The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company: Technical Intelligence in

the Southwest and Western Pacific Areas, 1942-1945.

The outbreak of war in December 1941 found the United States Armygenerally unprepared, especially in the field of technical intelligence.Enemy equipment captured in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was, until1942, only given brief examination by Ordnance or Chemical Warfare Serviceofficers before forwarding to the Australian Army General Staff, Intel-ligence (10) for examination and testing.

Training Circular No. 81, issued in November 1942, established pro-ceedures for the evacuation of captured materiel, but responsibility foranalysis remained with the Theater staff officers of the services and, toa large extent, with the Australian Army. The situation began to improvein late December 1942, when five Ordnance officers and ten enlistedpersonnel, all trained in technical intelligence at Aberdeen ProvingGround, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., arrived at Headquarters, US ArmyService of Supply (USASOS), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia. On 30 December,Major Alan C. Johnston, the ranking officer, was tasked to organize anOrdnance Technical Intelligence Unit for the Theater. The unit was to beunder the control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USASOS, in accordancewith policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (ACofS,G-2),USASOS. The original organization called for an Administrative Section,an Ordnance Analysis Section, and several Technical Intelligence FieldTeams. The latter were designed to operate from an advance base or witha regular combat unit. The Field Teams usually consisted of one officerand one or more enlisted personnel, and had the mission of collectingenemy equipment and sending it back to the Ordnance Analysis Section forexamination and evaluation. Assignments were flexible and personnel wereoften used interchangeably in the different sections.

Responsibility for technical intelligence was turned over to theUS Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) in February 1943, and Major Johnstonwas appointed USAFFE Technical Intelligence Officer, under the directcontrol of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USAFFE. Except for an enlistedassistant, all other Ordnance technical intelligence personnel werecarried under the T/O's of the Ordnance Office, USASOS, and the variousUSASOS Base Sections.

Until February 1943, Chemical Warfare Service staff officers madepreliminary examinations of captured chemical equipment and munitions,but evacuation and technical analysis remained the responsibility ofthe Australian Army. With the formation of USAFFE in February, aChemical Warfare Intelligence Section was formed from locally availablepersonnel. The Section originally consisted of two officers and oneenlisted man, designated the Chemical Intelligence Section, USASOS, andthree field teams of one officer and one enlisted each.

On 27 May 1943, Headquarters USAFFE directed the Commanding General,USASOS, to establish a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment near

S5um*-av 13y OPT Roiesr A. NAra-O Jr, MIAC5I- ISD, MAIMC 1t2

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the Australian depot at Base Section 3. Although the Ordnance andChemical Warfare Service Analysis Sections were still separate fromthe salvage depot, its establishment was the first step toward a co-

ordinated technical intelligence effort. Coordination for the analysis

of equipment captured by US and Australian forces after it reached the

joint salvage depot area was the responsibility of the newly estab-

lished Joint Allied Captured Enemly Equipment Board. During this period

both Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service field teams operated with

Allied forces in New Guinea.

On 29 September 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferredfrom USAFFE to USASOS control. Headquarters USASOS began planningfor the establishment of a Technical Intelligence Depot with sectionsfrom all services except Signal and Engineer. Before the plans couldbe implemented, a 22 December 1943 USAFFE directive, "Responsibilityof Technical Intelligence," delegated the responsibility for groundtechnical intelligence to the CG, USASOS, and directed him to establisha Technical Intelligence Depot along slightly different lines.

After study of the directive, the ACofS, G-2, USASOS, recommendedthe formation of a Technical Intelligence Composite Company utilizingpersonnel from all technical services except Transportation. Thecompany would operate under defined T/0's and T/E's and would providefor greater centralization and flexibility of the technical intelligenceeffort. The recommendations were forwarded to the CG, USAFFE, on 7December 1943, and were approved. General Orders No. 2, HeadquartersUSASOS, dated 3 January 1944, announced the organization of the 5250thTechnical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), under

the T/0's submitted in the 7 December recommendations. Personnel wereto be carried on Detached Service from their source units, and eachservice section was to operate under the general supervision of thechief of the service concerned. The problem of provisional organi-zation was that personnel detailed to the 5250th were still carriedon the rosters of their source units, making promotion difficult. Theformation of the 5250th as other than a provisional unit was un-favorably considered by USAFFE on 10 January. The ACofS, G-2, USASOS,directed the chiefs of all six services to furnish qualified per-sonnel for the 5250th on 20 January 1944, and all transfers were madeby February 1944.

The 5250th was organized with a Coordination and AdministrationSection, and a Technical Section for each of the represented services.Each Technical Section was to be composed of a Laboratory Element andseveral Enemy Equipment Intelligence Teams. However, on the Ordnance,Signal, and Quartermaster Sections operated analysis laboratories atthis time. Chemical analysis was done at either the 42d Chemical orthe Victoria Munitions Supply laboratories. Engineer and Medical Servicesdid not have teams in the field until the hlollandia operation in April1944. General supervision over the 5250th was furnished by the ACofS,G-2, USASOS. Major Johnston continued as Acting Commanding Officer, havingno orders appointing him to command as yet. Ile also served in the Office

of the ACofS, G-2, USASOS, as Technical Intelligence Coordinator.

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In December 1943, just prior to the organization of the 5250thTechnical Intelligence Company, the G-2, USAFFE, had been requested toask Sixth Army to permit a Combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit(Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Services) to participate in the CapeGloucester operation. The Combined Field Team was authorized but SixthArmy would not allow it forward of Finschhafen, although a three-manOrdnance Team did get to Saidor from January to March 1944. For theAdmiralty Islands operation (29 February - 18 May 1944), Ordnance andChemical Warfare Service Technical Intelligence Field Teams wereattached to the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Teams supporting the1st Cavalry Division. The CIC officer was in charge of each of thecombined teams, which also included personnel from the Naval MobileExplosives Investigation Unit. The first technical intelligence per-sonnel landed on 6 March (D+6). This was the first campaign in whichmembers of more than one technical service's operations were co-ordinated and it proved that a larger area could be covered in lesstime using this method.

Planning began for the Hollandia operation. Four officers fromthe Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland,and one officer and 14 enlisted personnel from the 234th QuartermasterSalvage Collecting Company arrived at the Finschhafen Depot. Bothseparate service and combined teams, and a composite unit were tobe formed for the operation. Separate Ordnance and Chemical WarfareService Technical Intelligence Teams supported the 41st Infantry Div-ision, while a combination of Chemical Warfare Service and Naval MobileExplosives Investigation Unit Teams were attached to the CIC Team insupport of the ACofS, G-2, 24th Infantry Division. Technical Intel-ligence Composite Unit #1 was formed between 13 and 23 April and con-sisted of nine officers and three enlisted men representing the sixtechnical services. Unit #1 landed on 30 April (D+8) and went intooperation. Engineer Field Team #3, the first Engineer Team to operatein the field, joined the Composite Unit for a short time, then departedfor operations on Biak Island.

Letter, GSB 323.3, HQ USASOS, dated 25 March 1944, and Letter,FEGB, 386.3, HQ USAFFE, dated 28 March 1944, authorized the establish-ment of a US Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen effective20 April 1944. During July and August the various laboratory analysissections moved from Brisbane to Finschhafen, thus reducing the distancebetween collectors (field teams) and evaluators (laboratories). Thecombining of the Laboratory Analysis Sections and the Receiving-ShippingSection at both Finschhafen and at the tempory Composite Unit #1 fielddeport at Hollandia resulted in more efficient operations.

Various Field Teams participated in the Biak Island (27 May -20 August 1944) and Sansapor (30 July - 31 August 1944) operations.In July, one officer was placed on detached service from the 5250th,and became the Technical Intelligence Coordinator with Hteadquarters,Sixth Army-a move which greatly enhanced the technical intelligencecoordination effort. On 25 August, Major Eugene 11. Manley, CE, wasofficially appointed as Commanding Officer, 5250th Technical IntelligenceComposite Company, Separate (Provisional), and as the Technical Intel-

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ligence Coordinator to the ACofS, G-2, USASOS. Major Johnston, theformer CO, assumed coimnand of the Ordnance Technical IntelligenceSection for thle forthcoming Phil ippine Islands operation. By 31August 1944, the 5250th consisted of 16 officers and 25 enlistedpersonnel from the War Department and 30 officers and 30 enlistedpersonnel from Theater technical service units.

Although technical intelligence units continued to support theisland hopping operations, emphasis was placed on preparations for thePhilippine Islands operations. Plans for the Leyte phase envisionedthree composite technical intelligence units - Technical IntelligenceUnit #1 (Ordnance, Signal and Engineer) with the 24th Infantry Div-ision; Unit #2 (all six technical services) with the 1st Cavalry Div-ision; and Unit #3 (all six technical services) with the Army ServiceCommand and further detached to Headquarters, Base K, at Tacloban,Leyte. Unit #1 was attached with the CIC Team under the ACofS, G-2,24th Infantry Division, and landed with the second wave. After eightdays of operations, Unit #1 returned to the Technical IntelligenceDepot at Finschhafen. The Officer-in-Charge of Unit #2 also servedas the Technical Intelligence Coordinator to Sixth Army. On 1 November,Unit #2 also returned to the Finschhafen Depot. Unit #3 landed on21 October (D+l) and acted as a forward provisional depot for Units#1 and 2 until their return to Finschhafen.

In November, after the return of the Technical IntelligenceComposite Units to Finschaffen, another reorganization of the 5250thtook place. Personnel from Units #1-3 were used as nuclei for theformation of Units #4-7 for the Luzon Campaign. On 14 November, theTechnical Intelligence Coordinator and a reorganized Unit #1 wereattached to Headquarters, Eighth Army for the remainder of the Leyteoperation. In December, Field Units #1-7 moved out to join theircombat units for the Luzon operation. Initially, a Technical Intel-ligence Composite Unit was attached to each division under supervisionof the division G-2. Experience soon demonstrated that greater flex-ibility could be obtained by assigning units to corps, where theyfunctioned under the corps G-2 and technical service staff officers,and from which they could be assigned to the areas of most need. Inaddition, one unit was designated as Sixth Army Headquarters Unit.The limited quantities of captured medical and quartermaster equip-ment made it unnecessary to assign technical personnel from thesebranches any lower than corps level. One Ordnance technican wasdetailed to special duty with the Special Intelligence Section, SixthArmy, to collect and repair weapons and equipment for issue to Filipinoguerrilla forces. A special team, designated the JAPLAT Team, was formedto collect data from Japanese equipment nameplates to satisfy a require-ment from the Military Intelligence Division in Washington.

Field Units #1-7 took part in the initial Luzon operations, withUnit #3 again functioning as the forward provisional depot, first atSan Jacinto and then at Angeles. By March, Field Units #1, 2, 3, 6, and7 had been relieved of field duties and had returned to the Depot. FieldUnits #4, 5, 8, and 9 (the latter having been formed during the operation)remained on field duty with their combat units.

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With the opening of the Luzon Campaign, steps were talen to closedown the US Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen and to moveit, except for a rear-echelon force, to Manila when that city should becaptured. Operations at Finschhafen ceased 28 February 1945, and the movebegan on 12 March. After the capture of Manila, the new US Army TechnicalIntelligece Depot was established there on 26 March, with eight officersand 38 enlisted personnel. The 5250th had 68 officers and 139 enlistedpersonnel in February, with nine field units attached to Sixth Army(36 officers and 60 enlisted), and three field units attached to EighthArmy (16 officers and 27 enlisted), but by March had grown to 90 officersand 185 enlisted personnel with a total of 72 field teams.

Headquarters Eighth Army Circular #138, dated 10 May 1945, directedthat the the technical intelligence teams in its area of operations wouldcome under the operational, administrative, and technical control of therespective technical service chiefs and would coordinate with the G-2 ofthe unit tho which they were attached. Field Unit #1, once again re-organized, was split into various teams--referred to by the prefix Victorand a number--for mopping-up operations in the southern Philippines. Mostof the Victor teams had completed their missions by June 1945 and had re-turned to the Depot. Planning was begun for Operations Olympic andCoronet--the invasion of Japan. Headquarters AFPAC tasked AFWESPAC andSixth Army to provide 52 officers and 97 enlisted men divided into a"field depot", five "A" and five "B" units. The Field Depot Unit wouldconsist of two officers and seven enlisted, and would include Ordnance,Quartermaster, and JAPLAT teams. The type "A" field units would consistof six officers and ten enlisted, and would include teams from all sixtechnical services plus a JAPLAT team. The type "B" field units wouldconsist of four officers and eight enlisted, composed of Ordnance, Signal,Engineer, Chemical, and JAPLAT teams. At this time, the 5250th wasaugmented by the arrival of HHD, 98th Quartermaster Battalion.

Japan's surrender put an end to the invasion planning, but the 5250thwas alerted to move the field units to Japan on 23 August. The 5250thwas further strengthened with the arrival of 38 officers and 58 enlistedpersonnel. The "A" units, designated Field Teams #1-5, the "B" units,designated as Field Teams #51-55, and the depot, designated Field DepotUnit #71, departed Manila for Japan during late August and early September1945. The original organization was modified slightly and the totalstrength of these units was 53 officers and 100 enlisted. The Field Unitswere assigned to the subordinate corps of the Sixth and Eighth Armies andthe Field Depot Unit was attached to Sixth Army Headquarters.

GHQ, AFPAC General Orders #337 and 369, dated 20 and 30 November1945, reassigned the 5250the to the direct control of GHQ, AFPAC. GO #337established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a Theater overheadinstallation with an authorized strength of 90 officers and 261 enlistedpersonnel. GO #369 dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence CompositeCompany, (Separate) Provisional. LTC Manley remained as the ComimandingOfficer and LTC David S. Tait became the Technical Intelligence Coordinator.

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The 5250th was also assigned responsibility for the United States ArmyTechnical Intelligence Center, which had been established under the G-2,GHQ, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). The Technical IntelligenceDepot began to shut down operations in October, the personnel departedManila between 6 and 9 November, and the unit closed in Tokyo on 20November 1945.

Upon arrival in Japan, the 5250th personnel were assigned to SpecialTroops, GHQ, SCAP, although they worked under the control of the ACofS,G-2, GHQ, SCAP. They worked through the War Department Technical Intel-ligence Targeting Section (WDIT), which was headed by COL Walter S. Wood.The WDIT decided what captured enemy equipment and which enemy installationswould be exploited under the provisions of General Orders #9 and 15,2 October and 9 November 1945. LTC Tait became the head of the TechnicalIntelligence Section for WDIT operations. The 5250th examined a numberof installations and a large amount of Japanese industrial and militaryequipment.

The end of hostilities saw the beginning of the demise of the 5250thand of the decline of technical intelligence in the United States Army.Technical intelligence organizations were revived during the Korean andVietnam conflicts and were based, in large part, on the lessons learnedfrom the 5250th, but technical intelligence remained almost dormant betweenactual hostilities--an extremely valuable but neglected field of intel-ligence.

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525Oth TFmrI TLIGENCE COMPANY

tokyo, JapanVOLUI7 I 7 Deceiber 1945

Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter I ... . .. . . . . .. .. ITech Intoll By Ord and CVS: Dec 42 - Jan 44

Cha'pter II . . . . . . . * *. . . .* . *. * * *. . * * . . 125250th Tech Intoll Cornp Co, Sop (r): Jt.n -- May 44

ChnptcrIII . . . ., . ..... .. . . .. ... 24Hollandia: 4^pr -- Jul 44

Chapter IV. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 36Biak to Yorotai: :ay -- Oct 44

Chapter V . . . . ........... .. . ... .. 54Return to the .hilippines: Oct -- Dec 44

Chapter VI . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 63Arny Tech Intcll Depot: Oct 44 -- Fcb

Chapter VII . . .. . . . . . . . . ... .. . .. 67Operations on Luzon: Jan -- July 45

Chapter VIII . . . . . . . . , .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 86Southern Philippine Caapaign: Dec 44 -- July 45

Chapter IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100The 52b0th at- Ilaila: Iar -- Sept 45

Chapter X. . .. .. ... . . . . . . . . .112Tecmical Intelligence Center, Japan: Oct -- Nov 45

VOLUME II

Inclosurcs 1 - 34 inclusive

ITdN3:H. ATbY ig -Co1101 GSC

Comtlanding

US. ARhMY XAinV TAt.l: fie:j-7 ":'s Ur t,f'TTE

HI = [ OHYH NG GiCGIUiOAL NIELLIGx

~T THE

SOMEST ANM lWESTEZ PACIFIC WIEAS

1942 -- 1946

_N T ; 0 E UC T _ N_

When the United States rras plunged into a Far Eastern war;Tith Japan by the bo:-:bing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941,pwe came fne t½ fac, :-Lth the fact that vie knew little or noth-ing about that Tslanc, -apire.. '-hat had Japan in the wzay of anArmy and a iavy? .7hat about their Mariana.s outposts and the otherJap mandatad islands? Hov' and with What -;'eapons vwould the Jap-anese fight?

Many of these questions in the early phases of the war wereunanswered. '.le had a war on our hands ye t vwe were uncertain ofthe onemy's capabilities. Our Technical Intelligence vas prac-tically non-existent -- , and vie almost lrost the war asaresult..ie found the enemry much more potent than -most strategists had.expected, and we paid for underestimating his strength with aseries of strategic withdravals to the south. '7e lost importantbases for a counter offensive -- the Philippines, Hong Kong,'Singapore, Java, Borneo, the entire group of islands to thenorth of New Guinca, even the northern portion of New Guineaitself.

'JIith only trwo American and trro Australian divisions be-tween them-and a completion of the conquest of the whole 'bes-tern Pacific, the Japs vrere finally stopped on the Tfokoda Trai l(Yap, Incl 1) in their drive toward the Allied base at PortMoresby.

The comeback look3d long and hard. Over three thousandmiles of ocean with thousands of Jap-garrisoned islands laybetween us and Tokyo. :!e now kne1.r the enery's capabilitiesand how absolutely his ,holo home economy had been geared tototal war, but an army in retreat learns little of the enemy'smateriel, equipment and vieapons, except their terrific effect.

These were among the major objectives of the Allies: toknowr what weapons the enemy had so that ?eo c6uld devise

pRPoET v Us AP VMY

HIMSORY Ca TECHNICAL INELIGENCE

countermeasures and countertactics of our own; to exploit im-portant discoveries for our owvn benefit; to rrin the technologicalraceO

In the earliest months of the war the United States had amere handful of Technical Intelligence men in the Pacific The-ater, dependent for training upon the iaJstralian Army. ThenTechnical Intell.Vgonce was" talkn over by the Ordnance and Chem-ical I7arfare Sc..ice sections of the United States .rxmy ForcesFar East (USAf.i) under the supervision of their respectiveservice chiefs, Thi.: operations, beginning in a small ray,culminrates 3 YJiz.ar, :.944 in the formation of a coordinatedorganization ofC th s:' m;r.jor services, the 5250th TechnicalIntelligence Coi oDsit .Company, Soparate (Provisional). The470 technical exports cadministered through this company Xkptthe JAllied Forces infoimod of Japanose progress in arms, armin-ition and equipmsont. They oere the oyes and the cars of thearmy in the battle of the Pacific.

As differentiated from the enenm in Earope, the Yapanesefoughtw in many cases, on a shoestring; their tenuous supplylines, reaching to the various island groups, were generallysevered before the llied troops ;rent into operation and bLack-logs of enemy supplies were consequently rwell depleted; surr-onder on masse, such as occurred in Eiropel with the accompany-ing seizure of large stores of cnepy supplies, was unklown inthe var with Japan until the sunmer of 1945 -- when the war wasover. The capture, then, of any considerable quantity of Jap-anese equipment was a matter of great Intelligence inportance,

The following pages trace the development and operationsof Technical Intelligence from NeM Guinea to the Philippinosto the occupation of Yapan, This is the history of the pion-eers of Technical Intelligence in the Pacific. an integral,vital -- and norr we know -- indispensable part of the historyof the Uhited States lJrn,

2

TCHDNICembeIL 4I2IGE BY O>IMOWCE -- a jai`Ra 1'I

Deconiember 1942 -- Jamary 1944

From the opening of the Pacific W7ar until. Novemiber 1942, therewas little Tochnial Di 'olligonco c.ctivity in the Southwost Pacificareoa (S)SJ.'). f: . smrz: L armr3 and some amnuni,;ion plus a few itemsof Chemical l7arf'a, c ¢p ._mIlnt viere turned into the Ordnance andChemical Warfare officers for exanination and tien forwarded by bothAmerican and Australian forces to the ;ustralia.l 4rmr for examin-ation, test and report. No organized attormit hLd been rade, how-ever, to have Technical Intelligonce carried into the field by ateam of men skillod in collecting and analyzing captured onemyequiEent.

Technical Intelligence in 4ccordance with Traliin GCircul.ar o 81

In November 1942, Training Circular No. 81 establihied a moreclosely knit control for processing captured enemy equipment of In-telligence value. The flow of materiel was/Mom combat troops (therewere, as yet, no Technical Intelligence teams) to service troops inthe combat zone, to the theater special staff officer of the approp-riate service, to the (Shief of the appropriate service in the UnitedStates. Flow of informational reports uas through channels fromthe combat troops to the S-2 or G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Stmff,G-2, (AO of S) to the War Department, as relL as interchangeablywith the service troops handling the mriteriel.

Combat personnel capturing equipment of ow design sent itroarward through normal recovery channels together . th accassories,anrminition, and pertinent information, each service hmndling itsown equipmennt. Simultaneous3y, a report ams rendered throughchannela.

rintenance and supply service personel delivered captudequipat, with no maintenance other than the application of pro-servatives, direct to the Theater spooial staff officor of the

EISTOfRY aF ICIgICAL INIEI E

same arm or sorvice or to his dosignated establisfmaut (such asa base Ehop or dopot). Peport nas adie at the sane timeto theG-2 of their corm.ind, Both combat and maintenance porsonnel re-covrring a now type of = teriel of a class supplied by anotheraervice delivered it to the nearest organization of the approp-riate service.

Theatcr staff officers ;ere rospons ble for preliminaryexpert anl!ysis as to the characteristics of the n-teriel. Basedupon. this,- thoy rmade prelirninary deductions as tothe state ofenerey resources for e.T:? as evidenced by the nrateriel, and pub-li~cd prc-limina:/T o".r :-tor's and maintenance --anue.l s, ith in-structi=cs on Jiu:;1L rc :ii.cations that could bo =Mde sothat thecapturod oqcipe-t CCoJ._d be usedbiy tUnited INtiors troops in thefield. Those repcrts, together rith the cap. LLrd rmtoriel(half of the capsnirod riateriol mr.nt ta the Au;l.tralim3ns half tothe MTJited States) -7ere then transmitted to the chief of the amor service concerned in the tUited States. Complete reportswere also made by the Theter staff officers to the G-2 of theTheater staff, and e cossary arrangemonts were rmde when poss-ible to exploit the ener- nmateriel vrhen captured in eidgequantities.

The chief of each supply arm or service in the Zore of theInterior made final analysis and deductiona and prepared finaloperator's and maintenance mamuals azdvisuaL training aids.

The Theater G-2,. under the provisions of this circulea,it will be noted, merely transnittod inforntion on the equip-ment end had no responsibility in its processing.

Ordinance ohanica!, Intellijence:: s .v; 194Z -- Zan1-1 _

As the battle for BAna and Gona, MNw Guinoa, 'Ts drawing toa close in Dacember 1942, a group of five Ordnance officers andton ennlisted men rds preparing to leave the &hited States forthe Southemst Pacific Area. These meon ioere specialists in arm-unition, small arms, artillery, fire controL equilimmt, andtraccld and rheoled vehicles. Previous to their dpeparture theyhad been given an intensive indoctrination ir. Ordnanoo TochnicalIntelligence at Abcrdeon Proving Ground, Mryl&ard, and at Wvish-ington, DO 0.

HISTIM F IC WlEGA

On arrival at Headquarters, tfited States Arr Service of%ppl'y (tSA3Q0), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia, on 30 December 1942,WJor Alan C. Johnston, rankidng officer, vas placed in diarge ofthe group to set up an Ordnance Technical Intelligence organizationfor the Theatere The program was to operate under the technicalccntrol of the Chief vCklnance tfficer, USJISOS*, in accordance '-ithgeneral polii:tos cstablished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,of that headquartors.

The detacilhrnt w&sc broken do-,m into three sections: nheAdninistr.at t .ve S:ctioon, besides being respcrsibla for the generalsupervisicnr of G0.r-nlanc:: ntelligence activities, issued reports,i~ntainm d liai.;' ;Ji withi Fited Statas and ALutra.ian Technical

Intel.Ligence orgaa izat- ,;s in other theaters, collected new dataissued in, the P-ciflc Thicater on Yapmnese Crdn:lonce tiateriel, andforwvarded this inf'ormation to the Chief of &C'ibance, W7ashirngton,D. C. (Technical Intelligence personiel in the South-vwest Pacific.rea and the 'iestcrn Iacific assigned to Headquarters 2Adrinistra-tion throughout the var arc slhorn in Incl 2).

The second section consisted of Technical Intelligeneo FieldTeams composed of an officer and one or more enlisted nen, rhooperated from an .dvwnce base or with a task frces, division orcorps. Their duties were to collect, identify, _repare prolin-inary reports on new iters, and hfip captured Japanese materielto the Ordnance .aalysis Section, (Technical Intelligence per-sonnol in the S7JP 4 and 'Jesteorn Pacific Jarea (EWSPAC) assigned tofield teams and the operations in which they participated arcshovn in Incl 3).

The third las the Ordnance wnalysis Section, located atBrisbane, iustralia, which roceived rLteriel fron field tcems,analyzed and prepared reports on new: items, prepared end shippedJapanese Ordnance materiel toJUnited States troops in the The-ater for training and to the Uited States for Technical inves-tigation and traizing, and maintained liaison -ith Technicalinvestigation and training, and maintained liaison v:ith TechnicalIntelligence organizations in the vicinity (such as the AlliedTranlator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General Headquarters,(GHQ3) 3PA, with General Staff, Intelligence, (10) of the 'us-tralian Army at A'ustralian Land Headquarters and with the WsaterGeneral of ordnance, in ilborne). (Personnel assigned to an-alysis work in the Tcchnical Itenolligence Depots are shown inI4ol 1)

HI3TORY OF TECHMIC,.L IITrELLG1TCE

This first detach-rl-nt of Technical Intclligence personnelassigned to thc Pacific -- all Ordnance -- rT;ce allocated asdcsipglated beloT:

Hecdauearters Section

aj .;lan Co Johnston, OUI.C. S/SEt Paul F. OQick, Chf ClkCapt Donald fr.v.;i:;,a, Xs-t CD1 Ulbcrt BeveridEco Clk

'"C.r~ 'LeC_; r7,,hni ical Intoigjcnec Tcat:!

1st Lt T ..I:n _ , - sh. T/4 Ra>yf.cnd J. IsDvylst Lt EL's' V ' T/4 Yobhn B., .:inT/Sgt C-lei: Eo T,, ... . ..:.

Crdntl ce ! nalysis Section

Lt Eugenc D. W7hit' T/3 John L. Lisd&alkT/.3't Georgc W. Bruncr SSt Clcnrnt JT, Tisnicrek3S/3gt Roethell .-. Loveless C;p1 Harry R. O'V.Lara

Theorc --as considorable flexibility in these asifLn:-:nts andthey vrero often used intcrchngecably, i.e., headquarters and sn-alysis section personnel :-.nt into the field arnd vice versa. 'As

it turned out, Capt adigan, S/Sgt Loveless and !3t Cu,.snicrekworc lwith Headquarters U3iSf3OS till Fobruary 1943 ,.hen the ;vieretransferred to the analysis section at 3risbane. Fronr- JYUclaryuntil July, w;hoen pTt of the personnel :fas pulled for field :-irk,the Ordnance analysis section reported in great detail cn prac-tically all of the rlatericl that -as captured. They issued 26complete tchinical reports -- onec report on the 75rm1 Aj gun, over50 pagecs long, and contained 30 photographs.

Tchnmical Intelligence pcrsonneol received training and in-forriation fronl the Aiustrali an AryV in the carly days, --hich wasquite valuable. se an cxai.ple, Capt hidigan and two enlistedrnn spent 1.9 days in Tblbou-nc in January 1943, at the Officeof the Ihster General of Ordmnnce in VFesley College, lookinp; overtheir coiapleto collection of Japanese Ordnance, taking the c;aponsapart, studyinG and analyzing then.

Though Technical Intelligence ;vas nover actually under theYistralian Arny for administration, except in 1t saeo capacityas other lbhitcd States forcos were attached for esrly operations,the alliince and cooperation twas close and -ms of great benefitto both arraios.

4

HISTORY OF TECHNIC L INTELLrtGETCE

Later, in February 1943, when Technical Intelligence masturned over to United States Army Forces Far Ea~st (USJFFE),Major Johnston vfas appointed Technical Intelligence officcr,opcrating under the direct control of the Chief Ordnanco Off-icer, USFAF E . The only personnel assigned to HoadquartcrsU3AdVFE at that ti:.- were Major Johnston and S/Sgt (Qick. I11other Ordnance Tcohnical Intelligence personnel -.-re carriedon. the T/O of the Ordnance Office, USASOSs and various BaseSoections.

Capt I\dig?:r a",- 'tiat tie operating put, f Base "B", OroBay, Newuv Cuin P e .a, Incl 1) took charge of all field tcams;he also L-S'ufE x'tspC: 9;,bility for investigating the JapanesoOrdnance mt.er:ic:! h.! :,y the Ihastor General of Ordnance, Lus-tralian 4r:%r; and frcl b 6Wrch to 11 July 19i.43 went on tcmaporaryduty -rvith the 42d3 ChoLical ,aboratory Coanp.ny to investigateJapancse explosives and eurnunitions.

Cherical '.!arfaro Service : Dec _19} j - 1 -= 1in

'Whereas Ordnance Technical. Intelligence personnel had booensent directly to the Pacific froa the Uaitod States, the Chem-ical Yiarfarc Intelligence Section was formrd locally.

Throughout 1942, norr types of captured eney equipment weresent to the Chcri.cal.1 ,arfer Service Intelligence Officer, Head-quarters, Now Guinea Forces, fmustralia,. to idoe the prolidinaryexamination und determined its oporatiornal significanco. It wasthen sent to Land Headquasters, ILustralian MryV,, Molbourno,(later, Advance Land Headquarters, Brisbanc) for Technical In-tellicenco. Land Headquarters then issued the equiprment to theappropriate arra or service for complete technical ncalysis andreport. Chomicall arfarc rmunitiors -.ere sent to either 42d Chem-ical Laboratory or the Victoria Manitions Supply Laboratory,Marybyrnong, Victoria, Australia. The entire channel of ovac-uation wa ALustralian.

This was improved sormc-hat in.January 1943, wJhen arrange-ments mere made for liited Sta*tes GChemiical i!arfare IntelligonceOfficers to be notified of rmatoriol sent back fron the for,.ardarea by United States forces so th.t they could work -ith LandHeadquarterst, iustralirin nSrmy, on the disposition of that rnt-eriel.

HISTORY CF TECAITICAL IUTELLGENCE

There ,-as, however, no established Chemical ?Tarfare Intell-igence organization. The work 7ras cnrried on as one of the func-ticnsof the chemical laboratories under the suaprvision of theTechnical Intolliecnce officer of the Chenical Tarfare Section,Headqliarters, UtSA(B. Their analysis consisted merely of exanin-ing and report.ng on Japanese chemical materiel.

It becamn apparent that in addition to the laboratoryanalysis, an c.rta.izacltion was needed which could collect equip-ment and stIdy > 'Panese tactics, methods and prcparat ions for chem-ical warfare. I u February 1943, when USLA@E rwias activated, a Chem-ical Wsarfoae S- t-ion -. sot up in that H aadqu-r ters with an Intell-igernce officer ,ie-;aii.:. to foxr2ulnte plsans for rnrre conprehensiveIntolligere ord ln.iza.-t '.on,

At this tiLnt thereo -icre two officers and one enlisted rTan inthe Chonical Inteilicenco Section, Ijeadqu1.rtes, USASCS: MajorJohn A. Riddick, 1st Lt ;.illiaon . Roberts, and S/3gt Vernon G.Phipps. To these was added another officer, 2d Lt Janmes D. 7asson,responsible for docurents research and publications~

In addition, three officers and three enlisted zion .ereassigned to three field Chemical .arfuorc Intelligence teams rork-ine under the direction of Headquartors USdFIE£ in the foruard areas,Assignmncnts were as follows:

CJS Intellir-ence Tean No. 1

2d Lt Jilliam J. Barry Pfc Paul R. Going

c;JS Intellir:ence Team No. 2

2d Lt Robert 1. Bond Pfc John P. Garner

C01S Intellimence Tearl No. 3

2d Lt Donald B. Henry Cpl Leen C. Schier

On 27 May 1943 the Comranding General, US&ISCS, was directedby par 5, Circular No. 31, Headquarters UStAFF (Incl 5) to "estab-lish at Base Section 3 a salvaGe depot for captured enemy equip-ment, conveniently located in rclzition to the captured encryequipment depot of the 4Australian Army now located in Base Sec-tion 3". The Ordnnnce and Chermical ..arfaro Service analysis sec-tions were still separate fron the depot, riich was used only forshipping and receiving equiprrent; and still there ;r.s no Tech-nical Intelligenco by Engineers, MDdical Corps, 4Qartornastcr orSignal '.orps; nevertheless, it was the first stcp toanrd coordin-ation. 1st Lt Orrio P. Sell, Jtr., IQ , was placed in charge ofthe depot.

6

HISTORY CF TECHNICAL INTELIIGENCE

At the same time, Technica-l Intclligenco of the United Statesand Australia was morc closely coordinated through the activationof the Joint Allied Captured Eoney Equipoent Board wh.ich replacedLand Headquartors in determining, the final disposition of capturedcquipment. AlL. natcricl received at both the United States andAustralian depots :-.~s chocked by the Allied Ea:iy Equipment Boardfor di.spcstion. The Board, consisting of two mmnbors from theUni ted .tates, -tvo from the gLtstrLalian forces, and one from falliedNaval Fordc-sp, e;cr dispcsition of matoriel b_.scd on T3chnicaL train-inn: nccd;o Thq s IJr,:L 'tod both forces to obtain itor.s w-hich nightnot othcr-.-iso bo avc,' blc. M-jor Yohnstor '.ras appointed as a ren-ber of this boa;-li in inc. 194,3 md a£Cainr, -. itl Lt Scll, in Decem-b-r l9i3,

Durinrg the pczi.ll 6 Juno to 8 Scptember 1943, Lt Barry andPfc Goi.rn of C.;S ::nrcllitenc Tc:m No. .1 -;icre scnt on tempor.ryduty to United Statca .LLvance Pasct rort ;,brosbyt e1l Guinea (htpIncl 1). Their missicn was to establish liaison with TechnicalIntcllitenco units from United Sta.tes Army Ordnance, Fifth .irForceo, Naval Intelligence, the Royal iustralian A.ir Force, andHeadquarters NTc; Guirnea Forces. They -;cre to clarify the ch.inelsthrough Trhich enevy materiel and Intelligence reports cnd equip-mcnt would go, and to provide that such chonnels were function-ing properly. At the same tirm, the team :as to be prepared toproceed to any area to investigatc rmtters of interest to ChemicalJarfar e .

Bunas -- Gona -- Sanananda: 9 Dec 1942 -- 22 Jan 1943

The Buna -- Gona -- Sanananda, New Guinea (I!,ap, Incl 1) opera-tions vrere conducted jointly by Australian forces and by I Corps,with the 32d Division bearing the brunt of the fighting.

Ordnance Technical Intelligence which had just arrived in theTheater in December had a team in the field by 18 January. LtBishop, Lt Cameron, end four enlisted men wrere sent to Port MNoresbyto stage for tro weeks for Puna -- Gona. Durinr the next six monthsthey covered this entire area and shipped back Y'mdi valuable Ord-nance equipmnent to Brisbane fror analysis.

In June, Lt B3isop and $r;t Peterson returned to Brisbane torelieve Capt DMdigan and S/,-],t Loveless in the analysis section,and Capt Madigan left irmmediately to go north to join the fielddetail in Guinea.

7

HI3TORY OF TECHNICAL INTEIUGENCE

Nassau Bay: 30 Jun 1943

On 30 Juine 1943 the McKechnie Force, conposed of elements ofthe 41st Infantry Division attached to the 5th Australian Division,landed at Nassau Lay (!iap,, Incl 1) and quickly moppid Lup, the smallener, i garrison -there. Ain Ordnance T, I. Te2n con.sistirng of CaptbL~diLan, officer in charge, Lt Canm-ron, T/4 '.inn, ard T/4 Levy,carmn up from the Pina --- Gona area in early JTuly so that they .mightbe on hand bef'c-:; the equiwr..et armd materiel could be destroyedor souvenired by UTritod States troops. Lt Car.eoron, Levy and 'Tirmleft durililr Aullu st for 3.risbrne and Caplt I. -i~a-n -Jas joined a -;eekl.ter by S,t/ .,vol.s- a~nd Cpl O'"e.eaa fr'-m tle Ornnanrce nmalysis

¢3ettion. 7is ?l t 1 ai.. o..? 1,.n in the field, furnihinG a turnoverof p;crsornl, fccr 'c.- luty. ,As tof offensive follo..ed up thecoast, the nevJy' .!o=rr.,ia Ordnance T. I.. Teamn ontinmed operationswith the corabat zz'oops.

O'iJ Intelli[,ence Te-ua No. 3, Lt H-Ienry and Cpl Schier, coveredthe Nassau Bay o,)eration for CGS. Afir trarnsortation from Bris-bano was obtaixrd by the team on 25 Jurie to Fort tMoresby, thenceacross the Oen Stanley Rarne to Doboaura, near Oro Day (Map Incl 1).

Here the team r;as attached to the Chemical Sectior, H,3adquarters41st Infantry Division, and spent t.-o -7eeks -oinr, through the oldbattiegrounds in the Buna -- Gona area where they contacted the men:7ho had taken part in the action and who -'re at this tire establishedin defensive positions alorIg the beach (the operation had "closed#22 January...). The team Was trn attached to the IMicKechnic Forceand sailed 12 July for Morobe and later on up to NsJassau :3ay, (TtpIncl 1).

On 22 July, their mission cormpleted, Cpl Schior -;as dispatchedwith the Chemical 0lrfare captured equipment to the Chemical Officor,41st Infantry Division, and Lt Henry left 28 July for Cro Bay, re-Dorting to Hoadquarters 41st Infantry Division and from there flewto Brisbane.

Lae -- Salamaua: 4 Sop 11I. -- 196 &. 136

On 4 September 1943 under cover of heavy air and naval bo-hbard-rent, a large Aiustralian f'orce landed and established beachheadsfifteen miles northeast of I.e, cuttinC the enenr.'s line of cor..-ini-cations to Finschhf en onm. the north coast of Nev Guinea, (!p Incl 1).On the following day, preceded by heavy bombirn and the United States

8

strafing, 503d Parachute Infantry Reineint parachuted and capturedthe airfield at Nadzab (a few miles northw7est of Lae). Airbornetroops vere quickly roved in, and following a rapid advance by bothforces, Lae fell to the 'llied on 16 September 1943.

Mean-whilo, Salamnua (MaT Incl 1) had fallen on 11 September andthe re..n.n.ts of four JcpAnese divisions, half-starved and malariarid,len, were plrs·,d back east along, the coast tovrard Mrorobe, bitterlycontesting ever, . liod .ain.

Capt .aldimor, Z/1r,"t Lovcless aznd Cp1 O'.era vrwere in the fieldwith. the 1anta re9 :Ln t;. rs until C:apt hadian3, 7'ho had been slightlywounced, .. et 1c ovcr_: for Salarnau. Lt Camrreron then took overas cLff/ce: in cc-,,Le iL; the same twro onli.sted merl, operating tiththe 23d Por- Hea~cr m:rs, 41st T;fanftry Iiv>: on,. at Lae, to coverthe Lao --. Finsc':hh.feni a'ea. They returned to Headq[uarters USiFFE2 December 1943 for duty 7vith one of the other field teams,.

The tean salvaned all Japanese Crdnance materiel of interestin the area, totalinrg about 60 tons of weapons (including fiftypieces of artillery) c:nd ninety tons of ,nx.nition. Lac -- Salnmauawas the most productive of enemy Ordnance equipr.ent up to the Hollandiaoperation.

It was reported that there .ere also large quantities of Chem.-ical T1arfare equipnent stored in the Saln~.ua -- Lie area. On 8'September orders were issued attachingr Lt B.rry and Pfc Going3, Chem-ic-al Itarfare Intelligence Team No. l, to the 5th Australian InfantryDivision, which was operating in the Se alzmaua area,

It rwas not thought, ho':ever, at this tiLne, th-at Lae wrould fallin the near future, and it was anticinated that Te:r NTo. i would beable to cover the Salaru.Lua area first and then proceed to Lae. Inthe event that Lae fell prior to the completion of the Salaauanission, arrangements wrere -rmde for C'3 Intellirgence Tean No. 2 toproceed to LIe irntzdiatoly,

During 3epteober 1943 operatiorn around Lae '-wore intensifiedand with the greater part of the avail-ble transport plc nes beingused to fly in troops and supplies, transportation for C'TS Intelli-gence Team No. 1 was delayed and they did not arrive in Dobodurauntil 16 September. Upon arrival, they reported to the United Statesliaison officer, 1st .istralian Corps, It -.as le anoed that Lae hadfallen that very day and a rzssaceo was sent to Lt Bond, su'gestingthat his WiS Team. No, 2 proceed there at once. Meanwhile, consider-able quantities of eneny Chernical ','arfare equiprent wore foundthroughout the area by Teem No. 1.

9

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTEGELLINCE

After an air raid alarm on the rmrning of the 20th Septembcr,Lt Bond and Pfc Garner, CWS Tean No. 2, took off from .7ard Drone,Port Moresby, and flew to Nadzab, the closest point to Lae. Uponlanding, they rspcrtcd to the 7th 1Australian Division ahich -maslocated a short distance from the field. There, arran-ormnts -;-ere

nmdad for then to report to 26th Lustralian Brifrade, located in Lae.dhile they wore awvaiting transportation to Icr, rine Japanese bomb-ers cao over, bhit ulistaking thenm for friendly plmnes no one paidany attcntion untfl the ,anti-aircraft guns opened up over the field.lfter all this 3dely transrortation warc finally secured to Lac.

Capt Forcyth of A'vanced Alliod Translator and Interpretersoction iwas thero rit-h . Japanese intcrpreter. Lt BroTn of rIobileExip'sivcs InvostiJ ti: Unit (I.E'IU) United States Navy, was con-tactud, and also Lt 0.._ito', who had becn transferred 7;ith Sgt Brunerfrom the Ordnance .~nalysis Srction to (rdnence qTchnical Intelligance,Fifth Air Force.

Shortly aftcr arrival, the te-a --rns transferred fror the 26thI.ustralian Brigade to Hcadqilarters, 23d Port Detachment, 'where trans-portation facilities were .more available. After collccting samplesof all the Japanese equiprmnt foun- in. the area, Lt Bond and PfcGarner left Le4 on 25th Scptember for Salam-ua where they .-3t LtBarry and Pfc Goinf' of CJS Teau NTTo. 1. This team planned to proceedto Lae and from there to Finschhafen as soon as it should fall. Allcaptured equipment collected by CS Tecan No. 1 in the Salamaua areawas flon-m by plane from Salarmxua back to Dobodurn.

On 26 September, transportation by wvter was oltairod to Lae,and Headquarters for C.JS Tce-n No. I vas set up with the 23d TortHeadquarters. After a two-day wmit for air transportation, Lt Bondand Pfc Garner left for Port bIoresby with the equipnmnt collectedat Lae and Salanmua.

By this tinme the oloaning up of LIe had progressed con;i derably..is at Salaraua, it was agZain evident that the Japanose had evacuatedthe area in great haste. Large quantities of docunent, am-u1nitionand equiprment had lkon left undestroyed.

Finschhafen: 22 Sep 1!9? -- 2 Oct 1943

In a coordinated lnand, sea and air rvcorent an JAustrnalian forcenmoved around the coast fron Leo and under cover of heavy air andnaval bonbardmnt landed and established beachheads six miles north

10

HISTCRY OF TECHMN1IOCL IMPELtGECE

of Finschhafen (Map Incl 1) on 22 Sopterber 1943. The speed ofthe double developnrent of L!eo and Finschhclfen appa.rently hadcaught the enery by surprise.

Fierce fightinG followred the s.liod lmndind .nd in thelatter stia,,os of the cperation rnny hundreds of rr s died ofsto. r-7tion, ;.-unds .nd sickness. The capture of Firschhafeninsured ilJi.cd control of Huon Gulf, (MLp Incl 1) and dislocatedthe cncu.y's gr., n Pritish Ncv Guinea.

On 2d Cctober, Lt 3Barry -;-ms notified that Finschhef on hadbeen occupied darrl'Gemclts for transpsortation to that .rcawere mnde io idi.tei . 'Af ter l.ndinc at the v:ronr, boechholdI(.fl.cri ,.:s wvitl'i.n fiv ,nridrod y^.rds of the yTaponcse position),Lt Barry and PI' C-oing .1itch-hikod through the junglo tcFinschhafen, six miles away,. Here they attac! hed themselves toConpany i& of the 13th Bat';alion, 20th Asustralian Brigadce, rhichvr.s in charge of salvaging enemy equipment in that orea.

idter recovering all a.vailablo encny Cherical Wiarf.reequimentthe -term loft Finschhafen and returned to Lao oand thenback to Nadzab, Dobodura., Port obresby and fin-ally to Prisbane.

Lt Cameron with S/Sgt Loveless and Cpl O'Mrra, s-rho had beencovering the Nassau Bay ancd Lae aroas for capturod ordnanceImteriel, operated out of Loae, -ihero they were attached to the23d Port Headquertcrs, 41st Division, to cover Finschhnf on.

11

HISTORY CF TbECHNICAL II'fELLIOENCE

C H ;E P T E R IL

5250th TECHiWCtJC INTE LLIGC.EC CCWOMSITE CO tI LNY, SEPR;CE IROVISION.L

JTuary 0I914 -- llt~y 194

On 29 Septer:ber 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferredby U3,F7F to ULS/0S, L.3 in late October rlans 7:ere m'ade by ULSIJOSto prcvide for - Techzr.._:3l Intelligence Depot consistirn of fivesect-ions: oe Dri -;iral ti7c, Ordnance and Chemical 'Arf -re Service,and in ad'lition, Qxartcrnaster, Medical and Transportiation. Nodetachment w7as formed, ho'.ever, for the entire set-up -as3 changedby IUSATE directive, Subject; "Respolsibility of Technical In-telligence"u , dated 22 Decerber 1943, (Incl 6).

By this directive, the responsibility for ground TechnicalIntelli/ence within the United States LrrVm Forces in the Far Eastrms delegated to the Conmarnding General, USM.AOS. Me rwas directedto appoint qualified officers to serve as United States rmrepresentatives on the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board, toprovide necessary officer and enlisted personnel to operate theUthited States Captured Enemy Equipment Depot and to furnish Tech-nica.l Intelligence personnel both officer and enlisted for inclusionin task force Intelligence teams

Technical Intelligence operations in SJIWA had, in the past,.been carried on by detachfmnts of special staff sections operatingunder varying arrangements in regard to assignment of personnel andsupervision of activities. In order to Irovide sn efficient basisfor operations of the various chnical Intelliigence detachments,USA.SOS, G-2, Col Sauve', submitted a proposed plan of operation,ith a reconrended T/O end T/E that included, for the first tite,,the six tmjor services, (all except Transportntion CorDs) and thatwas estimated to be adequate for Theater mfnrds, and -rcot -ndc. M-ha Technickil Intolligcncc oriestoe Cc-mpany be ~ictivacvd:, lTh.1 'proposalams foriarded to CorlandinrE General USAFFE on 7 December 1943. Itwas felt that the suggested organization would give more satisfactoryTechnical Intelligence coverage since it included the six services,that it would ma-1 possible the necessary flexibility operationand movement of personnel which was considered essential for theefficient functioning of the sections, and would enable the forn-tion of well trained and balanced Technical Intelligence teams,

12

HISTCRY OF TECHNIC4 LL INELLIGEUCE

Under this arrangenent, the several Technical Intellieonce sectionswould be able to facilitate the.collection and rapid disser.inationof Technical Intelligence information. It would also enable themto control the distribution of captured enemy equiyrmnt accordingto technical and traininG noeds in the Theater and in the UtitedStatess

Cn 3 January 194h, the 5250th Technical Intelligence CompositeColnpany, Senparte (r'ovisional) was org£anized as a prcvisionalcomrpary by Gcneral Ordr.- s No. 2, Headquarters UJSSCS (Incl 7), sothat assitnmTont of pczr-rnol1 could be ade rand operations continued.T/O and T/L.: prrvious!r survrestcd to US1FFE, wre used as rguides,with perscnanel c-.rliod _in detached service fror. source units.

The fo:ratioil of a separate Technical Into'lir.cnce CompositeCompan y other than provislonal was not favorably considered byUS1-FFE (10 January 1944).

