jerusalem newspaper Kol Hair carried an account onMay 1, 1981, by Mohammed Aref Samir, a Deir-Yassin survivor and Jordanian

Government supervisor of vocational and art education in the West Bank until the

Six-Day War. It read:


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_____________________________________________________

At 3 in the morning, the village was surrounded by ETZEL and LEHI men. Thevillage guards, equipped with an assortment of shotguns, couldnt even fire warningshots. They were surprised to hear voices speaking in Hebrew at such an early hour.

At about four, gunfire sounded at the eastern end of the village. Many times [before]the village had been under curfew and when the British called over the loudspeaker

from one end of the village, I could hear them at the other. Moreover, a shout in

Givat-Shaul, without a loudspeaker, could be heard clearly in our village. Thatmorning, we heard nothing, neither a loudspeaker nor shouts. We woke up to the

sound of gunfire. The first victims were the laborers who set out early. They were

quickly butchered. Later, they began a bombardment with a light mortar that caused

little damage. The rest went on in the houses.

From 5 to 11 a.m., there was methodical murder as they went from house to house. At

the eastern end of the village, no one got away. Entire families were done in. At 6a.m., they caught 21 villagers, youths of about 25, lined them up by what is today the

post office and executed them. Many women who watched that horrid sight went

insane; some of them are still in the hospital. A pregnant woman coming from the

bakery with her son was murdered and her belly slit open, having seen her son

murdered first. They set up a Bren gun in a house they had taken and shot whoever

crossed its line of fire. My cousin went out to see what happened to his uncle, who

had been shot a few minutes before. He was killed, too. His father, who followed him,

was murdered by that same Bren gun and the mother who came to find out about her

beloved found her death by them. Aish Zeidan, who had worked as watchman at

Givat-Shaul, came to see what was going on and was killed.Ninety-four bodies theygathered that day. No one told us where they were buried and we didnt ask. For thefaithful, the body doesnt matter. Their spirits are with us.

At 11, men came in on trucks and began rounding up prisoners.Until 9 p.m., prisoners

were collected at Givat-Shaul and driven to the Old City. As you see, I reside at Kfar-

Ramoun in a splendid house with marble columns and carpets - but I still live in Deir-

Yassin.

_____________________________________________________

The families of Mohammed Aref Samir and his wife escaped from DeirYassin to Ein-

Kerem, climbed through Malha to the Old City and walked on to Kfar-Ramoun.174

These findings indicate that most of the Arabs killed at Deir-Yassin were slain during

the battle, inside their houses as the attackers broke in or blew them up. There were

other incidents, too, Raanan told the press in 1972.


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_____________________________________________________

[RAANAN:]

At 11 a.m., we resumed action. We blew up the first house. We blew up another about

every quarter hour. We had no idea who was inside. We regarded every house as afortified position. By that method, we reached the house where Yiftah lay. As we got

to him, we saw hed passed away. A young soldier holding a Bren gun took up aposition nearby. We warned the people inside the house that we were about to blow it

up. Having seen what had happened to the other residents, they came out with their

hands up. There were nine people, a woman and a child among them. They guy with

the Bren gun suddenly squeezed the trigger. A burst hit the Arabs. Thats for

Yiftah! he yelled. What have you done? we shouted at him. One of them had arifle and was trying to shoot, he replied. Other men confirmed later that one of theArabs had stood up.175

_____________________________________________________

SHAIs Yisrael Netah was sitting with his partner, both in Arab disguise, at an Arabcafe in Ein-Kerem when refugees came in from Deir-Yassin and said that the Jews

had discovered Arab soldiers disguised as women.

_____________________________________________________

They searched women, too. One of those [Arabs] realized hed been cornered,

whipped out a gun and shot a Jewish commander, whose comrades, livid with fury,fired in all directions, killing the Arabs standing by. I drew a Jewish soldier pointing a

bayoneted rifle at an Arab woman. I chose not to explain that he was not bayoneting

and that the woman was actually a man. I sent the drawing to the newspapers, through

the Arab HQ in Jerusalem, with the additional information that 600 women, 500 men

and 400 children were slaughtered at Deir-Yassin. I exaggerated on purpose to

frighten the Arabs. My drawing was published in an Arab paper.176

_____________________________________________________

The dissident [Revisionist] fighters were not the only ones who murdered Arabs atDeir-Yassin. We assembled at a spot in the village, says Kalman Rosenblatt, aPalmach squad leader there. Our driver arrived with an Arab in greenish overalls and

interrogated him. It came out that he wasnt from around Jerusalem and had hidden ina school locker. The driver shot him dead. We were shocked.177 Another Palmachman, Gidon Sarig, describes how one of his comrades entered a room, saw

movement in a wardrobe, fired - and an Arab dropped out, rolling in his own


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blood.178LEHIs Reuven Greenberg says, The Palmach men... set off a charge on[an Arabs] neck and the head flew off the body.179

13. Against the Fascist Betrayal

The Deir-Yassin affair, researcher Dr. Yoram Nimrod wrote in 1987, greatly affected

the Yishuvs relations with King Abdallah; reduced the prospects of isolating the

Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, from the countrys Arabs and of establishing anopposition against him; made Abdallah appear as the Palestinian Arabs savior; andrallied the Arabs. When things went well, many Arabs joined the militias; when the

situation worsened, many abandoned their homes. Thus, the numbers of refugees

swelled and became an a obstacle to peace arrangements after the War of

Independence.180 If Nimrod is right, the Deir-Yassin affair decisively altered the

course of the war. The publicity seems to have been more influential than the actual

events.

