Hillsborough Booklet 1989 Football Disaster

8/7/2019 Hillsborough Booklet 1989 Football Disaster

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The Hillsborough Football Disaster Context and Consequences

Press Pack Introduction

In 1989, Liverpool and Nottingham Forest Football Clubs had progressed to the semi-nal stage o theEnglish Football Association (FA) Cup competition. The English FA decided that the match would take placeat the Hillsborough ootball stadium, home to Sheeld Wednesday Football Club, on Saturday April 15th.

More than 50,000 supporters travelled to Sheeld to watch the match but only six minutes were playedbeore the game was stopped by the reeree, as it became apparent that a deadly crush was unolding in theenclosed pens o the Leppings Lane End terrace.

96 people died as a result o the Disaster, hundreds more were injured and thousands were traumatised inwhat was claimed to be one o the saest grounds in the country.

A public inquiry was launched to answer the question o why Hillsborough happened, with Lord Justice

Taylor appointed to oversee proceedings.

Even though he ound that mismanagement o the crowds by South Yorkshire Police caused the Disaster,and that a number o ailings by the stadiums owners and saety advisors contributed to the high death toll,no individual, group or organisation has ever been held legally accountable or what is still the worst disasterin British sporting history.

The lack o ocial accountability has allowed or entirely alse accounts o the Disaster to continue to bepresented as act. Consequently an entire new generation has grown up not knowing what really occurredor why and most importantly not knowing where real blame really lies.

This press pack has been produced to illustrate what really needs to be known.

Herein you will fnd:A booklet which documents the key events that led to and caused the Disaster plus all thesignicant events that ollowed in its wake. This includes a reerence section o urther reading to expandknowledge o how a ootball match turned to tragedy. There is also a memorial page to illustrate the highprice o complacency.

A note rom both the author and the editor on why they undertook this project.

A chronological timeline, illustrating key events prior to and ollowing the Disaster, as well aswhen all the key decisions were undertaken on the day.

A table o ailures, highlighting the numerous breaches, and their subsequent deadly eects,

o the governments Green Guide saety standards.

A graphical representation o the stadium, to place the reader at the scene o the Disaster.

Hillsboroughs 20 Questions; a brie summary o key questions that should be asked.You decide the answers based on what you read in the rest o the release!

A study on the Duty o Care, which examines the areas o responsibility or the authorities.

You can contact us through the www.hdino.com websites main email address:[email protected]

Nicola McMillan, Author

andJim Sharman, Editor


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A Note rom the Author

At every stage ollowing the public inquiry into Hillsborough, the authorities appear to have been moreconcerned with burying the issue along with the dead, and not getting to the bottom o why it happened.The complete lack o accountability has not only denied the amilies any sense o closure, it has allowedthose responsible to avoid reprimand. It has also allowed or misconceptions regarding the causes o theDisaster to persist.

The derisory verdicts at the trials o Duckeneld and Murray, plus the decision not to have any retrial,is just so indicative o the lack o accountability that has gone beore. Misinormation is still continuallyregurgitated to the public. In spite o the vast wealth o inormation which is so easily accessible since theadvent o the internet, the original slurs are still spouted. The dated allegations purporting to supporterresponsibility, made in two BBC television programmes in 2008, prompted me to create this document,dubbed HFD with the aim o showing how utterly without oundation those allegations are.

The Politics Show made an incorrect and explicit link between Hillsborough and hooliganism, whilst thepopular Eastenders programme made a more subtle, implicit link. Both sparked outrage and indignationrom those who know the truth, and helped once again to reinorce the myths and lies that have persisted.

The aim was to help break this cycle o lies, to create a short and succinct document that not onlydemonstrates why Hillsborough happened but also illustrates where the myths originated rom and whythey have taken hold. I wanted to create a document that empowered survivors and supporters so that,whenever they encounter someone spreading these myths, they can quickly and comprehensively countersuch allegations.

Personal narratives have oten been used in the past to counter the views o those who believe supporterswere responsible. They are oten and inexplicably dismissed or being biased, which is incredibly rustrating.To counter that, I wanted to create a very impersonal account o the Disaster, eaturing acts which canbe veried. HFD has been a collaborative project and inormation has come rom a variety o documentedsources, all careully reerenced.

In its original orm, HFD was posted on an internet message board shortly beore the 19th anniversary andthe response has been terric, and not just rom Liverpool supporters. It has been reposted elsewhere andused as a tool to counteract the lies on various internet ora.

In this version, it seems that the impartial reader is nally hearing the other side o the story, taking onboard the acts o the Disaster, quickly silencing South Yorkshire Police apologists.

See it as a good introduction to the Disaster, a useul resource guide and a tool to combat those who want to

spread lies, myths and misinormation, or as Maria Eagle (MP or Liverpool Garston) called it in the House oCommons, May 8th 1998,black propaganda.

Nicola McMillanFebruary 2009


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A Note rom the Editor

Since the day it happened, Hillsborough has both saddened and angered me in equal measure, but ever sincethe legal trials were concluded the overriding emotion became one o anger.

I am angry that the people whose incompetence caused the Disaster escaped; that the authorities whoare meant to protect us merely sought to protect themselves and sometimes not even each other. SouthYorkshire Police blamed Sheeld Wednesday FC, who themselves blamed Sheeld City Council, andeveryone blamed the LFC supporters.

I am angry that the lies spread to, and then by, certain media refect to this day what the majority see as thecauses o the Disaster. I am angry that I could not do anything about it until now. The author presented anopportunity or me to give something to the campaign or truth and I sincerely hope that her work will gosome way to educating people that things are not what they seemed; that you cannot, should not, rely on

what you read in the newspapers.

Justice is a word oten used in the context o Hillsborough people challenge it and ask what kind ojustice is being sought, since they do not understand the depth o deception behind the Disaster. Thereoreinjustice is, I eel, the most representative word to describe the whole aair and maybe that will emphasisethe miscarriage o justice ollowing the investigation process carried out by the authorities.

That the lies and spin have etched themselves into the conscience o the nation and beyond is a damningindictment o the establishment and conrms the need or re-education o a population that hasdesensitised itsel to objective reporting and review, allowing itsel to be steered, like sheep, by the machineo authority.

From day one there have been those willing to place themselves above the parapets in order to challengethe lie. Many have suered unimaginable loss and pain, yet continue to try to clear the sullied names o theirrelatives and riends. These people are heroes.

For example, I have huge admiration or Anne Williams or reusing to be silenced, or reusing to givein, or digging deeper and or taking her sons case to the European Courts. Her courage, strength anddetermination are nothing short o inspirational and should serve as an example to all those who areadamant that they will not allow a corrupt system to ride roughshod over the truth.

I ervently hope that the European Courts deliver a verdict that will enable us all to pursue ourdemocratically-elected government, the very people who represent us, or a new review that willnally bring to public scrutiny all o the acts, not just the ones that were altered or ignored in order tomade it convenient or certain people to dodge their responsibility and to cover up the real causes o the

Hillsborough Football Disaster.

Jim SharmanFebruary 2009


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Hillsboroughs 20 Questions

1 Why did the FA not, as matter o routine, seek to ensure that Sheeld Wednesday Football Club had avalid and up-to-date saety certicate or the ground prior to its selection?

2 Why did the FAs Chie Executive, Graham Kelly, not pass on his concerns about the saety o theHillsborough stadium to the FAs Selection Committee?

3 Why was the Leppings Lane capacity never re-assessed by saety advisors, in spite o policerecommendations in 1981?

4 Why did Sheeld City Council permit no ewer than 17 breaches o the governmentsGreen Guide on saety standards to occur within the Hillsborough stadium?

5 Why was Chie Superintendent Duckeneld put in charge o a major semi-nal only 21 days beore thegame, when he was relatively inexperienced at policing such events?