On 20 January 1944, Chiefs of 3Srvices vwere directed to fur-nish qualified personnel for assirnnmnt on detached service to52350th Technical Intellidenc Composite Copanyv, Separate (rro-visional) "to enable the aocompnlishm-nt of the Technical Intelli-gence mission" (Incl 8). Thc transfer of personnel to the 5250thwas effected by the six services concerned by February 1944. (Acon:pleto roster of all personnel assimned to the _5250th fromJanuary 1944i, when it was formd, until November 1945, w.hen the5250th Technical !ntellience Composite Colspany, Scparate (Pro-visional) had moved for;Jard to sapan, is shomw in Incl 9. Thisinclosure lists the dates each man joined and departed from theCoripany and the awaards that he received).

Evaluation of The Technical Intollipgence Setlp

The principle of having- a coordinatinr unit for TechnicalIntelligenc proved highly satisfactory in the coring months ofthe war. Centralized control hnidc it possible for tearlas from.i thesix services to function as one unit, thus onabling" then to aideach other during the first days of an operation when speed wasimportant. Infomation, docurnnts and equimcnt cDuld be collectedfor all branches by all teans, and this equiprmnt assembled in acentral spot where it cmuld be sorted and evaluated by the individu-al service team concerned. Coordination Irovided flexibility, madefor geater ease and efficiency in matter of cornand, and eliminatedthe question concerning responsibility and scope of authority.

13

HISTORY OF TECHINIC.IL INTELLIGENCE

Mbst important of all, co-ordination made it possible for thecormand to have adequately equipped tomns formed and trained intime for all operations and assured complete covcrage by Tech-nical Intelligence.

There was one very definite drawback, hovievcr -- the 5250thTechnical Intclligenc Cor.lpany was established only as a pro-vis! onal or;anizaction. This in certain ways, conplicated itsadministrazio :.of't its personnel still occupyin; T/0 vacanciesin units which they had never ;worked, rade it gencrally impossiblcto secure -well earned and long deserved prrmotions, and becausethe con.Da.y oP.oratod on only a quasi-acccpted basis, sormtinsham-s-,iun~ its cffox-rz vw.en it could have booeen nst effective.

Nceverthelessr, urndr the direction of the 5250th TechnicalIntelliQ;onco Comrosite Comprny, Sce)prate (Yrovisional), a con-prehonsivo viec, of Joaan;se capabilitics 1'as secured and Tech-nical Intollic;once entered the period w;hen the -.ork of past yetrsbrought in positive results. It -;ms e big step fo r7ard.

Oranization of the 5250th Tech. Intell. Coip. Co. . (P)

The 5250th was composod of a co-ordination and administra-tion section, and a technical section for each of the six majorservices. Each Technical section, composed of laboratory andenerWmy equiprent Intolligence teuems, operated under the technicalsupervision of the Chief of Service and under the ;enoral super-vision of the .Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAS30S (OrgsanizationChart, Incl 10). Duties, as originally outlined in the reco.rronda-tion to USi3FFE, ;yore followed with only minor modifications. Theywere as follows:

Cormnanyr Headquarters

a. 44dministration of the Company and co-ordination of theactivities of the sevoral sections.

b. Company cormunder on duty in the Office of the LC of S,G-2, U~iSOSs, as Co-ordinator of Technical Intolligenco. .h jorJohnston, Ord, in addition to his other duties, w7as appointedinformally as temporary (without orders) cooanding officer ofthe COoiVany and G-2 Technical Intelligence Co-ordinator.

14

HISTORY OF TECHNICLL INLTELIZG

c. One officer on duty in the Office of the ,&C of S, G-2,USO3S, to conduct Tccmnical Intclligence liraison with the AlliedTranslator and Interpreter Section S?~. This responsibility wasfirst delegated to Lt Col Jones, Chief Engineer IntelliGenceofficer, and was later turned over to his assistant, Lt Girard R.LorrTey.

Service Technical Intclli~renc Officor

A Technical Intelligence clficcr in the office of each of theservices. His dutioe rcro:

a. To advise the Chief of Service on Intelligonco tottcrs.

b. To supervise IntelliCcnce activities for the pa.rticularservice, includinm-; trainint, collection, recording, storage anddisposition of captured enery rnttoricl.

c. To collaborate with the Technical Intelligonco sections ofother sorvices.

d. To ruvievu and issue reports on captured cnejy~ mtceriol,installations and procedures, and toforvard such information totheir respective Chiefs of Service in -lashington, D. C.

Service Technical Intellionce officers assigned werc:

Maj 3ohn A. Riddick ....... C'JS Maj ;Llan C. $ohnston .... ORDLt Ctl lfalter 13. Jones ..... CE Maj l~rray Herman ....... E;MMaj Steinberg ........... EI No service Intelligence officer(appointed later, in April) for Sirial Corps

Administrative and fnnelysis Unit

Originally, only the Ordnanc', (VIartcrraster and Sign-alsections operated analysis laboratories undeor the Chief of theIntelligeonce Section of the service concerned. Choreical '!arfaroService contimnueod to have its anurlysis ?ork c'-rried on at the42d Chemicol or Victoria Mnitions Supply Laboaratoics, and En-gineecr and Medical. Corps had no toans in the field until theHollandia operation in .,pril 1944. Laboratories for all theservices were ostablishod after that.

15

HISTORY OF TECHNICL INTELIGENCE

All Technical Intellieence sections, however, mnintrined ad-ministrative divisions, which vithin the scope of their activities:

a. Advised the Chief of Service on Intelligence rsmtters.

b. Coordinated and supervised Intelligonce activities,

c. Planned, supervised, and correlated Intelligence train-ing activitles .

d. Establ. shed and mnintained Intellig-ence liaison, andcollaboro tcd rwc;t, tl;[t Technical Tntelligence sections of otherarm and servslces a_,. ;.llied Forces within the Theater.

e. Maintai ned ,dc-quite liaison -lth the Intelligence Division,Office of the Chief of Service.

f. Interpreted, evaluated and dissoAinatod Intellitence in-formation as prescribed.

g. Carried on adeQuate and nrcessay docunment research.

h. Supervised the collection, recording,, processing, storageand disposition of captured enemy materiel.

i. Obtained data on operational cxrfoaince of capturedenemg nEnteriel.

j. Maintained a filo of all reports -nd do ta available onTechnical Intelligenceo

k. Reviewed and issued reports on elptured enaem rvateriel,installations, procedure, etc.

1. Lrranged for the shipmernt of selected items of capturedenenr materiel, to the TJUnited States for training and other pur-poses, as required.

m. Kept current, and subrittcd invontorios of captuxed enemyequiprut available to the service in the Ca-,tured Enemy EquipmentDepot or service laboratories, or en rcuts to that depot, or inthe advanced arenas

16

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

n. Proparcd prclirminary training mwnuals on tho use c cap-tured cnemy cquipmnnt, installations, ctc., and assisted in plannfnxa training progrm for United States personnel.

o. Prepared rcparts of activities of the Section.

Field Tcams

Field Tcaxs of each Technical Intelligence Section, -ithin thescope of their activities:

ta Collected a:ld fcrwordcd technical combat infcrrationthrough G-2 of the trak force.

b. .rranred for the collection and forwarding of capturedenemy equipment to the Scrvice Chief for further analysis or tothe Captured Enormy Equipmont Depot for shipment to the UnitedStatos,

c, Assistod and advised G-2 and the appropriate serviceofficer of the task force on all mattors of Technical Intelligonce.

d. Invostigated reports of the uao of noCr mthods, weapons,or tactics, and submitted reports thereon through G-2 of the taskforcec

c. Mado preliminary examination of and report on onc.y equip-mcnt captured by the task force.

f. Cooperated with Technical Intelligence personnel of otherservices and Allied forces.

g. ;4ssisted in interrogation of prisoners of vrar when re-quested to do so.

h. Collected informtion regarding enemy installations, andprepared reports thereon for forPrrding.

i. JIranacd for the salvage of bulk supplies and materiol.

3:. Submittod reports on captured cnry rm.tcriol for:7Tdedto the Gaptured Enolmy Equipmcnt Depot.

k. Maintained current inventories of captured onawr Matcriel.

17

HISTORY aF TECHNICiL IMNELLIGENCE

Captured Enornr Equipmnt Deopot (W Intollipenco Section)

The Captured EnonWr Equipment Depot, vrhich operated directlyunder the supervision of the Chief Qiartornastor Intclligencesoction:

a. Received, classified and maintained stock record accountson all captured enany oquiprment formnrdod to the Depot.

b. Dclivcrcd selected itcms of captured cncay equipment tothe appropriats scrvic or force upon authority received from thedillicd Captul~d Enir-y Equipnont Board.

c. Packed anJd 'hippod to the United States selected itemsof captured cnemy ou.";prlcnt, as directed.

d. Propczod and kept current an inventory of captured eneryoquipr.cnt and a record of the source and distribution of thoseitems to be forwarded throuCh channels at the proper tirnc.

c. Propecod a :inthly report containirr a list of capturedoncry cquipment forwarded to the United States during the month.

f. Returned or forwardod to individuals for souvoniringsuch items as vwcro released on the certificate of the AC of S,G-2, US4SOS, or other authorized agencies.

Early ldministration by the 5250th Tech. Tntell Co=. Go D :; -)

Lt Orric P. Sell, Jr. was relieved of duty .s ConmndingOfficer of the Depot and as a rnnbcr of the Jldliod Enemy EquipmentBoard when the 5250th was formed and was replaced by Major M}.rrayHoerman, ctC.

On 19 February 1944, a directive -.rs received by Hoadquortcrs,USASOS, from the Cor.ianding General, USLFFE, to the effect thatphotographs, prints, rubbings and dratrings of all nerloplatcs ornamrplato data froa all captured cnemy equipment would be for-warded to that headquarters. The collection of nomoplates andrubbings bocamn one of the main mi~sions of Technical Intelligencepersonnel. They were to send in litcrally thousands of thoseitems during the coning mrnths ofthe w-ar, and from informationbased on their translation (na.mes, dates, etc.) Japn oso ran-ufacturors of vwar nmtcriol were identified and located -- inform-ation that vas important in determining air raid targots and instudying the cnoer's economic status.

18

HISTORY OF TECHNICMJL INTELLIGENCE

Greater emphasis' was also placed on analysis of capturedequipment as an additional factor for the determination of theenemy's economic position. Sound deductions as to the stateof enemy resources for war could be based on ovidence obtainedfrom a laboratory analyses of captured materiel. Technicalreports included, when possible, conclusions, positive ornegative, as to the enery's economic status. These conclusionswere based on a comparison of material and workmanship of recent-ly and previously captured equipment. 'hen such changes werenoted, these items wiere returned to the United States for fur-ther laboratory ana iysis.

In February 1C7'I i. fajor Johnston, accompanied by one officerfrom each of the o+;!:r six services and 1st Lt Jarios E. Shelby,QMC, proceeded to adw.nced areas to inform base sections andarmy troops that as each of the six services were interestedin materiel, all captured Japslese equipment 'ras desired andshould be forwarded. At the same time he informed personnelof the modification of the regulation that facilitated legiti-mate souveniring. (It was hoped that this would encouragetroops to turn in captured equipment, thou,-h it turned out thatit had little effect on the vrillful looting and destruction ofenemy dumps.) Major Johnston also informed for-ard echelons ofthe proccedure necessary for shipment of captured materiel.

Captain Madiganr having returned from field detail in theNassau Bay, Lae and Finschhafen areas, had departed on 17Novembor 1943 for temporary duty to the Office of-the Chief ofOrdnance, ;Cashington, D. C. This was in conformi-ty with larDepartment policy of having personnel of Technical Intelligenceteoams on temporary duty from the WJar Depart-ment return period'-ically for consultation. He was gone until 30 tMarch 1944 whenhe returned to report that great interest had been aroused inthe .rMy Service Forces, iJashington, D. C. in Technical In-tclligonce and that numerous conferences concerning the enemymateriel situation were hold.

At the same time Captain Madigan left for 'ashington, per-mission was requested from the Chief of Ordnance to have CaptainEdward I. Creed, who rwas assigned to Ordnance Intelligenceactivities in the Alaskan area, sent to the Southwest Pacificfor duty with Ordnance Intelligence. On 15 December 1943 Head-quarters Ordnance Intelligence Section was notified that CaptainCreed would proceed to U.ashington for six weeks temporary dutyand then would be sent to this Theater.

19

HISTORY OF TECEH2ICAiL INTELLIGENJG

Saidor: 2 Jan 1944 -- 10 Feb 1941

In December 1943 a request had been sent to G-2, USAFvE, toarrange with Sixth iLr.yr to have ra combined Technical Intelligence

Field Unit p'rticipatc in the Cape Gloucester operation. Howeverr,after receiving permission from Sixth :Army, the unit upon arrivalat Finschhafen was not allo-,ed to go forvrard. An officer and twoonl.istcd men, howrever, did secure peomission to go on the Salidor(11hap Incl 1) ooen..ation 2 Janur7y 1944, thou.h the owmbincd unit,-*as not ur-d, l_,2 Bishop, T/4 .irnn and Cpl reveridge, wiho hadoperated as an Ordnaa-.c Intellirrence Tce m with the 32d Divid onsince 20 eto>;w' 19:.';, prticipated on this and r.inor operationsup the 11evr G:.i.nea cc, t (MI;hap Incl 1). Fr.m informa tion secured,the tcamji Drjcp r dc a ;.-,. booklet as an .nmplificntion of the AlliedLand FGrcs HTI .c'qartc.-, paurphlet on Jap-ancse oquipDcnt.

They also assisted in the staging; programn of the 32d Divisionon Goodenough Island, instructing the troops on booby traps andenemy Ordn-nco raltoriel. It .:"s found .more and moro that suchtraining of combat troops in use of Japancse wcapons, especiallysmall arms and machine guns, was of considerable value to thk taskfor co.

The teanm emainad dt Saidor until March 1944, .?hen th-y.,wererelieved. Lt Bishop and T/4 .Jinn '-iere then attached to the 41stInf antry Division for the Hollandia operation.

Admiralty Islands: 29 Feb 1944 -- 18 Mnay 19,44

The invasion of the Admiralty Islands (Maps Incls 1 and 11)specifically IAbmcte aiirstrip on Los Negros, was begun 29 February1944, when the enemy v,rcs cau£ght com-pletely off guard in a surpriselandinEg.

The campaign naried the final stage in the great swingingmoverent, pivoting on T!evw Guinrea, :-hich had been the basic planof operations in the Southeest Facific.

Abn of the First Cav�alry Division landed on Ma.lnus Island aboutone and a half miles northwcest of Lorongau, (MaI.p Incl 11) on 15March, They wvere covered by artillery fire from small neighboringislands seized the day before, and 'were supported by destroyers,P. T. boats and air bombardment. Brushing aside the initial lightopposition, the force divided., one group heading tovrard the air-strip, the other branching ctff to the south.

20

HISTORY OF TECHNIC.L INI'ELLIGENCE

'.7ithin three days after their landinc; on Mnnus Island tUnitedStates CnvalryTmn c'rpturod Lornr;au airstrip, innd on 18 March theystormied their way into Lorengau towm. They then h-ad occupied allvital areas in the .Admiralty Islands.

The chief prize of the Admiralty victory vrs Sea Eagle Harbor,(Map Incl 11) which had 55 miles of protected waterway formd bya l.agoon of soveral islands and reoofs. It and the two strategicairstrips at I, rong:au on Manus Island and bMor.ote on Los Negros,fonrcd a pote:.'.l. bacso for intonsive opcr-?tions a.inst the re-maininr eneomy stron<, iclds in Now Britain and Ioe-w Ireland (MapIncl 1).

ALS crti.-gjI?-ly . omned in Novemrber 19431, and attempted forCap* G:Loucostcl-c. Tcc:;.lcal Intelligence field operations rere tobe baseod on the principle of assigning a field unit composed ofone off icor .nd tuwo enlisted men each to a Counter Intelligenceteam for each task force. This provided for collection and in-vestig-ltion of enemy materiel .t the e-rliest possible mormentafter combat operations.

In accordance with this plan it was decided that a canmbircdOrdnance and Chemical ,.arfare Service unit should accompany the1st Cavalry Division in t1h .dmiraltios c>:zpaign. (The otherfour services did not have trained personnel available for fieldoperations until the Hollandia operation in ipril 1944). ACounter Intelligence Corps (CIC) officer was to be in charge ofthe unit and consolidated reports w;ere to be forwarded coveringCounter Intelligence, Ordnance, Chemical 7iarfaro Service, andNaval Mobile Explosive Investigation Uhnit (IEIU) No. 1 activitios.Captured documents were to be forwtrded to AlliTd Translator andInterpreter Section. The CIC team consisted of one officer, 1stLt Harold F, Frederick,, and eight enlisted mon. Tochnical Intell-igence personnel consisted of one officer, Lt Cameron, and tTroenlisted men, 3/Sgt Loveless and Sgt Lischalk, of the OrdnancoSection; one officor, Lt Henry, and two enlisted men, Ffc Gaddoand Pvt Street, of the Chemical ,.'arfare Intclligence Section.iLlso as part of the unit w-ere one Naval officer, Lt Bushnell, :ndone enlisted ;man from MEIU No. 1. The group was organized andfully equipped by G-2, US. 3FFE, before being sent to join the 1stCavalry Division. Lt Frederick was placed in cornmtnd of all per-sonncl, including Tcchnico-l Intelligence. They functioned as aunit with success durinC the entire lxmirlty Islands campaign.

21

HISTCRY OF TIEHICAL PITELLIGEICE

Lt Frederick and 3)rt ixrrnI orson (CTC), Lt Bushnell, TEIFJ (Tavy),and Lt 'icn:.. .C .) )nd d r;t L1-chrlk1 (C:Od) cornmosed' the first sec-tion of t-;e ur.it to ie:.rve for the lra cdm,2 ties. The:y -:re attachedto the S-2 of the 12th CavyLir Rcri1m:5- tvo o2-: 'any the.. to LosNe;ros -vher' t.y ,r:.. to r ofrce tic 5tthn C-avaIry Regir.nt, thenin comb:-t. Th departre ,;as delay,,ed for t',o days and during, thisti.me Lt Henry as:sistcd ir. pre'pr,-i CeogrI'phic survey of LosNeJiros to be used by thle c1sir,ltn T-he information thus obtainedproved invaluubl;e ,n ia t.r patrols.

The iroup departed frc.lm Care Sudest, JNew Guinea, (aT,lp Incl 1)so as tc arrive at Hy'ame `l.r'or, Los Nee;ros, (I-ap Tncl 11) on the6th of P}.lrch, (D plus 6 l. .lthou:nh te crisis of the operation hadpassed, the nrea cca3red by thl;e troops cTas yet very small. Thisenabled the teamn to arrive at c.ptur.ad eq.ipient and n.teriel dumpsbefore they ha-d been pilliracd nnd scuvenired .SLtLischalk Joined the 1st Cva.lry Division he-.aqcur Iers at Sea BEogleHarbor. The top ranrkinr; officers of the Division were interestedin Technical Intcllt:enc:l, were a.nxious that the te am should startinrL.di-ately, and sa;i to it that it v.as provided wJith necessarye qu i prc n t.

Durin:, subsequent action, ravteriel nd docunrents were receivedin great quantities, and cooperation frorm the line units and in-dividual soldiers w.'as splenrlid. They Save information as to thelocation of dum.pk:s -and brought in quantities of rnteriel. Thelectures and demonstrations to the troops on the value of enemrrequipment for Intellijsence purposes paid hig;h dividends.

On 9 Iarch, Lt Camr.eron and Sgt Loveless arrived, A collectiondump was orgr.nized and the first bulk shipment of caltured rnterieltwas shipped from Hyane Harbor.

The remainder of the detach'nnt arrived 16 March. Pfc Gaddowas izmmediately utilized in. fotlo'ing the assault back of 1-pitalaidission (i.Tap Incl 11) -,here a Che.:mical dumrp h-ad been repcrted. PvtStreet wvas pt busy with photoiraphic -;ork for the detachment andthe Division. G-2. Both men -were subsequently used on patrols, andcontinued -rith this until the end cf the c:r:'paign.

The dumps located consisted of -.-e.pons, aumnunition, quarter-master items, and .edical supplies of all kirs s. Many stall dumps-,ere loc"-.ted a few yards off t'le trail, protected and canouflar;edby canvas, -,rass, or ,.tai roofinZ, BE.ch dump was usually of oneclass of sullies such as clcthind.;, mdaical supplies or one typeof ar-mmrnition. Chemical TJrf:re protection equipment and r.nitionswere found in this sector.

22

FrISrORY OF TECHNICAL INTELIGENCE

.1l the documents and equipment were assembled but no atteriptwas made to sort the materiel in respect to services until it hadreached the collecting area. In this connection, transportationviwas the critical factor. Not only -,-as land transportation needed,but due to the insular nature of the campaign, water transportationalso had to be available.

The problem w.as nt by utilizing the trucks haliling supplies.dhen empty and ready to go back to the beachhead, captured equip-ment mas loaded aboard and was taken as far as the beach. BY thesame procedure with the landing craft, the materiel vwas eventu-ally returned to headquarters. This method of back loadirg forbulk shipments, though effective, was slovw,. and caused consider-able loss of time. Shipping back to the Depot at Brisbane offer-ed little trcuble, since, with the exception of the first difficulty,rush shipments were made by back-loading aircraft.

Photographs Y-ere taken, developed and printed of all newtypescdffqqapmrent, fortifications, and operations in so far aspossible. It was found that due to the heat and lack of properwashing facilities for the negatives and prints, photographicwork-was difficult under field conditions. Ltter it was foundadvantageous to wait and send exposed film to photographic lab-oratories for developing and printing.

This arms the first campaign in which the various serviceswere coordinated, and it confirrmed the fact that by combiningtheir efforts they could cover more territory in less time.Only Chemical CJarf are Service and Ordnance pooled their work forthis operation but their success substantiated the decision tocombine all six services for the Hollandia operations

By May 1944 all important areas in the Admiralty Islandshad been searched and all materiel of value had been collectedand shipped. The Unit had completed its mission and the per-sonnel returned to their various organizations.

23

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTEULIGENCE

C Ei P T E R III

HOLLY"DI'

April 1944 -- July 1944

To trap the 18th Japanese LArmy dispersed along the coast of

Newr Guinea and to capture suitable air bases for the futureoffensive ag:ainst the Philippines, the Allies hurdled the stretchof northern New Guinea coast from Saidor to Hollandia. The mapof Ne-7 Guinea had sugg-ested the five hundred mile hop, The Jap-anese response to our feints at \7Jevak and rMadang, (Map. Incl l)205 and 385 miles bclowr Hollandia, had invited it.

It vwas a big step, and plans were laid to use the great estforce yet assembled in the Southwest Pacific -- two United StatesArmy divisions -- to be involved in a single operation. It vras

furthtrmiore, the first all-.hoDric^an show in the Pacific.

Staging, for the Hollandia Operation

Technical Intelligence was to give complete coverage ofthis operation, for it was knovm that Hollandia (ahp Incl 12)was one of the important Japanese supply installations forSoutheastern Now Guinea and New Britain defensive areas. In-dicative of the fact that Technical Intelligence vas still ina fornmativa stage, organizationally speaking, were the variousmodes of operation used. Three teams and one composite unitrevere to go in.during the initial stages of the battle -- oneteam operating free lance, one team in a combined detaclhm.entpatterned after that used for the ,.dmiralties campaign, and onecomposite unit representing all six services, This last, theComposite Technical Intelligence Unit, was an innovation, thatlaid the basis for organization of Technical Intelligence teamsfor the balance of the JaT anese war.

CI'S Teem No. 2 (Lt Bond and T/5 Going) and the OrdnanceTechnical Intelligence Team composed of Lt Bishop and Cpl Winnwere both attached to the 41st Division9 but were in no combined

HISTORY C'F TC!-TIICI.L IiTELLIGEITCE

tecam durinE; this operation. The C.'S Teram had not been in ,noper?.tion since Sal c aua, but the Ordnance team had becen replacedfrom duty w7ith the 32d Division ,?fter the close of the Saidoroperation, just in tir.: to join the 41st Division at Finschhafenin March to stad:e for Hollandia.

Chemical 'Jarfare Service Ter. NTo. 6 and a MTobile ExplosivesInvestigation Unit, w;ere attached to Combat Te-n B of the CountorIntelliGence Corps in a combined dota.chrnnt similar to th-t usedin the iZdr.iralties. The group .ras attached to the Office of the.AC of S, G-2, 24th Infantry Division.

C'JS Teatn No. 6 colmposed of 2d Lt Allen 'J. rhillips, ind DvtJohn TIruFer, who had been cdded to the original CT.S Technic'lIntolligence personnel, -;rcnt into staj;ing early in January forthis operation, The st-.;inr area, on GoodenouL;h Island, forwardechelon of the 24th Infantry Division Tnas Ne-- Guinea, Here, theteanm assisted in the tr-inin-r pror;ra,, presentindg lectures onTechnical Intellioenco to all units in the Division that missedit on the mainland. This lecture series vas crordinated with theCIC trainincg ro[iracrm.

.hile in the staging area, a plan for establishment of adivision:.l captured onemy equipment depot wrs subllitted to theG-2 of the Division. This ;is a ccepted and a mneo w;as sent toall units, outlining; channels for forwTa.rding captured encmycquipment to this ccntra.l collection point,

First Corm.osito Unit is Forlmed for HDollandia Onceration

Mtjor Riddick, C.;S, MI4ajor Talcott 'ainwriight, , E, (new with5250th), I.ajor Madigan, Ord (wvho ha:d becn recently promoted),and Lt. Rowe, Sigrnal, arrived at Finschhafen from Brisbane 13·A.pril to start things rolling for st:a.-ing Tochnical IntclligenceUnit No. 1 for H:ollandia.

During that -eck the following personncl arrived atFinschh-.fen to join the unit: 1st Lt Bob C. .7oodson, Transport-ation Corps; Capt JilliarI . L:albcrt and fourteen enlisted menonfromr the 234th Quarterm.aster Salvaw.e CollectinE; Company -- thesemen were not Technical Intelligence personnel but wcre to ac-co.mny the Unit on the operation; and Lt Bartry from 'CTS TeamNo. 1, who -ras hospitalized as soon as he arrived -- he recoveredjust in time to acCompany the Unit on the 0por:ation.

25

HIST(ORY OF TECthrICAL rIINThLIGENTCE

On 22 Aipril 1944, four officers recently attached to thePacific theater from th Ililitary Intelligence Training Centerat CarP Ritchie, I1aryland, arrivecd: Captain Eugene H. Manley,CE, and 2d Lt I-hilip N. Van Slyck, Ord, vho were trained forCom:Lbat Inteli e;nce; 1st Lt Guy N. Birleffi, Ord, and 2d LtJerry ii. Ricci, (r.C, who were trained in; interrogation; ofprisoners of n;ar, The last one to join the Unit ?.s 1st LtEd;ward S. Peck, CE, -Iho arrived 23 A.pril.

Durin, the stagin:; period,, the follo:-iAn supplies typicalof those t?.ken into the field by Technical Intelligence teanswore dran;: Jungle clothing., field equirpment, office supplies,Ordnance,, a'uanition, wrappin£; rmaterials. Trinining was givento unit ror.lbers on identification of ap-.neso rr.teriel, es-pecially Ordn.nce and Che:ical .7arfare Service, -rith rMajorRiddick initiatiIv; the instruction and Izajor Ma.rdigan roview-ingand am)lif yin:; the information on Ordnance. I.jjor 7ainwrightdiscussed tropical diseases, health and s nitation in thejungle, with emphasis on prevention of zalaria and typhus.

The day that Capt ilrnley and his group arrived, personnelwere infozrced of the task force objective and -,reo shovm landingpoints and probable locations of enemy troops and du ;is, Thefollowing day Col Sauve' arrivod from Brisbane to discuss pre-movement platms..

The unit was not to go in on the oporntion until D plus8. (30 April). On 25 April at 2000 they were alerted. Aftera 24 ton truck, tvwo jeeps and two ' ton trcilors in a pouringrain, the unit had to scour the base for a dispersin£r gas dump,and reached lembarkation beach at 0200. Unable to secure per-mission to board, they slept in their vrehicles the rest of thenight. The folloinz,, day, loadin,n ?Las a-;ain hold up and thegroup returned to their o-,.-, area to await devClopment.

Finally, at about 1700 hours on 27 ;April, everyone exceptLt Ricci, wtho was to telce over ?dministraition of the UnitedStates .rrzvr Technical Intelli,;cnce Depot that 7was to be sot upat Finsclhhafen, 1vts &.br.:. ---i and g;l, "h0ro werCe ssinCod asDepot personrcl., and Lt Firleffi, :who w;as left as the rearechelon for the Unit to hLiring up vehicles and pIersonal baggagelater, boarded an LN and proceded in convoy toward Hollandia,arrivirk: on D plus 8.

26

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Operations at Hollandia

Coverin; ?. front of about 120 lmiles. ground troops hit thebeaches at; .itapo. Hollandi'i and T^nahmhrah By, ({Iap Incl 12)on 22 ipri1.. 1 Corps directod operations .:ith a co-bined TaskForce consistinr, of the 41st Infantry Division, landing at Hum-boldt Bay, (MIa?.p Incl 12) and the 24th Infantry Division, land-ing at Tanah;lcr?.h .ayQ Sirultaiieously, 120 :riles southeast, asep-aratu Task Force, the 163d Regiiiental Comabat Team (part of the41st Infantry Division)> landed at A;itape.

The Hollandia, Humrboldt Bay and ThanibTerah Bay areas werepri:;1rily supply insto.lltions and v:;ere lackin-, in anti-invasionand costal defense positions, The areas did have, horrever, anti-aircraft gun batteries mnd elaborate air rqid shelters typicalof Japanese forriard area bases.

H hour t'as schedule d for 0700. The naval bombardment beEanat 0600 hours and uwas lifted shortly before. the first walve hit thebeaches. No -oposition -r.s lnet in any sector and the only firereceived came from smr.rll caliber reapons wThich were quicklysilenced by destroyers standing off shore.

It Vas a quick and decisive illied. victory. The primaryobjective had boon the seizure of the Cyclops, Sentani andHollandia airdror.es, ( Ianp Incl 13) and by the 24th Jspril, littlemlore than two days -:fter the initial landincs, infantrymen hadcaptured all three ,irdror-.es and w.ere scouring the hills northof Lake Sentani (EMp Incl 13) for si-,ns of the retreating enemy.

Lt Bishop and Cpl :'irnn lended on D Day at Hunboldt Bay,lihite Beach l, with the assault troops of the 41st Division.There :-ere many lrF;e durlip areas alon; the shore and -. tempcrarycaptured equipment duip w;as set up on the' beach. The teambivouaced -.ith the 741st Ordnance Conmpany that first night justoff ,hito Beach 1, Thc second day was spent in reconnaisance cfthe area to-;mrd the to-n of Iiollandia, Considerable materiel wasrecovered both in the open and also stored in caves along thesides of the hills Howevcer, the ditance wrs too groet and nomraterioel .as evacuated to the durmp on this da^y.

The team returned to the original bivouac area that night,and on that ni;ht -- D plus one -- a single Jap bomber droppedthree. bombs into the area. Two of the bombs landed in the middleof the azaunition and gasolinQ that had been unloaded on the beach.Api:-roxirtely 53,000,000 worth of supplies were blown up that

27

HISTORY OF TECTI TUC.'L ITNELLIGENCE

niiht, One-tenth of a second lter they would have missed thesupply dumnp, for the third bom-.b landed on top of the cliff be-yond the beach and did little dar ge. Dormn the beach everyonedove for ca'ves. Burning gasoline and oil spread to the anr.uni-tion, fires burned furiously, .and armunition .7as detonating allthrouwh the night., The explosionswrer terrific. Not r.nyslept that night,

Follow.ing the destruction of the food supply, rations werecut one-third, later to one meeal a day. The Task Force atHollandia was 500 miles deep into enermy country, the Jpaneseheld the coast and supplies 7ere going fast.

On D plus three, Lt Bishop and Cpl irnn m.oved to Fim Jottywheru the 186th Infantry ;zs proceeding tow.ard the three air-droses. This area was selected because the road Jwas open throughto the drolc s and the dangier of troops movinL in and souveniringbefore Technical IntclliEence could recover the ma-triel -wasgreat, whcre.as the H-ol.3nMdia area itself could only be reachedby barge. It -was felt that the materiel in Hollandia would besafe from souveniring till the teamL could get at it in the future..is it worked out, they wore even then lte in getting: along thePim Jetty motor track as all the durmps had' been talmpered with andnearly all the boxes opened a.nd the contents scattered.

Due to road conditions, only an inspection trip 7-ras made bythe tea-ls into the airdrome area. Outside of the anti-aircraftgons at the strips, most of theo matcriel a?,s of .,ir Ccrps origin.There -were a gro-t ,a:ny wrecked airplanes on the strips indicatingthe thoroughnoss of the pre-invasion bombing. Along the road thefuel dumprs had been set on fire by strafingr attacks as shcrn byspent United [Sta.tes 50 caliber mchine ,un bullets. If ter thisarea was covered the tea:1 moved to the toven of Hollandia wrhcrethe 162d Infantry .,s locatcd.

On D plus 8, lv/jor RMIAdigan arrived v-ith the Technical Intell-igence Composite TJnit No. 1 and a11 Ordnance activities wereplaced under his supervision.

By the time CGJ.S Teami No. 6 tomether writh the MIIU and theCIC Team, arrived on Red Peach 2, cf Tanahmcrah Bay w.ith oler.mntsof the 24th Infantry Division several encmy outposts had beendiscovered in the beach area wihich avre evidence of hasty evacua-tion. Terrain difficulties betvween Red P3each 2 n.ld the advancing

28

HISTORY CF TECH1TICAL IN TELLIGENCE

infantry ,revcnted aldequrate spplies reaching them and nocessi-tated :novinc the Division Cor.rland Post to Red Bcch 1. This .nsaccormplished on D rlus 1. On arrivinr.; at Red Beach 1, C.,;S TeamNo. 6 (Lt Ihilli-s 'n:'d Lvt 7rur;cr) fcound it i :racticdl to con-tinue toward the air cro-.: -- a landsli<de had considerably in-creased the supply problem and the rains of the provious nir;htshard mde move:mnt by truck imr:ossible. In the vicinity of RedBeach 1, several more outposts werC locsated and searched, re-sultinc; in the discovery of more equiplment.

Shortly after the Hollanrdi drome had been taken, the firstene:ly supply dumps were loca-tcd approximatecly three rmiles north-west -f the drorm s. This was co-incidcnt with the apyearanoo Cfthe first sermblance of a road seen so far,

The ::ornin] of D plus 5, Lt Thillips and Ivt Kruc;:er accon-panie:l a patrol which contactcd a patrol fro,:-1 the 41st InfantryDivision bet.iween Szntani and Holliandir aiir drems. xround mid-day C.GS Teari No. 6 net C.1S Tom-,1 I-o. 2 (Lt PConld and T/5 Goinc;)attached to the 41st Infantry Division ^nd learned that lcxroquantities of onemy equin1ment had been captured in the area.

The fact that there a.-as no transaortaticn -available frornthe 24th Division an-' the appa-rent absence of Chemical equiprantin the Division's -.rc, prompted C;TS Team1 lo. 6 to join C.S3 TeamNo. 2 in order to evedite coveraLe c)f the large stcrraye areascaptured in the 41st Division soctor.

Durin,G_ the pcriod 28 ;,pril to 7 I-May, C S T-eam No. 6 workodcontinually -With CJS Team No. 2 in the 41st Division Sector.Contact wa.s -imaintained with the G-2, 24th Infrntry Division, butfinally on 8 .Iay C,;S Teasm No. 6 reported back1 to the Comm..a-ndPost, By this tirme, Technical Intelligence Ccmposite Unit No. 1had arrived in the operations area. to takce over the encmy equip-ment thus far collected. It -?was planned for this Coqmp.osite Unitto hnldle any Technical Intellicrence functions tha-t mii;ht arisein the future and for CIS Tcin \To. 6 to be made available for afuture operation. On 9 Mly C'US Teamr No. 6 lcft Hollandia andreported back to Headquarters US~;OS.

Tcchnical Intclli:-ence Co?:osite Unit No. 1 cmlc in on anLST on -.hito Poach 1, Humboldt- ay, Hollandia section, on D plus8, the 30th of iiApril, The pcrsonnel assisted tho troops in dis-charrging cuaro, pending the arrival of labor troops. All storeswere sta.cked on the beach twcnty-five yards off shore, for vrantof transportation to a safcr disposal area.

29

HISTORY OF TEC.THNIC.'L INfELLIGENCE

The. day they l.nded MIIjor Ridclick became ill and ;ras returnedto Finchh.fcu I', ajor iJrn-.-riirht ,?.ssumr. coT.iand of the UIlit.

.'lithout, :ro( er ordcrs 1n4 .oq.tc quthoriZatJ. Onf 'b.e Onitran into tLie old, i'rro i.. n of 2.etomirJili thcir s'atL.s anl f.;;m-ulatinL; i.l;r~m foI cri1n. C dr. sl1de- .ie n '';.;§ Fi.s loS;, b y ov, r.Jain';iris ht's heTans t C i h 'i; c _ f r .1 i.'a 2-i b,:t lC edqu-.rtcrs dv .Vnc c.helo n an: z o'esontc. :.es of 'eckless TaskForce so that the stazus of the Ujnit co-ld b~ establishedo

A te.lor:.ry camp site for the UTnit ';' s located on the beachunder a bluff occupi ed by a b'ttr3' of OI40 T' l A' stora.coe tentand jwuirle han.zocks wecre eroctud., but no ' attem!t ias rnde to setup i pei;rmnnnent c-mp site

The first' tw;o ca?.ys, pereoruiel reconnoitered for Japanosedum;p.s onr the trail to Itln1.ndia to-rn. r.t ';.lite Perach 3 arnd onJautef'f Py. Lt VT.n S3.yc, nid C, il T. r'vs r-esesvod perml ;si3 nto ,;o to 7Sa-:rl1 YettyJ ;:th o. iiLht machire ,un squad frorm the

532.2 3Bo.t n.nd Shore Re i.ent reinferLcir: ; a riflj squad from the24th InfYantry holdi nrg the jetty tand thei beach. Cil t.he excursionthat took thenm into ',!ank Villa';c: sevcral hundrod enery dtumpsof clothin[, ifood 0 and r.ndical surplios were locatccd,

The secon1d niht, arounwd 2000 hours, t-7c Jrnese sinlecn.irne pll-nos car-L directly over thc beaech supliy .nd c..lp sitearea at -about 700 feet rand dropDed hijh explosives and anti-per-sonnel bombs, t-.o of vihich strdr'led the camp rea , the rest land-in>i on top of the bluff, -- ipiinf; out the .iA battery° T-he number ofkilled and weoil.red from this bo'orin[; a.ttack exceeded that from theprQcviois one on D plus 1 -;hen so -1much deistructi1on ';:-sZ ca.used tothe su-l:lies. Ho-i:over. no one in the UTait .,uffered injuriosO

,:Iuch of the Unit's clothing aind c;quirsmert ',ras blcw.7. up, Forday3 after that they had nothi:;-, to ;ca.r exncpt -rlr'.t ' the. ;had onthoir !.ac,;k.,s or could salvpo frori Jl.a- dumps-. P.oea.'ti::er th_ foodshort'ac c-,u..ckd by the ori,-inal destLuction of the supply dumpon D plus cno continued,

is '.rrang;e'ments by 71ajor J.'Tin-rri Lht xwith G-4 of the TskForce the day bcfore the bo-,ubinfg the crp -;ras moved to Brixnkrm='sPl1antati.o-Lo south':;est of 'ia etty-r on Jautef a 3ay. Lt D)ck modredoquil.-ert by LCV¢ to the row cC1i. site hc -whic in th'C 7icinityof I Corps Si-;nal du.: i-nd ir.jor ',;aio,,.-- n smervised set tin, upthe c amp -- t7wo tents for cuar.rters a.nd -r nlative buildingn forstora co lcated in a grassy area in a kapok grov.

3o0

HISTORY OF TECHNIC.iL INiTELLIGENCE

That niht thoere as anothcr air raid alert. rmloes woresig:htod, but no bomnbs wcre drop-ped.

The next day thin ,s -ot under r.ay: mj or Thain.rright pro-cured authorizaticn from To sk Force G-2 fo: r.umembers of the Tech-nical Intelligenc; Co:znosi-;e Unit to enter JTapanese duraps andremove equipment ^f IntclliLence value; tl?. jor M.adiLsan establishedliaison w.ith I Cor:s Ordna:'.co for assistance in recovcring equip-r.ent and he also procured ad-itionanl space noer the cramp siteas an Ordnance stor.gc. area; Lt Rowe established liaison :-ithI Corps Si,-;n.l Cf fice for assistance in collecting: Sigmanl equip-mc nt .

In the follow.inii; days I.Major '-Tninri£;ht loc.ted l-rge MAd-ical durlis; Major l!6div;in took over lorge quantities of cap-tured Ordnance which had been collected by corabat troops andtoCgether with Lt Van Slyck and Cpl T.rvoes evacuated additionalJaparese equipment. Lt Row.e loc--ted items of Sitgnal Intelligencevalue; Capt LaiLlbert broulaht in supplies of Tapaenese clothing andfood. Lt anil Slyck, Lt '.foodson, and Lt Birleffi collected C:S.'materiel.

Nearly all the items recovered in the Hollandia areas werein the oriLinal pa-cking and in fine sh.pe, as left by the Jap-anese. Hovwever, quantities of -nmateriel eore destroyod by UnitedStates 2krr souvenir hu.nters. Dtu:ps -ere ransacked, ca.sesopencd and tr.ny complete :r. ch ine shops were ruined by souvenirhunters picking them ipart. YTevertheless, tons of cnemy equip-mcnt of -ll kinds were recovered by the tc.ats -- more than on anyprevious oel ration -- and ni.ch of this oquipmuent eas of hijehIntel li ence value.

;mongr the other ca.ptured documents, a rather interestingJapanese propQtCandr a ?-agazin3 printed in Enrlish, Me4lay and ep -a'nese, reportini, on the success of "Greater East A.sia Co-pros-'pirity Sphre", vm-s turneod over by the UInit to the CIC fortransl'.tion and. displosition by -ATIS.

From time to time several ch.anges in assignment of personnelwere made: Lt Van $lyck was appointed temporary troop co=r.ander;Lt Peck wv~as returned to Finschhafen and en route assisted inprocurinrg rrwater transportation for thc Unit; Mlajor Ridclick 'whohad recovered from his illness, Lt Birelffi and Tvt Ogle rejoinedthe Unit, having come up from Finschhafen on the Dutch ship,Towsscns w-'ith two w;capons carriers and a one-ton trailer; Itj orRiddick took over cor m-_ndfrcz Major IlainvrriLht, who, having

31

HISTOR"Y OF TE.KICAkL INELLIGENCE

secured five c.s.~s of Japanese Medical equipment .rith threesamples of each item, terminated his detached service and flewto Brisbanc, .iustralila, with the oquirlaent to have it translatedand analyzed and to report results of Mebdical Technical Intell-igence to Col S&'1vc'; I-vt John Eucer,ne-.ll y ?ssiC;ncd to 5250thfrom C,JS section 41st Divisi on, joinod the Unit; T/5 Paul R.Goin; vwas released from the Unit to acomrpany Lt Pond, CO.7 TeamNo. 2, scrving ~with the 41st Division. Lt Ro:¢e left on temporaryduty w'ith United $States F'orces at Diak, (Pklp Incl 12) to pro-cure Sirnal Intelligcnee aatoriel in that -rca, his mission atHollandia com,:pleted, he procured orders for himself from Sixth,rxr,, sav! to it that all his cquipmcnt collected in the tollandiaarea w.s packed, crated and lbcolled, ready for shipim.nt, andrndc arranr;coernts with I Corps transportation for shipme.nt.

On 20 May, G-2 US.S03 directed the followring. appointments:

Major Madia. .................. ExecutiveCa~pt 1h-1anlcyo.. .... .. . ...... ..... Ld jutantCapt Lambcrt... ........... Troop ConrtanderLt Van Slyck ....,....,.........froa Cor nkndantLt B3irloffi.·· ...... ,...····. · .Transportation CfficrLt 3Joodson.. ..... . . . ......... .. Mess OfficerLt Van Slyck.....s..............SuDp;ly OfficcrCaipt Lanmbcrt ........... , *. I e.Dcpot Officer

Lt Van Slyck ................... .ssistant Depot Officer

The Unit had the usual trouble with the misappropriation ofproperty; the two ,rcapons carriers and the one-ton trailer,brought up from Finschhafen by Major Riddick and Lt Birlcffi wasdischar:eod by mistake at ;Jhitc Bc1ach 1. -.)hn finally locatedby Lt Birloffi, one zeapons carrier had been taken over by aSignal unit and both truck and trailer had been looted. Report

i-as rado first to Inspectinrg Gcneral, I Corps, then to Comn.and-inc General, Base G.

i c.aptured Ordnonce eguipmeont dui-.p set up by MAajor Madiganat Brinknian's ilanutaticn -;ith rntciriel cratcd ard stenciled forshipmcnt to the United States, .?as roa-oved -.rithout authority by194th Ordnanco Battalion. Lotter reportinrg the incident vrassent to I Corps and la.ter to the Corranrdirnv Gonernl, Base G.

Bcefore imAch improvoleont was ma.de in the sarea to better thehelth and sa-nitation conditions, Kollandia tras infested with theUsual Juncle dises.sos. In the course of three rocks, nine en-listed mDen and ran officer from the 234th ciartcr.aastor SalvageCollecting Cormpany and the Tcchnical Intolligence Unit werehospitalized with Dencguo fevcr.

32

HISTORY OF TEC;i.TICAiL IT:L:TLIGE:TCE

There fzorc, in addition, tw;o other c-.sualtics susta.ined byUnit m;emberrs: l-t ,t t hichest;cr wa.s lburrncd .rith c-rbolic acidwhile unlo-:dini- a truck and w-'as hospitalizedr ; arnd Carpt Lambertwas hospita-lizccl for bone fractures and retur;ed to Finschhafonas the result of a, collision w-ith a 2-' ton ramp;hibious trud&.

Tcrwrd the Cild of M.y the Unit moved to Kajoabi Delta., justevacuated by C Come any of the 842d .,Aviation Engineer B-attalionthat w.as to be the site of the future Tochaical IntollirenceDeot -. t ot ollndia. The area w=as high, -ravelly, h ded, hkad noundcrgrow7th, ha-d good dra.ina.ej and wc;-s anple for the Units require-r.mnt s,

Here a display of cspturcd oneci equi;pront was set up forvisiting officers in a wihite Japaneso tent and two pyra.midals.

Shortly after the Unit had settled in their ncw -arca, acloud burst filled and partially dad=r the arm of 1'ojcobi Deltaand nearly flooded the U.it out. AOll h-ands .-iorkod .t clearingobstructions in the river bed and in da.-.-ing tho river banks.They savcd the area before any dmal;ae -. ars dcne.

Engineetr Toam. Mo. 3, coI:manded by Capt Donald D. Connors,was the first Technical IntolliL;cnc Engincr np toamu in thefield. It ;-as comnpiosed cof S/Sr;t Rijchrd T, -ith -nd T/4 Ro.gerSherwocd ¥,ho w;re relieved froml Distribution Division at Intcr-rmediate Section, USSCOS and wore sent to rnet Captain Connors,requisitioned from U$S.S03S EnCgineer a:t Hollandia on 5 June 1944.,

The team ins3lcted the dump areas in Hollandi?. but fooundlittle one-y oquiprmnt. Hiarirng that quantities of cnmay En-gineerintg oqui-ment especially certain mobile wvater purifying

·unita were being rocovered at Piak, the team departed a Jecklater for that area,

On 19 June Lt Birleffi ;ent on tenpor?7ry duty to Finschhafoe nto inspect anl. inventory equipment in the Technical IntellioenceDepot, On the scie day, Lt Sta'r;cr, Depot Officer ?.t Finschhcf en,arrived at Hollandia to clarify the stntus of equipment in thefield depots thero and to reach an unclrstandin{% on its disposi-tion, He took back with hi.: several items of J-panose equipz-ntand uniforms for a display pirpose at the Finschh.afen Depot.

The followin, dcy Capt Iahnlcy, who h:-d been appointed Assis-tant Coordinator of Technical Tntelligence in the Office of theIC* of 3S G-2, U40SOS,, left by air for Brisbanc, fAustralia, Lt VanSlyck .was .appointed A,djutant in his place and Lt Trier was appoint-cd IArea Comzan3der vice Lt Van Slyck.

HISTCIOR CF T2CH-:ICILL IiTTLLLICi:CE

The f1loriinrL: pcrsonnel, nho h,:d previously been rcquisition-cd fro:-. the Chie-,f CheO:ic.l Officcr, -JuSASS, jcined the Unit 22 June:

1st Lt Otis >I. Trir C..;S T/5 CT sp.re T.Wtnc:i.rcin~2- Lt Victor Dcl CGucrcio, C:.7S Yfc Cd; :ar G. ITilliganCrl Nlthmn H. Llrsor± Ivt Ed-r'rd T. Ilc'lcrryT/4 Robcrt J, $hc'r:an (appcintcca Unit Clerk)

Toward the on-. of Juno thoro ;.s increased ncemy activityin the vicinity, cand thouch no one in the Co:positc Unit r;as in-jurc-, al1l corsonncl wero directed to be ar-cnd -:hn leavin£; the

ar ca.

ocauso the unit v-as ocratin£; inf-rmally, there ts somequestion pertainir.- to the efficiency of the unit in crforringits nission.