The first exaggeration may be attributed to ETZEL: the information released to the

press by its commanders the day of the battle, and the ETZEL radio announcements

the day after. On April 11, Hussein Khalidi, the Arab Higher Committees secretary,called King Abdallah to intervene in Palestine on the grounds of what had happened at

Deir-Yassin.181

The Jewish Agency sent Abdallah a message in an effort to preserve his

understanding with Golda Meir. Condemning the Deir-Yassin killings as a brutal

and barbarous deed that does not comport with the spirit, tradition and culturalheritage of the Jewish nation, it implored Abdallah to act so that the present disputeover Palestine - if inevitable - will be settled according to conventional rules of war as

accepted by civilized nations.182 That same day, Abdallah cabled back, It is

common knowledge that the Jewish Agency directs Zionist activities everywhere and

no Jew does anything contrary to its policy. The Deir-Yassin incident is one of the

factors liable to let matters be determined contrary to the advice of those who have

preached for armistice, in America and other countries. The King presumes that the

Jewish Agency will do all that is required so that no atrocities shall be committed at

this time.183

The Deir-Yassin events became an affair due to the juxtaposition of several factors,foremost among them the struggle within the Yishuv. The Deir-Yassin affair was used

for political ends by MAPAM and the Revisionist parties, which were not represented

on the Jewish Agency Executive. MAPAM heavily influenced the Hagana combat

forces; the Revisionists had influence on ETZEL and indirectly on LEHI. As the


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British mandate came to an end, those two parties were determined to take part in the

decisionmaking processes; each used the event to promote its interests.

MAPAM was a composite of two factions that had split off from the large MAPAI

labor party; it enjoyed the support of many kibbutz settlements and considered itself a

social elite. Its members, however, were not part of the inner decision-making circlesin which they sought entry as the war broke out. True, one of their leaders, Yisrael

Galili, was named head of the Haganas national command, but that had been apersonal appointment, not a political one. The Jewish multitudes should rally to

collective responsibility to assure the supremacy of the labor movement, oneMAPAM leader, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, stated on December 3, 1947. Another leader,

Meir Yaari, proclaimed that unless the labor movement stood at the head of the

state, its independence and character, the integrity of the Zionist vision and itsfulfillment, will be at risk.184 If a national coalition did not arise, Ben-Gurion told aMAPAI central committee meeting on December 7, 1946, we shall establish a labor

bloc of all eight workers parties... for the next ten years.185

That did not happen. Until April, Ben Gurion almost single-handedly led a narrow

coalition of his MAPAI party, the large conservative General Zionists Party and twosmall religious parties, the Mizrahi and Poalei-Mizrahi.

Ben-Gurions conservative and religious partners pressured him to forge an operativeagreement with ETZEL and LEHI and integrate the Revisionist Party into the

coalition. American Jewish leader Abba Hillel Silver, who had been behind the Ben-

Gurions appointment as Chairman of the Jewish Agency, visited Eretz-Yisrael inmid-January, 1948. Speaking at a press conference on January 16, Silver insisted that

Ben-Gurion reach an agreement with ETZEL and LEHI rather than disband them.

American Jews, having helped thwart the Morrison-Grady plan and bring about the

November 29 UN resolution in favor of a Jewish state, he said, demanded aunification of all forces.186 Ben-Gurion could not afford to ignore Silvers demands.

The new MAPAM party was concerned about the dangers arising if the Hagana

reached an agreement with ETZEL and LEHI. Yaakov Riftin spoke at its firstconvention in January, 1948: ... We have fought relentlessly against letting in,

through the back door and without democratic process, those who have shunned our

communitys institutions. We regard any negotiations between those institutions andthe terrorist groups as an infringement of authorized Labor Union resolutions.187 The

alternative to a workers hegemony, Meir Yaari added, was a coalition with thereactionaries that would bring about a civil war; he argued that Ben-Gurion was trying

to legitimate the Fascist terror organizations and let them join the Hagana front.188

The convention passed a resolution for uncompromising resistance to the Jewish

terror that hampers our struggle from within.189


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. . .We should have our own political GHQ, Yaari contended. Not that we shouldscorn the generals, but wars are conducted synthetically. A small advisory force, a

guiding hand. What should we do to prevent a government without us? BenAharon asked, and suggested that if MAPAMs demands were turned down, therewould be actions on our own, our own concept of a government. We should present

to the UN an independent entity .... If we manage to attract other circles, we shoulddirect matters toward such a step.190 Two of MAPAMs conditions for joining a

future government were: no agreement with ETZEL and no Revisionists on the Jewish

Agency Executive, then or in a future government. MAPAM indeed appointed

committees: one for military and police affairs, including prominent Hagana figures;

and another for defense affairs, including other Hagana and public figures.191

In early March, negotiations between Jewish Agency representatives and ETZEL

seemed to be making progress. In AL Hamishmar, MAPAMs organ, Riftin railed onMarch 3:

_____________________________________________________

We shall rise against the Fascist betrayal .... If anyone in the labor movement stilldreams, and not only dreams, of an arrangement and agreement with the terrorists... he

misrepresents the truth, deceives the public and obstructs a general rallying of the

masses to denounce the terrorists and remove them from the stage of public life. We

have an account to settle with them, all along the line.

_____________________________________________________

Another leader spoke two days later at a MAPAM assembly in Tel Aviv: Parlor

terrorism is no less a danger than Fascist terrorism, with which there could be no pact

and no neutrality .... A MAPAI government with reactionaries would hold out no

more than four months .... MAPAM will not let the key governmental posts... be

wrenched away from the forces of progress, including the workers. We shall claim our

own, we shall not sit with Fascists.192

The Jewish Agency and ETZEL delegations reached an understanding on March 7th.

The Zionist Executive, due to convene in Tel Aviv, was expected to ratify it.

