Hi Shannon

8/13/2019 Hi Shannon

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Links


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Environment

Environmental use is a symptom of colonial thought rather thana neutral expression of the truth of the natural world

Adams and Mulligan 2003(W.M. and Martin, Professors of Geography atCambridge,Decolonizing Nature : Strategies for Conservation in a Postcolonial Era, p.5)Richard Grove (1995) and other environmental historians(see, for example,Griffiths and Robbins, 1997) have made the point that experiences ofcolonialism with regard to exploiting nature have been far fromuniform, and that an impetus to conserve nature began whencolonial authorities grew alarmed at the speed of environmentaldegradation in colonized lands. Somewhat paradoxically, whileideas about the exploitation of nature moved with the colonizersfrom the centre to the periphery of old empires, ideas about the

conservation of nature circulating in the periphery were broughtback to the centre. However, it is important to recognize thatboth the exploitation of nature in the colonies and the impetusto conserve nature for longer-term human use were a product ofthe colonial mindset, which was shaped by the interactionbetween colonial experiences in the centre and periphery. Thecolonial mindset can only be understood by looking at thisinteraction; but it was fundamentally rooted in Europeanvalues, which constructed nature as nothing more than aresource for human use and wildness as a challenge for the

rational mind to conquer. As Tom Griffiths (1996) has pointed out, eventhose settlers who were most enamoured of the flora and faunain their adopted homelands saw themselves as either hunters orcollectors, and wanted to assert their mastery over the wildnessthat they simultaneously admired and feared, or to collectspecimens that could be named and safely deposited inmuseums. Early colonial ideas about the conservation of natureessentially grew out of a broader desire to tamethe wild.

Their managerial approach to the environment is part of a sphere ofnormalization that is founded on a politics of extermination

Swyngedouw 09 (Erik, PhD of philosophy at John Hopkins University, formerprofessor of geography at University of Oxford, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City:In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, pgs 609-610)In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visionsembodied in different parties which compete for power isreplaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists . . .) and liberal multiculturalists; via the processof negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less


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universal consensus. Postpolitics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideologicalvisions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge andfree deliberation that takes peoples concrete needs and demands into account (iek,1999b: 198). Postpolitics is thus about the administration (policing)of environmental, social, economic or other domainsand they remain, ofcourse, fully within the realm of the possible, of existing social relations; they are thepartition of the sensible. The ultimate sign of postpolitics in allWestern countries, iek (2002: 303) argues, is the growth of amanagerial approach to government: government is reconceived as amanagerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension. Postpolitics refusespoliticization in the classical Greek sense; that is, politics as the metaphoricaluniversalization of particular demands, which aims at more than the negotiation ofinterests. The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuinepolitical space of disagreement. However, consensus does not equal peace or absence ofcontestation (Rancire, 2005: 8). Under a postpolitical condition: Everything ispoliticized, can be discussed, but only in a non-committal way and as a non-conflict.Absolute and irreversible choices are kept away; politics

becomes something one can do without making decisions thatdivide and separate. When pluralism becomes an end in itself, real] politics ispushed to other arenas (Diken and Laustsen, 2004: 7). Difficultiesand problems,such as re-ordering the urban or re-shaping the environmentthatare generally staged and accepted as problematic need to be dealt withthroughcompromise, managerial and technical arrangement andthe production of consensus: Consensus refers to that which is censored . . .Consensus means that whatever your personal commitments, interests and values may

be, you perceive the same things, you give them the same name. But there is no conteston what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus meansthat the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given

situation. Correspondingly, dissensus and disagreement dont onlymean conflict of interests, ideas and so on. They mean that thereis a debate on the sensible givens of a situation, a debate on that which

you see and feel, on how it can be told and discussed, who is able to name it and argueabout it . . . It is about the visibilities of the places and abilities of the body in thoseplaces, about the partition of private and public spaces, about the very configuration ofthe visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it . . . Consensus is thedismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world (Rancire,2003b: 46). The key feature of consensus is the annulment of dissensus . . . the end ofpolitics (Rancire, 2001: 32). Of course, this postpolitical world eludes choice andfreedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus) and, in the absence of realpoliticization of particulars, the only position of real dissent is that ofeither the traditionalist(those stuck in the past and who refuse to accept theinevitability of the new global neoliberal order) or the fundamentalist. The only wayto deal with them is by sheer violence, by suspending theirhumanitarian and democratic rights.The postpolitical relies on eitherincluding all in a consensual pluralist order and on excluding radically those who positthemselves outside the consensus. For them, as Agamben (2005) argues, the law is


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suspended; they are literally put outside the law and treated asextremists and terrorists.

Attempts to correct for environmental catastrophe withouttaking into account colonial oppression risks serial policy

failure and further ensures coloniality endures.Smith 97 [Andy Smith, Ecofeminism through an anti-colonialframework, published in Ecofeminism: Women, Culture,Nature, pgs. 21-47]For Native American women, sexism oppression often seemssecondary to colonial oppression. As Lorelei Means states, We are American Indian women,in that order.We are oppressed, first and foremost, as American Indians, as peoplescolonized by the United States of America, not as women. As Indians,we cannever forget that. Our survival, the survival of every one of usman, woman and childas Indians dependson it. Decolonization is the agenda, the whole agenda, and until it isaccomplished, it is the only agenda that counts for AmericanIndians.5 Many Native women completely dismiss feminism in light of colonization.6 I do notnecessarily see one oppression as more important than others.However, most Native women probably feel the impact ofcolonization on our everyday lives more than other forms ofoppression. One reason why colonization seems to be the primary issue for Native women is that most forms ofoppression did not exist in most Native societies prior to colonization.7 As Paula Gunn Allen and Annette Jaimes have

shown, prior to colonization, Indian societies were not maledominated. Women served as spiritual, political, and militaryleaders. Many societies were matrilineal and matrilocal.Violence against women and children was unheard of. Although

there existed at division of labor between women and men,women's labor and men's labor were accorded similar status. Environmental destruction also did not exist in Indian societies. As Winona LaDuke states, Traditionally,

American Indian women were never subordinate to men. Orvice versa, for that matter. What native societies have alwaysbeen about is achieving balance in all things, gender relations noless than any other.Nobody needs to tell us how to do it. We've had that all worked out for thousands foryears. And, left to our own devices, that's exactly how we'd be living right now.8With colonizationbegins the domination of women and the domination of nature.As Allen argues, subjugating Indian women was critical in ourcolonizers' efforts to subjugate Indian societies as a whole: "The

assault on the system of woman power requires the replacing ofa peaceful, nonpunitive, nonauthoritarian social system whereinwomen wield power by making social life easy and gentle withone based on child terrorization, male dominance andsubmission of women to male authority."9 Other women, particularly white women,may not experience colonization as a primary form of oppression to the degree that Native women do. However, I do

believe it is essential that ecofeminist theory more seriously grapplewith the issues of colonization, particularly the colonization of