On 7 July Lt i'i'rco Butler III, CE arrived and was appointedthe Dopot Co-:rancder vi.co Can)t Lrbert relicved, on 10 J.uly arnd 11

July the follo-rinj; personnel arrived and '-cre attached tc the Depot:

C.

lst Lt Louis Iiccny T/5 John 7. 'Tr.;o2d Lt Lam:-nce R. Smitl T/ Thnomas T. IronyEMI/j;t E cnjai;.n Eeckl-cr T/5 Gecreo GrirrcsT/St Hobert L. Jackson T/5 Glcn ,. Clcsno'1/3 Ka.rolU J. xrro T/5 C-rl H. JohnsonT/3 lirchio I. Dcaniel efc Gcorge R. HlazrlinGlT/3 John L. .lillard Tfc Rallph F. RolottT/4 Th/-:as E. Green Ifc Louias C. GorzesakT/l4 Ko-;rd n. 'i.lbeck rf c Theoolhilis G. HagCGisT/4 J!nmes J .. cExvoYy tvt Tlathanii C. BuccklcyT/5 Charles T. Test

CRD

Ifc ilbcrt L. M.lorath P-vt i'Tick . 'VannlulcciIfc Robert M1I. Do Friotas Ivt Richarrd E. Reynolds

AibLout the sam time :la jor Ridrfick -as relieved for anotherassigrLze.nt and ~,tjor ,hdif.an assumed command of the Unit and 6eneralsupervision of the Depot,

34

HISTORY COF TCHI:IC*L, IEZLLIGEDNCE

The fcllowinr; clty MIjor Joh:ns t on, Coordin.tor cf TechnicalIntelli.eLnce U3ASO03, arrived to surveyr the --ork that hadi booenaccom1plishcl by the Unit anld to adlvise the ircrsormul thot cap-tureCd mntoriel r ud.& larTel.y be ship>ped fro:i; ae F., and nase Gwould bc i:rimcic.il ly a tratnsshipr'rnt dopot. That daty l .a jorMadi£:an, !iAjor Shull, Mhjor Johnston, Lt Fhrlr.hy arn Lt Butlerconfcrrcd -!.ith Gencral Ycrer on the clispositicn of the Unit,norw that most of the enemy equipment in the area had becn ro-cOVvc red.

M.agjr Madi;an ha-in,: completcd his ilission, returned to Bris-bane for conference with the Chiof Orc'nance Cfficor, US*;SOS. On9 October he reported to Dase F to assulme charg:e of the Ordnance%n alysis Section of the Tccbhlical Intelligonce oepot,

335

Iii3TOCY OF T7CHIC L IITT-i-LI lTr'TC2

C :_ ii P T 1 R IV

RYI i:. mC: CR OiAI.

.'Qi.ii !L,!,- October 1Q4 4

&is th',e .:ar mo77ed fori'ard it gPainred mo7-entum_. nrld scopo.The omcninE, of the .Jldhiralt,- Islan.ds ca-apaifn .n 'ebruary 1544strc-t;:3e the lines of conir, unichtion w-ith heoui.quarters atBrisbane to 2,000 miles -- a longe ways by convey. For Tech-nical Intellicence, the rapidity of collection and processingof captumred enermy Nateriel and disse-rination of informationis one of' the prime missions. iThe United States CapturedSnei.y Equipm.nent Depot at 2risbar.e as dropping, too far behindthe front lines,

The Technical IntelliL:ence Depot Is Toved to Finschhafen

In accordance .ith letLer GSB 323.3 Headquarters USA30S,25 Ilarch 1944 and letter F22B 386-.3 leadquarters US1iTE, 28lihrch 1944, authority -was grranted to establish the UnitedStates .rr.my Technical Intelligen ce Depot at Firnschhafen,effective 20 4;pril 1944.

wa-i.rehouse turned over by the base Chemical 'T.rf are 3er-vice ':ras conlverted for u.se as the Depot bu.ilding. -. alls forthe buildin., were constructed .nd it iwas mlcade rain and burglar-proof,

Lt Rlcci, who hVa.d been left in charge of tnhe Depot whenthe Coomosiite .Jnit sta[ed 'or TIcll-adie in Ipril was relieved ofduty 1wi-th thie 5250th Technical Intellirence Company shortlyaf'ter;,erds and 1st Lt 2dw;ard R. 3tan;iler, .ACD, was appointedDepot Cfficer..

During .Tuly and A£i1ust the analysis laboratories of theTechnical IntellifL.ence sections vwere moved from nBrisbane toFinsc1,hafen. .,t first, the suctions utilized the facilitiesof the base for their ainalysis laboratories, and for quartersfor their personnel. This cor.liinirng of the analysis sections

36

HISTORY OF TCHNiIC4'L IPiTLLLIGENCE

vith the receiving and shippir., Depot -- both at the main Depotat Finschhafen and the temporary fielrd depot at Hiollandia -- wasa new and more efficient set-! . It cent:-alized control elimin-ated certain phases of dxlj lic -te administra tion. and handling ofequipalent and personnel and iwa3 conducive to gtreater collaborationamonrg the services.

Lt .lcide Santilli, SC, operated the S3inal analysis lab-oratory at ?risbane until the end of I.Tay, when he departed forFinschhafen to make arraniLnme;nts for the chan-.e in location ofthe a-alysis la' oratory aund to di.pose of ca-ptIured equip-mentthat '-had accum.llated t;here. T/')i Plackledge and Tj5 Traub, whohad a;cked soime 2,00C p ulnrds of organJ za.tion i-.:' dil;Iernte forth-e -:ove from Bris3bne to Finschh'afen, worked overti:_e -.7ithother depot personnel at Finschhalfn to expedite the ship.ent ofcaptured ene: y equip:;nt that h .d stocked up there from theTrollandia, Biak, ,r ara kde, ke,nd -3Jarmi operations,

It was 1-lJanned that the United States .Jrrly T'echnical Intell-igence Depot wvould not only be a center for the anualysis and ship-erent of captured materiel bt also thle location for a training

school for orientatioen of nefJ personnel assigned to TechnicalIntelli!~ence duties. lrong the first to receive this instruc-tion .rere 1st Lt Jack 7. D)anielo and 2d Lt /acob Overholt, assign-ed to the 52C5th in June and se-nt f'or.-vard to the Derpot at BaseF shortly afterwards to be briefed by Lt Santilli in methodsof coiloctinr and evatluating senemy. Si;nal : lateriel on opera-tions w;ith field teans. Briefing included stuldy of technicaldata and identification photographs, vith emihasis laid oncorrect m-nethod of reportinu;, particularly in the matter ofsupllyinr complette information on thle plce and circumstance ofrecovering equiprment,

Lt Col .'illiara Ait, Bexrc;in, Sig-nal Corps, rmade a special tripto lMelbourne to contact the Mh.sster Gereral of Crdnance, Australian.'rr.y, in regard to secu.rin s3armples of captured Japanese Signal

Corps equip:ent rwhich had been r-aported in the Alustralian depotthere.

General Brehon Somervell, Comranalding General Army ServiceForces, h.ad offered the icl'rvices of .rmy Service Forces enewyequipm.ent specialists to the Pacific The ater earlier in the year,and had received iLmiodiate concurrence that they -;7ere desired.In p,.arch, General Somervell -rote a letter (Incl 14) that clear-ly established the status of Techniical Intelligence specialistson temporary duty to the theater, and re-emphasized the inmportanceof Technical Intelligence in the rwar effort. This personnel wasdelayed in arriving until the sun,rer of 1944.

37

T.:STORY OF TECi2TIC; L II.TELLGENCE

rin t'1 t 011r of 19 .. ). cOi.rleirrI.,11e eelpho.sis waspllaccd o1.. -t.... d .. ,- .itioi _' i-:f n .tioi ,pertaininr; to cap-

rd .... ; ........ . t roturned fromr thed'rlt r'L -',,- O'''li--./lfD,.'i, 7 --. ?,0- .'-i -.lh i ,' ' "4t1 et1~{d fr h

HTl'o1ilerdi? :3pe'"r..:;:.2, r:',....':'e-1 :'-riT;tt. rCoort on the analysisof SO' ' r ' ;1 j e ' tce therepor t '.T1 .ic. ..... _-'t ^, !. hke 1booklet was

7t',:_ 1'i" ..< -... I- "":oi., b:t it ,'?s th.mt (desiralr1c to pub-1is i i.i .cSiatl, i- o r o d iseinai3,Irte h it nf'o-ation to

t~~e e. wo X i L c;.r (' 1 C- -, - -I , 4.1 e

t:,.ou:ti. co ais 1, .i.- nd ,li tr.' +1 . to t c ic l fieldr .,_'o'1 .o r u.. - nid;'%ify;i'," T n....- s. dr.'s and nMedicines.

.... ' 11.:'hr . ..... -= lore r;C_. s ' . rsu1t of . trip,'" . : U!:o-n iO. J_ C * rts, t oi .di i r1 .y to bri.!... e'"" ~ ?izu'?,:~ ,:'i:.vy cf hdm :ma.t~rio.ceqt o r . oba-c7; a to) <>.ider .':l_ u:; t ty c~ :.;l l '-t r i, 1 ca, ptu r. on

thtl o1) r, ion f'r :.!.-- sn , 1 r-.tcrises in -Prisbane,

,J1 . .. .jer lso ' . c y -'c other services;Lt B3n' .:. ar ..... .t- f' '.rnt., ?. Ch O>ical rf are Tech-lni cal Irt_ li c-e1 .; C1, pt Til-Y s.is - 1 (I J .ta cn Yap-2tL03e ,. '-ri - - , C- 1 rrm- .rc par d _n i su 1,u tri'- .ecinicalI.telli ' nc .n,' repr s . .. .. c h rt-r ,- d to the..r 'I r h: o or' h e.- i'bl :ie h

T.nitei .T, I _r --' 1. .. pt, Co.n. t olver his posi-',i0 1 t 0 1 i", !; i CC r :' , i l C r.

Li is, '-.,'1 . o i taire ' . -hi; ' .n Lt 'ish p7:procoeo,~t;~' berl, ;?!",L__r1Ioyvin i n rI ,' -. st, .aryl~d_ to sutit a-. ero. .-l.'eC?:)r." on 0C:di ^.c:; :c.r-ve" nieJ !ntelli-,nCee just as ::ajor'~ "', h;~'i :!o, h-lf : f'/ ' +'

-~~~~ -"- _~ . -Li.. .4epo

.' tor.-: in',bor '::et-,il - lom-ie dri:zr to the Deot fromt'r_- Q .'o -;it'. .h r -. t inr-c -. f c::.uu recL eq uilent to

be h-,:-,1l ,:~ t'th irore:..s dsip...i z -c, . Urutin<, adminis-.... -_ ....h ,' ]_di c e''~ atinih C

tr--tivc - a m - lr thor > l ' t li nhe- d for addition-al hel) C'.'C 'b rr- c )nt ot'l officer -rend enli.sttd men ucre added^ro r du t y t:t iratiqc:i- rt rs t the -- t -,-id -'it' the iel d teamns.L '~p ...-T1, l ... C. ..1 _. rsorn ".ns sinod +' the t h25Cth -ch-

Ii1OCU~~.. . 5zho To 2iCCh-p.~f~,nic~ ..... c- 'li once Co:"-ay e-<p-1,:C i-l~

,~r,_~:,, ~ ~ ~ ilc .ilkde-' o-' )--da

,dre, >. r; i S .; . l . -- 2 Sa 104I,

l~~~ -i n3'<, ~ r ic.,sr" :a f'th ' '"'.u;t, the .n"my

hai~. dc ;-,1^ -ed iC:o : .. r...:..,.eot1 e (--=/ IT::cl i 2 and 13) .s a stag-o:-: on, for tircraft ;"nd s"-'lie- directed t: the ::.ore easterly

auses in ,cw .- uin ea

,.rt .,.IQ'.3 0

HISTORY OF TLC7'IC;JL IMTELLGETICE

When ITollandia vas3 cTturei. by the talies in 1April, therewere signs that the two airdrours, one at Maffin Bay and theother at Sa;or Twhose construction h.ad never been fully completed,might be built up for general operations and the whole area con-vorted into e? defense sector.

Th is threat luas nipped with the surprise l-ading at ixraraby the 163d Regi;lental Combat Teeml (RCT) of the 41st InfantryDivision on 17 Tway 194) ?T;ro days later the Yaps lost theSarmi position writh the United States seizure of nearby WTakdeIsond. Later in this operation the l63d PCT was reinforcedby ele:-ents of the 6th and 31'st Infantry Divisions. PRenmantsof the Yap carrison from A1ara -.rithdrre,- overland to the rwest,over svwac2p -m.d untravcrsed jungle ranges, across country be-licved to be inhabited by headhunters.

.xn Ordnance team cohpDostd of ITajor Ifigrion Penn and SgtJohn Linchalk left Hollasdia on 17 June 144 to stage -ith the31st Infoetry Division -rhich .as going to relieve the 6thDivision at Sarti. During the staging period the team assistedin trainin?;, combat persormel for the cominEg operation. Theyloft then with the first part of the Divisiont arriving atSarmi on 12 yuly.

Contact vr-.s mde with the 6th Divisio.n G-2, w-;hore it wasfound the CIC had shippod out con;siderablc Japanese Ordnanceequipm-;nt. The rcnmainilnn. equipment was turned over to MTajorflnn for arackcing and shipping,

Thrc-e liays later a second Ordnance team, Lt Bishop andT/4 'jimu, rCportCt at Sarrmi. They wiere attachod to the 6thDivision. iSother Ordnance team:., 1st Lt Nc-:ak-kowski and T/4Rayromlnd Lbvy also reported in to 6th Division from tHeadquartersUS/ISOS four days later, Lt Bishop's temn pulled out for theSansapor operation shortlJy -fter Lt ITowakowski's arrival.

'!, jor hPcn, having been ordered to the United States onrotation, was replaced in iAuLtust by Capt Sternal w-rho took this'.s his first as:-idlulent in the fI.sld as a Technical Intelligenceofficer. -is toee.n cooperated -with Lt Nm;akowski. and T/4 TLvyand continued to recover Tapancse equxiplment, most of wrhich wrasfor-w.rded to the United States f.rnry Tcchnical Intelligence Depotat ri.lschhafcn. *Lt rNo-.akcw:r-ski and T/4 IP;vy, when they had com-pleted their ruisosion in Aunust, returned to the Ordnance analysisscction, zwhich -.;as still at Brisbneo and accom panied the section-hon it was shipped to Finsc'!hafon.

39

HISTORY OF T2C-Li'L I. .ILI GETCE

Lt ,errh hlt, Tho ha- boen the Sinal Technical Intelligencer aroesrntta ive in the area left .:ith the 6th Division to go on the$3ansapor oper-tion. Lt Daniels, Signza Corps, joined the 31stDivision to carry one ill av.ilable information pertaining tothis area .-.- s tulned over to hi-. He continued collectingcquiplernt and iirain,- it back t the Dopot, at Finschhafen,until he w!as relived of tcmorarvy dut, with the 31st InfantryDivision in Seapteirer.

itaek-: 27 MaLr -- 20 .Lup; 4

Cn 27 ?lvy 194i Unitod 3tates ground forces 1raled on BiakIsland (hFi/a Inci 12) which driLnates the northerr. ap-roachst CGeelvink Bay. The seizure of this island iarked the prac-tical en.d of the NeJ Guinea cmc.pein,. Bick's3 captu.re, ho-rwever,--as not st:cthiin tor be r-itten off the 1books in a few days..Jithin trwenty-forur hours after landicr: , it was clear that ad-vance to the thtree airfiolds -would not be easy.

The cdiui.ant factor of the rpcration rwas th high combatefficiency of the onaerL- The 1lst Infantry Division (minus163d RCT) carried the early operation at Diak. Urniteo StatesgroxLd f'orces htld the initiati-ve but it reaulired soi:P of thefiercicst fizh`tir in the history of Pacific -azrfare.

.'ter a tcwr o-day boattle ending 2 Tunr, United States in-fnlltrygr n :on the c _c1=rz-ndU . hci:fhi; called Mo I rr ?.idce; aftera three hour battle on 3 Tunc, they still held it; and by 16June tkhey had captured o-kI-h;: r .ird;lro in a surprise fl-nkmove(amrnt to t1o enel- s roe'ar

h Bi-!.k Islaland o'-artion was ovCer except for maoppirJ up,by 2 .. une ?after Tfnitod S-'iSataes forcceq in ca sustained movo-r.;ent of envelopzlent, had broken stubborn Tap resistance toseize the; other to a.irstrips, or okoe amnd Sorido, and the portfaciltieos of Sorido Village.

Lt o ' o, SC, cn his ovwn initiative had nrde a.rrangem-.entsto .ccon.mny the 41Lst Division on this opera.tion. Having com-plited his 7iission at Eoll-andia, he departedc from that basewith the Division 23 Iay as conayding off'icer of the Signalntelligence Tera, a-nd landLed .t 3Biak on H plus 50 m.inutes

27 ay.V.

40

atI-ITORY CT :>C uo'w I:1 TLLIcGNC2

e opocrtteod closely- :;ith the task force Signal c.mipany, forit wxas found that this ;as the rmost satisf.cto ry arrango-Ent asthlcy provided hi-m ith tr.ns.opcrtatin and nrecessary pirsomnolto re;cov-r thu cquipmr-lnt fromz¢ the field (this -;was before 5250thsupervisd tl:e c;i-pping of ll11 tea).) . pl.cc in thoe Signaldodot ;.-s sc;t "side for the storaD of cli-ient aid the Div-ision Sig;nal ccrL. ipy cxtended overy effort to facilitate therecovery and return of cnci.J equipment.

Thc activities of Lt o;Je weore also closely coordinatedwith the Division G-2 ana the Counter Intolligcnce Corps toem.

ot3tlh ;?avc valuable assi.sJt nce in reporting SinJ. l dumps nmdaid;in;, in thcir rcraoval. (It -ms noticeable from. operation tooperation that the desire to help of the officers in charge oftroops hiad , gresat do.l to do writh the success of the TechnicalIntellipgnce mission. )

There re ri no lr eo fixed radio stations at Biak such aswore found at Koll . 2 C.dia. Thorec was one smaller station, how-ever, located in thi, ontrance to onc of the largo c-aves, butby the tiime this ca.ve .s cleared of Tcaps by usoi;-e casoline,

oz.bos, anft rockets, the scts ;rce3 burmuJl beyond recCg;nition.

Th;ore .. s no evidence of the a.p,.r.ci; .tteLmptiing to - des-troy an1 of their cquipr.omnt either at opeortinii positions or indumps. Toiioe of the cquiprelint reco-vercd had been booby-trappedalthough the Japancsc hadl h-d suifficient timeo to trap or dos-troy the cquipament in the vicinity of the air strips. It wrasoftn fouind im.possiblo, hvo-never, espocia.lly in the first fewdays -of opcr?.tion, to ::et oll the equipment rc-emoved from thedurmps ^.- fast as they were reported or loc.ted, so "Off Limits"signs ;rcro posted to help prevent the lootili of dtumps beforeitcrls of Intelligence value cculd be removed.

Lt Rorec rcmaincd ant Biaak unltil 3 Tuly, when hc returnedto Base F (Finschbafcn) with all of thz Signal equipacmnt cap-turod -- -approxima.tecly 4,500 pounds.

Lt Bishop and T/4 JTinn were the first Ordnance Tceam to besent into the Biak oper.tion; they arrived carly in July. How-over,; bcfre the fighting wras completed, they wore orcdered bythe Sixth frri:v to report to the 6th Division in the \kYffin Bay.area, Ynhere the Division ;was being. relieved from the ^rara --.?aikde -- Sarii operation for the Sansapor operation, Consider-able heavy Ordnance uratricl they had collected on Biak had tobe turned over to the task force Ordnanco officer w;ho shippedthe equipmQnt for thon by water to .1ajor Mc.adigan at Holloandia.It arrived in good condition,

4-5

HISTOPRtf OF TEC'T -ICiL II:TUjIGETCE

Lt Claude F. Pope, Ptvt Allbrt L. .orath,, Pvt Richard E.Roynolds (all newly assie:gnr to 52Cr0t), c^r:?psir OrdnanceTorni No. l, ;erc sent to Biac durii-: S3ptembo'er to take overa.ftcr Lt Bishop and T/4 7inn had left to join the 6th Div-isi on. L c~nsiacr-clC quantity of o...e C. OrnncC rm.atericl¥?as still avail:tl an;d ,.ias shipired by theo to the Depot atFinschha fc n.

Cn 28 3Scptc-ber Ordnrancc Teac- No. .1 prccedod to 24th Div-ision, at that tielD strcing for the coning Philippine Islands?p*ration. P:cca!uso of orders, for this invaceont, this Ornalncetla ial'3o was unable to rurn.in at Bia-k until all the capturedm:a.teriel had beeoon shipped, but arranrigctnts -.- re amde withS-4, ;IHeadquartcrs Basoe "f (.-ii.), to ship it to the TechnicalIntelligence Dcpot at Finschhafcn.

Engincer Teala No. 3, Ccntain Conimors, S/Sgt Srith andT/4 Sh.rwood, arrived at Fiak fro-- the Hollandia operation10 June. Thoy had takeln off, like Lt Reo;:e, on their owninitiativec -- hopped a plane ride ',Then they heard that con-sidecrablce encr. Eninorecr eouip-ent -;as being ca.pturod in thatarCea.

Early in tie acific :Jar, Technical Intelligence tcEan.operated under Gcneral Orders froml trcr i: Hteadaquarters. Theyplanned their oim itinerary, secured trans-port-rtion, 1toc overeneny equiplmoent frci:m combat troops to ~whuom- they .rer notn._cessarily :.ttachod, .nd did all -t'his by c- rather co;pre--nas i.-e 'authority from the i;r-. that thncy were "te proceedwh-crver necessary to socurz' captured enemry cquip"nt". ?Theyoftcn had to win the cooc er-.-ion of leon waho had never heardof Tec!hnical Intelli.enccn aeln had nc conce-)tion of its ission,.Lheoy not ,only hacd to be cci.bat i n;- , technical ranailysists. and.r- ly scroungecrs of tlhv first ordcer, lxt ^also first class sales-.menm. . .Thy ta-llced thloir vay throurgh.

Jthouh, the '-,iakz opcr--.tion hard been doclared "practicallyvwon" by various ncs cow: entators in the St-tes, the hardcstfightinf --ams still to co.-c,. 'tien Cajptain Co-:,nors and hi's teau.arrived, Unitecd States tro.ops still had on-ly an unsteady holdon the origina-.l b .;cchhl.l -- the Japs took the beach road away

a. that tiine, wras to recover the equisin;nt, sub-mit a report,.sse.ble all equiprent at one point, ald then turn it over to

42

HI3TCRY OF T..'CH-T-I4C!L ILT~ELLIGEENCE

the base transportation officer. It was found more and moredesirable, as the wfar procecded, for the teams to safehandequipnent back to the Depot to insure its arrival intact.EnL;inoer Tea i- To. 3, ho;7C.zoor, like the other twro teams, hadto leave Biak b f ore the equ'ipnment -- an entire Japaneseinichine shop, mines, -!ator purifier unit, etc -- coald beshipped to the Depot act .inschhafon. Capt Connors, there-fore, cratcd the matericl o.nld left it with the task forceEnr, inc r3 .

The tjal~i left Bia.k c-:rly in Tulyr and Capt Creed calledMaijor Har:zood's Enginleer Toaez: (T/3 Ellyott and T/3 P..ris) tQgo up to Diak fro3m Fii;ci'hhafen to finish collectirg the equip-nont ald to return that on hand to the Dcpots. Tv.jer Har7rood,who had. boon assigned to the 5250th Technical intolliscncoCo'.:pany in June along wiith Capt Connors, and '.-ho had the onlyothor Enuino,.r Technical Intelli~;crnce tmaxn in the Thheater,crrived at Biak in Septeliber after the close of oper-tions(20 ,ugust). This tii.ic arrancements hatd been mrade throughthe 5230th for the tear.. to be vested with r.mre specificauthority to t'~kl over equipment fron troops in the area.

Dutrino this post operational period, the followingadcditional tee.::s, all personnel nevs in the field, arrived atBi :k:

2l Lt Allen ]f!illips Pvt Robert DenniganT/T J. Lo Garner

.Tdei cl 1

2d Lt Earl Raab

Qsr t r:Laster

C,.pt Yosuph 1"llvoy ~p;',t Charles ::rightPvJt Loon yrcers

SiTcial

2d Lt :-eI43nry Sarnvis T/3 Tohn Lotz

".3

HISTORY OF TCPI ITICCL ITLTrLIGEINCE

Thsco tenams not ornly reco7eorcd equipment re.mininfv in theLialk 'x;i-, but :.lso .iriod expocrience in Technical Intollieoncework uLnder ficld conditions as preliL-:inary training for csarbatduty during, the coain.j. Ih.ilipine canpaitn. Late in Septemberthe follaiowLV ter--. received or'ders to report to Hollandia tostcie .:ith the 24th Infantry Division for the IThilippines:Lt Phillip!s C'iW Tc.ran.; Lt Ra.ab of the Medical Corps; Capt il-vcy's Quarternmaster Team; and Lt TarvJis' Signal Team.

A Tochunical InteUlliPLnce Coordinator is ,p:!ointed to Sixth jAry

2It th.e bocinninL of the .w.r, Techrical IntelliEence hadbeen -!opendrent upon concurrenc of the .. r..ry before they coaldr o into aIy opeor.tion; the ,r-iry caild refuse, or havinCg gramtedpermission, could chamCn its mind.

Upon the formtin of iTS.E~'E another link was added, andthe request to 'o into combat had to be sent to them. They inturnl requostod perm.ission from the tr'r.

Even once h.Virg- gaiedd pca-iission, all 1-as not smoothsailingS. The totams frequently w-ould arrive at the Division

Cor p;sr for stagiIn;, only to discover thet the , k Forcelhal not been notified that the Technicel Intelligence teamswcre to be -ttached to their ho;adquerters. Not nowj-ing any-thing about it, the Corps ::'ould som:eotils order them back orsi.aply lick up and go off on operations, leaving the tcals..Thi, is w;hat had happened in conl:-!ection with the Cape Glouces-tcr opiratiln w;rhen a qpcially fcrlmei unit, cent up for stag-in,, after per:i:ssion 'al:d orif:inally betrn ;ivon by th; .trrr,w/as cdenied permission to go on the operation:-.

Late in juoe 1944 Col N. B. Sauve frwrardecl a letter toSixth .~r-,, outlining; a plcn for a Technical Ini;elligenceofficr to be atachl-le to Sixth Lhr- to supervise trainingprograri-so and to coordi-ate the activities of Tochnicol In-tcllie;once personnel supulicc. by USlASOS to Sixth LyXrzr. Sixth4iry agrceed.

fAuthorization was then obtained fronr US'JFE for directcom:miication betvween Sixth Airziy and USASOS on Technical In-tclli-gence matters (thus skiApping; the US3FFE link), and auth-ority was granted for TSJ,SO.S to issue orders attaching Tech-nicrJl Intelligence porooinel to Sixth 1irvy.

44

HISTORY OF TECiT-TIC'.JL IiT .;LLIC--DTCC3

Captain Crccl had': arrivedl in the Theater durin: Jtune and hadborn lplaccd on deta.ched service with the 5250th. He and T/3rtcorson .wore rplceod -t fir::t oni te:':-orary duty to Headquartersilara.o Force to ilrstruct the 112th and 158th Cavalry PegimrntalCo::lbat Tea.-s, which were to particip te in the Tlhodla.rk andKiri;,rirr. Islris -operationls, in the identific-ation and opera-tion of cnc:-V Orrcn -nce equi-:7ent.

The first ;;eol^; of July 1544, Capt Creed ;-;asp -ced on de-tacheo._s0rlvice with the Sixth Ir.~r as the first Coor-.inator ofTechnical Intelli,:,ence f:r an ixry in this 1Theater . Attachedtc the Office of the Asrisctant Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth .rmy,his 'wrk was to coordinate activities of all Techmical Intel1it;ence units placed on te.porr uty ut- with the 'rTrry; to main-tl.dn liaison betwrecn the AC of S, G-2, Sixth 'rny .nd the ACof I3, G-2, US'30S; to advise G-2, U 33SOS, as to the number andcoi.:osition of Technical Intelligernce units requcir&d by theIr.:!y; to coordlin-te the activities of Sixth m:r-Y-g's TechnicalIntlli.-;enne units; to supervise the trainiinrg pro-'ro:. for troopson Tochnical Intelliei::nce r-ntters; and to act as liaison officerwith the United States r r -y Technical Intellirpence Depot.

2/3 Jolm Lotz was assinedrl t- G-2, Sixth .rlly, to ha-dlethe clerical -work, and Car-::t Stcrnal and T/:>i-t I'etercsn Vrereattached to the r-rgr to assist Capt Creed in conl'uctin atrainirng program on the use of TJatpan;se wce p1aons.

Ultogether, the efficiency of the sclt-up was irlproved onehuLndrcd percent. Early in Septe:imber Capt Creed cal- do-m frorSixth lr-.y for a conference with Col Sauve' on the nu-mber andcomposition of' tea_.s for future operations, an-' arrzangeenents-were rar-dce to supp3,ly the requisite person- el. Task Forces thenlmcv ah:-. :' f timne what Technical Intelligence tea.7ms to expectand h':.wr their work was to be coordinarted vith the plans of theDivi.sion or Corps. Preli:-Jinary aIrrangceents :'re also made forth6 'Tecmical Intolli 'ence teams to assist in the pre-combattraining program. As it tutrned out, closer coordination wasestablished betwe-ln the teo:lis and key peorsonnel at Task Forceheadquarters as well as with the troops, and the flow of in-for.lation and :materiel between the teams in the field and theDepiot vrs conideorably expeited.

45

HI3TCORY 0? TECEUC-,L I IC-.T.E NCLEE

The D toot at irnschhc.Ien Is Enln-.r.,

In i.-uTtly Major Onakle Bullock, Corip3 of En:;,inoers, frcaSoi.uth Pacif ic ,cz, -n. to-, enlist:.. -men, -,;sre tr.nsferred to

nte t2qOth T c:aiczl, Intellilence Co.: ny, -. rnc' after a fewd.ays orientatio':, -,erc transferred to Finscfhiafern to processequipimcnt seint in by the tzo EnT:ineer toas -l- ?__ jczr FIarood I's

and- Copt Connor's -- sent out into the field. By this tilmell ca?.,turcd e nemy cquii'e-t ,;a-.s bcint fJcrvT-ardced to Finsch-

hfcrn rather than to Brisbane f or analysis .andc trans-ship-:clent to the Un1tited St.atoes.

Lt Col Jon:Is, Encincer Intellif inc2c Of 0icr fr.om1 U;3.'30S,::s- :nt fr:iBrisbvz;.nc1 t Finbs.chhafcn :- cllndi to studly

the facilitics of the nwc .r Deiot, t-o -' 'i o '.1csp.?ition of cap-turocd .r._invcir equipmont, to conrfer -- ith th new' n. n in c'r

Intolliceonce te.^s arn the ncily..poirnted Sixth Ar1:y liaisonofficer, Cao t Croc o

In .Jgujst Captain Gordon Bess, '.-b c vq.;s interested in.,dl h:-d I :'lTicd:e of Jao. anes equip---e.t, reucsteod transferto tho 5250thh. '.';-on.in: at ssi ;i ::nt to a ficed tem1, he wvas

dctailed to the Ordnance section tc relieve Capt Birleffi,?h~o ;7:s being transferredo to t'he 0ffi-c; of the Assist.ant~Ci;if of Staif', G-2, :Sv2'C0 * hri-, thlc first .-r eek of Soptcm-ber, ;aj or .l4 dre-; MII. Ncff ailnd thre;. cnlisited men, cormprising

CJS Team LTo. & (to.-: nu.:bcrs, in s',e casus fr-m, hero on, un-til t1hey -vra rye--esi•.:n.ted byC f20th' for the . fr:-y of Occup pa-

ti'o2n fo'r JapaIn . y.-:r lato:, -:re designated d by the W7ar Depart-;:&nt nanl. .id ot fellow in chronolfical or:'er those .alreadyassi01oJ2l in this Tln:~ater) left BrisbaCne on tec:mporary ? dutyVwith the Doepot at Base F.

.n United States Na.y M.obile Expo1sives Investigation Unit

(:iETU) composed of one officer and one mnlisted -m%, was attaoh-ed ico the United Status ;.r'y Tcc!hlicC'l Tntelli'Once :Depot at

iasq "F" at .about the s.ome tij: . The orders s -,ritton fcr this

porsonnel pcrmitted the-r. to acc-p.r:r the Technicel intelligenceteeams in tho ficld -;ith the Sir;th ,.rr.r.

It was decided that all Technical Inteligflence teamls forSixth and Eighth frmiies m:ould star;: at the Technical Intelligence

Depot at Finschhafl n andr tna t therefore the housinlg facilities

would need to be expanded so thalt personnel mi{;ht train,, amd

46

HISITCY ODF MCOTICI'L ITiL.IGENCE

ennalytic -:/)rk mi;:ht still be carried on riu'ing the stagingpecriodl It v.s cod1teo.?lated, -by th.n t ha'.t hore than one hun1drOd Tchinic3al IntclIig:nce .: fficers ?.nd enlisted 'on ul.7SAbe stationed at the Technical Intellid,once De,'ot at one ti:.3

On 293 Jly, thel Thlitod St I.tts .' T ciC iicc.l Intelligen ieDeo-t iriovod to 1 nc.:: iocltiOn sitiuatued four - i1Cs north ofiou pdq:urtErs Base "1W", on North 21st Street. TLhe no'.! locationof the Depot covere. a fi-e acre area, and contairSd,. six largelbuil<dins, c ach .ap.roximt-tcly 100 fect l;n,-, 20 foot wide and15 f'et high, c-p':bleo f --ccomodratin; one- of the sCrvicos''ept n,-'.n lrbcatory co-ciort.ybly ;.ithin its om. structure.The site for the Deyot was sclected by IMajor J'omston, ?aJorM,;c:oy and Cv<tain Oreed. Captainr Creed had arrivcd on 23July, brirD-in.,: with hi- . a leare shliprvint --f enc':-y eoAuip-: ntfrorm Si3th f'r~:'y.

Thle Che.:icl '. rf; ro, Engiieer, er dical, (p .1,rt'..:!aster,atnd Sid,nal .inlysis labor. torios, havning co:-.pl1;te ship:-1entsof alL natoriel pjort.ii.nil, to their sections that had accu:m-l1!ited at Brisbarn , arrivoce . Firschhraftn 7il 25 .Tly. TheOr'drLnco Intlli~e:once Section - .s doel91o d in moving untilr.i.tc.ricl on l:-n-l 1a boon shipfed to the Unitcd St3tes, butby the end of &ug;ust ';rs established with the rother sectionsat Finschhlfcrn :-!ith Lt C0amero:--ho had beer, sent forTard withthree officrs a.nd six erlijstsd mlcon to FinscEhhfnfcn in charge.Thre builJin.,, fre.rzs e.nc roof h ad been eroctcd writh the helpc-f n. labor d:tail fro:! the Ia.so, 7T1ch floc'r -;,as laid, butthcre :eCrc no sides, partitions or fencing rrhen the nalysissections arri-ved frtron Erisb'rmo. Evc.ry-one as-sistedr in cor.-X,1,tti'i construction, foncini and protection of the buildinlgsand in the install-:tin of se>anitation, lif;hting alnd' pipin-;

equi< mnt. (l a.ter -v'a. sa p fli;d frol r r nearby 70 foo-t -wator-fll). I Jhon co lltod te he nrew -Lited 3Sttes lr:ty TechniccalInDtoi-eJ nce Deot cn-rtainr1d f :ciiitios for tihe an.?.lysis lb-oratories as w.ell as for oua.rters for Technical In;telligencepcrsoniel at thle jDpsot mu'_ frorm' the field.

S.ansaalr: ,30 ,Yl -- 31 - 'L; 19L

The 'llic3 leapfrvogWe:L ->.2.7in to Sa.s.. sr (7larlip I;cl 12).IT.-cdiate str;tcgic geaii .;--.l te isol e ..a-thcr .5,000 ya-eanese troops a(nd to push the Unite d St-.tes effensive front20O muiles closer to the Thili.'i1ns S

47

HISTtRY OF TECrP1ISCL ItELLIGEICE

L'idc'elbur aend i~nstcrde.nm Islands and the adjr.cont shore-line knowm as Sansapor -were seized by J:oric"n anphibiousforces on 30 July w.ith virtually no opositim. Elocrnts ofthe 6th Infantry Division directed operations, and nlthourhdestroyers, cruisers, m.nd R?1;F Kittyhl.wks -'ore on hand toprovide sea and air cover, no prelirminary b^oibardnnt wasnecossry, '1 objectives were occupied by nid-rnorninE.

Tho occupation of Sansapor concluded Illiod re-occupa-tion of str?.to£Eic centers along the northern coast of DutchNew Guinea and establisheid allied air bases from Milne Bayalong; the entire coast of ITevw Guinea. The enery was nolonC;cr able to operate either by air or se.a beyond the Hal-.iahlra-Philippine line, which was the r.ain defense coverfor his conquered empire in the Southrwest Facific.

Rather than orCanize for an attack against A'Lomricanforces at Sansanor, the Japnoese Second Lrrly withdrew inbeGeos and by overland trails tovTard the south and west.The retreat was C.oncral froml all the one-time Yapanese strong-holds in Geelvink Bay and in up)er Vo:;^elkop. (I-p Incl 12)J quick end had been put to the effoctivenss of the 3ap-aneso i',rrvy which was char-e;cd with the c'ofensc of the entireterritory.

The Ordnnaice Tear co.rlposed of Lt Bishiop and T/4 7inn,.who had recently been recalled from. the Bis.ak operation,loaded out of Maiffin Bay ,'ith the 6th Division and landedin the Sansapor operation c:n D-Day, 30 July 1944. Reconr-aisannce of the i.rcdiate qroa sho'wed no si-:ns of any Crd-nancc rntcrioC and upon w-ritinL; for reports from the in-fretry patrols, still no ,ntcricl was recovorod. The unitthen rrocoeedod back to Sixth 1xrAy Headquartors VOCG, andreceived orders to return to Hcadqu-.rters USSOS, which had'y. this tim-e r.oved up to Hollandia. The unit reported theroon 10 AuLust 1944,

Chemical .i£rfare Scrvice Tce-Mn o., 6 (Lt phillips, T/5Garner and Pfc Dtnoni;an) and Lt TJcob Overholt, 'Sir,nal Tech-nical Intelligoenoc representative, stanscod with 6th Divisionat ILffin Bay with a CIC Tearl. Lt Overholt located a quan-tity of enonr oquiprlont of Intellic:enco valueo, and returnedfrom Sansai:or operations 20 .&,.,ust. The Division G-2 and theCIC Tcaro wereo co-operative and the Division Ordnanco officor

-z.wt on this risaion. Offioers and onlisted :r.n tf thoDutch irxyr assisted on patrols and it was found that theirnothcd of oporation and experience ere r very tnetructive.

4118

HI3S'CRY Oi' 'MMECWIX IC,.L I12.LL.tG2TE

On r s.cl11 sirpriso y-cer.tii-n such -.s t'lis .. here thorewore fc;w troi:J13 t,) o~,pc3o the Allied lnur.in.;, usually therewv.s c"-i'oreratlvcly little enc:;iy eqiip--.ont recovered -of Intell-ifjcrctcs val uo ,.

The foll.c;-iin.- locsoins incir 1cntal, b'it tyyica-l a7nd ratherintercst-inL;. -;7ore ic:rrdcl on tilis op)cration: transporta-ticnsha-ul. ber -.lrhibi :,us in fcm. r c arces of ITewi CGuinea for theTechnii.c.l Into1]i_ cncc. -orkl. officers :nd enlisterd :-eon sh-uldbe equi,.pe1 . ith side-r' s -.s --ell -s c..rbincs or sub- .mchineruns btcouse thc i'rc:er r -.r.^?S haed to be lai.d isido to ox-nz:inCo r h ,ndle eqouii-'ent fou.:-d ii. e:.:ey :U.-!:S capturecdoqui :,o. t should '- sent back Sby essenbor , ilthout having itdeolaye.l by CIC at intcrzediotc bcsecs;

For bost csc,.~icration in the Division, evcr-rthin-g fioundshould be reported to the Divisinn Scr-ice officers (Ordnance,Signal, ctc.) endl t.he various units of the Divisiona contactedthrh-ugh theo.- rccr,vorel se;rchli:,-hts sh.-uld. oe t'lrned overto the Tr)-vsisn f-;r use rn the ;cri.stcr, for by litghtinc,up the U.;cr' oter, u nncessorry firin and uneaesiness would bebrcug;ht to a. -:init-unli

Ton cccurarCo coofperti. n in tu;, a..ny oqui,.-eont fPundqother thon that nertainin2 to the individual tear., shouldbe turned over t- thoe --ro-er officer; enemiy coi)nd. postsro;.ortcd ts G.-2 should be be irvesti£:.ted -- vw,1uble cquip-:e.nt could often be fealr in tho vicinity; in case a dur:ifor one service s;cre found, the viciniCty should be scoutcdfor airoxl'-.utely 100 y0.rds .-- durxe775s for other servicescouldr ofton be locnatcc nearbyr; .u ps .-:ere usually fr'und-;itnhin 'O yards -f . vehicle trail. or roead

Alcqu.intance of nsatives in the ?.rc sh,-uld boe -. adfor. thoy ;.uld brin- inforrlati-n concerni he locttisn of

_i._.3~ 'd ti,. 'u ,h tr::kL.s .i:o:.2r_ .tin i .7il be giveI to G-2,·vTry often a c'r?.y or tvfo coul.d bc s:szzc bry GottinC; it direct;

COfficer, ancd . olJi'stod :cn shul-d receive a rQfreshercourse in scuticg 4 :nd la'tr1iinl; ad&aptive to the Theater,inclucdin:[ i:>;a~rtiuvlo-r instruct;ions in rcgr;anizin:f and direct-inf£ search pn.erols..

149

HIoTTOR., COF TEC7'TIC.iL IiLTELLIGENCE]

Tcripo _-f ctivits:,_' r Technical Intollif.tcncc Incroescs

Dirring, the lntc sT.,r rn e.Jl cduly fall cf 19J4 a dclitionalpcrsonncl wr.ero :7rocurdc ?.d ch'-nros of assin.r-cnt wore :an.dof±r the 5230th Tecimical Intcllieonco C2'osite Co-r-1nllY7SoD;',r.a.c ( revisiina;l). On 25 ;'.Ur:ust !'tajor ?T-nley, who hadrccontly beon :ro-::utod, :as cffici : lly al>ointod Cor.n-rnlin CC0fi.cr )of tho b250th and Cnorin.tor of Tochnicni" Intol].-ic. ncc Co'ficc 'f the .'C 'f 8, C--2, USSOS. Ho roli-vedIA.'jr 'Tohnst:-n, Twho tarrnd his full atton'ti-n to dircctinrgCrrldnmnco I!.tclli£onece fCr the co,-in.r; Thi ipjiino Islarnds ca- Ci.ai1 ;n. 1st Lt irl1effi as dcsi-nSted aLSi.3tant Coordinator

r- .;ssist21 t Vonr.aly Coi:-arndr; Lt ,Van .(3lyck an.s op ,.4to d4dzi-nistrattive Officcr for the 5250th fo; nil i-atters por-taijringi to 4tclhnical Intclltigence with the 'itchnical Intcll-i,;cG+C Deoot, iu;dor the cenor. sup'crvisicn of the -assistantExccutivc, S-2, B-ase F ^nda ur.dor the direction of Headquarters

Lt C:.-:ron, scho'lulod for assirL::.7:nt to a field tea,with Ei-hhth -.'rlr, .^as ro1.acod ?.s rfficor in char,;e of theOrr.:ance anra.lysis section by Tinjor '..iC;r C.-t .T.-,orrcn c .Sternal r] lot Lt Ihilli-,: .urzcl requestoed an -I.cre assigrLodto tho 5250th in Ordnanco Intoli irnco; /4 ,":illi-: L

Thittir'crt-n", T/4 R:-lph T..}-'iokrell, T/5 ./iilio Re. Holland,T/5 Johon ., Tos-,ne-t, tvt Clinton 1. Ba:o,;wi;ll, ?vt Haynvo3od L.Ioendorson, and ivvt Tl.sco Si Mooro wore detailed for duty withthe lo -ot. T/5 Pichrd T. i.cAl-in, who ropartod to the Dopotfr.; thtl TS.. 3S 'G-2 Off ice, t )t:k oveor a, Ero deoal of thead .llnist~ tiv -elerical -. ork.

TEI. ;olicy w-mas ccnltinudl of hav:nv , -rsorSoel no't on duty-;itl, the iad-al.nistrative section and ficlJd tea-ls -?.ssir;ned tothe l anlysi3 section, e.ondin[; rcquest fr porsonnl l:y Sixth,.4r Eiyhth ,iiros. UJ)on recuest, personnre.l wore rttached tothe 'r:oies fer a.sssi, LLent as field to-nrs to task fcr-cs.

Tho nu:loecr of pcorsnnrel nssic;ned to the 35250th for Tech-nical Intcllij- nct c dutios as of 31 .'ucust 1944 ;nas: Six:tecnQofiftcrs an. t.-:rty-f-iLv enlistQd, ein on to-..orarzy duty fromthc .;ar Lc~.:rwtc.nLt; thirty officers oanc7 thirty onlisted ronasiz, 'no fro;:i thi3 Thceatoe t-tal: 44 officers rnd 55 cn-listed en.e.

5o

HISTORY OF TSCHMICA'C L IN:,LLIG.r TCE

Late in September, M.ajor J1.nley sub'i-tted a check sheetto G-4, US,3OS3, requestinc; that necessary directives be issuedtransferrirn the Headquarters cf 5250th f ',:m .JCO 501 to XP0707. :~t this tile-, Col Saiuvo', acc -.ipaniod by the G-2 Inter-imediete 3ection, dopErtod fromn Brisbneo to Finschhafen toinspect the Depot there, to confer with the e.so S-2, and tovitness a firing deQoznstration cf 'a.:ancso wTea)pons.

The dissQ:ination of writton infor.aati'on -nr TtchnicalIntolli.;ence ;-ias constantly r'oin- on: 4 .notebook on japaneseCheo-4cal Ja.rfaro.e .;s distributed in SCLttcr.bcr, and the firstnumbe,r of the Chemical ,Jarfali Intollit.once Digest also wentto press. This dicest, which publicized up to date Cheoni'cal,farfare IntelliEcnce inf or.atin as it was received, and gen-eralizod descriptions of captured Cher.ic.?l WT.rf are mrateriol,provided pertinent informati:n until it could be consolidatedin loro perr.anent forri in the Yapanoso Chemical U..arfare note-book, ;), extensive report on Jap riunition rr.rkinL;s was -ub-lishcd in Novem.lber and Decosmber l944. This report was theresult of almost two years! research through captured onenydocurmnts, lmnitions rnd reports from other theaters. Itspri.nary function was to serve as a g;uide in distinrjiishingJapanese Cherdcal 'Jlarfare !Mnitions Bom Japanese regular Li.ni-

tions,

In Soptemborr USZF7E published Circular No. 83 (Incl 15)a standard operating procedure recon ne.nded by PT jor T:ainl1yto clarify rmthods of disposition of captured one-y equipnentand documents. This circular set forth the responsibilitiesof troop comranders in collecting, safe guo.rdiLng arnd turningover captured mteriel and established a control policy inregard to souveniring. As a result of the clarification ofboth these phases of Tochnicnal Intelligence, coordination be-tween troop con;ders and Technical Intclligence units wascon.siderably expedited.

The last operation for Technical Intelligence in the south-ern islands would be ;,torotai. Lodkinc, ahead. from there planswere already be in mande for the next iove of the United StqtesAr:' 7 Technical Intclli,;onco Dcnot -- this timle to the Philip-pines. I.nilc ;;as selected as the nQxt site) and it .as decidedthat tho Depot this tire would be r.oved as a unit, rather thanby sections.

51·

HISTORY OF TECT7TICAL I1T:rLLIGENCE

Mlorotai:_ 15 Sep -- 4 'Oct 194

The Illies moved into position for the drive on theP'hilipfines .-then the 31st and 3211 Tnfantry Divisions undercoi:,iand of )XI Coris seized .Morotail northErImnost of the Hal-inahora Islainds, lTetherlands 3ast Indies (Maip m1- 12), andmarines and iinf'a_'try;:en fror. the Central Iacific struck 500r:iles to the northeast to invade Paleu.

Beautifully coordiuated, both landing s occurred on themornn/; of 15 Selte:-ber 1.244· On Itorotai, all objectiveshad boeon seized by H plus four hours. On Yalau, the resistance,2ras as tou.:h as .4lerican troops had come up a.Cainst.