6 Why was there not a more eective police operation in ltering arriving supporters, as there had beenin 1988?

7 As the crisis unolded outside the turnstiles, why did senior ocers decide not to delay the kick-o, inspite o appeals rom ocers outside the ground?

8 Why was the lethal access tunnel to the pens never closed, as it had been in 1988?9 Why did ocers not recognise the state o the central pens, as television commentator John Motson and

video technician Roger Houldsworth did?10 Why was one CCTV cameras record o the central pens between 2.30pm and 3.06pm wiped clear?11 Who stole two CCTV tapes rom the SWFC Police Control Room and why?12 Why did ocers in the Police Control Room relay messages that supporters had orced open the gates

when Chie Superintendent David Duckeneld had in act given the order?13 Why did it take until 3.30pm or the request or medical personnel to help the dying and the injured

to be made?14 Given that 42 ambulances reached the ground, why did more o them not get on to the pitch to provide

expert medical help?15 Why did only 14 o those who died reach any hospital?16 Why was the citys Major Medical Disaster Plan never put into eect?17 Why, when it is not standard practice, did the Coroner seek to take the blood-alcohol levels o each victim,

including a ten-year-old boy?18 Why was a 3.15pm cut-o point permitted to be established during the inquests?19 Why has there been a persistent reusal by the authorities to acknowledge, and take into account,

the evidence that suggests not all deaths occurred prior to that 3.15pm cut-o point?20 Why has no individual group or organisation been held to account or the worst Disaster in British

sporting history?


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Hillsborough

Timeline or April 15th 1989

12:00 noon Supporters start to arrive at Leppings Lane / outside the ground.2:00pmDuckeneld and Murray go to Police Control Room.2:30 to 2:40pm Large concentration o supporters bottlenecked outside the turnstile area.2:38pm Strong surge along dividing ence enclosing pens 3 & 4.2:39pm Boy carried out through Gate C.2:40pm Request sent to Police Control to send spare mounted ocers to Leppings Lane End.Announcement on tannoy system asks people to move orward. Further surge in pens 3 & 4.2:42pm Radio system develops ault or several minutes.2:47pm Request rom Marshall to open gates at Leppings Lane End.2:48pm Gate C opened to eject supporter. Others enter beore gate C closed again.2:50pm Pens 3 & 4 are ull. Inspector Sewell deploys 60 ocers to the track, the West Stand and Gate A.2:51pmFootball teams announced over the tannoy.

2:52pm Message rom Marshall that people outside might be killed i gates are not opened. Gate C opened onDuckenelds orders, allowing 2,000 supporters to enter.2:54pm Teams come on to the pitch.2:57pm Gate C closed again.2:59pm People in the pens start climbing over the perimeter ence to escape the crush.3:00pm The match kicks o. Call rom Constable Waugh at SYP HQ asking i ambulances required.Answer no. Gate 1 opened to allow supporters into enclosure. Jackson sees supporters on pitch and goes upto the Police Control Room to report.3:04pm Beardsley strikes the crossbar at the Kop end. Inevitable surge in the pens.3:05pm Crush barrier towards the ront o pen 3 gives way, causing supporters to all over.3:06pm Match stopped by reeree when Greenwood approaches him on the pitch. Murray radios or a feeto ambulances.3:10pm Jackson asked to conrm Operation Support by Force Incident Room. Request to Control romperimeter ence or bolt cutters.3:13pm First ambulance (rom St. Johns) comes on to the pitch at the North East corner and drives to theperimeter ence close to gate 3. Requests or cutting gear and or the re brigade made by Bichard, who isthen inormed that supporters had orced Gate C.3:17pm Kelly, Kirton and Mackrell go to the Control Room or inormation. Duckeneld says he thinks thereare atalities and the game is likely to be abandoned. He also says there has been an inrush o supporters andthat Gate C had been orced open.3:17pm Ambulances begin to arrive at the Penistone Rd entrance.3:20pm Second ambulance enters the ground.3:22pm Fire Brigade turns up at both Leppings Lane & Penistone Rd and is told by a police inspector,I dont think we really need you.3:29pm Requests made or doctors and nurses at the ground.

3:30pm Meeting in the club boardroom with Duckeneld, Jackson, Kelly, the match reeree andrepresentatives o the three clubs. Duckeneld indicates that the match is likely to be abandoned.3:35pm Detective Chie Superintendent Addis makes contact via telephone with Control.3:35-3:36pm Edwards ambulance enters the ground.3:40pm BBC Radio Two: Unconrmed reports are that a door was broken at the end that was holdingLFC supporters.4:30pm Last casualties leave the ground.5:15pm Duckeneld and Jackson travel to SYP HQ.5:45pm Chie Constable Peter Wright and his deputy meet Duckeneld and Jackson.Between 4:30pm on April 15th and 9:00am on April 16th Two CCTV tapes are stolen rom groundsPolice Control Room. The crime and motive remain unsolved.


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Hillsborough

Timeline or April 15th 1989

Hillsborough

The Hillsborough Football Disaster

Context & Consequences


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AcknowledgementsThe production o this document would not have beenpossible without the invaluable assistance, inspirationand input o many individuals.

Just like the 96, none o them will be orgotten.

Our respective better halves, oten neglected duringwriting but nonetheless always worthy muses:Liam OMahonyJoanne Sharman

Feedback & assistance:Sheila Coleman

Sarah DeanePhil HammondMichael HinesAmanda JacksDamian KavanaghBob McCluskeyPhil ScratonDave SmithWendy WhiteAnne Williams

We thank the sta at Red And White Kop or all theirassistance in taking the project orward rom an initialinternet orum post to what it is today. For much assistancewith design, layout and ormatting, we especially thank

the ollowing:Alan FarlieMike Turner

We also thank all the sta at LiverpoolFC.tv or their workin assisting us to promote the project and or all their helpin contacting various journalists and other media sources.Here we especially thank the ollowing:Matt OwenMatt Walker

Finally we owe a huge debt o gratitude to all theindividuals and companies or their contributions thatallowed this work to be published, especially Mark atCDP Print Management or organising the subsidy.

Further inormation and discussion can be ound on theollowing links:

www.hfdinfo.comwww.facebook.com/group.php?gid=12210106214

I you wish, you can contact us through the main websitesemail address with any queries:

[email protected]

First published by Em-Project Limited in partnership withhdino, in Great Britain 2009.2009 the authors.

Printed by CDP Print Management.

Designed by Em-Project Limited.

All rights reserved.No part o this publication may be reproduced, stored in aretrieval system, transmitted in any orm or by any means,electronic, mechanical, including photocopying, recordingor otherwise, without having obtained prior permissionrom the publisher.

A catalogue record or this book is available rom theBritish Library ISBN 978-0-9562275-0-8


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On Saturday April 15th 1989 a atal crush occurred on theterraces o the Hillsborough ootball stadium in Sheeld.It was, and remains to this day, the worst tragedy inBritish sporting history, as 96 people died and hundredsmore were injured.

The Disaster became known simply as Hillsborough.

What ollows is a reconstruction o the key events thatled to, and caused, the Disaster. The history o ocialinvestigations, as well as the legal pursuit by victimsamilies, is also detailed.

The inormation and ndings that emerged rom thoseevents are concisely reported herein.

These are, then, the important acts rom beore, duringand ater the Disaster.

The Hillsborough Football Disaster Context and Consequences 01

Introduction


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Foreword

When disasters happen, the sheer scale, conusion and trauma o the moment overwhelm allinvolved: the dying, the injured, the survivors, the witnesses and the authorities. No-one shouldbe content with pointing the nger o blame at those who make errors o judgement in the heat othe moment.