Meanwhile, one Jewish Agency member, Moshe Shapira of Hapoel-Mizrahi,proposed asking Ben-Gurion to suspend all anti-E7IEL activities that could obstruct

efforts to unify. His proposal was accepted.193 The following day, MAPAMdemanded convening the Labor Union Council to discuss the agreement, which was

liable to have afatal influence on our standing, Hagana integrity, the Yishuvs image

and the workers status.194


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On April 1, MAPAMs political committee discussed portfolio distribution in thefuture government; Ben-Aharon suggested, Lets demand the Interior. The police, for

instance, should be ours .... Then we could organize our campaign against the

dissidents.195

For much of MAPAMs leadership at the time, the great disaster facing the Yishuvwas not its defeat in the battle for the roads or losing Americas support for the

founding of a Jewish state, but a possible agreement between the Hagana and ETZEL.

Anything that would thwart this development was legitimate in their eyes. The

decisive struggle would occur when the Zionist Executive met.

And then, for MAPAM, opportunity knocked; Deir-Yassin happened.

14. Verbal Blows

The Zionist Actions Committee convened on April 6. As sessions opened, right- and

left-wing members exchanged verbal blows. Dr. Herzl Rosenblum, a Revisionist,

proposed discussing the Yishuvs defense methods to ascertain who was responsiblefor the deplorable situation. Many, he said, were of the opinion that it was Hagana

high command. For quite some time now, Ben-Gurion retorted, the cream of ouryouth have been shedding their blood in defense of our settlements while a campaign

of libel and denigration of the Hagana has been conducted by outside elements who

are trying to break it; we wont tolerate a Zionist Executive meeting at which that partof the community that sheds its blood sits on the defendants bench. A Revisionist

yelled, We demand an inquiry; not against the defenders, against you! MAPAMsYisrael Bar-Yehuda proposed investigating the connection between the Revisionistsand the cattle and goat thieves. A resolution was passed to set up a policy anddefense subcommittee that would discuss the ETZEL agreement as well.196 Sessions

continued on the 7th, in similar tones; Meir Grossman, a Revisionist, argued thatETZEL and LEHI were the most combat-experienced bodies in the community, so

that repudiating the agreement with ETZEL would amount to a national crime.

Yitzhak Tabenkin of MAPAM would not acknowledge any rights of a coalition

without his party. All MAPAI and MAPAM delegates were opposed to the agreement

with ETZEL and LEHI; all General Zionists and religious party delegates were in

favor.197

The Jewish Agency ratified the agreement on April 9th. Although MAPAI

representatives had cast all the opposing votes, MAPAM blamed MAPAl, charging

that its members had pretended to make a show of resolute opposition merely to create

an alibi for itself.198 By the time the Zionist Executives Political Committeeconvened on April 11, its members had learned about the Deir-Yassin affair from the


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newspapers and radio; now they learned the Haganas reaction to the murderous deed.Nonetheless, they ratified the agreement, 14 to 12, with one abstention by the

Hadassah delegate. The final decision therefore lay with the Zionist Executive.199

Desperate last-minute attempts were made by opposition to prevent the agreement. On

April 12, Hagana posters were hung all over Jerusalem and Al Hamishmar ran anarticle comparing Deir-Yassin with the Palmachs conquest of Kolonia on April 10,

presenting the former as an atrocity committed by a degenerate clique... a misfitoperation accompanied by abuse, fascist rampaging and robbery .... a malignant sign

and a peril to the community, and so on, while depicting the latter as a step in theYishuvs overall defense plan. MAPAM delegates at the assembly lobbied to

postpone the vote. At 2 a.m., April 13, as those efforts seemed to have failed, a

MAPAM delegate shouted, This is a treaty with murderers, the heroes of Deir-Yassin! The assembly finally put it to a-vote at 5 a.m. The agreement was ratified, 39to 32, with four abstention.200

Political, social and personal constraints hardened over the Deir-Yassin affair after the

agreement was ratified. MAPAM and other political bodies, which exploited the Deir-

Yassin events to their advantage, felt too much an obligation to their respective

versions of the story to retract them. And, as the years went by, they even embellished

the story. Gihon claims that Pail urged him to go beyond his report to Mart, which

Pail branded not Zionist enough, and write another on the dissidents conduct at

Deir-Yassin. Gihon duly submitted this new report to Shealtiels staff.201 One weekafter the event, the Hagana weekly Bamahane ran an article entitled Deir-Yassin andDisgrace, signed by Avraham, Pails Jerusalem Hagana code name.202 At that

time, only one man gave final clearance to Bamahane articles: Yisel Galili, head ofthe Hagana national command and a MAPAM members.203

15. An Atom Bomb

MAPAM carried no weight with Shealtiel, but his concern was to evade

responsibility for anything connected with the Deir-Yassin affair. Everything he said

implied that he had been unwillingly involved.204

It was years before I learned that SHAI chief Isser Beeri and his assistant, YitzhakRoth, had received my report on Deir-Yassin, says Moneta.