In takin:: l.orotai, ;rhich lies sonm 315 iiles northwvestof Sansepor, .'Te;- Guinea, and 300 mLiles southeast of ILindanao,'hilippine Islands, United States troops capitalized on the

eleent of surprise.. Heavy air bo.-abard:ent durinc the pre-ceedinrf w:eeks h?.d decoived the enelyr into concentrating rmostof his stren-th alone-, the coastal flats of Iaoe Bay in' north-ern HaLmlahera. 'T!'rotail, dominatinc: the approaches to thisBay, was but lidhtlyr efended, and -!hat fcv Jas J zere£;arriso:led there retreated into the hills duriin; the pre-limLinary naval bombardment. Casualties to UJnited Statesrocuncd forces -ere extremely light and there vere no air andsea losses,

Technical Intellicene -nit io. 1h (personnel present onthis oporasio:i are listed in Incl 3) left for Lita.pe on 28Auc:'-st 14>4 for te-aporary duty -,ith Xi Corps to stag7e for the15 Seteto : er Trade '.inds operation at Morotai, The Unit,7lt'h Clpt ivorrott Ce Lary in cnm-and, left !'itape on 9 Sep-ter:iber and landed with the fourth vnave at Morotai. CaptainCcnncr'ts Ei:.cineev Teamal iio, 3 (S/Sort Sr-ith, T/4 Shervood)founld little erno.w Eny;ineer equipment on this operation butdid o1btain inforaticn on Ja,anese En:;ineering staidards andfor tificaticols.

On ,11 Septeol:ber Capt Connors ::as oassigned to Hoadoquarters,US.,SC:., as EnZineer Technical iltellience Officer ReaI EchelonServices of Supply.

Lt 'Tiillien LE, ?,intorstein w;ho had just recntly report-ed to the 5250th; T/Sot Ela:ence T'. Rossi, and rvt ITickVarnnucci, were assigned os the Ordnance ,rntclli-ence Team at..orotai, .lso reported no no-; items reqovcread and returned in

October to the Technical Inteligenc Depot at Finschhafen,

52

HISTORY CF TECIT=ICAL INrELLIGENCE

lMorotai had turned out to be one of those Cook's Tours.No new e quipr.-ont fron the operation was reported and nothingwhatsoever wr-as shlip,)ed to the Uniterl States Army TechnicalIntelliprence Depot at Base F. It .-.rs the sort of unproductiveoperlation from an Intelli:oence stand point that was so in-co-::proehnsible to /Jashin;ton, yet --- there sim-ply was noequipiment of Intelligence value to send back,

'53

HISTORY CF TECHNIC.L IUELLIGEI1,E

(C, HAP T E R V

TTTRN TO T _I :ILTT IIrES

^^tober -- December 1944

By October 194W!, by means of island hoppine, the UnitedStates Forces were re.dy to embark on the t-hilippine caalpaign..y this time, knocking; olit pillboxes and isolated stronEgpoints had been developed into a science, the science offiighttir, a new type of warfrce. Storniiln the beaches wasalso far from no;, for behind the do-urfhfuet laoy such campaignsas Bu.na, Il:o, Hollandia, Liak and :a-any others. Somae had beenbloody .and discouro;in;g 'ut a big, job had becen com:lpleted withcxceedingrly m-eaer resources. U.ith the Thilippines ('ilap ncl16) in si.ht, the V picturoe ,s completely chan-:ed. This timlethe United St?.tes ix-.my hlac the ren and the matcriel, as wellas the odtcer n.:tnation to carry the v:ar through to a success-ful conclusion.

The 13th of October 194! sa-w a gigantic two-pronged con-voy of 60o trans-o4'ts, lanmding crfaft and -,arships moving north-ward frx.1-oollmldia and west-ward from the :':liralties. !Aboardwere. troops of thQ Sixth l;r.j thin X and OjIV Corps. The g-roupwas escorted by air and sea by units of the Far East ,iir Forceand the ' and cloe'-nts of' the United States Third andSeventh Fleets. Gcncral 1Macrthur was in personal coemaand ofthe ar._mqda that was to mt7rz £ood the prorise, "I shall return".

Qn. 17 October, the 6th Ranarger Battalion str.ck the open-ing blow wThen they seized tvwo islets guarding the entranceto Loyto Culf (ihp, InCl 16 & 17) and on the mrorning of 20Cctober, unloadingr bcg;an on four beachheads along Loyte'scast coast.

oefore the firish of the operation, enemy forces on theisland had risen to 1$30,000, including reinforcements brouchtin from the other islcnds. H?:o-over, the initial attack wasso ovcrw;hoelini: that Tacloban, Lcyte, (MIap, Incl 17) wascaptured with 1c loss of loss than a dozen ,ten and in lessthcan t;wo weeks the United Sta'ies forces held tao-thirds ofthe island of Loyte;

54

HI3TQiRY OF TECTHNIC4L I;.LTILLIGENCE

Landinr Opr-ations and Enel::v Tactics

On the mornirr: of 20 October at 06C0 hours, the naval bom-bardi.ent of Layte befran. Fr-nl 0600 h-^l!rs until 0900 hours thebattleships and crui.ers fLied a:i.roxi 'rtely 2600 tons of ex-plosives on that isl.c.nd. .'t 0900 hcurs3, -. 'hile the heavy unitsstill continued thieir borbarl..ent; tl)e rocket launching' LCI'smoved up for the f'iall blo-w before the actual assault troopsboi'an landin;. They .-.ent inr areast of each other in a longline to-.ard the beach, and be:,anr lalmchinr their riockets.Fric- 0G00 till 10C0 hours all thtat roul.d be 1heard was onelong con-,inuous r;mdnb.intrl roar co.:g;; ffo0 -;the islan,. EBy thistime the first assault wave had al.no.:t reacned. the I-each, theLCI's coas.ed their fiire -:nd the first wave landed oni lfyteatdai-ast only sli-,ht oppositio. Th'ne initial landings .eremade by tne 7th an,.' 24th Infantry Divislon, and the 1st Cav-alry Divis ion s8.

There was no doubt of the sincerity of the natives. Theywere overjoyed at their release. There were, inevitably, afew pro- 'Qapnese nativecs who acted as spies for the eneyr.lJith the except-ion of the childron the natives .-ere in poor

physical colcdition, having suffered fro- .ma2lnutrition. Cloth-in: Dand houlsehold effects -were virtua.lly non-existent as theJparesi ha'.d -ereisitio.red or co3mt-anderred al ost every item,Fafinilies hadL been turned out of their ho.es to nmaim room forthe billeting; of tLe Ya)s.

Operation of' Technical Intelli;'ence _on LeYte

Tt was tLe plana for the Leyte operation to have three Tech-nical Intel',',ence field units ;-rith the com!Dat trcops. They wereorganized alone; the lines of the first composite unit thatparticipated in the Eollndia operation. Each unit was attachedto a division anrd was conrposed of teeas cf all -- or nearly all --of the servi.ces, CoQ-i' lete covera:,e of the desir*:nated combatsector, and coordination in ad.inistration and operation werethus as sured.

Late in SeoterSbr, Technical Intelligence Unrit ,o., 1 wasplace,:,d on terporary duty wit-h the 24th Irfantty DU.vision atHollandia? to sta;-e for the Leyte operation. This UTnit was con-posed of th'e followinn: personsnel:

555

HISTORY OF TEC]LYTlCAL IiW;,ELLIGESJ-NCE

EnriLJ;neer ^TeaiM No, 14

m1a or :-ennreth C. TIarw;ood. T/3 Elsvrorth F. ParisT/3 .TJaes T. E llyrett, JTr

Orlhance, Tearm TcR*. 1

1st Lt Claudes . 'ope Pvt Richard Et Reynoldst:fc AtlJbert L. J.Iorth

Sin:rl Team

2d Lt Te4ry -Tarvis rT/3 John Lo Lotz

Leyte was the fil-st operation for the Si-ralj Tea-, composedof p rsDo.nel receintly asci.scr.id to the .250th, !Tajor Heorwood'steam which w-as to operato as part of the advanc base depottem, anrd Lt -c'-pe 's tca-L, had lainel sose expoerenrc_ in thefield durin-,; thle 'sti-operaltions period at Eiak, but it -astheir first co.)ibat a Ssi.-;_rn1,rt .- ith l'cchric.al Intelli-en-co.Capt Joseph1 IL I.lvor, s- hor h had becn a ssi-mned as '.artcrmazstcrInteliconc. officer for this Urnit, -as dellrod and did notarrivc at the aoborkatiun pointr in tiir.c for the operation.

During sta%:in, uembers of Tcchnicl Intelli£~ence UnitMo. 1 i-;_t with the AC of S, G-2, of the Division, to whom they-wrce at bTaUched w-ith r?_;e:o.bers of TT!S, -'EU No. 1, and the CICrteoas. f. co.pl-:tce bricfin::, -.e thods of ;orking; tog;cther, pri-ority in the ccluction of enory gquip-:1ont, etc., wero thorouC£h-ly covcrod. 'is .J¥IU had the best facilitics for r apid disscmin-aticn to tzhe co.iba-t troops, it -:as decided that thy worculld dctfirest c ll on all explosive .matoriel captAured. The Tcchnsic- lInatlli:;enco Ordnance Tc.a- woJl0.d -;et next highcst priority.

imlansr weroe a.de for the Unit to gc ashnore in the second wave.It bc-ac a standard policy throu'ho~ut the rest -f the -wa.r forTechnical ITtolliCeoncc teCuIs to :o in a-.rly -- within one hourif possible -- after the first wave landed, to prevent troopsfrom scuvenirin i valuable eouipmlcnt, thus destroying its use-fulness for Technical Intellil'ence.

IDuri7n st>ainir;, the Unit checked teca i and individual cquip-rimot, andc dre replacecments for shortae-s. At 1800 hours, 13Octceor, the Unit sailed wJith the convoy from Hollandia toLcyto.

;56

HIST0?`Y OF TEo ' _:7-U4f: Li T!:2EIOEDE:

D.'r i.i: l- 1'>iir. c-rqti'~ns, bI'>ier T-rrw;od's t'o7r enlistedzion, T%-' a.l1ytc ..: l-,.ris,3 ditin;.i.~he1d thcmiselves on RedBecri c by roovoriv ,:r i, - nn a cnc- >-7 ulld.zerr ndl unlc-dinclit ;:K'_ilc nd; .._:C % :sfirs.

Toch :ic-.l j. C ,'.:.li ',Ci Tinit .T .1 c ovrolC Loyte Voaloyon t-is cpe.: ti;, ',-ut -s little ocqui_:_ent --ras ca;- 2ured, itwa°s !_oci !ord tit a t ht::y ,-houi' return to tlhi; Tnitcd St-.teA2: ! Tcc 'Lnc;' IC 'z-ilit ;I'ence Dct t Ft binschhiafIsn aftsr onlyci2J iu.7.J. in the field.. :hoy -tk bck e with thol: thle equip-:.:nt tlh-.t har b_-on recovorec.

Uct mchci;catl Inr-tclli.enco TUnit iTh . 2 whiclh iws'sattrachod to*thc- ist Cavx.lry Di-visirn f-or thno LTyto c.rLtian n, was comrposedof te fotlol;inr; to:tLrns:

Chermica-l .':rf.re Soervice -r2m i -To 7

C%.pt2.ii ~Ev.ro.'tC/S,;.t Lr/ tulius L. Horton

T!'i .ica l Scc, Team i'--. /~

apt;.in rxrris Acle

Quarterrraster Sct i on

Ca;-ltain Robert S. Gunll crson "S/Sot !illia- J. possT/Sj;t "-iELu_.cc F. R-:ssi

Sir nrel Section

1st Lt ,Jillis , > . Ho7-in! 'T/$S,?t Robert J. PicConrk.ie

0,rdf'nanco Team- Tc:. 11

Captin DLurence A. S'[Crnl i -vt Robert Do -o reitasT/'S :t I-'ul F. ~lliclc

En, inefr T or L . 2

Cap4tain Donaldl C. Conn-rTrs T/!i. REoer E. Shcrwood

ITIost of this porsonnel, vpith the cxcoption of Copt Con-nors' teci' v;hich had beon a t ZHollanila r.nrd Biak, -,;cre ner w toTechnical InntelliLonce and had only n short period of train-i<,l in the iYn-llysis sections of the United States Lrrny Tech-nical Inteoljigcence Depot.

57

T'IS TOPY OE ..i.. -chI'.:L ,i c ;eLLL; l-CE

-ft Cir ;rna,;;i,, t.heir -7hiilel (v-hich hd:! to e sent up lnter)an.L ,tO -ri a :t;Ui. -'a-,it .t HClllan.:ia, ttc-:,.. Tii roccerecd to I'hnus

I1., in thl .,'.li' .. l , t s'. t :r.t i; s; c:c !st 0.v!alry Div-i ,i: c.j. f r - ,

Y ni:•enL1 TI:'k.,i' ;:. cc _7- it , .. o2 C. - c rorthorn

Lny -!, :vL C7ili nce Uo it

2W t 5z-d .;:> n.i... . . ,o .~.,vcti-r C.:rdir-.a-r of TechnicalInt ;c'-li Xc; -ist tl "'--" ; . '- ir '.: ti-n to his duties asan Or.9 rc 'ch:i -. Ti 11 i cc o-f ic_ . tT-op.or rily ro-place 'l ......... . ,;i' ... ;!. ' i_' o i s i .. S F_ .._ ' ,:;UnL fro rsll,;,r , hi r :.rhir . S: ,~ i' t .ti: s .3 .s . o--- .. ii.vt fo r Sixth4L r.-y Ca :" .a .- 1 _. ..e :l r t. s:).. .i.ttd by

1ti 1- .7.-ch; C11- 3. * r , t -ls .. r c ll-lorated .withthc rth:)r i.Cc- ..' focar td i m i .sooi -oion ( ' r-- -..ticula~rly on! 27 ecai.' ni '- -2 r-._zIicati.rP to cc.;.'t units.The preoscncc of a n'-c Teh;.:-..7 In tvlli nce coordinator at an.adx-.vance: ;;.llr RcSil-1. t t4 '.-; -f hrm.yt hl r--u.ri nthe course :.f thc; o: rction -- qsc sios s J.irected to CaptStoror·ail c .:.cir. ilil . .- '*n .i. .o ecuiirpientt, plarticvlarly Ordnarce,werte i~nuorea; lc . )

T;chn. Licai I.nte'li -cncv 'Jnit No, 2 had not been attachedto t -l, 1st C-.vnalr, u.til 03C to_ bor, -a litle cvLr a- week

b;efsore t-he Div;ision sailoa- anrl too ls.ateo to elnabl e ic is andtra. ileriis to, be shil':edi vwii'l_ thIe Ur :it; the absence of auth-orizvd ti;rovLs',ortfati.-n ceverelr h r, ica t..i. -t:.:.1 pcpera.tionsan ....- . rri s " l'e- , I.cicol. Of "ic r, ha'. to bhc detained to?.cco:,Wl ia:y a rear Ce .. chn...rlt t_. bl'i il 1 .`. l.i',iioi.al vehiclos.

By 1 iTOvoroe ar -c,',hniioC'al t ll c it _i.Co 2 as v-ollas N7o 1 h''d c.-...lt t .. it ssion an'l hl ad o?'.r: rd a shipfor return to t-he Uzi-tbd ,-l ttcs 'r.r . Tchcnical Tntlli c-nceDepot "-,t FinschL:.f n0

The followinn. tcax:- cos3i-osod .Techanial n.tl!li"onc.Unit No. 3:

Cl.S Intellience Teaml NoR 5

2d Lt Vic'Tor Dc5l §ueci.ct &f:c E!'".ar u.lli£;an',/5 C-as!:lar(e '-,a. ai ci'n

58.

En-irner Intellir nce o', To. S,,

C't -... lr . J.ohns.:n >It Henry Carson

CZtain -AS.:.-rI . .. .1. . lCTv'CY

:kI-7licQ. Intolli-'-onc Toa:1 i-? 14

6- t:r.n No^rris ,tlc

OrcdrLnce 7ntoil.i;ence e C. i :oD. 2

Cc -t,.ii GordrLn Bess /SC,;.t C-lenn E. Peterson

n-,,-...c... Tr:ti ' ni cnce Te:: 'o

Caztcai; ., vaLrd' ,-, -l F. .!ick

qi,.rtor-:-':.ster Tntlli. ec11 .. e. Te-:: : ?J.-...[

}{a.j r ji S.ni3dny K. 2;.'-

Sig.l lli1a ':eot li;:' .e n2 e Tc e ' .o

21J L;;c J¢co../. Go verlirlt T/ Roboert S. 1_anub

rZchnnic.l Intelisan c -plo .i' No. 3 :7as placed o-n ter.porarylduty :..tit .rl, oService Cor-z nnd nd on flrttle teiiporary duty

to i-o,dmortqrs, Base 'I, Tr ibclobn, Leyte ';here' they arrived onD p1-:s one. ,pc, p.-21ntt ';as, Vrs or'anized here from :r hich tripsto all i;-tl;s of is1o.r -are .... l,

TBCi^:'o. IIt~-±.ik;_ne, Unrt{it Iv. t 3 iat first functionedipri.:'rily y S a i.,rrcvi;si.na=l1 eOot unit 'to rcc ivs and :.akeshipn.'ents ofi' ctured oner equi::e : nt rcurlht in by Tech-nical Intelliigence Units 1 n-d! 2 c erting rith the co:lbattroo7ps in the for-,rc. ares,.

During: the first1 ton :oays a ; ter arriv--l, Tsclhical1 In-tcl1iL,cC Q Jil N;; 3 J ,u n a .. - (n d i.nl 1rO 'iT,: ,.' the fieldDipot for the receiviili shijn o....f th " i -.ccin' cnth, p-turex'd equi.meunt. This w.tas a tconporary idva.nco dopot si.ilar

5 9

HISTOCY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

to that at Hollandia. Except for certain bulky equipmentshipped directly to the United States, most of the capturedmateriel was trans-shipped to the United States Army TechnicalIntelligence Depot at Finschhafen for further analysis. Partof the time was also spent in checking the arunition dumpsim the vicinity of Tacloban and Palo. A short time laterwhen both Technical Intelligence Units No. 1 and No. 2 hadbeen withdrawn from the operation, Unit No. 3 was left as theonly Technical Intenligenco unit on tIyte island. As such,this Unit had the dual rosponsibility of running the depot andkeeping contact with all combat organizations engaged in thisoperation.

On the sane day Technical Intelligence Unit No, 2 depart-ed from Loyte, Ordnance Team No. 4, ccuposed of Capt EdwardNowmkowski and T/SC;t Cgick arrived. This team, which wasoriginally assigned to Field Unit No. 2 had had to return tothe Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen because ofsome confusion in shipping arrangements and had taken a latership. They reported to 1st Cavalry upon arrival, but wererelieved from that organization a week later and plaeed ontemporary duty with Army Service Comniand.

Since Technical Intelligence Units 1 and 2 had left, CaptNowakowski and T/Sgt QWick functioned with Technical IntelligenceUnit No. 3 at the depot and aided in collecting materiel.

After ccnpletely covering the area in the vicinity of thedepot, this teaja and Technical Intelligence Unit No. 3 wentinto the field with the 24th Infantry Division, covering thewhole front of the Leyte campaign. MAch equipment and materielwvas recovered during this drive and field reports on nany newitems were prepared.

Considerable equipment was recovered after the $apanesereinforcement paratrooper attack near San Pablo and in the (rmocarea- in the 7th and 77th Infantry Divisions' sectors. However,the lack of time, the large area involved, and the ruggedterrain features, prevented the evacuation of large quantitiesof the material captured.

Besides maintaining liaison with the previously mentionedunits, liaison was also maintained with the 1st Cavalry, the11th Airborne Division and the 24th, 32d and 96th InfantryDivisions, If any outstanding recoveries of enery equipmentwere made by these organizations, trained Technical Intelli-Gence personnel were made available to handle the field analy-sis of the equipment.

6:

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGEN=C

There wvre no shipments of enemt equipment from the fielddepot at 3ayte until towards the end of November since routingto Finschhafen.:had been stopped and no ships left for theUnited States until then.

Technical Intelligence for the boyte operation as a wholewas not as productive of captured enorn equipment as had beenanticipated.. It had been assured that large stores of enemyequipment would be uncovered there, but that assumption provedto be false. Due primarily to terrain and weather conditions,the typo of fighting encountered on oiyte throughout nearlyall of the early phases of the operation was spasmodic. Fewenemy dumps wore captured and proportionately, the quantitiesof equipment recovered intact were .liited. Upon the com-pletion of the Ieyte operation, fcur new Technical IntelligenceUnits, 4, 5, 6 and 7s were formed for the "M3 operation. (Per-

sonDel of these units are shown in Incl 3) 411 three TechnicalIntelligenca Units were disbanded and the personnel used as a

nuclei of experienced men for the new teams which were to beformed.

During December Engineer Intelligence Team No. 7 (Lt JohnF. Keane,. Pvt James W. Stephens; IVt Christophcr ;7. Tarar) ofthe re-organized Technical Intelligence Unit No, 1 engaged incollecting specimens of all available captured enemy Engineerequiprmnt from the Sixth AXW Enrineer teams in the field witha view to setting up a training progran for Eighth Army En-gineer units, Special attention was given to land mines,booby traps and demolition5s Ot 28 December the trainingmateriel was turned over to the Engineer Section, Headquarters,Eighth Army.r

Operations oin .yte Are Turned Over To Eighth Arm

As the control of all operations on Leyte was to be turn-ed over to Eighth ArLM, Lt Col Erle HE. ulian who had beenassigned to Eighth Army h late October as Technical Intelli-genoe Coordinator and a reorganized Technical IntelligenceUnit No. 1, joined that Headquarters on 14 November 1944.(Personnel composing the Unit are shown in Incl 3). As EighthArrfr had not participated in any combat the tine was spent byTechnical Intelligence Unit No. 1 in alking contacts with theX and XXIV Corps and with the associated service chiefs, Plans

wore made so that upon Eighth lrmy's takint cormzud of the remain-der of the Leyte operation, there would be no time lost in tak-ing to the field. They were ordered to report to 38th Infantry

Division on 26 December 1944,. the ersa day Eighth Ary tookoperational control.

61

HISTOT'Y OF' TEC-i!YICAL TIT'iLLiO--ENCE

A surveyr '.;as rade of all cap~turod Ordnance equipr.mnt inwestern TJrtYt' Tb.rouchout this <area lar1e gquarnititics of equip-

olent wver. r cov.ered. Eii:hteocn lic'ht tanks, tyi, 95, w;ere de-stroyed in thse -untains below; Linon. '.s those tank's formndro2a. blocks:, thley -r- e shovc . over th_ si-ics -f the ruc,Toednountain cr'a. to dispose of the,. Cnly' twr; re:luincd in aposition such as3 'oi.l.d allow; for thoir evacuation.

;.imuniti-n ;i:.s ncountered in lar:e . luantities. ~ovever,as .-ilo.y of the dceipts wr.re lmracticUlly iocrAd on the road,the L. :ineeors ded,;troyrl thmci as a safrety ?r-caution as theycleared the roads3 for ;:.ovC:ent of Illitarr supplies. Enoughalrmuiition of all tyres, never-the-'ess, re:--:inod in Goodcondition tc satisfy the rcqucsts for its use in analysisand test firin, ., co-nsid!erable a'.ntity of renovated Amer-icon a.-;unition w7as found in the captured dury so

Japanese Lar:unition and :natericl -.-ero lsed by UnitedStates troopi's ;helrovr _ ossibile Jrapnese 81 m.n:i mortar am.uuni-tion, for instaince, leirnr, utilized as harassing fire againstthe nemly.

TIe Japnmnoso rlnced greoat emphasis on destroyin-{ UnitedStates artillery piecest For this, suicide tactics were em-ployed. I JrIp soldier w-ould strap an ex losive charge to hisbody andll chC.~:e into the field piece, destroying: it and him--self as he pulled the irnitea- doto-atin:- the chor.?e. .~inmlartacctics were used against taki:rs. Captured d.-cumnents on anti-tank tactics described this procedure as a part of theirtraining.

During: the first half of January 1945 Ordnance Intelli-gence To.-eam ITo. 6 (Capt C0armeron, T/3 Carl Pc SiiaLons, Pvt NickVannucci) vwas allse assijgned to tbhe 38th Division, but as thatdivision was not to be co-nmittecd to co;.mbat for soeic time,arrangc.e icnts were m-ade for this tear. to ag-;ain cover the com-bat areas of tihe 7-th ai:!d 77cth Divisionrs in -res tern Lyte.These two divisions w-.ere cn-;o-d in moppin-; up activities atthe ti:me Cooperation fromi rXTI Corps, in co:;Cand in thatarea, w-as excellent in th.e evacuation of equipront. Theysup-,'lied all the necessary trucs and la.bor to -'et the jobdone.. Thel Technlical IntclliLo;-ice Orr.anceo cnlisted mensupervised thle 'wrorvk a -s ra t4oti 6(3 tons Cf one-ry r-tcriolwas3 evacua ted 1 d shiil :i to as> E .. Ta cl oban, Leyte, fortrans-shipme;,nt to thel United Stcates . rro h Tochn-ici Intelli-gence. Depot at Finschhafen..

62

HISTORY OF TECI.ICA.'L NITTELLIGENCE

C H 4" P T E R VI

UNITED STQ'OT3 .2.'MY TEICAIL INTELLIGEhET; DEP OT

October 1944 -- February 1945

The United States Ary' Technicual Intelli!-cncc Depot .as thenerve center for Technica.l Intelligence activities. It was ad-ministered clirectly under the control of G-2, US!SOS, with eachservice olJer-tinC; an artdlysis section lunder the technical super-vision of its respective service chief. Technical Intelligenceunits 7preparinL; for operation sta,-;cd at the Depot anEl uponteriaination of duty in the ficld returned there, uhere the per-sonnel were intcrgratce into the analysis section staff. ialequipment .nd iLzxteriel recovered by the teamls -,as brought orsent to the Technical Irntelligence Depot for study and research.

Shipp-inc, from the Depot at Finschhafen to the United Statesimprov;d considerably during October, November and December.Shippinc from outlyin-, bases was sloA,. A quantity of equipuentparticularly Si&,nal Corps and Ordnance materiel ;7as receivedfron the Ne-w Guinea operations, Diak, Sansapor and Mlorotai,and as a result of the rapid advance of United States troopsduring January and February :n Leyte, an unusually large quantityfro:l all the services was recovered. A1t the sam- time a steadystrea-.m f small items confiscated by base censors and base In-telligence officers flowed in. Japanese aircraft equipmentshipipd from Aitape and other New Guinea bases was transshippedto -ir Technical Intelligence, Far East Air Force, for disposi-tion.

So;:e confusion in the handling of name plates was evident.The Uar Department had directed that all nanraplates should benailed to the Director of Intelligence, AFrIy Service Forces,'Jashington, D.. C., but the Chiefs of Services prohibited therermoval of namcplates fron equipment to be shipped to theUInited States. Howrver, Tochnical and econo:ic warfaro Intelli-gence requirersDnts couldc both be satisfied by double distribu-tion of namleplate inforration and therefore, the following pro-codure aent into effect: narmeplates received from TechnicalIntelligcnce teams, IAnalysis Sections or postal censors, unless

63

HISTCRY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGECCE

cleared by the ;llied Translator and Interpreter Section withthe task forces,, were forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, Hq. US$C3S,from where they were air milod to the Director of Intolligonce,ArWr Service Forces, .lashington. Nar3plates of extreme tech-nical significance, integrral ports of the oquipment, werephoto(graphed or duplicated by rubbings, and the prints, neg-atives or rubbings .ailod to 4Army Service Forces, '.ashington.

Throughout this period nardplntes and operating instruc-tion panels were received roteularly in quantity from TechnicalIntelligence teaMs in the field and fron. postal censors, Pre-liminary translntions were rendered for the benefit of theanalysis sections and the plates were then transmitted direct-ly to the United States.

In view of coarents fron consignees in the United States,packing and crating of equipment for shipment was conductedwith greater care for durability. Additional precautionswere taln to insure adequate labeling of crates and inclosingof sufficient copies of vouchers and packing lists to facili-tate recognition of equiprent and acknowledgennnt of receipts

Lt Stancer was relieved as Depot Officer for anotherassignment 15 December 1944. On tenporary duty with the Tech-nical Intelligence Depot as Acting Iroperty Officer and Assist-ant Administrative Officer were 2d Lts Edwin A. Mirtz andKenneth li. Iaykendall, Intelligence officers assigned to Base"Fn ·

The following Technical Intelligence Units, which stagedduring November at the Technical Intelligence Depot, movedforward during December and January to join divisions partici-pating in the M-1 (Luzon) operation:

Technical Intellig;ence Unit No. 4, 6th DivisionTechnical Intelligence Unit No. 5, 43d DivisionTechnical Intelligence Unit No. 6, 37th DivisionTechnical Intelligence Unit No. 7, 40th Division

The Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen is Closed: 28 Feb 19.5

TJith the opening of the Luzon operation, steps were tarwnto close dovm the Depot at Finschhafen and to prepare to rmovethe entire shipping and receivinr, sections and six analysislaboratories (except for a rear-echelon force) to aLnila, Luzon,Philippine Islands, when it should be talkn.

64

HI3TORY OF TEiCHICiML ItELJCE

In the ia-,o,.nti,-Je, teaal personnel rernaininr at ,,ho Depotwere tr?.inod under supervision of tea-a comanndors with theassistuice of analysis section chiefs, while anmlysis sectionpersonlel .omre occupiocd principally with v:'ritin£: technicalreports !and disposin-: of captured equipmernt on hand in prep-aration for the 'conteimppllted r.love. They cr.ated equipmentthat vJor.ld be needed and as .dditional tools and instruimentswere acquired, chlsts wrere constructed, labeled and stored.Only the linil:u.i require:'-nts in tools were roetined in theshops as operting oquii"ert..

iersonnel from:- the various an?.lysis sections m:ede a tripto Sio, Iew; Gutinca, (.'p; Incl 1) to cobtain -nc:j :m.aterielwhich hae. been left there by the je.l pamee a-.- proxirt.mtely ten.. rnths before, British Civil Affairs units were of creatassistance in this operation.

Eighteen Ei-:htbh ;rj'y Technical Intclligence officers andton lmoved forw;rd by air during Jamlary to join units in thefield. Vehicles and ooquip"':ont of these tcais -vere safehandedlator when shi'ppinac space ;;as available.

Thoc Acssistant Coordinator of Technical Intelli;oence,US3$SOS, Capt " irleffi, and the Ordnance Intcllir:ence officer,sar.ne oadquarters, Bajor .iil'kes, visited the Technical Intell-iGence Depot in January to expedite forward ::lovor.mnt of Tech-nical Intelligcnce tca:,s. They brought with then a shiprnentof speed 4;raphic caeras for use in the field and¢ in the sec-tions, to facilitate preparation of technical reports.

Operations at the Technical Intelligence Depot, Finsch-hafen, ceased 28 February 1945. ial analysis and organiza-tional equipmont was readied for ir.:tediate shiplicnt to the nowdepot area in ,.manila. LoadinL: co.nncned 6 _'March and the de-tachni:nt was scheduled to sail 12 Ilarch.

The closing of the Technical Intelligence Depot necessi-tatod turni. ov-er approxi; lately thirty-five tons of capturedequiprent to the Ordrinance Officer, Ba3e 'F". Complete arrange-!lents were made for expeditinE:g the loadin; of this equipmentby the first available water transpcrtation.

Captain Octave F.. D. Tho--as, Office cf the Assistant Ex-ecuti.v 3-2, Base "F", serve-d as Capt.ired. Enerir Equiipo.ntOfficer for the base and naintained liaison with the Ordnance

65

IIISTORY OF TECTV-IC.iL IJTLE=LIGCENCE

officer until all captured mate:iel .at the Base had! been shipped.It was antlci-cte: t 1hart rcceirts of eoerir- equip:rnt at Base "F"would cr o:n..;nle foor two .:onths ,7hile the now Depot wasgettins; cstp'`.lishcJ i n L.bnii?.,

A total 'of ,(K Officecr9 :nd 1.39 enlisted r-. n -r.s on detach-ed scrvicc, durilx- tibru-.ry t' thc ;2-Oil ° Technical Inte-lj.genceCoSo-si-tu Co ±- G ri, $l rc.r: .c (1ro.i·oe ..as). .. f t hes e, rnine Tech-nical Ir:il .. 1i:clc uni;s, c, .-:osei cf 36 offlceis r=ni 60 enlisted.men, vY&rme .lr tCrc.. y dut,' to tthe rxyh ,r~-.y and Lrore eCTVh-nical Intc?.licicc: unriits, cc.posd of 15 of:±'icers and 27 eillist-od i;:xn, ;7mre sn toi.p)or-.r7y duty t~ the Ei.j'htn Armly. ',rd!ditionalTcchnlic!lJ. Intc'lli'enu ce teas .thich had been sta-'ing-, sailed forfor?/arcl areas fro; fiase "F" beforo rnove:rnt cf the Depote

Technica.l intellir-:ence Deipot is Est::blished at Jkhnila

The Headqua'ters of' the Tjnited States Ar.n Technical In-tclli;encoe D:pc-t, co:-poosod of 8 officers _and 38 enlisted men,departed from TPinsc:haf.;n, 'To Guinea, for Manila, Luzon,ihilipp ine Islanlds, on 12 !rch.

.Iith the mrovcr.-£nt of the De!oot to }MIanila. and the transferthere of Iedquarto-rs T.US,1oS, that city bec~a', the hub of Tech-nical Intelli!c.nce a.ctiv-ities in the i:.cific theater. TechnicalIntolliL:encQ in the '.;e¢ster.n iacific area had cor. of afro andwa5s opera tinc. 'oro efficiently than at ,nyr previcus tise.

pu~ ~tn~ Ll ~o ~6

HISTORY OF TECTHUICAL INTELOLIGEUCE

C H A R' T ' R VII

O1TIO ONS ON LIJZON

Tanuory 1945 -- Fobruary 194,5

Alth-ough the Iioytc operation was a bold and dicisivostr-ke, it was only a small part of the P:hole Philippine cc.i-ipaij;n. On the 25th Octobor 1944, five days aftcr the landinC,-n Iayto, the 1st Cavalry Divisi-n struck c.,;ain n.t Sa-rr.(i.t, Incl 16 andc 17) On 15 Doconbor thc noxt strategic land-ing; was Made on Mindoir, 288 diles ncrthwest of Lpyte, (IapIncl 16 and 17) by the 503d Parachutc Infantry rcirforcc.'Ls the parntroopers lao.ixccd on Mirndorc thoy encountored littleJap resistance, alth-ur-h Tokyo radi- proclaimed Trindore thekey to "control of tor.mrrow's imilitry situation".

On 5 Jmrou-ry 19145 i.arincuquc -was talkn with little opposi-tion in the interval between ITindcro arnd Luzon by cloe:-nts of3ixth Ari:r in the first :-rovc to clear thc Sibuyan o 'a. (,ihpIncl 18) Tlcn on 9 January, 82 days after Loytc, 600 shipsof an armadac c.arzyinC Sixth 'riy trc-ps appcoreod in the Lin-.,aycn Gulf, 100 rdilcs to the n-rthw-cst of Mimila (MTap Incls

16 ind 18) the point of thc initial Jo.panosc landinc; in the£hilippir.os in Docciabcr 1941.

:Sith the Seventh Flcot aircraft actiinf as cover, r 15maile bcachhead was sccured and soon expanrlod to over 40 -liles,In five dys, morre than 400 square oniles had boon retakon andarl-rrod colunmns ;cro on the r.rve toward ~tnila alon, the threehih,.ways lo- in; to the south.

Capture -f Urcanrctn oppened the northorn sectinn of the,tanila-Baguio HiGrJhway 5 ancd snapped the enely's su-ply linethrough tho central Dizeon plain. Tarleac, ro-l. ;n. rail con-ter of tho contral plain was overrun,* (rap Tncl 18)

I:{,hni-. lay straight arhcad, cnd it doveloeed into a. ra.ceto see who would nrrivo thore first, the 1st Cavalry Divisionor the 37th Division, As the 37th -.loved rapidly dcl-.n Hic;hway3 fron San Fornaldo and the 1st C.valry drovc down Hic;hvway 5,the race was on. (mp Inci 18)

67

HISTORY OF TECfTMCAL INTELLIGENCE

0n 3 February at midnight the 1st Cavalry Division'sadvanced units crashed the gates of Santa Tomas internmentcarp and Bilibid Prison in Manila, releasing 5,000 internees.

Tne Fall of Mnila

The battering down of the gates of Santa Tomas by 1stCavalry troops heralded the opening of the battle for Manila,No more unorthodoxz battle was ever fought and seldom had sucha fanatic foe been encountered.

A mixed arnoy of from 16,000 to 18,000 men defended thecity. The units involved consisted of a strange array ofhospital patients, air oorps personnel, officer candidates,naval personnel from the sunken shipping in the harbor, new-ly inducted civilians and the like. These troops were organ-ized into provisional units of company or battalion size.Roughlly two-thirds of this heterogenous fighting face con-sisted of naval personnel .nd one-third of army troops. Armyorganizational equipment of the defenders vras supplementedby armanent from the battered planes from the surrounding air-fields, and from the sunken ships in the harbor.

EnerW troops totePod about 18,000. Its these forces hadbecn ccmm>itted to defend T 4bnila to the end, little attemptwas made to withdraw into the hills to the east. With minorexceptions they fought to the death according to the originalplan of defense.

Nor had any plans been formulated for the evacuation ofthe civilian population. Rather, they vero used by the Jap-arnse as best suited their tactical needs: As screens againstattacking troops, for barter, and as a means to enable theirforces to infiltrate the American lines.

Manila w-as taken in thirty-five days. The mission ofdelaying the United S-a.tea forcs had cost the enemy 17,000counted dead and had loft nodern Manila a shambles.

After the Fall of Manila

After the fall of Manila., the remaining Japanese in thearea retired to a previously constructed defense system to.the. east.. This a.as the forrtidarblo Shimbu Line, In March,elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th and 43d In-fantry Divisions began a strong thrust which finally crackedthe line.

68

HISTORY OF TECH-ITICkL INTELLIGENCE

The Japs, however, still remained entrenched around two dams,Ipo and Otawa, vhich stored a major portion of l.anila's water supply.On 17 MTay Ipo fell. (Map, Incl. 18) The blow was so unexpectedthat the Japs failed to demolish the dim with their previouslyplanted explosives. Later in Mray, the 38th closed in on 11awa andalso secured that dam intact.

In the meantime, the area south of Mianila, to the extremesouthern tip of Luzon, was gradually cleared of organized resistance,

Recapitulation of Technical Intelligence Organization vAth Sixth Army

A proper understanding of Tlchnical Intelligence at this pointin the war requires a recapitulation of the manner in which it hadevolved in its organization and its relationshi-, to the Armies.The Technical Intelligence Field Unit was the basic organizationof Technical Intelligence. The Field Unit was composed of Tech-nical Intelligence Teams selected from each of the six major branchesof service concerned vith supply. One officer and two enlisted mennormally composed a T. I. Team. During the Luzon operation therewere generallr six teams to a unit. The senior officer from thoseon the various teans functioned as the officer in charge of the unit.

Initially, in the Luzon operation, a unit was attached to eachdivision and, acting under division G-2, operated only in the divi-sion area. Liaison between C--2 and the unit was one of the functionsof the officer in charge and each team in turn maintained liaisonwith its respective branch of service at division headquarters.Operating in this fashion, all enemy materiel captured was processedby trained personnel. Certain items of equipment requiringlabatory analysis were collected by the team and shipped to theTechnical Intelligence Field Depot Unit. It was the function ofthe Depot Unit to orperate a provisional depot in the field untilthe United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot wras permanentlyestablished in the Philippines.

Experience demonstrated that the original assignment of theunits to divisions had a tendency to make this type of work inelastic.It became the practice in the middle of this operation, as unitswere released from the divisions, to assign thfem to corps, and forthem to function under corps G-2 and staff officers. This practicemade available the entire corps area to the unit rather than thecomparatively small division area. In a:dition, one unit wasassigned as a Sixth Army Headquarters Unit. By making this shift,the efficiency was immeasurably increased.

692

P:STo)RY OF' TFCITTICAL :rNT 7T- I.rGTCE

Based on. tie ex-:,riernce gained iIn the early A)hase of theLuzon ope~r'titon) it vwas : lec;idenq tc.t the Technical Intel.igenceUInit sh'ic. d not ne,;ess,..rily include 2uau'terr aster and Miedical teamsas th:,r_~ was not ;tuff'cient wrork to w. their inci .iC;1 inev :ry unit, :['v '-:rtermnnstcr nd ono iL'edical officer assigned toonprate d:i.rcctl?- unrder the control of the coordinating office(the corps '-2) ,;.; ,;:ufficiert. Sixth Army Technical Intelli.-eonceunits on lal'-r ovratotionf consist-ed only of Orcdrnnce, Enginc-r,Signal Corps alJd Che..nical. 7.arfare pcrsonnel.

T.uchnical Intclligenc Uinit activities reports wrere submittedmonthly through G-2 channcls. Technic.l reports were widely dis-semi.n'Iid, Ccpics wrlre fcrwvrrdcd directly to the vl.i-ious Chiefsof Servic, i!';.SCOS, vi th information c'on-is :adeC ava-ilab1le to G-2.lnrly of the l;eo-,nical renorts Ivr-, pbi.'.x;.;c in the lechnical In-

telligcncc, S;c-t-.on of thi, Si:xth A my G-2 Toeekly Report prepared bythe Sixth A.rm;y 1'ocln:i.cal Intclli.Snc Coordl.nr,:-or.Tests madc. bh,, tc '',7:. tn am rcr, irade anvail able to .all concernedand wjr_ of iLinoci._-.te t-.cticall v.luu to the Si::th Army SpecialIntolligonco S..ction and. to guerrill. irunits operati.ng withctapturcd oqui. iincnt.

Besides ni.'iting th.. usual. n.luilber of reports for disseminationto the front. line troops tlhrough the G(-2 weekl.y reports of thecorps to d-'.ch the.,y :-r. ained, personnel_ f the Technical In-tclligence units loroo-.red and arLri.nistcr:<,d tr-i.ning progr.ms on theuse and roefir of Cnoy: equlipment for Sixth Army comba.t troops.

One ordn._ance techniciia:i. vr.;s rAl]_aced on duty with Speci.alIntcl'igt-rnco, Cix-tEh Arin., to coll.ct andi rcp.ir -we.pcns !and othereq'li-oment to 'b issued -'o ,uorrilla forces.

in -are s undr opera .tional control of the; Conmmnding G:nerol,Sixth Army (distinguishcd' from areas under control of the Command-ing Guneral. UST:L2., or '`ccgnizeod civil go-clrmnent,) decision fordisposition oJ' 3alva~.< mat.:riel was made by Sixth Army in all butthe foll.o'v-.ng cases:

Tlichical I:nt.l ligenc aguncics wer,~ authorized to with-dra%,w for Ilntl.ligencc and tr-ining p-arposcs anyr iteoms ofcap-tured suppulies and cqui..r nt. Th.iy wore advised promptlyof tha loc-.tion of c.ntured mratori. -ncl a rnd w.re given firstpriority for rcriov-.l of nec;-iss-.ry ite.ns.

Ca:.pturd food, clothi.ng, a.nd medi.c]. smu-' lie s -nd cquip-mcnt wir.; possed to controcl of Philippini Civil Affairs Unit(P CAU) aft r th... Technicrl Int.lligecnco officer with thecmaturing unit si.gnified termination of his interest in theseitems.

7o

Cominanecnders of' c-ptvri.ng cor-s, divisions or other majorind.o-<;lndcent ur:nts coi;,rm:d;od by -:.nra!l officers, utilized anycm0t'lr.(1- suw l ies- ird :qu--rr :nt considered b - them necessaryfor tl-' h,r rcs.cut..o n of iruncdiate combat.

Tochrnic.l Int. l].i~,...<c o:l I-,z7n

Vi''old ~Units o:.:; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 7nd 7 took pa.rt in the-niti:l.J sta-.:s of th. T,uon opcration ancd _'t,.r rer, sup lmcentedcr rclievcd by row t (-ms. (i crsonnel comprising these and otherunzits th-.t; oper {.ted oni Luzo1 areL sLio,,rn in Incl 3). Capt Creed,recov,,dr..d from his shinr-nel vound, ag.ini tock over as CcorCinantorcf ''chlnec-. l:nlttellirnc .r anld Ca.-mt St._rn!l, vrho had ben ActingSixth Arirr T. I. Coordiil_..ti.r, joined one of th. tcms in the field.

Duie to the r.ic!d advance of United Statcs troops on Luzon,vast quantities of matoriel werc captured by thc Technical Intell-igelnco field units, including many new itri:ls of J-.pnr.eso equipment.iore informa.tion 7aS liadI 'v-iliblc to tactical ccmmuanders concern-

ing this no.-ly disccvered ouaenl-r equinioent, particul.rly Ordnance,than ir .any rmviolus o.j.r^.4-iol,

In tVl-: course of their rr T'r chnc'._cll it.' i'._.g.ence activ-itios, ner;be;s .f th,. v i.us to-mis colle:icted dt-. _hich supoliedinfcrmati.on on Ja-n("l nse 2il..muficturrers, Icc.ations of Jap.nese Armyunits, a-ndcl th., n;ios of cthler i.ndividualls .nd orcamiiizations thathad donated supplios tc th., b n::.:,y .riarl.y. F'-ny items -e:ore discovered,such as records, m s-.nu-l, diaries, '.nd .. s, which erer-turned. over to CIC or to .ATS for i.nfcrn:f tion .nd tr.nslation.

T. i. Fi:ld Unit No. 3: Tochnl .cl Intceliigence Fi-eld Depot Un:it

Fi.old Unit No. 3 again .cted as the Provisional depot unitin Iuzcn as it had dcnce in the Le-to cperation. The advance sectiancf this Unit 1.eft Lryte -.nd arrive.d at $Sn Fabian ('ap, Incl 18)in thb. Li~r.gnyen Gulf region, Luzon, on 11 January 1)1!5, but waslatcr m.cved to San Jacintc, F anga.sin.m.n I'rovince, as Sixth Armytrc,-es mocverd rapidly inl.and. ICero, the provisional depot remaineduntil it vwas p: ssible to estaol.ish the Uiniteid Sta.tes Army Tech-nical Intelig.ncc Depot in a...nila.

Besides acting as a depot unit,this unit covered the 25thDivision sector in the early stages of the Luzcn cperation.Eng-incr Team NTo*3 (Capt Johnson,T/5 Garrett,Pvt Carson) recovereda quantity of mines,of which some were stored for shipment to theDepot at Finschhafen and others werc released to Sixth Army unitsto be used for training purposes. Medical Team Nol (Capt Able) ofthis unit recovered a variety of drugs from small Medical dumpsscattered throughout the area and turned thcm over to PCAU to beused for civilian relief.

*7i

HISTORY OF ?E"T ' ' "7,.. r- ..'_-1,

In Fcbruary, F'ield Unit No, ' i.o.i + ;o h; piro-;eJori i:'pofrom 3an Jacinuc to ,ng.:'s !a:tanfi :.- -rwvi:.e , DI.zn.., b.t. .eftthe materiel that had beo::n col..lectc a; .l .,.1.- : , tc bc- for-warded later to thU. ..L.' r .... g-l.r .,cnr.,:'al n'.t!..:noe Iepot tc becstablishud at ..a.i.a, The origi.nli plan of mairi;ti.ning a depotat San Jacinto proved to be vlnfrvorab.e aLs ecquilpment receivedfrom the tea.ls wa3 b..ing taken further -ma.y frfcm imanila insteadof vorking, i;tvard thalt; ci.ty as or.igina.lly -)lainned, The iopot zmunitattcmpted to k -::p contact with the various unf'ts, but distancesbecame tco grCat.

By this time quite a few changes hnac been made in the personnelcf the I)epot Unit: Capt Bess had bcen v-'c.:ndcd by rifle fire whileattempting tc render '1uisable a Japanose 12'" hovitzer and had beenevacuated to Loyte; all othor personnul had. returned to the Tech-nical Intelligence Deot except Capt Ncvmkowski, T/Sgt Peterson,and T/5 mlcorc,of Ordnmnc,;T/5 Gar'eott and Pfc Carscn, Engineers;and T/5 MI.angiaracina, Ch(hmical Wairfaroehe alsc returned to theDepot shortly thereafter; later, Lt Abbott was added to thisgroup.

From their ne;'r location, Clark Field and the country sur-rounding Angeles were readily accessable, '.Much equipment had beenburied by the Japanese in this vicinity so that in addition totheir usual duties at the depot, Field Unit No. 3 had considerablefield work to handle, operating socetimes under enemy fire.

Shortly after the Depot had been established in Manila, Japan*ose mrateriel recovered in Luton during proceeding operations wasbrought in to thle Ilanila Depot from San Jacinto, where the advancei'ield depot had been tempcrarily in operaticn; the field depot

unit wThich had roved to Angeles ho-:vcr,vz-as temiporarily main-tained t, facilitate the handling of the flow of captured enoeiyrlatoricl comliing in at that time.

Tc suppl.cin.unt their transportation facilities, the AngelesDepot tof.l repairetl a yersonnel carrior by going out and findinganother one sc that parts could bo obtained. The team also brokedovin two Japanose diroctrrs, reoporting on the inferior machiningparts, All. matericl. collected.(. moppin- up cperations duringM'larch produced only a moderate quantity of captured equipment),vras brougllt up tc cco..it-cn and shlipped to the Technical Intell-igence Depot at Yanila or to the ';nited ,tates,

72

:T"'TO'IY 01' ?C'-7TZCT. I'7 T I'( 'l" I

During .,pril l Lt hbbott returned to the Depot at Tanila]and Capt NMwakows!<li, befor¢c Yaliny' ;-ct.:'sine( to OrdnanceTeam No, ' T ;chnlcal Ir .I.Li::..;c Un'.t -:lr- 9, was hoLp itanizedfor yellom- j.n',lic,'c. ':'l', -i o oifc L < z~r p:r seI't, T/'.gt Peterson,ranking, N(.Qj wv-n i.n 'ch.rl-e of the tcmporary, drepot until June,when 2d 1,, "W:r.de. l "l,5'-,ibt;- i:;ineer, w's sent from the UnitedStates ..r].ly T(cchn-ic-l i:. ] ignece Depot into WTTadquarters,Sixth A,1r7!y to (racaL;.a( the Lq :ipmcnt rcnmaining at the provisionaldepot, nt, . n,.s It. lr.bster w-s assistcd by T/5 Garrett and PfcCarsonj th, fc:i o ', 1, -''inol 1 t. that time returning to theTechnical V-t-,1 ._g . :neo Q,'q:'-t, at a'ni]a.