Yet, when institutional complacency and gross negligence by those in positions o powercontribute to the circumstances o disaster, rom the ailure to respond eectively to theemergency, and the treatment o the bereaved and survivors, and to deceitul allegations thatattempt to shit responsibility onto the victims and their amilies, we are dealing with an entirelydierent issue. When the processes o investigation and inquiry not only ail to deliver eventhe basic elements o natural justice but also collude to mask the truth and deny culpability,we have to question their role within a society that prides itsel on its democratic principles and

its rule o law.

The deaths o 96 men, women and children at Hillsborough, the hundreds o those injured and thethousands traumatised, are the tip o an iceberg o grie and suering among riends and amilies.Each year at Aneld on 15th April, thousands stand together on the Kop to share in a collectivetribute to those who set out on a beautiul spring day to watch a ootball match, never to return.

The Disaster unolded in ront o television cameras, was recorded on CCTV, and happened in thepresence o hundreds o journalists; yet soon ater, the myths o Hillsborough consolidated aroundblaming the ans or orcing entry, being drunk and violent and, to paraphrase Brian Clough, killingtheir own people. Emanating rom a lie told by the South Yorkshire Police Match Commander,while ans were being pulled rom the terraces, the lens o hooliganism has continued to dominate

commentaries on Hillsborough 20 years on. With the media so heavily represented how has thismyth been sustained?

Hillsborough: Context and Consequencessets about answering that question, and manyothers. It provides an inormed, well-constructed and accessible account o the backgroundto the Disaster, what happened in the build-up and the emergency responses. It covers theatermath and the ailures o the lengthy legal processes in establishing responsibility. It lendsemphasis to the Home Oce inquiry that identied overcrowding as the main cause and policemismanagement o the crowd as the main reason. What ollows is an overview o the key issues,easily read, yet ully reerenced. It is an invaluable, educative resource or those seeking a clearunderstanding o the injustices o Hillsborough.

Regrettably, it is necessary to do this because the myths o Hillsborough live on, leaving the

bereaved and survivors still, ater 20 years, deending their reputations and those o their lovedones. In itsel, this serves as a reminder that injustice was the tragedy that arose out o theHillsborough Disaster. It is an indictment o the justice system that ater two decades no-one hasbeen held responsible institutionally or individually or the disaster or the cover-up that ollowed.There has been no acknowledgement o responsibility and no apology. What ollows contributessignicantly to putting the record straight.

Phil ScratonProessor o CriminologyInstitute o Criminology and Criminal JusticeSchool o LawQueens UniversityBelast

February 2009


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04 Grounds For Concern05 The Liverpool End05 Turnstile Admission06 Finding Their Own Level06 The Central Pens06 Even Distribution O Supporters07 Open The Gate!08 The Notion O Inrushing Supporters09 The Crush09 The Emergency Response09 The Liverpool Supporters Reaction09 Police In The Control Room

10 Pitch-Side Police Reaction11 The Medical Response12 The Immediate Atermath12 The Media View12 Policing Opinion13 Late14 Ticketless14 Drunk15 Aggressive16 The SYP And SWFC View17 The Supporters View17 The Taylor Report

Legal Proceedings19 Hillsboroughs Cold Case19 The Inquest Who, Where And When19 The DPP19 The Inquest To Establish How?20 The Police Complaints Authority20 The Judicial Review21 Civil Cases21 The Scrutiny22 The Police Statements22 The Private Prosecution24 Hope For Hillsborough

Glossary25 Books And Articles25 Reports26 Websites26 Media26 External Links


Contents


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Grounds For ConcernThe Hillsborough Disaster o 1989 was by no means the rst time ootball supporters hadencountered problems at this specic ground. The turnstiles requently could not cope with thenumber o people awaiting admittance and, inside the ground, there were recurrent incidentso crushing at the Leppings Lane End.

The rst recorded incident took place in 1981 during the Football Association (FA) Cup semi-nalxture between Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club (Wolves) and Tottenham HotspurFootball Club (Spurs). In spite o having a larger average ollowing, Spurs supporters were givenewer tickets than Wolves and were also allocated the 10,100 capacity Leppings Lane End.

Within minutes o the game starting a crush developed in the stand and 38 Spurs supporters

were injured. On this occasion the police allowed the aected supporters access to the pitch.

Following this incident the FA opted to select other venues to host FA Cup semi-nals or the nextsix years. Stadium owners, Sheeld Wednesday Football Club (SWFC), were prompted to makesignicant changes to the Leppings Lane End. South Yorkshire Police (SYP) suggested a reductionin overall capacity1 and the division o terraces into sections. The idea was that the capacity couldbe distributed equally and evenly across the terrace. Lateral ences were erected on the terrace tocreate ve penned areas.

Despite these changes, there was no reassessment o Leppings Lanes capacity. The individualpen capacities were carved rom the 10,100 gure. There was neither any system to count thenumber o ans entering each pen nor any system to warn when a pen had reached its capacity.

New ideas were drated to resolve these issues but never implemented. With no count system,SWFC was in breach o its saety certicate at every single match.2

It was not until 1987, that problems resuraced, when the FA reselected Hillsborough to host theFA Cup semi-nal. There was evidence that the central pens were uncomortably overcrowdedon that occasion and again at the 1988 Cup semi-nal.3

Prior to both the 88 and 89 games, Liverpool Football Club (LFC) challenged the decision toallocate the smaller terrace section to their supporters, while the enormous Kop stand wentto Nottingham Forest Football Club (NFFC).


1 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 124.2 David Conn, The Beautiul Game: Searching the Soul o Football, page 94.3 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 181.


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The rst objection in 1988 was due to the size o the allocation. The second objection in 1989was due to the complaints that LFC received rom its supporters, who had experienced crushingin 1988.

Despite the grounds or concern, Hillsborough was once again selected to host the 1989 FA Cupsemi-nal match between LFC and NFFC.

The Liverpool EndSYP advised the FA regarding which end o the ground should be given to which set osupporters, as they had done in 1987 and 1988.

For so-called saety reasons4 SYP repeated in 1989 the ticket and turnstile allocations o

the 88 semi-nal, with LFC being allocated the north and west stands, NFFC the south andeast stands.

Just as in the previous year, LFC supporters were once again given ewer tickets than theiropponents. Their allocation was 24,000 tickets whereas NFFCs was 29,000 tickets.

LFCs supporters were able to access the stadium through just 23 turnstiles, whereas NFFCsupporters had access through 60 turnstiles.

Turnstile AdmissionThe 60 turnstiles allocated to NFFC ran the ull length o two sides o the ground, whereasLFCs turnstiles were all situated at one corner end.

The pressure thereore to admit the given number o LFC supporters was greater at theseturnstiles. In 1986, a police memorandum written to senior ocers warned that the LeppingsLane turnstiles dont provide anything like the access required.5 That observation wentunheeded and admission to the ground once again proved dicult or supporters.

Although the Leppings Lane End turnstiles were labelled alphabetically, they did not run in thatorder, making it hard to ollow the directions on the tickets. In addition, there were insucientnumbers o police ocers at hand to direct supporters or organise queues.

Admission rates proceeded to all while congestion outside the turnstiles developed and grewas more ans arrived.


4 Brian Reade, Living with the Same Bird or 43 Years, page 172.5 Phil Scraton, Hillsborough: The Truth, page 46.


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Finding Their Own LevelSupporters who had passed through the turnstiles were let to nd their own way to the terraces.

The option o lling the ve pens successively had been rejected by senior ocers. Earlier in theday, Superintendent Bernard Murray told Chie Inspector Creaser that supporters should be lettond their own level.6

With no direction, supporters ound that the obvious7 route to the terrace was via a tunnel.Above the tunnel entrance was the word standing. Most standing supporters presumed this wasthe only route to the terrace. Many were unaware that there were two other points o access.

