HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING Effective Firefighting Operations

HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING

Effective Firefighting Operations in High-Rise Towers A disciplined proactive command and deployment system can be used to reduce time-lag

delays in high-rise firefighting operations. It requires pre-planning and pre-determination of

how reconnaissance can be deployed effectively and rapidly on arrival to (a) locate the fire;

(b) control the primary risk zone and (c) establish a Forward Command role at the Bridgehead.

Paul Grimwood PhD; FIFireE

Paul Grimwood is in his 45th

year of service in the UK and

is currently the Principal Fire

Protection Engineer at Kent Fire

and Rescue Service. Following

operational service with London

Fire Brigade, Merseyside FRS,

West Midlands FRS and a six

month detachment to the New

York City Fire Department in

1976, Paul obtained his PhD in

Fire Engineering at Glasgow

Caledonian University this year.

His research into the amounts

of firefighting water required

to optimise structural fire

attack has since formed part of

the BS 7974 (5) suite of UK fire

engineering guidance documents

and National Operational

Guidance (NOG) package.

74 GULF FIRE JANUARY 2016

T he Bridgehead provides a safe

working 'platform' from which to

launch fire-fighting and rescue

operations and should be located in or

near a stairway, at least two floors below

the fire. A Standard Operating Procedure

(SOP) should determine. The three primary

roles to be undertaken in the Incident

Command function:

Lobby Commander

2 Forward Fire Commander

3 Search and Rescue (S&R) Commander

• The Lobby Commander will be the

senior fire officer on an initial two

engine attendance that arrives together

or closely within a minute of each other.

T The fire in Sa if Be lhasa Tower,

Dubai, in October 2012

• Where the second engine is

delayed, the first officer on scene

should undertake the Forward Fire

Commander's role and form part

of the initial Reconnaissance Team,

establishing control of the fire lifts

and reporting to a relatively 'safe'

floor at least 3-5 floors below the

lowest reported fire floor.

• The second arriving officer will

become the Lobby Commander and

will deploy additional crew members

to make up secondary support to the

primary reconnaissance team.

• Where the Incident Commander

has deployed as the Forward Fire

Commander then the next arriving

senior fire officer (depending on level

of command) can either report to

the lobby and take command of the

incident, or report to the Bridgehead

as the S&R Commander.

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•

• The S&R Commander (based at Forward

Fire Command) should be deployed to

deal with the deployment of search and

rescue teams above the Bridgehead,

based on the priority triaging of

occupant assistance calls received.

A high level of communication and

coordination is needed here.

Some common problems encountered at

high-rise tower fires over the past twenty

years fall into the following categories-

• Non-sprinkle red buildings allowing

fire to spread rapidly

• Poor pre-planning and lack of

familiarisation with the building

• Inadequate fire resistance (or fire

stopping) in some buildings

• Combustible cladding or insulation

on external walls

• Inadequate staffing or resources on

the primary response

• Under estimating the physical

demands placed on firefighters

at working fires

• Ineffective Incident Command Systems

based on 'reactive' approaches

• Inadequate channels of communication

and ineffective use of existing channels

• Inadequate firefighting water provision

matched with the potential fire load

• A lack of understanding, or awareness,

of building air dynamics common to

tall buildings

• Complacency!

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Proactive Incident Command System (ICS) The author's research in the city of Kuala

Lumpur in 2008, a city encompassing

over 450 tall buildings, demonstrated

how a proactive response can reduce

intervention times. The standard

approach there to high-rise firefighting

was, as in most places, based upon a

'reactive response' incident command

system. The author's research prompted

a change to a 'proactive' system of

incident command and response and

this enabled a reduction in response

and deployment times by at least four

minutes (water on the fire) (Figure One).

In this trial, the Proactive ICS plan

established a Bridgehead (Forward

Command post) within eight minutes

on level18 and enabled water to be

applied on the fire within eleven minutes,

following arrival on-scene. A secondary

support hose-line was never achieved

within time-scale under the 'reactive'

approach. The most glaring issue was

the inability to maintain a constant

attack on the fire, under the 'reactive'

approach, due to insufficient staffing

at the fire floor.

As firefighters are generally exposed

to high heat build-up as fire develops

between the concrete floor slabs their

time at the fire is often reduced to

10-15 minutes. This means relief crews

should be ready for deployment from

the Bridgehead (Forward Command) to

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..a. Figure One: Reactive timings (upper) versus

Proactive timings (lower) achieved by the two

response and deployment strategies implemented

in the same building, before and after training.

The Proactive ICS also enabled careful management

of staffing deployments to ensure the fire attack

remained uninterrupted and supported.

arrive on the fire floor and at the nozzle

ahead of time. This is a critical point that

is often forgotten and failure to do this

often allows the fire to develop rapidly

beyond control. Two recent office tower

fires in London and Madrid have seen

'first response' firefighters incapacitated

by rapidly developing fires between the

concrete floor slabs as they were exposed

to high heat conditions on the fire floor

for just ten minutes. This required second

and third waves of firefighters to involve

in their rescue rather than firefighting,

causing the fires to burn beyond any

immediate control.

In order to establish an optimum

response and intervention model for

high-rise tower fires it is important to

analyse and prioritise the command

roles and tactical objectives that are

achievable according to the weight

of attack in a staffing and command

perspective. It is also important to assess

the risk profile according to any particular

building's occupancy, life risk, fire load

and in built fire protection features.