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Native lands, in its analysis of oppression. One reason why this isnecessary is because Native lands are the site of the mostenvironmental destruction that takes place in this country.About 60 percent of the energy resources(i.e., coal, oil, uranium) in thiscountry are on Indian land.10 In addition, 100 percent of uranium

production takes place on or near Indian land.11 In the areas where there isuranium mining, such as Four Corners and the Black Hills, Indian people face skyrocketingincidents of radiation poisoning and birth defects.12 Many Navajotraditionalists are speculating that the "mystery virus" that isafflicting people in Arizona may be related to the uraniumtailings left by mining companies. They think that the uraniumhas poisoned rats in the area.13 Children growing up in this area are developing ovarian andtesticular cancers at fifteen times the national average.14 Indian women on Pine Ridge experience a miscarriage rate six

times higher than the national average.15 Native reservations are often targeted fortoxic waste dumps, since companies do not have to meet thesame EPA standards that they do on other lands.16 Over fiftyreservations have been targeted for waste dumps.17 In addition,military and nuclear testing takes place on Native lands. For instance,there have been at least 650 nuclear explosions on Shoshone land at the Nevada test site. Fifty percent ofthe underground tests have leaked radiation into theatmosphere.18 At the historic People of Color EnvironmentalSummit held in October 1991 in Washington, D.C., Native peoplefrom across the country reported the environmental destructiontaking place on Indian lands through resource development. TheYakima people in Washington State stated that nuclear wastes coming from the Hanford nuclear reactor had been placedin such unstable containers that they were now leaking, and they believed that their underground water wascontaminated. They said it would cost $150 billion to clean up these wastes,19 and plans were being made to relocate thewastes to a repository on Yucca Mountain, where the Shoshone live, at a cost of $3.25 billion. Yucca Mountain is on an

active volcanic zone. Kiloton bombs are also exploded nearby, thus increasing the risks of radioactive leakage.20 TheInuit of Canada reported that NATO war exercises had beenwreaking environmental havoc where they live. The 8,000lowlevel flights that had already taken place over Inuit land hadcreated so much noise from sonic booms that it had disruptedthe wildlife and impaired the hearing of the Inuit. Furthermore, oilfalling from the jets had poisoned the water supply. TheShoshone reported that lowlevel flying also takes place overtheir land.One man was killed when his horse threw him because it was frightened by the noise of the jets. Theyreported that the flying had been scheduled to take place over the cattle range until the Humane Society interceded, saying

this would be inhumane treatment of the cattle. Consequently, the war exercises wereredirected to take place over Indian people instead. The delegates allreported that they were having an exceedingly difficult time in getting the U.S. government to acknowledge the effects ofradiation on their people, despite the obvious and widespread effects in the region. If the United States recognizes one

case of radioactive poisoning, it will have to recognize thousands. 21 Because Native people suffer thebrunt of environmental destruction, it is incumbent uponecofeminist theorists to analyze colonization as a fundamentalaspect of the domination of nature. This is true not just because


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we should all be concerned about the welfare of Native peoplebut also because what befalls Native people will eventually affecteveryone. Radiation will not stay nicely packaged on Indianlandit will eventually affect all of the land.


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Link WallEconomyTheir advantage is an construction of imperialism used to legitimize colonization

under the mantle of economic liberalism

Lipschutz, Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, 1995, On Security, pg 15-17

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy andeconomics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a secure global

system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of

economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth

of this system.43One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a

particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation,throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and

preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished

under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that

economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the

world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States

inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deckwas that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to

make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and

societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure.

The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so

greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shahs efforts to create a Westernized societyengendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but

so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on

Persian Gulf oil. Islamic fundamentalism, now characterized by some as the enemythat will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers worst nightmaresmade real,45although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and

elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic powerthey now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American

security.The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy

is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and

economic security. What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrialpolicy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security

component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6:Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under InternationalEconomic Interdependence) shows how strategic economic interdependence aconsequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the

increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and theever-increasing velocity of the product cycleundermines the ability of states tocontrol those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and

military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek torestrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that

by and large the only such restrictions that havebeen imposed in recent years have all

come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposedvulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this new security


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dilemma, as Crawford has stylzed it? How can a state generate the conditions forlegitimizing various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not

enough to invoke the mantra of competitiveness; competition withsomeone is alsocritical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of

cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy in the

United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although thediscourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints couldbe broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen,

and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non) Pacific

conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can

new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to justify new cold

wars and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or

has the world changed too much for this to happen again?


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B. Impact is a Global Economy of Deaththe anti-life dimensions ofeconomic security ensure people become less than capital exchangeNorth/South war inevitable.Dr.Vandana Shiva,Alternative Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader in the InternationalForum on Globalization and one of Indias leading and groundbreaking Theoretical Physicists,2005, Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability, and Peace, pg 13-14

The word economics is derived from the Greek word oikos, meaning home. Home is where one isborn, grows up, and is looked after. Mathew Fox wrote, Our true home is the universe itself.Robert Frost observes, Home is where there is always a place for youat the table and where youcan count on sharing what is at the table. To be part of a home, a household, is to have access tolife. How is it that economic systems today are such unwelcoming spaces? How have they

become places that, rather than take us in, often bar our entry, and, in the process, refuse us notonly a home, but a right to sustenance, stability, and ultimately life?The dominant economy goes by many namesthe market economy, the globalized economy,corporate globalization, and capitalism, to name a fewbut all these names fail to acknowledgethat this economy is but one of the three major economies at work in the world today. In EarthDemocracy every being has equal access to the earths resources that make life possible; thisaccess is assured by recognizing the importance of the other two economies: natures economyand the sustenance economy.The globalized free market economy, which dominates our lives, is based on rules thatextinguish and deny access to lifeand livelihoods by generating scarcity. This scarcity iscreated by the destruction of natureseconomy and the sustenance economy, where life isnourished, maintained, and renewed. Globalization and free trade decimate the conditions forproductive, creative employment by enclosing the commons, which are necessary for thesustenance of life. The anti-life dimensionsof economic globalization are rooted in the factthat capital exchange is taking the place of living processesand the rights of corporationsare displacing those of living people.The economic conflict of our time isnot just a North-South divide, thoughthe inequalitiescreated by colonialism, the maldevelopment model of debt-slaveryimposed by the IMF andthe World Bank, and the rules of the WTOhave that dimension. The contest is between aglobal economy of death and destruction and diverse economies for life andcreation. In our age, have or have not has mutated into live or live not.


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LinkBorders

The focus on borders replicates legal codificiations of identitiesthrough inspection strengthening borders becomes an

apparatus for managing populationsHeyman 2004 [Josiah, department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas, El Paso, Ports ofEntry as Nodes in the World System, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 11:3, 303-327]

When people move through ports, legal identifications areaffirmed, applied, or rejected through a bureaucraticpoliceprocess called inspection. Inspection re- sembles Foucaldian surveillance, though it is notnecessarily all-encompassing and effective in internal disciplining (Heyman 1999a). Rather, ports should beunderstood in the context of the interplay of governmentofficers and active popu- laces.As Alan Smart has written for the pairing of state lawenforcement and ille- gal practices, we need to work from both ends

simultaneously and hope that we manage to connect up in themiddle (1999: 100). Thus, in analyzing inspections, I distinguish identifications imposed from outside from self-assumed identities (Heyman 2001: 130). Inspections concentrate tremendouscomplexity into a short moment of interaction. Understandinghow inspectors and entrants orches- trate these complicatedactions demands close ethnographic attention, but repays it withgreat insights into the making and regulation of mobility. People enterland ports in two ways, on foot and as the driver and passengers in cars. There are differences in how ports handle thesetwo kinds of entrants, but I will concentrate on crucial elements of inspection found in both cases. The first meeting ofentrant with state officer is called, not surprisingly, primary inspection. The decision at primary is whether people andvehicles can directly proceed into the national interior or are sent to a waiting area to the side of the exit for moreextended secondary inspections. At the latter, definite identifications are made, from admission to rejection or evenarrest and prosecution. Primary inspections at this border include both examination of goods (customs functions) and

people (immigration functions) and inspectors from the two federal agencies (the Cus- toms Service and the INS1) arecross-designated to share responsibility (these roles bifurcate in the secondary area). Primary inspectors make decisionsunder amaz- ingly tight time constraints. The management yardstick for busy ports such as El Paso or San Ysidro, whichare under elevated threat advisory (the current normal condition), is one vehicle cleared every thirty seconds onaverage. Although periodic high alert conditions dilate this time standard (e.g., by requiring physi- cal examination of atleast one compartment per vehicle), there are countervailing pressures to speed up traffic clearance under normalcircumstances, including the negative health and safety effects of backed-up traffic and the cross-border tour- ism, retail,and manufacturing coalitions that pressure port management to facili- tate border crossing (see Heyman 1999b on localpolitical contexts of ports). Al- though ambiguous cases can be sent to secondary, in busy ports secondary areas becomeovercrowded with referrals, so there is constant verbal feedback on the availability of secondary space to primary