There were no conspicuous signs7 to invite supporters to take the alternative routes. Supporters

were drawn to the tunnel,7 which led to only two o the ve available pens the central pens.

The Central PensThe ocial combined capacity gure or the central pens was 2,200.8 Later the Health & SaetyExecutive (HSE) ound that gure was too high.

The combined capacity gure should have been reduced to 1,600, as the crush barriers installeddid not conorm to paragraph 142 in The Guide to Saety at Sport 1986.

Even Distribution o SupportersSYPhoped9 that even distribution would be achieved, instead o taking action to guarantee it.They reasoned that, by leaving all pens open, the supporters would eventually level

themselves out.Chie Superintendent David Duckeneld, the ocer in overall charge that day, assumed anysupporters nding the central pens too crowded would be able to turn around and walk out.10

In theory, those ans would then ll up the emptier pens and distribution would be achieved.

There was, however, only one way or ans to exit the central pens and that was to go backthrough, against the fow o incoming supporters, the same access tunnel which was 40t inlength, dark and had a slope steeper than the Green Guide stipulated.


6 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 58.7 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 44.8 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 126.9 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 171.10 Phil Scraton, Hillsborough: The Truth, page 63.


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The option to leave was made more dicult when a police tannoy announcement requested thatsupporters in the central pens should move orward so as to make room or others. By 2:30pm theoption was completely gone, as many supporters within the pens and in the tunnel itsel had lostvoluntary control o their direction.

At this point, Duckeneld noted that the central pens were getting on or being quite ull.11

Still, no order was given to direct supporters to the emptier pens. At the subsequent public inquiry,the SYP argued that, although it was common practice to monitor and close access to pens atleague matches, at FA Cup semi-nals the pens were let open.12

That argument can be rejected easily due to the act SYP monitored, closed access to, andsuccessully13 distributed supporters across the terraces at the 88 semi-nal. Mr Lock, SWFCs

Security Ocer and a ormer policeman, said, It would have been quite easy to close the centrepens to ensure people were moved to the side pens.

Duckeneld admitted that ollowing this procedure was something that didnt cross his mind.14He had only been appointed 21 days beore the match, had no recent experience in policing sucha high prole match and the procedure had not eatured in the previous years planning.

As a result, numbers in the central pens continued to swell, whilst the wing pens remainedrelatively empty. BBC match commentator, John Motson, noticed the disparity in the pens andmade reerence to the lack o ans in the wing areas. Unbeknown to him, there were a substantialnumber o ans still outside, awaiting admittance.

Open The Gate!Outside the turnstiles, the congestion had grown so severe that there was a perceived risk to lie.In 1987, when congestion arose at the same turnstiles due to supporters arriving late, SYP decidedto delay kick-o.

Duckeneld, however, decided against this course o action even though it was requested byPC Buxton, who believed a delayed kick-o would immediately reduce the pressure. 15At 2:47pma request was made to open an exit gate. Five minutes later, Duckeneld agreed to open the gate.


11 Phil Scraton, Hillsborough: The Truth, page 62.12 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 171.13 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 270.14 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 229.15 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraphs 62, 65 & 226.


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SYP later argued that although they had ve minutes to sort how the infux o ans would beabsorbed, they did not do so because they could not have oreseen the outcome.16

Several witnesses reute this and testied that warnings were given to ocers wanting to openthe gates. One ocer was reportedly told by a steward, No way! Therell be a crush in there!

Turnstile attendant, Colin Milton, said the ocer ignored the stewards warning.17 Another SWFCsteward, Jack Stone, who had been asked our times or the keys to open Exit Gate A, but reusedeach time, said in his own statement, I knew all hell would be let loose i the gates were opened.18

Gate C was opened and, or ve minutes, there was an infux o 2,000 supporters into thestadium. Undoubtedly opening the gate relieved the pressure outside but, with no directive to do

otherwise, the majority o supporters headed or the tunnel leading to the central pens.

Lord Justice Taylor said the decision to open the gate, with no attempt to steer ans to the emptierwing pens, was a blunder o the rst magnitude.19

The Notion O Inrushing SupportersIt is a commonly-held belie that the thousands o Liverpool supporters who entered via GateC then rushed into the back o the already-overull central pens, with the eect that thosesupporters at the ront were crushed to death (the BBCs Politics Show on 2/12/07 contains thelatest example o this supposition. The BBC has since had to apologise or this, as there was neverany evidence to support the view expressed).

CCTV evidence clearly showed supporters entering via Gate C walking across the concourse andinto the tunnel. Taylor revealed that, o those who died near the ront o the pens, at least 16 andprobably 2120 came through Gate C ater it had been opened at 2:52pm.

It was estimated that, with the addition o supporters rom Gate C, there were more than 3,000ans in the central pens, almost double the ocial capacity.


16 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 229.17 Martin Sharpe, The Sun, April 17th 1989, page 9.18 Mr Stones own statement on record; source conrmed by P. Scraton.19 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 231.20 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 108.


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The CrushThe lateral ences prevented supporters rom escaping to the spacious wing pens, whilst theences at the ront prevented any escape to the pitch. The infux o supporters rom the tunnelprevented a retreat backwards.

With nowhere to go, the pressure built up slowly and increased with each passing minute.Survivor Eddie Spearitt described the crush as being like a vice, getting tighter and tighter.21

The intensity o the crush was most severe towards the ront o the pens, where the greatmajority o victims received their atal injuries, but there were a ew atalities urther back.22

As a result o the crush, 730 supporters were injured; 96 atally.23

The Emergency ResponseThe emergency response began only when Liverpool supporters spilled on to the pitch and thematch was brought to an abrupt end at 3:06pm.

The Liverpool Supporters ReactionLFC supporters were rst to react to the unolding Disaster. In the upper tier o the West Stand,supporters reached down and pulled ellow supporters out o the Leppings Lane End pens.

Supporters also tried to administer rst aid and used advertising boards as make-shit stretchersto erry away the injured. Taylor described the eorts o these supporters as magnicent.24

Police In The Control RoomIn the Control Room, police had access to ve CCTV screens, all receiving live images rom thecameras situated around the ground. All cameras had zoom capability and were ully unctioningon the day o the Disaster.

Ocers could view the area ahead o the turnstiles, the concourse inside the ground, individualpens and the people inside them. Additionally, the Control Room was perectly situated to allowocers to view the Leppings Lane End with the naked eye.25


21 Brian Reade, Living with the Same Bird or 43 Years, page 174.The Lost Aternoon, The Guardian April 11th 1999Full account o Eddie Spearritts experience can be ound in P. Scratons Hillsborough: The Truth.

22 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraphs 108 & 111.23 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 121.24 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 125.25 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 170 / The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, chapter 2, paragraph 42.


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Furthermore, radio contact with ocers around the ground was possible and indeed radiotransmissions o distress and possible injuries were heard by SYP Headquarters, who thenphoned the Control Room at 2:59pm to ask i any ambulances were needed.

The Control Room responded that there wereno reports o injuries, but to stand by.26Control Room ocers said aterwards that they believed a pitch invasion was occurring at rstand that was why they requested operational support (a call or more police ocers) and theyalso called or dog handlers.

At the inquiry, Taylor concluded that Duckenelds capacity to take decisions and give ordersseemed to collapse.27 Several vital minutes were wasted because Duckeneld roze. 28

It was not until 3:29pm that the emergency services were properly alerted to the Disaster.That was when the Major Disaster Vehicle (the only vehicle equipped to deal with large-scaleincidents) was called or.

Pitch-Side Police ReactionFive ocers were stationed on the track in ront o the Leppings Lane terraces. Their writteninstructions made no reerence to the detection o overcrowding,29 but their instructionsdid speciy that supporters in need o medical attention should be allowed access to the pitch.

