Leo E. Rose

FEW events of modern Asian his­tory are so fraught with long-range implications as the recent eruption of host.ilities between India and Commu­nist China. Ironically, the initial im­pact was felt most strongly within the Communist bloc as well as the non­aligned Afro-Asian nations for which India has long provided leadership

. and inspiration. But the consequences for the West are likely to be no less significant, for dramatic changes in interregiona1 and interbloc alignments may be in the process ~f formulation. The Sino-I.ndian conflict may prove to

february 1963

be as much an effect as a cause of these developments, but it is the cat­alyst forcing a reappraisal of policy postures throughout the Afro-Asian world.

Before analyzing some possible re­percussions of the conflict, it might be well to examine the origin and basis of this dispute with reference to the objectives and policies pursued by Communist China and India in the past decade. Often these were ob­scured by the "peaceful coexistence" that has supposedly characterized re­lations between these two civilizations

3

,HIMALAYAS

in the past. Only now is a more realis­tic appraisal of their recent relation­ship possible.

Potential Danger The Chinese occupation of Tibet in

1950-51, in such strength as to belie Peking's claims of "peaceful libera­tion," had a decisive effect on the shap­ing of Indian policy toward Commu-

Revue Militaire d'[n!ormation Nehru has acknowledged that his govern­ment made two miscalculations when Red China occupied Tibet in 1951: the timing of a Sino-Indian dispute, and the area in

which the conflict would take place

nist China. It was not, as has often been charged, that the Indian Govern­ment failed to recognize the potential

Leo E. Ros-e, a research political scientist of the Center for South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley, is one of America's leading authorities on the crucial Himalayan border region. He is the author of numerous publications in this field, and is Associate, Editor of Asian Sur­vey, a monthly publication of the In­stitute of International Studies, Uni­versity of California. He is coauthor 01 Himalayan Background, a book due for pUb.lication in April 1963.

danger posed by a Chinese-dominated Tibet. But Jawaharlal Nehru himself has admitted that his government made two .basic miscalculations in 1951: the first concerned the probable timing of the emergence of a Sino. 'Indian dispute, and the .second, the area in which this conflict was likely to be centered.

The over-all framework wit h in which India's foreign and defense policy evolved was the decision to con­centrate the country's sparse resources on economic development programs, Only the absolutely essential mini­mum was to be, diverted to defense spending, and then whenever possible to programs that contributed to eco­nomic development. Thus India's de­fense preparations, based as they were on the assumption that Pakistan was the immediate threat and that a ma­jor war with China was improbable until both countries had developed their resources to a much greater ex­tent, were bound to prove inadequate in any crisis involving a 'dispute with Peking.

It should be noted, however, that the emphasis on economic development has had its positive aspects, even as far as defense policy is concerned. In­dia is now far more capable of sus­taining a war economy than would have been possible a decade ago. More­over, the considerable success achieved in economic development has had an important effect on the internal po­litical situation, and' is' one reason why the Indian Government does not face a serious subversion problem in its present dispute with a Communist state.

Strengthened Defenses Within the limitations of the allo­

cation of resources, New Delhi moved as early as 1950 to strengthen Rima-

MDitary Review 4

'Iayan border defenses. New treaties were signed in 1950 and 1951 with the strategic border states of Nepal, Sik­kim, and Bhutan providing in effect for cooperatioll" in the event of out­side (that is, Chinese) aggression. Ef­forts were also made to strengthen what was then considered to be the most strategic section of the border, the Northeast Frontier Agency (NE­FA). New Delhi's assessment of de­fense requirements missed the poten. tial significance of the w est ern (Ladakh) frontier, a miscalculation that later proved extremely embar­rassing to the Indian Government.

In Tibet, India's policy in the 1950­59 period was directed primarily to­ward salvaging as much as possible of the former Indian position and, in particular, placing India's traditional trade and pilgrimage rights on a new legal basis through an agreement with Peking. Formalization of the status of the Indian Mission at Lhasa, which had been established in 1936 on an ad hoc basis, was also considered vital, not only for the protection of Indian Interests, but also as one means of sustaining and supporting the limited autonomy granted the Dalai Lama's government under the 1951 Sino-Ti­betan agreement.