inspectors. Hence, there is no substitute for snap judgments at primary. The problem forinspectors is that they have to make judgments at one restrictedplace and time about personal and legal situations ramifyingbackward and for- ward in time and space. For example, a person speaking Englishwith a heavy Spanish accent declared that he was a United States citizen, returning from visit- ing his mother in AguaPrieta, Sonora, and that his residence was south Phoenix. On moving from primary to secondary, where he was questionedin detail, he indi- cated that he was born in the United States, moved with his parents to Mexico in his early childhood,and returned to the United States to live with an older sister as a fifteen-year-old, where he attended high school for twoyears before dropping out to work on a gardening crew. The question at stake was whether he actually was a United Statescitizen by birth with every right to return to his home and job in Phoenix or was making a false claim to United Statescitizenship. There is no definitive identification for United States citizenship, no national United States identity card, sothe admission process involves a contested set of inferences about this persons past (why he spoke English, but verypoorly; why he was familiar with a high school in Phoenix) and his activities and societal involvements in two nationsbeyond that observable in the port itself (why he was in Sonora during the Christmas period, what rights he had or did nothave to be working on a gardening crew in Arizona). He was admitted from secondary, in the space of two minutes, on thebasis of his familiarity with the Phoenix high school, a reasonable and probably fair but by no means certain decision.


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We will find crucial the means by which such decisions aremade, the contexts that govern these means, the aggre- gatepattern of such decisions, and the accumulated national andworld-systemic impacts of that aggregated mass of snapdecisions.


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Growth/DevelopmentDiscourse of growth and development is rooted in universalisteconomic rationality with racist/paternalistic presumption of aknowledge gap in the Global South

Elabdin (Associate Professor and Chair of Economics @ Franklin & Marshall College)4(Eiman, Postcolonialism Meets Economics, edited by Eiman Elabdin and S Charusheela 30-31)

The problem of knowledge has been the object of intense reflection in thepast half century. Here, I am not concerned with the nature of knowledge itselfbut with the role of economics (steeped in the modernist construction ofknowledge as universal truth, rational, instrumental, and, in a way, exclusive toWestern modernity) in producing the subaltern subjectivity ofunderdevelopment and lack of epistemic authority.18 The question of knowledge, whichunderwrites both the first and second tasks of post-colonialism, is: How does the postcolonial secure sufficientepistemic authority to write its own histories and to construct its own meanings? To begin to answer this questionrequires examining the very way in which economic knowledge has been configured so far, and how knowledge asa body of human cognitive relations to the world has been structured in ways that serve hegemonic culturalpurposes. The implication of knowledge in systems of power is old, at least ever since Francis Bacon proclaimed that[h]uman knowledge and human power meet in one, for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be

produced (Kramnick 1995: 39). Postcolonial critics have underscored the manner inwhich knowledge about certain societies was produced and effectivelydeployed as instrument of dominion over them (Said 1978). Africa was invented by theacademic discourses of philosophy and anthropology that is, produced as a field of study based on Europeanapprehensions about its place in History recall Hegel and the cognitive characteristics of its savage mind (see

Mudimbe 1988). The contemporary exemplar of this complex of knowledge/poweris the discourse on development,which has defined the conditions ofpossibility of all knowledge about former colonies since the formal end of thecolonial era. Development as discourse offers both the scientific grounds fortheoretically placing postcolonial societies in pre-modernity, and theconsequent policy prescriptions for their modernization thereof.

Development not only embodies the historicist understanding of socialchange and the belief in the superiority of industrial culture, it also containsknowledge as its essential component since development, as a general phenomenon,entails a learning process. The problem of knowledge, however stipulated ineconomicsas literacy, the acquisition and mastery of technological skills, or simply human capital accounts for the poverty of any given society. The cause and effect chainbetween knowledge and economic growth (see Lewis 1955, Rostow 1960, Ayres 1962, Rodney1972) provides the scientific basis for an acceptable social theory. Accordingly, thedevelopment discourse presents knowledge as an obstacle to be surmountedby the less developed and, at once, produces the knowledge that becomestheir frame of reference for knowing their own selves.


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NAFTA

Free Trade Zones are produced by of racialized colonialism

in Latin America hyper-exploitation of darkerpopulations guts labor rights and solidarity

Werner 11(Marion, University at Buffalo-Department of Geography, Colonialityand the Contours of Global Production in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, 2011,7/30/13.http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~wernerm/Werner_Antipode.pdf|Ashwin)

Since the 1970s, there has been a substantial surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) in industrial production in theglobal South. Scholars have, for the most part, characterized this increase as a new phenomenon that indicates astructural shift in global capitalism, arguing that the global South is no longer enrolled in capital accumulation primarily via the extraction of raw materials for industrial processes in the global North.i Rather,

transnational capital has been able to take advantage ofdepressed wages in the global South through developments in

finance, advanced communications technologies, 4 as well asmultilateral and macroregional trade liberalization.Mainstream debates about these new patterns of global production in the circum-Caribbean, forexample have largely been restricted to analyses of the efficacy ofthese arrangements in terms of national capitalistdevelopment.ii These debates, however, obscure othergeographies: on the one hand, they do not recognize the historical andmaterial continuity of new production arrangements withthose of the colonial past; and, they fail to engage with the racial and gendered ideologies and practices that are

reproduced in relation to colonial formations , to great material and economiceffect (Hart 2002; Nagar, Lawson, McDowell, and Hanson 2002) The work of Peruvian scholar Anibal Quijano can behelpful in this regard. Quijano names the articulation of hierarchical forms ofsocial difference with wage and non-wage forms of labourcontrol, the coloniality of power. He argues that the racial hierarchiesforged through the conquest of the Americas constitute a terrainof articulation, one that adapts historic patterns ofexploitation to the contingent necessities and attendantconflicts of contemporary capitalist accumulation(2000). It is this terrain ofarticulation that draws contingently from the invention of race through conquest in order to structure hierarchical

relations of domination and exploitation: The distribution of social identities

[through racial categories] would henceforth sustain all socialclassification of the population in America. With and through it, diverse forms of exploitation, labour control and relations ofgender would be articulated in changing forms depending onthe necessities of power in each period.(Quijano 1998: 30, my translation) Interms that are not dissimilar to those in the early work of Stuart Hall (1980; cf. Althusser 1990), coloniality does notpresume any essential connection between subjects marked by social difference and the relations of exploitation and

domination that they experience. The invention of race established particulargeographical and social roles in the global division of labour of
http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~wernerm/Werner_Antipode.pdf%7CAshwinhttp://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~wernerm/Werner_Antipode.pdf%7CAshwinhttp://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~wernerm/Werner_Antipode.pdf%7CAshwinhttp://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~wernerm/Werner_Antipode.pdf%7CAshwin