'. I. I. iLd tnit No! 7: ilOth Divnsior

Piel(J TTnit, No 7 was attached to the )rOth Division earlyin Decrmber 19L11il atr, tCpc Glnuco-str New -3ritainl. The divisionleft No-w Y!ritain 9 pecember to conrluct a dry-run landing opecra-tion at Ir`l:mnus T:3land in the Adcniraltties, They. landed at Lingayenbeach 9 January, T-,.Day, at 1900 hours; under ?i fire, with enemyplanes flying low over th(: LST they were aboard. RB 29 Januarythey had ndvanced as far as Bamball, where stubborn enemy resis-tance fromi well-fortified cnves slowed down their advance.

This unit, like a.ll others in the field during op;rations,accompanied com.abat pa.trols so they would }),n on hand rrhen equip-ment was rccovared. and considerablc TntJligernce materiel forall the serviccs was uncovered in the Ft, Stots'enburg and ClarkField areas, although many oi the supplies had been looted bythe civilians.

T. I. Field Unit No., 6: 37th Division

Personne]. of TField Unit No. 6 landed at Lingayen Gulf22 and 23 janua.ry°

After reporting to C-2 of Sixth Army, the Unit joined the37th Diisiion 'at Conchpion on 27 Januar.y l9 , and operateodwi.th th;s dii- oen onl thli drive do'n Hiilrhway No. 3 all the wayfrom that poirt' throiuh th],e ?lani l operation.

~No enemy Chemlcllc1 ;failfre equipment was uncovered by CiwSTemn No' 3 (Lt !ax Ljo Hilbbs, T/?i fTs9 Dr Garner) in the- 37thDivision aS_:¥ ·- nti l the Uni jt rekahed C]irk Field and ocr tS+oti:rn, r -;.i-¢ ,% .'-;~Jld: o ]ai'-i,~ ano~ ~;, r. r,, : _ ,.lt.4; : i w,.

erdt.c-eJi ib%..n- a, C:n rc'.ri;lcM ,.z.e0i 1J'i.-; was i.nm,. i theTan:l'l arl.n by 6 t. tct', 1'; th. . re+'-n" * mane 1i nm.i-lccql.ui)jnt', 'w iYJ :;o' .ed ln sm:i.l qu;antla.:Ls 'tt.ro. g;llhctu the city,

73

HTSTOnRY CF TEC'ITTrC'"L T'\UTT.TG'YNC,

'pparently the Japan se cer, w.ell supplied with smoke bombs andincendiaries. The latter wer? used with good acffect in portionsof Manila already taken by United ,ctat.-s troops, for there was nocn.my lair activity in the ,Inia sector after the entry of UnitedStates forces,

During! the early days of th, b'a tle for Manila, a lazity ofgas discipline war nthed among the encmy troops, cvidenccd by thefact that few Japancse casualti.es were carrying their gas masks.During the latter stages of the Inila operation, howercr, good gasdiscipline wa-s apparcnt. No war gases, other than a limited supplyof toxic smoke, were used, and it was believed that t he Japanese;oere not capable of' initiating or maintaining chemical vwarfare. Ttwaas Alrther deduced thatthe enemy did not anticipate the UnitedStatcs ;.rmy intiating the use of war gases.

Arrngements w..re mad:: for Capt Clyde R. Woodworth to op-eratec withthe 37th Division Surgeon ts office. The iianila area? wascovered as sections of it fell, except th: portion immediatelyaround Intramuros, Tntrr-.uros, itself, and the port area. ncnmymateriel recovered consisted of approximatcly 200 items of drugsnot listed in the nmanumal, ,'J'panese DrUgs and ,edicine", and mis-cellaneous items consisi.tinrl of mcdical. notes and pharm:laceuticaltexts written in Japanese. No large du.'ps ware found, however.Accordin- to Filipino accounts, the prilary cause was the factthat the encemy did not have extensive supplies of either liedicalequipment or drugs. A,nother important factor was that M.edical:Mlatcriel not burned by the rctre:'ting J-apanese was looted promptlyby the natives.

Ordnarnce Team l`To. 3 of this Unit (Capt r;illimm E. Tinter-stein, T/ VTinn) conducted firin, tests onl a newly recovered andvery iip.nortant trpe C , 20 cn and a hh.S m n roknt launcher.Capt rinterstein's re:prts on these rockets were later publishedby Sixth Army and by the, Tar Dcpiartlmnt.

Siignal Te'mu No. 3 (Lt Daniels, T/h Tobert R. _Ap-,ar, Jr,T,/h r:.ax "A,,. Bratt) located atthie I;,anila Golf Course a transmitterstation, the equivalent of the U. S. Press -ireless Corporation.'.nother ralio station was located in the San ?'iguel Brewery,where other equipnent of Intelligence value was recovered. :.tthe Union Theologicalh Seminary, burned-out Signal equipment, partof the Japanese 5Kit' short -wave radio telegraph receiving equipment,was discovered.

7T

HIST(ORY OT TTCI;IC:,lL ITTEL. I:('NCF,

Major G,-ncral. R.brrt S.lkPeil't1]cr, C-i.zarnding Gcnu.ral of the37th Infantry Divisi;.;r) rc-tc a l-'tt;r cf c-!:mmndatinl on' theactt-i.vties of this unit t- the Co:mmanding Gcneral, USISOS,(Incl 19),comllondinfr their e.!nthusiasmcnergy and initiative while worrkingunder ccnsid:rablc hlasards from enery fire, nines and booby traps,Iic wzroteo that tllri.uah1 their efforts much equipment and many supplieswvhich Twrul.(l 1lv (y hll iOsce bec-n lost weore obtained. He furtherstated that in (a nrw br o3f c.scs the first inf-:rmAtion on itenscf JapLanese (rclmanc.: anld -thl-r equipnmnt was obtained through thtefforts vf th]e te;a',: c rllrisinr:' Technical Intelligence Unit No.6,citing particularly thu 4lh7 1.n: rocket, first encountered in M'anila.

T.I. Field Unit No, 1; XI Crps

Field Unit !c.l rcported to-38th Division, Eirghth Arry,stagingon Leytc fcr the Iuzon operation,and secured per.issicon to go intothe i'ield wrh!re they operated in the 7th and 77th Divisions'sectors.

During; the ere.ter p.art of January 1945 the Unit was prepar-ing for the .H-7 pcerlation- On D-Day,29 January, they landed withthe 38th Divisi,-'n at La Paz, ZmabalCs, :Luzn. As there was no opp-csiticn,thc 3ith r--v..d rapnidlly fcrnvrd and the TWieold Unit set uplocati.: on n-the Ccstolajos airstrip on the n:'.!ht of 30 January.

The next dLay all. tlhe t:.ar.ms of Uni..t;io. 1 were placed on temp-crtarer duty with G-2,XI Corps in ccnfcrmity with the policy ofshifti.ng T,l,units under cor 's r.ther than division headquarters.XI Corps headquarters vwas in ccrnandl. of the entire operation andallotwed corlpleto, covyera[o by the tvar.ms in their search for newitCols cf cncny cquipment.The corps at that time was directingl theoperaiticn rf the 38th Drivision and the 3)1th lerr;inental Corbat Teamof thc 2lth iJivision.hlwhso r:ission was to cut off Bataan Penninsula

mand to join f:rces 'wi.th the XIV Ccrps coming down frmcn the ncrth,

The ::isciin, froc:' the T.chlmical Intelli-ecnce standpointwasnot t;et: sucossful,as little equipment of Intellig.ence value wasco:-llect(-d,, T:hl.e:cforfr thLe lUnit was directed by Ei(:hth .rrm.y to re-turn to I,elte to prepare for anoth.er .:;poration. They left fromnCSubic B.a.y) ari.ivmin[: at EiL'hth Arm-y Hcadquarters c¢n 1_5 Fcbruary3with only one dc.ay to prepare for another operation, They load'edthe follciwirig (,day t,) join the task forco fcr the next operation,

75

HIS;TORY OF TI'PC NIT'AL IN'FLLIGENCE

i'. I. Field ITnit N!o, 2: lst Cavalry Division

Fielld ninit Tio. ? was attached to t :: Ist Cavalry Divisionon 8 K-:lrutar1ys lt915, and opcL'ated in anrd ;l-ound 'anila and thehills to the (a : 'r -tlhaL. city. The onl: ;'..,:u-r·-' of' OrdnanceTeam No, 11, (',i)',. ::t,:rnal., .lli.hou',h handiica.!ppeci by lack ofenlisted m(en (lid lo,' le seve,.:ral important O-rdnancce items. Theseirnc-ludecd q'arp it ie:s oi' pr,-ctically ev'.:ry type of amnmunition,.F'rom shell h.lrd- n!e,_: idenrtified th: t ype ot artJllery beiigused a 'ainst Un i.te I Stat :s t;roops ari by the 3s:me method wasabl: tLo d :d t..': :a teha the ....ll my .va.s using -u1 :" rocket, Reportsw'ver., *ilso rad,- of dumps ot o m..n:cmn.- ammni tion whi.ch cold be. madeavailab.le t1o United Stat. s troops.

Ch,-mie :L ,,ia.rfirt.: 1'cTlam o. '; ('rapt ,illiam J. Roberts, SgtChaxrl:::s B. Gt)'s, T/5 Ilaull I. rGoJig), which h.:,l flown withvehhi.clcs aindq 'i'Lpr:1(nt, 2' D.lc:-mber to join I ,orps, atis '-ssign-t:d the mis:sion of conductIjn ' , sJurvwy on thh .,t.-:tus of JapaneseChezmical Warfir(,e mip.l!:ionos in .,;lni'a. Intelli., ncu had reportsthat sNvcrl plOaces in th,t c:ity h?,d b..ln us::: a stora-e forth:se munitions. Th'l iLnvcsti:'utiolj, co-roborat.in- that ofothers CIVS Intligenc t- m: J.n t!ie Ilanf]i. t arc.a, showed thatnon--lethal Chem.iccal ,v-'t.are !inmit-.ons and :rotect.ive. eqluipmenthad be.:n used in mod-v:...! .: qu :ntitI. s in -an :f.around Ymanila butnot in latr: e clinu-h qunti ].a._; to indic:tie th-t the Japan-se

were prep';-r`:d oiff'rnsii-vl or id::tO ' ively for Chemical Afairf-re.Throughoutl the entir': Philippine Campaign, Engineer Intell-

igence teams did 'a ltre ~. amount of mine. :tmoval work when itexp;dited combat ,tction, rather than waiL, for Divi7lion Engineertroops to clear tbh: -re:as. 'Th;: Enginee:r Intc-,lligence teamsand thei En:illlne n:lysi:; Sction :lso assisted in settil-- upexhibits and t-l:incd Arm,/ Divisions on J.:p mni.-ns lnd booby tr:aps.

3y th- ,,nd of' February, which ended thi- first p::riof o!' theLuzon opcrAtion, Technical Intilligcmnce per.sonl. 1 on tcmnporaryduty to Si.xth Armry had ope:r'It,,.d in the, c:ntr-al plainof Luzon,Lanila, CorripFidor, .Lt.,n .nd th. hi.lls east Iin:3 southeastof IMlanila (ifap Incl 13).

76

HTLST0,Y OF T.CTINTC XL INTTLT.IG2,NC

Tecchnicil T tel ito ncro on Tuzon a fter cebruary 1945

All tie previoussly dicunse.1 'ie] 1 Tniits-- Units 1, 2, 3,6, and 7 -- had lbeen relieved f'r,:: fiell.: duty by farch and re-turned t, thl(-, Teeclricn ITntelli.;ience DTnp':b for luty v.ith analysissectiuns. Ficl:l lUnit No. 5, h-wewrr, rc:..oinlel1 on operations withXIV Corps, Three ( ti ,r units vrwrec also) in thll field after M(arch:Field Unit N:o , v.l'li::l ' :ls. h:.d iarticipated in the original Luzonlanding:s; assi:,rle t.; I Cor;:Is; Fil.tld Unit NC. 8, new in the field,also assigned to T C rps; and Ficld Unit No. 9, newly assigned toXT Corps.

Special r. T, Teams with Sixth Arry

ITeadqularters Sixth ArcyY located at San Fernando, Panpangaprovince, instituted ,n extensive training course on enemy equip.nent for its troops durinS the month of .tnay. Alto,~.ther, nineTechnical Ilntell]i-enc temps, desi~gn tecd as tt"ne-'y rquipment andMateriel Instrll+,i,7on Teams;s, prt:icipatud in this program, con-ducted under the: direction of the AC of S, 6(-3.

The rorr-ups included: Chemical a..'arfare Team No. 2 from FieldUnit No, 4,; ngineer Team No. 6 from Field Unit No. 8; three Ord-nance tcam:s -- 5, 7, and 11 -- composed of personnel from FieldUnits 5, 8, anc 9; and three Signal teruns -- 1, 2, and h -- fromiField Units 9, 4, and 5, respectively.

In addition to Units 11, 5, 8, and 9 that were in the fieldduring rpril, and the rnemy Equipmrent and !;ateriel Instuctionteams, there were addedJ two individual tenas operating directlyunder Sixth Xrny G-2 on special assinnments. Instead of beingconfined to certain sectors, those teamrs novered all areas oc-cupied by Sixth ArTmy com:bat units on LuzOn.

To assist the guerrilla forces in Northern Luzon in locating,collecting and ropairi'l- items of equiprment, T/3 Lischalk and PvtThevenot, Ordnance technicin.s, functioned as an Enemy 7Weaponls Teamworkin, directly under the Spcinl Tntellience Section, Sixth ArmyHeadquarters. Pvt Thevwenot was hospitalized so;le t inc later, butS,3t Lischal].k, aided by his team training in the field, continuedto supply the troops with we-pnns and a;nmunition. Due to his workconsiderably quantities of Japanese Ordnance materiel were utilizedbythe guerillas in the N rthern Luzon area.

The othr special tearm *was a JAPLI.T Teun consisting of T/,SgtJulius I,. Tfo rton an-l Sgt Illen J. Branigan which worked directlyout of Sixth ArRy He adquarters and was assigned to the collectionof JY.PI.':T,. code name for nameplates and rubbings from captured

77

HI.,TORY OF TECMIHNICAL INTTELLJLENoFC

ez:nemy equipment,. Thl- s team processd -i larre quantity of nameplates d-aily foi, t-aon:omittal. to A; o C- , -'SA SOS, from whomthey were sent to t h'n Direct.or or o Intel]i,;Lnce, lrmy S-rvice

Forces, :ashi.nr-, on '( .it::r to 'iJl ( Ground rn(di st y Sectio!n, '1S,;'ashington).

This tean,, whiceh ;-;uc,.- . 's.. ll.. ?.exp;it ,.'] t!r < ollection ofnamrpl.:teis wvrs orL'ti:;, 4d i, con:.t o,i.ty , .rith ;F '" lott r,FEG(-3 8 6 .3, ,,ubj".ct: Simpl' t s scnd Scril. Eamb.r .ta fron.Capttured Jap:ln;-:,e ,..lt'i;. o'ihc r thaon airc,'-f ,. d, t.ci. 3 ehbru-ry19115 (Inl 20()). Thi;s '.tt!: d]L.e.- tei respornsibility for thecollection -nfl proc 3ss ,)f o,):i' n;'rrT i,.t~o; an(' mi:r.kings on c; pturedenemy quipi'nent ini S'.i tI o to ht-. 'omcl:nuin, ; CLnei'al, TUSA0S, !nddirec tod Tcchnireal Int(.:ligenc.c p rsonn3l to collect and advisethecommands to which th,.?r wcrc attached on procossing nameplatesand marking dat,,..

Sinc.; the Office, of the AS oi S, G-2, F'SASOS, was responsiblefor the. co :rdinai . \n of T.hn-in .;1. .Tniel.ligence activitcs, the

S-2 offices of var;j. is v-S:' es in the Phi].ippines were designatedthe coordinating ag;eneies for Techricxal intelligoncr' whihin thosebases, offict-r was app,:,i.nt,.--d at e-_ch base ,with T:.chnical Intelligenceincludi.na re-ponlsibilitv for' cell., cio]i 0.2 JAPL'T, as his solefunction (lett ::.r, ;Si3'-366.3, lieadquarters !'3A20OS, Sub ject:Nameplates and Technical Intellig.eice, d:.ted 13 Ft bruary 19b5(Incl 21).

T. I. Field Unit No.. : I f& XIV Corps

T. I. Field Unit No. 5 had lar.:d.d or -. hite Beach No. 3 at thetown of San Fabian, 'vith the 13tdd Division the morning of D-Day.During the period of 9 to 31. Janu.ry th s Unit )perlted in the h3rdand )ccasionally in the 25th Diviions' areas, b-)th in CaviteProvince,, souith oJI' i1 'anila,

On 1. Ftruary th- thir t wi..' plaec: on tmporary duty withI Corps, continuine with the !43rd and some telams with the 32nd and33rd Divisirns, On 21 T'.ebruarv they were rtli(cved from duty withSixth Ar!ly to be sent t.o XIV Corps, operating in BatanfgasProvince in Southern Iuzon e:.st of Lake T tal, where contacts weremade with thc 1st Cav/l-ry and the ~lth Airborne Divisions.

Chemical ilarfare Team 1No. 7 (Crtpt Lary, Sct Pranigan, T/L[ vooney)of Fi-:ld Unit .To,5, c,ollI.ct,C(,d a c;noJid :rable quantity of Jap equipmentin the: hf3d and l!,tcr in the 33d and 32d Divisionns' sectors. Thisinclude-d:. proleetiv. clothing, £fl.an throwers,. :2mintenance and testingkits, detector dits, smokoe candles and ,:_s masks of various types.

There se.::med to be no systematic l.ying of mine fields in thel3d Divisiln sactor. A fiw tape measure mines were found lying on theconcr:te hihw.3y, but they wcre poorly conceAled and easly recognized.Otherss, nl)t si: easily d;tected, were placed in brokcen spots in thePa'crmcnt.. At ni.'ht, infi.ltration parties planted mines and depthchar.es at bridges and along the shoulders of prcvirusly cleared roads,Which resulted in sonme casualties and made it necessary to rcsweepthe roads every morning,

T7

HISTORY OF TETC'(-TqJICAL INTELLIGENCE

Several booby traps reported by civilians to PCAU were removedor neutralizcd by the Engineer Tntelligence Team (Capt J6rdan A.,IHaIncr lA/4 Roeor 1'. Sherwood, and Pvt Enile M. Turcotte). Later,because cf the enomyls use of mines and booby traps, a report ontheir descrirtion and method of neutralization was submitted bythe team to 43d Division C-2 and thence tc the S-2 of all battalionsand ro-imonto.

In the 11th 'Airborne area a great dcal of heavy Engineeringequipnment of all, types was recovered, including diesel and gasolineengines, air ciclrossors, se;oarchlights,ccncroto mixers,well drillingrigs, stool sharpeners,lathus, bull dozorsroad rollersgasolinelocomotives and lmnly other itels6 I'Also, thousands of mines, mostlybombsjshells and dtepth-chargos vith pressure ifnitersjwere foundin this area. Many yardstick, flowcr pots conical boat1 and lungemines with a light metal shelloyrero also found throuLhout this area,

Medical Temn No, 5 (Capt Frederick B. Thonpson Lt James L.Molthan) recovered the following iternswhich wrere either put to usefor United states troops or turned over to PCAU fcr civilian use:a portable X-Ray unit, 2 portable surgical tables, a culture in-cubator,and numerous drugs and dressinl-s,

Ordnance Intelligence Teoan No, (Lt Philip A, TWurzelPvt BenT.Garcia) in December rwas attached temporarily to 43rd Division,but on corlplction of landin4g operations on D-Dayvrcrked independ-ently as a team lccated at San JacintoLuzon. San Jacinto made aconvenient base for shcrt trips into the surrounding operationalareaswhore considerable equiprment was recovered. By request of G-233d Division,this team submitted an instructive report on Japanesetactics and equipment used in the Luzon area which -vrs disseminatedto the trcops. This tean also turned over assorted items of Intell-igence value to the Depot and released a few weapons to the Ccordin-ator of Technical Intelligence for guerrilla supply.

In April, they were joined by Capt Sternal. Previous to thisCapt Sternal haOc operated alone as the only tean in the field fromField Unit No.,2. He had-been in contact with the eneny east ofMlanila throughout March,cxcept for a ten-day rest period. He re-suned operations on the 25th of March and then was transferred inApril to Field Unit No, 5 as officer in charge of the Unit,

In Liaythis personncl .as transferred to Headquarters Sixth'rmyyagain operating as Ordnance Tear. No, with T/5 Storckx (fromField Unit No, 8 ) added as a second enlisted rian;Capt Sternala'ain headerd( up Ordnance Team No,l11 assisted by T/4 Blaney andT/5 Gabage from Field Units N;o. 8 and 9 respectively,

Quartermaster Tean No.5,(ILt Philip C.AndorsonPvt Kenneth S,Echord) uncovered soveral large food dumps containing the usual riceofishycrackers and cotmon condinents,which were turned over to the43d Division Quartermaster and PCAU for distribution to the civilianPopulaticn. 79

79

HTrSTCmY 01' TCUTNTC'T, TVTNLLTGJ7"1

Simnarl, Tam ?l,.. h (Lt 1'Tllir.i 1, ITar:in.l T/3 lnurt ':.Richter, T./- Julius J. ,latto) covortd thc )13d Division regionsouth of !.anila during, J.nuary and February, securing, alongwith other equipment, i suitcase radnio viilently intended for es-pionage work. Thic iten was reported through the XIV Corps G-2Periodic Report. In June, this tean wa; transferred to Headquarterssixth r,rmy ,as nne of th, ETnemy Equipment and ciaterial InstuctionTeams.

The Chcilical ?.:irfaroe, ETngincer and 'odical te'n-s from thisUnit returned to the Depot carly in Trarch The rest of the teai.s,with the exception of those transferre I to Hcadquarters Sixth rrny,returnec on 25 'ipril.

T. I. Field Unit iNo. L4: T Corps

%'lilc M.5anila was being cnptured to the anuth, United StatesForces wheeled and struck northward toward Baguio, around whichcentered one of the most bitterly protracted battles of the entirecarpaign. The city fell on 29 ^.pril. Phoad lay Balete Pass, con-trolling the -approaches to the Cagaya.n VTa]3ey, Japanese broadbasket in the philippines.

Field Unit No. 4 which had landed in the Lingayen Gulf areaon D-Day, was nttached to I Corps, workinc: in t'he 6th, 25th, 3'3d,and 37th Divisions, sectors. Considoerble equipment and materielwere recovered as the Unit worked its wny up the Lingayen Valley.During webruary, this Unit alsfo ailed in conducting a short courseon Japanese equipment for -irriored units under I Corps.

Chemical ,nrfare Team No. 2 (Capt Paul J. ?ralsh, T/4 RobertJ. Shorwman, T/5 Riayllond D. Gaddo) of this unit supplied informa-tion to Headquarters, I Corps, which enabled them to make an est-inate of the enemy Chemical ',Arfare situation, including: theperccnt:l.ge of enemy troops carryin- gas masks and protectiveclothing; a notation of the presence of Chemical -lirfare munitionsand devices used in offensive action; a record of the r'as-proofingof eneny enpl'accllents; and a report on the fact that Japanese tanksand holding (ictachments wore carrying smoke candles for screeningpurposes. --ith the exception of connon type smoke candles, how-ever, this teanm found little Chenicrl TlTarfare equipment. In May,T/4 Shovnman wvas rocall-:d to the Technical Intelligence Depot, andCapt :7alsh and 9St Gaddeo wcre transferred to Headquarters, SixthArmry, to instruct in Chemical Uarfare with the Enemy Equipment andMfateriel Instruction To(ams conducting the Sixth /,rny trainingpr ogra.

Engineer Temam No. 1 (Major Harwood, T/3 Ellyett, T/3 Paris),

80

ITTSTO01Y OF TTCIrTINTCALT, ITN'rLT?'ITTCr

in a 'lition toi tlli r utine recnv1'ry of enrey equipment, dis-covered and neultraliz1 th'n nv7 - s1.'k n~in, and mrny improrvsedmines ,-nl boc.by trps3. T1he renor'r,s odit,&e by i.-£s sea.1: for lissem-ination to- front line units on :r!:;oa.:tns :l'! istrtL!Cti ' ns inhandling irnprovi.strl TT.p beotl;y tyrips wic:z i:.;- :izumnta_ ir prevent.ngcasualties in tec !iivisions in wlli.ch ;-iey ;cr.~, servlng. If ccmmrtn-ic'tions ha , been b e+,tt: r, liv E. ' 1s 'rhave bcOl saved in the2hth Divisi on, vwhi.nUl h'dl n .stlajt -`wo c-.sualtlcs from sack minesand suffL,red cw)pcurrct m.-luje to equ-ipment:.

Sev.ral items o,.i' enemy Ordn:.ncc, of which little was known,were rdisce,,vare.! in the 6(th infantr-y Divisionrs sector by OrdnanceTe,'ll o. 1 (Capt ?op, hfc -vi, ,J. peters. pvt Robert ?:To reTmrietas).These included flramec thrw'ln- .- runs and tanks, and a tye 90, T15 mmhifgh vclucity field glln, Other irtprover-ents ,ncL nevr trpe Or Inancennted: an incrcesedl number of medliwi artilAlery guns (105 mm and150) rmm cnlibcr) over the li.;-htcr cnlibr:rs (70 mm end 75 min types);also incre-ased aimounts of 10i5 and 150 ;im rmirunitior.

Enemry st.,reo of f. A w-hich were taken were turned over tothe Philippine Civil ,^ffrirs Units, who in turn distributed then toneedy natives. "To lar-e f ,, .I dumps cr diur:ps of nlew equipment wereencountered by Ouartermist-r Tear No. 1 (T,t Roy H. Curry and pvtHarold E·, ,bbott) and st.lall durmps were ra.)idly looted by the Fili-pinos. Around Batuio, in the 33d and 37th Division sectors, theteam recvere-l a feLw Quarternaster itemsl rff c'-,:ian type, thequantity and s tyle of items recovcre . plainly indicating the lackof supplics of the enemy: i.ters such as raincoats and blanketssherwed evidence of wear and. were evidently recl aimed, washed,patched, an-L reissue.l by the Japs; Americ:n-made GI shoes thathad been captured ha,'/ the uppors cut away anl tlle edges remade sothat they also might be re-issued to the Japanese.

Sirnalt. Team No. 2 (Capt 're1d '. Wierst,,ad, T/Sgt Robert J.McConkic, T/.5kstill C,. ]iekl :si-mr) founl little Signal equip-

ment until the f.sll jf T:muic:,. ITer ., large quantities of equip-nent were rccovrre!: fri.~ cavzes and other storage points. Somerm!ios wcore turned over to United States troops, and one, ano:Adel 94 mark 6 radio oet~, -;-as used by the 37th Division forintercept work. A Jnr.p.r.s.. public addlress srystem %with a 100-watt output, completc with I '-,ynom-:ic sdeal:er, was installed ina corn :and and rec:.nnaissanc:: car by personmel of this team for useby the Sixth Ar;'y psycholuo)ica]J -;arfare Brnnch. The bulk of thecaptured equipment was shipped to the Technical IntelligenceDepot. In June, this entire term was tr'ansferre d to TIeadquartersSixth rnry, as one of the lneny 7quipmr:nt and T,ateriel InstructionTeeams.

81

IlISTORY OF TEC1IiIIC.T, INTELLIGENCE

T.IFiold Unit N<c, 8: I Ccrns

Of the seven ori!ina3 Field Units that had launched the cporat-icns in S;:uthern Luzmn,only Field Units 4 and 5 rernained in thefield during March and ALpril, The rest were returned to the UnitedStates !.rr.a Tcchnic.^.l Intclligence Depot and rwere replaced by FieldUnits 8 and 9.

Field Unit No. 8 left Finschhafon on 5 I.rch 1945;just beforethe DeoIot clbsodl in 1-reparaticn for the transfer tc Manila0 As theUnit was now in the field", it operatcc in conjuncticn with FieldUnit No,4 until the end of MSarch, lnd as in the case of ncw per-scnncl,a rCcd de.l of its ti:ne v;as absorbed at first in beccringfar.iliar vrith field operaticns in pre-iaration fcr future assignlontso

Field Unit Noc8,acting uion instructions of G-2,I corps,operated'idth the 32d and 25th Divisions in the Villa Verde Trail and BaletePass areas of Northern Luzon fre.7' 24 }March on through A.ril¾ Inaddition to their rcegular dutiesall sections of this Unit cooperatedto collect nurercus items of enemy equipr.ent to be added to the ICorps Informnation andt Educ.ticn Conterts display°

C7S Teal No, 13 (1st Lt Louis 1}.cny, ,lS/;t Benjamin A Becker,T/5 Charles H, Johnson) of this Unit had spent considerable tirecontacting the Chr.ical lWarfare officers of I Corips, includingdivision officrs. in order to concur vwith a new procedure ofoperation for C1.S Technical Intelligence teoms as directed by theCheiical officers of sixth .rrmy and I Comrs.S

In March, J !,S-t Bcker received a headv wound as a result of theaccidental discharge of a 45 caliber pistoland was evacuated fromthe area.

Engineer Tcam Nos6 (Lt Frank JDiPhillips,Pvt Rudy GoColby,Pvt Euseno F. Wcins) found a considerable quantity cf mines andbooby traps, They ovrcr callcdl ui.on to fariliarize the troo% s vriththis equipment and to subl:mit rel:orts which wore published by G-2for the interest of all ccnccrnoedLater in May they w-ere called into Sixth 'ArLm Headquarters to assist in the Enemy Equiprment andMatoricl Instruction Tea.lst training prorgranm

The m..edical officer;Lt John BiMuddilan,ooperated in conjunction;'ith Field Units 4 and 5,in the I Cor;:s sector, Sar.rles of 195Ja>panese mcdicinals and laboratcry reagents ireo recovcred,togotherwith sanmples of Jap-anese rledicl,, surgical,delntaland X-Ray equip-ment recovered from around Baguio, Lt Muddiman also identified theener.y drugs stcred at PCALU hos-iital.s within the I Corps sector toI.ernit their use by PC.,U physicians,

HISTORY OF TCHIT'l ^.L IHTiTETI,I GT'.lCE

Ordnan~,e Tumn No.,9 (IT,; Glenn E,. OnanSt, lt.arren D, Blaney,T/5 Allen LI':itc:.;lckx) i',velod , . ns-.da.rdoT; e amounr, of enemyOrdnancc :Lr.: L* :Ln : o ,,er ;;.. arr. ...'; na,.hh.noe ura ;,....h had b)eenused in .tCe'-.nCd , O,:''; a-c ",of ' ;1.. cfJi rm;r, ' was tu.neCd in toOrdnance co.ni?;.:: . f'c .c,;~ at lnd t,]l ,-?'':;l--: i:W.s mlincd .. rorto a coio.l. ot f. l ., anyp Mn.ny M, ;if.e5s roi j.'o-!.C Jp. an:-r,:se ma;hire,funs wrc LUtrnc.l cn ':i c ner.y by U;;ited Staeo,3 and. Philippine AL.rryunits in 'I;azr ;at 1 s. s,

Lt, Omian rcu-niu to the Tech;-ical Intelligen.oe I)e-:ot in l.My.T/5 S-'c?:' yrep:,-- -id tP ,l.l rby u;; Vc'.t L-.' 'lrZ-1 d P.cGarcia. cn T07;,'.;h; e .ieo. i';, .r. .m c r T ; Btola.Ioy ;;el,:rte-d to ptSternal onr O~clnar~ eoL No :.L Ii, . ' t- A e.s ;e'ar-t-:.ipciad in the SixthArmy Enrimy E,allimnlrt arni Fl cc'p:, c iest. utio; :-.rotrar ,t

The quartcrmast,±: sect-Lon ha. i-,tc-i lu"-k reccvcring eauip-rent as nc er.eir ur':y , .-f i'.na' -e'. .as eI sizni.'l,:.ai:.ce a'7re o"',turedalong the Viila Ve.rde Trail -', in the Ba'lete Pa¢ a.'re-. thsogh Lscellancouls i-;enms .;vrc- roec 'r".1D,! t +tci tre limrted ac'ti-- ,L' concern-ing enemy Ql.lart.-rMast(o--r iteri:i.s.Cat- Robert 3, Glmnderson ,Pvt PoncianoLoredDP-rt ,Ii..hl, eI J; Picoli.,of this team devoted rnach of their timeto assistin, the Ordnance tean, Hovover,some research on UnitedStates quartcr;,ilstcr itei!s .as completed.

T.,I. Field Uni' No.9 JXI orps

Field unit No,9'was attached to XI Ccrps coerating in thecentral Luzon sectors All. six services comprised the teams of thisUnit.

GCTVS Intelligence Team NJoh14 (Capt ILussel To,JerbyCpl WillianHDavidsonPfc George B.Reagan),covering the 28th and 43d Divisionarcas,found so:.ic new equipment°

Good examples 6f Ja-anose heavy Enrincer equipment woere locatedby Engineer Teamr Nco6'(Lt Frank G. PospisilS/Sgt Richard T,Smith,Pvt Frank M, LeCdesr.ia)

The }.iedical cfficer, 1,t Earl )D.Raabrecovered some M.edicalmateriel fror a- larzre sxupply hJnm19: a r:ncrosc-o-~ejan anesthesianmLachinealibhGL:, ,,is:ceuJ. ..:eous bandagecs a.nd dressingslysolacdental kit a water l;rsifreranc assorted quantities of drugs andmedicines, Non-expendabl. items were processed through the tech-nical Intelligence Dcpoto

Several types of heavy erquli;,ment were recovered by OrdncanceTeam Ioe,8 (Capt Jack K,Palce.r:Cpl John P,SramllwoodPfc Charles R.Kabele) anda ordnance Tear No c,7 (Lt Henry Lo, bbottT/i5 Victor J.Gabage)Pfc Robert PShinn).This included a 15 cm sel;-p)ropelledmount,a 70 rm battalion hcvtrit,era 75 nrm Lamaa truck and all t3yes ofarnmunition.Two type 97 Jap tanks mounting 47 rmr, guns were found.

83

HISTOI¥Y .'O TFTCGitE'J/L IN JLLIGEFTvE

Durin? ... :.tr.:1 and ,.r'i., sev..r.l chori> s itr pers')rnel were madewithin thi:" ceam an c 5,'-nLn', &t'teh ̂ :rj irC hosp-Ltai .a.ton peri:o1 wasreturne t t c re:;hn . .. n.t:_li-: ..;c:: ii....ptj Ja; t .aL eer wais cs ital-ized fcr a1o..)e,bic dvy.u.' ,"ryJ C,; , ':,.::- h.. slta1i: c. fa.r .n ir;crctudhandl; u'lld th-; . 4 Oif).flr .rJ: t!tK"J..; we-re ro:,!lrnko :.s Ordnance tean No 7with Lt, A rt'' t : in (:1 .r.

I1 , v.r (4p1 '.; I .1:'(.;o r .turrned to the Tuchiiical Intclliigence Depotbut .. t /.,' tt :i c r, ;..ll r'e!·jrted to Sixth Army Heedfcquarters as Dreof tl Ord.ri.C!, le .:s, ; )ar'Lc'iPa ',n i.nr in the -Lnemrv Ecq;ip..ent and ''ate-rielIistructli_; tra'ii ri:, progzL.; Or; . 3,-be, upn baling reaease-d futhe hoipitaJ, h:' ; r -ti,;:,rt..:d :,c ixth Arny7r to assis+, wi.h the trainingpro .ra-j a.s pj'.r't i1' Cpt t{ rnaii's Oi:dn rnc. Tceam No. .ll

irJ 't;yies r:f' ..u..rt.r::-- ' er erequirlent w,;re rceccv..;red by S/SgtWilliam J, Pcts, I-vt ri;rd raI. tre; -end rvt r 'i.li.ar iatkins oi Quarter-naster Telm NT,,o 6, As most of th se had n: Int.el]_iier, e value, they

were turned r, -:r ts, lo aSl salVel' ;.rits for disposition. During April,Pvt X¥atkins .,':s relievw.d of duty with this team.

Signl:. Teaim N'. 1 (T/3 Lotz, Pfc Anderson) found that areas re-cently evacuated by the enem'y yielded only smnall ramouilts of Signalequipment. Therc(f'ore, in Ju:ne, Pf^ Anderson reoGurned -o the Tech-nical Inte].ligence Depjt, Yanila, and T/3 LDtz was sent to SixthArmry Ho:-dqu:rrters a, Sign4l T'eam No, 1 in th:- Enenmy Equipment andMateriel Instruzcivn program.

Close of' Operti-ns on Lu.on

Sixth Army operations in central and northe-rn Luzon during TMaymoved slowly but sttadily forwrard° East of f'anila, where the enemy-.as strongly entrench--d, their r sistarmce was stubborn. Ipo and0'aJwa Dg.rns, wili.chi contrr-ll.cd' the Iianila water supply, vrere securedintact, hwvrever, a'd 'the Japanese fP rccs here, as well. as in SouthernLuzon, were e:ncircled Ind redtllci.d to renar.nts by June.

In the north, Bsgui.3 fell, and though the Japs stage;d strongcounter-attaoks against United States f-rces along the Villla VerdeTrail, they ivere; pusherd bl.ck froni their cave positions along BaleteIidge, and Baletc Pass its:elf was taken.

At th(e bugi.lning -if Juln,) the Cag;-yan Valley Was the only largearea in Luzrn remniaiing in :rnemy hands. A cormbined American andPhilippine f)rce cl)s-ed in on Jpmarri, 'et the northern end of theCagayan Vae-lluy aInd secured the tomn without opposition on 21 June.iveanmrhil.e Sixth Arry forces hadl ma.de pincer drives from Balete~ass at the southern end :f t+he Valley n)rtlhwest atong IIighway No.L[ and northeast along Highway N.. 5. On 26 Tuwie, near A]cala,Sixth 5rmw's 37th Division made co-ntact with leading elements of

HISTOTlY OF TECH1INTCAL TIT"LLTJ'TNCE,

the 511th PFrachute Tnlfantry which htd advanced south alongHi'jhway No. 5 fC,ll(..in an airb(.rnc invasi)nln nc(,r r.parri. ThisJuncti, n effP:ctivoly secureo. the cntire len-th of the Ca-ay.nvalley. ?roLm then t :; th.. clr!sre of the tuzo n operation, whichw.as terrnillnt...l by the end of the -w;r, f.Fihtin7 consisted mainly

in liquidatin,; p wvkets of cnir.ry rcsist"nce which had been by-passed.

85

HISTORYL OF T ,TC I -j- T .TI rv>^

, i 1P T E ki VIiL

';S<U? '_.:'it' k iLLPLrr' E CA. . .

rcc.: t r .! -- w)v 1umst 191!V

.,s t.c 'i-·xh .rir 'l. h:.d e-rn ..- s: L ned the Luz:,n operati.on and theirfull eflorts were needed to be focused to the north, the task ofclean.r.i ot,t thle Jap:'..ese resistance in the South.ern FPhilippines wasdele:!.ted to Ei'ri:th 'rmv (26 December 19LL). ThovT.'h sor:e of theislands had bl->n ini . l>77 inv-aded by Sixth Army -- Sa.,a.r, j'Tindoro,

'iarinduque -- all of t+hese had to be cleared of 3aps ('taps, Incls 16and 17 ). in LyteC, Fighthi Ar-y had a fine base ror future operation.

The Solthern Philippine Campaicn sonsisted of landing operationafter landint ope~ati n, some asa nrst little oip-oition, s:ie ag,-instfanatical stan?.as byc tehe ene ,v. One characteristic st-Žod out- eachisland corsi.ste.A of a series of p-'l'os ard cave stroric7 points:each censi sted of the sare rrim and ,ruoellinr dig~,io, or burninrg outof the enety wi F':b troops fi--hti n forwa Ld by inc'es 'ailnst the mudand terrain on r._ny occasions. The fi'htinz -:eve½o. ed intbo a routineof destr cti..on andl the crr beca;.e to kill until the ill of theenergv to res:ist hacl been ttterl: broken. Duri.ng the followin-7 months,Japanese were ullshed pack in all sections -nd the Japanese supplylines ;.-ec Clt, ;f.rci-.-T t. ei .y to live of'f the land. 1Iowever,the Ja-ancse thn-.- u .~:ad..liy i deq..:le.dtird a well .orzarizedand well intai:rateo force o n tin e ir~1-r' areas, n!ainteining acoord- Inat-ed anl orderl reir ent bac; intc thie !our.ta-ns.

Rec._itll tl -in of Tc'-r'inal II1tel'- ieci- rornizati-on -iith Ei-Thth Army

The . sdm'.::is rati :Lrn of nec,'- '-ni Intel inee1ce " it;h Eight. Armywas somewhriat di.i'erent t:an with .r I xt'rmy, Circular 138, Headquarters,Eighth Arnry, dited 13 L. _V .;, -rectsi tnat echnical Intelligenceteams att-chled to that. leadJquartes wculd be olaced dircectly underthe adriiiJ stra'-ve, operatirra! and t+,e6,jical contrrol of the chiefsof their -espec::,. _vc scrv:.ces. vi,?n attaLched to un.ics in the field,the teams worker: n t,d.er a '.d -'.-erm cornt:olied by th. service chiefs ofthe units to vvhici a.t-tac'.ier%. Close coordinlatlon was maintained ArithG-2 of' the Alzvr.

'36

Th-e i.,;hth 'r:ay T-chnical Ibt lli'-cnc¢ Coordinator, Lt Col Julian,coordinatcl. Tcchnical TAeclli-onco activitcs with the chiefs of servicesanli .ct-ld as an 'dvisor iin T.chnic71. 'rntcllirZ-ncc mattcrs.

Corrcspondenc- bctwc.;:n 7ifhth 'rli.r andr C,-2, UT.q.SO.S, and the Commanding Officcr, !;250t.h Technical Intclli-:.nc.: C,-mpny, waTs .ruted by G-2channcls thr,!u,'h the Technical Tntelli!encc Coo-rdinators, 7ighth '.rmy.

mn Addition to the r f:ular field technical raports and m.rnthlyactivitos rep'.rts, this circular 'also pr-,vidcd f-)r th- sub-rissi':n ofton-day ictivit::s rreTrts by each tc.rn. Technical repo:rts pprrnvcd bychiefs r.f s-rvic-s w.'r..: puli shed in the Eihth 'rmy mrrchnicalTntellir.:incc Bullettin.

Since ihrtth ',n rprat-i.ns w-r smnll,'r in sc7?oe than those rfthe Sixth rm7, thcy n-ccs:'itqt,[ c; r T.chi.ic 1n I.+,llir -nc^ncrs .nncl. "ith S'xth 'ryr, th:. t nd.ncv h-i breen, as the ,po-rrtirnnro!r:-sscid in Lzzpon, t; rcili:-vc th.e T _ch iical Intelli-cncc units fromtmpora~r duty u ,ith '- ..: :~ivrisins and to attach the. t+- ccr-;:. Tn theS;!uthcrn hilippir,.-.s this 7-7s d.inc t-: . l.css extent, fr,r frequently it-was necrssary to, c,,:lit --n7, o s;.n.lc divisi n -or cven a rcgim:ntalc. mbat tecam to each ,,:pzr ti n. -- hen nercssar-y, th-, n-rwb-r o'f unitncrsrnnlel wias cut. by 'i...i..--ntin. , c,:rtein scrvic .s but this iws holdt,' a rininur: s- 'as norvt t-. impnir the f::'firicncy of the unit.

lth-uh n"-! tr"inin:: .ror7rarm vs crricd n by the TcchnicalIntelli-,nc': tc"-s wvith Ei hth A.;ry, c,-nsiderable informr.tinn was pas-sod -n t- the tr,;ops in the form of reorts -.n nc~;~ rquipent recovered.Tnfnrmation c-ric-rnin, con m:!r us-e rf rines, nnd dfcscrintinns ^.f imprevi-cd mines and ont'1 r Ordninc,: ot' ir.neliato combat i-oortancc, were dis-sominnatd. Equipromnt forr trai. nri mT ,urnc.srs 1iaS a7lso madc ,vailablc toDivision units.

87

HISTORY OF TE'CL'i CtL INT1 T! IEvFCE

Victor 3 -- Palarvan: l].st Division

The Technical Intellirence urits, r. stead of beinRgdesigratcd by nl-,mbers, ,rere identified according to theoperation in vwhicii th-ev participated tlrou-hout the SouthernPhilippines campaign, Since ,,h.e assignmrent of personnel ontemporarT, d'oty to tilh Arr/.zs :.as a oreroicative of the Armiesthenlselvos, and s.rInce Ei.hth irny had a definite policy ofmobility for Tecn ic:al Intelligence personnel, there wasconsiderable reshufl'.ling of teans under Eighth Army control.The reor-nanized Technical Intelliarnece Unit No. 1 was againredistributed by Eign+'-l ^Army and its personnel assigned tothe various Victor opcrations.

A Technical Intelli.gence Unit composed of one officerand two enlisted men was placed on temnporary drty with theli1st Di.visi3n Lor the V-3 operation against Palawan,Philippine Islands (ifaps, Irncls 16 and 17). Personnel ofthe Unit werc: Capt. Robert J. Ingrahm, T/3 Carl R,Simmons and Pfc. Walter E. Hawkins. (Complete roster of theSouthern Philippines campaign is included in incl 3).

On the morrin, of 28 Febr;ary, 19L5, the Unit landed onPalawan with the 186th Re:iniental Combat Team of the 4lstDivision. Serviceable, standard items of capturedeq lipmert recovered, irxludirq grenerator sets, lathes andradio repair parts. wiere turned over t.o the tactical unitsfor immediate use. The balanee of' the equipment was shippedto Headquarters Eighth Arr: for inventory ai:d shipmdnt tothe Unite-ld States .rmy' Technical Intclligence Depot.Information on the ty'pes of booby traps found was given tothe Task Force Intelligence officer.

88

HISTORY 0 F T7CHT'ICAL INTELLIGENCE

Victor -- Zmb;,an,a r:2.ina .,: T, iSion

As t '!e, C ch::"_cl t': ' L.-1 .... "n. LJ r T lw ,al a waIs stagin2 forthat op7t.':-;.4 ; :- s:,ld cr.r'"_ .Lr. -' .'i .- . .. r .' :,?.7.: . cn~{1Mindl ~,r O|,fl~ ~1O i' :' t :7v1 1 ;1I*-,,7, ....i 't r .: : .:1 . t , ,:t. Ln t' i .'-.,:aiL nstZr . (lban . . \.?. ? -.L.l. :!,; ]2 ..?'l. ? -& .. .rC'L_ 1] _

personnel fi th2s T .::, ;?':-;

2nS Lt (.r"nl' , ;. -iLr % , -.. as if IvoryT/5 ¥.~i.Lli-u: li. [.:c

pvt Janes 1'r Stephens

, rd.f cal -It tei'iigence Tom:i

1st Lt Travis L. B:nwden

Ordnance. Intell.ience Team

Capt Ernest V. Cameron

Signal Intelligence Team

1st Lt George P. Ford

A week was spent in preparation for embarkition, and on 6 m..archthe group boarded afn 'LST and depan.: od- Mfter an uneventful trip,they arriv.;c on the scene of the empending acti ,n on the morning of10 M a.rch.. Tne bom'bnrdment that fol.iyOved was texrrific9 Finally, atH plus 4, the Unit l.anddd on Red Bcach under enemy shell and mortarfire which cnntinued throuhout the day.

The Technical Intelligence Unit set up its headquarters onZamboanga' and proceeded to cover all the areas taken by the combattroops., The operation was one in which the supporting units of art-illery, mortar and dive bombers played the more important part, withthe infantry cccupyiLng areas after they have been thoroughly shelledand bombed. The Japs uxploited every possible ameans to supply theirtroops with weapons andi improvised every conceivable item that couldbe made l)ca.lly,,

This operation yielded a considerable quantity of old and manynew weapons never seen before. 'ore n.nd more automotive equipmentwas captured as the enemy was driven int(j the interior wrhere thereads were impassable, This equpipliernt, when captured in serviceablecondition, was turned over to PCAU to aid in supplying and process-the civilians.

89

HIfISTORY Or TE':,'NICAL INJtEIGENCE

Ground mines were extensively employed in this area and weremade from every available material. Tncludec were wooden box mines,type 93 mines, artillery, shells rif-ed as mincs, Navy depth charges,torpedo war heads ar6 a new marine mine, As a ?raat deal of thiswas Navy eqliipiment, the Nav!l Yobile Explosives Investigation UnitNo. 1 was called in to identify and examine it.

Lt Ford found that the Japaresc type 97 portable wirelesstelephone set could receive signals clearly from Ur. S. frequencymodulated SCR-610 end 9CR-300 sots at distances of 2300 to3000 yards. This was import:nt, as nCass"r.s in the past had fre-quently been sent in the clear on these two sets. The ListDivision Signal officer, the. 0C-2, and the Division artillerywere given t'his information.