The sheer weight o people in the pens led to exit gates in the perimeter ence springing open.Ocers prevented injured supporters rom leaving the pens, contrary to their own instructionsand to advice rom Lord Justice Popplewell that in the event o an emergency, ans must be

granted access to the pitch.

30

Pitch-side ocers did, however, try to alert the grounds Control Room to the situation.With no response orthcoming, they eventually took the decision to open the gates and then triedto administer rst aid. This was just one example o some ocers acting on their own initiative.

Other junior ocers ran round to the tunnel to try to relieve the pressure rom that end.


26 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraphs 106.27 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 282.28 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 284.29 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 245.30 Lord Justice Popplewell, Committee o Inquiry into Crowd Saety & Control at Sports Grounds, Interim Report,

Home Oce cmnd 9585, paragraph 215.


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Ground Commander, Superintendent Roger Greenwood, also acted without instruction whenhe ran on to the pitch to tell the match reeree, Ray Lewis, to stop the game. Lewis immediatelyhalted the game at 3:06pm and called the players o.

The stopping o the match, and the subsequent clearing o the playing surace, was crucialto allowing emergency services to come to the aid o the supporters. It also enabled othersupporters to extricate the injured, dying and dead rom the pens.

The Medical ResponseDoctors at the ground also came on to the pitch o their own accord to assist the injured.They were joined by the 30 St Johns Ambulance ocers who were stationed around the ground.

They attempted to revive people through the perimeter ence and on the pitch. At 3:13pm,a St Johns ambulance came on to the pitch and stationed itsel by pens 3 & 4.

There was just one single South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) vehicleoutside the ground, on stand-by.31 It was not until 3:07pm that more ambulances were requested.

At 3:13pm a feet o 42 ambulances started to arrive. However, they were prevented romentering the ground because SYP were still reportingcrowd trouble.32 When permission wasnally granted, some twenty minutes later, the ambulances then had diculty accessing thepitch due to the positioning o advertising boards and other changes made to the ground.32

Fire engines, carrying hydraulic cutting gear and resuscitation equipment, also had diculty

accessing the stadium. The re-ghters were orced to carry their equipment into the ground.By the time they and the Major Disaster Vehicle arrived at 3:40pm, most supporters had letthe pens.33

A number o emergency service ocers at the ground, as well as various o-duty doctorsand medics, heavily criticised the lack o organisation as well as poor communication andco-ordination o ensuring that adequate aid reached the injured and dying.


31 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraphs 105.32 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 302.33 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 101-104.


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The Immediate AtermathIn the end, only 14 o the 96 victims made it to a hospital; the rest were erried to a nearbygymnasium, where they were laid out on the foor. At 3:45pm a doctor treating people on thepitch was asked to examine those in the gym and certiy deaths. As the deaths were counted,erroneous reports began to circulate that supporters were responsible or the Disaster.

The Media ViewThe reporters at the ground knew there were simply too many ans at one end o the ground34

but why this happened was an unanswered question. Shortly ater the St Johns ambulancearrived on the pitch, the press were given a possible explanation.

Graham Mackrell, SWFCs Secretary and Saety Ocer, told media sources that a gate had been

orced open and supporters had rushed in.

The press then interviewed the FAs Chie Executive, Graham Kelly, about this allegation, andthe possibility o unauthorised entries35 to the stadium was added to the emerging story.

By 4:00pm the reported cause o the Disaster was as ollows: At ten to three there was a surgeo ans at the Leppings Lane End o the ground. The surge composed o about 500 Liverpoolans and the police say that a gate was orced and that led to a crush in the terracing area.36

This media explanation or the Disaster was relayed to millions, eectively orming thepublic perception and was based on what Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, in his later report, calleda disgraceul lie.37

Policing OpinionBoth Kelly and Mackrell had gone to the Police Control Room or inormation shortly ater 3:15pm.There they were both misinormed and misled38 by Duckeneld that a gate had been orcedwhen in act Duckeneld had ordered the gate to be opened. Taylor knew this meeting set o39the alse reports that ollowed.


35 Steve Lohr, New York Times, 16/04/89.36 http://www.contrast.org/hillsborough/history/media.shtm37 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, chapter 4, paragraph 100.38 Phil Scraton, Hillsborough: The Truth, page 66.39 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 283.


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However, even beore this meeting, allegations that ans had caused the Disaster were beingcirculated rom the Control Room. During a request or ence cutters, logged at 3:13pm, supporterswere accused o breaking down a gate. The police version o events was only disproved whenootage emerged rom BBC cameras recording the scenes outside the turnstiles.

Even with this revelation, the police maintained supporter responsibility and accused supporterso deliberately creating the crisis at the turnstiles which orced ocers to open the gate. Just likebeore, inormation that supporters were late, ticketless, drunk and unruly was passed to keyspokespersons who then volunteered their opinion on the causes o the Disaster to the media.

LateChie Constable Peter Wright stated in a press conerence later that evening; 3,000 ans turned

up in a ten minute period beore kick-o.40

Graham Mackrell also inerred on Match o the Day that LFC supporters had arrived late.41The inormation on the tickets however, issued under Mackrells supervision, requested ansto arrive 15 minutes prior to kick-o.42

SWFCs own admission count showed that 4,593 o the 10,100 supporters in Leppings Lane hadentered the ground by 2:30pm.43

Taylor said that at 2:30pm, more than 5,000 ans were still awaiting admittance.44 He alsoconcluded that the small area ahead o the turnstiles, o which there was an insucient number,caused the congestion and thereore dismissed any conspiracy theory linked to a large number

o late-arriving supporters.

45

The HSE ndings were key to Taylors assessment. They concluded that the Leppings Laneturnstiles were likely to cause delays and crowd congestion.46 They also estimated that thereneeded to be a continuous stream o admissions, at a rate o 700 per turnstile per hour, rom1:00pm onwards to have any chance o admitting 10,100 beore kick-o.47


40 & 41 http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=uaA1XHcDt7U42 & 44 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 192.43 http://www.hse.gov.uk/oi/releases/hillsborough/me8934.pd45 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 208.46 Health & Saety Executive Report, paragraph 6.3.47 Health & Saety Executive Report, paragraph 9.4.


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Eectively 5,000 supporters needed to have entered the ground by 2:00pm to have any chanceo admitting the remaining 5,000 beore kick-o. Taylor surmised that both the police and theclub should have realised that the Leppings Lane turnstiles and the waiting area outside wouldbe under strain to admit all the Liverpool supporters in time.48

TicketlessPolice Federation Ocer Paul Middup, when interviewed by ITV, stated that 500 pluswerewithout tickets and were hell benton getting in.49

Yet ocers at the turnstiles denied there were a large number o ticketless supporters. 50SWFCs own admission count system showed the terrace did not exceed its 10,100 capacity.The HSE also conclusively proved there was no substance to Middups allegations.

As part o their analysis, the HSE counted the number o LFC supporters entering the ground,including those through the turnstiles, through Gate C and even those who climbed over theturnstiles. They gave three admission gures based on their analysis.

Their rst gure was 9,267, their best estimate was 9,734, and their third gure was amaximum estimate o 10,124. The HSE report stated it was unlikely that the terrace exceeded10,124 and that total admissions were approximately equal to the designated capacity o10,100 people.51

Taylor surmised there was no substance to the allegation that ticketless ans caused theDisaster.52

DrunkThe day ater the Disaster, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, her Press Secretary Bernard Inghamand Home Secretary Douglas Hurd were shown around the stadium by police ocials.

Ingham told the press, I know what I learned on the spot: there would have been no Hillsboroughi a mob, clearly tanked up, had not tried to orce their way in.53


48 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 190.49 ITN News at 10, 18/04/89.50 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 200.51 Health & Saety Executive Report, paragraphs 5.8, 6.2, 8.1, The Interim Taylor Report, paragraphs 200-203.52 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 208.53 Phil Scraton, Death on the Terraces, page 184.