Friendly Relations As conceived in 1951, then, India's

long-term interests on the northern border, as well as broader policy con­Siderations, required the establish­ment of friendly relations with the Peking regime. Conflicts of interests between the two most volatile Asian societies were to be avoided, or at least postponed. In this period there were no immediate issues upon which Indian and Chinese policies clashed, thus permitting Sino-Indian friend­ship to appear to flourish.

February 1963

From 1951 to 1956, thoug~, Peking was cautiously but persistently pre­paring the ground for t~~.e1imina­tion of the limited Tibetan autonomy permitted under the 1951 agreement. Meanwhile, China's policy dictated that open disagreements with India over Tibet or the Sino-Indian border were to be avoided. On several occa­sions high Chinese officials assured India that no territorial questions existed between the two governments and that Indian rights in Tibet would be scrupulously protected.

Policy Revised The outbreak of a widespread re­

volt among the Kham tribesmen of eastern Tibet in late 1955, however, forced a radical revision of Cninese policy in the frontier area, for the up­rising threatened the security of com­munications between China and Tibet.

The main components of this com­munication system were two lengthy roads, traversing fantastically diffi­cult terrain between China and Lhasa ----one from Szechwan and the other from Tsinghai Province. Both roads had been nastily constructed and were expensive and difficult to maintain. By 1956 their most serious handicap was that they ran through Kham.popu­lated areas. It was obvious to Peking that a long and arduous campaign was required before the Kham rebels, op­erating in ideal guerrilla country, could be suppressed. A new, more re­liable route to central Tibet was es­sential, and quickly, for the Kham re­volt could not long be isolated from the other areas of Tibet.

To solve their problem the Chinese decided on the construction of a road from a different direction-the by­pass route across the high albline plain known as Aksai Chin ("white stone" desert) that linked Sinkiang

5

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HIMALAYAS

and western Tibet. This route held several advantages over the two roads from the east. By compariaon, the topographical problems were minimal. Much of the Aksai Chin route trav· ersed deaolate, plateau terrain where, as Nehru noted, it was only necessary "to even the ground a little and reo move the stones and shrubs.'"

Moreover, most of this area was uninhabited and rebel activity was un­likely to pose any serious difficulties. Climatic considerations were also fa­vorable. The Aksai Chin is most easily crossed in the cold, dry winter months -the time of year that the other two roads are frequently obstructed by heavy snows and landslides.' Previ· ously, the intense summer heat and, the absence of water had detra<:,ted from the utility of the Aksai Chin route in the summ"r months, but mod­ern technological development red'lced the seriousness of these handicaps.

Indeed, there was only one major drawback: Aksai Chin is the north­eastern section of Kashmir and is, therefore, Indian territory. Appar­ently the route was so badly needed that Peking decided to risk a break with New Delhi, probably on the as­sumption that India would reluctantly recognize a fait accompli once the road had been constructed, in ·order to avoid straining Sino-Indian friendship and "peaceful coexistence."

Chinese parties surveyed the route in 1956 and road construction com­menced shortly thereafter. Peking an­nounced completion of the road on 5 October 1957, although the e x act alignment of th; route was npt speci.

1 JawaharlaJ Nehru. India'. FQ'I'eign PolicU. Se­lected SpeechfltJ. September, 1946..April, 1961. Gov­ernment of India. Ministt'Y of Information and Broadcasting, 1961, p. 33"3.

J Two historically verified invasions of Tibet had used the Aksili Chin route-the l)songar Mongolinvasion in 1717 and the Chinese Communist inva­sion in 1950-51. In both instances the invaders chose the early winter months for their movements.

fied. Reports of Chinese activity had reached New Delhi in late 1957, but weather conditions delayed the dis. Plltch of reconnaissance parties to the area until the spring of 1958. . The question has been asked Why

India was so late in learning of the road construction, but this is not as strange as it might appear. The area is. uninhabited and, until 1958, the Ipdian authorities only sent up occa· sional reconnaissance parties. Prior to 1951, Ladakhi trading parties had sometimes traversed Aksai Chin while on their way to Sinkiang, but the en· forced closure of the Indian Consulate in Yarkand in 1951 had terminated this commerce. The Chinese had also placed difficulties in the way of the establishment of the Indian Trading Agency in western Tibet, provided in the 1954 Sino-Indian Treaty, thus per· mitting this agency to operate only a few weeks of the year.