Lt Bowden made trips to all installations held by U. S.troops but very little Yedical equipmenrt of technical interestwas found. A Filipino doctor stated that the Japarese had takeneverything of medical vulue into the hills.

On the morning of 13 !Larch, as Lt Sowden was proceeding to aguerrilla aid sta:tion zweith t:ro guerrillas and a driver in a weaponscarrier, a Japancse machine run opened fire from the side of theroad. Lt Brwden an: the driver were both hit. The party proceededon fo t back to Headquarters where t'ie injured were admitted to the133rd Gen.ral Hospital.

By the end of 'arch only mopping up operations remained onZamboanga, and on 31 March the Unit embarked with the Sulu-'hiteforce for an operation on Sanea and Bonqa Islands of the SuluArchipelago, (Lap Incl 17) Philippine Islands. With this landing,certain members of the Unit had made three D-Day amphibious landingsin a little over one month.

No great stocks of equipment were found on this operation andver, few new items of eq'iprrent. It was noted, thou-h, that someof +he equiprent taken was of Germran manufacture and some of ithad been made in the United States.

As no new it::ms of el.lipment were being employed by the ememy,the Technical Intelligence TUnit returned to the hlst DivisionHeadquarters, Zamboanga, on 26 April.

During Rkay, Lt Yelchor and T/5's Ivory and Moore secured nonew Chemical fWarfare items in this area, but did recover someinteresting older types of equipment

90

HISTORY OF TECTNIC.L INTELTI IS';CE

At the and. of bay, Technical Intelliyence personnel whoparticipated on this operation, returned to the Technical Intell-igence Depot with the exception of tvTo ofi'ic.; Capt, Cameronspent the early part of June in the office o( , ':k rdnance Officer,Eifghth Army Headquarters, assisting in the e;;taeblj.ihrrent of afuture operational prDcedure for Eighth Arr:.y Ordrns;ce Technic±alIntelligence Teams, ITpon te-r.inatnti)n of this terr;prary duty hereturned to X Corps Headquartsrs to supervise3 Corps TechnicalIntelligence t ams arnd to take -,ver as Corps Ordnance TechnicalIntelligernce 3fficrr and as officer in charge of Ordnance Team No. 6.

In early July, Capt. Ford reported i.n to HeadquartersEighth Army for staff work with the Chief Signal Officer. Thisincluded, alon, with othecr work, preparing a chart showing Japaneseelectrical Signal instrulrents with the onre�rcan counterparts.

Victor 1 -- Panay -- Negros: 4Oth Infantry Division

The Techrical Intelligence Unit attaclhed to the 4Oth InfantryDivision for the Panay operation (.Yaps, Incl 16 .and 17) landedwith the combat troops of the Division on D-Day, 18 March, at Hplus thirty minutes. Personel of this Unit were:

C.'JS Intelligence team

Sgt Harvey Bylsma Pvt Homer Blankenship

Engineer Intclligence Team

1st Lt d;illiam Purnell

Ordnance Intelligence Team

Pvt Nick P. Vannucci

Quartermaster Int-lli-encc Team

Capt Kenneth H. Bowman

Signal Intelligence Team

S/Sgt John P. Kost

91

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL I)TV.LLTGEFCE

Operations were carried onin the vicinity of Iloilo City.Little ene-y equipment of Intelligcncc value was recovered in thisoperation, and only a few dumps with convontional ite-ms ofJapanese equipment were uncovered. The Japs, as they evacuated thecity of Iloilo, took :q!:iprert that was of value with ther andburned the re;st. The lo:-ge warehouses alone the docks were bare,with the exception of fertilizer and empty beer bottles,

Mumerous radios, which wars. of Aneric-,n commercial make andwhich had been destroyed beyond repair, were found in the Oapaneseradio station. A Jap microphone and one radio, a few phonographrecords and an electrodynarmic speaker were recovered from this station.

S/Sgt Kost, the only man assigned to Signal Intelligence withthe 40th Division, received help during Lay from Signal Team No. 7,regularly with the 24th Division, but little additional Signalequipment was recoverEd as most of the equipment left behind by theretreating enemy had either been destroyed by them or by U. S.heavy rmort~t and artillery barrages.

In the town of Tigbauan, Capt Bowman (4Y) found a small supplyroom in a ruined chapel. Afew pieces of cnlisted men's clothingwere collected, togethcr with mixed amnunition and printed matter.There had been a small garrison of Japanese there, and only a limitedamount of supplies, other than foodstuffs, was left,

The IlOth Division, hay ni s,-cu;red Paroay, shifted its attentionto ending the Japanese occupation of Ne7rom Philippine Islands.The Technical Intelli?-:nre Unit with the vision also followedthro'gzh on this operation, which opened 2y March, On Negros, ason Panay, the enemy made little use of aeavyr Engineer equip:rent,and small Enrineer items of Ja.anese ma'-c wcre virtually non-existent.The largest e:nemy damp secured up to the end of April contained onlyone Enrineer itrem of tc chnical valbie, a company size water filteringplant. Lt Purncll was Enginecr ciefjic'r on this operation, withthe rest of his team as-3i nead to the 24th Division.

M!uch of this equi:mert, both All ed and enemy, recovered onthis operation was turned over to the combat troops. Included wereAmerican-mr,,d gasoline motors, electr.c generators, lathes, planers,shapers, tools, auto parts, auto tires, gasoline driven ro-d rollersand tractors.

Sgt Bylsma and Pvt Blankenship found practically all Chemicaldiarfare m..te!?ial encotnrntered on Negros destroyed or damaged. Ascorrectly reported by this, as wiell as other teams, in thePhilippines the Japanese were apparently unprepared to successfullyconduct or defend themselves against chemical warfare.

92

HISTORY OF TC;f{NI]C. L I.'TELLjiq E 'CE

Although most of .'i'e -.icdl.v-.dual Japanesn observ-d carried gas masks(probably due to tho eC.i :tii,= V'sc rf V i:its ;:pmh >rls by 1UnitAedStates troops), the;.r She',, rs wt;r' rot t,.- proofed.

In th.w Dum,,v.:u-.e scct- Gc Io Ccros Grifr-rn Ca-t tcwm3nlocated sonme .: h '2u,.-rtr:o, st'r -; t=:v,; ,c'-'" ..- thl t.lb i,-. aLiqianitn+i.s of C1.?s., It hcl.n1.t. 'n i/'. rrri :.';:. .r. W j v:'. rpacks,rain co..:ts atd r. t t..r' Nco , it-'s : - -- '-t .vcze acls-)l.iTn i-nk tr"ck writh aui:Li: :'~ ": :,a,:~, ai a:i!n ^le: cIropcontairKr, .'na'i-n. £C7c f o ct ' r 'enr r;?i rconpr: sse' an o zak..-. a&'d 'a - =Xi i -n;kE.i'aO 'ft - ::'r.[r;w;aileil.,

Tier2 ',v3rc' no lrc7T c--ncentrations of s,.3. e.. a' *.o auipment.n the ;s:,1nd, and ev-on in tnc c vas !sed. as c'~erz,3'c: s-upl 'rpoints, suprliel w-re scant; n.d ir aiso-2o'r. As no atteript atorpaniz:.d sU,]. ly a? P -, chc o r. W CV:e-tr'tl liaairn, offthe land, confis atir? foo :nd :surlii. s from thc. nti.Ves.

By t:he end -f June all iicchniic.l rnti,:l1:aence activities forthe V-1 op.ration hId hben concluded, ard '11 purs:mncl, except PvtVannuc -, .ho was trar-7fc'-"J to H :araquari'ers X Coris forassignment +o Or'lna:.( ,: 'iac.:m No, 6% ha.d rztvrne!' to the. TechnicalIntCel i:'enc. XDept.

Victor 2 -- Cebut: Americal. Iilfantr, Division

A Tcc'ini-al Intcllignc_ Unit was att.achncd to thc AmcricalDivision oin 1' ¼!arch. P-rsoin,'l in tine new U.init were:

CWS Intcll:i.zer ce Team

Capt Robert Ingrahm

Engincer Inte:l.. igenco Team

1st Lt Jomn F. Keane Pvt Christoher !J. Ta·mer

Ordnrancr Intelligence Tear

1st Lt qIrady J. Bell, Jr.

Qluartcrmiwstct- Intellig;enc Team

T/Sgt, Eugene F. Rlossi

Si rnal Intelli ienc Tean

T/3 Donald R. Borchers93

HISTORY ,F T'~TfC:I:I L INTELLIGENCE

Emb2rkln! with the D:ivision, the Unit r:-ached Cebu,Philippine Islands, ('aps, Incl 16 and 17) on D-Day, 26 }arch.The landinr was made at Tal say, from wvl'rc the tronps moved in tocapture Cebu City. Hcr.--, Division Headquarters was established.

Capt In!7rahl-m, r,,S, investigated the Japanese r;~,nition usedagainst l'nit.t;d ;tates troops which was reported tc .iv off agrecnish, na;iatoi;r s: lke. -n'tornation :)n the .as h:.d been givento th_ Div:Lsi.,r, 0-2. Th.: invest;. - t, J i,.-.dic t zi that no toxicgasses were bei.,? used and the fincings were disseminated to thet.roops to l.lay any fears conccrn.,;! the p;,ssibiiity of the cney'suse of such agents.

'o lar-e supplies of Chemical Warfare materitl were found.Items recovered included improvise d ibolotov coct.ils, preslnmablyfor use ag-.inst U. S. tanks, and -ight suits of light-?.1ei-htruberized protective clothing.

As severUl irprovised weapons and types of explosives wereencountered, Lt B:.ll of Ordr!ance, made a rep)rt to the DivisionG-2 rugirding iriprovised b )mros -and demolition charges that were beingused in destroying glns. Some of these were foumd on Japanesewho werc ateminptinc to irfiltrete to A.Gric'n artillery positions.Areport was also made on an im.provised 130nimr! iaortar. The mortarwas apparently a field expcdient devised t:~ use the ammunitionleft behind when la.rce qlantities of weapons were t::kcn fromCebu to reirnforce Leyte.

Though no nrsw Ordnarc;v eq-;iplrcnt was reccvered, fo,,rte',n veryhigh frucqency directior::l radio trans'it.ers having the same fre-quency banns as the Unites Sta-tes VT fuzes were captured near CebuCity, Thesc sets w-reo inspected by T/3 Borchers (Signal) andarran-emcnts made in conJi-nction with the Ordnance and Si!nalofficers of Eichh irmyrr 'Ieadquartc'rs to have the radios tosti d inthe field witil aztual Aif.firi.n to sec if VT fuzes could beactivated by iaavcs froin these sets, since this woultd provw. aneffective counter-measure against UTnite St-tes weapons.

Towards the er!d of~ay, L t Bell was transferred to HeadquartersX Corps to coor'inate Ordnance Technical. Intelligence activitiesin the I.iind:.nao area.

Lt Keane and Pvt Tamner, Enginecr Team No. 7, also ropo',ted onthe number .nd variety of enemy improvised mines. In addition, twolandinr field lights with ,enerators mounted on trucks, recoveredintact were shipped to the Technical Intelii;encc Depot minus thegenerators and trucks which wer:- put to use by Division Ordnance.

9)4

HISTORY OF 7TCHNITr .L INTFLiIGENCE

The tactical situation by the end of ,lay had reached the pointwhere the enemy had retrceated north to the hills, leaving the bulkof their equipment in caves alone' th road. Tl'his equipmentwas also secured.

During the latter part of the month the team also made anextensive reconnaissnmce of the ftcilities in captured areas onCebu and submitted reports, including one on a cement plant whichwas found inoporativ, y because of' lack of certain mechanical partsfor the power pli =nt. The team then travelled to Nezros, locatednecess.ry parts at a su 2:'.r plant, an-T :-.s ne-otiating for a loanof these parts when thev we'e recalled to Ei-hth Army Headquarters.The project was ther-efore turned over t) and completed by CaptIn grahm.

Neither T/Sgt liossi, Quartermazster, nor T/3 Borchers, Signal,fo nd large stores of material and eauipDrlent. Yo new items wererecovered and most standard items, w;ihicl were of no technicalvalue, wer'e turned over lo the division for its use -- inparticular to the Si-mncl Dpoct to be i'sed ,a parts in constructingthe division broadc stin~ station, .,VD. Nameplates, as in allcases where eq;.ipmo.nt was t-rned nver to the troops, were forwardedto the Un ited Statos "Army Technical Int.:lience Depot.

The enenly, withdra-wing steadily, destroyed all supplies leftbehind, and it waes roted by the end of J..y that their stocks ofmateriel were becornin- critical, consisting by then mainly of smallarms ammunition, and foodstuffs, principally rice and sugar.

By the end of June all personnel present on this operationwere returned to the Technical InrAtll.jence Depot with the exceptionof thr'ee men: Lt Keane, trarsferred to ::.ssis[t Lt Col J'llian atEighth Arra- Headquarters: T/3 Borchers, who was retained to clearup the unfinished ';ore for the Unit, and who was then assigned tostaff wvor l ,sitvh the Chief Sin:l Officer at Eighth Army: and LtBelil who was trnsferrcd to X Corps Headquarters to take chargeof a combined Ordnarce Team No. 6 which operated in the Seran.,aniBay area of h`indanao d,-rin- July with the 2S!th Division.

95

HISTORY OF TRC`;]:C:L IfiTELLIGENCE

Victor 5 -- .ind.n;o; X Corps, 31st and 2Lth Divisions

The followini T'echnical Intel .igence personnel were assignedto X Corps for t.h \Victor 5 oper,.tion:

GCS I;t elli ecnce Team

Capt iilliam J. Roberts Sgt Paul R. Going

Engin-cer Int<,ll i aence Tearn Tc. 8 (part)

T/Sct John G. Barkowski Pfc Edward BurnsteinPvt Philip Zarahn

Ordnance Intelliaence Team ITo. 6 (part)

T/3 Carl R. Sirmons Efc Joseph F. PollackPfc !,'orton H. R-)sen

,uart,. .rr .- ,ster Intelliq.. nc,; Tecm

Pvt Jean 0. Gornzales Pvt Bertrarr L. LesliePvt Thoodore D. Lillis

Sinl:al Intelligence Team No. 7

Lt Col Erle H. Julian 1st Lt Alcide SantilliT/5 Bruce A. Harding Pfc tlaltcr E. Hawkins

These three officers and twelve enlis-..ed men, representing allservices except the Ledical Corps, landed. at Parang, Iindanao,second largest island in the Philippines (i.aps, Incl 16 and 17),on 18 April 19L.5 and. from there proceeded to the X Corps area, wherethey reported to the 0r-2. As reconnaissance of the area resultedin the recovcry of little mrr.aterial of Intelligence valLe in the31st Division area, only four men functioned.with that Division,while the ±emaining eleven operated with the 2hth Division aroundDavao. Prior to the outbreak of the war this area had been thecenter of Japanese colonization in the Philippines a/nd the laraestnumber of Japanese in the Islands still lived there.

A large Japanese storage dump was located. The materiel,which was distributed amon- five huts apparently used as livingqlarters, consisted of rice, ammunition cmd Signal Equipment, thelast bdinr b7,ried in shallow caves. Quantit-ies of fond and clothingwere found btr Pvts Gonzales, Lillis and Leslie and wcre turnedover to PCr!rWU and Quartermaster Salvage.

96

HISTORY OF TECHTICAL INTFELIGE NCE

Turned over to tie Surgeon, X Corps; in this same operation,were four to five tons of captur~ed medic l supplies for distributionto various hospital units for use for civilians and prisoners ofwar. Of much practical use ,rere twvo complete water purificationunits mounted on 1! ton trucks. This captured equipment was usedby troops in X Corns and was shi,.ped to the Tchnical Intr-lligenceDepot aftaer it was no longer needed.

T/Sgt Barkowski and Pvts Burnstcin and Zarahn (Lt Purnell,officer in charge of this team was on duty writh the lOth Division)recovcred several n'ev E~ngineer itemis, some interesting improvisedequipment, and a considerable quantity of standard materiel. Someof thLs equipmcnt was put into irmediate operations, while allmines and explosives were collected and later dcstroyed by Ordnanceauthorities since they constituted a hazard to surrounding personneland materiel. As the Division moved forward i.< SoutheasternMindanao during June, fewer land mr nes and sirmilar devices wereencol!nterid. Ilike.rise, enemy fortificatinns antl defense systemsshowed a tendency toward hasty construction. It was apparent theenemy did rot anticipate a retreat of sunh depth: however, theyshowed appreciation of terrain End utilized it to the best advantage.

T/3 Simmons and Pfcs Pollack and Rosen, operating in the Davaoarea, fol-nd quantities of Ordnance equipment. As in all othersectors, the Japs showed a marked ability at improvising weaponsfrom other cannibalized equ:ipraent. eortars c pable of firingstandard 75mm and i.7" artillery proj ctiles were made from lengthsof Ias pipe. In one secto'r, twenty of these projectiles werefired at Unitec'] St-:te:s troops and could be seen tumbling throughthe air as they approached -- though none exploded.

The Japs also improvised land mines armed with bomb fuzes,hand grenades made from hiollow wooden blocks wrapped with wire,and others made from gas pipe. Thay used United States rationcans filled with picric acid, obtained from dismantled aerialbombs, to scatter around and utnder equipment. Fifty rocket motorsfor launching 60kg gcneral purpose bombs were located within the24thn Division perimeter at Devao.

Lt Col Julian, Lt Santilli, T/5 X-lrding and ifc Hawkins, Signal,operated in and around Dav.o and in the Midsayap sector. In thelatter place, pigeon comrunications were discovered and turnedover to the 31st Sinal Company. Later, a considerable quantityof Signal, especially r:.da-r, equipment was located. An entiremultiple transmitter installation, discovered in a cave in the Davaoarea, wos oxarinod and photo:raphed. The enemy, evidently placingconsiderable importance on the destruction of this equipment, sentback infiltration parties who were able to demolish the entireinstallation.

97

HISTORY OF TECHiIC'iL INTELLI1ENCE

The Si-nal team sc coilected Ja.panese secret documentsbearing information on )reoosed disposition cf Japanese forces inCentral Mindanao in the event of .n amri-car; invasion. Thesedocuments were inmm.ecdiately turnerd over to the 19th RegimentalCombat Team and thrnce to ATIS.

By the end of June the Technic:.l Intclligenc Unit on theV-5 operation was bcin? disb'-ndc:. Lt Col Julian returned to EighthArmr Heaiqlart;-rs; T/3 Simmons joined Capt Cameron from the ListDivision on Ordnance TSlam 'No. 6: Pfcs Pollack and Rosen joinedLt Bell from the Victor 2 operation and Pvt Vannucci from theVictor 1 operation and all of them transferred to X Corps Headquartersas Ordnrnce Team No. 6: the rest of the Technical Intclligencepersonnel on the Victor 5 operation, except Lt Santilli and PfcHawkins, rctuirned to the Technical Intelligence Depot.

Dutri:-g the remaining time they se, ved with the 2l4th Division,Lt Santilli and Pfc iawkins recovered no enemy Signal dumps, thoughthey found an appreciable quantity of Sixnal equipment scatteredthrougnout the sector. Four items, including a Japanese radiosonde,were turned over to th.' United States troops for immediate use.

Examinati ,n of a Japarnese telephone central near Davaodisclosed maps and documents which were appr:.ised with minimumdelay. An accompanying map showing the wire lines of the sectorwas translated, together with m:arking tags from incoming lines.

Three radio cave install' t'ons in tnis area had to be walledup for tactical protection. One was inspected by Lt Santilli andPfc Hawkins prior to its being blovw'; up be an Intelligence and Re-connaissancec squad. Japs had already burned it out and it wasstill partially burning when inspected. The second cave was walledup 'with several Japs still operating inside. The third was hastilyreported with incompleta information, but rwas walled up before acomplete survey could be made.

Upon termination of' service with X Corp at the end of June,Lt Santilli and Pfc Ha-;rkins were assigned to staff work with theChief Signal Officer at Eighth Army. Lt Bell. Pfcs Pollack andRosen and Pvt Vannucci, who formed Ordnance T a.) No. 6 with XCorps Headqlarters, found that the Japanese on Mv;indanao had by thistime little equipmient. It had been withdrawn to other islands inthe Philippines where United States troops had attacked and also,quantities had been depleted because of the distances involved inresupply. Consequently, little equipnmernt of new design or withnew modifications was recovered by this team.

98

HISTORY OF TECHNIC,L INTELIGENCE

Quantiti.:s of Uaoanese 'i-munition wrec de.-troyed by 24thDivision troips because of its d2ngcr'-)s condition arid because ofthe possibility of be+lhg reca pturtd by the enclrry. Howevcr,Ordnance To ) !). f i spected and, re;-novid for storage such'muniti-i -j wras rcFqulrerd for tactical problerms sponsored by the.:ar and Navy Depart>:- ts.

Oth r itcms r covercd in this area inclvuded:

4 type 96, 25 mrn sinpgl m-ount, nuval 7uns w/36h0 rounls of shells1 typJl 95, 7-5 :rmi rpntain guon (inoperr:.tive) complete w/sight28 motor vehicles (rcDpoired .rd turned over to the

Philippint Army)2 type 10, 12 c;i !45 caliber D. P. naval runs1 Oerlikon type 20 Air-. shell (modified for use as a hand grenade)1 type 99, 81 mrm rmortar (turned over to Eighth Arimr for

training purposes)9 weapons, variius culiber, from: 6.5 mi ri.fles to 13.2 mm

r.achine cannon turned in to 310 Ordnance Cormpuny Depot)2 tpecs 11 and 96, 6.5 rin liIhit machine guns1 type 89, 50 mm grfnade discherger3 type 38, 6.5 mmr rifles1 type 39, 7.7,mrn heavy rachine gun1 type 92 recciver1 type 93, 13.2 r;mi machine carnon w/tripod

99

HISTORY OF fH:`If, I CST INTELLIIG1JFCE

H'APBTER XI

Tl:;' 5250th Iir ,J.:T.

arch -- September 1945

IIea-iquarters 52..th' T chnical Intelligence Ccmnosite Company,Separ-..? (Prcvisicnal) and] the United States .'rry T echnical Intelli-gence D'pt--t arrived at Janlla, Pilsipm ne Islands, from Finschafen,iHe-w rf-uinea, on 26 a;rch 1915.

ajor .i'anley, Commandc.nc Offij.cer of the Co:.pany, had precededthe organization forward, arrivlr in an-.la iarch tno select asite for the Headcuarters. Srec.:fications rfr the loca.tion vwerethat it contain housing, mess-;In, and recreational fac.ii.ties fora-;-.-roxir'atUeiy 90 officers anld 2. eizlisted men (72 Technical In-telligence tears), .s vrell as shon. space :cr ana.lysi:s laboratoriesfor each of the six serrices; ror..o fcr the si-.ping anc'. receivingderartnment, an,! sufi. ic._iernt grcv:.nd space for a motor pool and anOrdnance area for heavy eull.or.en-'.

This is typical o.,. the .ray in which 'rn'1 7a+ion locations ,'ereselected in the city of Yan'.la after its capnt:re' T.hile drivringabout the city looking i'or a suitable lcca-ior, jaj<Jo]Tanley spottedtwo large warehcuses on ton of a hih.., had. to circl.e twsrenty-fivemiles arcmcnd to find a br1df:;e to cross to the area.

The place he had found turlned out to be ideal. It was a 500 by1,000 foot area "Blue print of Derot, Incl 22) four and a half mileseast of do-rtown T ani.la, sufficiently re.imoved frcm +,he dust andtraffic of the destroyed city to afford p;rivacy. Situated in SanJuan TIeirhlts, a cr.,iet resi.'ential. district, the grounds were on oneof the highest elevations in i.anila.

The tzwo three-story vl.arenhc.a.ses, owned '.-y the Oriental Print;.ngCo, atny, were unoccunied, and adequa'ely housed the analysis labora-tories, the shi.p-;ing and receiving section, the enlisted men's andcertain of the officer's quarters. ii nrivate home nearby, whichpreviously had been occuiped by a Ja-'aneso general, looled like ane:czell.ent officers cltb and quarters', but had already been requisi-tioned for a general of the United States ererthees,everything wrorked out smoothly. T"nen the general found' out therewould be a traffic of captured guvns, tanks, ancd other heavy equip-ment beirv, shipped, in and out of the Denot cl.ose by, 1he relincquishedthe house and tool: another he preferred in another nrart of tomn.

100

HTSTOi.Y OF T:L.CIINICAL INTEL,LT;GEtNCE

The houlse wasa c ivcr into an ,ttractive officers club andquarters. ;.n enlist. 1len' 1'; .crr:3tiin club 26 x 72 feet, had to

be construct.;J, as w.ll as ;:hu .ro and. washin, facilities forenl.stt.i rllen, l atrines, a ,.rage 26 x 30 feet in the mrtor pool,an- an oit !::.,r t' :;:t :tr.

?iitn appr val o' th-e ,Nar Department, a phto':;raphic laboratorywas later constc' ;te ! to- han]dle the require!,ints of the analysissectioris ;rand fi. . t':: is. he processin? of ph::.tographs taken bythe 72 TI'echlical IttetL]iiEnce te:us at that time assigned tD tue5250th, 'rld ti.] pre-lp'rticrn .f the reauired number {)f copies forforwardi- -i t,- time v'r Dia.rt,..ent, were sj. i;,rg.. a burden on existingtheater f'-cilities that they were unable to carry the 1 'ad. TheTechnical Intelli ence Phuotoraphic Laboratory became one .f thelar:,.est in the the;.tc. rI,

Frior to corrpleti-n .-f unloadin7. the shipn on which DepotJreadquarters had arrived wns movled t) a.nther ] ocati .n and struckan oneny nine, damra.;in$ thre hol..' r:nta!inint nuch imp ;rtant shopcquipmr.nt. This ship, car:ry'in- b':th records and personal p.ear,wa.s n- L raiso, :,rla Lso.:ie o)f the material salva-md until thefollowi ni Oc-t lber.

I".'-:.n arrival at r'nila, the vari us secti:rs. were assi. ned

space, ana c- ,rence" constr'1cti:n ',f neos..sar.y facilit es.Collectian and analvsis 'wer. corn+tinue '. c:,nc. r .. rntly with corn structiondespite the l-s, r- f the equipnment from tie siip. ,omen personnel from

the onalysis sections ,f the Dec'ot weo-e p icled durini - the maj orportion o:f' lay under . .: t ia l ter :bh.w;,.en, who was named as.sistantconw'any cnrl,manl]er ,lnnir -·'aj,i ,r..,il.t-y 1peni.n' the comCleti,:n cf allconstruct-'ion pr-.jects. .,t Van Jlyack, reanrvnile, continuw:cd as adc.nin-istrative ,f.iic er.

Ship;in!_ and iLecfivin.-; Secti.:n

LeeceC-pts of' :.ntry .:qipment at the Depot) in ia.nil a consisted ofa stea-.ty flr,-;i ..f capture.I :Lr.at.ri.cl fror. T'chr.ic,:.l nt-llr-tl:enceField Ur:its, frl.nr the -svLisi nal TechnicL Intl]..i 1.i.ce Depots inLuzon, fro: ri-.>._dquarters rTi.hath Airmy, ±'ro)n_, hil.Lp)ine bases, and.fr'om cens :.rship Jetach;.ents.

Then trhe I.ab:ra.tory work was ayain in f'l11 swin-, arranfemmentsrere c cmn:rl.ete I with i .rt Cemr.:and f *'- t:e ianulin .ri f shipments of

cap tureO, msateriel. t, the United States. Stal;:-diin. operatinz pr -ce.dure f.ir tne shipF Ln6 of Intelli ,ene sarp-)les, as worked out by

101

HIST3rY CO 'iCTcIn7TIC:TI II TVIIIGW-TCE

t.ajor Y:anlcy in conjurction ^.ith Chiefs of Services, Hpeadquarters,,7F;'S,:C, wvra r, m,, into elf'ect at Lthe T chnical Intelligence Depot,and initial shiprents from the I anila area to the United Stateswere accomp.ished. :ncl.uded in these shit rents v,-re many newtypes of equim-,ment not -previously analyzed.` as vell.l as large ship-ments for training !.:r-,>oses.

In ac.rcorchance v.ith tar Denartnent Circular- No. 13, 11 January19h5, re-zarrinT. thle slimVent of capt,-.red matee±ial to the UnitedStates for Inte..ll!igen:ce -ur-ocss, reroorts were mace to the theatercormi:ander i.rnOeJia.1'elr upon reovery of the first, second and thirditeml: of Jan-anese grolvnd force equ:rm -,lent not previously carptured,so that this inforra'-.i on r'ight be cabled to Wash in'ton.

As set forth1 :in the ritish- 'ica r. t of 15 Noveber19)14 concern.in, ce-pturcd . uan.nese Cro C l d 7Ior-es equ-ipment andTechnical i..se.rc-;, shipments were al.so r.aC1.e i'rect to T ritishdestinations u-lcn notif.'cation by the DIrector of i..litary Intelli-gence, >3ritishll ar Off'ice, thrc-gh t'-e Com-andin, Gfner.al, e.rmyService "Forces,

Information Disse:iina-ted to Troops

Thr'ch..1~,'out th;is oeriod Teclhnical Intelhig.ncee i.'?.formationwas disseninaUed to srubordinate cocrrhands tiercurh the media of the"G-2 lr.eekl-y iRe-ort,:' ed2tede and rublished by the AC of S, G-2,Sixth Army, andc th'-e "'"echnca..l InteIte.igence Bulletin," publishedby G-2, -iglith Army. Technical Intelligence units in the fieldhad access to similar puiblicatieons origJrat!-n, -w.ith anc distrib-uted by the various ccr-ps G. 2 sections. Z-7.abora-le dis-lay-s ofrerressn.tative articles of Jal;anese equilroent writ.h accompanying

descript.ive reading matter, were pr-?rared by ail analysis sectionchiefs a7d set up at the Technical Intelligence Depot. Later,this complete displa- was move dodi. to .' 7ES'-'.C HeaCquarters(oictures of thLis disrlay are shovm in Incl 23). A perrmanent displayof Japanese Ordnance was _iso placed at Grnance He.oe,'e.rters,9.lT-~ i.'... ,A as requested by Ge neral .Iolman, Chief Ordnance Officer.AIP:AC; another permanent exhibit of Ja.anese eqa.irment, consistingof 33 pieces of Ordnance equipment and 17 piec-s of q'uartermastcr

equir-ent, iras issued to tlhe .lth Ai; Commrriand fcr a rrominent dis-play requested by the Cc/'m;3anrd__ rr Goneral. of the unit,; and a thirdsinilar exhlibit wras assermbled a't C- >:.

Al1so indicative of th the t.in' aid given to troops were thethirty spec.ai Orcdnance kits 1,serl dclring a training orogran insti-tuted by eplacement Co:-mand. These kits, rwhlich vwere of consid-erabl.e ho(nt in fTriliarizing the troops .with Japanese infantry

102

HISTORY OF TiECIIIT.CAL NTJI¶'TLTIGETTTCE

rearpons, contained the followving itenms:

1 - 7.7 hm heavy I:G 2 - 7.7 rr'rif es1 - 7.7 mr. light '( 1 - 81 .nm mortar6 - 6.5 .n rif'les I - mu mna mortar

L.ajor Talcott C. -f'-fir-.-.ight

On 20 1April 19-!, :ajor talcct-t C. "FainwTrrihbt vrho had been withthe 525Oth as an offi.ze.r 5n chlr m bloth ir: the field and at the, edical Analysis Labcrator?-, die LCroj:! heart attack. The successof the Technical Int.lligence rission in the Pacific Theatre, par-ticularly as pertained to thl rimedical field, -:as to a great extentdue to his oitstanding professional kmowled-e and ability as asoldier.

OGerations in thie P'o.ilfr-pznes P2egin to Close

Dy the enc' of May 19k4, r.'eclmical Intclligence had. secured acompreheinsive anc fairly det-iled Kiro¥:led'-e of all teclhnical devel-opments used by the enermy in the i iip-r--ne caa=r-^ign. '.Thateverthe Jdpenese h.ad. developed that was ne:: in equ-iptment and techniqueshald been secured, studied, analyzed -- ande thla' information dissem-inated to United States troops. Iliantities of enemy equipment hadbeen captured and were bein7 shinmecd to the Unitecd States fortraining eurposes, '..Though the, Battle of the Phiiieoines contin-ued and thousands of Japs still remained scattered throughout theIslands, to all i-:t,ents andc nurecses the mission of TechnicalIntelligence -- that is, cf the men ooerating directly in thefield -rlth the troorps -- :rs drawi.ng to a close. Durin: the fol-lowing two months, u-nits .:ere gradual'!r -ithdcravm from the field,returned to headquarters, and stc ed f.cr the Blacklist Operations.

With the"official" concliusion of the Thilie-pine camraign inJuly, a survey of the rc:su3lts of Technical Intell.gencc activitiesfrom 27 I.a-rch 19!;5, :-;he, li-,he Unite+r States ',rmy Technical Intelli-gence Depot was established in anila, to July 19.5, indicatedthat 952 new items of Inte.lliCre.nce signifi.cance had been recoveredin the PhilipDine Islanmds campaign., DuLring the sane period, overh,000 namaeplates andz reproductions were shipped to the GroundIndustry Section, i.ilitarr Intellig,ence Service, Wrashington, Al.so,2l[[ technical rerorts wer- submitted by the ana-Jlysis sections ofthe Depot; these covered a wide variety of both new and nreviouslyreported Japanlese materie,l of all branches of servi ce and were

103

II'STO)rt.Y (I" ZC7 T C. ...... i -C

published as apr.vc'rod ' y th,.? chiefs of services, F,,'YES, ;C,

New Persom-nel Join ',""!tl

In June AFF''.C for'rarded to iL.,'S1?'.AC the require:ments of SixthAirmy for Technical ln'tcl igoncr. units for the coming operation.Five t-'yoe "^." MUnit:-, ?voe type ")"' Units, one Field Depot Unit --a total of 52 Co:c'.._cers a.no 107 enl2.sted ren wrould be needed forcomni.ng. : .. xth. .Xrmy o-eraticns. (Pa-,e 1h of Tncl 1 to Incl 2hdef:nes cor;-osi.tion of verious ,,nits). These requirerments wrereincorporated in the logist-ical instructions issueU by 1LFPAC.

Ant.cipatl..n thle ClOilpic and Coronet Operations on the Japanesemainland, seven-ty additional officers anc. one hundred arnd t,,enty-five en.ist.ti men were requisitioned fro-m the ..ar Derarrtment forTechnical Intll.igence dutyr in this theater. These figures cov-ered only preliminary'Sixth Arr.y recoairements.

The company wvras also augrio-lted 1 Julr., by the arrival from NewGCuinea cf ETeLeacq-tr-ners an id'.>adoluarters Det-,ch'..ent, 98th Qluarter-master Battalion. The corna.ding officer, '.aajcr Ja.meos n. Collie.was rmladc Deputy Co i;-ander of thn 5250 tl. Tcc'. ;...l Tntell'ignceCoimanar under l.fajor i;.anley. The r-uarterimister .Rattalion alsofurnished of fice personnel dl:'ing th'Is .z riod, and was responsiblefor the ccmrpnny acli:n-stration.

WTith the return of Tec'hn'.cal irntellge"_nce personnel to theDepot in the ensuing mo.ntls, an e-'tensive training 'progrmm as arefreslher course for t,.is mrl'soIinn1r. and as an orientation ccursefor the- new Technical Int'ellim-nco erso:.mel arriving in thc theaterwas establish.ed at the Depot under tihe direction of the senior fieldofficer of each service. The course, based upon -?ractical es-er-icnce in the field, incluc'ed lectures, charts, and a compl'tedisnlay of enc,',-t equipi:,ent. The seiven-day progr';i, which preparzdTechnical Int-:l.ie-.nce persor-nrl for future onerations, vras opened1.8 August _i.ith an .introd'.uctory adcdress by '.raor ma.nley and vwasreceived v.Jith enthusiasm (schedule of classes is shoVmn in Tncl 25).Classes 1iure at-;,en¢ded by ..L personnel present a-,; the Depot exceptthose needed for section .or.,

The redical, Ordnance, and OCh?.n-cal. larfare analysis sectionheld s1u:,-l-.-ncntary specialist training progra:-s for their nren acndcertain nersonnrl also attended a weak-Qon- a:rnmunition ccurse atlHIT iro. ",

loh

A't the -nrd of -;!.r ? renuest -7as mar!, to fi.T thhat authority begrantcd .ifor a Tchnical I ntclli.,ernce pass ',o be authorized for issueby' AFI'AC to all Tecl'rc?'1. Irrt -' nlig rnce officers orprat-ing in thePacific t e. ... ar. ;u t':ctrity !ras granted, Cae.1 Officers of 5?O0thwver.-; issuier.C ocncal Inteliiconce passes vr: ich ccnsidera'ly expe-ditecd thieir orL0.

Con so] id&tiln of 11 T'chnical Intel-.1lnce .^ c tiviJties r.eco-memnnded

For so7:' m.onths past, both; Col F.auv-, 0(-2 ij,,..",S, ancd ajor"anl.ey, i'cordina-tor of Tochnicai Ilntolligei.ce, -ha. .;rg,:d the consol-idation of all Tccl-hnical Inteli .- cnce activit:..:_s u!n-der one coordi-natinri cor:i,.'iend at' G:.: .

Shortly aftr th acih.i;-at ionr cf Tte( tates Ar+: Forces,Pacific, (.7P:I'. ) ' b-.ew h'. diraf'ed (25 iay !?i .~) z. comnplete l,!an foroperati.on of Tocl~nic~l -t,..: .j ,-nce umcncr tha-t 'hladquarters and hadsubrm:it-'t~c it, tothl- cr ;,rith a .ro-'csed . f a.tll .ents to pro-vide f.or all' '-rersno -n. .t thi t.e o n ic. a:,ec: service with the5250thl Technic.tl in-tll i-jlc-c Coi,?-ny.

.,Assum;ing tj·a..t . soe.:ara-ie. area corr.a-nd :oIl nue course ofti.me be form) d for o'era'-ions r-:ithi.n the Philipoines and southwrard(t is caire into effect 7 June w:-lhen headqu.arters acliinistration :mascharn.ed fro. US;UI!OS to UTnited 5t.ates A1 rnir Forces restrn PJacific

(.....:,.;')), a nd pointing out that ad¢ditiolnal armies col.J.ng uLmderi 'itC tha.t r;cuicd bje totally u:nfmaniliar vrith Technical intelligence

as established in S,'2A, th-~r recor, ended that to ini.m'.ze confusiondelay and d-u,].ication of effort, cantralizc.ed control under 2l': IC

be establ:,.i s - d..

.Lhir rcco -,--da`-: -'on -rs '-t .-. ora..r. v shelved br-. v-as .later aeo'tiedon an 3.'v Cn ..or:: cor- e..hns v.e SCa.l.e, 'en thle atoli.c cn±C: s::d.ei.lvenmeirzcd poln. '3 scln~e) vh,~nl? b+:.e sm. riee 'vTrA ;.aS abrua-t+.i y rer. , -.mcUtire incdustri !, scientil'ic and tecn.mcl.o7ical resources of theJa-paness E:,ire -rere opened for, invesitiation, centrali;-ed control -not on or 'fo h -e TUnite;d St-'ies Aty but Ifor all Allied -Tad',quarters -wras mrnndatory.

-05

HIITORY T( 'S'7TUC'I. I T LT' JIG'TC

End of thc "-'ar

Friday evo:>:;.:.:t, lO :u._ust l4L), around 2100 hours, the Y:anilaradio station, ,:'T broadccst tha.t it '1-ac becn "tuncfficially"arrouneecl th-; t l ' ....i- anese Ironrwrial Govormlen't hac indicated they-oullc3.d ac c-t, tlj. Tictps.r c ' tC -t'b rrTs. Aitet r the long wait Saturday

nighlt, 1. 'u:ust, tl:- '" 'r.s of' thle iapanese surren dor -vas officiallyconfir'med in 'I' -ni.a -u,,w,-7 " :rnrff 19 Aurust.

Ive,-y -:!,-ni that haa. bD:n n mate for th-I iicL-i:nding Olynpic Opera-tionl -uas sus-rnduc1 . Th.le rrnics m.a-,e a rn4'id shi:-t of weight fromcombat fcrce to ar:-? o- occl.. .tion.

Technical Intetlio.^.nc .c i.Tn-t.s ''wr? erted to move to Japan23 August, naccssittt,.ne; a~r -rO1OmC2i;+e an,,L troeendous turnover ofpersonn;:!il. PracticIly al .1 1cersonnel in th; field. warre orderediiriedi::tIeoy into th Unl.ited States Arnrr~ Tcchnical Intelligence

Drot.* At the s-rae tiMle arngorents- ...ere ade to attach adcditionalpersornnel to the 52l50th so that more teams could. be organized.Thirty-eiLrTht ne- cf-ificeors and 8 enlisted ren from: -all branches ofservice joined t ',h e ,rg-... zat;.cn ;urir7 tlhe crurse of the month.

All. Techn:ical Intelligence units werers eu-'ecd and. trained andready to move out on the dotes set by Ge ' a" .oadclu.arters.

a.jor construction projects finished dclriri n. August were ne-wenlisted mon airnd officer mess halls and t-rc 'obLi1.din-rs ori'in.allintended- fmr the i:edical analvsis secti,on. Cro rded conditions i.nthie enlist-dc. ,neon's nd o:fficers' quarters caused by the additionalnpeisonnel reo:orting in fromn the field rere .l _ri_.;d by --oveyingar.rroximately 5O0 enlisted .en into the sectir:n. rhich formerlyserved as a poss hall and by using the I cdical analsi..s buildingas additionrl officers quarters. With the suc'den :;-ove to Japan,thle enlarged .L;ica lI.boratory was no'. needed, end c3nstructionof a stor,-Le -wr.rhbouse P-r th. Signal. anal--sis section was delayedp-ending d:cocisicn on the future st-.turs c thle lUnited States AIrmyTec'-hnical Int -11iienco Dre-oot in the Fh -.' i-pine sector. The movamentof a raijcrity cf f'ield u nits to -inec or.,:-nizzstions eliminatedqalarteri.ng.. of . rso...el as a problem- by th-e end of .'uglsst,

Prclirinary plans .for coorcdin-.t:ion of scientific investigationsand Tedhnica.l Intcll- gence ..n connection r-ith ul.imate operationswere discussed at a confe.rancri held early in the rmocnth vwith theSrecial Scientific Cnsultant from the irar Department, the Pacific,ara"rar e Board, and -the Office of the Counter-Intelligence, GHO.

lo6

HISTORY ' TECTrIICAL IiTTEi T Ii:jCE

The recor.-:endaticn t}hat had been made earlier in l.'ay by ColSauve and Lt Col Ia nley(recenttly prcr-ooted) to G-2, GeneralTeadqu.arters that the 525Cth Technical Tntellignnce CompositeCompanyr, SaSarate (?Prvisiornal), at that time under the controlof J7L'TESP;AC should be attached to GTQO for operational control,again came to the fore.

, recor-Ien-;la.tion from Chief Engineer, GiQ, to G-2, GHQ,advising the same set-up, kept the matter open, and at anotherconference, wiath G-2 and Chief Engineer, G!-TQ, in the latterpart of August, it becamne increasingly evident that TechnicalIntelligence -vould be able to operate much more effectively outof higher headceuaters. It wras decided that no action could betaken inreodiately but that GHQ w-ould arrive at a definite decisitionin the matter.

Little was done about Japanese material in the Philippinesat this tire, as it was anticipated that all requirements couldbe met more satisfactorily in Japan ahd that the problem ofJapanese ratcrial in the Ai7ES?AC area would be one of localdisposition.

Few·; bookings vwere placed -with Port Cormland because of atendency of services involved to stop all shipments untilclarification fror .raslhington of material recquired, due to thechange caused by the surrender of Japan.

Lt Col i:anlcey submritted to G-2, GI-O, a draft of recommendedregulations to prccode USAFi:FE Circul.ar 83, 1l!4h, on thedisposition of captured enemy -material in the Pacific theater,The draft cot-ained a recommendation for retention of variousitems as souvenirs by individual soldiers since hostilitieshad been termrinated.

T. I. Personnel Depart for {Occuwation of Ja-)an

Personnel from ten Field Units and Field Depot Unit wereassigned from 5250th to Sixth and Eighth Armies during Augustas part of the occupation forces for Japan (Blacklist operation)This split betwee:n both Armies the T.I. units originally intendedfor Sixth Army alone.

107

HIST01YT Or' TC}IP'IC:L INTELI: IGENCE

Fiav- type "A" bUnits ..cre formed and placed on orders as follows:

Field Unit INo. 1, '1 (,i-'th Airr- (de.aJ ;.cld T anila 4 Seb 45)Field Unit iTo. 2, 1 Corys, Sixth ;irn.,y (departed J'anila 20 Son 45)Field Unit 5o. 3, 1 Cor!s, Si.th Ar.ly ( " 28 .ur 45)Field Unit ;Io. 4, ;(' Corps, Eighth Ar:iy ( " " 28 Lug 45)Field Unit No. 5, X-VL Corps, Ei:-hth A-rmy ( " 25 2lug 45)

Field D)cpot Ulit i.. 71 wars- crctLi-.cd ,nd assigned to Sixth ArmyIeadquartcrs, depalrting i a-.-ila 1! ocptcenbcr 3.195.

Five tpeTJ '£ Un-.ts ;'c:i:c forricd and placed on ord;rs:

Ficld Unit To. 5,1, I Corse, 3ixthL Army (departed ,ianila 29 J:ug hS)Field Unit No. 52, I Corps, Sixth Army ( " 30 _Aug hS)Field Unit i!o. 5:3, _X Cors, Eighth Army ( " 25" ug 5)Field Unit I",. 5L, AIV Corns, EiJlty Arrm- ( " " 25 ug 45)Field ;Jniub li. TIX lCols, Eighth Army ( " " 2h Aug 45)

(A roster of pcrscnncl of these field units comprising a total of 53officers and 100 enlisted reon, s shcin in Incl. 3).

Technical IntclligE7ncc target objective folders woer published anddistributed to the Units as they left the Depot as well as to all corpsand divisions under S:ixth A'rmy. These fold.rs ou-F,lined by areasvarious targets of in-l,ercst to Technical mncl Tcchlnological Intelligenceon the Islands of Janan. FIcr:ls for reporting on Janancse industrialinstallations v-er- also distributed to the tCarns.

Upon tlLc d-a:z.rture of Tnajcr Ceollit and It V-n '.'yc(lk on o!orations,Capt TTilliar fl. 3ha; I[fi wtrs ahTpointcd Cxocut1:;v. officer of the 5250th.Lst Lt THorb!:rt J. Jubeliror (l-atcr nrormloted to Captain) wa.s arn-ji.ntedsunply officcr, and 1st Lt Ed-in K-;.rtz w-.s a:lCintdd assistantadcninistrative and :oCss officer. Lt Col. Er:rin Ji. Sullo reportedearly in Septcmber' to take charge of the Si.-gm'l n.:lysis Section; 'hewas also clect.d p1 rcsidont of the officers club upon the departure ofMaj er Harry E. Carnos tc the United Stat(s.

EquipL)rlent and Tnf,:r-:n.tien

.ith the w'ar on&d,<.d the quantity of new capture.d cnerny cquipmentreceivecd at the Depot durinr the rmcnth was ncrligiblo. 'nalysis ofcnony equiprent at thle Tm;aila de-pct had ceasred by S3pte;'lbebr, exccptfor clearing up 58. reports alrcady undor vray.

108

IIIS'iRY OF T1iCtII1CU;L INT1I,L IGENCE

'll equipnont on hanre was dispscd cf as soon as possible,In th_ monthl cf 'u-ust 19h.,030 pounds of enecr.y material wereshippied. to the UIriit;cd Sta.tu(s by watcr; 2,020 nounds by air;and 15C il)'.cuncs by .'rrr c:,_urier s:ervice. YTfatcr bookingsduring, the same pIriod a;clolMts to '?77850 poulnds, Air ship-

1:icnt ,:i' :enemy Ordnar.c: riateria'. , : .::i.it:.rry Iatell.igcncc Sorv-.ce, (fIqS)Uni.ted States Arr.ny Forc :;s 'Turopcan Theater, Paris, France, lefttlafila 5 August. '1To hundred tJwenty-eight photographs of captureenmiy ,:raterrial vmrc fcrx:'r.rdud tc 1lap and Photo Division, (,IS),WIashingtonr, D. C., an( 283 namerplate.i s and riscollaneous rubbingswer sent to Grcund Industry Section, .9S, during the sa,.oe period.

Tcnty-nrlc cC-opies cf colpilaticn on Ja.ancso cconomic data fromthe S.1,nal Secti.n werc sub:i.ttcd to the Office of the AssistantChief of St-:.'f, G-2, G ,F.'L ,SP:'C, fcr further distribution to Sixthand Eighth .ArrJies, mld additi.:ns to the Ja -:ancso Chemical VWarfaroNotebook v-cre se:nt to tiCe nrintoers.