JANUARY 2016 GULF FIRE 75

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Advantages of the proactive response

• Established immediately at arrival

on-scene

• Not prone to stagnation (time delays

and down time caused by a reactive

approach)

• Ability to work in separate teams,

coordinated by sector commands

• Responsive and adaptable to rapid

changes in circumstances

• Adequately staffed in order to fulfil

key command roles from the outset

• Able to communicate effectively

between pre-determined spans

of control

Proactive command and response

means pre-planning the Standard

Operating Procedure (SOP) or Tactical

Plan, in advance of arriving on-scene.

It's about an immediate deployment of

a reconnaissance team with equipment

using a Rapid Ascent Team (RAT)

approach. It's about locating the fire

quickly, taking immediate actions that

might contain fire spread (like closing

a door if safe to do so), and setting up

the Forward Command Bridgehead

reading for ongoing operations. Getting

adequate staffing into place at the

bridgehead to allow for a three team

cycle relief to each hose-line operating is

also important (one crew on the nozzle,

one crew next in on the nozzle and one

crew in rehabilitation before a second


entry is allowed). So for each hose-line in

operation a minimum of 6-12 firefighters

are required in the 3-cycle relief.

Primary Response Operations (ICE) In the UK we use a response plan

(Figure Two) that encourages three

tactical approaches to be followed beyond

any immediate rescue attempts taking

place. These are-

Intervention (fire attack)

2 Containment

3 Evacuation

Intervention means an immediate hose

line (or aerial water tower) is placed as

part of a life safety function to stop a fire

spreading beyond control. This might

occur in an open-plan office area where

we literally have a few short minutes

to ensure adequate firefighting water

reaches the fire before the involved fire

load becomes too big to handle or spreads

vertically. This will start to occur as the

fire spreads beyond 200 square metres

of floor area.

A containment action might include

surrounding the fire with hose-lines or

aerial water towers, to prevent lateral and

vertical fire spread.lt may also involve

closing doors and controlling ventilation

flow paths to and from the fire. An external

fire behaviour observer can be located at

a safe point to observe and communicate

warning signs of exterior window failures,

<II Figure Two: Primary

response tactical

decision making on the

fire floor (ICE) -Choose

the optimum solution

first after any immediate

rescue considerations,

based on internal and

external conditions and

occupants who may be

at risk in the primary

risk zone (hallways,

corridors and possibly

un-protected stairways).

smoke and fire conditions, fire spread

to upper floors as well as how the wind

might be impacting on the fire itself. This

information is critical to any decisions

on the fire floor, prioritising intervention

ahead of evacuation or containment.

Evacuation of immediate (primary

- near the fire) or secondary (further

way) zones are of immediate concern.

Prior to opening a door to the fire zone,

might it be more beneficial to oversee an

evacuation from the primary zone that

could be compromised by smoke and heat

escaping into an escape corridor(primary)

or stairway (secondary), for example. In

some cases it might be more beneficial

to 'defend' occupants in place. However,

uncontrolled movements of occupants

in areas at risk can easily lead to serious

injuries or even death. Unconscious

occupants are sometimes found in

escape routes after the fire has been

extinguished, where firefighters failed to

place evacuation ahead of a firefighting

intervention.

Firefighting Water The most recent research undertaken

by the author involved investigation

into the quantities offirefighting water

required to effectively extinguish building

fires. This work involved some detailed

analysis of over SAOO UK building fires

occurring from 2009- 2012. At each fire,

water was flowed and breathing apparatus

was worn.

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T Figure Three: Research graph based on 5,401

building fires in the UK, from 2009-2012 where

water was flowed and firefighters wore breathing

apparatus. The data demonstrates a series of curves

for dwelling, industrial/storage, and all otherfires

(based on the midline), that show optimum flow

rates in accordance with average fire loading and

floor area. To fall below these flow-rates may expose

firefighters to longer duration fires that will require

additional resources and staffing.

u


The research with Glasgow Caledonian

University demonstrated the optimum,

minimum and critical rates of flow (Litres/

minute/m2 floor area) before excessive

fire damage occurs and firefighters are

exposed to increasing levels of heat.

Where fires are approached during the

growth side of the development curve,

the following flows are recommended for

early stage fire suppression:

•

..a. Fire in a tower block under construction,

Jumeirah Lake area, Dubai January 2010.

• Critical flow-rates, below which a

developing fire is unlikely to be controlled.

• Minimum flow-rates where suppression

is achievable but firefighters face severe

and punishing conditions.

• Optimum (adequate) flow-rates where

control of the fire is achievable without

unnecessary punishment to firefighters.

The following graph shows where

the flow-rate is optimised (as used by

firefighters) against various occupancies

according to compartment size and fire

load. The quantity in flow required in

dwellings is far less than in industrial or

storage buildings per square metre of fire

involvement and all other occupancies,

such as offices, hotels, retail and schools,

flow somewhere around the midline

(validated through research by Stefan

Sardqvist). To fall below these 'optimum'

flow-rates will expose firefighters to

greater risk by extending the time to

extinguishment. also leading to greater

levels of fire damage within the building.

1(111111 For more information, go to ~ [email protected]

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HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING Effective Firefighting Operations