When it was finally determined that the Chinese road ran through Indian territory, a note was sent to Peking protesting the infringement of Indian sovereignty. Thus by the end of 1958 India and China were involved in a major territorial dispute, although it was several months before the Indian and Chinese publics were to learn of the collapse of "peaceful coexistence."

Primary Dbjective The extension of the Kham revolt

to central Tibet in March 1959 en· hanced the importance (If the Aksai Chin route. That this route is vital to China's position in Tibet was fur­ther demonstrated in 1961 when Pe­king abandoned the projected Tsing­hai-Lhasa railway and then announced that a railroad w 0 u I d be pushed through Aksai Chin connecting Kho· tan in Sinkiang with Taklakot, a strategic center on the Tibet-Nepal

Military Review 6

border, where it would meet the ex­tensive road system the Chinese have constructed directly to the north of the Himalayas.

Most of this road system is de­picted only tentatively on the map since its e x ac t alignment is not known. From Chinese, Nepali, and Indian sources, however, it is known that a road, starting at Taklakot, pa­rallels the entire Tibet-Nepal border

Marine Corp8 Gazette At one point in the dispute, Peking of· fered to renounce all Chinese claims to the NEFA in return for India's conces·

sion of Aksai Chin

(approximately 20 miles to the north according to a N epa I i boundary marker team that used this road in the spring of 1962), and then runs into the Chumbi Valley. From here roads run to the east, to the areas bordering on Bhutan and the NEFA.

Thus the primary objective of Chi­nese policy in the frontier area since 1959 has been to force India to sur­render the disputed areas of north­eastern Ladakh. Various tactics have

february 1963

been employed to attain this end. At one poin~ Chou En-Iai offered to re­nounce all Chinese claims to the NEFA in return for India's concession of Aksai Chin, but these terms were un­acceptable to New Delhi because it would have involved exchanging an area in active dispute for territory in which; until September 1962, In­dian control was unchallenged. Too, the patently expedient character of Chinese territorial claims had fully impressed itself on Indian officials .by 1960 and a surrender on one section of the border was viewed as an invi­tation for further Chinese claims..

To strengthen its demand for a "negotiated" settlement of the border dispute, Peking also' exerted direct pressure upon the Indian position in Ladakh. Military posts were estab­lished in Aksai Chin and feeder roads constructed, with the objective of bringing all the approximately 15,000 square miles of d.isputed territory un­der Chinese control.

Peking's deliberate refusal to spe­cify the precise extent of its territorial claims in the Ladakh' area constituted a mo~e subtle fonh .of psychological pressure. In 1956, when Peking de­cided to push a road through Aksai Chin, a new map had been issued de­picting this area as part of China. In September 1959 Chou En-hli wrote Nehru that the 1956 map correctly showed the boundary alignment as conceived by China.

Less than a year later the Chinese casually presented India with a new map incorporating an additional 2,000 square miles of Ladakh as Chinese territory. When questioned on the di­vergence between the two maps, Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, made the 'demonstrably absurd asser­tion that the boundaries as marked on

7

... SINO·INDIAN BORDER AREA

- - - - - PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES ROADS

===== ROAD (APPROXIMATE AUGNMENT)

AREAS CLAIMED BY CHINA: ~CONCEDED TO ~ LADAKH 1960 MAPl±lJJ±lllBBURMA 1960

NEW DELHI•

PATNA

•

bot" mapS' were equaUy valid.' There is only one interpretation that could make this statement meaningful: this waa an implied threat to produce an­other map claiming additional Indian territory if New Delhi continued in its stubborn refusal to cede Aksai Chin.