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capitalist accumulation and the spatial distribution of formsof labour, i.e., waged, paid, unpaid, slave, indentured, etc. despite the fact that neither capitalism nor racismnor sexism exist in relations of necessary dependence. And yet, these structures are not simply analogical, as Spivak

reminds us (1988). Rather, there is a way in which accumulation proceedsthrough the iterative production of the coloniality of power:

that is, the reworking of hierarchies of social difference andforms of labour in order to recuperate profits from theirinterminable tendency towards stagnation and decline. If colonialityis fundamentally a relational process linking hierarchies of raced and gendered workforces made national throughadditional practices of the state to capitalist accumulation, it is also, fundamentally, a spatial endeavour. It is not onlythe articulation of race, gender, class, and nation that shape the contours of wage labour and those rendered assuperfluous to its relation, but also the relational production of place. 6 Places are processes formed through specifichistories of accumulation, disinvestment, violence, dispossession, and resistance in relation to other places. Thestructural position of places within hierarchies of capital accumulation is reproduced (or not) through processes shotthrough by the coloniality of power (see Massey 1994; Sheppard 2002). The relational production of place is central tothe contours of accumulation that I trace in the following sections. Two key localities figure in this story: the inland cityof Santiago, the erstwhile capital of export garment production in the Dominican Republic, and the border towns ofOuanaminthe (Haiti) and Dajabn (DR) (see Map). These places have very different trajectories: Santiago has longserved as a center of capital accumulation in the countrys northern region, called the Cibao, possessing a wellestablishedand globally connected provincial elite. The proximate border region, on the other hand, is defined by state violence,subsistence forms of livelihood, and substantial out-migration for much of the 20th century. I trace the conditions of

possibility for the new connections being forged between Santiago and the border through apparel productionoutsourcing as part of redrawing the relational boundary between exploitable workers and those produced as excess to

accumulation. In doing so, I discuss not only proximate changes inaccumulation strategies in the Dominican Republic but thelayers of violence, disinvestment and dispossession in theborder region that make the latter conceivable as a new low-wage frontier. The creation of trade zones in the Dominican Republic wascelebrated during the 1980s and 1990s by proponents of neoliberal policy for diversifyingexports following declines in sugar prices and shrinking US sugar import quotas, the countrys source of foreignexchange for much of the 20th century (Kuczynski and Williamson 2003).vi Sugar plantations promoted through theparallel US occupations of the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) and Haiti (1915-1934) incorporated Haitian workers,mostly men, in the Dominican Republic as low-wage labour, forming a long- standing temporary workforce confined

through policing, deportations, and racial profiling to the plantation regions in the southeast until the models crisis inthe 1980s. Dominican men worked in related agro-industrial production as well as state-promoted manufacturing,although the total wage employment in both activities barely topped 100,000 (Lozano 2001; Moya Pons 1992). Structural adjustment, including two steep currency devaluations, and President Reagans Caribbean trade policy

facilitated a proliferation of trade zones in the 1980s. Over the course of the decade, thenumber of zones grew from three, employing 16,000 workers,to twenty-five, employing 135,000 workers. Employment reached its peak in 1998at nearly 200,000 workers (CNZFE 1999). Employment generation was just as significant as the distribution of thesejobs. Trade zones were established in secondary cities and towns in part because provincial industrialists, excluded fromimport substitution subsidies from the Dominican state largely reserved for state clients in the capital city, soughtalternative avenues for capital accumulation (Moya Pons 1992). Thus, the zones were significant in arresting, to a degree,out-migration from provincial 148 areas to the capital city (Ariza 2000; Santana 1994) as the possibility of paid employment, albeit poorly remunerated and insecure in multiple ways, grew in other regions of the country. Tradezones were initially promoted to absorb Dominican men retrenched from collapsing sugar mills; Dominican women,however, formed two-thirds of the workforce in the first two decades of export manufacturing (Portorreal 1991; Safa

1990; Safa 1995). Not surprisingly, early studies of the countrys new export strategy emphasized its gendered aspects especially changing relations in households associated with new female entrants into relations of wage employment. Inhindsight, two other aspects were key to this feminization of labour: regional consolidation of the garment industry anda reconfiguration of racialized spatial divisions of labour. First, while jobs were created in trade zones based in decliningsugar mill towns associated with the eastern plantation economy (alleviating the local burden of restructuring to a degreewhile dramatically altering gender relations), employment largely consolidated in the northern Cibao region, an areaassociated with smallholding agriculture and secondary agricultural exports like tobacco (Schrank 2003). The center ofthis strategy was the city of Santiago where local industrialists took over many US-owned operations or formed jointventures with US firms in the trade zones, a sector dominated by garment production for the US market. As we will see,this contingent outcome of northern regional dominance would prove highly significant in shaping the spatialreorganization of the industry since the 2000s, as well as gendered forms of exclusion in the Dominican garment sector.

Second, trade zones represented a spatial strategy on the part of


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the state and capital to produce Dominican labour as anexclusive object of low-wage exploitation by multinationalcapitalin the Dominican Republic. The incorporation of Haitian workers in Dominican trade zones was prohibitedin practice. The director of the Industrial Promotion Agency (Corporacin de Fomento Industrial, CFI) explained therestrictions on foreign workers in Dominican trade zones as follows: [T]he effort by the government to construct anddevelop industrial parks is to solve the problem of unemployment. The trade zones must be for Dominican workers. Forthis reason, the employment of foreign machine operators, especially 9 Haitians, must be strictly forbidden because this

would provoke a devaluing of wages since Haitians come to the country and work for anything.vii The notionthat the mere presence of working Haitian bodies decreasedwages justified state efforts to distinguish, contain andseparate Haitian and Dominican workers. The context of thisspatial strategy, however, was precisely the collapse of stateschemes to manage the Haitian workforce through guestworker programs and the containment of Haitian workers tosugar concerns, the latter being dismantled throughout the 1980s. As Haitian workers were incorporatedmassively as a largely undocumented workforce in cities and towns, as well as in domestic and secondary agricultural

exports (like coffee) (see Lozano 2001),viii Dominican trade zones reinforced new

geographies of segmentation, guaranteeing the relational andhierarchical reproduction of Dominican and Haitianlabour, violent abstractions underpinning a gradient of hyper-exploitation (see Merrill, this issue). By the early 2000s, Santiago, a city of just over half a millioninhabitants, was home to the countrys largest trade zone, employing nearly 40,000 workers, principally dedicated toapparel production for the US market. The city also anchored three other zones on its edges while garment f irms based inSantiago and the nearby town of La Vega subcontracted production to a half-dozen zones in secondary towns in theCibao. Thirty-five percent of the occupied workforce in the province of Santiago was directly employed in trade zoneproduction and the region as a whole concentrated two-fifths of all trade zone jobs in the country (PNUD 2008: 258-

261). The consolidation of trade zone employment in the Cibaosaw a decisive shift in the feminization of the workforce:men made up an increasing proportion of workers, reachingnear parity in garment production by the middle of the decade.The slow exclusion of female workers can be attributed to acomplex mix of factors: my research suggests the importance of paternalist labour relations in the Cibao, the recuperation ofsewing as skilled, masculine work related to the industrys consolidation andrestructuring in the 1990s, and growing participation of women in international migration.ix Industry consolidationunderwrote the accrual of domestic returns from garment exports to a handful of Santiago-based 10 industrialists whosefirms grew at breakneck speed in terms of employment, from a few hundred to as many as fourteen thousand workers inless than a decade.


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Venezuela

And the foundation of colonial politics in the Americas traces itself to

Venezuela. The US and European governments used economic tools as policingmechanisms upon Venezuela. The Monroe Doctrine became emblematic of all

engagement in the Americas. The US took a unilateral approach to controlling

economic exchanges between Latin American nations and punished those who

rebelled against its Imperial control.