_____________________________________________________

[MONETA:]


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Ben-Gurion knew the truth. I asked to see him when I worked in the Prime MinistersOffice during the 1950s as Teddy Kolleks assistant for Arab affairs; but when he

heard what I wanted to talk about, he didnt want to discuss Deir-Yassin: I think heknew I would tell him the truth - and he wanted to preserve that cruel Jew image,which he considered a first-rate secret weapon, a deterrent, an atom bomb. I suppose

he regarded the Deir-Yassin publicity as a psychological weapon that had rendered usa great service. Pail and Begin also wouldnt talk to me about Deir-Yassin.205

_____________________________________________________

To offset the continuing harm to Israeli information efforts abroad caused by Deir-

Yassin, the Israeli Foreign Ministry published a booklet on the subject on March 16,

1969, for the use of Israeli diplomats. It was an attempt to prove that most of the

material on Deir-Yassin was false.206 In 1971, Begin responded on the pages of the

London Times to an earlier article critical of E77.EL; he mentioned the Foreign

Ministry booklet, quoting several passages from it. Yitzhak Levi then warned Beginagainst the distribution to the Israeli public of a false version of the Deir-Yassinaffair, which unavoidably will make the matter public and place the responsibility on

you. He sent copies of that letter to Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense MinisterMoshe Dayan, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and other public figures.207

Eleven days later, Begin wrote in Maariv, advising Levi to publish his own version in

the Times.208 Foreign Ministry Director-General Gideon Raphael wrote Shaul Aviguron April 18, 1971, I refer to your letter concerning Deir-Yassin and Begin's referenceto the Foreign Ministrys publication of background material on the matter. You may

find it interesting to learn that; have discontinued the use of this material and havefiled it away.209 On May 10, 1971, Eban informed Galili in an official letter that thebooklet had been meant only to assist arguments abroad; use of it had been

discontinued and it no longer constituted an official document as far as the Foreign

Office was concerned.210 Even in 1987, investigation of the affair made certain senior

public officials apprehensive, and pressure was applied on the author to be less than

thorough.

16. Brutality tend Hypocrisy

The events at Deir- Yassin had an immediate effect on the Jerusalem theater, a

delayed effect on the course of the war as a whole, and long-range consequences

extending even to the tune of writing. Davar reported on April 11, 1948, Jewishsources point out that if they manage to hold two positions, Kastel and Deir-Yassin,

half of the hilly part of the Tel Aviv/Jerusalem route will be under their control.Indeed, Jewish traffic moved unmolested between Neveh-Ilan and Jerusalem, a very


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troublesome section of the route until April 9th. Arab opportunities to attack western

Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem lessened; the situation of the Arab villages

southwest of the city worsened considerably and Jewish morale in Jerusalem shot up.

One objective of Operation Nahshon, it should be remembered, was to prevent total

Jewish demoralization in Jerusalem.

Four days later, on April 13, 78 Jews, mostly medical personnel riding to Hadassah

Hospital, were slain. That was the Arab answer to Deir-Yassin. The joy of revenge did

not erase the grim effect that the horror stories of Deir-Yassin had on the Arab

population. Emile Ghouri, Abd-el-Kader al-Husseiii-is successor as commander ofthe Jerusalem front, told reporters on April 8, The Deir-Yassin battle sowed fear ....

The peasants abandoned their homes and deserted their villages.211 According to a

British assessment, the Arab population broke down following Deir-Yassin.212Moneta: After Deir-Yassin, I returned to the Palmach and took part in attacks onother Arab villages. Most of the locals ran away before we arrived and the villages

were taken either without a tight or after a short clash.213 Farmers were not the only

ones to flee their homes; urban Arabs from Jerusalem and other towns did the same.

Haifa fell to the Hagana in April. Fear of a fate similar to that of Deir-Yassins

residents, SHAI reported, was one factor inducing Haifas Arabs to collapse and flee.

The Jews objective in that action was far-reaching, and they achieved it, Abdallahal-Tel, the Arab Legions Jordanian commander, wrote in his memoirs. They cast

fear and horror over the villages and their residents fled.214 In the short term, theDeir-Yassin event brought advantages and contributed to a mass flight of Arabs,Yisrael Ber wrote.215

The ugly face of war leers through the battle of Deir-Yassin and the ensuing public

scandal. Its events have been presented ever since as an exception to the general

nature of the War of Independence. That is a misrepresentation. Similar events, albeit

of a less extreme nature, took place at other sites and times during the War of

Independence and the wars to come. They are typical of war. The battle itself revealed

the fighters brutality toward the adversary, soldier or civilian. The affair exposed theantagonisms within the Jewish camp. Generally speaking, military officers and

political leaders strive to conceal events like Deir-Yassin through conspiracies of

silence, classification of documents, censorship and mythology; they are also assisted

by house historians. Deir-Yassin was an exception to the rule: the ETZEL, LEHI,

Hagana and MAPAM leaders had a vested interest in spreading highly inflated

versions of the true facts. It was not virtue that guided those who condemned the

deeds at Deir-Yassin; they, too, during that war committed similar atrocities that

remained hidden from the public eye. The events at Deir-Yassin illuminated two

human attributes that add precious little honor to the race: brutality and hypocrisy.


14/27

________________________________________________________

Uri Milstein's Footnotes________________________________________________________

1. Interview with Mordechai Ra'anan on December 9, 1977; interview with Yehoshua

Gorodenchik on February 16, 1988.

2. Yosef Shapira (ed.), David She'alti'el - Jerusalem 1948, p. 142.

3. David She'alti'el Archives; series of interviews with Moshe Idelstein and Moshe

Barzilai in 1987.

4. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 32/17, from "Mizrahi"(Yitzhak Navon) to the district commander, April 2, 1948.

5. Jabotinsky Institute, protocols of a 1952 petition by fighters disabled at DeirYassin

against the compensation bureau of the Ministry of Defense, challenging its refusal to

recognize them as disabled veterans; series of previously cited interviews with

Mordechai Ra'anan.

6. Series of interviews with Yehoshua Zetler from 1978-1987.

7. Interview with David She'alti'el on May 13, 1968.

8. Yosef Shapira (ed.), David She'alti'el - Jerusalem 1948, pp. 142-143.

9. Interview with Yehoshua Ari'eli on December 11, 1987.

10. Letter from Nahum Gross to Natan Donewitz, editor of the Ha'aretz supplement,

August 30,1968; series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Idelstein and

Moshe Barzilai in 1987.

11. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 31/17, from "David" (DavidShe'alti'el) to "Dror" (Mordechai Ben-Eliyahu), April 4,1948; Ibid., Statement No. 32

of Zalman Mart.

12. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 40/17, Hagana intelligence,

April 15, 1948.


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13. IDF Archives, Statement No. 88 of Yigal Yadin.

14. IDF Archives, Statement No. 32 of Zalman Mart.

15. Jerusalem Archives, statement of Moshe Idelstein; series of previously cited

interviews with Moshe Idelstein and Moshe Barzilai; series of previously citedinterviews with Arieh Tepper-Amit; interview with Yeshuron Schiff on May 5, 1968;

interview with Na'aman Stavi on June 8, 1979.

16. Previously cited interview with Yeshuron Schiff.

17. Series of previously cited interviews with Mordechai Ra'anan.

18. Series of previously cited interviews with Yehoshua Zetler.

19. Interview w;th Ben-Tzion Cohen on May 7, 1963.

20. Series of interviews with Petahia Zelivansky in 1968-1970.

21. Series of interviews with Yehuda Lapidot in 1963 and 1987.

22. Series of interviews with Me'ir Pa'il from 1973 to 1981; Author's Archives,`

statement of Me'ir Pa'il on May 10, 1971; interview with David Cohen on July 18,

1987; series of previously cited interviews with Yitzhak Levi; David Ben-Gurion's

Diary, February 2, 1943.

23. IDF Archives, Statement No. 75 of David She'alti'el; previously cited interview

with David She'alti'el.

24. Author's Archives, cables from "Avraham" (Me"ir Pail) to "Avni" (David Cohen)

and "Sasha" (Yigal Allon), and cable from "Hillel" (Yisra'el Galili) to "Etzioni"

(David She'alti'el); previously cited interview with Yehoshua Ari'eli.

25. IDF Archives, Statement No. 31 of Yeshuron Schiff. She'alti'el's may have

imposed his ban because Schiff was not in an the secret talks between Mart and the

dissidents.

26. Interview with Moshe Barzilai on May 9, 1982.

27. Series of interviews with Shim'on Moneta in 1987.

28. Yardena Golani, The Myth of Deir-Yassin, Hadar, 1976, pp. 11-13; ETZEL

Campaign Annals 6, pp. 78-81; series of previously cited interviews with Yehoshua


16/27

Zetler, Mordechai Ra'anan and Petahia Zelivansky; previously cited interview with

Ben-Tzion Cohen; Archives ofHakibbutz Hame'uchad, War of Independence

Statement Files, series of statements by Moshe Idelstein in 1982; Jabotinsky Institute,

statements Mordechai Ra'anan, Yehuda Lapidot, Ben-Tzion Cohen and Reuven

Greenberg.

29. Interview with David Siton on August 18, 1987.

30. Shmu'el Even-Or, Ma'ariv, Hebrew month of Iyar 27, 1974; Yardena Golani, The

Myth of Deir-Yassin, p. 14; previously cited interview with Moshe Idelstein.

31. Central Zionist Archives S/25/2966.

32. Haboker, December 30,1947; Yitzhak Navon on the IDF radio program Making a

State, January 30, 1988.


January 5,1948


January 15, 1948.

35. Interview with Yonah Ben-Sasson on November 12, 1980.

36. Ibid.; David She'alti'el Archives, report of "Ben-Nur" (intelligence agent in

Jerusalem).


March 3, 1948.

38. Author's Archives, Deir-Yassin Affair, secret report, eyes only.


from "Yavna" (Yitzhak Levi) to the district commander, April 7, 1948; Author's

Archives, letter from Yitzhak Levi to Menachem Begin, April 14, 1971; Yitzhak Levi,

Nine Measures, pp. 340-341.

40. Interview with Mordechai Gihon on December 2, 1987.

41. Jabotinsky Institute, Deir-Yassin conquest file; previously cited interview with

Mordechai Gihon.

42. Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures, p. 341.


17/27


April 9, 1948; Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures, p. 340; previously cited interview with

Mordechai Gihon.

44. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 88/17, from "Hashmonai"

(Jerusalem Etzioni Brigade intelligence), 10:00 April 4, 1948.

45. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 88/17, from "Sa'ar" (Michael

Haupt), April 4, 1948.

46. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 21/17, from "Hashmonai"

(Jerusalem Etzioni Brigade intelligence), April 4, 1948; Jerusalem Archives,

statement of David Gottlieb.

47. Author's Archives, Arza Operations Log, 17:00 April 4, 1948, message No. 562;

IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 87/17.

48. IDF Archives, War of Independence Collected Files 228/3, Operations Log, April

9, 1948.

49. Menachem Begin, The Revolt, p. 224.

50. Jabotinsky Institute, Deir-Yassin conquest file; series of previously cited

interviews with Mordechai Ra'anan, Yehoshua Zetler and Petahia Zelivansky;

previously cited interview with Ben-Tzion Cohen; documents provided to the author

by those named above; ETZEL Campaign Annals 6, pp. 81-82; David She'alti'elArchives, BenNur report; Author's Archives, report of the Hagana commander in

Jerusalem on the EYZEL LEHI action of April 12, 1948; Yosef Shapira (ed.), David

She'alti'el Jerusalem 1948, p. 139. The Jabotinsky Institute also contains further

statements by Lapidot and Cohen.

51. Yosef Shapira (ed.): David She'alti'el - Jerusalem 1948, p. 141.

52. IDF Archives, statement of Tzion Eldad; Yosef Shapira (ed.): David She'alti'el

Jerusalem 1948, p. 139.

53. Archives of Hakibbutz Hame'uchad, War of Independence Statement Files, series

of previously cited statements by Moshe Idelstein; series of previously cited

interviews with Moshe Idelstein in 1987.