Indian Response The Indian response to Red China's

overtures and pressure tactics since 1959 has taken a number of forms. Proposals for negotiations were con­sistently rejected until and unless China withdrew from all territory in dispute. .

India commenced a program aimed at reducing the tremendous tactical advantages the Chinese enjoyed in the Immediate vicinity of the border. A ban was imposed on the export of "strategic" goods to Tibet. thus com­plicating the problems the Chinese faced in supplying a large military establishment in Tibet. High priori­ties were assigned to the development of communications in the frontier areas, with Ladakh receiving special emphasis. By 1962 an all-weather road bad heen completed to Leh, the dis­trict headquarters in Ladakh, and sup­port roads to various sectionS' of the border were scheduled for completion by 1964. Substantial progress was alS'o made in the development of air trans­POrt.

As the development of communi­cations permitted. I n d ian military posts were established in the vicinity of the border. In the NEFA, posts had been placed earlier at every major aeeess point along the McMahon Line, al that time respected, although not

INew China New8 Agency. Peking, G December Itu,_ Su",ello! the China. Mainland Press, 12 De­ttmber 1961. Number 2637. p. 27.

flilllly 1963

recognized, by the Chinese as the de facto boundary.

In Ladakh the tactics had to be dif· ferent since, the new' posts were set up on territory in active dispute with the Chinese. Here, the Indian objec­tives were to block all paths for fur­ther Chinese penetration; to regain con t r 0 lover territory previously seized by the Chinese; and, when fea­sible, to cut the supply lines to Chi­nese posts. In addition, several bar­rack and supply posts were established in the immediate Vicinity of the bor­der in 1961, thus permitting the trans­formation of advance Indian posts into all-year stations. Previously, both the Chinese and Indians had withdrawn border posts with the onset of winter, a situation that greatly favored the Chinese since for climatic and topo­graphical reasons they could remain longer in the fall and return earlier in the spring.

The I n d i a Ii military program achieved limited but significant suc­cess, as was attested by the increas­ingly strident· Chinese complaints about "Indian imperialism." Of the 12.000 square miles of Ladakh previ­ously lost to the Chinese, 2,500 square miles had been regained by August 1962. Obviously, these developments constituted a serious threat to the vital Chinese communication lines across Aksai Chin. A critical point was reached in July 1962 when a large Chinese detachment througb intimi­dation tactics attempted to force the withdrawal of a newly established In­dian post in the Galwan River VjllleY. The h e a v i I y outnumbered Iridian ' troops stood firm and refused to with­draw. Finally, after more than a wllek of tense maneuvering, the Chinese withdrew witbout having attained tbeir objective.

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HIMALAYAS

Direct Military Action To Peking, this incident must have

dispelled any illusions that its goals could be achieved through the mere th,reat of the use of force. Moreover, the comparative position of the two adversaries on the Ladakh border had changed considerably from the 1959 situation when the Chinese held an unchallenged superiority. With the completion of roads presently under construction, the Indian position would be further improved. Possibly 1962 was the last year in which the Chinese could take direct military action in this area with the advantages still heavily weighted in their favor.

Peking's decision to I a u n chan armed attack on the eastern and west· ern extremities of the Sino-Indian frontier in October 1962 was doubt­less motivated by a number of consid­erations, some of them global in per­spective and, hence, subject to diverse interpretations.

Red China's immediate goal in the border area, however, is more readily apparent. The failure to achieve its primary objective in Ladakh through "peaceful" means placed Peking in a dilemma. Chinese control over Aksai Chin had not been consolidated, and new, more drastic measures were con­sidered necessary. The tim'e of year and locale chosen would seem to indi­cate that, in the first stage of opera­tions at least, the Chinese viewed the attack as a limited war with limited objectives. All areas of Ladakh shown as Chinese on the 1960 map were to be seized as we)) as a large section of the NEFA, the latter possibly for use as a bargaining lever in future ne­gotiations with the Indians.