Mignolo 01 [Walter D. Mignolo, Professor at Duke University, Coloniality at Large: TheWestern Hemisphere in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity]If the idea of the "Western Hemisphere" found its moment ofemergence in the independence of Creoles in both Americas, itsmoment of consolidation can be found almost a century later,after the Spanish-American War and during the presidency ofTheodore Roosevelt, at the dawn of the twentieth century. If historiesneed a beginning, then the history of the strong re-articulation of the ideaof the Western Hemisphere in the twentieth century had itsbeginning in Venezuelawhen armed forces from Germany and England [End Page 37] initiated ablockade to pressure for the payment of foreign debts. The Spanish-American War(1898) hadbeen a war for the control of the seas and the Panama Canal against the threats of thewell-established imperial nations of Western Europe, a danger that was repeated with theblockade against Venezuela. The intervention of Germany andEngland was a good moment to revive the call for autonomy forthe "Western Hemisphere," which had lost strength in the years prior to and during the American

Civil War. The fact that the blockade was against Venezuela createdthe conditions for the idea and ideology of the "WesternHemisphere" to be revived as not only a question of U.S.jurisdiction, but also of the jurisdiction of Latin Americancountries. The Argentinean Lus Mara Drago, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made the first step in that direction inDecember of 1902 (Whitaker 1954: 87-100).Whitaker proposes, in a broad outline, an interpretation of these years ofinternational politics that helps us to understand the radical change in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world systemthat took place at the beginning of the twentieth century with the Rooseveltean reinterpretation of the idea of the

"Western Hemisphere." According to Whitaker, Lus Mara Drago's proposed resolution tothe embargo on Venezuela(now known as the "Drago Doctrine")was in reality asort of "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine from a multilateralperspective that involved, of course, all of the states of theAmericas. Whitaker suggests that Drago's position was not well received in Washington because, among otherthings, the United States considered the Monroe Doctrine a doctrineof national politics and, indirectly, unilateral when applied tointernational relations. Contrary to U.S. views on the Monroe Doctrine, Drago interpreted it as amultilateral principle valid for the whole Western Hemisphere that could be executed in and from any part of the

Americas. The second reason that Washington shunned the DragoDoctrine, according to Whitaker, was a consequence of the first:


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if, in fact, a corollary had been necessary to extend the effectivityof the Monroe Doctrine to international relations, this"corollary" should have come from Washington and notArgentina, or any part of Latin America, for that matter. This was, according toWhitaker, the road Washington followed when, in December of 1904, Roosevelt proposed his own "corollary" to theMonroe Doctrine. Although similar to Drago's proposal, Roosevelt's had important [End Page 38] differences. Whitaker

enumerates the following points of similarity: (a) both "corollaries" were designed to solve the same problem (Europeanintervention in the Americas) and were based on the same premises (the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of the Western

Hemisphere); (b)both "corollaries" proposed to solve the problemthrough an exception to international law in favor of promotingthe Western Hemisphere; and (c) both proposed to achieve thissolution through an "American policy pronouncement, notthrough a universally agreed amendment to international law"(Whitaker 1954: 100). The differences, however, were what reoriented the configuration of the new world order: the"ascent" of one neocolonial or postcolonial country to the groupof imperial nation-statesa change of no small measure in theimaginary and structure of the modern/colonial world. The differencesbetween Roosevelt and Drago, according to Whitaker, are found in the manner of implementing the new internationalpolitics. Roosevelt proposed to do it unilaterally, from the United States, while Drago proposed a multilateral action,which would be democratic and inter-American. The results of Roosevelt's "corollary" are very different from what could

be imagined to have happened if the Drago Doctrine had been implemented. However, Rooseveltclaimed for America the monopoly of rights of theadministration of autonomy and democracy in the WesternHemisphere(Whitaker 1954: 100). The Monroe Doctrine, rearticulatedwith the idea of the "Western Hemisphere," introduced afundamental change in the configuration of the modern/colonialworld and the imaginary of modernity/coloniality. Whitaker's conclusion onthis chapter of the modern/colonial world is apt: "As a result [of the implementation of the "Roosevelt corollary" instead

of the "Drago corollary"] the leader in Washington and those in Western

Europe came to understand each other better and better as timewent on. The same development, however, widened the alreadyconsiderable gap between Anglo-Saxon America and LatinAmerica"(Whitaker 1954: 107).


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Terrorism

Constructing the threat of foreign terrorism is just a

smokescreen for the biggest terror state of all to continueits mass killingsChomsky 99(Noam, Professor (Emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics &Philosophy at MIT, and Heinz Dieterich. Latin America: from colonization toglobalization. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999)

NC: Well, it's a leading terrorist state. The United States air raidagainst Libya was one of the major terrorist acts,probably the major terroristact of this year, at least. They killed dozens of people. That's probably fivetimes as many people as can plausibly be attributed to Libyan-sponsored terrorism in the last 10 years. And that's one raid. In fact,

if you look at the kinds of charges that are made against Libya and you apply the same standards to the United States, youdraw some very interesting conclusions. Libya is accused of involvement in, say,bombing of airplanes, although only a loose connection isevident. But you know, the major terrorist actof 1985 in the Middle East, interms of the number of people killed, was a car bombing inBeirut where 80 people were killed, which was carried out bypeople associated with the CIA.Well, the CIA said it wasn't directly involved, so thatexculpated them, but there is no proof that Libya was any more involved in the things that are attributed to Libya. These

were groups working with the CIA who carried out a bombing and missed somebody and killed 80 people. Thebiggest terrorist act of 1985 was the bombing of the Air Indiaplane, in which 350 people or so were killed. That was probably

carried out by terrorists who were trained in the southernUnited States.Now, by the standards we apply to Libya, the United States isresponsible.Look at real terrorism, not this small scaleterrorism, terrorism like the state terrorism in El Salvador,where a U.S. mercenary army is massacring and slaughteringpeople at a fantastic rate - maybe 60,000 people in the last sixyears.Or, take the terrorist army in Guatemala, which the United States has always supported, or the Contras, theleading terrorist force in the world. U.S. terrorist activities against Cuba have also been phenomenal. Since the Kennedyadministration, Cuba has been the target of more international terrorism than any other state in the world, probably

more than all other states put together, until, say, Nicaragua. Whatwehave here is a majorterrorist power. "Gangster state" is an appropriate description.


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K aff link

Even radical critics of Western reason and advocats for

progressives causes still operate within colonial time, fixing aEuro-centric imaginaryeven the idea that their performance orintervention somehow alleviates conditions or improves currentexistence relies on a conservative imagination of a worldresembling colonialityAlcoff 2007(Linda, Professor at Syracuse University, Mignolos Epistemology ofColoniality The New Centennial Review7.3)It allows us to understand the constitutive relationship between thehistori- cal a priori of European thought and its off-shoreadventures. It also allows us to think through the Anglo- andEurocentric structure of thought and representation that

continues to dominate much of the world today, whether or not, in agiven place and time, formal national liberation has been won. From Dussel, Mignolotook up the idea of transmodernity,which signifies the global networkswithin which European modernity itself became possible.Transmodernity operates to displace the teleological and linearprogression of modernity and postmodernity, rendering eventhe most anti-Western postmodernists still complicit with thetemporal concepts of colonialism that erased the colonialdifference. Whereas the concepts of modernity and post-modernity maintain the Eurocentric imaginary timelineof Greece

Rome Renaissance Modern World, relegating the colonized areas ofthe world as peripheral to the main story, the concept oftransmodernity is intendedby Dussel to displace that timeline witha spatialization in which the whole planet is involved at everystage in history. If modernity is imagined to be European,transmodernity is planetary, with principle players from all parts of the globe.