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Ocers sought to nd evidence to support this theory by collecting inormation on the amounto alcohol purchased rom pubs and o-licences in the area beore kick-o. Police had alreadyinterviewed bereaved amilies, immediately ater they had identied their loved ones bodies,to ascertain how much alcohol each o the deceased had drunk beore the game.

The allegation o drunken ans also seemed to infuence the Sheeld Coroner, who inexplicablydecided to take blood alcohol levels rom every victim, including a ten-year-old boy.54

Taylor considered the allegation but ound drunkenness was not a contributing actor. Taylor said,The great majority were not drunk or even the worse or drink,55 adding, Some ocers, seekingto rationalise their loss o control, overestimated the drunkenness in the crowd.56

AggressiveThe impression o aggressive behaviour had already been given visual credence: a line o policeocers ormed on the halway line whilst the Disaster unolded, as i to segregate LFC supportersrom NFFC supporters. As LFC supporters spilled on to the pitch,John Motson recognised andmade mention, well beore the match was stopped, that the trouble seemed to be overcrowdingand not misbehaviour.57 Yet the allegation persisted, grew and dominated press reports in thedays ollowing the Disaster.

Then, on April 19th 1989, The Sun newspaper published its now-inamous story entitledThe Truth, with three sub-headlines which claimed: some ans picked pockets o victims,some ans urinated on the brave copsandsome ans beat up PC giving the kiss o lie.

The story accompanying those headlines claimed drunken Liverpool ans viciously attackedrescue workers as they tried to revive victimsandpolice ocers, remen and ambulance crewwere punched, kicked and urinated upon.

The story itsel was based on comments made by Irvine Patnick, the MP or Sheeld Hallam,and an unnamed police ocer.58


54 Phil Scraton, Hillsborough: The Truth, page 88.55 & 56 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 196.57 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 250.58 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/jul/07/pressandpublishing.ootball1


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Patnick, the only Conservative MP in the area, was not even at the game to witness those events.Nevertheless, his comments were widely used.59

Two days ater The Suns story, the Home Secretary inerred in the House o Commons that19 police ocers had been physically assaulted at the ground and that SYP were collating theinormation to pass on to the inquiry.

However, by May 3rd, ollowing questions rom the House, Douglas Hurd was unable to statehow those injuries were sustained. No evidence regarding physical assaults on ocers was everpassed to the inquiry.60

In addition, rom the thousands o press pictures taken and the 71 hours o recorded video

ootage taken rom ve police cameras, 19 SWFC cameras, as well as BBC ootage, there wasnot one single image or image rame to support the allegation. Taylor completely dismissedthis argument saying, Not a single witness supported any o those allegations.61

The SYP And SWFC ViewWhile unnamed police ocers and SWFC ocials continued to iner supporter responsibility tothe media, they both conducted their own private investigations into the causes o the Disaster.

SYP argued it was the responsibility o SWFC to monitor the pens and they employed a structuralengineer to investigate saety aspects o the terrace, discovering that the numerous breaches tothe Green Guide were perhaps even greater than the HSE estimated.62

SWFC also produced its own 105-page report. In that report, SWFC laid responsibility ormonitoring and managing the crowd with the Police and maintained that the sole cause o theDisaster was Duckenelds blunder in not redirecting ans away rom the tunnel ater he orderedthe gate to be opened. The saety certicate, and all the issues relating to the changes to the pens,barriers and ences, was, the club argued, the City Councils responsibility.63


59 http://www.contrast.org/hillsborough/history/media.shtm60 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989-05-03/Writtens-1.html61 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 257.62 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, paragraph 17.63 David Conn, The Beautiul Game: Searching the Soul o Football, page 92.


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The Supporters ViewLFC supporters have been consistent in their belie that the Disaster was due to a ailure othe polices crowd management, coupled with a lack o communication and organisation. 64In a BBC Radio interview held at the ground, Dr Glynn Phillips spoke o the mayhem outsidethe ground and said police had lost control.65

His view has been echoed by LFC supporters throughout the subsequent years. The supportersview o police mismanagement is comprehensively supported by the ndings o the Taylor Report.

The Taylor ReportOn April 17th 1989, Lord Justice Taylor was appointed to conduct a public inquiry. The termso reerence were: To inquire into the events at Sheeld Wednesday ootball ground on

April 15th 1989 and to make recommendations about the needs or crowd control and saetyat sports events.

Submitted to the inquiry were 3,776 written statements o evidence and 1,550 letters.Taylor also considered 71 hours o video ootage and the oral evidence o 174 witnesses.

On August 4th 1989, the Interim Taylor Report (ITR) was published. In it, Taylor exoneratedLFC supporters and ound the main reason or the Disaster was a ailure o police control.66

Taylor ound the build-up and crush o ans outside the turnstiles were not the ault o thesupporters and the likelihood o problems occurring was highly oreseeable. Once the decisionto open Gate C was taken, the appropriate action o closing access to the central pens should have

been taken but was not.

67


64 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraphs 223-225 incl.65 Rogan Taylor, Andrew Ward, Tim Newburn, The Day o the Hillsborough Disaster: A Narrative Account, pg 85.66 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 278.67 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 231.


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Taylor said that i SYP were not aware o the overcrowding prior to opening the gate then theyshould have been. Taylor then criticised the slow reaction o police to initiate the Disaster Plan.68

Taylor also criticised the FA, Sheeld City Council and SWFC. Regarding SWFC, Taylor said:There are a number o respects in which the ailure o the club contributed to the disaster.69

Taylor went into great detail speciying all the ways in which the club was at ault. The layoutand the conusing signposting ahead o the turnstiles, which contributed to the build-up osupporters, and the poor signposting on the concourse, partially caused the overlling o thecentral pens.

The number o ways in which the Leppings Lane terraces breached guidelines was also

denounced, with the terrace itsel described as unsatisactoryandill-suited70 to host thenumber o supporters invited. Taylor said the City Councils ailure to revise or amend the saetycerticate was a serious breach o duty,71 while the FA was criticised or its ill-consideredchoice o venue.72

However, the most damning criticism was reserved or Duckeneld, or ailing to take eectivecontroland SYPs attempts to blame supporters or being late and drunk.73 Taylor concludedthat, although Duckeneld apologised or alsely blaming supporters or causing deaths it was,a matter o regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police werenot prepared to concede that they were in any respect at ault or what had occurred.74

On the day the Taylor Report was released, Duckeneld was suspended rom duty, Chie Constable

Peter Wright apologised or SYPs role in the Disaster and oered to resign, and his AssistantC.C Ian Daines said: Blame has been attributed and some o it, quite rightly, at the eet o SouthYorkshire Police and various other organisations.75


68 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 301.69 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 290.70 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 290.71 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 286.72 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 270.73 & 74 The Interim Taylor Report, paragraph 285.75 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/855766.stm


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Legal Proceedings

Hillsboroughs Cold CaseBetween 4:30pm on April 15th and 9:00am on April 16th 1989, two CCTV video tapes were stolenrom the SWFC Control Room. It was later concluded that those videos would not have shownanything relevant.76 However, the important question o why they were stolen in the rst place,and by whom, remains unanswered.

The Inquest Who, Where And WhenJust three days ater the rst anniversary o the Disaster, Dr Popper, the coroner or SouthYorkshire, employed by Sheeld City Council, started the statutory process o establishing whoeach o the deceased was and when and where he or she had died. This was established via a

West Midlands police ocer reading a summary o undisclosed evidence.

Detailed in each summary were the blood alcohol levels o each victim. These summaries werenot subjected to any cross-examinations and were presented as act.