Ordnnricc m. iteriol which hzd b,:,n ca-pturcd aboard the Japanesehospital ship "Tachibana !l.ru" vas turned over to the United StateskAr.ry T:,chnical I nrSplligernce Dnpot t. be invontcried, photographed,rclcrto.d, and rctaicrlcd in st,-crgc vrwith its original packaging,pending rocospt of instructi:.ns frclm the Cor;nandor-in-Chief, ArmyForces Pacific. It was hold ocr -Use by the *"ar Crir-es Branch,AFPArC, in po.ssible v c1' crines trials. Troops that had seizedthe hospital' ship, h-wcv(,r, hMd baen al:l-Arwed to souvenir muchof the equiprment before Technical Intelligence was notified.Equipm.ent s.lvaged (I;.ctcgraphs, Incl 26) inclldes:

27 bayen:ts56 typc 8') 50 .vL -:renade dischargers1 ty.e. 10 50 i':r flare discharger257 type 38 6.5 rn-. riflcs2 tyrpc 93 field light range finders1 tpe 93 tripod bar light range finders4 t%:1,c 92 70 r.an battnlicin guns (incorplete)13 I:ounts f or heavy machine guns22 sparc barrels for heavy machine guns

4 rargc, drurls for 70 r~i· battalion guns35 tyIp 96 6.5 r r light nachino guns73 i'agazincs for light machine guns4 clip- lcaders

62 spatre barrels for light michine guns.14 type 92 7.7 rn heavy machine guns

9 anti-aircraft adapters

109

,l'.,STOrY 01 TMCHNICAL INTE;LLIGENCE

This Ordnance minatericl was peckc and mar'eed as enemy ;'edicalequipr:ent with packa es anl b xes markedc with lare Redl Crnsses.The '70 r.; b'.ttali :n -iuns were disasseiabel an, packed in b-xesbeari.nr tLhe .'e ]. C>-ss. T'h rifles wer,., packedt in straw mattingbundles containin .' fr'r. f ur to ten rifles with each bundle labele1with a .e Cr -s

5250th Or';ero ta ;tky:

In -ubrittin'; a reprrt (17 September 194h) on the dispositioncf pers )nnel :,'retsent twith the 525Oth Tcohr:ical. Intelli ~ence rP.,-)any

a;;rilabl:- .fr the ccml.l,-ti-n -f Japan, C3 1 Sauve' and Lt C^l 'anleya :-.in ur ,eJ the centralization of Technical Intelli 'ence a-'rinistratimnunder Gener-l lHea,'quarters (Incl 27).

Subsequjently, a series :L' c.inferences were hel' wi th Col 17falterS. ,.'f?, G-2 Sectiron, GHQ, reLative to the tr;;nsfer of the 5250th fordirect a: :inistrati an und-er GHQ. 'ecor:enJati .ns include . prop seddirective t-) be i:;sue 1 by GiiQ when thlt h, adquarters s.o-ulrl assure-tirect rcsp:nsibility fo-r 'ecimical In telli -once in the ?acific theater.C-l Woo 1 lteft sh rtly th.:il'rbf [,r for G.:neral T-ea,!quarters Advance inJapan. Finall aj;r-::,val fcr reassi -nm:i.nt -!f trfhe 5250th Technical Intel-licence Cormnp;ny to GHQ and, c):)ri.ination :) a:Ll scientific, technical,and. technl -~ical]. Int,.lli -ence undler G-!Q was ,ivcn .y t General R.K.Sutherland Chief' 'f Staff GHrQ aFKi.C (GO 337 ,~ 369, H2, 20 an' 30Nover.ber 1945 Incl 28 .n: 29).

Col ..1 wa;s alpiiltel C ,r rinatar of 'v'ar Dep.artmelnt Intelli.genceTar-ets .fTl1) un:.ner a;j:r ':?ncral Charles A. villou7hby, 0-2, ,,FiAC;Lt C1. Dalvi' S. Tait ~vas a;i,-).nted, C:r.iinat)r of all Techrnical Tntel-li:-ence: a.n- Lt, Col anley continue-' as Cr:,n"in-i Officer )f the5250th Technical Into :li . ence Colmpany, which, in a: 'iiti-n t:, its normalfunctions, w3:s t- be resr onsible fa:r the Uninted States Airrmy TechnicalIntelligencc Clenter unlJr `,-2, GHQ, SCA . Thne TD:chnical TntellipenceCenter was t:- ?pr:wvi.le h'-usir-:, -messing an;d- recreati n acc-ci.J.ati.nsf;r officer, enliste ', rivili3n, innl visitino f rei 'n :-,ersonnel forall Technical Intelli. ence within the theater.

;,cti n was taken t-, cl se ,!vm the Unite! St.:ttes fAri2y TechnicalIntelli -ence cJ at, I-nila, and ta transfer it, t-.:<-th!r wlrith the5250th T:chnical Intellilence C;,tl:any, t:o okyo. N-o new analysis ofenemry equipment was lunlertaken. i), new equin':.e t was shi-Fed in fromthe fiel:-7. l1. pers,-nnel remainin.rl in the fie] I rep:'rtel in to theDep:)t. .11 salvaue :.ateri:l was dispose .if in acc'orlance with theaterpolicy. All enermy equiprmeiet .:n han;i ws shi. -e!l to the United States.,Accounts ,f Shippin- an:, teceivin- were cl: se 1 Oct ber 1945.

110

HISTORY OF' TECiNTIC L INTELLIGENCE

New adjusted service ratings as of 2 Septcmber 1.945 wereturned in t-L Ht, dquartcrs, .'.?L1SPiAC, 'and shortly thereafter nonfrcn the C:-1 pany cli;,ible f:r release frcn the A'rmy under thepoint systen wore returned to the United States. ,^dditicnalpersonnel required t(; take their place i-,ith the :rganizaticnwore requisiticned, (Dates of joininc and departing fron theorganization for all personnel of 5250th are included in Incl 9.)

In Octaber, pecr verbal orders -f Lt Ccl ITanley, all analysissecticns cf the Depoct wore closed and -re-.ared for shinnent.Deoot headquarters, ,lOss, surly, and shi-;??inC and receivingsecticn reclained e- on until just befcre the ccr.rpany depparted.

On 1.5 October Lt Ccl Trtnl.ey was sent to Tckyo to imalonecesstry arrangeonents fir the rlcvo:eent of the 5250th TechnicalIntelli:o-ncc Cllnpany to Ja;an.

On 18 October :i ;-vclient ordors wore sent by radiogran fromGHQ .;FD.'.C, ,DVAI' T CE (in T-kyc), dir:2ctin- that the crgalizaticnbe n; ved fith ATIS fr-.rl Tlanila to Tokyo, with 60 days rationsand organio transportation. (Incl 29).

;Authcrity fcr ncvel.eont havinr boon cobtainod, sup-?lies weredrawn, a rceting cf officers vas held, instructins ware received,and per:onnel were alerted.

On 6 Ncvr.lbor 33 officers cf the 5250th left for Tckyo on theship, "Kinkad" and on 9 Nov-rmber the balance of the personnel ofthe 5250th Tecmhnical Intclliiunce Corpany rmn--d t.ith all crganicequipment -n the "Frxancis Ogden" -- tine of arrival in Tokyo, 20Ncvember 19h5,

i11

HISTOiLY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

CHA T E R X

TECHNiFTCAT, INTFLL!:GS32NCl, CETTER: E JAPAN

October -- November 19'5

A.t Col lanley had florim to Tokyo before the 5250th TechnicalIntellP~;nce Comrany sa.ild f- om l':-u'.u.la. to ;nake prelininaryarransemtn :n.s 7or iie trani'er of the unit to Japan.

G-2, C;TTQ; directed tiat a United .t,tat!es ,rrmy TchnicalIntelligenc' i - be o stbabl:;shcd r.t 'okro .;rserai No.. 1,Shimoju . ,: kyo: TI'he Cclter vas 'tc h,-2 -ad:inisteredby the 52rotij r'e .zi a'a Intel.linz e -,mp.ay- wi' T Lt Col Y.'anleyas Commnncti:;n: 0f' cer

Thu IiLperial Japanese Government was notified through theCentral Liaison Office, Tol-yo (memorandum AG 601 (19 Oct h5)GD, Subject: Acqu::.s~ition (of Certain Facilities of Tokyo ArsenalNo. 1, datied 19 October 1945) that buiidings 255, 2635 269, 276,395, h75, L8.L andt the .pen ar-eas aljaccnt to these buildings ofthe .Arsenal wouuld be "-ml.; available inizlediately for occupancy byan agency of General Hesdcuarers of the Supreme Commander forthe all.ield lwers'' (CH 2, SCAi)i

The IrrTperial Japanese Government was di rected that allitems of sup,-ies, cqu.ipment, furnituire, furn.ishinrs and fix-tureas wouli rumain in the buil din.s until a representative ofGeneral H-cxdqaler iers ,o the Sunreme Commander for the Allied

P owers designated the items rE:qlired for use by the AlliedForces and those items which mi'ht be rem,.,ved.

It was further directed th-tt the Imperial Japanese Govern-ment make rnecessary arrany:.emrnnts to have a representative of theiroffice at building 395 at 10CC , 20 Oczcober i945; for a mcetingwith the :-eprasentative of' Gerne-al Headquarters of the SupremeComnlan ler for the Allied Fowers, The detcils pertainin. to thework to be accornil±shed C and the iJnstallation cf tthe facilities

referr'ed to above would. be "colrmlunicatedl t) your representativeat thae tmr.me",

Lt C;)1 Yr.anley met with the Japanese representatives at theArsenal 20 Oc-ober and directed them as to the installation ofbatthing, samitary, messing and other facilities which would berequired and directed that buildin-s and ,rounds requisitioned

112

HISTORY 01' TECHNIC1,L INTELLIGENC E

would( be thoroughly cle:.menc prior to occupancy by the 5250thTechnical Intelli fence Com.,any,

Description of the Ars-nal

The p.,rtion )f' T.kyo Arsenal No. 1 turned over for use asthe Unit(:d Sta-tes Army Technical Intelligence Center, comprisedeir;ht buildings (iicturis and Rlucprints .f Depot, Incls 28 and29) with a totl if 157,949 square feet floor space, and a groundarea 1000 by 1500 feet square.

The main builtding, which ha-' formerly been used as the admin-istration centcr for the T :ky,. .Arsenal, was takn over for admin-istration hcactquarters for the 5250th. One 3-story building wasuse.i for the shippino( and r(eceivin.7 scti:)n, for company supply,andi for the c mbin(-; 'irmy-Navy library of the Washingt.,n DocumentCenter, Ad.vance. One 2-story building was converted into labor-atories and offices for the six analysis secti:Dns .f the Comnpany.

One builidin7, part of which was 5 sturies high, was usedrfor mess hall, quarters, -cnd recreation center for officers, anda similar buildin.7 wiras desi nato.d for similar use f: r enlistedmen, A larcye wareh.use was utilize l as gara-e and mrltor pool,where all vehicles coulr . be stmrtA indiors. The seventh buildingwas a theater f-r c)mr.pany perslnnel. .nother building, wvhichhoused tw scientific laboratories with testing equipment intact,was taken -ver in al.iiitin t': the seven previously requisitionedand wras available f r use by technical personnel for analysis ofIntelli;,ence samples ol Japanese materiel.

Transfer -of the 5250th t~ GHQ

Upon his return t-;I Mi.nila, Lt Col Mtanley apyointecd Lt C:-lSullo, I:aj rs .adiai-,n and Hirst, and Ca'.pt Shaw as forward ech-elon t. fly t::, T ky., to comrlete arrnletemnnts f-r the arrivalof the Cornpany, They arrivel 26 October supervised the clearance'f the bu.lldings ant har' the premises set up so that when theships with the bi:lance :.f the C-.nmpony aboard docke·d in TokyoBay the Pirsenal was renl.-y for 'occupaency.

After the C-,ommy sailed from 'Manila, Lt C:' 1r!anl.ey flewto Tokyo, lea.vingm Capt V.ary i,, Chave, Assistant Coordinator ofTechnical Intelligeince, an-. Lt Edwin A, Kurtz, Assistant Pdcrin-istrative Officer, as rear echelon for the org.anization, Theyfollwe,? 22 Noverber,

In a c.)nfercnce with G-l, G-2, and G-3, GHQ, in regard tothe transfer -of the Technical Intlligence Com.any frcrm AFWESPACto GHQ, it had been recon:mendel that the personnel be assigned to

113

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

GHQ, Special Troops, and it was suggested as desirable to pre-serve the entity of the organization in its name, "!'5250th",the number assigned it under the orders establishing the organi-zation as a "Separate, (Provisional)" Company under USASOSs

AFPAC assigned the company to Special Troops, GeneralHeadquarters, Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, upon theirdeparture frc;a i.sanila. Gernera. Orders 337, General Headquarters,.Army Forces Pacific, dated 20 Novemnber 1945, established the5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a theater overheadinstallation and stated that grades and ratings would be auth-orized by separate communication. General Order 369, sameheadquarters, dated 30 Nov 45, dissolved the 5250th TechnicalIntelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional),

By let+er order AG 32K03 (2° Nowv 4) GA, General Head-quarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Sib.ieet- Allot-ment of Theater Overhead Giades ond Strength) dated 29 November1945, allotment of theater overhead grades and ratings was madeto the 5250th Te^hnical Intelligenre Company as follows:

Officers:

Col Lt Col IMajor Capt 1st Lt 2d Lt Total

]. 3 10 23 4O 13 90

Warrant Officers:

CWO: 1 1

Enlisted iven (grades as shown):

1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th

1 12 17 35 46 48 10 170

Aggregato 261

Occupation Instructions No. 2

Occupation Instructions No. 2, Office of the Supreme Com-mander for the Allied Powers, dated 25 September 1915, outlinedto the occupation forces for Japan the general instructions gov-erning the collection and disposition of enemy equipment of theJapanese armed forces. This was the broad outline. The disposi-tion of enemy equipment collected for Intelligence purposes wasgoverned by later directives.

114

HISTORY, OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

General Orders No. 9

General Orders No. 9, General Head.quarters, Supreme Com-mander for the Allied Powers, Subject: Japanese Military In-telligonce Targets, dated 2 October 1945 (Incl 32) designatedthe Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, to coordinate end super-vise th(. exploitation of military intelligence targets in Japanand Kort.a.

Under this General Order, the exploitation of targets andobjectives included coordination and utilization of certaingenral and technical Intelligence agencies: the 5250th Tech-nical Intelligence Company, including the United States ArmyTechnical Intelligence Depot and field unit personnel; Trans-lator Interpreter Service (TIS, a revised ATIS organization)Combin'd Document Center and field detachments; special staffsections responsible for the technical Supervision of theirrespective Technical sections in the 5250th, including laboi-atory and field teamns Air Corps and Na.Vy technical units anal-ogous to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company; and specialtechnical missions, national end foreign.

Coordinating control and supervision over the variousagencies interested in Technical I¶telligence investigationswere exercised through normal command and staff channels.These agencies included special staff sections of AFPP&C Armies,separate Corps, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Far EasternAir Forces, United States Army Strategic Air Force, Alliedagencies, nnd speci'al missions represented in Japan and Korea.Each of these agencies designated plenary representatives tothe Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, rHQ, who operated under hiscontrol and whose mission was to coordinate and supervise Tech-nical Tntelligence activities to prevent competitive duplicationof offo)rt.

Technical Intelligence in the Pacific theater was designedto accomplish the foll:wing objectives: First, the exploitationof materiel, including the examination and evaluation of avail-able enemy materiel and deduction, from this evaluation, of thestate if Japanese resources for war. Intelligence so obtainedwas exploited for the reciprocal benefit of the United Statesand llied Armed Forces. This included examination of Japanesefacilities which might be involved in the production of materielfor war and the provision of trained personnel to assist thechiefs of services (Ground, Naval and Air) in the supervisionof the collection, safeguarding and evacuation of capturedenemy equipment for Intelligence study and for tactical andtraining purposes.

115

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Second objrctive of Techn.cal. Intel.li:~ence in the Pacific wasthe exploit.lti ol %: d.cIw:I erst . T'is nr.L,-)ed providlLng t.r-aned.personnel. t, s-";c:r dV .:I:~.:tr...r7 enecly Jc;&u. ants;, circ¢lAa "gaccessioll reuL'.c, t..a.t ~s 1S5:,3 lf docu.ients re=eived, toauthor?.zod agencies; extrao.t.-n g Intelligence needed for securityand cnntrol by means of frap,mentary translations or photostats;selectS ng militiry, t.r:hr.icni cit'nltif:Lc and general documents fortrans-nis.sion to- ,h-c It United S ah!- st .:et;ainirng to cl''rent targae; bookspuhlie.1 b-i' the War ard 1a- eaz-n and the specifz -interestsof speciarlisv agen..iLe. anA, f, all;. foczsizg all fi.el1d agenc-es pfthe Groaund, ava/' and Air *' .s '-:,' ' J - for document activity.

Thirdl Ibject±_ve ..f Tcern±la in c-ielLgence was trhe exploitationof Order of Battle Intelligence and -elated subjects: this involvedlists of all regulcar units (Ground; Naval and Air) lists of codenames and nuilmers T/O''s and T,'E's of all tLes of units; lists ofdivisions, lbrigado.s and mIajor -nits of Grw-3 Na-'ai and Air Forcesby components5 strength, arman.nt, etc; lisL.s of recruiting districtsand uni.ts trained therein; lists of ,Armyr and Navy officers and theircomrnands, including direct:-ries of transfers and promoti.ns, biograph-ies and service records; hist-,ries of major units; investigations ofrecruiting and training systems, of Home Guard and Volunteer DefenseUnits; investigations of military police, t gether with records ofspecial and secret service organizations, (Tokumu Kikian); investigationsof military intelligence agenc es, including histories, operations, etc;and, finally, reports on military societies.

Fourth objective cf Technical Intelligence was exploitation ofhistorical records and Dfficial reports of the Japanese General Staff(Ground, Naval and Air). This included the organization of Japan forwar, the preparations for the War of 1941, compaigns in the SouthwestPacific Area from 19)42 to 1944, campaigns in the Philippines from 1941to 1942, second campaign in the Philippines in 1945, campaigns in thePacific islands from 1941 to 1945, and campaigns in other areas from1941 to 1945

For effective coordination, the foll-.,wing policy provisions wereenf -rced!

To prevent compotitive duplication, all foreign and nationaltechniclal rmssl ns3 upon arrival reere registered with the AssistantChief nof Staff; G*-2, tHL-), who not-.1fied the occupation authoritiesconcelned; G-2, GHQ, conducted all liaison with the JapaneseGovernmental aurhorities relative to the operation )f technicalmissions, dtlegatirig such liaison as was required to occupation forcecommanders; since Intelligence targets were geographically distributed,the occupation force commanders wvere responsible for the coordination

116

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

of expl.)itation .)f targets within their territorial Jurisdiction,operating through subordinate conmmanders or staffs to prevent competi-tive duplications. To expedite the conduct of these investigations,G-2, GHQ, was authorized to corrospond directly with the heads of thevarimus interested agencies previously Ymentimned or their representa-tives on technical details, and direct correspondence between plenaryrepresentatives and the heads of the agencie s they represented wasauthorized. To protect Intelligence materiel and records available inonly limited numbers against exploitation by a single research agencyand to make these items accessible to other Intelligence agencies theirremoval had to be cleared through the occupation force commander.The principle of reciprocal exchange of reports applying to all fieldtechnical agencies, all reports of Technical Intelligence relating toinvestigations in Japan and Korea were cleared through the AssistantChief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, prior to their being dispatched to locationsoutside the area.

War Department Intelli-gence Target Section

The War Department Intelligence Target Section (WDIT) wasestablished under the provisions of General Orders No.9, 2 October1945 and General Orders No.15, 9 November 1945, to exercise coordi-nating control and supervision over the exploitation of military andcivilian Intelligence targets of interdepartmental and internationalconcern in Japan and Korea.

Col Walter S. Wood, appointed chief of WDIT, coordinated, super-vised and established policy for the activities -f the technical,civilian and military subsections of WDIT and their relations withall other agencies.

Operating under Col Wcod, was the Technical Intelligence cection,headed by Lt Col javid S. Tait, which was responsible for TechnicalIntelli-ence of all descripti)ns in the Pacific Theater. This sectioncoordinated the activities of the Chiefs of Services of AFPAC, theU. S. Special Technical Kissions, the Foreign Technical Missions, madearrangements concerning trie exploitation of tarjets of TechnicalIntelligence interest, and saw that proper technical personnel wereassigned to complete the reports.

Operating within the Technical Intellingence Section weregl U.S.Army Technical Intelligence Center (5250th Technical Intelligence Co.);Collection and Reports Sub-Sectimn, which coordinated the reports sub-mitted with War and Navy Department Intelligence targets; Translator& Interpreter Service (2,000 personnel), charged with the translationand publication of all Japanese dccurents and with the furnishing oftranslator and interpreter personnel; Washington Document Center

117

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

(ADVON) which selected and shipped all Japanese documents to theUnited States; and War Department Intelligence Collection Committ(ADVON), created by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, which advised theTheater concerning the transmittal to Washington of Intelligenceinformation.

Included in the U.S. and Forei.,n Technical Missi'ns coordinatedunder the Technical Intelligence Section were the following agencies:Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Economic and Scientific Section,British Staff Section, United States Strategic Bomb Survey, JapaneseAntiaircraft and Seacoast Artillery Research Board, Air TechnicalIntelligence Group (Far Eastern Air Forces), British AmphibiousMission, U,S. Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese MerchantMarine and Austrialian Scientific Mission.

- Temporary passes from the Office of the Supreme Commnander forthe Allied Powers, Military Intelligence Section, were issued toauthorized personnel in accordance with provisions of General OrderNo.9 to permit the bearer to enter any restricted area in Japan orKorea South of 38 degrees north latitude for purposes of TechnicalIntelligence.

Agencies furnished weekly a list of targets to be visited,notifying WDIT at least 48 hours in advance so that the localcommander of the area and Translator and Interpreter Service couldbe notified.

All requests on the Japanese G)vernment were funneled throughWDIT.

Upon completion of target investigation, report was submittedto WDIT.

Technical Intelligence Instruction No.1

Lt Col Tait, when he was assigned at GHQ, AFPAC, in Manila, hadstrongly favored coordination of Technical Intelligence when Col Sauveand Lt Col Manley had first proposed it in writing in May 1945. AsCoordinator of Technical Intelligence under Col Wood at Tokyo, LtCol Tait drew up Technical Intelligence Instruction No.1, OeneralHeadquarters. Nilitary Intelligence Section, General Staff, dated 20November 19L5,that laid the foundation for the coordination of allTechnical Intelligence activities relative to the occupation of Japan.

Under this directive, the fAo.l:wing policies prevailed!

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HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

The United States Army Technical Intelligence Center served asheadquarters f' r the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. As fieldunits )f the 5250th comileted their work with Armies, Corps andDivisions, they were recalled to the Center for re-assigonment underG-2. Special investigators temporarily attached to chiefs of servicesand other agencies could also be assigned to the organization foradministration while in the theater.

Chiefs of services and )ther Intelligence agencies preparedplans for the exploitation of military Intelligence targets in theirdesignated fields and filed these plans with G-2 for coordinationwith other agencies at least 48 hours in advance of execution.The plans listed the names of personnel involved, stated thetransportation and equipment required, and presented a brief outlineof contemplated procedure.

To assist in the investigations, additional qualified personnel,as well as transportation and-equipmenit, could be requested from the5250th through G-2 Operations (Major Henry V. Hall) on WDIT Form No.1,Photographers from the Ph,:t-grsph Laboratry that had 'een establishedat the Technical Intelligence Depot in Manila and reestablished at theTechnical In-elligence Center in Tokyo, could also be requested toaccompany investigators on field trips.

G-2 assumed responsibility for notifying other interestedagencies; arranged with the occupation forces the details of billetingand transportation; notified, through its Japanese Liaison Section, theJapanese authorities involved; and, when desired, arranged for prr-liminary interviews with Japanese officials that often materiallyexpedited the investigations.

All interested a-encies maintained a cl';se liaison with G-2 andwere held responsible for becoming familiar with the records andrept)rts of Intelligence investigation maintained in the TechnicalIntelligence Subsection of WDIT so that unnecessary duplication ofeffort co)uld be avoided,

- Documents necess :ry to complete investigations were evacuatedthrough TIS to the Washington Document Center (Advarnce) Library atthe Technical Intelligence Center.

Samples of new or modified material or equipment which was tobe evacuated were handled as follows: When practicable, the investi-gator personally evacuated the item to the Technical IntelligenceCenter. If this were not adviseable, he made arrangements withDivision G-2 for packing and shipping the equipment, and notified theTechnical Intelligence Center that it had been sent. If shipment weredelayed, he notified the Division G-2, who was responsible for safe-

4Eh9

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

guarding it until such time as the appropriate agency could arrangeshipment to the Tochnical Intelli;ence Center, where further studyof the material coull be made at one of the analysis laboratories.If shipmonrt were inadvisable, the investigator completed such studyand photographs as were ncessary and arranged with the Division G-2for the security of the item. In all cases, final disposition wasrequested from the War Department and effected by Technical Intel-licence Center personnel.

Upon completion' of the investigation, it was necessary that areport be submitted. T) insure its adequacy, the Chief of Servicespecifically indicated in his ortekrs to the investigating personnelthe questions he desired answered. The report was mimeographed anddistributed by the Technical Intelligence Center.

Activities of Technical Intclli7ence Teams in the Field

At the time of concluding the writing of this history of Techni-cal Intelli ence, not all repirts of the teams in the field had beenreceived at 5250th Headquarters. Th-se available, h wever, indicatethe conditions encountered in Japan, the copeuration that was givenby the conquered pe)ple, the j-:bs that were assigned Technical Intel-ligence teams in the occupied country, and the type of informationthat could be secured.

Assigned to Sixth Army were the followig Technical Intelligenceunits (personnel are included in operations roster, Incl 3):

Field Unit No.1 .............Headquarters, Sixth ArmyField Unit No.2 .............X CorpsField Unit Noe3 ............ I CorpsField Unit No.51 ...........I CorpsField Unit N,52 ............I CorpsField Depot Unit N.71 ......Headquarters, Sixth Army

Field Unit No.1 Headquarters Sixth Army

Field Unit No.1 was assigned to Headquarters, Sixth Army, wherethey investigated the Civilian Defense Corps at Tsuruga, FukuiPrefecture, on the n :rthern coast of Honshu.- Investigation showedthat the Corps, which was organized along lines similar to manyagencies in the United States, apparently was not successful inaccomplishing its mission due to a lack of facilities, equipmentmid management.

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HiLSTORY OF TECHNIC1AL INTELLIGENCE

Hircshima an&r Kure, Honshu, Japan

Field Unit No.2 was place:1 on temporary duty with X Corps, andassigned VOCG on operations with the 41st Infantry Division. Sincethe Unit was only all wcdc two jeeps in the first echelon of X Corps,1st Lt Cyril L. Martin, ?Acdical officer for the unit, was left incharge of a detail to bring up a 1-f-on truck and trailer with thesecond echelon. The :th(r men from the Unit remaining behind withhim on Mindanao, Phili-ppine Islands, were: Cpl Robert E. Jones, CWS;Pfe Rudy G. Colby, CE; T/5 Nick P. Vannucci, Ord; and T/4 Estill C.Picklesimer, Simnal Corps.

The first cch::lon arrived. at Hirer, Honshu, Japan, 7 October 1945,with specific targ-rts accessible, Army Ordnance Supply Depot at Hiro-shima and Kure Naval. Base and Ordnance Arsenal at Kure (}Yap Incl. 33).The branch office of the Tokyo Electric Company was not located andwas believed to have been destroyed by bombing, and six other targetslisted for investigaticn also could n.,t be located. Police andJapanese officials stated they hal not heard of any Df these instal-lations in Hiroehima.

2d Lt Robert E. Cleary, Jr., anrd Pfc Ralph H. Spevack of theChemical Warfare Team of this unit, recovered a new type decontaminatorfor dry mix in the Hiroshima -rrmy Ordchance Deptt.

Major William 0. Farnam, Jr., and T/5 William C. Carrett, EngineerTeml, rccoverel a new item, a small jack harmner, which was reportedand returned to the Technical Intelligence Center. As requested by41st Infantry Division, this searched several caves near Kure, butno items f' Technical Intelligence value were recovered.

Capt Edward Nowakowski and T/5 Kenneth I. Moore, Ordnance, checkedthe caves near Kure with the Enqineer Team, but also failed to recoverany equipment of Intelligence value. 1At the Kure Naval Arsenal a newmobile 20 cm rocket launcher was recovered. At the Hir)shima ArmyOrdnance Supply De-.ot, new items found included: 15 cm horse-drawnmorrtar; 37 mm anti-tank mun (the gun was on a mount similar to type1, 47 rmm AT run); and an amphibious tank (destroyed), which theJapanese claimed was the only one existing in Japan (manufacturerunknown, but tank was madle in Saanmi, near Toky'o). Quantities ofitems contain(ed in another target were received from the 41st Division.

2d Lt Anthony G. Coppola and S/S2t Wiilliam J. Poss, QuartermasterTeam, recovered a Japanese potato peeling machine in working conditionat officers quarters, Kure.

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fHISTORY OF TTECHNICAL INTE.LI'GENCE

1st L+ .1.;.am , . .ir.l. a T/' Aloert J, Kaplan, Signcl Corps,found ":mal ; ,: an1',,Li.c- cf rr, Y¥ 3i.. Tf.' i :rnt , Hz'roshima, butthey ware ,'i no ':: .j hb ::.;a. >f), rdla3. ',--a :, csh.rlg.

As aw V. , ' < .. . J- i ;,'N vra; !c'..' n,.e.rerq of Field UnitNo ,2, j;1n + r..r .ajm -: :-lld o,-''c,'j A!: nu, -, i ,r.4trbuted to themea:?er re:,:1-. c ' C u;, _ .c" '.t .. .:t ;', -- ra had boenalmrs$ C'm:1,:;: l r.i, d .{d :,f L ' L mr,2> .1, ~l±. .:-tO.J.C bDubing r aid.

I Cor.ps 5'j'I Jey.;m

F ejsr IL1i ts 3, 5S arld 52 operatedt vr th I Corps in the South-Central. H:nh1 .rea! ',1--:Ld T-:n.i t 'Th3. n: tempora:ry du.ty to the 25thInfri cy.y DLvi.s::. n, spn' i: 5eFtenbo-or aw:tinrg :lllcont To the Nagoyasector (i,<p I:lc] 33) Tf,.cy -:iu'vied ..a-e tb.hat ncMnTh, a..'er beingdelayed snme 20 da-s . T..o wf ,ath rr ald L;t.'s in -c;.ies N,),ya iarbir,The v:u.nie ,)f w#orc was heaTr, Dt, bL;t .e unit attemptad to visit alltargets uf inportance before the Divisi on lestruc iGon teams destroyedthe equliprenG,;

rViS Team No,:3, (1st Lt Char.les F, Melchor, Jrc, Stt Carl H.Johns.n, vt' Ch.larles 'a', Poth.' ilv.,svtizatecd .ll ChcricsalJ Warfare targetslistel f )r the N,'aj ,a area. Irn.. r:I.cn was _b-truned in each case fromdetilel ij.ntcrr'qation throuvlh Japanese .nmuerpreters oz factory mana.ersand from physical ins-:ecotimos of the factories. A list of targetsinvestigated and inforationl obtainel therefrrm n was as f-llows:

Niss.an Chemi cal Plant, l cmter. in the cock area of Nag;oya, wasfound to be a brancll rplant .',f the Nissa- Chenmical Industrial Co,,Ltd.,with m!ai.n ffi::cr3 in 'Iokyr.' ,7 pr.o&duct:i cC,3iste-d of bulk manu-factiire of fu lrlIr sli .uric a¢c.c0 W; a uiJer ph )sphlaoe N' chemicalresarci-c. s car.ier n at t.':.s p'.ar,, an-d F.tandcl.r me-',hods of in-dust,;,al .,hrn; ..j h rcre. e usi.., T.le pi.nt was only slih1;.ly dar:ageddurirn h:ostilit.ties tsnd at the ti:.ie if invastiiation was continuingoperatioll f.)r the :rolu.cbwion if suiLhburic acld.

Tckai Scida Co!iany wvas forme-rly 1)catod adjacent to the NissanChemicaln FPlat, but had been t .tallj.y dec'.toyed daring hos-tilities.No furth,' infrinati , n concernin-' this plant could be obtained.

Tokai Sodiumn CD. throulgh listed as a target on available mapsof Nagoya in the vicinIty .jf Nissan Cheirani-l. Plant, was reported byNissan. plant offi.cials who were interro-atLd to have mosved to anotherpart of Japan prior to hostilities. A search of the surrounding areaa,.;arently conffirmed this report.

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HISTORY OF TECHNIC.L INTFLLIGE2CE

Yaha-i Flactro-Chonical Plant and Showa Suda Plant, located inthe dock area of Na .,ora, combinled during hostilities under jointmana-a:Eent for the -rY...ucti-n Ai bulk cher.icals. Standard processeswere use I for the manufacture -.f all chemicals and no apparent chemicalresearch ha'l been .:r was bein-z condlucted. VWith very little plantda::ia-e sustained during h:stilities, i.roduction was being continued.

Sakura Gum Co., Ltd., Naoya Branch (formerly Dai Ni. on CellophanePlant), was 1. cntc ! north of NanL ya Castle, Nagoya. Wartime productswere rubber tubes for airrlane :asolino hose, rubber tubing for air-p:lane hizh pressure hydraulic hcse, and sheet cellophane. Equipmentfrom the secti 'n which manufactured rubber tubes had been moved toother i~lants. The colli,,hane plant, v..iich was destroyed by bombing,was rebuilt and resumed1. the manufacture of cello,;hane around 1 December1945.

In stu.lary, it was apioarent that these large chemical industialS(,lants were enc ag.ed only in the manufacture 'f intermediate productsand n.t in the i;rD.uctin of finished war materiel, which was accom-plished in other plants. Evidently these plants were not char.gedwith the res'-onsibility "f chenical research, since the only laboratoriesencountered were fo)r 'ro.uction control. The primary responsibilityof these plaits in wartime seoiamed to be quantity production of essen-tially the saume chemicals which had been produced in peacetime.

Only one member ,f Enineer Team No.3 was still assigned to fieldduty by 9 November, The other tw' menibers, 2d Lt Wendell S. Websteran:l T/3 Arnold F. iVellensiek, had been relieved of duty with T.I. UnitNJ.3 and ha-' been assigncd t; the 11th 'Replacement Depot for return tothe United States.

Only member of the .iedcical iemt l.ft by the midlle of Novemberwas 1st Lt Henry T. Zclechosky. i'fc Ira A Davidson of this team hadtransferred to the 11th Replaccomelnt De!? t for return to the UnitedStates.

Capt Robert L. Henry, Jr., reorted. to the Replacement Depot,leaving T/4 Roecrt Vi. Grubbs and Pfc Joseph F. Pollack without anofficer in charge cf the Ordnance Team.

1st Lt ihil:io- C. Anderson, upon the dep.arture of T/5 J:hn M.Devlin for the Rel lacement Depot, continued as the only member of theQuartermaster Teal. He also acted as officer in charge of the FieldUnit.

The Signal Teamn (2,^1 Lt John H. L-tz, S/Sit Max A. Bratt, (whoreporte. to the Replacement Depot 17 Nwvember, and S/Sgt Robert H.Groom) c-vered the Naoroya Aircraft Plotting Center, made a complete

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HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

inventory of all Jy,%ancr'se Si!nal tar.,ets listed in target folderf r the 25th Irfantry Division area, an,' slipi-,ed important itemsto the Teclhnicl Intelli ence Center, T- ky'

Tnvesti-7ation J.t .--Sb, Hnnshu.

Fiel(d Unit Noo.51, on temporary .luty to 33r! Infantry Divisionof I Coiri:s, arrivf" in K be, [Honshu, (rMap Ircl 33) 25 'e1ternberOThe first il.:qrussionn was that Kobe was cornpltecly ruined, but latermore tho)rouh irspections le.l to the rec-,very of considerable informa-tion and iateriel.

The CWS Team composed .f 2d Lt Robrt C. Payant, Sft Harvey J.Bylsrna, and Cpjl Homer Blankcnship, investij,-ated the Cavalry Schooldurmp at IHimeji (Mai-, Incl 33), and recoverec the follwing items inthe quantities inlicated:

3 boxes ..... HCM fran-ible sroke rrenades16 boxes ..... tye 94 substitute smoke candles10 b~xes ...... ty e 94 srall smoke candles (A)

8 b:,xes ...... ty,e 94 flbatijn? sroke cardles (B)20 boxes ...... 50 mn smoke shells for type 89 grenade discharger10 bxes ...... franrible vomiting ras grenades10 b xes ......colired smoke cndles30 ............ty e 91 'rrny -as masks

Other tari-ets investi.:ateol by this team includedc: NisshinMillin- Co.,Ltd,, Kobe; NTa:aoka Kuchus:ai Manufacturing Company, Kobe;Nil,-in Dur.lo:, Rubber Comnany, Kobe; Sanyo Chemicmal Factory, Timeji;Hineji Cavalry School, Himeji; Ko)be Fort Def'ense Garrison, K)be;/Mitsui vV/areh:)use No. 324, Kobe; Koyosed Factory, Tokaraiuka 1Cap,nclb. 33; .Nati nal Bearinrg 'Works, Takarazuka; Ja,:anese Iirmcji Arny

Disci:linary Barracks, Himeji.

The Engineer Tear.m, comi;osed of Capt VWilliam C. Gohrinp, T/4Alvin J. Orville, and. Pvt James W. Stephen, found no Enginser equipment,with the exception of small hand tools located at the 4th Infontry Re-placement Unit, Osaka Division, Himeji, Japan.

This sai:ie team, investigatin. the Kobe Shipbuilding Plant ofMitsubishi, Heavy Industries, Ltd. 3 Chome 'Wadasakicho Hyogoku, Kobe,Honshu, funnd the plant had- not been damaged. during the war and wasat the time of investim atimn capable of full production. The plant'smain production during war and. peace time had been shipbuilding and

124

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

the fabeication of steel and iron wipes and railroad rails.Operations at the plant at the tine of report consisted of minorrepaitrs on six r.erchant cargo ships of fron 850 to 6800 gross tons.

Other targets investigated by this team were: Osakokikoi,Seisakusho; a:raasaki, Seikosho KK; Nichio Seiko KK; Sumitomo ZinzokuKoyo KK; Oriental Steamship Cot.qpany; Tao Kinzuko To-yo KK; TokyoElectric Company; Kobe Shipbuilding Plant; 4th Infantry ReplacementUnit.

The Or-lnance Team was composed of Capt Nelson J. Sweet, officerin char-e of the entire unit, T/5 Richard E. Reynolds, and ifc.Jamles E. Unruh. Wvith the initial impression that Kobe was completelyruined and that factory targets were nil, Capt Sweet at first plannedfor the Ordnance Team to start 1 October insl ecting equipment turnedin by the Japanese Army.

Further investigation led to an insiection of the Kobe SteelWorks. The plant mana:er, who was interviewed and who acted as aGTuide thr-ugh the factory 'seemed very co-oerative and answered allquestions that were askedJ?".

The Kobe Steel dorks ha., first been bo:;led 18 Earch 1945, butlittle damage was sustaincd by the tank and tank gun sections of thefactory. It was bombed again on 5 June 1945 and severe damage waswrought, although attempts w<cre made to keep up the tank and igunproduction. All work steptped on 5 July as the Feople would no longergo t) work for fear of being bombed. :ccordin, to factory officials,there was a shortage of steel, but labor problems kept the productionat low figure. The plant was -overnment controlled, and even theofficials (apiarently) were not well informed as to where or how thesun and tanks were used.

Reort on Himeji Cavalry School (Tanks)

The same Ordnance Team investigated the Himeji Cavalry Tank Schoolthe proving ground at Himeji, (piay, Incl 33) where three tanks were foundof a type different from any other recovered to that (late. The tanks hadno gmeans of being identified other than by a nar.meplate that did not givecomplete information. All tanks were in fairly good condition, althoughtwo showed signs of possible sabotage: the wires from the instrumentpanel had been torn out from one, and a namieplate had been removed fromanother.

It was thought that the tank mi Lht have been m:ade by Mitsubishias the Kobe Steel Works were making the gun and shipping it to thatfirm.

125

HTSTURY O(,i TECHNICAL, IPTELIG 1YENCE

Arr~.r7ei.±ierits aer- rvi.lre '. -thp, ,rd...ci>sion G--2 to pick up theresporlsk-hle ,,a,arnle Off'.tf cr5 n e '.. ic. .-anl- r1: .nn of the sc,Uoci. inorler to ,ola-in .r, n..:)'fe _?f'o)l) a C :, r. It, .'. taui: and to 1Lv; experi.encedpersonne'- io rput h;e -tanks in: ruin l n r, o-ri-d. u.oc-, .rhotoiraphs weretaken and wveie ,ab,3 .'Li'cd wlthca t l, rt

Report on Amxi':;n.ti;,n 1.rr Kobe A nti-. " iirat. efences

COapt S .c-;t' s (i-: !r:n.(,e '''a. a3 eo eror. d ,n -;,he 5amiiiunl.tionavailil..]_, r was ....availab1 > l,)r lKf-bu a. i .rrLlf ..... i r,:ten.,. ;'l___ ,-*.m. Ak lnl h .].i~ a .-u.-)n wasstored in a i;erCehouse .illt i',o1";l -: )eie L, in KO:be. An inrventory ofthe buil lin- : .:scluse,' tlhe o'. l vln :

436 runs.. ... ._ c r,. b:'Imb aivurniti-n8 ? 4 r'o.trs .. ...... - c,lm, /s aLa. n -. tion

213I. r'.lI. ........ 7 c .;, susi-: a Llte86r( - r .' ,..... 7 ci, bLark

6736 rourl:Is . ..... 7 cl. A' arn ,, uniti.tin

A SO-second nachoriculI tinc f-cze wvr.ts also di.scovered in theammuniti n ¢areh.u Ise. rt i,,: s t.lly ht th:,t tAis fLz,z manunfacturedin Toky~o in 195, ,was a r.l::: .ficl crol -f .the tyr.e 9: fuze. LOsaka 'ir Sti n in tho K be lo-t A-ency were invrstiratc; by thisOrdnance personnel,

The T;)kI-D Electric Corniarny

The Si: nal Team :: f Unit Ni >51, composed D)f 1st Lt, Jarecs W. Elkins,T/S2;t iL'ario JLa Conata_, anc T/' Edrocnd E. I.nna, invest- L,.ated the TjkyoElectric Coli,. any, a subsi(ilary of General E lectric of Now York,

Bef-)re the outbreak :.f hostil.ities, the Kobe branch engaged inmanufacture of comr.ercial ra- ii- ri;ceivers, ele+c la:ps andl otherelectrical a,,ppliances. Durin,: the war, -, he rlai,at ,as operated understrict goverrniient conrD)l and. was allowed to make only tlarine raliosets,

Approximately O150 pE.ople were em.l- ,ed at the factory. Of these,approxiimately 107 were Jacan.ese scho:l b-ys and( the rest were adultsemployed in the office as clerlcs ;lld. typioet$

The plant had n t been in pro(cuction since 5 Jure 1.945, which wasattributable tl the fact th-at the water and. electric: su ,ply to the Kobearea had been detiilished, ancg because there was no l:on-ur a demand for.'arine radio sets. The plant was aboldt, forty percent destroyed, withthe receiver buil.din;- c .r pletely :?emi:lishe,! and facilities in the restof the plant heavily danmag'ed.

126

HISTORY OF' TLCT1NICI,L INTELLIUGENCE

,The Him&-ji Ca·,alry School anl! the !th Replacement Unit of theKobe D 'fens2,, Divlsi.,n were'~ als; iiispectod by the 'ream,.

Eield Unit ',T-)5,5.

Field Unit bin.5 2 the third Technical lnJelligonce Unit attachedto I C -ris,. lane: 'j - t''e!-:ber 19L5 at Wakayi.lua, Honsh;l, proceededthe f-tllain- day t, Csaka ( ,ay', Incl 33).

The Cheni r al Warfare Team, composed of 1st Lt Victor Del Guercio,S'-t G.r-cen ', Dulckett, and Cpi Ralph Cn setrr, irnsected the followingtarcets: Nissh) & Co,, Ltd. This ilant was a truas;portation agency fordelivery of raw mraterials to mranufactur.rs, anlcd id not hancdle cheidicals.,Mitsubishi Cco., Ltd.,, were dealers in fond ani other essential materials

for civilians, and h-nd1l.ed n' chem!.icals.

Nipl_:on So:ida Comn,,any had its office in Osaka,its factories in Hoku-riku District in Northwc-st Honshu. This crm.pany was a manufacturer ofchemicals, but its plant was outside the Unit's area of operati'ns.Yamada & Cz. a womlesale h-use in chemicals, was lestroyed by air raid.Miki & C!., Ltdl. w ere wh lesale idealers in rphcnol dyes. At the NaruoNaval iiir Base. so-le Cheraical Jarfare itemis were found, and some of thesewere new items° C4.S eqgi,,prent was also fiomnd at the Takeda Pharma-ceutical Ind.ustries, Ltd, The Kitajima iowider i.:a-azinc Stored muchamnrunition, includrin? somle CheroiicaJl 'iarfarc equipment. Chemical War-

fare equi!ment was l1'catec at Tezukaya!na Girls High School, and muchCJS an-munition was stred at the Uenos'-ib.a A:im;unition tlant.

New Chemical ~i"arfare itemls which were recovered were: a. cas-proofbuildin c-'ntainin;f t ree col:ective protectors; type 1, I..Ddel 1,Si-nal smoke canle, type 3, m:,del 1, Mark 27, 60 kg incendiary rocketbomb; n].l incendiary-candle; and a tear gas ,renad e.

1st Lt J')hn E, Harmls, T/4 R-er W, Sheroodl, andi Fvt B.G, Mala-rmuth,Enfincer Tea:m f rr the Unit, ilnsnectec the followin- targets: Oki DenkiK,K. demolished beyond recornition by fire bombs; Nip-:on Seitetsu KK.destroyed, a lar;,e supply of steel on hand in the yards ; KIubtaTekkosha KK. was in excellent cortlition, rea(dy for peacetime productionof 13-ton tractors and dleisel engines. Osaka Seisa Zoki KK, located inthe Nankai Buildin-r, Osaka City, iianufactured machinery, weapons andarmnunition; Sekimuchi YKikai Seisakusho KK, in Osaka City, ha,- bout 90%of its area destroyedc by fire bombs,.

This team locatedl near Sakai (r.ap, Incl 33) twenty-three carryall scrapers with a capacity of abult ei:ht cubic yarls.

127

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTFLLIGsENCE

The SiniX! Tel, sc .T t Jack t i, Daiiels, '/S'rt Frederick J. Doll,and T/JA ,: i ~"~ 3" ,, TR- -t " ' L'-.,..a.d -- l ^ o w,-..l n:arrE--ts. COkiDenki K K 't r. ,; L:.n ... , ;JT 0D' n., :_,n ag sg ;ce va:lue;Nipij:,li ''j-on ' -lrC._' t F'" -. i- 'Dy b6 ; ,Un ;, atl. :'.csushitaDenki S,i ' S,n.e -I --pro .uciniz _;...- -' ,.. ., r L' az )had it? u :' ' .C .a.. ;n.ria.: for

flf rjw ie'¢ - , ,. .' t ¢!. .. t.;J . e! -, se jiured

iva. e. '<2 . a, .a I v ;fcer of ti. 3rdf-7upi, i- K. '. 21 p1 b 'E A (Ni -- 4 on paper- only,but was ec jji v f L ;)1 L, *J3 -er'rioe betweentwo telicf.±t : c.n .:.r nro ay'.- -- ,ier :;7 ,co. . iri , thi a organiza-ti .)n.

Nr.W i2tc-'Isf 1- 3 c .:e't ire-i. ' 1e.7fe S./]i.i Tcar1r:- VH. set usedby anti.-az crcf r.--:, . Ii -:c, i li . -ruic ie ; ondwire-laya<ij \er.. J , -a - L -'-0 ,7 - ty' -pe 18air-Crovurd '-ais n rCadlo recc-ier; and a pcoi rL-p',.r-sl:'-rt-ave radioreceive-r .

Ccp .;t LesK' F Lavr rc-ce(, F7'S -m Vic t.ox E;redeho:fti,. and T/1. Boyd 11.Bierl :, F.el'' i-'. ' , J?: 'D , 'Irr, 1-.r',r. .. ike. '.'e rdk'kalwhich -r " ?,II 3 ' ' ' t ' a 0 a , I r -"of th:e r'- r ;ha¢,::l l- c,,xi " .(,;,:.'- il ,.r",la .rm ' :';. e _;' ,-;aed on pe 0ust14 by boinls -,1 al, ' .. la, viL f " he nacife 'iooI hla.d beendalma.,e ,

nMw teai)'ons fn . )nd by'; t-ne- ur:.a :'re, 12 cer A'' dual, purpose gUnwithl 3 ew, Ds 1it:s :hd.oclv -:n -e. -'"- Ilse o.ni i:t Slph-: tr; 7 crT rocket!-)u a~{..-1; o ....... r.r.e, 121R- y ,9 (';: -t_;'Je 'i) e r.e.-' ltL ,.:del cmpleted

roc.-it a'. oI t'l , , lr 1 C :,a: : 'c~.- -"-t c:nr -It ed i-_,l'y -v,,o ' .-iye1shad l ' L : -b1rc , o ; ue ltd cn rille trank --inly lre l iJl. r ;lt r, -s.ul- l,2 . . '..r su,--. ed to lavebeon iii T lk-o a.r ea .