54. Series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Barzilai in 1987.


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55. Author's Archives, previously cited statement of Me'ir Pa'il.

56. Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures, pp. 341-342.

57. Yosef Shapira (ed.): David She'alti'el - Jerusalem 1948, p. 139; Menachem Begin,

The Revolt, p. 225.

58. Series of previously cited interviews with Shim'on Moneta.

59. IDF Archives, report by "Elazar" (Mordechai Gihon), April 10, 1948.

60. Previously cited interview with Mordechai Gihon.

61. Author's Archives, report by the Hagana's anti-dissident unit on the Deir-Yassin

action.


63. Moshe Solomon, In Our Time, in The Hagana in Jerusalem, Vol. II, p. 123.

64. Series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Barzilai.


66. Series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Idelstein.

67. Jerusalem Archives, statement of Petahia Zelivansky.

68. FRUS 1948, Vol. 5, p. 817.

69. Jabotinsky Institute, statement of Ben-Zion Cohen; previously cited interview with

Ben-Zion Cohen; previously cited interview with Yehoshua Gorodenchik.

70. David She'alti'el Archives, Ben-Nur report; Jabotinsky Institute, Deir Yassin file.

71. Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Gorodenchik.

72. Author's archives, previously cited report by the Hagana's Jerusalem commander;

series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Barzilai and Moshe Idelstein.

73. Jabotinsky Institute, statements of Reuven Greenberg.


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75. Jabotinsky Institute, Deir Yassin file; previously cited interviews with Ben-Tzion

Cohen and Moredechai Ra'anan.

76. Interview with Yonah Feitelson on November 29, 1978.

77. ETZEL Campaigns Annals 6, p.83; interview with Yonah Ben Sasson on May 10,1980; previously cited interview with Petahia Zelivansky.

78. Jabotinsky Institute, statements of Mordechai Ra'anan, Yehuda Lapidot and

Yehoshua Gorodenchik; previously cited interviews with Moredechai Ra'anan and

Yehuda Lapidot.

79. Jerusalem Archives, previously cited statement of Petahia Zelivansky; series of

previously cited interviews with Shim'on Moneta.

80. Jabotinsky Institute; previously cited statement of Ben-Tzion Cohen; previouslycited interviews with Ben-Tzion Cohen.

81. Interview with Michael Harif on June 22, 1981.

82. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statement of Mordechai Ra'anan; Jerusalem

Archives, previously cited statement of Petahia Zelivansky and statement of Ezra

Yakhin; interview with Ezra Yakhin on July 28, 1987.

83. Author's Archives, report on the ETZEL-LEHI action at Deir Yassin; series of

previously cited interview with Eliyahu Arbel.

84. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statement of Mordechai Ra'anan; series of

previously cited interviews with Mordechai Ra'anan; series of previously cited

interviews with Yehoshua Zetler, Moshe Idelstein and Moshe Barzilai; previously

cited inteviews with David She'altil and Mordechai Gihon; interview with Shlomo

Havilyo on January 26, 19888; IDF Archives, Statements No. 32 of Zalman Mart, No.

31 of Yeshurun Schiff, No. 75 of David She'alti'el and No. 53 of Tzion Eldad; Yitzhak

Levi, Nine Measures, p.343.

85. Previously cited interview with Yonah Feitelson.

86. IDF Archives, Watch Officer's report, night of April 8-9, 1948.

87. Interview with Nahum Gross on Januarly 19, 1988.

88. IDF Archives, Yitzhav Levi file, report by Mordechai Gihon on the capture of

Deir-Yassin, excerpts published in Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures , p. 342-343;


20/27

Author's Archives, Uri Brenner's interview, given to the author, with a participant in

the incident; Jerusalem ARchives, previously cited statement of Moshe Idelstein.

89.Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Gorodenchik; Yedi'ot-Ma'ariv, April 9,

1948

90. Hamashkif, April 11, 1948

91. Jabotinsky Institute, ETZEL veteras' petition against the Defense Ministry.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statements of Petahia Zelivansky; previously

cited interview with Petahia Zelivansky.


96. Jerusalem Archives, previously cited statement of Reuven Greenberg.

97. Jabotinsky Institute, Deir-Yassin file; previously cited interviews with Ben-Tzion

Cohen, Michael Harif and Mordechai Ra'anan.

98. Interview with Dvora Ya'akobi on November 25, 1987; interview with Bruria

Hoffman in November, 1987; interview with Yerah Etzion in July, 1987.

99. Author's Archives, "Elazar" report.

100. Author's Archives, report by Etzioni intelligence officer; previously cited

interview with Mordechai Gihon.

101. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statements of Mordechai Ra'anan,

BenTzion Cohen and Yehuda Lapidot; previously cited interviews with Mordechai

Ra'anan, Ben-Tzion Cohen, Yehuda Lapidot; interview with Ezra Yakhin on July 28,

1987.

102. Author's Archives, Etzioni intelligence report.

103. Author's Archives, from "Etzioni" (David She'alti'el) to "Hillel" (Yisra'el Galili),

April 11, 1948; IDF Archives, Statements No. 57 of Tzion Eldad and No. 75 of David

She'alti'el; Archives of Hakibbutz Hame'uchad, War of Independence Statement Files,

lecture by Yosef Tabenkin at the Efal Teachers' College on February 3, 1981;


21/27

Jabotinsky Institute, statements of Yehuda Marienberg, Yehuda Lapidot and

Yehoshua Gorodenchik; series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Barzilai;

interview with Dvora Simhon on May 7, 1968; previously cited interview with

Yehoshua Gorodenchik; Archives of Hakibbutz Hame'uchad, War of Independence

Statement Files, previously cited statement of Me'ir Zorea; previously cited interview

with Me'ir Zorea; Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi Archives, statement of Zalman Mart.