The Coroner was not meant to deal with the question o how each victim died until the Directoro Public Prosecutions (DPP) had decided whether or not prosecutions could be brought againstanyone involved.

The DPPUnder the advice o two senior Queens Council ocers, the DPP, Allan Green, decided not tobring criminal prosecutions against any individual, group or corporate body or the Disaster.

Despite Lord Justice Taylors ndings, the DPP said there was insucient evidence.No urther explanation or this decision was oered when the announcement was made onAugust 14th 1990.

The Inquest To Establish HowThe DPPs decision meant that the inquest could now resume establishing how the deceased cameto their deaths. The jury had already heard the uncontested view that the victims died quickly,with no pre-death trauma and, as a result, a 3:15pm cut-o point was established. Any evidenceor questions over the emergency response then became inadmissible.77


76 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, paragraphs 21 & 22.77 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ambulance-ban-cost-lives-at-hillsborough-622239.html


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The ocus o the inquest was the build-up at the turnstiles and what occurred inside the pens.Witness statements were then read to the court including Superintendent Marshalls 17-pagerecollection o the day, which contained many unsubstantiated allegations that Taylor dismissedin his own report.

At this point it was demanded that the jury be dismissed and the inquest stopped. Following twodays o legal arguments, the Coroner requested that the jury should simply orget those prejudicialcomments.

The Coroner then summed up the evidence and gave legal direction to the jury. Jurors were warnedthey had to be convinced beyond reasonable doubt i they were to return a verdict o unlawulkilling and advised that a verdict o accidental death did not equate to no blame and could include

a degree o negligence.

The jury went on to return a majority verdict o 9-2 o accidental death.

The Police Complaints AuthorityOn July 11th 1990, the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) instructed SYP to commence disciplinaryproceedings against Duckeneld and Murray.

Murray aced one charge o neglect o duty; Duckeneld aced our charges o neglect o duty andone o discreditable conduct.

In November, Duckeneld resigned rom SYP due to ill health. As a direct result, disciplinary action

against him could no longer be concluded and SYP decided it was unair to proceed with actionagainst Murray alone.

The Judicial ReviewBereaved amilies approached the Attorney General, who has the power to order new inquests,to do just that, as new evidence had come to light. The Attorney General reused. Six amilies weregranted a judicial review at the divisional court to quash the original inquest verdict, based on theirregular way evidence was presented and the emergence o new evidence.

The divisional court dismissed their application.

In its nal judgment, the High Court even reers to the UKs biggest sporting disaster as havingoccurred at an FA Cup semi-nal match between Liverpool Football Club and Sheeld Wednesday

Football Club.78


78 http://www.liverpoolc.tv/club/docs/chronology.doc


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Civil CasesCivil cases have been brought throughout the period since the Disaster. The Chie Constable oSYP has not contested liability or these claims. In a House o Lords judgment, Lord Keith concludedthat the Chie Constablehas admitted liability in negligence in respect o the deaths and physicalinjuries.79 Subsequent civil compensation payments to the bereaved and injured were issuedjointly by SYP, SWFC and Sheeld City Council.

The ScrutinyIn December 1996, the TV documentary, Hillsborough, claimed new evidence had come to light.Newspapers carried the story and public interest in the Disaster was once again stirred; a demandor a new inquiry ollowed.

Instead, a scrutiny o evidence was ordered by Home Secretary Jack Straw and on June 30th 1997,Lord Justice Stuart-Smith was appointed to oversee proceedings. A scrutiny has no basis in lawand, unlike an inquiry, is not a public hearing. No cross examination o contentious evidence occurs.Stuart-Smith would objectively assess all evidence presented to him, unchallenged and in private.

When the scrutiny began it appeared that Lord Justice Stuart-Smith had pre-conceived ideasabout the Disaster. When arriving at Liverpools Maritime Museum on October 6th 1997 to visitsome o the amilies, he asked one bereaved ather: Have you got a ew o your people or are theylike the Liverpool ans, turn up at the last minute?80

Stuart-Smith went on to assess new evidence that was not orwarded to the inquiry orthe inquests. Stuart-Smith also considered the contentious 3:15pm cut-o point, potential

intererence with witnesses, and edited witness statements or his report. He upheld Taylorsndings but he did not believe the new evidence warranted a new inquest.

He concluded: None o the evidence I was asked to consider added anything signicant to theevidence which was available to Lord Taylors inquiry or to the inquests.81

Jack Straw accepted the ndings, stating there were no grounds to order either a new inquiryor inquest.


79 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, chapter 1,paragraph 10 & 64, plus Divisional Court transcript page 40,Lord Keith o Kinkel in Alcock v Chie Constable, 1992 ac 310, 392.

80 http://www.liverpoolc.tv/club/docs/chronology.doc81 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, Chapter 7, paragraph 6.


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In November 1998, Proessor Phil Scraton was granted access to the House o Lords ReadingRoom. There he examined numerous transcripts o the meetings between Stuart-Smith andthe relevant parties. From this examination it seems that a drat o the report was circulatedin advance to people who were likely to be criticised. It appeared that they were allowed tocomment on the drat beore it went to print.

In the drat report, Stuart-Smith had expressed concern that several witness statements hadbeen altered to edit out any comments that were adverse to SYP, but comments detrimental to thesupporters had been let in. There was, however, little mention o this concern in Stuart-Smithsnal report. He simply says it would have been better82 had some o the deletions not been madeand it was at worse an error o judgement.83

The Police StatementsIn 1998 the Home Oce made available the statements taken by police ocers on the day o theDisaster. These statements show the extent to which they were edited.

Critical comments rom on-duty PCs, relating to a lack o leadership by senior ocers, poorcommunication or comments on how crowd control tactics diered rom previous years, werealtered or edited out entirely.

Family lawyers estimate that 183 PC statements were subject to such editing. Many PCs reusedto sign the altered statements put to them.84 & 85

The Private Prosecution

In August 1998 the Hillsborough Family Support Group commenced private prosecutionsagainst Duckeneld and Murray. They were charged with two oences: manslaughter andwilul maleasance in public oce.

A urther charge o perverting the course o justice was led in direct relation to Duckeneldslie about Liverpool supporters allegedly orcing open Gate C.

Ater two years o legal wrangling, a case was nally put to a jury in Leeds, West Yorkshire,and lasted or six weeks. On July 21st 2000, ater our days o deliberation, the jury ound Murraynot guilty o manslaughter. Four days later the jury announced it could not reach a verdicton Duckeneld.


82 & 83 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny Report, Chapter 4, paragraph 89.84 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/839047.stm85 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1999/02/28/nhil28.html


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The jury, when asked, indicated that, with a little more time, they may reach a majority verdict.Mr Justice Hooper decided against this and also reused a retrial.

He told the court that orcing Mr Duckeneld to undergo another trial would constitute clearoppression and the trial had already been very public and the deendants had aced publichumiliation.

He also added, I have an overriding duty to ensure a air trial or the deendant. That, I am rmlyconvinced, is no longer possible.86

For his own part, Murray admitted in court that he was haunted by the memory o Hillsboroughand wished that, at the time, it had occurred to him to close access to the tunnel.


86 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/855766.stm


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Hope For HillsboroughBereaved parent Anne Williams is actively pursuing a case in the European Court o HumanRights, challenging the ocial version o the circumstances under which her 15-year-old son,Kevin Daniel Williams, died.

Anne believes that the original Inquest was unsatisactory in establishing the true cause o hersons death and that, subsequently, the inormation on his death certicate is incorrect.

Anne argues that any cut-o point violates the right to investigate ully all the circumstancessurrounding her sons death, under Section 2 o the Human Rights Act.

She also argues that i a jury is not presented with all available acts then Section 6, The Right to

a Fair Trial, is also violated.