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In-round activism

When the privilege of the intellectual is utilized in service ofthe oppressed in debate and other forums of knowledge

production, it inevitably only serves to maintain and securitizethat position in dominant power structures. To counter this,radical measures must be taken

Maduro 11, Otto, Latino philosopher and sociologist of religion at Drew University,,Decolonizing Epistemologies Chapter An(Other) Invitation to EpistemologicalHumility Fordham University Press, November 2011

No wonder, symmetrically, that, for their part, those already esteemed andrecognized by most as intellectual authorities, as experts, as thepeo- ple who really know, and who know what is really important, try(without

knowing that they are trying) to keep their knowledge rare, either by givingof it only that modicum that they deem accessible to the populace (somehow letting therecipients know that this is the case and earning recognition for their charitabledonations) orby denying that knowledge to the common folk,clothing their wisdom in esoteric, obscure, specializedjargon, thus redoubling their distinctive preeminence as expertswith an impossibility of being understood save by their peers.Unless acutely aware of such complementary epistemologicaltendencies between elites and the subaltern, the very groups andindividuals engaged in an intellectual struggle (supposedly) insolidaritywith the oppressed and against the dominant elites,

might easily end up swal- lowed by those same dynamics ofintellectual distinction, carving secondary niches of expertise(inchurches, unions, NGOs,opposition parties,etc.), whereauthority,recognition, connections, self esteem, and other forms of capital can beaccumulated andlater exchanged for yet further types of capital-probablycontributing, in the end, not to dismantle, but to reinforce andfurther veil the role of (recognized) knowledge (theirs included)in the reproduction and cover-up of relations of domination.Ironically, this is at times the case with Bourdieus thought and jargon- originallysupposed to have emerged to expose elitist relations and oppressive hierarchies, butevery so often used instead to re-create and reinforce dynamics of exclusion and self

aggrandizement. Nobody is exempt from the temptation andpossibility of slowly sliding from (honestly believing that theyare) producing and using their knowledge mainly in the serviceof vulnerable, at-risk populations, to using the privilegedposition of the intellectual among the subaltern (and toincreasingly orient their production of knowledge) to secure,enhance, and reinforce their own position of privilege-thus


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enabling themselves to accumulate enough capital (relations, prestige,selflesteem, etc.) to exchange for positions in other social locations,including in the service of the dominant power structures andelites.I submit that, rather than an anomaly, this is the normal (tragic)tendency of intellectuals, especially when we refuse to

acknowledge that this is the normal tendency and to take thenecessary collective measures to counter it.


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Energy

The Affirmatives management by extraction is part and parcel of a

long history of systematic energy violence, exploitation, andsecuritizationultimately marking the indigenous populationssurrounding the resources a threat to energy security that must becontained.Banerjee 9(Subhabrata Bobby, Director of Research at the School of Business,University of Western Sydney, HISTORIES OF OPPRESSION AND VOICES OFRESISTANCE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE TRANSLOCAL, REARTIKULACIJA #9,2009, http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=612/)

Management by extraction arises from the endowment curseand is an all too familiar discourse for millions of people in the

Third World living under the oil curse and the minerals curse.Extraction of oil and minerals in many parts of the world isalmost always accompanied by violence, environmentaldestruction, dispossession and death. Transnational oilcompanies, governments, private security forces are all keyactors in these zones of violence and the communities mostaffected by this violence are forced to give up their sovereignty,autonomy and tradition in exchange for modernity andeconomic development which continues to elude them.Shell inNigeria, Chevron in Ecuador, Rio Tinto in Papua, Barrick in

Peru and Argentina, Newmont Mining in Peru, VedantaResources in India and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas,Mexico are but a few of the more well-publicized cases of theendowment curse.The market, state and internationaleconomic and financial institutions are inextricably involved inmanagement by extraction. The Chiapas region of Mexico, forexample, produces 54% of Mexicos hydroelectric energy, 21% ofits oil and 47% of its natural gas, and also contains the countrysmost impoverished people, where 36% of the population do nothave running water and 35% do not have electricity. There are seven hotelbeds for every 1,000 tourists and 0.3 hospital beds for every 1,000 locals. In one of the countrys richest regions in termsof natural resources and a source of wealth for the rest of the country, 71.6% of the Indigenous population in the region

suffers from malnutrition and 14,500 people die every year. Transnational corporationsextract wealth from Chiapas by mining their land, felling theirforests, and selling a tourist experience at the expense of localcommunities who have the misfortune of inhabiting theregion. In 1994, thousands of Chiapians rose up against theMexican government in an armed insurrection and temporarilytook over the regional capital of San Cristobal. The Mexican


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government responded with military action and after severalconflicts offered a conditional pardon to the rebels. Zapatistaleaders responded to the Mexican governments offer ofconditional pardon with the following letter, entitled Who mustask for pardon and who can grant it? Why do we have to be

pardoned? What are we going to be pardoned for? Of not dyingof hunger? Of not being silent in our misery? Of not humblyaccepting our historic role of being the despised and theoutcast? Of having demonstrated to the rest of the country andto the entire world that human dignity still lives, even amongsome of the worlds poorest peoples?The letter ended with the Zapatistas stating thatperhaps it was the government that should ask the Zapatistas for pardon, which they would be happy to consider. The

market was not particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Zapatistas either. In a memo entitledMexico Political Update, the Chase Manhattan Bank, a majorfinancer of the Mexican government concluded that thegovernment will need to eliminate theZapatistas todemonstrate their effective control of the national territory andsecurity policy. Thus, international finance and infrastructureis a key requirement for development to occur inunderdeveloped areas, of which governments mustdemonstrate effective control and security, which meanscertain communities need to be eliminated. This isnecrocapitalism.


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Cuba embargo

Current US policy unjustly treats Cuba like a failed state despite decades of

advancesnew fact-based relationship key to reset relationsRobinson 10(Eugene Robinson, The Washington Post, January 5 2010, Lexis Nexis, Accessed July 18, 2013, JD)

Undernew rulesprompted by the failed Christmas Dayterrorist attack,airline passengers comingto the United States from 14 nations will undergo extrascreening: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syriaand Yemen. For our first quiz of the new decade, which countrydoesn't fit with the others?The obvious answer isCuba,whichpresents a threat of terrorism that can be measured at precisely

zero. Cuba is not a failed state where swaths of territory liebeyond government control; rather, it is one of the most tightly locked-down societies in theworld, a place where the idea of private citizens getting their hands on plastic explosives, or terrorist weapons of any kind,

is simply laughable.There is no history of radical Islam in Cuba. In fact,there is hardly any history of Islam at all. With its long-standing paranoia aboutinternal security and its elaborate network of government spies and snitches, the island nation wouldhave to be among the last places on Earth where al-Qaeda wouldtry to establish a cell, let alone plan and launch an attack. YetCuba is on the list because the State Department still considers it-- along with Iran, Sudan and Syria -- to be a state sponsor of terrorism .Really? Despite thefact that theU.S. Interests Sectionin Havana was one of the few American diplomatic posts in the world to remain openfor normal business, with no apparent increased security, in the days after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks?TheObama administration has made many admirable moves to bring U.S. foreign policy into closer alignment with objective

reality. But progress toward a fact-based relationship with Cuba hasbeen tentative and halting, at best. Obvious steps that could onlyserve U.S. interests-- and, in the process, almost surely make Cuba a more open society -- remainuntaken.

Failed state rhetoric hails back to dichotomous civilized/barbarian identity

constructions that lead to violent interventions

Hobson, 2009(Christopher Hobson, Department of International Politics Aberystwyth Univeristy, The Limits of Liberal-DemocracyPromotion, Alernatives #34, EBSCO, JD)

Coercive democratization emerged as a form of democracy promotion in an international

environment in which nondemocracies have been identified as both behaviorally and

ontologically threatening to liberal democratic states.37 It is hardly a coincidence that the

rogue state classification has emerged in the liberal postCold War order, defined in

contrast to its liberal democratic other. This conceptual coupling of liberal democracies

and rogue regimesasymmetrical counter-concepts in Kosellecks terminologycan be seen as

the latest iteration of the civilized/barbarian pairing.38 The kind of mentality fostered
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through this framework, in which the nondemocratic other is not only different, but inferior

and dangerous, encourages a climate in which coercive democratization becomes more

likely. Consider these alarmist words from Marc Plattner, coeditor of Journal of Democracy and codirector of theInternational Forum for Democratic Studies: Liberal democracy has real and powerful enemies who are bent upon its

destruction. We no longer have the luxury of pretending otherwise. Once again, as was the case during the Cold War, the

imperative of maintaining our security and our way of life requires that we defend and support democracy.39 From this

perspective, the spread of democracy is desired for defensive, as well as more progressive,reasons. This is essentially a reversal of the older Wilsonian doctrine of making the world

safe for democracy, as instead it argues that only in a world of democracies can the United