.ll _afes in Os...a. a-..a ,ce :'.;. :';lrumrr and mantefacturer' srnark ir'urck raff pr!ssitb1' vh) ;-'c 1L t-.).l nine. tc c-.ncelrmiscir>,l rs, 01- t-. c ncoal -tlhe mancufactlurarIs identity, 1, Epossib1r Gerrian T¶auser type.

Eiitil hrmy Trech;nmical Intell-iu-'rl", Fieldt TJn-ii;s

Iio:s2..ned trJ Eji-t iAirmy weIe -vhe follDwin Tenhnical Intelliyrenceunits (pers morlnei are nclu:dud n oerat s rter,

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

F3.eld Uni.t No., 4 .. ,. .. XI CorpsField Un,.t tNo, 53 .. ,,.· XI CorpsFIlel d Urit No. 5,......... XIV CorpsField Un;it lNho, 5154 ,,,,,XIV Corps7ield Unit No, 55 C~...X Corns

Field Unit No., 4 and No. 53, borh assigned to XI Corps in theTokyo area, coolc:rated cisely vrrith each o'the-?r ,jder the dir.ection ofYia.jor Jaroslav :. Iz-1&', who also served as officer in charge of Ord-nance wrLth Unit No, 4,

They arrived in Yoko1hama (.lapi Tnc]. 33) 12 Septenber 19-5, trackeddovn assigned targets and during the course of this work encountered anunber of new¢ installaticrns, At the Tolkyo Ordlance S';ocrly Depot, ColMatsumato supplied the ih.uits w-ith a mnan showing the location of branchdepots under their control, '!qhen asked, he also infcrmed them thatthe nonle of the organizati.on in char-ge of all Japanese Ordnance activ-ities (in the Japanese 'rmy this included Engineer, Chemical Warfare,Signal and C)rdnance) vwas the A.,irmy Ordnance Arsenal Adrnir1istrative Head-quarters, vwith Lt Gen Kan in charge; The equ:ivalen, to the U.S, Medi-cal Corp)s w s a separ.te gagency with its headcl?...rters at Yoga in To-kyo, while the equivalent to the UiJS. Quartcrmasctra- Corps -was smallenough so that it was run as a Staff" Section of Inoperial Headquarters.

The units established direct lia.ison T'i th the Army Ordnance Admin-istrativo Headquarters through a Japanese staff officer of their Tech-nical De3partront, From hini the units recuivred a list, in Japanese, ofall stanldard items of equipnleCnt, and a list of the Experimental Sta-tions or Prcving Grounds and their specialtics in the XI Corps area.

Ex)erim.ental Sta.tions at Koi.'.unj i

On 21 Scotember a trip vwas arranged to the Fxeorimnental Stationat Kokubun-i, (,)ap), 1IC1 3D) inside vwhose walls there vaer five of theten sta.,iolns- Fperi'nmntal StVation -1i (mlachine gunsj artillery, rocketand arlmunit'ion r1'eS:L'cl); ixporiOnta Station :'3 (Engino,!r equipmentrkesearch); Expe:rimr-ntal Stati.tn ;': 5 gnral. equipment res;,arch); Experi-mental Station ;,:8(rma, natriE .eseat. c' , , and Exp c-rimental Station No.2 (fire control and ;pt-ca.ci instrzm:ltss); which had be-n moved to ware-houses at Ko!unbunji from Kogmnci whoen Ai-n .rie.an troops occupied thatarea. The co:Ti-!le:te in:3tJ.l]ation at KeO1bunji was also by this timeunder rigid guard by Americal Division troops,

The trip to Kokubunjl was arrsa.ged so that the he-ds of tilhe vari-ous departments iwere present hen the Technicicol Intelligence unit arri-yed, U. S, personnel attending were: i!ajor Jaroslav V, Klimn, officerin charge of UTnit #1,a; Cat rtWlllard C, Hc1l.o-w.ay, officer in charge ofUnit i'53; 1st It A.lcido Santilli, Signal Corps officer of Unit Y#53;and Ensign Gibson from ,,IU (Navy).

129

HISTORY OF TLCHMICAL INTEILIGENCE

After a gene~rl instruction, each officer separated from theProup an.-I jnvrstagaed i3 spe-,.a'ity

Statii-n No.5 (Sinl. Curps) was vaisi^*d by Lt Santilli,

Station No.5 (raw nateru.V:- ) was invres.iLr:tted by allpersonreo. The ,i,.ssi or: cf th .. ; - v:- s 'to t .- tat',a , a'. l typesof raw rI:.atC.l L... )r use by -Joe -. :P;A '. %-1. i'( wal- s-o),,T1Tn-. ed brTechnivcal 'n:K.-" l:-'mce :-:fi'c_.rc ?:esml ~ ', '.tbat, if deaiited informationabolat ,;oes..'es v;er :J r,;i ' ,,, hra.' o c]ifi led pcrson.a?i. oe sent tointerviR: ,.( nu ens:'lls.e r- a._-.icbl.- Mi~e-mi8rnhilce, a tr.einiminary interviewwas held il:-, th.,e C.::i.e, cf general affairs, arnd an officer fromthe o)r,~snic c'ierLL3stfry le)al.i e t.

Station Nr),3 was vi.sid bjy .M.j K.ima, Calt. Holloway, and EnsignGibson. Capt H:)ilovray Fre. 'ar a scpalate report on %his Station.

.Maj Vli.ma and Ei:.szir. O bsn visitedl Station No.2, (fire controlequipment a.lr oi ol.y. . .r.cnr .yy loc(lte- at Koganei, Many new itemsof fire cn-:..;. lw:,; observe i and the ;arehousos were placed underguard until Tetiil c .Int,.lli;ren:; e sLiples c, uld be taken. Anotherofficer v'as .nim: trie'Ae1d, but as.oi fror. some inforlnat,.on about fungus;rrowth on lenri s and a few eaaLm-atrions of tihe Stations activities,little infor.-a.tion coul-d be obtarined,

The last placc examinel. was !Fxperimnental Station No.l (machinery,7uns, azrti.;le-y, rockets, ammrunition), where nmny Ordnance items ofTechnical Intellirence interesr, were found, Inciujed were the following:

15 crm iA mun (no type had been set)12 cm A'A *rmn. ape 375 cm A.A ;.un, t-'-ye lh75 cm recoJless guns90 raim recoiless guns75 riii hand r ocket lauIncher90 r:m hanc' rnocket la;nmcher57 mrm AT (anti..rymal T',Us

75 .;m ,2T :n 'LG 6.. eter sec)75 'ii, &.T :,un (c.,py of ez-rran KYK, 75 im'i tank gun)

The M.ajor Gener,,1 and meimers of his staff were interviewed,and it was found that this statLon (id 'the basic research and designon small arms, ar ,llehr , rockers and a;nminiiona The a.ctual proof-firingr was done at Fu!,fsu (for rsmall arms) and Ichi prefecture.In addition to specific data on various weapons, the followinggeneral infolrmation was obtained:

Some liaison wa mafintained with the Germans, but not the freeexchangc expected. For instz-nce, the Japanesa pe te 9,m 88 mm g un,

130

HI.TORY OF Tj7'',.NrTCAL TI'T1', 5

n direct conry of the T'i]' T' 1i8 Grim1r 8, wa,13 ccni3d *rom a gun capturedin China "nd wrls nl(t c;btain.;od frol tiv ½ rnns Thl no7zlc dasign onroclCets .-rls or:ainu .1...-v/ Gcrm .n, bt vr'., ,cdif:iid bty the Jaaznese.

The Ja't:!n;. c .. :ivredi tjllu)b, and recoill mneclhlanisms for 7?5 mrn WK.gun, PAR 3! CO( mmnl '.[f un, -red PAR hO 7( r) mTi' 7un, plus the GermanPAK hl, ?../., t"-wc b,':r, .:,:, i rr' Il;hcn ^.sl<kd -,r-v thbv did nct adoptthmrn, t ::3,"- C,'ls3:rcr d, ".1. : r.t rn( .:: ;rcduictien f .cilities."

The ;.:ci :ls lcun r-s_ r, ch v-.ws st'rtcd by the J- anise, whenthey hC.'e'l f Lthb r.i,, a-::ll t-,', blt was net, orursuud rtil theGovI'Irn.ri 011. O .S nn srd -rI .ctur~ls a .nd. rl-vwins.

In gliral1, mo t i pmr;int Ih-d b(een rijnrvC.w frocm the experimentalstitions aLt 'bh tr..re t ..: T' i. lu.ite; mv:dce their inv,-:stig-.aticn, 2nd wasat th'.t tirce u,(l:c.r the control cf JT:n..nece Tvrelfth Army Heatdqua.rters,ThroCu, D'; C ls n _->2 1ir,:-ct li.' st nLs. n was established withthe v rcivs st-Lff crTr Co c.fficers c. 12th .Army to ascertain thelccA'ti.cn cf "1L it...mns cf oei. - 'cnt cf T.chnica.l Tntcll.igcncc interestin the nr,_a. ":.r; L ra:ult, ;:'y i-\tems cf nov: o'uinrmont wore discovered,includiiq 7T m7 - r-c i.:Ks -rlns, I rlm r-::cket launchers, models of newtrne -t'm Su' s, a.' ozin!.u ... ... b1u .. .1 Ava. lable standa-rd itemsand dr..-vr.-iicl'n-t typos cf Ja.annose oqu:. e -'ient in vw' ch the U. S. War

e..p .rtr cjlt 'ws _n'terfost2e, .-cre-: lcc-.tcd I.nd tss .nbn] 0. ; arrancrinentsfor thl.`s :..r; ccmplctcd 't " se:parate m.U:tiLng be'twecen the vari.Luscff c .rIs cf ;,-.chl scrv. c; frim tho Tchnical Int.elligence Units andfrrlm the J,-a.n.Doe 'RicrClfiti a'rny.

;rii3 p; as -rrnged ';tl th!te Arry OCrdnncne 'dvlinistr :ti-;n Bur.eaufo'lr Ordd'ne:nc, &gnal,, ]heomica-rl 1T .arf-i.rC and 'j .'TT rue-r.Is.ont-tives to becsccrt<,d to x.xre:.rir:mental ,,t't.ti-n ''6 (C.S3 Ruscerch I ab-.rat-:ry;r) andExm0ri-ri?.ntal. St..tiocn 117 (F;undare-l entol Ph-rs c'l 1 Rt.e.earch Jabrortcrrr),both t Olkub:. Ituch ir',.re! .t .n (f dvc].r lr'cllt, rose-irch o.ndTcchln. c"- ' Ilnt . ' Cnci .:l ntr.t was uncuero: d.

II. di't n t.o til4 ....ison ir. ny -sta.bl"sheld, Lt Ccl Tait, atthat tU-ra Cih .f Cenf.t,.-l J. .iaison S.cticn, G-2 4HO (AFi'C), r-.dethe f.ci :.ti.:s of h:is s ct-i n iw v "t .b)aw if further c-nt-cts vrcr;requir;d .:i.tih aly ' !:ar.-i cul] r J a.e fri'cup.,

T.ward t'he .nd "; -S-:r.t..rber, j I'[li .a attundod a meting atAn-tJ.-Ajrcraft (cr:innd F ' lr(' -dc:a.r.ters tc disc s s the IIistcry ofte 15 cm AL gun .:ith the drsicners rr. rrngc.ents -ore made forthe- Ja- ancse to turnl c''r to h m ccmplete. ile::]e prints on this gunand. on thu )!O clm r _ckAt ;li.h -was a.t th tt, ti.m under devrclcpment,He alo;c rece::ivd charts sho.wring, in Jnpancso the characteristicsof all standard prcxeillenmt pwcders manufa:ctur_.ed by the Japaneseo

131

J!ISTORY OF TECHI TICfL IN'EI,LIGENCE

Other Ii.sta.ll+ti -ns Investi ,'te'

The )W TTe i ...c2:. IeJ. l:.-ieYnc untis with XI CDri.s collectedlar :e Ulai',zi l.. -f ecujipr-nt at the f£.ll:Jir r installations whichthey inves. :l t :, .

Konishi Ph:;t-o:;; hr C,; manufacL'.r-c aerial camaeras .phto cheimicalscfre- 8·~i- 1 /0 °,A .K -t FVl

'ja, er

i:hysics Dc; car.m rnt, UJIiv!.'sity of T'kio; no equinient ofInteii- -once -,ntcrest r'-cover-edj

Jyuja Or nance diareh:)use: st-'r_: l amrunition,.

OJiku Aikrabane iArrrmy Cli,thiir! ;.areh:use: all Quartermaster supplies.

Itabashi i.rscnal- sall.l arrms and cm rmnition.

Gas mask factory in To-kyo: rec.nv(crted. to clothing marnufacture.

Tokyo .rsnal ',.. 1: pr : luce amr..unitin, -fuzes, this was theinstall]atl:,n latr t'ki.;n wver as the TechnicalIntel-lieali e Center.

Tokyo A rsrnal iN),2: c2,nstriction r.aterial auJnunition.

Oji Factory -;f' Itabaz.shi Fact .ry, Tokyo Arsenal No.2: explosives.

Yoko:suka }Na val Arsenal

rL;iay Che;lical Sarfare Scho)-l (NTarash:.no): imnpFrtant fcr C.:'S Intelligence.

Teluvisior L&Lbo)rat;ry,- Japan Broad1castin7 Company: irector inter-vievved but little information secured.

Korakuen Stailuu'l: o-n th- --iain .roa6. in Urawa (Lap, Incl 33), 30 AArr.ns with af.mruniti n, searchli:ht, etc. reco!vereId.

To-kyo Shibawva (forrierly L'atsuda): (Kanara;a, Ka'wesaki).

Tokyo Shibaura e(l1atsudca): ra'io tules (Kana;:awa, Kawasaki),

Sumitomo Commnr unication C'cm)pny (TTamaawa, Kanaa.'raw)

Fuji Communicatim)n Corp1any (KanaslId, Kaiagawa).

Warehouses, Imperial Guard Grmunds.

ILISTORY OF TECHINIC L INTELLIG(ENCE

Hino ilrrorel Car CI,,: neiw type arm.lored half-track manufacturingplant; not operating.

Tama Gun Pow.3er F'acto.ry: extensive sur ,lies of explosives;n't o,-:ratin;:

}.'ayeda Heavy 2?acYhicrr C .: rmarufacture I dluc!?;s, mines;veeiingfloats. o;'. L t L, rt;iln

[to I:aint an," Lacqu,-r C;). nrit operating.

Tokyo l;atanabe :Sebtai Co.: lpaer marmnfacturin-.

Nippin Airp'lanto Fact-)ry: air-frames and. floats.

Tokyo Tanabe I harmaceutical Co.: vitamin manufacturing.

Shimada Aluminuml Co pa,.ny: airplane -as tanks.

Akamnatsu Wed1 Co,: Jmohair.

Dai Nilmpiin Bicycle Co.: in prdlucti)n.

Toakiki MTachinery Co.: Navy 40 k;r. FS smoke generat rs.

Tokyo Mletal Refining Ce,. scrap, refininj;.

Toku.shiboschin: bearin- an;l brushing manufacturing.

Thuoko Gyo Cs., Lt. L: type 94, 8rir, pistols and 12.7rmn type 1 aircraft4gachine iuns, It' which ap lroximately 100 were in the assemblysh ,p.

Sanyo Machinery C.)F: turret lathes.

Tana Suipply Offire: comprised ap-:roximately 100 builcdings; loadingstati)n for lan-rl inos and artillery ammunition.

Knle,gafuchi Tractor Msrnufacturin., Co.: 90 h., . caterpillar tractors.

-lant in Soka: manufacturel cril';r, brass, bronBe alloys.

Storate area near Soka (Mlap, Incl 33): fr bar steel, lumber, plaster,-aint, lubricantsj electrical sup:,plies, automotive parts.

133

HISTORY OF T.CHI' 1NCAL, I!NT1EThLLICENCE

Narimasu 'irfi el: containel special purjose veh-:.cle, explosives,cl .thin,;-.

Great Japan Fcrtili-cr C ): vit.i.ildns, con'iensedl fe., pills.

Tokyo Su ],Jy Puirii j'/, liarr honsecs #23, '" . 3 S' nr: andmretc:}r :loi;'1CJ ; ,.u L.'_-; > Un i.t je iLi. suP. ~sted

la r±zt. .n zh..J -~.~a. ri). be0 sent t) :;.F~lwtsiar Gv ;.;:u ti %11Wes4;L. ate

En- ine.r Suijly r ChiLa:. E..'ipj Incl 33); qulnti--;y of EngineercquC:i pmalnt as we lIl as sosin Crcdnarlc equipment; inventoryYvas malde ly a :.nr ,f ficial;S,

Chofu Air Strip: nleu items ,f cl'thin;.

Koza Su'pnly Dump: Or !nance items.

St. Luke's Hrspital: taken -,ver by 42nc Geniral Hospital

V!aval Medical C 11oee:. tra.ine-d Oaganese NIaval officers:

Tokyo Chanty Hosl-itJ;; o- er-ated Naval l:..,ical College.

Imperial Institute of Infectious"Disease3s

Naval Hospital: invent ,ry taken.

Showa Tsen Hospital: civilian.

Tokyo irmxy lti ,::iC.l Sur)ply Hqs.: rese-arch conducted; papers translated,

Airfield: pyr-,technics.

Ichinoiiiya Gas Factory: -as bombs, blastinr caps; large amounts ofr.ustar;' JtaS p-rD.-luCed; hal gpas -rotected equipment.

Sonniko Te:el Co.' dyes, smlall tools.

Matsushita Dry Battery C0.: dry batteries - hl,O0,000 in 194b.

Chigoski Radar Installations: S:ina-, OrInance equipment.

Bagani Arsenal: now Ordnanc'e equipment.

134

IISTORY' OF TE'C{IIHITCL INTELLIGCENCE

Fvuttsu ! rsrenal: q!lii,.l:ent was thorou.hllly an(t systematicallyd!estroyed by thl( Jlys; -)me nwr ammunition frunc,.

Hiratsuka IJava. ArLr: nal: f' ur, c(la, k r rm an1 ' small quantitiesof prrintinrt papur and bullk ill'redionts frr -;hoto-ch<.dcac.sl; of nruch technical interest from powderanalysis stal diJ, in-t.

Kokabunji lPrn.vin' GI::'mims; ?, !: su:'IlvY )if Siftnnal equipment includingsome now .teOvlo(l,42, ts; docu ents of this equipment,

MIatsushita 'ry Battery C, -Csaka Factory: prjoducing flashlight batteries,but c:ul:.l Tro-!uce qulito a nIm.ber of other types,

Sixth Mlilitary Laboratory, Okuba: {7as bombs, projectiles; Chemical;arfare rCscarch.

Seventh Lilitary Laboratory, Okuba: fundiamental physical research;docurment on un.crvater bar es for transpolrtin7 munitionsand fuel translated anr. f-)rwar:led to Naval authorities;information scur,:i o-jn hOmm rocket with built-in granpcselectnr- s-urmlmry: DI' projects ldl.ertaken (translation byGHQ) socu.r.o'.

Vitamin Factory: mostly burne(:; inoperative; few supplies secured.

Nippin Gun Lvvrler C ., Lt.,: f:ru-s f:,r civilian use (reconverted).

Army Meodical Suppl.ly Hq. at Yo-:ca: obltaine' information on supplies;TI. Unit su-reste. an investi:.ation be iaade of a considerablequantity. -f silver bullion, nolJ, platinur., foil and wires insafe- un!ler (unarmel ) Jaanese Tuarcls.

Japoanese liceno:r (En,-ineer) Scho-,l ?.t Yatsudo (T.iap, Incl 33): consider-able quantity of neaw En-ineer equipment; all precisioninstruncnts and rec-!rds dispCseIL of before U.S. entry intoJas n.

Showa-Fertilizer Co.: parent compary of a syndicate consistingof the followinr:

Kawasaki: YarnUfacture2ls of sulfate of ammonia, liquidamr:,)nia, nitric acid.

Kan:se: limo-nitr)-?enf calcium carbide.

HIeLSTORY OF TECT,.1.ICAL INTELLIGENCE

O!citsu: p .tissium chlloride, potassium nitrate,

Tateyaliwa: potassium chl-:ricle,

Hirt: i- ., )ta3s:lJm chl-rate, solium cyanid.e.

Shiojlr-i: rt. ~,fi'-a:.. abbaso.vs, fene-e-all,'ys.

Chichilbu; fone-ci.,roe,

K)um[ ,i oir-

1;atsluTrtc:: elc ctral]ytic irin

Y.koham.a: alll-in -rahite electrles, caustic soda,Su.±uic acid.

O:iachi: -lur;idnum,i artificial graphite,

Kitak.t... a:luii1 nm

Toyarla: aluJina, aluriilun,.

11.All prsonlnel of Field Unit I:1,J scre<7ned' equipr.ent, e.dctddfrom the above-listed tar.ets and mriarke i-e as of Technicil Intel-lirence intere-st. Then the tarrets were first investi ated nod.ecisicn as t-·) wareth.use ssace ac' bee(n l']e (The Technical Intel-li- ence Depot did n.:t arrive until later), andu nine -f tne heavierequi.pient -was roved. At that ti-ne it was estirated that appr 'citmatelysix --. 'ton truck I£< a!ls of srrioll equip.rent plus various autoiotive equip-ment were re.,a, ff.r T;I, anoLlysiso

Jaanlese jrry n n linc-r schn-cl is Seize-I

Within a wreFlek after 'lan-1ndin, t Yokohan.a, and after imich scrambling,the two Enri.neer Team.!s o.f il._' il Units NJoc 1-,. and NTo, 53 anrI. secured atent fPull i' -En....n¢lcr ite;n. lben they obtained a lead from a Japlieutenant -ecner'i wh-*hch led the t+.eals to the Japanese Arry lEnglneerSchool (their Fort Beivoei-r), at Matsudo (.~'ap~ Incl 33) about fifteenmiles N. E, of Tolryo-

1st Lt Clinton 0. ¢otter, T,/3 Jaires 'V,. Ellyette, and T/3 ElsworthP. Paris, EnAL;nerer Team .f Unit. No, 4, mr)nvced in qrd took the placeintact., comxipiete with personnel and equipmen',,o 'irranenments weremade with the officer in c¢har!-e for *che Japanese to inventory theequlmenll, and. wi;h -the .exception that no precisicn instruments,blue pri:ts, or office papers could be found (in one- powder factory

136

HISTORY OF TECiiNICAL IWTE;LIGENCE

a Japarncse ca-tajn showed the ta.m nthe pile of ashes where theirrecor-1s were burLle ), a lar-e quan-tity of equipmnent was esser.iblcdat the ,chkj, l

Usirn t;- ..i:cilt1kies available at the School, Lt Fotter and histeam en *arcA( :n res..torch -)f sc-,e It.ims, art, 4 efcre the end of Octobersubnitt;c.r 1 t!sn ce l.ss ?n rner ui.rment recovered. By that time allmcrmb.rs -:f -r'hI ri;toac ,.' m:,vc I-tcc i;h.e Ist Ca;,'a].iiy ivisi',n and wereawaitin- ;,r,'ers i:(r shi rent to the Uriitedl Stats for (ischarge fromthe , . rmy.

Cait :i..llarc CO Hi_'_l oway, T/3 Charles .', Jerkirs, anrl Pfc PhilipZarahn, mei:,bels of En--ine-r Te.;. ., 53, t:- k ovcr, anCd the twoenlisteo men hauen d othFr Ern ineer iteizs fromn Chiha irto the Schoolwhere all En-ineer equipTnent was st, re -' . erniinj shippini instructionsfrom the 525Sth.

After the Unit :i States Arr..y Technical Intelli-ence Depot arrivedin To1ky·r, 1.aj r Charles E' ir-st, Jr., .fficer in char--e -if theEngineer Analysis Suctir\n at the TI. Center, anrd T/3 Jenkins, movedthe equilrment col].ecte-1 to tole T,-ky- frsenal.

Cpharanthin, Druul ui:os . T:, Cre TubuerculDrsis, Is Rocoverec

The TtSiical lelm "f Unit Lo,l, 1st Lt John B. C. Liudlimran andT/5 iNorm n T. Geron, reLi rtel' an inlt,_r.o .ratin -,f Ja~aiiese medicalpers,)nnel ccnnected wvith the T: .k-/o Institute for Infections Diseases.This prelirmnairy inrvesti-atiorn was relative to cepharanthin, aJapanese- 4evel:t .-,-l ru.,

Special instructions issued to Lt .ud-.!irnan by the 5250th TechnicalIntelli: cnce Cr,-pzany, " te 1. 15 iil,Ust 1945, read1 'A drug called'Cepharrarntthine t hac .een riorte' efiective in -this cdisease (tuber-culosis). Lore; sipecific ic forration is needei on this subject".

ITh. follwinri articles wvere forar.ed by air to the >edeicalAnalysis Section, 52S0th Technical Intelli.:ence Company, by Lt.

u( d miran

1. 10 -rams crystcalline alkaloids, total alkaloi'ds from "Ste-.phania Cepha rantha", containing hi:h percentage of 'cepharanthin

2, 1500 tabletseach containing 0OJ,.1w. "Cepharanthin"

". 100 ampules, each containin, O.I.mr;. "Cepharanthin", fcrinjection.

137

HTMTO`2'Y' 01V' TI'Cl. INIC.L IITVTL:T.LINTNCF

. 100 a.' u. 3, each c:.'ntainin- 0,2,m;;. "Cepharanthin" forinjoct2. r.

5. One v-liu ;,, i92 ta ;es, by Sillji Hasse'-ara, entitled,.'..Ct'. t , i. .y cf Cephararithin'' , in J .apnese

6. One i. , by Shbuji iinsse-?wLLa, entitled "Eyper4r:jlci:+: .l. .'L2.i Cli:,,ic] SL'r,5:. iC3 on C:.)hI ranthin a;rainstTuoer'; i, ·.l , - r L:,,r- sy , and w'l;cing, Chugh", in German,

7. (nAe zti c 13 caes, reortin3, fravorable results inuse of cepnarrllithin arrainst ;ulinrry tuberculsie, inJ apar- ,; : e

8. One article, 3 -yrCos, reijortin:, favoirLabls, results in theuse :)f Ci,,haranthin a. rinst whoopin7 couzh, in Japanese

9. Onr article, 3 axes, repcrtin-' favorable ruesllts in theuse of cep-haraulhin azainst asthma, in Japanese.

Lt kud 1'il.an an! '[T/5 :rer;:n intervicwed a profess )r at the ImperialInstitute 'If Infectious D -isease; Tokyr, and!- the r'ircct-r of the Funda-mental Insti.tutc for Chcurmtb:repy, Ichikawa, P'ioneer in the researchon the ,ru ,; L sur-·on--captain, tuberculosis consultant fo)r theJapajese. 'Jtaval `,,:lical Co±,le Tl:,; an! a-.roxi.atoly ten Japanesecivilian h-sicians in ;il :Si,iI ons, on- these4 , opinion was sharplydivi.led, soime bU!lievio.; th. -'u.. '"us"l .~'

Lt udldirnan reTop-rte , ':It Ccl::haranthirn has the properties someclai:: f'r it, it is of -reat ilorptanc: Iowuver, field ;inaiysis iscompletely imipractical and no attemLrAt is ar.ba i hDrein to estimate itsmerit., "

The pres dent of thu Naval MIT. ,ical College, Tohyo, aund his tuber-culosis consultant 'vero inlterviewed by the Medical Teat of Unit No.lat the ilaval ilelidicai C lla-e, Tokyo.

.e-i~ical Technical Intellli-ence Team NoJ, also reported on the"'Sta.dlard I-'rocedure in the Japoanese Navy for Treatmlont of Gonorrheaand Syphilis"'. This information was obtained. fr,:m Japanese NavyMedical ofLicers.

Larg;e Quantities of Ielical Equipment Rec.:vc-red

Jaj-anese equipment recovered b', the team is listed' below.WEne nf these items ha!. been PreviOusly reported bky Medical Technical

iTST oTlR OF 'P 'ITIrrCAT IFfT TELLI GENCE

Intel!i erjcF;, arnl al. ite)rs wore in servicea'le condition. nmacdi',itioalw2 cuamiti:.., ty of n3'r, eoul..ipet - - ablut t.e same number ofitens -- was.3 a.l.s o iakex ;i the te.o., 1 ,at ha. not yet been inventoriedat the tir:e of -- i .r rrp' :r':

a,;ir t s kt-it?l .~sJ i*, .3. "7 '3 , 3 ;'.¥ cte

Gas .l~' .'..cr t.-.L' ];.a ibn catoryP ,rtr le ti.. L", f . tal'

fHyi po 'err..c -f.'_St,1%¢r..s::.{,ic ......... .' chestFiol. stcriJiz'er- ,ih st.F,,l hr.n rz,n ,al ciolir iri chestOzor-le ienertor

Electr .meter, in cniesti7-r'r-o; 'a wter co)ntainer

rarachute f ~r ab- ;veLunl capacity retcr."s aar:i -7,, er

.i.r-drp para.-,hute (suli li-s)Iuo-r:,sclpDe for ilse with 3'5 zri car.erabarmboo litteri-.rT. str,_n'th tester, in caseBlo-i, ..r'- ss rr: kitIndlirect blood triansfusion setDi.sper-nsjin I kit, w'')Reservoir for storiacrh -ui-o7Ear and n.?se '--it, with caseijly :raih, wvrith caseEye chart caseSt'r r,.;tl-i,(n lassrs, c-seIH;c~dror.tter set.i.cr scoIr, fo"ldin-,? mei~.ur lecitzl,%crsc e, f- 1 rX ,s m; ,. m net type

ilcr(,sc C,!e, type unilite:-.'nec2 c.aliras, r case, fo:r use with fluor'scope, 'Army2 c t:.&ras., 3.!lr; . in casc, ±for use with fluor-:scope, NavyOver 100 nev c.dri 3s alred .e'iciflles,issorte1 :mnecJic2. cnerZca_.sissorteO scientific paers

The- entirce -:crid) :f the latter half of Octobelr was spent bymembers of both Units No, L and NiJo 5[3 in evacuating, arranging tobe evacuated, and consolidating selected items of Japanese equipment

139

H;h XUh7 oF vTEC['Lq[.": 2INELL'.E N(;2

of T'echnical Inte2lli -enee value, These were collected in variouscentral 4 o.o;:lt-.t ns f.)r close c:)ntrol and r,.)re effict ive ,uarering tohelp preoecnu prerrmture (offi7cial:ly -rdered) dest,--uc:.io. T'leseplaces vwere: the Cherj.ical ,'Iri'are Scho ) at NtTra-, i.-:o wvrereequi-iruent was '.>.in;" :,rera:redCl f: r shiieenat by -nhe E-ih'th A,rryCherlmical uf:f:].cc!, c. ile En 'ir,t :- Sch-:l .It Fta.,i-, w Lhre equ.ipr,,ntwas bc -n' rn m;!vre1 t' i;he, Tuehn- C;al ]'-ni;elli r '.C e.nter Ie. otj recentlyestablz 's.ledr tlj:. 'we cl.l:lc. Ln-te ].i','enee v arc oiouse at Ist CacvalryD`ivisi :n ( ,iC, area; T:,i kyo 3) y Ye)'t; Akabane ;,.iimunition Depot.

by ;i he efnd~ of Oct-l-),r thie folo;in!, officers and enlisted menfrom the tvo fielrl liruln , h! and 3] la haen iaede available on thepoirnt syctem and had either left or were atbout to dei art for theUnited States:

Field Unit 4N:. :

Cazt GeCorg-ce I Ford, SCCa-t K ennel H., Bovarlrl, Q.CI,-t Lt Clintern 0, Q otter, CET. /T/. >,'r L d s ,J Xa, rr: ~, ' oi,

T/'3 Eiw SWl-th -. , Par-is CET/, Ja.:es ;., Ellyett', CET/'5 Fralnk E, Browmn, Jr,, CWSi fc Juan O, Gonzales, Q.C

Field Unit N,., 53

Ca;:t fdrillard C. H )1ll. .raY, CE1st Lt Nicholas Twvmsan, Ord1st Lt Francis K. Switzer, CiSS/Jrt K.urtt 1[. Rlchiter, SCPfc i-iiillf Zarahn) CE

Field UniLts nio.: p an No:, 5 with XIV Corps

Techrlic1l Intell.i.cfnck Fiel.2 Uni'ts ho, 54S and No,5 were ontemporary duty to 7i-V C ,rps HUcduarteri, wh ich landed at Shiogama,Honslh't. (Lia 1p, Incl 33), 16 anrd l'7 Setem i:er l-,lI;:, Htadquarters movedon the 1-7th. t :isnktai, H n.lsl-lu. (Ma~p, Incl 33), and both units operatedout of that area in the encuingr mont.hs,

2d Lt Robert Ao iorltius, Sgt V,'illiam N, Davidson, Pfc Carl C.Cureton, CI¢S Team No, 54, investi:,ated the Army and Navy Arsenals at

1J40

[Y[STORY OFi' TETINTCAL INTELIJIGENCE

ScprlJai, Liut f':cAln- nr, lr Ci'.S nui_; mcnt. Thle N-rt-J Arsenal had anacil -1'iit aciid Fe.l:.Jj I' 1t, ti of which had beendisI:ant:ll and the :xjL; '+1 ;. ":I 1e e(l ·. .ii'"' re:ve Both Ars4enalsa>:Le trerW tm n .- 3,' , ,, 'r nc, ed a~s r .ivi. ]s._i a o.f tvhe main Or'namnc Arsenalrathelr thi2: f 1 Cl.icU .,. f p's 'ui s(.

2rd Lt l,'rk r1: .i;'-.lJ, ; ]it'ri T, fit-', and Pce FrankLa, h,.:L -t:, , .' .. ' n-_ , - .z -e ated both Army and

N',vy S.2s ;:1L s -,"t -a:'i a .a Iu-t .f.. r4 n. e 1-ip:.ent,

Or Tln!cee Tlo .h'.i. hl-,- 1st Lit Henmy L. A^bh"ti-t.; 's/i Gerald C,Lockri,' f:-, f Ci;.r'leos it, Tal.erle,l whl.n t-heN j.nsoect.l -Che L't:ajoNavy ':rsc'na l'i a-t %"..... f und the pr':;cti -,n was 20C-i,ml shells,ty· 99 2Mr. l air'raf't. cann 'n, t .y.e 13 8¢ir-raft El cxicle 7.17n.mraachirin -rrns, incn .-lry b, )rs a.ix I a-rh:;ch-,, flarcs, r- -st of thenachliryr f r theo l'l.rt ha,] bc::n r:iovnod under -round.

TUp)n i.rs,:-ctic,; f the Sendai. Pranch ':f Tonk-o Arsenal, theyfoun)l mo.st ' f the ,.lint isASi e ' h een r 2'.-m.amr..tmiti.-; n nd fue w iti po1rder s.lie ,c;-- in fron )ther sD7uces.A few t) a::s of a.n Ltit,n ion. h iu r se-:-ral ,huredr-)una's ol type 90 $Sk1r and t-"1 _e iW0 f',cs f'J- uhese shells° h.etam3 also i uniri f : ur ty, e 2 rrii CA- re -sr ((lirecto-!rs) differentfror;. thte tyTrc? 2 Navy AiiA cirect.rs pruv.oeusly rec,veredo These thatwere fourt. wcr: irn :,:'! c -;.iti:n, wi-ch tc-.t; now unCes packed0 fnr ship-cent, anc' tle tlh,r tw-) strippet( of thh-: neters.

At an unuse-i arfie'id o.uI 7.J.ie fwast of Senda.i, Orldnance Te.nJ No._5 Iercv reo 18 y :- ca99 3ir-1 dua; l d.urio;se, pedres tal mou-nt, anmti-aJ.rc..: af- ' -enL,, in i.-an',-t cauri,,n u v9i!r5 .V 9 51i was believed. thatseveraJ_ oi t'l. U ,s ere. rceir,terl i.n ,hu S1,ut,1ieltl htiil i-pine iFsl:7ndsC 1 .... ,, L., ', c- i '' .,'cn dc 'stryCidt ft+ the s a.;,.e ai-rfeld theyalso ,-c) aK -.. k X:L . abui? 1)00) r 'n1rms of r,;oGe 100, 68.rm, aru..unitia n anda-hW orm(DLcalttYl ,c; fmuLes tyjJc' 100C rT;Loch, irNLCa.C.1 +tj.e, AA.

The l:S t f.gN Cays- i,. Oct 1:,er this csamor team .inspected. stockpiles L C,: 1c Ctut! Jqarls O)':n.ma'c-e. ;,d dertem! nI f If thiere wereany ec;i.e1'i, ,'f TntlA'!.-rence alu ai; ;_ h fao.lwi'ng points.Ya] .. .. .:a, n.<L la.ata. A. kij, .n. /'ri ,_a ( In. m 33).

3 - HIa 40L', 5ml aircrf't cannon. This itemrWl,,s st ,r-e] at. 11th i.irb. orne Diviesion.Vrt l erY- ACita, uni:nr the cn-rfol of,the S-L. 'mtii Jdi.spo:szti. cn was given by-the r52tOth., d ue to arrive in Japan shortly.

141

HISTORY OF TECFAJICAL INTELLIGLNCE

1 - tye 3(), caliber 6._5mr rifle1 - type 30, caii.ber 6.5nmi Cihbine1 - 22 year type, c.lLber 7.,7;nrm rifle

BY that t. t enl( f Oct.)ber, .,kita irefecture had commpla.tecl the: c 11ccti ml 'f .ll Ja'p,I-anese ee-.: ,iIenr. '-,d the dostruc-timn ;f ar,mreuriiti -i.l iwat . rc.fec ture "' :-a c . .t.h.e ccl _tion:-'f rll Ja:! a lncse elq .:ilent, ri ; by ].0 N;ize;,ber }. 1 a^l aI..li zrt--:itlonduwIln:! at sea: Yai af'-,ta i r :i'ct-;ure haCG cll . j ar.e ,3s ' eiJ entc oll-catc- in thrce citiess -'n' .is-slition iadJ been star'ted onar.mlun: ti - ri

The Si neal Toarm, 2.r L-.t Leslie R. I,'1Uich..mpD5 Jr,, S/SgtLl yl K. Pu.'hbrs; S/Szt R-thert A' rT'ictc.r, als) investigated theNaval "rs:n ll .lt Shio ,:a. ani! the Aiir.y Arsn.mal at SMn.-'ai, butfoun 1 n : - -n:A!l equirlient, UTrn checkinil the r:-vernnent--o'wnedraqio. statirin, JXQ, SonIai, they i :-un '̀ equij:ment '.f corinercialmanufacture, but n,) ne.w develDpi; nts were nc:te.'

Equiimeort w.as tolnd an' repsorts m-ere submitted o)n the JapcnElectric C>), Sl(nlai: tht Airf.rcc. rrA.. i. station near JirrimnacT.hi;a ra.i1: instal. t:i.l .n .n the island -f Kinkzza;l and the Navalfix&ed st.ti )n Ti[;iiE, n>ar 2O1o

Technical Intel][i;-t rnce Unit NoD 5

Tcchinical lntclligence Unit ine. 5 also larde. with Headquar-ters 1lV C. r-Ls ;-an rmve- on t. Sendale Shortly after they arrivedCa&,t Ber,,l L, LIght, officer in ch rc.7 rof the Unit, returned totht 'lUJitcu, States on the (i:.int systenr and ist Lt ferry L, Whitet.!k )verr, The tw:ar rlisted men, S/S,-:t G1::nn Lo I-iau,en andt T/4Will:i;-a J, Sau(or, the balance -..f the Si .nal Tee.am that Capt LiP2hthas heae.e,, 3wNrc then tri;slerre ! for terp ..rary luty t. the 11thAirb:)rne DrLsi. n, XTV Cor:'s, wvhere they were -rcl7rer t a2ssistin co.lectin- _.ndi destr~yinT JapI:anese equipment0

The Enn 4inefr Tear: (Lt Ferry L, 'hite, T/L Euvene 7rf. Fields,Ffc Hen:ry Ce.rs.an) werte Ied by thu X.V Csr-s Engineer Section tolook for and make roe-orts on the location of iingj.neer construc-tion mat(.rials, Invc:stigatcion of a pontoon bridge dump at Iai-yachi, Honshu, revealed that minat rials weLr+: used for an EngineerSchool anld were in poor conditiono Tnvestigation of the dump ofTollolu 129th Cors, Sendai, was made, but niatorials had beenused for training iurposcs, and no n,,w itemas wlere discovered, ByNovemnber, ].fc Carson had been relieved of assignment with thete-amr.

HISTORY OF Ti"C !iTCAL IT'TETLIGE!;' ,E

The COE'S Taram (2d Lt John A, Wagner, Syt Lovere D. Brormn,Ivt 'illi " imrocirl-) recoverc4,: cqui.Fm1it in thu 1224 IrlnantiyUnit anmd thc 2dt C'.airy Iei.mel t bivol'ac aes:i, =lcd sh)bm.tbedre-ports on t,,r:i. r i'nlitngs. Invustag tl.s tr unis in theS"ndai arca, ovr resulted in no P,;' Ii:..C;..gs

Af'ter 'Ct.ln- '.,S dcSaOSiot.nlJn tCAi. .sittiL l;-i..-'J.rborne rjvi.sionin th,:! ;gLL;Cle of 3Cetobcr, th(, t: am irc:','est: ,t -.J tl:e -rno-Ldy.a

Navarl Arsenal ana rocover:el it..s oI' Th'.'C; Tci:e.iJi=aeric- valuefroi, this arsenal and t'rom Shi:a.os'hizu Ci:i';D. _.i'rfield, These in-cludeld:

4 Na-ry e oerimental tyeo #3 chlorine gas macks(16th ?!car model)

8 portable gas chamber tents3 flame throrTer tanks, S-gun model

gLas 3sr..yers (trackd trailer)

By 10 Nov:-mber all members of thi s team, had been relievedof teaporary duty to rturn to their. pro-;er statior.

Targ ets investi.-lt, 1I by- the ' c.,dical Team) lst. Lt Harold.. , Jones and l fc Clifford E, Hiarralson, L.nluJ.eK; Japanese 2dCavalry ReI-iment bi.vouac "area n Ser:.di, th- Seri;:i Branch D.-pot(V"ediical) at ITanakita, S-.ed.ai Army Hospjital #2 at 1Latsuda (iviyagi-ken), and the Yv.oac.t- .+ Ar.:y 'H-osp,ital at Yam.gata.

Ordinnce equinient ol' Int, T .ligcnce interest was identifiedand sejregatud by the Or.inmance 'eam (lst Lt Kenneth L. (fardcrn ,Jr,, T/' John R. Siallfwoos, i-fc Andren Nadas) working in con juat-tion with the 357th Orcl D.pot Co, at the followr.ing installeations:Sc:nldai ArmvI Arsenal, Nawival Arsenal at Shoog3ama and Matsushima,Shiras.axa Awmm.nitioll Dhmv?, YanLagata .lectrcoheaical Co, and thearea o:1' thu 105th Regiliecnt a.t Fukushima (Iap Incl 33). New itenmsrecovered:

12, 7:Lrm ;1.gh e.x]losivwvc roul.i for Browning type gun20) mi r., E, rou,'i : for Ho 5 cannon201nm rr'Icticc round for tyipe 98 and 99 gunst: e 98 fuze for instantrneous or short delay action70-mlrm. rockect launcherlig~ht 1:ersonnel ca.rier accommodating eight persons

143

HIISTORY O? T>',ZCHV!TC.I, INT!,LI(ENCE

Unit No, 55 with IX Corps

Tec;ni.cl Intolligence Unit No,) 55 was l.:i.aeJ on temporaryduty with Hea riqplarters, IX Cor,,so Durini Se tentber the OrInanceTeai., (lst It Ci.rLc's E., S'loo, Ifc nQ al ;J.. Linstedt. Pfc 7vil-lianal -I Kcnn:!Oy'1 was ~t,ir vhe'c to bhe P11st , viji'sT.cn, ·%nd landedwitht them,1, 2:, S'.1 t ,ibbrI oI. G:r-,cLn Beach, Ao. c' T-!ornshtu .rapIncl. 33) O- 2, S;r..:.teiler tle: rr-i. or:el to t 32 ,1 InfantryRegi men't in Hir!aklre illp Inci 3:-, 3/ re tL:y investigated twoarmrnr:ics anld l llD(- l.:ritc i',rsion f Or- allce t'ei o, t sut nc newcquii:imcnt wri..: i.,oc ..tted, 2,'; 3.r, etTmber they relported to the 323rdInfaritry 1heg.ent where Lh-iy i.nvesi:,"ter the .Taaan Iron SmndIn) C),, anrd oth-.r knrwn st-.r: .ge pilce- of arms., Tney also re-portedl toi. the ', ot Reglm;..nt to inspect a'mmuni tion of whichdisposition was being qlaIlU

Ecarly in Oct))ob,-r anJthur Ord!lance Team of Unit No. 55(Caopt Wvalter E. Swain, fL'c Ben T, Garcia;.. i:fc iorton HI, osen)was placed m)n ter 2)orary duty to the Chief Ordzianc- Offiicer, IXCor;-,s, After arrivwl Lt Sai.yoro, ILokkcaido (/ar,., Incl 33), thistean or~ertae in tLe jsari a.rea wmrerŽ an or, nanmce dump, encount-ere&. by the 77th iiiafanry Division, ;a.s reported to the tear. forinsieecti.i"m The ilStLJ.1T.ia jn iwas -;rimarily an mvrmunition dump,an-d tth. small amount of r)r-clance equipment stored there wasclasslt'i.,.d as standlarl,

The CYS Tearm (1st Lt John 1,4 Kapp, T/4 John L0 Mooney,C1i BEuster B ntley)jenroute to lokkaiclo abcar-: the USS La ;orte,sent a wire to 7?th i-risioon to guard Nipp;on Soda Co,, manu-flacturers rof war gass'es, -which wras liste-l in the target folderas at T1naklodatet (Yaap, Lr;cl 3.3) This ce.)m,:..T:ny was a number onepriority rati..ng according to War DeTpartment research°

The tea: l t1:ndoi nd set u- at Saip.orc, Hokkaid.o with Head-quar-ters IX Coris, 6 Oct),ober l!9i.5. 'rcviours investigation bythe Divit1lin A :rllaery Ee'.::la-t.ers indccated that the Npp:onSola c-), -was rtoF, n I-!;ck. -, b'out in Honhu ,A recheck by membersof the To Io tear., resulte. i.n the iollowin.:;

Lt K-ap cnntaote 1 a 1 ethc.list mrinister who told him that a,proiessor at ETa1kroda--e ColEkgt, would be an authority on chemicalplults of military sirnific.:mcc This profess)r obliged themby 7uidinq the tc am to thi, fo:!llowing plants:

144L

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Nissan Chmiccil Inl!ustrial Co,, Ltd,, Hakorate,mcmanuJ'cturers cf rsuj.ihuric acid

Koatsu Kojrjyu Co., ILanufacturers of Oxygun andc;.lc.iurm su ';hr ,phoshate

Toyokoatsy Chiluncal Co,, a-t Sunogw'e, manufacturers;' a:. ] nllia sul!.i h.te and a:icnia a'as

Konrtsuk!c')r-, C.,.~ at, s.soi-nchn, manlufa:t4arers of oxygen-l r'ac l.yline from calcium carbinde

But none Df the abhcv.: plants manufactured war gases,

Further search n-l i nterrogation verified the previous reportthat the N4ipoIn Slda Comi',any vwis not, as indicated in the War De-partrment ttrget f'lo]er, in Hakndate, but that it was in Honshu,

Investiga'ti n )f all other tarte.ts listed in the folder, andmany more Lti. sc.)wve inde:-end,;:!nty by the team, resulted in therecovwry of cornsi-. erable quantities of Chemical WIarfare materiel.

The Engineer Tnanr (2'1 R)bert E, Vrmnice, T/5 David L, Barker,Pfc Jam;s HII Rig-s) r .. ,rt-e1 that the lack of Engineer equip.ienton HAkkA._d., ,vith the excl.:--ti)n f' building materials and the equip-ment for ha.ndlini, th-ni wa.s nrltable. The unit also assisted in in-vestigating certain industrial plants f-rthe purrose of rehabili-tatioin.

Awarls reccived by T, I, .']in of 25Oth

Awar's given to mien who served. with the 5250th Technical In-telligence Compariny in the iacific Thleater are shown in Inclosure 3h,

And NSw.'W.,

7 DeTc(rber 1945, To-kyo, Japan, The war is over and many inthe Army, !_nc].u1-1ing men frorl the [250th, are going home -- andh.:-pi'ng to reach there by Christmas;

in t-eace t.iL;, Intclli zerce, anl espiecially that parvenue,Technical Intellience. slips In'to bad reaiilte -- not only withthe ordinary Ani.eic an Citizen rh.. c5 nsic:lers it a menace t^ U, Sopeac.-intenti :)ne!',. internoatir..,nral c.iplc macy, but what is much moret- the ,?oint with the United States Army itself, which has hada tentdencry to c'nsil.er that in )each time Intelligernce is,,,,super-flu -us, If' we are nri-t to be the blind leading the blind, thereshould be a chance in that -policy.

145

HISTORY OF' TECHNICAL INTELIGNCE

Technical sui.eri 'rity available to a nation will be the mostdetcrminato factor, next time,s in dociling who is to win, who isto lose. There is only one means of finding out the technical in-novations of oth,.r niations - that is by an efficiently staffed,effectively o;.ratin' Technical Intelligence Depart ent. Nexttime we must bc one jury iheard, not one Jump, behind.

146