Perhaps other considerations, only indirectly related to the Sino-Indian dispute, were uppermost in Chinese

Communist calculations. The tWists and turns characteristic of Sino.So. viet relations in recent years reached a critical stage in 1962, threatening to culminate in a complete and open split. The reasons for the deteriora­tion in the relations between these two powers are exceedingly complex, involving perhaps a basic divergence D

il) their respective views of the world, But one·factor that has long in­ ,

iuriated Peking was Moscow's implicit "pro-India'" policy with regard to the India-China border dispute, most evi· dent in the USSR's economic aid pro­gram. At the very time (1959-60) that economic assistance to China was being reduced drastically, the Soviets were substantially increasing aid to India-and much of it in heavy in­dustries. Moreover, under an indif­ferently disguised military assistance program, aid was extended, aimed spe­cifically at strengthening India's de· fenses in the frontier area. New Delhi was sold Soviet transport planes and helicopters, suitable for use in the Himalayan regions, at substantially reduced prices.

To add insult to injury, Soviet in­structors helped train Indian pilots in the use of these aircraft in the Ladakh area, and the world witnessed the strange spectacle of Communist So­viet pilots helping sup ply Indian troops facing Communist Chi n ese force~.

USSR's, 'Position Difficult Chin;1's attack on India obviously

placed'Moscow in a difficult position. particularly since it coincided, inten, tionally or not, with the Cuban crisis The definitive account of the inter· relationship between these and othe! events will not be written for several years. Neverlheless, there is sufficienl grounds for speculating that Peking'!

Military Revil' 10

c decision to seek a military solution ~f the dispute with India also consti­tuted one facet of a major offensive against Khrushchev's leadership, both within the Soviet Union and the Com­munist bloc. The least that could be expected was that the Soviet Govern­ment would be forced to abandon or modify its tacitly pro-Indian policy.

Indeed, the elaborate pretense with which Peking sought to give the im­pression that China was acting de­fensively in launching the attack on India may be explained in part by the existence of a mutual defense pact with the Soviet Union. If Moscow could be induced or maneuvered into accepting the Chinese version of the origin of the conflict, all Soviet aid to India would have to cease, and mil­Itary and economic aid be extended to China. The USSR, however, has been careful to avoid this pitfall in ber official statements on the conflict.

Yet a flexible Soviet policy will be­come increasingly more impractical if Sino-Indian hostilities should be re­newed on a large scale--unless, of course, Moscow is prepared to risk an open rupture with China. The attitude 01 other Communist Parties, and par­tiCUlarly Asian parties, may well be crucial in determining ultimate policy on this question, and this would seem to preclude anything more than a pol­icy of nonalignment leaning toward China for the Soviet Union.

Implications The implications of the conflict for

Sino-Indian relations are, naturally, even more comprehensive. China's 'limited war" policy failed to achieve the results confidently expected be­cause India rejected all cease-fire pro­POsals that did not provide for the withdrawal of Chinese forces to po­sitions held prior to 8 September, the

february 1963 .

day Chinese troops first crossed the McMahon Line. Having failed to "in­duce" New Delhi to negotiate a sur­render, Peking decided to exert fur­ther mil ita r y pressure. A second offensive was launched in the NEFA area in mid-November, which suc­ceeded in overWhelming the badly out­numbered Indian forces.

Having impressively flexed its mus­ c

cJes, the Chinese then unilaterally im­posed a cease-fire along both the NEFA and Ladakh fronts, at the same time offering India humiliating terms that amounted to a virtual sur­render of some of India's most basic strategic and political interests. PeL king announced that Chinese troops would withdraw 20 kilometers to the north or east of the. line of "actual control" as of 7 November 1959 and the Indians were. warned to withdraw all forces an equal distance to the south or west of this line. Negotia­tions would then be undertaken to settle the boundary dispute on the basis of the existing situation.

Nothing less than an irreparable military defeat could have made these terms acceptable to·New Delhi. In ad­dition to the loss of territory involved, India would have to abandon most of her major lines of defense in both the Ladakh and NEFA areas. In these circumstances China could renew her aggression at any time under condi­tions even more advantageous than those prevailing at present.