States be safe.40 If regime change has recently emerged as one possible method of promoting democracy abroad andprotecting it at home, it has been meant as a tactic to be used in specific circumstances. In ascertaining where to possibly

intervene to install democracy, it is important to recognize the role played by a certain reading of the third wave. Recallin g thesnowballing effects of the third wave, it has been proposed that it is not necessary for democracy to be installed in all states,

just pivotal ones, or in Diamonds terminology strategic swing states.41 These will then effectively act as democratic

vanguards, kick-starting regional diffusion processes. This logic was used in the case of Iraq by Bush, Rice, Wolfowitz, andmany neoconservatives. Condoleezza Rice optimistically proposed that Iraq was on a road to democracy, which can be a

linchpin for changing the nature of a very, very troubled region.42

This threat construction is used to justify a failed embargo - strains

international relations and props up regional violenceGoodspeed 09(Peter Goodspeed, National Post, A Cuban evolution; Obamas offer of new beginning winning support of hardenedexiles, April 18 2009, Lexis Nexis, Accessed July 18, 2013, JD)

"The last 50 years of our embargo against Cuba have proven thatunilateral sanctions do not work," said Myron Brilliant, a senior vice-president of the U. S.Chamber of Commerce. "Rather than encouraging Cuba to democratize, theembargo actually helped prop up a Communist regime." "Thepolicy of seeking to isolate Cuba, rather than achieving itsobjective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the

Cuban people and to eroding U. S. influence in Cuba and LatinAmerica," says a recent study of U. S.-Cuban relations by the Washington-based Brookings Institution. "Ithas reinforced the Cuban government's power over its citizensby increasing their dependence on it for every aspect of theirlivelihood," the report says. "By slowing the flow of ideas andinformation, the United States has unwittingly helped Cubanstate security delay Cuba's political and economic evolutiontoward a more open and representative government."Theblockade has also warped public perceptions of U. S. policyoverseas.Last fall,when the United Nations General Assembly heldits 18th annual vote against the U. S. blockade of Cuba, 185countries voted against the U. S. policy, while just three -- the UnitedStates, Israel and Palau in the South Pacific --voted in favour of the embargo.For the timebeing, Cuba remains the only country in the world that is off limitsto the vast majority of Americans. "Cuban-American travel,while humane, still puts the majority of Americans in the oddestpolitical position," says Sarah Stephens, director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas."They're able to visit Tehran, Pyongyang, Khartoum and


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Damascus, without begging for a licence, but unable to visitHavana, even if their presence in Cuba would add informationand vibrancy and contribute to openness as American travelersso often do."


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Nuclear WarTheir war scenarios are a perfect example of the blindness of themodern/colonial epistemeemperically, focus on nuclear warsenabled the massive destruction of indigenous peoplestheir

discourse of nuclear extinction both ignores that histories andauthorizes continued genocideKATO 93[MASAHIDE,Dept. of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, NuclearGlobalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear war via the Strategic Gaze,Alternatives18, 1993, pp. 339-360]the vigorous invasion of the logic of capitalist accumulationinto the last vestige ofrelatively autonomous space in the periphery under late capitalism is propellednot only bythe desire for incorporating every fabric of the society into the division of labor but also

by the desire for "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery." The penetration ofcapital into the social fabric and the destruction of nature and preexisting socialorganizations by capital are not separable. However, what we have witnessed in the phase oflate capitalism is a rapid intensification of the destruction and extermination of theperiphery. In this context, capital is no longer interested in incorporating some parts of the

periphery into the international division of labor. The emergence of such "pure"destruction/extermination of the periphery can be explained, at least partially, by anotherproblematic of late capitalism formulated by Ernest Mandel: the mass production of themeans of destruction." Particularly, the latest phase of capitalism distinguishes itselffrom the earlier phases in its production of the "ultimate" means of

destruction/extermination, i.e., nuclear weapons. Let us recall our earlier discussion aboutthe critical historicalconjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and

became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry.Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historicallycontextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus givendue recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and

Nagasaki,which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whosemeaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry,

the nuclear catastrophe is confined tothe realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the

crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear

testing"since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclearexplosions have occurred on earth.28The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are theUnited States(936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192 times), theUnited Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times).29The primary targets of warfare("testsite" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations ofFourth

World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars againstthe Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic ofKazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times)." Moreover,

although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand thenotion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel

cycle(particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japanand the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and otherIndigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeitundeclared, has been waged against theFourth World, and Indigenous Nations. Thedismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the

"nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have

taken a form of nuclear exterminationin the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus,


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from the perspectives ofthe Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclearcatastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real

catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity.Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand

catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence,

the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped

out from the history and consciousness of the First World community.Such a discursivestrategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclearcatastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth'sNuclear Playground,which extensivelycovers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere ...

were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas ofthe fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. Inpreparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself."

Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkable study of the history of "nuclear testing" inthe Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and thenuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with theproblematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear

warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the

very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of

the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliteratedand hence legitimatized.The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" ofnuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism.

Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the

unshakableauthority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclearcatastrophe happening inthe Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a dailybasis.

Their discourse of potential nuclear explosions continues andobscures ongoing nuclear violence against indigenous nations and theperipheryKATO 93[MASAHIDE,Dept. of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, NuclearGlobalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear war via the Strategic Gaze,Alternatives18, 1993, pp. 339-360]Nuclear war has been enclosed by two seemingly opposite yet complementary regimes

of discourse: nation-state strategic discourse (nuclear deterrence, nuclear

disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and so on) and extra-nation-state (or extra-territorial) discourse (antinuclearism, nuclear criticism, and so on). The epistemology

of the former is entrenched in the "possible" exchange(s) of nuclear warheads among

nation states. The latter, which emerged in reaction to the former, holds the

"possibility of extinction" at the center of its discursive production. In delineating the

notion of "nuclear war," both of these discourses share an intriguing leap: from thebombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the "possible" nuclear explosions in anindefinite-yet-ever-closer-to-the-present future. Thus any nuclear explosions after WorldWar II do not qualify as nuclear war in the cognitive grid of conventional nuclear

discourse.Significantly, most nuclear explosions after World War II took place in thesovereign territories of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. This critical historical facthas been contained in the domain of nuclear testing. Such obliteration of the history ofundeclared nuclear warfare by nuclear discourse does not merely posit the deficiency of the

discourse. Rather,what it does is reveal the late capitalist form ofdomination, whereby an ongoing extermination process ofthe periphery is blocked from constituting itself as ahistorical fact.


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General

The affirmatives depiction of Latin America identifies the US

acting upon a passive country framed around depictions of pooreconomics, drugs, or chaos as its savior. This threatening framesecures a violent relationship between the actorsTaylor 2013 [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales,UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America,http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc.