104. Previously cited interview with Yonah Ben-Sasson; series of interviews with

Avraham Halperin, who replaced Ben-Sasson until a new commander was appointed

to Givat-Saul); Jabotinsky Institute, statement of Yehuda Marienberg; Yardena

Golani: The Myth of Deir-Yassin, p. 44.

105. Previously cited interview with Yehuda Lapidot; Jabotinsky Institute, previously

cited statement of Yehoshua Gorodenchik; previously cited interview with Yehoshua

Gorodenchik.

106. IDF Archives, report by Ya'akov Weg in the Yitzhak Levi file; excerpts

published in Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures, pp. 343-344; Hadassah Avigdori, The Path

We Took, p. 91; Author's Archives, previously cited statements provided by Uri

Brenner and previously cited letter from Nahum Gross to Natan Donewitz; series of

previously cited interviews with Moshe Eren, Moshe Idelstein and Moshe Barzilai;

previously cited interviews with David Gottlieb and Petahia Zelivansky; interview

with Kalman Rosenblatt on July 28, 1987; interview with Gid'on Sarig on March 22,

1987; interview with Ya'akov Giron on October 29, 1983; previously cited interview

with Nahum Gross.

107. Ha'aretz, April 11, 1948.

108. Al Hamishmar, April 13, 1948.

109. Yardena Golani, The Myth of Deir-Yassin, pp. 64-68;- Jabotinsky Institute,

previously cited statements of Yehoshua Gorodenchik and Yehuda Lapidot.

110. Auvior's Al rchives, Deir-Yassin papers; interview with Sarah Peli on July 9,

3.937; series of previously cited interviews with Yehoshua Zetler; Xol-Hair, inlay 1,

1981.

111. Natan Yellin-Mor, Freedom Fighters of Israel, Shikmona, Jerusalem, 1974, p.

472; Jerusalem Archives, statement of Yaffa Badian; previously cited interviews with

Moshe Barziiai and Shim'on Moneta; Yo'el Kimhi, letter to the editor, Yecli'ot

Aharonot, May 2, 1972.


22/27

112. Author's Archives, Deir-Yassin papers.

113. Problems of the Times- An Open Forum of Public Life, Vol. VII, No. 3, April

15,1948.

114. Al Hamishmar, August 4, 1972.

115. Jerusalem Archives, statement of Shim'on Moneta.

116. Author's Archives, previously cited report to David She'alti'el on the capture of

Deir-Yassin, April 12, 1948; previously cited interview with Gid'on Sarig; series of

previously cited interviews with Moshe Barzilai and Yehoshua Zetler.

117. Previously cited interview with Bruria Hoffman.


119. Hadassah Avigdori, The Path We Took, p. 90; previously cited interview with

Moshe Eren.


121. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statement of Mordechai Ra'anan; series of

previously cited interviews with Mordechai Ra'anan.

122. Hamashkif, Davar and. Ha'aretz, April 11, 1948; series of previously citedinterviews with Mordechai Ra'anan.

123. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statements of Yehuda Marienberg and

Yehuda Lapidot; series of previously cited interviews with Shim'on Moneta;

previously cited interview with Yehoshua Gorodenchik.

124. Author's Archives, statement provided the author by Uri Brenner; Jabotinsky

Institute, statement of Knesset Member Me'ir Pa'il. In 1989, Pa'il said that he had put a

number in that report as no one had made a body count at the time.

125. Jerusalem Archives, previously cited statements of Petahia Zelivansky;

previously cited interview with Petahia Zelivansky; series of previously cited

interviews with Shim' on M oneta.

126. Jacques de Reynier, A Jerusalem fottait sur la Ligne de Feu, Neuchatel, Editions

de la Baconniere, 1950, pp. 69-78; interview with Dr. Alfred Engel on December 7,


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1987; series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Barzilai; Jerusalem Archives,

previously cited statement of Petahia Zelivansky; Ha'aretz, April 12, 1948.



129. Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Ari'eli; interview with Tzvi Ankori on

December 9, 1987.

130. Jerusalem Archives, previously cited statement of Petahia Zelivansky.

131. Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Ari'eli.

132. Interview with Doron Hisday in January, 1988.

133. Interview with Baruch Sarel in January, 1988.

134. Previously cited interview with Tzvi Ankori. Ankori did not know that De

Reynier had already been to Deir-Yassin.

135. Author's Archives, military police action report, April 12, 1948; Author's

Archives, from "Oded" to district commander, April 12, 1948; series of previously

cited interviews with Yitzhak Levi. According to Levi, Oded was a Home Guard,

commander.

136. Author's Archives, given to the author by Yehuda Lapidot.

137. Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi Archives, Cassette No. 425.

138. Previously cited interviews with Yehoshua Ari'eli and Tzvi Ankori.

139. Jerusalem Archives, previously cited statement of Petahia Zelivansky.

140. Previously cited interview with Tzvi Ankori.

141. Previously cited interview with Doron Hisday.

142. Previously cited interview with Yeshuron Schiff.

143. Author's Archives, from Oded to district commander, April 12, 1948.

144. Author's Archives, to Tzion Eldad, reply to "Oded" complaint.


24/27

145. Yardena Golani, The Myth of Deir-Yassin, p. 79.

146. Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Ari'eli.

147. Interview with Hillel Politi in December, 1987.

148. Interview with Eli Korah in November, 1987.

149. Interview with Shoshana Shatay in November, 1987.

150. Previously cited interviews with Mordechai Raanan and Yehuda Lapidot;Hamashkif, April 11, 1948.

151. Authors Archives, previously cited statements of Meir Pail; Ilan Kfir, ThreeVersions of the Deir-Yassin Affair, in Yediot Aharonot, April 4, 1972; Meir Pail,

The Fractured Truth of the Deir-Yassin Affair, in Yediot Aharonot, April 20, 1972.