To meet this threat, India would have to divert her energies and re­sources to military preparations while China, as the potential aggressor, would not be under similar obliga­tions. No less critical is the effect the..! acceptance of these terms would havel on the Himalayan border states and southeast Asia where Indian prestige

11

HIMALAYAS

and influence has already suffered a serious blow. China could' not be per­mitted to enjoy the fruits of aggres­siqn quite so easily. Certainly, the temper of Indi.an public opinion was strongly and unanimously opposed to any surrender to Peking's dictates.

Alternative Policies Despite the successes achieved to

date, Peking must decide between a number of alternative policies, none of which are particularly attractive, 'Presumably, a return to the pre-Oc­tober situation in the Ladakh and NEFA areas is unacceptable to China, and some form of action will be re­quired to retain the initiative in Chi­nese hands. Perhaps. further incur­sions, limited in scope and area, may be undertaken in order to impress upon New Delhi that the price de­manded for a settlement will become progressively higher the longer India refuses to negotiate on the basis of the existing situation. Or the Chinese may decide to shift the main area of conflict to new ground, possibly the border states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan where India faces even greater problems in countering Chinese moves than on her own territory.

Inherent in both these policies is the greatly enhanced danger .of all-out war, which China may still prefer to avoid. In an expanded war situation the short-range advantages the Chi­nese hold throughout most of the bor­der area because of the comparative ease of communications within Tibet would diminish somewhat in impor­tance. Virtually every item of supply, including gasoline, must be brought into Tibet from China over lengthy and unreliable lines of communica­tion. Once the Himalayan range is crossed, China's logistics problems be­come even more formidable.

Moreover, India's sources of exter­nal military aid are greater, particu. larly if the USSR maintains her prCB­ent attitude toward the dispute, Any superiority in weapons the Chinese ,may have had in the initial period of the conflict would thus prove tempo. rary. Indeed, the timing of the attack on India, so advantageous from the viewpoint of the limited objectivCB Peking 'apparently had in view, may eventually prove to have been a serio ous miscalculation if the conflict is not soon brought to a successful con­clusion. '

Repercussions The prospect of an extended period

of hostilities with China cannot help but have fundamental repercussions on India's relations with other neigh· boring states. A settlement of the long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, for instance, is abso­lutely essential to the maximization of Indian defensive efforts on the north­ern frontier. Both Pakistan and lnilia have legitimate security interests'in Kashmir which would be surrendered only with the greatest reluctance. With Communist China's intentions now proved aggressively. hostile, La­dakh is vital to the security of the entire Sino-Indian frontier, while the Gilgit area of Kashmir (presently un­der Pakistani control) is equally im· portant to Pakistan's defense posture, Unfortunately, this fact vastly com· plicates the solution 'of \he Kashmir dispute, since the best lines of com­munication into Ladakh and Gilgit run through Kashmir Valley, the real bone of contention between these two powers. It may be unrealistic, there· fore, to expect anything more than a moratorium on the Indo-Pakistani dis­pute until the Chinese threat has di­minished.

Military Review

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The Chinese Communist aggression also holds incalculable dangers for \00 Himalayan border states of Ne­pal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, possibly the next objectives of Chinese expansion­ist designs. Sikkim is in the most ex­posed position, for the easiest access route to the heart of the Gangetic

trate on Nepal and Bhutan (or just Bhqtan) which at present are not pro­tected by the Indian armed forces imd in which communications are less well developed.

The immediate effect of the Chinese Communist aggression was to tie the border states more closely with India.

United Natinn8

The settlement of the India-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir is essential for maximum Indian defense efforts on 'the northern frontier. Here, a United Nations observer

transmits an Indian complaint to a Pakistani officer on the cease-fire line.

Plain in India lies through this tiny Indian protectorate.

On the other hand, Indian troops 'reentrenched throughout Sikkim and communications are comparatively well developed. Unless the Chinese were intent upon pressing an attack ilirough Sikkim to the borders of east Pakistan, cutting off Assam and the NEFA ,from the rest of India in the jroeess, they might prefer to concen-

Fear of China has been real, if offi­cially unacknowledged, in the border states. Heretofore, the fear has been mitigated by the belief that China would not directly challenge India's hegemony south of the Himalayas. This assumption completely shattered, the limited degree of flexibility grant­ed the border states by their previous status as "buffers" between India and China has been largely dissipated.