I want to argue that Latin America is invisible to IR, and that taking the region seriouslyunsettles the discipline in two key ways, especially if we embrace an explicitly Latin American postcolonial perspective.Firstly, it places early colonial and slave experiences at the heart of international relationships. This questions IRsenduring emphasis on state sovereignty and inter-state war by foregrounding what I call inter-polity relationships and

recognising inter-polity struggles. Secondly, reading IR through Latin America from the south-side up gives us a different perspective on theUSA, one which reveals its coloniality in the past, and (moreimportantly) in the present. I argue that the very special relationship between Latin America andthe USA, so often understood as being simply imperialistic, might be thought of as a complex mix in which Latin America

is both different and the same, both other and akin. Recognizing this complexrelationship opens new ways of thinking about the region andinternational relations. It is intriguing that International Relations hardlytalks about Latin America at all be it conventional IR or indeedmore postie or constructivist approaches1. Most coverage of the

1 I have developed these arguments in much greater depth in a draft article submitted to the Review of

International Studies Seeing Latin America: coloniality and the politics of representation in IR. For thediscussant: during that study, I consulted around thirty textbooks focused on a range of topics and aimed

at various levels. Of especial relevance were: John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, (eds.), The

Globalization of World Politics, 4 ed.,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Antony Best, Jussi

Hanhimki, Joseph A. Maiolo and Kirsten E. Schulze,An International History of the Twentieth Century,

(London: Routledge, 2003); Michael E. Brown, (ed.), Grave New World: Security Challenges in the

Twentieth Century,(Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Bruno Bueno de Mesquite,

Principles of International Politics, 2 ed., (Washington: CQ Press, 2000); Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics

since 1945,7 ed.,(London: Longman, 2000); John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History,

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); K.H.Holsti, International Politics: a Framework for Analysis, 7 ed.,

(London: Prentice Hall, 1995); Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States,

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and

Transformations, 8 ed.,(Boston: Bedford St Martins, 2001); William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World

and Beyond: an International History since 1900,5ed.,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard

Mansbach and Kirsten Rafferty, Introduction to Global Politics,(London: Routledge, 2007); Anthony

McGrew and Paul Lewis, Global Politics,(Cambridge: Polity, 1992); Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David

Kinsella, World Politics: the Menu for Choice, 7 ed.,(London: Wadsworth, 2004); Trevor Salmon and Mark

Imber, (eds.), Issues in International Relations, 2 ed., (London: Routledge, 2008); Jan Aart Scholte,

Globalization: a Critical Introduction,(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000); Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim

Dunne, Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Sutch and

Juanita Elias, International Relations: The Basics,(London: Routledge, 2007); Paul R. Viotti and Mark V,

Kauppi, IR and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 2 ed., (London: Prentice Hall, 2001); Odd Arne
http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.dochttp://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.dochttp://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.dochttp://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc


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region is about the United States doing something to or in LatinAmerica and such activities are framed either as a legitimatesecurity concerns, or as reflecting a barely concealedimperialism. The contextual or historical work focuses on US interventions (such as Chile, Guatemala orNicaragua) and Latin America is deployed in cautionary tales about issues such as economic instability, politicalcorruption, violent societies and the drugs trade. Latin Americans also become international actors if they are migrants,

but only if they attempt to set foot on US soil. These issues are mostly dealt with as being US foreign policy concerns andthe impact on Latin Americans themselves is seldom considered. This emphasis on US actions and its foreign policyanxieties is on one level very understandable, given the prominence of the USA in global politics and its unerringassumption that it holds the position as regional leader. It is also perhaps explained by the dominance of US scholarship inIR more generally, and of US scholarship about Latin America in particular this is their intellectual backyard as much as

their geopolitical one2. Especially for conventional approaches to IR, Latin Americas importancelies in its position on the Whitehouse or CIA agenda and as such,it is mostly seen as a place of threat (or pity), as a caricature ofbarbaric danger, characterised by violence, terror, economicchaos, and drugs. In this way, Latin America is portrayed as a passiverecipient of US actions, or if it is an agent, it is a dangerous one.The region is unnervingly dangerous because its threats are

under-hand and not inter-state wars - one of the curiouscharacteristics of the region is that remarkably few inter-statewars have taken place over the last 200 years. This renders Latin Americainvisible as an agent (because making wars or peace is a key-sign of agency for IR) yet visible as a shadowy, menacing

presence. The region is therefore a place to be known about becauseit was feared, not as a place to warrant investigation on its ownterms, a source of policy solutions or where significant anddifferent knowledge might be generated. It seems that bad

Westad, Global Cold War,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brian White, Richard Little and

Michael Smith, (eds.), Issues in World Politics, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); John Young and John Kent,

International Relations since 1945: a Global History,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). I also made acloser reading of the following more critical texts: J. Marsall Beier, International Relations in Uncommon

Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory,(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005);

Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair, Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race and

Gender,(London: Routledge, 2004); Roxanne Doty, Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in

North-South Relations,(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Jenny Edkins and Maya

Zehfuss, Global Politics,(London: Routledge, 2009; Jim George Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Re-

Introduction to International Relations,(Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1994); Naeem Inayatullah and David L.

Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference,(London: Routledge, 2003); Gilbert M.

Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand and Ricardo D. Salvatore, (eds.), Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the

Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations,(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Sankaran Krishna,

Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century,(Lanham:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); L.M.H. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire

between Asia and the West,(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Karena Shaw, Indigeneity and Political Theory:

Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political, (London: Routledge, 2008); David Slater, Geopolitics and the

Post-colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations,(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Cynthia Weber,International

Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, 3 ed,. (London: Routledge, 2009).2Arlene Tickner, Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies, International Studies

Perspectives, vol.4, no.4, (2003) pp.325-50. Her large research project confirms the dominance of

Western IR: Arlene B. Tickner, Latin America: Still policy dependent after all these years?, in Arlene B.

Tickner and Ole Waever, (eds), International Relations Scholarship Around the World,(London: Routledge,

2009).


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economics, corruption and demagoguery is what IRor at least theconventional sort is pre-programmed to take notice of.This makes it impossible for IRto see Latin America, which in turn undermines its claim to make sense of the world.


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Economic Engagement

Economic engagement has empirically been the tool for

American imperialism. The US opens new markets toproduce a specific form of knowledge to reshape theidentities of others to legitimize US colonialismDomosh 6 [Mona, Joan p. and edward j. Foley, jr department chair, professor of geography at Dartmouth,Ph.D., Clark University, American Commodities in an Age of Empire, Taylor & Francis]

Most metanarratives of American expansionism point to the1898 Spanish-American War as a critical starting point to the rallyingcries of Teddy Roosevelt up San Juan Hill and the acquisition or annexation of the Philippines, Puerto

Rico, Guam, and Hawaii.1Yet long before military men and machines hadreached the shores of other nations, American products notAmerican guns were busy subduing and civilizing thenatives.Since the mid-19thcentury, the United States had been engaged in

what has been called informal imperialism, defined by Mark Crinson as aform of imperialismby which control was established throughostensibly peaceful means of free trade and economicintegration.2 The ideological configuration of this era ofimperialism informed both Americasmilitary interventions ofthe late 19th century and its later economic and culturaldominance over large portions of the world . Central tothis configuration was thebelief that American economic expansionbeyond its national borders was different from, and better than, the militaryand political maneuvers of imperial Europe. In other words, American commercial expansion was, as the opening quoteof this chapter suggests, a great work of peace, a noble cause. Today, most people would have difficulty taking thesentimentsbehind this idea seriously. Judging leadership in the world by thesuccessful development of the great worksof peace would require attention to international aid agencies, health care initiatives, or thenumber of political andcultural ambassadors. In 1875, however, avery different meaning was at hand: great works of peace referred tomachines and other industrial commodities, not medical breakthroughs or international governing bodies. This quotewas takenfrom a book published in anticipation of Americas Centennial Exhibition,held in Philadelphia in 1876. Whatwas on display there werethe products of industrial development machines and the commoditiesthey made. How andwhy these things were represented asworks of peace by companies that sold them overseas, and in whatways thisdiscursive fashioning of commodities as gifts constitutedand reshaped Americans understanding of other peoples and

cultures, is the subject of this book. What I examine here are the ways in which Americas firstinternational companies positioned their actions sellingcommodities overseas to increase revenues as part of thecivilizing process (thatis, as a way of sharing the benefits of industrial development withothers) andhow, in turn, this positioning created different meanings of andknowledges about other peoples, nations, cultures, andplaces. Ifocus on the cultures of business, using businessmen andwomen (man

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