There is eyewitness evidence rom medically-qualied personnel to demonstrate that Kevinwas alive ater the ocial 3:15pm cut-o time. With simple medical attention, it is believed his liecould have been saved.

Evidence has also been submitted which details how the bereaved amilies right to a air trial atthe original inquest was also impeded.

However, a avourable verdict or Anne Williams will not automatically precipitate a new inquest.The European Court o Human Rights has no judicial power over the British Government and itwould be up to the incumbent Home Secretary to authorise a new inquest.

That said, i the European Courts do decide that there is a case to be heard, it would be ocialconrmation that the original inquest was unsatisactory.

This recognition would place pressure on the Home Secretary to open a new inquest, so that allthe circumstances surrounding the Disaster could nally be established beyond question.

At the time o writing, a decision rom the European Courts was imminent.



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Further inormation on The Hillsborough Disaster can be obtained rom the ollowingsources, which you are encouraged to read:

Books & ArticlesNo Last Rights: The Denial o Justice and the Promotion o Myth in the Atermath o theHillsborough DisasterPhil Scraton, Ann Jemphrey & Sheila Coleman, ISBN O-904517-30-6

Hillsborough: The TruthPhil Scraton; ISBN 1-84018-156-7

Death on the Terraces: The Contexts and Injustices o the 1989 Hillsborough DisasterPhil Scraton in P. Darby et al (eds) Soccer and Disaster: International Perspectives

ISBN 0-7146-8289-6

Policing with Contempt: The Degrading o Truth and Denial o Justice in the Atermath o theHillsborough DisasterPhil Scraton, Journal o Law and Society, 1999 vol 26, no 3, pp273-297

Power, Confict and CriminalisationPhil Scraton, London: Routledge (Ch 4 Negligence without liability: the scale o injustice aterHillsborough), 2007

The Day o the Hillsborough DisasterRogan Taylor, Andrew Ward, Tim Newburn (Eds.), ISBN 0-85323-199-0

When You Walk Through the StormSean Smith & Anne Williams, ISBN 9781840180671

The Lost AternoonThe Guardian, April 11th 1999,http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/1999/apr/11/eaturesreview.review6

ReportsThe Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989: Inquiry by Lord Justice Taylor(Cm.: 765) Peter Taylor ISBN 0-10-107652-5

The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Inquiry Final Report (Command Paper)Home Oce; ISBN 0-10-109622-4(Both reports can be downloaded rom the ollowing website http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_Report)

Scrutiny o Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster (Command Paper)Home Oce; ISBN 0-10-138782-2

The Taylor Inquiry and Stuart-Smith Scrutiny o Evidence can be read herewww.southyorks.police.uk/oi/inormation_classes/categories/

Sports Stadia Ater Hillsborough: Seminar PapersRIBA, Sports Council, Owen Luder (Ed.) ISBN 0-947877-72-X

Ground saety and public order: Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, report o JointWorking Party on Ground Saety and Public Order (Report/Joint Executive on Football Saety)Joint Working Party on Ground Saety and Public Order; ISBN 0-901783-73-0

Health & Saety Executive reports into the Hillsborough Disaster

www.hse.gov.uk/oi/releases/hillsborough.htmHillsborough Attitudes Survey Reportwww.liv.ac.uk/ootballindustry/attitude.html


Glossary


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WebsitesOcial website o the Hillsborough Family Support Group (HFSG)www.hsg.co.uk

Ocial website o the Hillsborough Justice Campaign (HJC)www.contrast.org/hillsborough/

Anne Williams personal campaign website;www.hopeorhillsborough.piczo.com/?cr=6

BBC News On this Dayhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_2491000/2491195.stm

Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hillsborough_disaster

Googlewww.google.co.uk/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4GFRD_en___GB253&q=the+hillsborough+disaster

MediaHillsborough, a Granada Television drama rom 1996 (Jimmy McGovern)http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0116533/

How the disaster was reportedwww.anatical.hu/hillsborough-disaster-tragedy-1989-liverpool-video/

Report on how SYP statements were altered

www.wsws.org/articles/1999/mar1999/oot-m10.shtml

External LinksStand Up Sit Down (SUSD) (The organisation to introduce sae standing areas in top-fightEnglish ootball)www.standupsitdown.co.uk

The Football Licensing Authoritywww.faweb.org.uk/search/fasearch.php?zoom_query=HILLSBOROUGH&zoom_and=0

Crowd Dynamicswww.crowddynamics.com


Glossary


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Dedicated To The Memory O The Victims O Hillsborough:

John Alred Anderson (62)Colin Mark Ashcrot (19)James Gary Aspinall (18)Kester Roger Marcus Ball (16)Gerard Bernard Patrick Baron (67)Simon Bell (17)Barry Sidney Bennett (26)David John Benson (22)David William Birtle (22)Tony Bland (22)Paul David Brady (21)Andrew Mark Brookes (26)

Carl Brown (18)David Steven Brown (25)Henry Thomas Burke (47)Peter Andrew Burkett (24)Paul William Carlile (19)Raymond Thomas Chapman (50)Gary Christopher Church (19)Joseph Clark (29)Paul Clark (18)Gary Collins (22)Stephen Paul Copoc (20)Tracey Elizabeth Cox (23)

James Philip Delaney (19)Christopher Barry Devonside (18)Christopher Edwards (29)Vincent Michael Fitzsimmons (34)Thomas Steven Fox (21)Jon-Paul Gilhooley (10)Barry Glover (27)Ian Thomas Glover (20)Derrick George Godwin (24)Roy Harry Hamilton (34)Philip Hammond (14)Eric Hankin (33)Gary Harrison (27)

Stephen Francis Harrison (31)Peter Andrew Harrison (15)David Hawley (39)James Robert Hennessy (29)Paul Anthony Hewitson (26)Carl Darren Hewitt (17)Nicholas Michael Hewitt (16)Sarah Louise Hicks (19)Victoria Jane Hicks (15)Gordon Rodney Horn (20)Arthur Horrocks (41)

Thomas Howard (39)Thomas Anthony Howard (14)Eric George Hughes (42)Alan Johnston (29)Christine Anne Jones (27)Gary Philip Jones (18)Richard Jones (25)Nicholas Peter Joynes (27)Anthony Peter Kelly (29)Michael David Kelly (38)Carl David Lewis (18)David William Mather (19)

Brian Christopher Mathews (38)Francis Joseph McAllister (27)John McBrien (18)Marion Hazel McCabe (21)Joseph Daniel McCarthy (21)Peter McDonnell (21)Alan McGlone (28)Keith McGrath (17)Paul Brian Murray (14)Lee Nicol (14)Stephen Francis ONeill (17)Jonathon Owens (18)William Roy Pemberton (23)Carl William Rimmer (21)David George Rimmer (38)Graham John Roberts (24)Steven Joseph Robinson (17)Henry Charles Rogers (17)Colin Andrew Hugh William Seton (23)Inger Shah (38)Paula Ann Smith (26)Adam Edward Spearritt (14)Philip John Steele (15)David Leonard Thomas (23)Patrik John Thompson (35)

Peter Reuben Thompson (30)Stuart Paul William Thompson (17)Peter Francis Tootle (21)Christopher James Traynor (26)Martin Kevin Traynor (16)Kevin Tyrrell (15)Colin Waer (19)Ian David Whelan (19)Martin Kenneth Wild (29)Kevin Daniel Williams (15)Graham John Wright (17)


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An overview o the key issues, easily read, yet ully reerenced.invaluable, educative resource or those seeking a clearunderstanding o the injustices o Hillsborough Phil Scraton

Long overdue. Brilliantly precise, accurate and an education orthe uneducated. Nicky Allt

The Hillsborough Football Disaster

Context & Consequences

Documents

Hillsborough Booklet 1989 Football Disaster