152. Interview with David Cohen on July 18, 1987.

153. Authors Archives, Book of the State draft, p. 216-217.

154. Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures, p. 342.

155. Series of previously cited interviews with Shimon Moneta.

156. Series of previously cited interviews with Moshe Idelstein.


158. Previously cited interview with Yonah Feitelson.

159. Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Arieli, corroborated by Mrs. Arieli,who was present during the interview. Arab witnesses now accept this figure and

admit exaggerating the Deir-Yassin massacre for propaganda purposes. The Jerusalem

Report, April 2, 1998.

160. Kol Hair, May 1, 1981.

161. Authors Archives, recorded conversation with senior military officer, December4, 1987.

162. Authors Archives, Hagana intelligence, daily summary, April 18, 1948.


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163. Authors Archives, previously cited statements of Meir Pail; Ilan Kfir, ThreeVersions of the Deir-Yassin Affair; Meir Pail, The Fractured Truth of the Deir-

Yassin Affair. ,

164. Interview with Moshe Idelstein on November 25, 1987, with Moshe Barzilai

present.

165. Previously cited interviews with Mordechai Raanan, Yehoshua Zetler, Petahia

Zelivansky, Yehuda Lapidot and Moshe Barzilai.

166. Previously cited interview with Moshe Eren.

167. Previously cited interview with Shlomo rlavilyo.

163. Previously cited interview with Yehoshua Arieli.

169. Authors Archives, re: Atrocities by Dissidents during Deir-Yassin Action,April 12, 1948.

170. Authors Archives, letter from Yitzhak Levi to Nienachern Begin, April 14,1971.

171. Yitzhak Levi, Pline iWeasures, p. 344.

172. Previously cited interview with Yonah Ben-Sasson.

173. File No. 179/110/17, from Collins & LaPierre, O Jenasalem, p. 278; ETZEL

Campaigns Annals 6, pp. 90-91.

174. Kol Hair, May 1, 1981.

175. Ilan Kfir, Three Versions of the Deir-Yassin Affair.

176. Series of previously cited interviews with Yisrael Netah.

177. Previously cited interview with Kalman Rosenblatt.

178. Previously cited interview with Gidon Sarig.

179. Jabotinsky Institute, previously cited statement of Reuven Greenberg.

180. Yoram Nimrod, Deir-Yassin - The Event and the Method, in the anthology

Oranirn, 1987, pp. 82-86.


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181. Israel State Archives, Political and Diplomatic Papers (1980), December, 1947

May, 1948, No. 376, p. 625, note 1.

182. Israel State Archives, Political and Diplomatic Papers (1980), December, 1947

May, 1948, Document No. 376, the Jewish Agency to King Abdallah, April 12, 1948.

183. Israel State Archives, Political and Diplomatic Papers (1980), December, 1947 May, 1948, No. 376, p. 626, note 3.

184. Alishmar, December 4, 1947.

185. Mishmar, December 8, 1947.

186. Davar, January 18, 1948.

187. Mishmar, January 23, 1948.

188. Mishmar, January 25, 1948.

189. Ibid.

190. Yoav Gelber, Why Did They Dissolve the Palmach?, Schocken, 1986, pp.83-84, 101-102.

191. Ihid., p. 102 .

192. Al Hamishmar, March 7, 1948.

193. Central Zionist Archives 45/1, minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive meeting,

March 17, 1948.

194. Al Hamishmar, March 19, 1948.

195. Yoav Gelber, Why Did They Dissolve the Palmach?, p. 98.

196. Central Zionist Archives S/5/322, minutes of the Zionist Executive meeting,

April 6, 1948; Al Hamishmar, Hamashkif, Haaretz, Davar and Hatzofeh, April 7,1948. Bar-Yehuda was referring to rumors that ETZEL had robbed Sharon district

Arabs of 1,000 head of cattle.

197. Hamashkif, April 5, 1948.

198. Central Zionist Archives S/5/322, minutes of the Zionist Executive meeting,


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April 7, 1948; Al Hamishmar, Hamashkif, Haaretz, Davar and Hatzofeh, April 8,1948.

199. Al Hamishmar and Hamashkif, April 12, 1948.

200. Central Zionist Archives S/5/322, April 12-16, 1948.


202. Avraham, Deir-Yassin and its Disgrace, in Bamahane, No. 5-6.

203. Series of previously cited interviews with Yisrael Galih and Yigal Yadin.

204. Sources of his version are found in the text.

205. Series of previously cited interviews with Shimon Moneta.

206. Background Notes on Current Themes, No. 6, Dir-Yassin, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Information Division, Jerusalem, March, 1969.

207. Authors Archives, Yitzhak Levi to Menachem Begin, April 12, 1971.

208. Menachem Begin, Invitation to Visit London, in Maariv, April 23, 1971.

209. Authors Archives, Gideon Raphael to Shaul Avigur, April 18, 1971.

210. Authors Archives, Abba Eban to Yisrael Galili, May 10, 1971.

211. Hamashkif, , April 20, 1948.

212. FO 371/68632.

213. Series of previously cited statements of Shimon Moneta.

214. Abdallah al-Tel, Memoirs, Maarachot, 1960, p. 27.

215. Yisrael Ber, Israels Security - Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, p. 193. Amysterious character who served as a senior officer in the Hagana and later in the IDF,

Ber became a historian and military commentator for Haaretz. He later was chargedwith espionage for the USSR and died in prison while serving his sentence.

Documents

Historian Uri Milstein Debunks the Myths of Deir Yassin