13

HIMALAYAS

Sikkim and .Bhutan are probably more directly inhibited by recent de­v;eJopments than Nepal, whose attitude toward the current power struggle in the Himalayas will be determined to a con~iderable extent by the success and firmness with which India event­ually handles Chinese aggression. For the moment the common danger ap­pears to have overridden the mutual recriminations and suspicions that had periodically disturbed relations be­tween Nepal and India in recent years. But the temptation to seek security through guarantees from China, no matter how little faith may be reposed in Peking's word, could prove tempt­ing to Nepal if China is permitted an unchallenged superiority through the Himalayan area. The repercussions on India's security would be disastrous.

Fundamental Changes To meet the multifarious threat

posed by China's aggressive policies, fundamental changes in the orienta­tion of Indian foreign policy are in­evitable. Initially, these may not take the form of an outright repudiation of basic principles, such as nonalign­ment, but may be most perceptible in the way in which these principles are interpreted and implemented. In the first place, India would consider it advantageous to encourage the Soviet Union and the European Communist Parties to maintain at least a neutral position in the Sino-Indian dispute. Soviet economic and military a,'lsist­ance to India, although desirable for its political impact, is not the crucial fa~tor in New Delhi's calculations. Far more important, the Soviet Union must not be placed in a position where she might feel constrairied to extend substantial military assistance to the Peking regime.

Furthermore, the abandonment of

nonalignment could easily tend to alienate India from important see. tions of the Afro-Asian bloc. Peking's intensive efforts to expand its influ. ence, at India's expense, throughout the nonaligned camp make the situa. ·tion even more critical. New Delhi has ample reasons for feeling gravely dis. appointed with the hesitant and equiv· 'ocal position assumed by some of the nonaligned powers in their reaction to Chinese aggression. Nevertheless, In· dia's ties with these states must be strengthened, and this could not be achieved by an outright renunciation of nonalignment.

Indeed: one of the more intriguing aspects of the current situation con· cerns the policy India may now decide to pu·rsue toward southeast Asia, for here also previous Indian polky is outdated. If circumstances should ap· pear favorable, New Delhi may even be prepared to throw its weight be· hind efforts to establish some new form of relationship among south and southeast Asian countries, aimed pri· marily at forestalling China's bid for the domination of all of Asia.

Could India hope to have any sue· cess in welding south and southeast Asia into a viable alliance? Realistic· ally speaking, probably not, at least until the impression of China's over· whelming strength has been effectively countered. Nevertheless, China's reo sort to overt aggression has greatly increased already existe.nt apprehen­sions in all southeast As'ian countries and has finally dispelled any illusions that the Peking regime is a sincere adherent of "peaceful coexistence."

Prior to October 1962 the mere sug· gestion of the necessity for a unified Asian response to the threat posed bl Chinese expansionism would have been sum'tharily dismissed by many Asiam

Military Review 14

as "cold war" politics. While the ob­stacles confronting such a proposal are still formidable, a.t least now it would be assured of consideration by southeast Asian Governments desper­ately seeking alternative forms of se­curity against the ambitions of their powerful northern neighbor.

What are the implications of the Sino-Indian conflict for the West? Perhaps the most significant conse­quence in the long rUll will be found in that largely intangible emotional factor upon which relations between countries are based. The generous and unquestioned response from Mr. Kennedy and Mr. MacMillan to In­dia's urgent pleas for military assist­ance has had a dramatic impact on

Indian public opinion, unmatched by any event in postindependent .India's history. In the West there is a fuller aPllreciation of India's vital impor­tance to the defense of. the rest of Asia against Communist expansion, as well as a tendency to view India;s complex relations with neighboring states in a new, broader perspective.

There will, of course, continue to be issues upon which India and the West will disagree. But these will seem less substantial than in the past, and the spheres in which there is a recognized community of interests, already sub­stantial, have now been considerably enlarged. Needless to say, the poten­tial implications for the future of Asia are tremendous.

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fllirory 1963 15